Environment and Planning A 2004, volume 36, pages 2163 ^ 2181

DOI:10.1068/a3622

`Te para todos'? A comparison of the processes of devolution

in Spain and the UK
Benito Giordano

Honorary Research Fellow, School of Geography, University of Manchester, Oxford Road,

Manchester M13 9PL, England; e-mail: benito Giordano@yahoo.it

Elisa Roller

Honorary Research Fellow, Department of Government, University of Manchester, Dover Street,

Manchester M13 9PL, England; e-mail: elisa roller@hotmail.com
Received 20 January 2003; in revised form 18 June 2004

Abstract. This paper focuses upon a comparison of the experiences of regionalisation in Spain and the
United Kingdom. Spain's process of devolution, initiated in the late 1980s, has led to an asymmetrical
structure of devolution with certain regions, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, acquiring
more autonomy than others. However, the slogan `cafe para todos' (coffee for everyone) has in recent
years been employed by Catalan and other nationalists to argue that the State of Autonomies has not
respected the special status of Spain's historic communities and has diluted their claims for greater
levels of self-government. It is precisely such a model of asymmetrical autonomy that has been
adopted in the United Kingdom since 1997, the implications of which remain to be seen. As this
paper explores, however, there are already signs emerging that the United Kingdom is following a
similar trajectory to that in Spain, which is why the comparisons are particularly important and
timely. Indeed, the authors argue that adopting a model of asymmetrical autonomy can lead, even
at an early stage, to the emergence of regional identities in regions with no previous manifestations
of regional consciousness, the rise in territorial tension after devolution, and the backlash by the
historic regions against a `one size fits all' or uniform approach towards devolution.

1 Introduction
Devolution in the United Kingdom is clearly an ongoing process, which is why it is vital
to compare the experiences of other European countries that share longer histories
of devolution and can offer potentially important insights for the future trajectories of
change in the UK. Thus far, however, the debate on devolution in the UK has been rather
parochial and little attention has been paid to the experiences of decentralisation elsewhere (Mitchell, 2002). This paper, however, bucks that trend because it focuses directly
upon the situation in Spain. The Spanish case can offer important lessons for the UK
because of its relatively recent history of devolution (since 1978) and extensive decentralisation. In particular, the so-called `historic communities' of Catalonia, the Basque
Country, Galicia, and Andaluc| a(1) were granted more autonomy than the other Spanish
regions in what is commonly referred to as a model of `asymmetrical federalism'
(Moreno, 2001).
It is precisely such a model of asymmetrical autonomy that has been adopted in the
UK since 1997, with the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and Northern
Irish Assemblies that have been granted a greater degree of autonomy compared with the
English regions, which following the publication of the White Paper in May 2002 have
the possibility to opt for elected regional assemblies (Cabinet Office and DTLR, 2002).
Clearly, the implications of this asymmetry remain unclear, especially for England, which
is why comparisons with the Spanish case are particularly important and timely.
(1)

The Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia (and later Andaluc| a) were designated `historic'
communities because of their distinctive historical, cultural, and linguistic characteristics supported
by a deep sense of national identity.

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B Giordano, E Roller

In recent years, two trends stand out from the ongoing debates about devolution in
Spain. On the one hand, there has been a ratcheting up of demands from regions that
do not have the same powers as, say, Catalonia or the Basque Country. Conversely,
there is an increasing resistance from the historic communities of Spain, who want to
protect as well as reinforce their powers of autonomy, in light of what are seen as
attempts by the central government to move towards a standardising of devolution
arrangements, or what the nationalists term `cafe para todos' (or `coffee for everyone',
that is, the same arrangements for everyone). In the UK, as this paper explores, there
are emerging signs that devolution, although at a much earlier stage, is following a
broadly similar pattern to that in Spain. For example, there are already clear signs in
England that regionalism is developing beyond its largely institutional ^ structural
roots, (partly) in response to the perceived imbalances in the asymmetrical devolution
settlement thus far. Furthermore, following the White Paper in England, it seems that
there is a belated recognition on the part of central government that the `English
question' needs to be addressed, and therefore a trend towards what, following the
Spanish example, could be termed the granting of `Te para todos' or `tea for everyone'.
The implications of this remain to be seen, but it is possible that the response from
Scotland and Wales, in line with the historic communities of Spain, may well move
towards protecting as well as enhancing existing powers of autonomy.
Although much could be written comparing the UK and Spanish cases, we limit
the scope of this paper to a series of variables common to both, including the
emergence of regional identities in regions with no previous manifestations of regional
consciousness, the rise in territorial tension after devolution, and the backlash by the
historic regions against a `one size fits all' or uniform approach towards devolution. We
argue that the move towards asymmetrical devolution has a series of unintended
consequences, such as the rise of interregional political and economic rivalry. Prior
to a discussion of the Spanish and UK cases, however, in the next section we explore
some of the conceptual issues related to comparing trajectories of devolution within
the European Union (EU).
2 The dynamics of devolution in the EU
Much has been written on the changing structure and composition of the nation-state
which, it is argued, is evolving because of a dual set of forces. The first, emanating from
above, at the supranational level, involves exposure to the globalisation of the economy,
communications revolution, increased economic interdependence, socialisation flowing
from membership within transnational systems, and the process of European integration (Keating, 1998). The second, emanating from below, at the subnational level,
involves changes occurring from increasing tendencies towards regionalisation and in
some cases resulting from successful nationalist movements (Hooghe and Marks, 2001;
Keating and Hooghe, 1995; Lynch, 1996). These forces arguably have resulted in two
complementary evolutionary processes that have transformed the traditional definitions
and functions of the nation-state. They have also led to new actors and institutions
playing influential roles within a changing political structure characterised by the
constant interplay and increasing interdependence among and between the subnational,
the national, and the supranational levels of governance (Brenner, 1999).
From the late 1980s onwards, `Europe of the regions' became the fashionable
slogan to describe the (re)emergence of the `region' within the changing structures
of EU governance. More recently, however, the enthusiasm that surrounded the
`Europe of the regions', certainly in academic circles, has waned somewhat. Instead,
reference is made to the `Europe with the regions' to describe the ways in which regions
have an increasingly important role to play in the functioning of EU governance

Processes of devolution in Spain and the UK

2165

(Hooghe and Marks, 2001). This is partly to do with the recognition that the nation-state
is clearly not disappearing or that there is a uniform process of subnational institutional
building going on within every member state of the EU (Jones and Keating, 1995).
The scenario is very much territorially contingentfor example, in federal states,
such as Belgium or Germany, subnational authorities have much more power. In
addition, on the one hand, in member states such as the UK the regional tier is very
much a nascent institutional form. On the other hand, Spain could be described as a
`regional state' with a significant degree of autonomy for subnational authorities
complemented by a strong central state. The key issue in policy terms is that the
development and recognition of the regional tier vary so greatly across (and within)
different EU member states which makes it impossible to refer to a particular form of
regional governance that is common throughout the EU (Jones and Keating, 1995).
Nevertheless, the issue of greater autonomy and restructuring of existing state
structures is firmly on the mainstream national political agendas in a number of EU
member states (Giordano, 2001; Giordano and Roller, 2001). This then begs the
question as to what are the common, underlying processes that are driving such
demands for greater devolution across the EU.
The first process relates to globalisation and its impacts upon the contours of
contemporary capitalism, which arguably have propelled regions to the fore as the
most competitive elements in the current global economic order (Porter, 1990). In
particular, the literature points to a limited number of acknowledged `regional' economic success stories, such as the Third Italy or Silicon Valley, which are heralded as
examples of this shift, stressing that regional economic competitiveness is strictly
connected to an array of noneconomic variables, particularly the mobilisation of local
resources and potentials (Storper, 1997). In this context, where regions are arguably
becoming the fulcrums of competitiveness and continued economic divergence between
rich and poor is almost guaranteed, national governments have been compelled to try
to promote and orchestrate development from below through devolving power and
responsibility for economic development precisely to the regional scale. The conventional (although much contested) wisdom is that the scope forand certainly the
political acceptability ofeffective intervention by nation-states in economic matters
had diminished, and that many of the areas that had experienced the most profound
transformation in their economic circumstances were precisely those endowed with
well-developed networks of regionally based institutions (Harding and Evans, 1997;
Harding et al, 1999; Tomaney and Ward, 2000). In other words, put simply, the common
assumption is that greater regional autonomy has positive impacts upon economic wellbeing; however, as will be discussed later in this paper, this is a somewhat bold claim.
The second factor driving the process of devolution relates to the political and
institutional dimension within the EU. Increasingly, it is argued that the processes of
European integration have provided subnational authorities with a new set of opportunities in what is commonly referred to as the rise of multilevel governance (MLG) in the
EU (Hooghe, 1995; Jeffrey, 2000). According to the MLG thesis, subnational authorities
are becoming progressively more empowered in what is a shifting mosaic of governance
interactions within the EU; nation-states are still pivotal but simultaneously they are
ceding power both upwards to the European scale as well as downwards to the subnational
scale. The emerging scenario, therefore, is one in which regions can have direct links
with the European Commission, effectively bypassing national governments, and bringing them closer to policymaking and decisions about resource allocation (Giordano and
Roller, 2002; Keating and Hooghe, 1995).
Furthermore, this process is reinforced by the ongoing integration of the EU (Keating,
1998). Institutional innovations, such as the creation of the Committee of the Regions

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B Giordano, E Roller

(COR), the Conference of the Regions with Legislative Powers, the Assembly of European
Regions, and other transnational networks, as well as the European Commission's
insistence that regions actively draw up their own development strategies, have helped,
at least symbolically, to enhance further the importance of regions within the EU. At the
party level, the COR has provided a `voice' at the EU level for certain regionalist political
parties. Moreover, political opportunities derive from elections to the European Parliament
which have provided an arena for democratic support and recognition. Such developments
have arguably helped to reinvigorate regionalist parties' political claims.
Only focusing, however, upon regions as simply another scale within the reshaping
and restructuring of the European mosaic of governance, does not allow us to understand the complete picture. Additionally, it is important to consider another dimension
to the political drivers behind devolution which relates to the role that regionalist
political parties have played, and continue to play within the EU, in terms of putting
the issue of greater regional autonomy onto the mainstream political agenda (Giordano,
2001; Keating, 1998). Employing widely differing strategies, the leaders of the Scottish
National Party, Italy's Northern League (Lega Nord), and Catalonia's Convergencia
i Unio, to name but a few, have carried forward the demands for greater autonomy
in their respective regions but also at the national as well as the supranational level.
Names such as Jordi Puyol and Umberto Bossi are synonymous with their regions'
respective struggles for greater autonomy, albeit for different reasons. Moreover, at the
same time, these leaders have been able to benefit from, and indeed exploit, as well as
further direct the changes that are taking place.
The third factor that is helping to drive the process of devolution within the EU
relates to what could be termed the sociocultural dimension. It is apparent that, partly
as a backlash against the homogenising cultural tendencies of globalisation, there is a
process of reassessment and reevaluation of traditional languages, cultures, and histories underway in the EU. In certain areas, these are being translated into increasing
demands, through greater devolution, for recognition of such cultures, languages, and
traditions. An emphasis on region building as an active, ongoing process that is
contested but dissipates into the wider public realm, is helpful (see Paasi, 1991). In
other words, it is not always necessary for identities to preexist because `regions are
not, they become'. It is possible, therefore, to cultivate a regional consciousness through
the media, the Internet, and through a variety of institutions that disseminate markers
of regional identity. Although sometimes these are less tangible, even over short
periods of time, regional institutions and their respective boundaries can begin to
have a wider civic resonance. As will be discussed in more detail later in the paper,
the Spanish case is particularly relevant in this regard. Before turning to this discussion, however, in the next section we outline in detail the decentralisation process in
Spain and then go on to consider the lessons for the UK.
3 Decentralisation in Spain: what lessons for the UK?
In Spain the decentralisation process has been a relatively recent experience (since 1978)
that has been characterised by its contingent nature or, more accurately, a `stop and go'
process. For example, the rate and pace of devolution have hinged on the political climate
of the day (Roller, 2002a). The Spanish Constitution of 1978 is a clear reflection of the
political circumstances of its time and is based on a nontraditional model of territorial
organisation that is neither a centralised nor a federal model. Instead, it comprises a
multilayered heterogeneous system of governance encompassing seventeen regions or
autonomous communities (comunidades autonomas) but retains some of the traditional
administrative units in the form of fifty provinces (diputaciones). Fundamentally, as
the selected model emerged from the social and political dynamics of the immediate

Processes of devolution in Spain and the UK

2167

post-Franco era, the constitutional drafters were prevented from selecting a more
traditional framework (Solozabal, 1996). A plurinational or multinational state was
not envisaged by the Constitution nor was the creation of a single nation-state.
The State of Autonomies, as the new model commonly became known, thus took
on a series of idiosyncratic characteristics. First, the process of political decentralisation is characterised by sovereignty being devolved and not divided. In other words,
the entire process is based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation as one
of the fundamental premises of the Spanish Constitution. Yet it is the same Constitution from which the autonomies can derive the powers that they are entitled to execute.
Second, this decentralisation is defined in the Constitution as `self-government', which
means there is a redistribution of power between the regions and nationalities of the
Spanish nation and the Spanish state. Nevertheless, this structure is not imposed from
above, either by the state itself or by the political arrangements envisaged by the
Constitution. In other words, the Constitution does not establish a territorial design
of the nationalities and regions but rather lays out the conditions by which the regions
(with popular consent) may decide to proceed with the practice of self-government.
The 1978 Constitution stipulated that the degree of autonomy granted to each of
Spain's constituent parts is dependent on the political will of its inhabitants, expressed
through a referendum or by cross-party agreement among its political leadership. Thus,
it envisages a multispeed process of attaining autonomy (see table 1). This multispeed
process led to the drafting of individual Statutes of Autonomy for each of the seventeen
autonomous communities. Article 147 of the Constitution recognises the Statutes of
Autonomy as a central component of the Spanish state's legal and constitutional framework. Institutions of self-government, including the judiciary and executive branches, are
organised and derive their power from the Statutes of Autonomy. Nonetheless, the statutes
do not act as individual constitutions for the individual autonomous communities but are
Table 1. Three ways to become an autonomous community.
Article 151 for the so-called `historic communities'
Requires two referendums
(a) one seeking approval for autonomy,
(b) following negotiations with central government, one seeking approval for Statute of
Autonomy.
Regions that have been autonomous communities through this channel
(a) the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia were deemed to have already had their
referendum on autonomy during the Second Republic (1931 36) so were required only to have
a referendum on the Statute of Autonomy,
(b) Andaluc| a went through the channels specified by this article and had two referendums.
Article 143 the commonest way
Did not require either referendum (one on autonomy approval, the other on Statute approval).
Initiative from provincial and municipal councils creates assembly with regional elites designed
to draft Statute.
Statute is then sent to the Cortes for approval as an organic law.
Requires five-year transition period.
Used for twelve autonomous communities (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Murcia, Valencia,
Aragon, Castilla-La Mancha, the Canary Islands, Extremadura, the Balearic Islands, Madrid,
and Castilla y Leon.
Special case Navarra
In 1978, Navarra still possessed its `foral system', a historic charter which guaranteed its right
to self-government and greater administrative autonomy.
In this case, the statute takes form as the `Law of Reintegration and Amelioration of the Foral
System in Navarra'.
Essentially adapts Navarra's foral system to the 1978 Constitution.

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B Giordano, E Roller

considered part of Spanish organic law and accordingly fall within the jurisdictional
framework of the central government (Solozabal, 1996).
The statutes represent the `framework within the framework' (within the Constitution) within which the institutions of self-government of the autonomous communities
operate and within which laws are formulated and implemented. In themselves, the
statutes are the end result of a series of negotiations and agreements between central
government and representatives of each autonomous community. Each Statute of
Autonomy is considered as a unique form of organic law ``in that it cannot be modified
by a norm of similar rank, but rather `according to the procedures established therein' ''
(Solozabal, 1996, page 247). Amending the statute requires the formulation and
approval of an organic law by the national parliament. The uniqueness of each statute
reaffirms the state's recognition of the varying needs and demands of each autonomous
community. Each statute lists the distribution of competencies and powers between
the central government and the respective autonomous community, clarifying and/or
extending the distribution of competencies as listed in the Constitution.
The 1978 Constitution, therefore, began a multitrack autonomy process which has
meant that decentralisation has been of an asymmetric nature. The separation of
autonomous communities according to each level meant that regions such as Catalonia
and the Basque Country, where nationalist and separatist sentiment had traditionally
been deep rooted, were appeased by being placed in the category of `historic nationality' with a high degree of self-government. Their respective Statutes of Autonomy
were both approved in October 1979. Galicia's Statute of Autonomy, the other `historic
region', was approved in 1981 following a delay imposed by the central government
because of fears that there was an increasing trend towards the devolution of powers.
Although initially Andaluc| a was not deemed to be a historic region, its Statute of
Autonomy was approved in 1980 for political reasons.(2) Thus, in the first five to ten
years the levels of self-government varied widely among the different autonomous
communities but nevertheless regions gaining their Statutes of Autonomy through the
`slow route' have quickly caught up even though they were required to follow a different process, which is stipulated in Article 143 of the Constitution (see table 1). This is
of a transitional nature and lays out the conditions that regions are obliged to fulfil in
order to complete a formal application for autonomy. Once the autonomy status has
been granted, this becomes law and is required to go through an additional five-year
transitional period in order to attain the same level of autonomy as the `historic'
regions. Typically, various exceptions were made to this category with Navarra,(3)
Aragon, the Canary Islands, and Valencia (4) granted similar levels of rights and
privileges to those laid out in the other Statutes of Autonomy by means of organic

(2) Andalucia's status as a nationality has often prompted protests from Catalan, Basque, and
Galician nationalists who claim that this status has been artificially created and has no historical
justification. Nevertheless, it has enjoyed the transfer of competencies in similar degrees to the
other `historic' nationalities although the disparities in the level of transfers have sharpened in
recent years.
(3) Navarra achieved its autonomy through special provisions designating it as a `foral community'
implicitly recognising its historical distinctiveness with its fueros (historic legal codes).
(4) The autonomous communities of Aragon, the Canary Islands, and Valencia have been
recognised as `nationalities', with Valencia's `nationality' enshrined by its statute and the reform
of the statutes of Aragon and the Canary Islands approved by the Spanish Cortes in 1996 allowing
for the recognition of these as `nationalities'. Aragon's nationality is referred to as a `historic
identity', thereby distinguishing it from the `historic nationalities' of Catalonia, the Basque Country,
and Galicia.

Processes of devolution in Spain and the UK

2169

law rather than a statute in itself. The other Spanish regions (5) were granted the status
of autonomy through the gradual process enshrined in the Constitution by Article 143.
In essence, currently, the only real differences between Spain's autonomous communities are with the Basque Country and Navarra, both of which retain a distinct system
of funding.(6)
Similar to Spain, in the UK, as Hazell (2000, page 268) points out, ``asymmetry
runs through every clause and schedule of the devolution legislation, from the fundamentals of powers and functions down to the niceties of nomenclature.'' It is precisely
this asymmetry that is emerging in the UK with the establishment of a Scottish
Parliament and the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies, with the English regions
remaining relatively weak in comparison (Elcock and Keating, 1998; Hetherington
and Tomaney, 2000). It seems likely that the asymmetry of the devolution settlement
in the UK will increase even further with the prospect that the regions of the North
East, the North West, and Yorkshire and the Humber will have directly elected
regional assemblies that will have relatively more powers and influence than the other
English regions. In this situation, therefore, there would be asymmetry not only
between the respective nations of the UK but also within England itself.
It was really the political regime change from the Conservative to the Labour Party
in 1997, with the election of Tony Blair, which set the process in motion for devolution in
the UK. In fact, as Tomaney (2000, page 675) points out in relation to the wider UK
programme of constitutional change, ``historians assessing the achievements of Tony
Blair's `New' Labour government will doubtless place the devolution of powers from
the UK Parliament to Scotland, Wales and potentially Northern Ireland, near the head
of the list.'' Of course, that is not to say that the UK government has ceded its preeminence in any substantial sense, but there is, as Hazell (2000) notes, a view that the
centre is rendered more vulnerable by the relative ease with which (from the centre's
perspective, if not from those within Scotland and Wales) the devolved institutions
have bedded down.
Rather than provide a detailed discussion of the trajectories of devolution in the
UK hitherto, which are the focus of other papers in this theme issue and elsewhere (for
example, see Hazell, 2000), in the following sections we explore some of the lessons
that emerge for the UK from comparisons with the Spanish case. Three main areas are
considered the emergence of regional identities, the contours of territorial tensions
that emerge, and what can be termed `regional catch-up'.
3.1 The emergence of regional identities

The process of decentralisation in Spain has led increasingly to a growing sense of

regional consciousness and identity in areas with no previous claims to historic or even
territorial distinctiveness. One example would be the region of La Rioja, an artificial
construction dating back to 1978. Although traditional regional identities such as the
Basques and Catalans continue to remain important, there is evidence to suggest that
the creation of the State of Autonomies has led to increasing manifestations of new
types of regional identities. Of course, it is difficult to make comparisons between a
(5)

Castilla-La Mancha, Cantabria, Extremadura, Murcia, Balearic Islands, Asturias, La Rioja,

Madrid, and Castilla y Leon. Nevertheless, even among these autonomous communities, there
are differences, with Asturias, Castilla-La Mancha, and Madrid refraining from any distinctive
reference to nationality or any other form of historical or national distinctiveness. The other
autonomous communities are referred to in their own statutes as `historic regional entities'.
(6) The Basque Country's funding system is called Concierto while Navarra's funding system is
called Convenio. Within this financing system, the Basque government reserves the exclusive right
of fiscal revenue collection and where the percentage of revenues later transferred to the central
government is negotiated by both parties.

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B Giordano, E Roller

`natural' region such as Catalonia, with a territorially bounded sense of history, and an
`artificial' region such as La Rioja, created to allay the fears of those who predicted the
breakup of the Spanish state. However, the different patterns of regional creation and
development have affected both the way regions perceive themselves and the strength
of national identity. These new manifestations of territorial-based identities, however,
have not replaced a sense of national or Spanish identity. Indeed, both identities
complement each other and have given rise to a growing sense of dual or multiple
identities (Moreno, 2001).
As can be seen from table 2, the so-called `historic' communities, such as the
Basque Country and Catalonia, have the highest rates of strong regional identity,
that is, more Basque or Catalan than Spanish (19% and 24%, respectively). Nevertheless, other autonomous communities such as Asturias also demonstrate high levels
(20%) of strong regional identity. So-called `artificial' regions such as La Rioja or
Castilla y Leon show low levels of exclusive regional identity but high levels of dual
or multiple identity (more than 50%).
Such findings are particularly pertinent for the UK, for several reasons. First and
foremost, the Spanish experience shows how, over a relatively short period of time, in
regions such as La Rioja that have no `historic' sense of identity, a sense of regional
belonging can and does emerge. In the UK, the tendency is to assume that the Celtic
nations are somehow predisposed to devolution because of their different cultural and
historical traditions and identity. On the other hand, the common perception is that
the claims for greater autonomy from the regions of England are somehow hampered
by their lack of a preexisting sense of identity. As the Spanish case exemplifies,
however, a historical sense of nationhood, of the kind evident in Catalonia or the
Basque Country, does help to further claims for greater autonomy. However, other
regions without such cultural distinctiveness, such as La Rioja, can develop a greater
sense of regional identity over time.
One of the main reasons for this is the fact that a regional identity does not always
have to emerge intrinsically but rather can develop in response to an `other', when one
region is mobilised into copying others (Mitchell, 2002). This is precisely what happened in the Spanish case. For the `nonhistoric' regions of Spain, the need to mobilise
in response to opportunities presented to them by greater autonomy combined with the
challenge posed from the historic regions moving forward, benefiting from their
autonomy, was a sufficient catalyst for further regional mobilisation. In the UK case,

Asturias

Aragon

Basque Countrya

Castilla-La Mancha

Castilla y Leon

Catalonia

Extremadura

La Rioja

Madrid

Murcia

Table 2. Evolution of regional versus national identity in Spain's autonomous communities

(source: Mota, 1998).

4
6
63
20
4
4

13
9
64
11
2
3

4
4
37
19
29
7

30
11
54
3
1
3

22
16
53
3
1
6

16
6
32
24
20
2

5
5
80
7
1
1

23
18
51
3
1
4

28
12
45
3
3
10

19
8
64
4
3
3

Regional identity

Only Spanish
More Spanish than regional
As Spanish as regional
More regional than Spanish
Only regional
Don't know
a

Data for the Basque Country are for 2001 (source: CIS, 2001).

Processes of devolution in Spain and the UK

2171

a similar process is arguably already underway, as devolution presents the English regions
with the need to mobilise in response to the `other'in this case Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Irelandthat are already perceived to be benefiting from devolution (Mitchell,
2002).
Furthermore, the Spanish case shows that the creation of the State of Autonomies
has led, over time, to a greater interest in regional politics and institutions. This has
especially been the case for `artificial' regions such as La Rioja, where the increased
interest has been significant, rising from 11% in 1986 to 37% in 1992 (see table 3).
In addition, not only has interest in regional politics increased but also support
for Spain's State of Autonomies has increased remarkably over the years along with
growing demands for more autonomy for its regions (see table 4). Moreover, there has
been a marked increase in support for the performance and role of the autonomous
communities in providing public services and in reconciling Spain's historic internal
divisions (see table 5).
In the UK case, once again there are important potential lessons to be learnt in
this regard. Already there is some evidence to suggest that in England, the part of the
UK which thus far has benefited least from devolution, there is growing support for
greater autonomy (see table 6, over). As shown in table 7 (over), there is an increasing
consensus emerging in England that regional assemblies would have a positive effect
Table 3. Percentage of those interested or uninterested in regional politics (source: Mota, 1998).
1986

Asturias
Castilla-La Mancha
La Rioja

1992

interested

uninterested

interested

uninterested

31
24
11

64
73
78

34
30
37

64
69
62

Table 4. Evaluation of autonomous communities (percentage of those who agreed) [source:

survey based on 2496 nationally representative interviews (CIS, 1996)].

A state with only one central government and no autonomous

communities
A state with autonomous communities similar to the one that
exists now
A state in which the autonomous communities have more autonomy
than they currently have
A state in which autonomous communities would have the right
to become independent states

1984

1990

1996

29

17

13

31

41

47

29

19

22

10

Table 5. Evaluation of autonomous communities (percentage of those who agreed) [source:

survey based on 2496 nationally representative interviews (CIS, 1996)].

Have contributed
Have contributed
Have contributed
regions
Have contributed

1993

1996

to bring public matters closer to the citizen

to increasing public spending without improving services
to a better cohabitation between the nationalities and the

48
50
38

61
43
45

to better addressing the problems of each Community

51

68

2172

B Giordano, E Roller

Table 6. England: do you want a regional government? [source: survey based on 2646 nationally
representative telephone interviews in England (BBC, 2002)].
Percentage
Yes
No
Undecided
No opinion

63
23
8
6

Table 7. Perceptions of regional assemblies [source: survey based on 2646 nationally representative telephone interviews (BBC, 2002)].

A regional assembly would give your region a stronger voice

in Westminster and at Brussels
A regional assembly would improve the economic development
of the region
Regional assemblies would simply result in more bureaucracy
and red tape
Regional assemblies would bring government closer to the
people
A regional assembly would just become a talking shop for
politicians and be a waste of money

Agree (%)

Disagree (%)

72

23

64

26

62

31

60

35

48

44

on regional political and economic performance. Although there are issues about the
robustness of the data, in many ways the data are of secondary importance; the more
important issue is that it is not surprising that interest in devolution and regional
politics is increasing in England precisely because of the changes that have taken place
in Scotland, Wales, and (to a lesser extent) in Northern Ireland. This reinforces the
issue from the Spanish case about the ways in which regions strive to gain parity with
the `other' in asymmetrical structures of devolution. This issue is pursued in greater
length in the next section.
3.2 Increasing territorial tensions?

As Rokkan and Urwin (1983) argued in their landmark book on territorial politics,
``any attempt to solve one peripheral problem cannot be insulated from the rest of
the state: a spillover effect is almost inevitable'' (quoted in Mitchell, 2002, page 758).
In other words, as Mitchell (2002, page 760) argues, ``asymmetrical devolution creates
asymmetrical problems''this is precisely what has happened in Spain, as along with
so-called spillover there has been an increase in territorial tension in a number of
areas. In the Spanish case, this territorial tension is manifested on two levels: on the
one hand, the asymmetries of the devolution arrangements have led to a certain degree
of resentment between regions with extensive levels of autonomy and regions with
more limited autonomy. On the other hand, this territorial tension can be seen through
the friction between wealthier and poorer regions.
With regard to spillover, the process of decentralisation has been so extensive that
it has transformed Spain's system of governance so much that the rate and pace of
decentralisation have varied enormously from autonomous community to autonomous
community. For example, authority over nonuniversity education was transferred to
Catalonia and the Basque Country in 1980 whereas this policy area was not transferred
to the regional government of Asturias until 1999. The number of competencies

Processes of devolution in Spain and the UK

2173

transferred to Catalonia reached 145 in 2000, whereas only 63 areas had been transferred
to La Rioja. Clearly, what we see is a process by which those autonomous communities
that have fewer competencies demand more in order to try to emulate those with more
competencies. In this respect, the process of decentralisation has hindered central government's attempts to overhaul the state bureaucracy and public sector because much of the
reform can be carried out only once all constitutionally stipulated competencies have
been transferred to the regional governments.
It is, however, the increase in territorial tensions that has been most significant in
the Spanish case. In particular, the system of public finance, with the establishment
of the State of Autonomies, has been transformed, with two main consequences. First,
the central government is gradually losing its hold on control of public spending; the
distribution of public expenditure between the different levels is as follows: central
government (57.1%), autonomous communities (29.5%), and local government (13.4%).
Second, fiscal decentralisation has also heightened the issue of regional socioeconomic
inequalities with some serious political implications. Despite the concept of interterritorial solidarity (7) enshrined in Article 2 of the Constitution, relations between
the autonomous communities have frequently been marred by bitter rivalries between the
richer and poorer regions over who pays and what is received in return.
Furthermore, as tables 8 and 9 (over) show, there is a clear correlation between
economic differences and perceptions that the central government discriminates against
richer regions. In addition, as table 8 demonstrates, there are significant differences
among Spain's autonomous communities in the extent to which they are able to control
their own finances. Thus, the rivalry among Spain's regions is twofold. One source is the
tension that exists between the historic communities (Basque Country, Catalonia, and
Table 8. GDP per capita (Eur15 100) and regional budgets in relation to population (in
Spanish pesetas per capita), 1997 (source: European Commission, 1999).
Autonomous community

GDP per capita

Budget per capita

`Historic communities' or fast-track regions (Article 151)

Andaluc| a
57.2
Basque Country
92.3
Canary Islands
74.3
Catalonia
99.1
Galicia
63.0
Navarra
98.1
Valencia
73.8

320.0
345.4
314.6
297.8
319.4
514.7
254.8

Other autonomous communities

Aragon
88.9
Asturias
73.6
Balearic Islands
97.0
Cantabria
76.9
Castilla-La Mancha
65.9
Castilla y Leon
75.9
Extremadura
54.6
La Rioja
89.0
Madrid
100.6
Murcia
67.2

190
145.4
99.9
145.8
226.4
174.3
202.5
134.0
117.7
120.2

(7) Although this concept has been constitutionally interpreted as establishing the elimination of
socioeconomic disparities among the regions (with the creation of the Fondo de Compensacion
Interterritorial or Interterritorial Compensation Fund), it has frequently been employed by weaker
autonomous communities for political objectives as a type of `us versus them' notion.

2174

B Giordano, E Roller

Valencia

Madrid

Galicia

Castille y Leon

Castille-La Mancha

Canary Islands

Basque Country

Andaluc| a

Table 9. Perceptions of the central government's treatment of the autonomous communities

(in percentages) [source: survey based on 2496 nationally representative interviews) (CIS, 1996)].

Question: Thinking about your own autonomous community, do you think that, in general, it receives
worse treatment than the rest of the autonomous communities or not?
Yes, it receives worse treatment
50
33
44
32
59
61
19
33
No, I don't think so
35
60
42
58
29
29
73
59
Does not know/does not answer
16
7
15
10
12
9
9
8

Galicia) and the rest. A second and perhaps potentially more contentious rivalry in the
long term is that between richer and poorer regions.
The last point is particularly pertinent because, in spite of over twenty years
of regional government, economic divergence rather than convergence is a feature of
Spain's regional panorama. There was a degree of regional convergence, however, but
this came to a fairly rapid stop with the economic slowdown of the early 1970s, with the oil
crisis and the onset of economic restructuring and globalisation (Rodr| guez-Pose, 2000).
According to Rodr| guez-Pose (2000), several trends are evident. First, between 1980
and 1995, the highest rates of growth were achieved in the regions where tourism
is overwhelmingly the most important economic sector (Canary Islands and Balearic
Islands) and the traditionally wealthier industrial and service areas (Madrid, La Rioja,
Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Navarra). Second, out of all the Spanish regions
only two, which in 1980 had a GDP per capita below the average (the Canary Islands
and Extremadura), have grown above Spain's mean since then. As table 10 shows,
Asturias has had the lowest rate of growth followed by Galicia; Andaluc| a and Murcia
Table 10. Annual average growth rate of regional GDP and employment, percentages (source:
Rodr| guez-Pose, 2000).
Region

GDP growth, 1980 96

Employment growth, 1980 95

Andaluc| a
Aragon
Asturias
Balearic Islands
Basque Country
Canary Islands
Cantabria
Castilla y Leon
Castilla-La Mancha
Catalonia
Ceuta and Melilla
Estremadura
Galicia
La Rioja
Madrid
Murcia
Navarra
Valencia

2.21
2.59
0.88
2.62
1.81
3.62
2.11
1.94
2.30
2.59
4.29
2.68
1.45
3.03
3.06
2.23
2.56
2.32

0.85
0.26
1.03
1.16
0.20
1.29
0.85
0.26
0.28
0.79
1.75
0.16
0.66
0.37
1.58
1.12
0.55
1.09

Processes of devolution in Spain and the UK

2175

also performed badly. Third, the result of recent trends is that there has been a greater
polarisation of regional economic well-being. On the one hand, the North and Centre
regions have performed poorly, suffering considerable economic decline whilst, on the
other hand, the wealthiest regions are Madrid, the Canary and Balearic Islands, and
the Ebro (Rioja, Navarra, and Aragon) ^ Mediterranean (Catalonia and Valencia) axes.
In short, the fact is that, although decentralisation has enhanced each region's
decisionmaking capability and `voice', it has done very little, if anything, to reduce
economic differences between Spain's rich and poor regions. For the UK this is a
sobering finding because, as Morgan (2002) points out, much of the debate in the
UK, especially in England, has been about the economic benefits that devolution will
bring, even going so far as arguing that it could be a potential solution to the North ^
South divide. The Spanish example, however, does not augur well for this point of view.
In addition, the issue of spillover is especially pertinent for the UK because there is
already clear evidence that this is beginning to take place. For example, the English
regions, especially in the North, have deliberately tried to emulate the Scottish experience prior to devolution by setting up constitutional-type bodies or conventions, such
as the North West or North East Constitutional Conventions, that are focused upon
articulating and furthering respective regional demands (Mitchell, 2002).
Furthermore, in the UK, as Mitchell (2002, page 761) argues, ``devolution has
sharpened awareness of existing heterogeneity or, at least, sharpened the awareness
of heterogeneity.'' Territorial tensions, therefore, have also begun to increase in the UK
and, as in the Spanish case, these are especially prevalent in relation to public finance.
Most notably, English regionalists have highlighted the inequalities surrounding the
functioning of the `Barnett Formula' which, rather than taking into account of `need' or
economic performance, functions to ensure that changes to public expenditure programmes in England are matched by equivalent changes in the (already larger) per
capita budgets of Scotland and Wales (Robson et al, 2001; Twigger, 1998). The key
point, however, is that Scotland receives 23% more per head in identifiable public
expenditure than does England, and Wales 18% more (Barnett, 2000).
There is a real need, therefore, to revisit the Barnett Formula which was intended,
right from its inception in the late 1970s, to be a temporary fix. Instead, a formula that
is more in line with current regional economic need would arguably be fairer, especially for the English regions. For example, the anomalies of the Barnett Formula are
most noticeable when one considers the North East region of England where in 1997
GDP per capita was 13 percentage points below that of Scotland, yet public expenditure per capita was not higher: in fact, it was 19 percentage points lower (Barnett,
2000; Morgan, 2001). As in Spain, it is precisely the sense of financial grievance that
underpins demands for increased autonomy from the regions of England's North
(Morgan, 2001). It is no coincidence therefore, as table 11 shows, that in the northern
Table 11. Do you want devolution? Percentage of support for a devolved assembly [source: survey
based on 2646 nationally representative telephone interviews in England (BBC, 2002)].
Region
West Midlands
North West
North East
Yorkshire and the Humber
South West
East Midlands
Eastern
South East

Percentage
73
72
72
72
61
59
55
49

2176

B Giordano, E Roller

regions of England there is the most interest in having a regional assembly. It is fair to
assume that calls for a change to the Barnett Formula are likely to increase until there
is a perceived sense of parity between England's northern regions and the Celtic
nations. On the other hand, as we discuss in the next section, the hard-won competencies gained in Scotland and Wales will not easily be diluted, or compromised by a
standardising of autonomy across the whole of the UK.
3.3 Cafe (or is it Te) para todos? The dynamics of regional `catch-up'

In many ways, the Spanish model has been a success in that it has managed to reconcile
nationalist claims by giving special recognition to Spain's historic communities as well
as providing a stable system of decentralised governance. The impetus behind this
transformation came from the historic nationalities and their claims of an hecho
diferencialthe recognition that the historic nationalities of Catalonia, the Basque
Country, and Galicia are to be differentiated by right and not by privilege. The term
is difficult to translate and represents the characteristics (real or perceived) that
distinguish one community from another. These characteristics can be ethnic, linguistic,
historical, or cultural. In political and constitutional terms, the concept has been
interpreted as applicable to any autonomous community which enjoyed a certain degree
of autonomy in the form of fueros (historic legal codes) or possessed institutions of selfgovernment prior to the Second Republic. The concept has frequently been employed by
nationalists to ensure the differentiation between the historic nationalities/communities
and all other autonomous communities within the Spanish state.
The climate of political bargaining and continuing negotiations surrounding the
consolidation of the State of Autonomies has had widespread effects on attitudes
surrounding the so-called `institutionalisation of diversity'. Generally speaking, the
State of Autonomies has been widely accepted (see table 12). Even most Catalans
have generally embraced the benefits brought on by the new distribution of powers
within the Spanish state with one of the highest rates of acceptance (second only to
Madrid) of the treatment received by the central government (Giordano and Roller,
2002) (see table 12).
Nevertheless, the State of Autonomies has often been criticised as having resulted
in a piecemeal system of devolution without taking into account specific objectives
(Cuchillo, 1993). It also has had unintended consequences particularly with the emergence of a growing sense of `comparative grievance' (Moreno, 2001) or a `snowball
effect' in which the nonhistoric regions have tried hard to play a game of `catch-up'. In
other words, regions with no previous tradition of autonomy or strong regional identification have demanded self-government rights and this has led many nationalists to
Table 12. Catalan perceptions of the organisation of the state in Spain [source: survey based on
2496 nationally representative interviews) (CIS, 1996)].
Options

Percentage

Question: I am going to present you now with some alternative forms of state organisation in Spain.
Please tell me which ones you think you are most in agreement with.
A centralised state without autonomous communities
11
A state with autonomous communities as exists presently
47
A state with autonomous communities which possess greater autonomy
18
than presently
A state where it would be possible for the autonomous communities
19
to become independent
Does no know/does not answer
5

Processes of devolution in Spain and the UK

2177

feel that they are beginning to lose their special place in the Spanish state. Moreover, in
recent years, much of the debate surrounding the success of the State of Autonomies has
revolved around the issue of the hecho diferencial and, more specifically, what has been
termed, cafe para todos (or `coffee for everyone', that is, the same arrangements for
everyone). Increasingly, nationalist parties such as Convergencia i Unio in Catalonia and
the Basque Nationalist Party argue that their respective nationalities, recognised in the
Constitution, are being diluted as a result of the development of the State of Autonomies
and the cafe para todos syndrome (Giordano and Roller, 2002). Nationalist parties fear
that the tendency in recent years has been to encourage uniform arrangements for all of
Spain's seventeen autonomous communities in part as a result of the spillover effects
caused by the State of Autonomies (Roller, 2002b).
More importantly, in many ways the constitutional framework has failed to
restructure relations between the state and the autonomous communities in a meaningful way. It fails even to define the Spanish state as a `State of Autonomies' and
scarcely any reference is made in the text of the degree to which self-government is
granted to regional authorities (devolution). In essence, the constitutional framework
is conceptually vague and has often resulted in an excessive flexibility of interpretation,
with demands by many nationalists for a relectura or `rereading' of the Constitution.
Although a product of cross-party consensus, the 1978 Constitution was also the result
of a `top-down' approach to the process of decentralisation. This has meant that
varying demands by nationalist movements over the years have led to fluctuating
degrees of pressure on the state to address these issues, resulting in a selective process
of devolution. Thus, the constitutional arrangements have led to a political climate in
which the balance of power between the central government and the autonomous
communities is constantly being shifted by political pressures, leading to permanent
political bargaining (Roller, 2002a).
The pattern that is emerging in the transformation of both the processes of state
and policy process transformation is that it is characterised by attempts to find a
hybrid solution in which devolution is homogenised (to ensure the equality of all
constituent units) but also to retain a heterogeneous character (to respect the distinct
linguistic, cultural, or historic character of specific regions or nations). In Spain, some
have argued that this dual process will inevitably require a federal model with the
corresponding constitutional reform in the long run (Moreno, 2001) because federalism
ensures that the decentralisation of the policy process occurs along territorial lines.
However, this may not be the most appropriate solution because it is unclear how the
homogenising qualities of a federal system could respect the current asymmetries
within the Spanish state and whether nationalist movements could learn to accept a
constitutional reinterpretation of the Constitution which could see them forego any
distinct roles in the policy process. The `domino effect' of decentralisation, however, has
now reached a crucial turning point and in the next few years key decisions will have to be
made about the extent to which the process of homogenising competencies among the
autonomous communitiesthat is, `coffee for everyone'should continue and how
the political claims of the historic nationalists can be reflected in the asymmetries of the
system.
For the UK, this reveals several important lessons. First, the establishment of an
asymmetrical system of devolution can lead to a regional catch-up dynamic and to
some extent this is already evident. Wales wants to gain parity with Scotland because
its powers are more limited; this is akin to certain Spanish historic communities, such as
Galicia, demanding equality with others, such as Catalonia, that have relatively more
competencies. The English regions, as already discussed, are beginning to mobilise in
response to devolution to the Celtic nations and more potently towards emerging

2178

B Giordano, E Roller

territorial tensions, especially in terms of public financing. Moreover, as in Spain,

increasing policy divergence in certain areas between Scotland and Wales, on the one
hand, and England, on the other, is helping to drive regionalist demands in some of the
English regions.
Furthermore, as Mitchell (2002, page 759) points out, ``a policy adopted for one
territory may provoke demands for similar policies or other concessions. It can also
create tensions and have consequences for territorial management at the centre.'' In the
Spanish case, this has certainly been so: not only have interregional tensions increased
but the pressures upon the central government have become more intense. In the UK,
similarly, the ongoing processes of devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland
have ensured that there has been an awakening of an English dimension within central
government (Mitchell, 2002). In some quarters, most notably in the UK Conservative
Party, there were calls for the creation of an English Parliament, or alternatively
`English votes for English laws' (Jeffrey and Mawson, 2002). Ultimately, the solution
proposed by the Labour government is for the creation of directly elected regional
assemblies for those regions of England that choose to have them.
The publication of the White Paper on English regional government (Cabinet
Office and DTLR, 2002) represents a significant landmark in the constitutional history
not only of England but the whole of the United Kingdom. As Adams et al (2002,
page 208) argue, ``the government's proposals in the White Paper, if enacted, would
change the landscape of the British Constitution and the terrain of English politics.'' It
will be interesting to see what the results of the referenda in the three northern regions,
expected for the autumn of 2004, will be. However, there are no guarantees that there
will be `yes' votes in all three regions and indeed a `no' vote in any of the three could
really undermine the regional working that has already taken place. The implications
of a `yes' vote, however, are potentially wide ranging. The elected assemblies would
certainly provide a `voice' for the English regions that could rival the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in spite of the fact that the powers of the regional assemblies
would be limited (at least initially) compared with those in Scotland or Wales. The
key question, which is where the comparisons with the Spanish case are particularly
relevant, is what are the implications of giving what we term `tea for everyone' in the
UK. One scenario is that, as in Spain, over time the English regions will demand more
parity with their Scottish and Welsh counterparts; after all some of them, such as the
North West, are larger in demographic as well as economic terms than both Scotland
and Wales. On the other hand, giving regional government to certain English regions
could feasibly drive further demands from Scotland and Wales, to preserve and more
likely to demand enhancements to their own devolution settlement in light of changes in
England. Moreover, this would result in a similar process to that which has taken place
in Spain, whereby nationalist resentment has increased at the proposals to try to
homogenise (cafe para todos) the devolution settlement. In the UK case, giving `tea
for everyone', albeit some more than others for the time being, may well raise the
devolution stakes even further, increasing territorial and political tensions on the way.
4 Conclusion
What lessons can be drawn from the Spanish experience for the UK? First, the Spanish
constitutional arrangement provides a model of political decentralisation in which there
is no identical model of autonomy for any of the regions. Each of the autonomous
regions has chosen, with varying degrees of success, its own model with the inclusion or
exclusion of competencies that it wishes to control. The process of the decentralisation
of the Spanish state has not ceased with the drafting and eventual enactment of the 1978
Constitution. It has been one of evolution, in which the regions have negotiated and

Processes of devolution in Spain and the UK

2179

renegotiated their statutes and competencies with the central government; a series of
``ongoing processes whereby central or federal governments and mobilized regional
cultural communities continuously negotiate to maintain the latter's acceptance of the
legitimacy of the state's claim to jurisdiction over them'' (Henders, 1997, page 532).
Furthermore, these processes of continuous centre ^ regional negotiations as well as
the spillover effects of decentralisation from the historic communities, have led to the
emergence of identities in territories with no prior regional consciousness or even
interest in devolved politics.
In the UK, thus far, commentators have been somewhat critical of the way in
which devolution has been rather uneven and slow to unfold, especially in England.
Moreover, as Mitchell (2002, page 746) argues, devolution was not part of some
`` `joined up thinking' on constitutional reform which would allow for an overhaul of
Whitehall and the removal of reduction in territorial tensions at the centre.'' On the
other hand, as the Spanish case illustrates, devolution is a contingent process that
changes, develops, and evolves over time, sometimes throwing up unexpected consequences. In the UK the fact is that the government seems not to have any real vision of
the changes needed at the centre, which is reflected in government reorganisations and
changes in personnel responsible for devolution (Hazell, 2000; Tomaney and Mawson,
2002). Although this complicates the ongoing process of devolution, the Spanish case
illustrates that it is part and parcel of regional reforms. Moreover, the fact that since
1997 the same political party, New Labour, has been the largest party in Westminster,
Edinburgh, and Cardiff has helped considerably to provide continuity across the
various territories. In Spain, of course, the political colours vary considerably between
respective autonomous communities and the centre. In the UK, therefore, over the
next decade or so, it will be interesting to monitor the implications that changes in
political colour between the centre and the devolved territories will have. Another
interesting phenomenon to observe will be the extent to which regional identities,
particularly in England, will be strengthened as a result of the devolution programme,
as has happened in Spain.
With regard to the economic dimension of devolution, the Spanish case provides an
important and cautionary message for the UK, which is that creating regional governments has done very little to narrow deeply entrenched and long-standing disparities
between the relatively wealthier and poorer Spanish regions. Although it is fair to say
that greater autonomy has helped to improve the economic fortunes of some of the
poorer regions, at the same time it is the wealthier regions that have benefited relatively more from having greater autonomy. In the UK (especially with regard
to England) the debates over regionalism have focused primarily on a need to try to
resolve interregional economic disparities. The establishment of regional assemblies, it
is argued, would provide the degree of capacity and credibility necessary to bolster
economic development. Given the severity of existing regional economic disparities in
England, however, it is an almost insurmountable task and, given the Spanish example,
one that is likely to remain so. Furthermore, the lesson from Spain is that devolution
has undoubtedly fuelled the political debate about the nature and logic of redistributive
fiscal transfers on a territorial basis. Similarly, in the UK, there is an escalating sense,
especially amongst the Northern English regions, that the Barnett Formula is iniquitous. As in Spain, such controversies will intensify over the next few years in the UK.
Finally, following on from the previous point, the message from Spain is clear
devolution intensifies territorial tensions whether they are financial, political, or institutional. In the UK case, as Mitchell (2002, page 764) argues, ``most likely in the near
future, and there is already evidence of this, there will be greater emphasis on territorial
tensions. This territorialisation of politics cannot fail to have an impact on England

2180

B Giordano, E Roller

however it is constituted.'' The objective for the UK central government then is to

anticipate the emergence of such tensions in order to avoid them and one way of doing
this is to consider the experiences of other states that have longer experiences of
devolution, such as Spain, as this paper has illustrated. Yet, thus far, it seems that
the UK government and also a number of influential commentators on devolution have
paid very little attention, or at least only in a superficial manner, to the debates and
experiences of other states (Mitchell, 2002).
The lesson from Spain is that asymmetrical devolution inevitably leads to a process
of catch-up whereby regions with less demand parity with those that have more
devolved responsibilities and competencies. Simultaneously, precisely those regions
with more, such as Spain's historic nationalities, oppose the attempts to standardise
devolution arrangements, metaphorically the granting of `coffee for everyone'. In the
UK both of these devolution dynamics are present, even if they are in their initial
stages and all of this really depends on what happens in England, if and when regional
governments are created and how they function. It remains to be seen, therefore,
whether over the next few years a similar situation will emerge in the UK; in other
words, a backlash from Scotland and Wales about the granting of `te para todos' (tea
for everyone).
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