PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE

MANUAL

PLATFORM AND COMPLEX LAYOUTS

PTS 20.185
JULY 1991

PREFACE

PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication,
of PETRONAS OPUs/Divisions.
They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design, construction,
operation and maintenance of processing units and facilities. Where appropriate they are based
on, or reference is made to, national and international standards and codes of practice.
The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied by
PETRONAS' OPUs in oil and gas production facilities, refineries, gas processing plants, chemical
plants, marketing facilities or any other such facility, and thereby to achieve maximum technical
and economic benefit from standardisation.
The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and
decision to implement. This is of particular importance where PTS may not cover every
requirement or diversity of condition at each locality. The system of PTS is expected to be
sufficiently flexible to allow individual operating units to adapt the information set forth in PTS to
their own environment and requirements.
When Contractors or Manufacturers/Suppliers use PTS they shall be solely responsible for the
quality of work and the attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In
particular, for those requirements not specifically covered, the Principal will expect them to follow
those design and engineering practices which will achieve the same level of integrity as reflected
in the PTS. If in doubt, the Contractor or Manufacturer/Supplier shall, without detracting from his
own responsibility, consult the Principal or its technical advisor.
The right to use PTS rests with three categories of users :
1)
2)
3)

PETRONAS and its affiliates.

Other parties who are authorised to use PTS subject to appropriate contractual
arrangements.
Contractors/subcontractors and Manufacturers/Suppliers under a contract with
users referred to under 1) and 2) which requires that tenders for projects,
materials supplied or - generally - work performed on behalf of the said users
comply with the relevant standards.

Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements with
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to ascertain how users implement this requirement.

CONTENTS

1.

INTRODUCTION

2.

SCOPE

3.

DEFINITIONS

4.

ABBREVIATIONS

5.

REFERENCES

6.

PHILOSOPHY

6.1

SYNOPSIS

6.2

POLICY

6.3

6.4

6.2.1

Approach

6.2.2

Safe Haven Concept

6.2.3

Risk Criteria

FACILITIES ORIENTATION
6.3.1

Overview

6.3.2

Basic Orientation

6.3.3
6.3.4
6.3.5
6.3.6
6.3.7
6.3.8
6.3.9
6.3.10
6.3.11
6.3.12
6.3.13
6.3.14

TEMPSCs
Boat Landings
Risers
Cranes
Pipeline/Flowline Routing
Vent Location
Helicopter Approach
Equipment Exhausts/Air-intakes
Drilling Vessel Approach
Construction/Maintenance Vessel Mooring
Shipping Lanes
Future Expansion

MODULE/AREA SEPARATION
6.4.1

General

6.4.2

Hazardous Area Requirements

6.4.3

Fire Protection Requirements

6.4.3.1

Jet Fires

6.4.3.2

Pool Fires

6.4.3.3

Vapour Cloud Explosions

6.4.4

Means of Escape

6.4.5

Escape Routes

6.5

EQUIPMENT SEPARATION/LOCATION
6.5.1

General

6.5.2

Access Arrangements

6.5.3

Firewalls/Blastwalls

6.5.4

Control/Radio Rooms

6.5.5

Risers

6.5.6

Hydrocarbon Inventories

6.5.7

Human Factors and Ergonomics

APPENDICES
I

APPROACH TO ASSESSING RISER/SAFE HAVEN SEPARATION

II

JET FIRES - ESTIMATION OF SIZE

III

POOL FIRES - ESTIMATION OF SIZE

IV

TIME TO FAILURE OF STRUCTUUAL ELEMENTS UNDER THERMAL IMPACT

OVERPRESSURE EFFECTS

REVISION REGISTER

Revision No.

Date

Details of Revision

7/91

First Issue

1.

INTRODUCTION
This philosophy has been prepared to define a consistent approach to layouts
offshore facilities operated by PETRONAS.

for

The philosophy incorporates many topics raised by the review of safety systems and
procedures in PETRONAS dated 5/12/88. This review was undertaken in response to
the Piper Alpha incident) and the need to prevent or minimise the possibility of a similar
chain of events occurring at an PETRONAS facility.
Despite the fact that this philosophy was prompted by the need to design out, or
minimise the likelihood of disasters, it should be emphasised that the bulk of the
philosophy addresses good layout design for normal operating conditions.

2.

SCOPE
This philosophy aims to give guidelines as to layout requirements for offshore
complexes, and individual platforms. This philosophy will be used for all new designs and
will serve as a basis for review of existing facilities.
The philosophy is specific to the open, naturally ventilated platform design used by
PETRONAS for their offshore fields in East Malaysia. It is also specific to PETRONAS
complexes which comprise multiple bridge-linked platforms.
The guidelines can be summarised as follows
-

Basic company policy is laid out in; Section 6.2 'Policy'.

Macro layout considerations, including designing for the effects of jet fires and
pool fires are described in Section 6.3 'Facilities Orientation' and Section 6.4
'Module/Area Separation'.
Further requirements relating to individual items of equipment and their
location are included in Section 6.5 'Equipment Separation/Location'.

Specific topics include

-

The Safe Haven Concept

Risk Criteria
TEMPSC and Boat Landing Locations
Riser Location
Jet Fires
Pool Fires
Escape Routes
Firewalls/Blastwalls
Control/Radio Room Locations
Hydrocarbon Inventories

3.

DEFINITION

RISK
A function of probability of occurrence of an undesirable event together with a measure
of its adverse consequences. This definition can be extended to more than one event,
i.e. covering also the risk of activities.

PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION

Passive fire protection is protection that requires no activation, is always present
and capable of protecting. Primary means of passive fire protection are fire barriers,
firewalls and fire proofed materials.
SAFE HAVEN
A Safe Haven is an area within which personnel may take refuge for the duration of the
incident or pending their evacuation from the installation. For the Safe Haven to be
effective it must be able to withstand the most severe external fire environment to
which it may be reasonably expected to be exposed. The environment within the
Safe Haven must also be commensurate with life support requirements.
The opportunity to provide a Safe Haven is thus usually limited to those installations
where there is a living quarters. On such installations the living quarters must be the
Safe Haven.
GROUP
PETRONAS

4.

ABBREVIATIONS
EP

Exploration and Production

ESD

Emergency Shutdown

FAR

Fatal Accident Rate

FAFR

Fatal Accident Frequency Rate

GPA

General Platform Alarm

HSE

Health and Safety Executive (U.K.)

INMARSAT

International Marine Satellite

LER

Local Equipment Room

LFL

Lower Flammable Limit

POB

Personnel on Board

SIPROD

Simultaneous Production and Drilling

TEMPSC

Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft

5.

REFERENCES
a)

EP 55000 EP Safety Manual

b)

SES 65.1 Hazardous Area Classification

c)

SES 88.1 Fire & Gas Detection and Protection Systems

d)

SES 88.2 Offshore Safety - Shutdown and Alarm Systems

e)

SEP 88.2 Topsides Riser Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Valve's and Riser
Fenders

f)

SEP 88.3 Fire Protection

g)

SEP - DRAFT Platform Drainage and Sump Systems, issued under cover
memo ref. EDV/4-89/612.

h)

TECHNICA Report no. C1887.3 - Sarawak Shell Berhad, D35 Conceptual

Design Risk Assessment Study of Complex Layout Options

j)

EP 90-1045 RISER - Riser Safety Evaluation Routine

k)

TECHNICA Report No. C1949 - Bardegg Project, Risk Assessment

Study of the Baronia-B Complex.

1)

VERITEC Report No. 88-3485 - Pipeline Isolation Risk Assessment of E11,

ERB WEST and SOUTH FURIOUS.

m)

U.K. Department of Energy - Piper Alpha Technical Investigation Further Report.

n)

SES 95.4 Helidecks on Fixed and Mobile Offshore Installations.

p)

NFPA 101 Safety to Life from Fire in Buildings and Structures.

q)

1S9 6385 1981 (E) Ergonomic principles of the design of work systems.

Other relevant documents not directly used in production of this PTS are:
r)

EP 90-2500 Platform Layout Considerations.

s)

NFPA 101M Alternative Approaches to Life Safety.

6.

PHILOSOPHY

6.1

SYNOPSIS
The safety of offshore platforms and complexes can be optimised by segregating groups
of equipment. In particular, escalation of events to risers can be minimised by good
layout. This philosophy emphasises an already existing design trend to physically
separate risers and other groups of equipment from each other, to optimise safety.
Physical separation by distance is preferred to other means of separation, such as by the
use of firewalls and is relatively easy to achieve with the type of standard bridge linked
platforms employed throughout PETRONAS.
A procedure for assessing whether adequate separation is provided between risers
and living quarters is included in Appendix I. This procedure is conservative in that it
initially sets out to separate risers and living quarters such that no ignited riser leak (in
any direction) can impinge on the quarters. Only where it is impossible to achieve this
aim by simple engineering means (relocation of risers to other platforms within a
complex, extending bridge lengths, etc.) does the procedure consider layout solutions
which may expose living quarters to jet fires of short duration, or to prolonged jet fires but
with a very low probability of such events happening.

6.2

POLICY

6.2.1

Approach
The Company priority for protection is :-

1.
2.
3.
4.

Personnel
Environment
Production
Equipment

Protection of personnel and other priorities must be provided by the following

-

Adequate means of escape and survival

Sufficient mechanical and structural integrity under emergency conditions to
permit escape of personnel.
Segregation of modules to reduce fire spread.
Containment of flammable and substances hazardous health to health.
Employment of a fail safe ESD system.
Provision of appropriate means of fire fighting.
Minimisation of hydrocarbon inventories.

It should be clearly recognised that the safety of personnel is paramount. As a

consequence personnel should not be endangered by attempting to protect lower priority
items, so personnel must retreat to a safe location, and if need be, allow the loss of
equipment rather than expose themselves to high levels of risk.
This PTS outlines layout considerations which can provide protection in line with
some of the points. above. Other points are addressed in the PTSs on Fire Protection
and Topsides Riser Emergency Shutdown (ESD) valves and other documents,
references (b) to (f).

6.2.2

Safe Haven Concept

One of the main conclusions of the Piper Alpha Report (Ref. m) is that personnel must
be able to retreat to, and shelter safely in a suitable location until it is safe to evacuate, or
until the incident is no longer a threat to personnel. Where a platform complex includes
a living quarters the main 'Safe Haven' must be the living quarters. The Safe Haven
(Living Quarters) must be located and/or protected such that personnel within will survive
any probable fire scenario.
The necessity of providing a Safe Haven at complexes where living quarters are
provided is based on three main premises. Firstly, personnel within the living quarters will
survive the initial effects of even the most severe fires, therefore there is the possibility to
save those personnel. Secondly, most PETRONAS living quarters are on separate
structures to other facilities, this provides a good opportunity for personnel on the
facilities to escape from a situation which may escalate (leak or small fire) and shelter in
a relatively safe location. Thirdly, the quarters are the main location at which mustering,
evacuation and emergency response can be organised and thus, where personnel can
reach the quarters this offers their best chance to survive and/or escape.
At individual satellite platforms or complexes where there are no living' quarters similar
benefits of providing a Safe Haven do not exist. Firstly, most personnel on open decks
will not survive the initial effects of severe fires, particularly, if they are on the same
deck as the fire source. Secondly, without a separate structure to escape to, the
ability of personnel to put sufficient distance between themselves and the source of a
leak or small fire is limited. Indeed, the creation of a haven which cannot be practically
designed to withstand severe fires may lead to personnel being trapped within that
haven. Thirdly, individual satellite platforms and complexes without living quarters do not
have a single location at which mustering, evacuation and emergency response can
be easily organised.

For these reasons, where there are no living quarters, it is not intended to create a Safe
Haven. Instead emphasis should be placed on providing adequate means of escape to
ensure survivors of initial incidents can put sufficient distance between themselves
and the source of an incident.
At all facilities, rooms/modules may offer opportunities for personnel to shelter from
some fire scenarios. Such rooms/modules should only be used when escape to the
Safe Haven or sea is not possible. Similar considerations to those used in Appendix I to
assess the wall rating for the Safe Haven may be used for these rooms/modules.
However, additional protection for such rooms/modules should be assessed from the
point of view of reduction in risk achieved versus cost, whereas protection of the Safe
Haven is not negotiable.
6.2.3

Risk Criteria
As defined, risk is the product of probability of occurance of an undesirable event
together with a measure of its adverse consequences. The procedure in Appendix I
initially aims to reduce the risk of a riser incident destroying the living quarters (a high
consequence event) to zero. However, it should be appreciated, that in many cases the
probability of such an occurance may be very low. Thus, it is implicit in the
procedure that where it is impractical (or prohibitively expensive) to reduce the risk
of such events to zero, it may be necessary to accept some low risk to the living
quarters. Equally, at some point the increase in risk due to extra construction and
maintenance activities required to design out a particular source of risk may balance or
even outweigh the reduction in risk afforded by such measures. In such cases it may be
necessary to accept some low risk to the living quarters, in favour of a lower overall risk.
The procedure includes several steps which ask the question "is the increased risk due
to riser location acceptable?" For guidance as to how to assess risk levels refer to EP
55000 Part 18 (particularly sections 1830 and 1840).

6.3

FACILITIES ORIENTATION

6.3.1

Overview
This section outlines design considerations necessary to achieve a good overall layout of
a group of platforms and also discusses factors influencing the orientation of both an
individual platform and a group of platforms.

Points in this section address overall platform/complex orientation together with the
relative location of major equipment groups. Section 6.4 addresses equipment
separation and layout in more detail.
The first paragraph on basic orientation is most important with the last paragraph on
future expansion being of secondary importance. The other paragraphs cover
points of similar importance and where conflict arises between requirements a project
specific compromise will need to be made.
6.3.2

Basic Orientation
In line with maintaining the integrity of the Safe Haven the preferred location for the
Living Quarters is upwind and upcurrent of hydrocarbon handling facilities. The
intention of this requirement is to ensure that in the event of a major gas leak or oil spill
burning on the sea surface, the leak or spill will tend to drift away from the Safe Haven.
In the South China Sea wind rosettes show two predominant wind directions at a little
less than 180 to each other. One direction can account for up to 30% of all winds and
the second direction around 15% of all winds. The wind rosette should be carefully
considered, to ensure that the Safe Haven is not downwind of the predominant wind
directions. This can usually be achieved by off-setting the living quarters in relation to
the main axis of wind directions. Only when it can be clearly demonstrated that the
magnitude of such a leak or spill is too small to endanger the Safe Haven should other
orientations be considered.
Where constraints exist on providing good platform orientation for example when
additional platforms are added to a complex which were not foreseen as part of the
original development) other means of mitigating the risks arising from the sub-optimum
orientation should be adopted. These means should not be limited to layout
improvements and topics such as firewalls, escape ways, hydrocarbon inventories,
radiation shielding etc., discussed in this philosophy, but should also include other
measures in other referenced documents such as improved gas detection more
rigourous ESD requirements, etc..

6.3.3

TEMPSCs
These should be located such that non-hazardous equipment or structures tend to
shield the TEMPSCs and adjacent muster stations from heat which could arise
during a fire at the facilities handling hydrocarbons. Where TEMPSCs and adjacent
mustering areas may be exposed to heat radiation which could damage the TEMPSC or
injure personnel, consideration should be given to installing local heat shielding. The
TEMPSCs should point away from the facilities. The TEHPSCs should be pointed such
that upon launching they do not cross each others path.

6.3.4

Boat Landings
Generally boat landings should be located on the lee side (downwind) of facilities.
For single jackets a side downwind of the most prevalent wind direction is usually
chosen. For a series of bridge linked platforms boat landings can be located on several
different sides of the complex to allow for at least the two main wind directions (see
discussion on facilities orientation). At PETRONAS facilities escape to the sea is a viable
alternative to other evacuation methods.
In view of the importance of boat landings as a means of escape, the large number of
personnel present at living quarters and the probability that the Safe Haven is the safest
platform for boats to approach during an emergency, all living quarters must be provided
with a boat landing.

6.3.5

Risers
Risers upon rupture can potentially create gas clouds of considerable size. This
applies to all risers which when ruptured can produce gas i.e. gas lines, two-phase
lines and condensate lines. The cloud size is a function of riser diameter, operating
pressure and GOR or volatility in the case of two-phase and condensate lines.
If
individual risers can release gas at higher rates than other process piping, then the
layout should locate the riser(s) as far downwind as possible, relative to the other
facilities. The intention of this requirement is to minimise the probability of gas clouds
finding ignition sources and igniting.
To a lesser extent consideration should
also be given to keeping oil lines as far downwind as possible to avoid oil pools
drifting towards facilities, or large volumes of smoke being drawn into the quarters.
Currents will also affect the direction of drift of oil pools and where possible oil risers
should be located to allow prevailing currents to cause oil spills to drift away from the
facilities.
Note

6.3.6

Several recent PETRONAS complex designs have achieved optimum

separation of risers from ignition sources by the inclusion of separate
riser platforms, at reasonable cost.

Cranes
For normal transfer operations from supply boats, the preferred location for cranes is on
the same side of a structure as a boat landing, as supply boats will approach the crane
location into the prevailing wind. The crane location relative to the boat landing may
change if the boat landing needs to be relocated to meet other considerations of this
section, or if the crane needs to be relocated to achieve transfer of
equipment/supplies between specific deck areas.

6.3.7

Pipeline/Flowline Routing
The results of a rupture in subsea lines may not be as severe as a rupture in the riser
section of the line. This is due to two factors - the likely fire mechanism, i.e. gag or oil
pool rather than jet fire, and the increased distance between the source of gas and the
facilities. However, the inventories of hydrocarbons that can be released are still
considerable and the frequency of subsea failure having life threatening impact can be
many times higher, thus the possibility of damage to the subsea lines should be
minimised by ensuring that all vessel anchor patterns are not likely to interfere with the
lines and that objects cannot be dropped onto the lines. In particular subsea lines should
be routed such that they do not run beneath the drop zones of platform cranes in day to
day use. Soft mooring points can be considered where anchors cannot be kept away
from subsea lines.
Subsea lines should initially not be routed such that they are closer to the Safen Haven
than their associated risers. Where it is necessary to route subsea lines closer to the
Safe Haven the consequences of gas or oil pool fires arising from ignited leaks from the
subsea lines must be thoroughly checked, using a similar approach to that used in
Appendix I.

6.3.8

Vent Location
Vents should be located so that prevailing winds do not blow gas towards the facilities.
For remote vents, often located some 600m from the platforms they serve, the distance
between vent and platform may ensure gas concentrations at the facilities are well
below explosive limits. If dispersion calculations demonstrate this is the case
orientation of the vent with respect to wind direction is less important. For both platform
mounted, and remote vents the approach of boats and helicopters must be considered.
Under no circumstances should boat or helicopter approaches be through areas with
predicted gas concentration of more than 50% LFL. Similarly, approaches must be
2
through areas where heat radiation levels from an ignited vent are less than 5 kW/m .
This radiation level allows several minutes for boat crews to seek shelter or pilots to
alter course.
Dispersion and heat radiation calculations must be used to establish 'exclusion zones'
for boats and helicopters around a facility. If adequate approaches to boat landings and
helidecks are not possible with such 'exclusion zones', then the vent must be relocated.

6.3.9

Helicopter Approach
In addition to avoiding 'exclusion zones' around vents (as described in the previous
paragraph) a minimum angle of approach of 210, to a helideck is required. This arc
should extend 1000m from the helideck, and should be obstacle free. Details of
helideck dimensions and obstacle locations are given in Reference n.
The helideck must be located such as to allow helicopters to approach and depart
against prevailing winds (again see discussion on wind direction in facilities
orientation). No gas pIumes should be possible at elevations of less than 30m above the
helideck.

6.3.10

Equipment Exhausts/Air-intakes

Exhausts and air-intakes for large items of equipment are considered in this
paragraph. Exhausts must be orientated such that prevailing winds do not blow
exhaust gases towards air-intakes or across working areas. Air-intakes include major
equipment air-intakes and HVAC intakes.
The direction of exhaust gases relative to cranes and helidecks should also be
0
considered. Temperatures at helidecks should not exceed 55 C and there are similar
restrictions at crane cabs for operator comfort.
Air-intakes should not pull in air from, and exhausts should not discharge to hazardous
areas or from areas where gas concentrations approach 50% LEL.
6.3.11

Drilling Vessel Approach

In emergencies drilling vessels should drift away from drilling platforms, i.e the drilling
vessel must head into the prevailing monsoon current.

6.3.12

Construction/Maintenance Vessel Mooring

Clear approaches to platforms and complexes must be allowed for construction and
maintenance vessels.
When construction or maintenance work is planned for platforms or complexes which are
in operation particular care must be taken to avoid high gas concentration from vents or
high heat radiation levels from flares or ignited vents. It is preferable to arrange vessel
approaches relative to vent/flare locations, to design out these possibilities, noting that
any layout which may impose production restrictions on the facility to reduce gas
concentrations/heat radiation carries an economic penalty. Vessel locations should
not restrict TEMPSC launching.

6.3.13

Shipping Lanes
If living quarters are included at complexes located near to major shipping lanes, location
of the living quarters on the opposite side of the complex to the shipping lane should be
considered to provide some shielding of the living quarters from ship collision. Other
measures to protect facilities from ship collision, such as installation of radar on the
facilities should also be considered.

6.3.14

Future Expansion
The location of possible future platforms which may be added to complexes must be
considered. How such future platforms can be integrated into the complex should be
considered in relation to all the points raised in this section. while it is not realistic
to pre-invest large amounts of Capex for future platforms which may or may not be
installed, some pre-investment should be considered for probable developments, if it
allows costly modifications to be avoided in the future.
In particular any future development which would bring risers and living quarters into
close proximity must be viewed very carefully. Also the impact of poor construction
vessel access for future installation work should be assessed when comparing
alternative layout options.

6.4

MODULE/AREA SEPARATION

6.4.1

General
Modules or areas containing particular types of equipment should be physically
separated from one another. Specific types of equipment are:
-

Wellheads (including Production Manifolds)

Drilling Equipment
Risers
Process Equipment (including Compression)
Utilities (including Power Generation)
Living Quarters
Control/Safety/Communication/Life Support Systems

The intent of segregating equipment into modules or areas, dependent upon type, is to
allow more and less hazardous groups of equipment to be separated in a logical manner.
The relative risks associated with each group of equipment must be assessed. The
generally preferred layout is then one that locates the highest risk equipment group
furthest from the safe haven, although this is not strictly necessary, provided it can be
demonstrated each group of equipment is sufficiently separated from the safe haven.
Note :

6.4.2

The risk assessment must take account of the exposure time as well as the
magnitude of a possible event - a drilling rig may be at the centre of a
blowout creating more damage than an incident in a compressor module, but
if the rig is only in use for 2 or 3 years and the compressor module may be in
use for 15 years, then the overall risk from the drilling rig may be less than
that from compressor module.

Hazardous Area Requirements

As a first pass at laying out platforms, minimum spacing between hazardous and nonhazardous equipment must be provided in accordance with Hazardous Area
Classification (SES 65.1). Generally this means a minimum of 7.5m separation
between equipment handling hydrocarbon and 'safe' utility equipment.

6.4.3

Fire Protection Requirements

Separation of modules or areas containing particular types of equipment must be such
that :
-

the possibility of a fire escalating from one module or area to another is minimised.

the Safe Haven is separated from other modules/areas such that the Safe Haven
remains sufficiently undamaged to provide adequate protection for personnel
under any likely fire scenario.

Specific fire scenarios which can occur are jet fires, pool fires and vapour cloud
explosions.

6.4.3.1

Jet Fires
Jet fires can occur when a release of high pressure gas or condensate is ignited.
Potential sources of a jet fire are process equipment, wellheads and risers handling gas,
condensate or two phase oil and gas. The most effective way of stopping any gas fire is
to stop the supply of gas. For process equipment automatic isolation and blowdown
must be provided in accordance with SES 88.2 (Offshore Safety - Shutdown and Alarm
Systems) to ensure the gas inventory feeding the fire is minimised. Similarly
wellheads are provided with subsurface and surface shutdown valves again controlled
by the facilities shutdown system. Closure of these valves ensures that the jet fire from
a leaking wellhead will be of short duration.
The short duration of jet fires from either gas handling process equipment (and
associated piping) or gas wellheads means that damage is usually local and structural
failure is unlikely. Minimisation of this damage can be achieved by good layout within an
area or module and/or by appropriate fire protection Systems (these are discussed
in detail in the philosophy on these systems Ref. f). Whether such jet fires may cause
damage to the Safe Haven should be checked. This can be done using software such
as TDGAS and FRED which predict flame lengths, and radiation levels for different
sizes of gas releases plus data on fire resistance times for structural walls in Appendix IV.
If such software is unavailable Appendix II can be used for initial estimates.
When considering the effects of a jet fire from a riser, it must be recognised that the jet
fire may be fed for a considerable length of time by the pipeline inventory. In this case
structural damage is likely and risers should therefore be located such that the collapse
of the adjacent structural members (jacket legs) does not endanger the Safe Haven.
Again the radiation levels and effects upon the Safe Haven walls can be obtained from
TDGAS and FRED or estimated from the tables in Appendix II.

It is recommended that for any likely source of jet fire the source is separated from the
Safe Haven by sufficient distance to prevent failure of the Safe Haven walls. This
separation may be achievable by re-arrangement of platforms within a complex or by
increasing bridge lengths. Consideration should also be given to installing an additional
jacket (tripod) to extend bridge lengths.
Should separation distances still prove
inadequate two further measures may be taken to ensure the integrity of the Safe Haven.
-

Upgrading of the Safe Haven walls. This is unlikely to be a solution if a riser

creates the governing jet fire case for facilities separation, unless the
pipeline inventory is sufficiently small so as to reduce the jet fire size rapidly,
however such an upgrade is pointless if the supporting structure cannot be
similarly protected.

Installation of a subsea valve in the appropriate pipeline. Subsea valves are not
100% reliable) and for most PETRONAS installations in relatively shallow water,
subsea valves are unlikely to be a more economic solution than providing further
separation between quarters and risers. However, for additions to existing facilities,
where it is impractical to achieve adequate separation, or for installation in deeper
waters, subsea valves may be a viable option.

The above measures should also be reviewed in light of their

(additional construction, maintenance, etc.).

impact on overall risk

It should be stressed that jet fires from riser leaks are unlikely to be directed towards the
Safe Haven. However the first aim should be to design out any possibility of the Safe
Haven being threatened. Only when this is not practical should risk analysis then be
used to determine the probability of threats to the Safe Haven. At this stage other more
probable flame directions can be considered and more accurate radiation calculations
performed using software such as FRED. This more accurate data can then be used in
the procedure in Appendix I, to summate the heat input to the Safe Haven walls
(and support structure). It can then be determined whether the separation between
risers and the living quarters wall rating is adequate.

6.4.3.2

Pool Fires
Pool fires can occur when liquid hydrocarbons leak onto a surface, and ignite.
Process equipment, wellheads and oil risers can leak and cause pool fires. As with gas
jet fires automatic isolation of process equipment, wellheads and risers must be used to
limit the extent of the spill.
However this on it's own may not lead to rapid exstinguishing of the fire and the pool
will continue to burn until the hydrocarbons have been consumed. The pool can form
either in drip pans or on plated platform decks or on the sea surface.
Extensive
equipment damage can be caused by a pool fire on a deck but damage to primary
structural members is unlikely. A pool fire on the sea surface can damage jacket legs.
Pool fires arising from the rupture of an oil riser can lead to large pool fires on the sea
surface which are likely to threaten the structural integrity of platform jackets.
Computor software, such as FRED can be used to predict the size of pool fires,
and resultant radiation. If such software is not available, Appendix III can be used
for initial estimates. These radiation levels and required separation distances must
be checked to ensure that the Safe Haven is not threatened.
It is recommended that for any likely source of pool fire the source is separated from the
Safe Haven by sufficient distance to prevent failure of the Safe Haven walls. This
separation may be achievable by re-arrangement of platforms within a complex or by
increasing bridge lengths. Consideration should also be given to installing an additional
jacket (tripod) to extend bridge lengths.
Should separation distances still prove
inadequate two further measures may be taken to ensure the integrity of the Safe Haven.
-

Upgrading of the Safe Haven walls. This is unlikely to be a solution if a riser

creates the governing pool fire case for facilities separation, unless the
pipeline inventory is sufficiently small or that the inflow to the pipeline is shut down
so as to reduce the pool fire size rapidly, however such an upgrade is pointless if
the supporting structure cannot be similarly protected.

Installation of a subsea valve in the appropriate pipeline. Subsea valves are not
100% reliable, and for most PETRONAS installations in relatively shallow water, this
is unlikely to be a more economic solution than providing further separation
between quarters and risers. However, for additions to existing facilities, where it is
impractical to achieve adequate separation, or for installations in deeper waters,
subsea valves may be a viable option.

The above measures should also be reviewed in light of their

(additional construction, maintenance, etc.)

impact on overall risk

Reducing the effect of pool fires from process vessels and storage tanks is
discussed further under the headings of Hydrocarbon Inventories in Section 6.5.6.

6.4.3.3

Vapour Cloud Explosions

When escaping gas mixes with air, prior to ignition, an explosion can occur.
Overpressure created by an explosion depends upon the nature of the explosive
mixture, degree of confinement of the gas and air mixture, and the degree of equipment
congestion within an area. Natural gas explosions are generally of the deflagration
type. Such vapour cloud explosions in the well ventilated, unconfined decks common
to PETRONAS installations (as opposed to confined or semi-confined explosions) create
very low overpressures, of around 0.1 bar.
Typically, explosions within an enclosed module can create overpressure of 1 to 3
bar, or even more with poor design. Care should therefore be taken when laying out
equipment to minimise the use of walls and roofs, and congestion of equipment and
piping. If enclosed modules are used, computor software such as VENTEX should be
used to estimate explosion overpressures.
In the context of the overall layout of areas/modules of different equipment type
within
a
complex,
explosion considerations are unlikely to introduce any
additional requirements.

Should a vapour cloud reach the Safe Haven and ignite, damage to lifeboats is possible
(see table of overpressure effects in Appendix V.) However following the explosion
the worst consequence is then burn back to the leak source and creation of a jet fire.
This jet fire will be of reduced size compared to that from the initial leak, as part of
the source's gas inventory will have been eliminated by the explosion. Location of the
Safe Haven in respect to such jet fire has already been discussed in this section.

6.4.4

Means of Escape
when a GPA is sounded at platform complexes which include living quarters personnel
are required to muster in the living quarters.
At complexes where there are no living quarters, or when personnel cannot safely
approach the living quarters, personnel are required to muster at alternative locations.
The alternative muster locations may be enclosed rooms such as workshops and dog
houses or boat landings, areas adjacent to life rafts and bridge linked support vessels.
After mustering personnel may then be required to evacuate the facility by TEMPSC,
helicopter, boat or directly to sea. Escape routes are required to enable personnel to
reach muster locations, and then to reach evacuation points. At PETRONAS facilities,
escape to sea is a viable alternative and escape ways must be provided to facilitate this
means of evacuation. Generally helicopter evacuation is unlikely, in emergency
situations.

6.4.5

Escape Routes
Escape from any module or area must be possible by two separate routes. Ideally,
retreat to the Safe Haven should be possible by two separate routes. However, this is
often difficult to achieve at typical PETRONAS complexes and a single approach to the
Safe Haven may be acceptable provided that the route is unlikely to be damaged and
that the approach to the route to the Safe Haven is reasonably sheltered. Where only
one escape route to the Safe Haven is provided, separate escape routes to other
platforms must be provided, where possible, and/or means of escape from any 'dead
ends' provided, such as boat landings and life rafts.

In the context of most PETRONAS installations, modules/areas are often on separate

bridge linked jackets. Providing two separate bridges from one platform to another with
landings separated by 20m or less may achieve little in facilitating escape. However
equipment must be arranged such that the bridge is easy to approach and that the
approach is sheltered from potential dangers. For large platforms, where an escape
route may require personnel to traverse a considerable additional distance to reach a
single bridge, consideration should be given to providing a second bridge.
The requirement for a second bridge will also depend upon the likelyhood and magnitude
of dangerous events upon the platform from which escape needs to be made, equipment
locations, number of personnel and bridge lengths.
On installations where the Safe Haven is on the same structure as other facilities two
escape routes into the Safe Haven must be provided.
Given the viability of escape to sea, two stairways on opposite sides of a platform must
be provided down to the sump pump deck, to allow access to boat landings. On
drilling platforms, particularly where SIPROD is planned, one stairway should allow easy
access to the widow-maker.
Escape ways should have a minimum unobstructed width of 1.0m, and be as direct as
possible with no changes in elevation. Where several deck levels need to be negotiated,
stairs from one level to another should lead directly to further flights to other levels.
Particular care should be taken at changes in direction to ensure routes are negotiable
by stretchers.
Escape routes should not be routed over drip pans where pool fires would make the
route impassable. Where it is not possible to avoid routing escape routes over drip pans,
solid plating must be used for that part of the escape route, rather than grating. If escape
routes pass close to piping and equipment likely to leak, consideration should be given to
using firewalls to provide local shielding for the escape way.

6.5

EQUIPMENT SEPARATION/LOCATION

6.5.1

General
This section provides guidance on how the plant should be laid out, item by item,
rather than by equipment groups, as discussed in the previous section. Details of, how
to space main items of hydrocarbon containing equipment are provided in Reference f.
In general high 'active' hazard equipment should be separated from high 'latent'
hazard equipment. For example large low pressure vessels (high 'latent' hazard) may
fail in a very short time if exposed to a ignited leak from a small high pressure vessel
(high 'active' hazard).

6.5.2

Access Arrangements
Access arrangements must be straightforward and simple. Operating and
inspection points must be accessible and visible from operating aisles, preferably
without the help of auxiliary platforms and ladders. Equipment parts, instruments,
valve handwheels and piping must not protrude into access aisles.
The location of normal entrance/exit points for personnel must enable easy access to
work areas. Good visibility of these entrance/exit points from key positions such as the
driller's console or crane operators cab is necessary.
Entry points from outside the installation must be located to meet security
requirements.
Access points by boat and helicopter must take into account flare, vent and exhaust
locations, pipeline routings, riser locations and hazardous areas.
Where
simultaneous drilling/workover and production may take place, sufficient space must
be available for pipe handling, mud handling, chemicals delivery, sludge removal
and other well operations without interfering with production installations or personnel.
Space must be provided for equipment replacement and lay down, such as turbines,
and for maintenance, such as tube bundles pulled out of heat exchangers.
No hydrocarbon containing or essential control equipment should be directly located
under the swing zone of a permanently installed crane, unless protected against loads
dropped from the crane. Essential control equipment is defined as any part of a control
loop from power supply to final element necessary to ensure safeguarding and other
emergency systems will function. The use of monorails to move equipment around
or between platforms, for maintenance is preferred, to avoid problems with crane swing
zones as discussed above.

Air intakes for ventilation systems must be taken from a safe area well clear of hazardous
areas and exhausts. Pig receivers and launchers must be near the edge of the platform,
orientated towards the sea with sufficient access to insert/remove pigs and not enclosed
within modules. Sufficient access between receivers and launchers should also be
provided to facilitate operation of the equipment.
Separate chemical storage areas must be provided away from escape routes, muster
areas and accommodation.
In addition to normal exit points, emergency exits may be necessary to ensure that
every work area has at least two exits. Wider and/or additional exits are required where
more than 50 persons may be present, such as dining or meeting rooms. Where no
regulations exist, follow NFPA 101 (Ref. p).
Access ways and stairways must be negotiable by stretcher teams.
Areas must be established where personnel may assemble with a greater degree of
protection from fire, H2 S and other hazards prior to evacuation. Access doors to these
areas must also be protected or distant from potential hazards.
Emergency equipment (life-rafts, breathing apparatus, etc) must be located in areas
sheltered from probable hazards in addition to that required in areas with specific
hazards. Routes from muster points to evacuation points must be as direct as possible
and must preferably be on the same level. Control rooms and alarm and emergency
control panels must be located in non-hazardous areas, except for simple
pneumatic control systems.
All firewater pumps required for protection of the Safe Haven must be located on the
Safe Haven Platform. Power supplies for the pumps and any auxiliary equipment
necessary to ensure operation of the pumps in emergency conditions must also be
located local to the pumps. The pumps should be located such that any probable fire
incident on the Safe Haven Platform cannot affect both pumps, common power supplies,
or auxiliary equipment.

6.5.3

Firewalls/Blastwalls
The use of walls to change the hazardous area classification of an area should be
minimised. Walls reduce the effects of natural ventilation, increasing the likelihood of
build up of flammable gas mixtures. Walls will also increase overpressures in the event
of an explosion. Separation of areas by providing open spaces between the areas is
preferable.

High explosion overpressures can be reduced by good layout and orientation of

equipment within areas. Areas should be kept as free of obstructions as possible, and
large items of equipment which reduce the area for explosion venting can be orientated
with their main axis parallel to the explosion venting path.
Walls on the living quarters facing hydrocarbon handling facilities must not contain
any windows. For living quarter walls not directly facing hydrocarbon handling facilities,
over and under pressures which could occur from explosions should be estimated to
determine whether windows will be damaged by such blasts. If damage is likely windows
should not be provided. Where windows are absolutely necessary for operational
reasons, then they must meet the fire classification requirements of the wall and be able
to withstand blast damage.

6.5.4

Control/Radio Rooms
Where living quarters are provided control/radio rooms must be integral with the living
quarters and shall be considered as part of the Safe Haven. This requirement is
intended to ensure that personnel can monitor an emergency situation, initiate shutdown
and blowdown of process plant (if not already automatically started), start firefighting
systems, check POB status and communicate with boats, the Emergency Control Centre
and other installations to determine the most appropriate course of action in accordance
with emergency procedures - all whilst being in a location safe from danger.
To maximise communications on the Safe Haven, during an emergency and
minimise evacuation times, it is preferable to have the control room, assembly points,
muster stations and TEMPSCs all on the same level as the bridge to adjoining
facilities. The radio room on the Safe Haven must be provided with communications
equipment plus all necessary power supplies and means of transmitting/receiving which
can reach nearby platforms, and allow relaying to the Emergency Control Centre, in an
emergency. As a minimum this should be HF/VHF radio to SOLAS requirements, and
consideration should be given to providing INMARSAT or other good communication
links during an emergency.
Where LERs are provided on individual platforms, these should be located close to the
bridge or stairway from which operators will approach the platform. This is intended to
allow checking of platform status and equipment control or isolation prior to reaching the
equipment itself.

6.5.5

Risers
Separation distances of risers from the Safe Haven have been discussed in Section
6.4.3 under jet fires and pool fires. As risers are generally the highest source of risk
to the facilities, risers must be located such that any fire or explosion on the
facilities cannot damage the riser shutdown valve, and minimises the likelihood of
damage to the riser below the riser shutdown valve.
A separate area (or areas) for risers is therefore preferred. Where process equipment
could create a fire which could damage the riser and/or shutdown valve, the riser and/or
shutdown valve shall be protected by fire resistant deck plating and possibly other means
of protection. The preferred location for the riser shutdown valve is in the vertical part of
the riser, under the cellar deck (Ref. e). The danger of a pool fire at sea level damaging
a riser below the shutdown valve must be considered and wherever possible, significant
hydrocarbon inventories shall not be located above risers.
The possibility that small ignited leaks from some risers can rupture other risers and
produce more severe riser fires must be considered. Risers which can create very large
fire situations upon rupture must be segregated from and separated as far as possible
from other risers. Alternatively passive fire protection can be provided for the risers to
which riser fires can escalate.

6.5.6

Hydrocarbon Inventories
Good facilities design must ensure all inventories are minimised by reducing design
margins, operating pressure etc., and by reducing the number of items of equipment
wherever possible.
Process vessels (separators) and diesel storage tanks are potential sources of pool
fires. Storage of large volumes of liquid hydrocarbons (more than that required for day
tanks for emergency equipment) must be avoided in or adjacent to the Safe Haven. The
location of large volumes such as oil/gas separators and main diesel storage tanks must
consider the pool fire scenario as discussed in Section 6.4.3.2. Whenever possible large
volumes must be located at the lowest platform level. Where this is not possible either
drip pans or other means of drainage shall be provided to allow the spill to flow away, or
plated deck must be provided to prevent spillage onto personnel below. When
considering drainage, the drain system provided must be of sufficient capacity to contain
or remove (adequately sized drain line) the spillage and seals must be provided to
prevent any pool fire from spreading to other areas via the drain system (Ref. g).

Other means of limiting the effects of liquid hydrocarbon spillage should be

considered, such as installing additional shutdown valves in liquid lines between
vessels and using several vessels or tanks (compartmentilisation) to reduce
individual inventories (particularly relevant in the case of diesel storage).
As well as minimising storage of hydrocarbons, the storage of all other flammable or
harmful chemicals should be reduced as far as practical.

6.5.7

Human Factors and Ergonomics

Ergonomics aims at improving the man-machine interface by examining the design
of products, tools and working methods for optimum efficiency and safety and taking
account of factors such as motivation, work stress and human relations.
Integrating ergonomics into the design has the following advantages:
-

reduction of fatigue and stress, thereby reducing the chance of error

improvement in job performance.

To determine:
-

the optimum layout for day to day operating controls

the optimum layout of emergency controls
the optimum layout for maintenance activities
the degree of automation required
the need for protective systems
the operation of various safety systems,

the following factors should be considered in the design stage and checked with the user
departments.
-

modes of operation/flexibility necessary

role of operators and maintainers
length of shift
skills and experience of operators and maintainers
availability of qualified maintenance personnel.

For information on "Ergonomic principles of the design of work systems" refer to : ISO
6385 1981 (E), (Ref. q).
In practice, with the low degree of complexity on most PETRONAS facilities such
considerations can usually be covered by involvement of operations and maintenance
departments during the design phase. Specific ergonomic studies are not required.

APPENDIX I
APPROACH TO ASSESSING
RISER/SAFE HAVEN
SEPARATION

APPENDIX II
JET FIRES
ESTIMATION OF SIZE

JET FIRES - ESTIMATION OF SIZE

Two steps are necessary to determine the extent of a jet fire.
1)

Calculate release rate

2)

Calculate flame length

Formulae to calculate release rates are given in this section together with figure Il-1 to determine
flame lengths, and resultant radiation levels for various release rates. Formulae are sourced from
Reference h, and radiation levels from Reference j.
Note: Of primary concern when considering the overall layout of a complex will be full bore ruptures.
It should initially be assumed that a jet fire can extend in any direction from a potential leak source.
Once the flame length has been determined a circle should be drawn around the leak source with that
radius to determine the possible effects on the facilities.
Only when facilities cannot be suitably separated to ensure the integrity of the Safe Haven under any
possible jet fire situation should the relative risks of jets in particular directions be taken into account.
This type of analysis is far beyond the scope of these rough guidelines and should form part of a
detailed risk analysis which will included analysis of flame width as well as length and other factors.
Gas Pipeline/Riser Leaks
The initial discharge rate of the gas at the beginning of the release is given by:

where
W
Cd
A
P1
R
M

release rate (kg/s)

discharge coefficient
2
area of orifice (m )
initial pressure (Pa)
universal gas constant (J/kg.molK)
molecular weight of gas (kg/kg.mol)

initial temperature of the gas (K)

ratio of specific heat capacities : Cp/Cv

The speed of the decay in discharge rate depends on the size of the inventory in comparison with the
discharge rate, and on the behaviour of frictional effects with time. The relative importance of these
effects is different for full bore and less-than-full-bore releases, and the two types of release are
discussed separately below.
Full Bore Ruptures
In full bore ruptures it is frictional effects which dominate the behaviour. On rupture, a
depressurisation front is formed; this enters the pipeline and travels along it rapidly. The release rate
drops because the frictional forces are increased by the increasing length of pipeline between the
depressurisation front and atmosphere.
The model used in this analysis assumes ideal gas behaviour and a simple pressure profile inside the
pipeline.
At a time t, the depressurisation front is a distance x from the pipe-break. The pressure is
assumed to rise linearly over the distance x, from atmospheric pressure at the pipe-break, to the full,
initial pressure P1 at the front. This assumption of linear pressure rise allows the frictional effects to
expressed in a simple form. The discharge rate equation is the one given above, but a value of Cd is
used which expresses the frictional losses along the length of the pipe. Cd is given by:

C d

1 +

4 fx
D

where:
f = friction factor, assumed to be constant
D = pipe diameter (m)
x = wave front velocity (m/s)
The speed with which the depressurisation front moves along the pipeline was calculated by
considering the rate at which material is removed from the pipeline. This gives the following
relationship for x as a function of t:
x =

D
4f

2 . 617 x 10 7 zft

MD

+ 1 2 / 3

where:

Substituting this in the expression for release rate gives:

W

AP 1 Z

2 . 617
1 +

1/ 3
x 10 7 Zft

MD

This model shows a dramatic reduction in discharge rate over the first few seconds of a release,
during which time the rate can fall to about 20% of the initial rate. The instanteous release rate at t =
0 is of little practical use, as no gas is actually released to produce a jet of the predicted length. To
check whether the initial release will reach the living quarters use t = 25.4 D (1 second per inch
diameter) to get an approximate value of maximum flame length.
When considering release rates at various time intervals, in accordance with the approach in
Appendix I, the mass of gas released over all time intervals should be summated and compared with
the pipeline inventory, to determine whether the inventory has been exhausted.
Small Hole Size
In this case the depressurisation front does not enter the pipeline, but stays at the pipe-break. The
release rate drops because the pressure drops as material is released from the pipeline. The pipeline
is treated as a pressure vessel, with a uniform pressure throughout the pipeline. This is a reasonable
assumption provided the pressure drop along the pipeline for the calculated flow rate is much less
than the pressure drop through the point of leakage; this should be correct for the smallest hole sizes
but this assumption may give conservative results for larger holes.
The release rate is given by:
C d AZ

RT
t
MV

W = Cd AP1 Ze
where
3

V = Total volume of the pipeline (m )

All other terms are as described above.

Unstabilised Crude Riser/Pipeline Leaks

When a pipeline containing a two phase mixture is breached, the ensuing blowdown is a complicated
interaction of a number of parameters. The initial flowrate through the orifice will be a mixture of gas
and entrained liquid droplets in the same proportion as is present in the pipeline. As the pressure of
the discharge stream falls to atmospheric, much of the liquid droplets will flash to the vapour phase.
As material is removed from the pipeline, the overall pipeline pressure will fall. This will cause some
of the liquid still present in the pipeline to flash, thus altering the relative proportions of vapour and
liquid present in the pipeline to feed the leak.
Accurate modelling of such a system is extremely difficult. It is necessary to make a number of
simplifying assumptions to allow meaningful results to be produced reasonably quickly.
The approach recommended is to use the gas outflow model described above to find the initial gas
rate through a particular sized hole for a given initial pipeline pressure. This gas flowrate is then
discounted by 20% to take into account the extra frictional effects of the presence of liquid droplets.
The mass flowrate of the liquid droplets is then assumed to be equal to that of the vapour phase, so
the discounted flowrate is doubled to give the total initial mass flowrate.
The total blowdown time for the pipeline is assumed to be the same as for a gas pipeline of the same
size operating under the same conditions. This seems reasonable given the higher pipeline mass
inventory and the higher mass flowrates.
It is appreciated that the above approach may be subject to significant error, but the impact
calculations are relatively insensitive to the exact discharge rate. The flowrates are initially very high
but they drop off very quickly. The resultant impact is a high level of fatalities outside
throughout a typical complex but no fatalities inside the quarters. This is generally true for all full-wellstream pipelines and risers.

FIGURE II-1: GAS JET HAZARD RANGES

APPENDIX III
POOL FIRES
ESTIMATION OF SIZE

POOL FIRES - ESTIMATION OF SIZE

For continuous releases of crude oil Figures Ill-1 to III-3 can be used to estimate the height and
diameter of a resulting pool fire. The release rate should be assumed to be the normal flow rate in the
line still being pumped from upstream facilities which have not shutdown.
Note:

3
Based on an oil with a density of 850 kg/m a flow in BPD can be converted to kg/s by
-3.
multiplying by 1.75 x 10

For instantaneous or short duration releases (such as volume released before a shutdown valve can
close Figure III-4 can be used to estimate pool diameter.
Note:

Volume released (m3) = 2 x 10-6 Qt

Where Q is in BPD
and t is valve closure time in seconds (if unknown assume 45 seconds).
For instantaneous releases assume flame height = 2 x radius.
Radiation levels at a distance x from the centre of the pool, can be calculated as follows:

D2
+ DH)
4

1)

Heat release QR(kw) = 40 (

2)

Radiation at distance x (m), in kW/m2

QR
2x 2

Figures III - 1 to III - 3 are sourced from Reference 1, and data for Figure III - 4 is from Reference h.

FIGURE III-1
CONTINOUS RELEASE
DIMENSIONS OF POOL FIRE

FIGURE III-2
CONTINOUS RELEASE
DIMENSIONS OF POOL FIRE

FIGURE III-3
CONTINOUS RELEASE
DIMENSIONS OF POOL FIRE

FIGURE III-4
INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE
DIMENSIONS AND DURATION OF POOL FIRE

APPENDIX IV

FIGURE IV 1
TIME TO FAILURE OF STRUCTURAL
ELEMENTS UNDER THERMAL IMPACT
(Ref. k)
TIME (MINS)

Unprotected steel beam (load

bearing)
Protected steel beam
Unprotected steel plate (nonload bearing)
Jacket leg
Jacket bracing
Semi-submersible column
Riser
AO Firewall
A60 firewall
A60(H) firewall
H120 firewall

TOTAL HEAT
2

JET
FLAME
5

POOL FIRE

37.5 kW/m

LOAD (KJ/m2

10

30

N/A

15
5

60
10

120
30

N/A
N/A

8
5
5
7
1
5
10
15

30
20
15
10
8
30
60
120

150
40
30
15 - 30
15
60
120
240

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
70
282
564
1128

Failure is defined as follows:

Load-bearing steel beams - temperature required to cause buckling, around 3500C.

Risers - temperature required to reduce tensile strength below hoop stress in riser, allowing for
possible increase in internal pressure due to closed-in gas.

Deck plates - temperature required to reduce the strength of the plates below that required to
support their own weight and the weight of any equipment resting on them, around 5000C.

Firewalls - temperature on the inside of firewalls rises by 1400C, or fire and smoke penetrated
firewalls. A wall surface temperature 1400C above ambient would produce radiation of 1.9
2
kW/m , sufficient to melt PVC insulation and start electrical fires, but not sufficient to ignite organic
materials by itself. It would make it impossible for people to remain in the area.

APPENDIX V
OVERPRESSURE EFFECTS

OVERPRESSURE EFFECTS

PEAK
bar

OVERPRES SURE
psi

EFFECTS WITHIN ZONE

0.1

1.5

"Repairable damage"
Cladding blown off.
Bridges and lifeboats impaired.
No fatalities.

0.3

"Heavy damage"
Firewalls and steel walls blown
out.
Process plant within module
ruptured; all inventory released
through large jets/pools. Process
plant in neighbouring modules
damaged; 30% inventory released
through small jet/pools.
50% chance of ESD valve closure
failing.

0.5

50% chance of Xmas tree leak.

0.6

Decks blown out.

30

Riser wall rupture (Technica, 1988)