Editorial

Human evolution and the

nature of morality

Theology Today
2015, Vol. 72(2) 135140
! The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0040573615581548
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Kenneth A. Reynhout
This past November a symposium was held in honor of J. Wentzel van Huyssteen,
who recently retired after 23 years as the James I. McCord Professor of Theology
and Science at Princeton Theological Seminary. It was my privilege to organize this
event, titled Evolutionary Science and Theological Identity, a suitable tribute to
my former advisor and continuing mentor and friend.1 The symposium featured
papers from ve respected, international scholars of theology and science, which,
along with a formal response from van Huyssteen, have been reproduced here for
this special issue of Theology Today.
Interdisciplinary theology has been the persistent theme of van Huyssteens
research, specically related to the challenges and opportunities posed by science
and the philosophy of science. Over the years his work has ranged across a wide
terrain of topics, including theological method, philosophical theology, and theological anthropology. In each case, he has explored the multifaceted relationship
between religious faith and scientic culture.2 More recently, he has concentrated
attention on palaeoanthropology and the particular matter of how Darwinian evolution might inform theological anthropology on the question of what it means to be
human. This was the theme of his celebrated Giord lectures, and the symposium
lectures collected here lend testimony to the importance and enduring impact of van
Huyssteens contributions to this important area of research.3
This is all widely acknowledged, but what may be less well known to the casual
observer is just how dicult this research program actually is, contributing even
more grandeur to van Huyssteens accomplishments.4 Engaging the facts of human
evolution from a theological perspective is an incredibly challenging task, at least if
1. I am grateful to both Princeton Theological Seminary and the John Templeton Foundation for
generously supporting this event.
2. For a short overview of van Huyssteens work, see my essay: Kenneth A. Reynhout, The
Evolution of van Huyssteens Model of Rationality, in The Evolution of Rationality:
Interdisciplinary Essays in Honor of J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ed. F. LeRon Shults (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). See also the essay by Niels Gregersen in this volume.
3. Published as J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and
Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006).
4. The allusion to Darwins famous last line of the Origin is intentional. Not only the idea of evolution
by natural selection, but also the person of Charles Darwin and his other groundbreaking ideas
have been hugely influential on van Huyssteens work.

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one is doing it responsibly by making progress in solving problems.5 Such an

undertaking is profoundly multidimensional, with scientic, philosophical, and
theological components. This complexity is apparent, for example, when one considers the possible theological implications of the deep evolutionary roots of human
morality and ethics, one of van Huyssteens current concerns. Surveying some of
the dimensions of this problem will help set the stage for the essays that follow.
The complexity of the problem starts with the science itself. There is no single
science of human evolution, but rather a mosaic of scientic disciplines that
together paint an overall picture of human origins. Hence the scientic study of
human evolution is already deeply interdisciplinary, involving both natural and
social scientic disciplines in a creative interplay of discovery, integration, and
adjustment. The sciences of paleontology, anatomy, physiology, genetics, neuroscience, psychology, primatology, geology, archeology, and anthropology all contribute to our understanding of the human species in an evolutionary framework.
Mastering the diverse range of scientic theory and evidence behind human evolution is challenging, even for scientists.6
Another complicating factor is the state of the evidence. Foundational to the
entire endeavor is the recovery of material remains, including fossilized bones and
hard tissues, trace fossils of things like footprints and feces, and artifacts such as
re pits, tools, and weapons. The fossil record is actually quite sparse, at least
relative to many other ancient species; yet, many morphological and behavioral
characteristics can be inferred even from fragmentary skeletons.7 The shape of a
single tooth, jawbone, cranial piece, pelvis, nger joint, and so forth can often tell
quite a bit about posture, gait, grip, diet, brain size, and other things, especially
when compared with contemporary humans and other great apes. But there is still
no getting around the fact that scientists are working with partial information.8
Nevertheless, this incomplete picture is being lled in as paleontologists are now
nding hominin fossils at a record pace. This is a boon for the sciences of human
evolution, but it also means that the science can change rapidly. For example,
newer fossil discoveries along with genome mapping have modied the long-standing single branch theory of development, which held that all the fossils could be
5. The task of progressive problem solving is a hallmark of van Huyssteens theological method. See J.
Wentzel van Huyssteen, Theology and the Justification of Faith: Constructing Theories in Systematic
Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 172ff.
6. For an accessible introduction to the science behind human evolution and the history of discovery,
see Ian Tattersall, Masters of the Planet: The Search for Our Human Origins (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012).
7. Fossilizing bones requires quite specific circumstances that do not obtain at the same rate for every
individual species, and land mammals with relatively small populations (like early hominids) rarely
got fossilized (carnivores, scavengers, insects, and bacteria usually decompose an organism before it
gets covered). To complicate matters, even when fossilization occurs many of the bones we are most
interested in (craniums, hands, feet, etc.) are some of the most fragile and so are easily damaged by
erosion and other forces.
8. For a succinct overview of how hominin fossils are formed, found, and analyzed, see Bernard
Wood, Human Evolution: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University, 2005), 2457.

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lined up single-le to connect modern humans with their last common ancestor
shared with chimpanzees (67 million years ago). Instead, it is now clear that there
were multiple branches and that several early hominid species likely lived at the
same time and even interbred. It has been found that we share some DNA with
Neanderthals, for instance.9 Discoveries such as this can make science of human
evolution very exciting to follow, but the rapidly changing theoretical landscape
can also be overwhelming for the interdisciplinary non-specialist.
The situation gets even more complex when we start asking questions about
something like the evolution of morality. Brains do not fossilize, and even if they
did it is hard to know how much we could condently infer from that.10 The
nuance of human belief and behavior is dicult to untangle in the best of circumstances, and tracing backwards in time to nd their roots is even more challenging.
Results from primatology, social neuroscience, and psychology point to the inevitable conclusion that aspects of moral cognition are based in the biology of the
brain, and, therefore, must have been shaped by evolutionary forces in our distant
past. However, reconstructing this history is quite a challenge, and experts disagree
on the relative inuence of various factors (competition, cooperation, sexuality,
etc.), the order and priority of particular behavioral and cognitive capacities
(empathy, altruism, theory of mind, etc.), and where (if at all) to draw the line
between biological and sociocultural forces.11
The danger of anthropocentric projection looms large over such an enterprise.
This may seem odd, since we are talking about human origins, but we still run the
risk of inappropriately forcing our current perceptions and values onto the evolutionary process. For example, there is a widespread assumption that the development of empathy was an important evolutionary milestone, and although this may
be a good assumption, it is an assumption nonetheless.12 Interrogating assumptions
inevitably brings us into proximity with philosophy. Classic questions in moral
philosophy include: What are good and evil, and where do they come from? Are
they transcendentals, having some sort of independent existence, or are they merely
emergent properties of human experience? Either way, what is it about the human
condition that makes us moral creatures? Are there one or more essential qualities
or attributes that form the sine qua non of moral existence? If so, what is it, or what
9. For a short, recent discussion of these and other groundbreaking advances, see Bernard Wood,
Welcome to the Family, Scientific American 311:3 (2014): 4347.
10. Undoubtedly, some conclusions could be drawn based on what we know about certain brain
regions in modern humans, but those conclusions would be tentative since we do not know exactly
whether structure and function evolved together or separately.
11. Theorists include Donald M. Broom, The Evolution of Morality and Religion (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (Cambridge, MA;
MIT, 2007); Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Roots of Morality (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University, 2008).
12. In his Gifford lectures, van Huyssteen showed his own sensitivity to the danger of projection when
he carefully avoided characterizing early cave paintings as art in a modern aesthetic sense. Van
Huyssteen, Alone in the World?, 175.

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are they? Is morality fundamentally constituted by some kind of reason, emotion,

or some other form of social awareness? In sum, if we are going to look for the deep
origins of our moral sense, it is important for us to know what kind of sense we
are actually talking about.
Other important questions that cut across the sciencephilosophy boundary
include whether or not evolution can, in principle, account for everything we
associate with morality. Is evolution only responsible for a general moral sense
of right and wrong, or can it also explain notions of responsibility and accountability? Evolution might be able to explain the human propensity for developing
moral norms and making normative judgments, but can it also explain what
gives particular norms their normative power, their binding force?13 This is
related to the question of reductionism. When it comes to cognition, can evolution reductively explain the whole package, from general capacities to specic
beliefs and everything in between?14 Finally, there is the issue of free will, a very
old problem in philosophy but one that is now being asked anew in relation to
cognitive science. Practical ethics and moral subjectivity seems to require
authentic freedom beyond nature, but what if freedom is an illusion? Or,
does evolution potentially present us with an opportunity to rethink the meaning of both freedom and nature? These are all puzzling yet important philosophical questions, and their presence only magnies the challenge of the
interdisciplinary theological task.
Moving to theology proper, human evolution presents a challenge to all three
primary loci of theological anthropology: human nature, the image of God, and
sin. Here I will focus on the doctrine of sin, since that is most directly connected to the evolution of morality. Very little of the traditional, Augustinian
account of original sin is untouched by the apparent facts of human origins.15
The most immediate and obvious issues have to do with rst humans and a
rst sin. The arrival of modern humans, Homo sapiens sapiens, was a relatively recent event by terrestrial standards, but it certainly happened much further back than the biblical genealogies suggest. Anatomically modern humans
(hominids with skeletal structures that can be matched with at least some

13. Paul Ricoeur is one philosopher who argues that evolution cannot fully account for all aspects of
moral normativity. Jean-Pierre Changeux and Paul Ricoeur, What Makes Us Think? A
Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain, trans. M. B.
DeBevoise (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2002), 23956.
14. One scientist who resists such reductionism is Agust n Fuentes, who has contributed an essay in
this volume. See also Agust n Fuentes, Evolution of Human Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University,
2009).
15. There are, in fact, many problems with the original version of original sin. It is not supported
exegetically, it did not solve the problem of evil, the idea of inherited guilt is suspect, and sin
should not be directly tied to the sexual act. Tyron Inbody, The Faith of the Christian Church: An
Introduction to Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 17374. Cf. John E. Toews, The Story
of Original Sin (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013).

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contemporary people) appeared roughly 200,000 years ago, but to call these
people the rst humans is potentially misleading.16 The ability to manipulate
symbolic material a necessary precursor to language and abstract thought
happened closer to 100,000 years ago, so many of the things we normally
associate with being human, including our moral sense, undoubtedly matured
much later than the arrival of our anatomic species.17 Moreover, population
genetic analysis strongly argues against the idea that there were two original
humans, but instead supports the claim that we began as a sizable population
numbering in the thousands.18 It is dicult to see how the idea of an original
sin committed by an original, representative human can be made to work in
such a scenario, although some have tried.19
Potentially more troubling (although this aspect of the problem has not
received as much discussion) is the way in which evolution suggests that in
some way our moral propensities have emerged from a natural process. As
we saw earlier, this is by no means well understood, at least not yet. We
must nevertheless begin facing the real challenge that some parts of our sinful
natures are indeed natural and not (or at least not merely) some postlapsarian corruption. Conversely, nature may have also graced us with good graces.
It seems that evolution has conditioned us for both antisocial and prosocial
tendencies, which terribly muddies traditional theological distinctions between
nature and grace.20 Put more simply and bluntly, if human sin is the direct
result of a natural process, then what are we being held accountable for? Why
the need for salvation? For atonement? For a cross? What is the gospel, the
good news, for the human species? This is, I think, an important question for
any Christian theologian seriously to ponder.
By outlining these very real challenges, I do not intend to be discouraging.
I am actually optimistic about the future of the gospel message, but I
also recognize that any viable future must be forged in conversation with a
scientic culture. In my own work, I characterize this interdisciplinary task in
hermeneutical terms, as a diverse set of interpretive practices aimed at

16. Richard Potts and Christopher Sloan, What Does It Mean to be Human? (Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institute, 2010), 42.
17. Ian Tattersall, If I Had a Hammer, Scientific American 311:3 (Sep. 2014): 5559.
18. See. e.g., Brian P. McEvoy, Joseph E. Powell, Michael E. Goddard, and Peter M. Visscher,
Human Population Dispersal Out of Africa Estimated from Linkage Disequilibrium and
Allele Frequencies of SNPs, Genome Research 21:6 (2011): 82129.
19. See, e.g., Raymund Schwager, Banished from Eden: Original Sin and Evolutionary Theory in the
Drama of Salvation (Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2006).
20. This is a long standing issue that can be traced back to Augustines debate with Pelagius. For a
short introduction, see Hans Schwarz, The Human Being: A Theological Anthropology (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 177215.

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borrowing meaning across disciplinary boundaries.21 There is perhaps no better

example of this than the complicated theological dialogue with the sciences of
human evolution, where interpretations occur on multiple levels both within the
sciences and beyond to philosophy and theology.22 This is partly what impresses
me so much about J. Wentzel van Huyssteens work. He has taken on a monumentally challenging and hermeneutically complicated task, but nevertheless
continues to responsibly weave together science, philosophy, and theology
with sensitivity and sophistication. His talents for integration have had a profound inuence on my own work and on the work of many others, as evidenced
by the exemplary set of papers collected for this volume. They were all written
in recognition of van Huyssteens many contributions to the eld of theology
and science, and although they are not all directly about his work they all bear
his mark to one degree or another.

Author biography
Kenneth A. Reynhout is Assistant Professor of Theology at Bethel Seminary in St.
Paul, Minnesota. A graduate of Princeton Theological Seminary, Reynhout specializes in the interdisciplinary intersection of theology, philosophy, and the sciences. He is the author of Interdisciplinary Interpretation: Paul Ricoeur and the
Hermeneutics of Theology and Science (Lexington, 2013).

21. Kenneth A. Reynhout, Interdisciplinary Interpretation: Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of
Theology and Science (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2013). My succinct description of this task is
faith seeking understanding through explanation.
22. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone argues that hermeneutics is an integral part of evolutionary science,
especially in the field of paleoanthropology. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Roots of Thinking
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 915.

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