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LANDINGIN vs.

REPUBLIC
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed
a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel
Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her
petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, remarried there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no
longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors
were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and
gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for
the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was
consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness
and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence
to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written
consent of the adoptees biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of
the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the
adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent
to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his
parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial
and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to
remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
In re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim

FACTS:
FACTS:
Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently,
two minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of
their own, Monina and Primo registered the children to make it appear
that they were the childrens parents. The children were named
Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared
for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo
died. On 27 December 2000, Monina married Angel Olario, an
American citizen.
Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In
2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and 7 months old. Michelle and her
husband, Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption as
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing
the petitions. The trial court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she
should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.
Monina appealed contending that the rule on joint adoption must be
relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the
paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner
argued that the legal maxim dura lex sed lex is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argued that joint parental authority is not
necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was
already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary
since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
2. Whether the adoption should be granted considering that the alien
spouse consented to the adoption
3. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary
since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of
majority.

HELD:
1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in
the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not
present in the case at bar. (Section 7, Article III of RA 8552)
The use of the word shall means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it
is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses. Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the
children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
2. No. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown
in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as:
(1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the
adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his
own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters
country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were
shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.
The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of

consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the


adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
3. Petitioners contention is untenable. Parental authority includes
caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.
Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that
is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age
emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all
acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a
legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled
to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits
to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights. (In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and
Michael Lim, GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009)
Castro vs. Gregorio
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner).
Unfortunately, they separated later on due to their incompatibilities
and Joses alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two
daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from
birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima
Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed)
and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose
Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosarios housekeeper). After a Home
Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the
petition was granted.

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She


alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support to his daughter
Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly raised and
provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering
gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent
of adopting Larrys two children, Jed and Regina, without her and
Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that
he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always
offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children thats why he adopted them.
Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking
to annul the decision of the TC approving Jed and Reginas adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosarios consent was not obtained and the
document purporting as Rosarios affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P
also allege that Jed and Reginas birth certificates shows disparity. One
set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO
certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and
Regina are not actually Joses illegitimate children but the legitimate
children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their
birth. CA denied the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne
of the adoption, it ruled that there is no explicit provision in the rules
that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be
personally notified of the hearing.
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the
different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the
identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the
scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could
not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for
annulment of judgment.
Issues: Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10
years or over of the adopter is required?
Decision:
RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of
wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of
his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption.
The law, however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule,
as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children
born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or
her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose
and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation.
For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first
signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopters children if
they are 10 years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
Republic v. Hernandez
FACTS:
RTC is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein
for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to
complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired
consequent to his adoption. This is because when the spouses Munson
filed the petition, they also prayed for the change of name of the kid to
Aaron Joseph as it was the name he was baptized with in keeping with
religious tradition. Change of name was opposed by the republic
arguing that it should be conducted in a separate proceeding. But as
previously stated, RTC granted the petition including the change of
name, despite this opposition. No challenge on the fitness of the
spouses to adopt or on the validity of decree of adoption. Just the
change of name.
ISSUE: WAS THE CHANGE OF THE PROPER NAME (FIRST NAME)
CORRECT?
HELD: No. The change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the
adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to
or include the proper or given name. It must be brought under Rule
103.
A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to
the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider
carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same
unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized

to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which
appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he
must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason
which may justify such change.
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being
sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or
adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name
and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on
a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody, and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one
was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and
which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal
names is not sanctioned. Baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a
change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been
using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper
and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. A name
given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is
known in the community when at variance with that entered in the
civil register is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been
struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the
adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name
registered in the civil register, would be to countenance or permit that
which has always been frowned upon.
Once such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such
choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the
same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the
identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for the
most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its
change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an
adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a
consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and
moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be

favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the


adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter
does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name.
Sayson v. CA, 01/23/92
FACTS:
A and B had 5 children: C, D, E, F, and G. G was married to H, and they
allegedly had 3 children: X, Y and Z; X and Y are allegedly adopted kids
while Z is a legitimate child by blood. Upon the death of G and H, the
siblings of G C, D, E, and F filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of G and H. In retaliation, X, Y and Z
filed a complaint for accounting and partition of the intestate estate of
A and B. X, Y and Z asserted that since X and Y are adopted children of
G and Z is Gs legitimate child, they were entitled to Gs share in his
parents estate by right of representation.
The validity of the adoption of X and Y was raised in the second case,
as it was contended that at the time X and Y were adopted, Z had
already been born. Thus under the Civil Code, G and H could not have
validly adopted X and Y. Another issue was raised with respect to the
right of X and Y to represent G.
HELD:
1. The validity of an adoption cannot be attacked collaterally but can
only be
done in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
2. X and Y cannot exercise the right of representation.
Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
other descendants, w/o distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
should come from different marriages. Adopted children succeed to the
property in the same manner as a legitimate child (Art. 979 CC). The
philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first
to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed
that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a
provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
The right of representation (Arts. 970, 971, 981 CC), however, does not
extend to adopted children, to whom the grandparents were total
strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do
not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the

adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child
and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
Lahom vs. Sibulo
FACTS:
Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom took care of
Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and brought him up as their own.
In 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On May 5,
1972, an order granting the petition was issued The Civil Registrar of
Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin
Lahom. On March 22, 1998, RA 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act
went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
On December 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the RTC of Naga City, averring that despite
the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to
change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to her frustration, that
respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see
her once a year and that she has suffered wounded feelings, knowing
that respondents only motive in his adoption is his expectancy of his
alleged rights over her and her husbands properties, as shown by his
filing an action for partition against her. The trial court dismissed the
action because of lack of cause of action and prescription, the petition
having been filed after more than 5 years since knowledge of the legal
grounds for rescission.
ISSUES:
1. WON the adoption may be rescinded after the effectivity of RA 8552
2. WON the adopters action has prescribed
HELD:
1. The adoption may no longer be rescinded. In Republic v. CA and
Republic v. Miller, the Court has held that the controversy (re adoption)
should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA
8552 that petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and
repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
2. The adopters action has prescribed. Even before the passage of the
statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear
bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter

would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of
that period.
3. An adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption,
can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child
his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Bartolome vs. SSS
FACTS:
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc. He was enrolled under the governments Employees
Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on
board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer
considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted
by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as Johns
primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
According to the records, Cornelio died during Johns minority.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptees minority
results to the restoration of the parental authority to the biological
parents of the latter.
Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
The Court ruled that Johns minority at the time of his
adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in
favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there
are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration


of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption
wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptees biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopters parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of
vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee,
while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is
still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents
retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the
subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS
covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child,
the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals
the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption
vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same
way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise
of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their
minor offsprings adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that Cornelios adoption of John, without
more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from Johns death as a dependent parent given Cornelios
untimely demise during Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees
Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, Johns
sole remaining beneficiary.