MALAYSIA BETWEEN AMERICA AND CHINA: DEFENCE DIMENSIONS

Lt Col Isa bin Daud

ABSTRACT
Defence dimension is one aspect of bilateral relations between Malaysia with other states
through military cooperation. Malaysia as a small state has to manage its defence
relations with other states especially major powers such as the United States (U.S.) and
China to safeguard its interests and security. Despite Malaysias growing concerns and
apprehension towards China potential military threat to its territorial claim on
South China Sea disputes and despite Malaysias strengthened military cooperation
with the U.S., Malaysia had at the same time stepped-up its military cooperation
with China. This study thus sought to address what factors best explained the evolving
patterns and peculiarities in Malaysias defence relation with the U.S. and China over
the past decades? The main findings suggests that the higher the uncertainty about
Chinas security actions on the South China Sea disputes, the higher the likelihood for
Malaysia to adapt the seemingly contradictory approach of developing military
cooperation with China; the higher the economic interdependence of Malaysia towards
the U.S. and China, the higher the likelihood for Malaysia to develop more
comprehensive relations with the U.S. and China including defence relations; and the
domestic politics of Malaysia would play a major role in shaping Malaysias bilateral
military cooperation with the U.S. and China.
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia as a sovereign nation needs to protect its national interest, territorial integrity
and survivability. Malaysia has bilateral and multilateral relations with other states in
political, economy, social and defence dimensions. As a relatively smaller state in
Southeast Asia, she has to manage the relations with other states especially major powers
such as the U.S. and China in order to protect her national interests. She realises the
potential threat, the economic importance, the uncertainty of their relations and power
asymmetry between Malaysia with the U.S. and China. One dimension of the bilateral
relations between Malaysia with the U.S. and China is through defence relations which is
military cooperation.
Malaysia has several security issues with some countries and among the main
security issues are territorial claims in South China Sea with China. Malaysia perceived
the potential of assertive military actions of China on claiming its territorial claim in the
South China Sea with Malaysia since 1970s after China came up with its nine dotted lines
in the South China Sea as its territory. China also have built-up its military in order to
protect its territorial claim in South China Sea. In term of military capability, Malaysia
was not at par with China. As a smaller state, she supposed to balance the military power
of China in the worst case scenario if China would be more aggressive to Malaysia on
claiming its territorial claim especially after the Chinas incursion on the disputed islands
(James Shoals) in 2013, 2014 and 2015. However, Malaysia has stepped-up military
1

cooperation since 2013 with China despite this growing concerned on China as a
potential threat. At same time she was broadening and deepening its military cooperation
with the U.S. Therefore, it is puzzling that why, despite Malaysias growing concerns and
apprehension towards China and despite Malaysias strengthened military cooperation
with the U.S., Malaysia has at the same time stepped-up its military cooperation with
China. Therefore, this study will seek what factors best explain the difference of military
cooperation between Malaysia with China and the U.S.?
MALAYSIA-UNITED STATES AND MALAYSIA-CHINA DEFENCE
RELATIONS, 1957-1989
Malaysia (Malaya then) gained its independence from the British in 1957. Since
independence till 1989, Malaysia was going through the Cold War. The defence of
Malaysia was still under the patron of the British through Anglo-Malayan Defence
Agreement (AMDA) in 1957 (Hawkins, 1972: 16; Mak, 1997: 29; Chin 1983: 3,
Alagappa, 1987: 175) and later after the British East of Suez Policy in 1971; AMDA was
replaced by the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) in 1971 (Chin, 1983: 3,
Alagappa, 1987: 180: Baginda, 2002: 47). Malaysia as a smaller state (Acharya, 1997: 2)
relied on the major powers for its defence especially after independence (Chin, 1983: 3)
where she was facing internal and external threats during this period.
The characteristics of bilateral military cooperation from 1957-1989 between
Malaysia with the U.S. were initially indirect (AMDA 1957, FPDA 1971, assisted
Malaya in Emergency and Vietnam War); low level military cooperation; and then
institutionalised (BITACG 1984. In comparison, characteristics of the bilateral military
cooperation between Malaysia with China can best described as suspicion and distrust;
and with no defence ties. It showed that toward the end of Cold War, Malaysia was
increasing defence relations with the U.S. and there was no bilateral military cooperation
yet with China.
The main contributing factors on the shift and variation of the bilateral military
cooperation between Malaysia with both countries from 1957-1989 were military threats
perception, economic importance and domestic politics.
The first and principal factor was military and political threats perception.
Malaysia considered the U.S. as a close ally to the British and was not considered as
military and political threats to Malaysia during this period. Malaysia had long viewed
the U.S as a key partner for its economic wellbeing and security. In comparison, due to
Chinas support for the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) insurgency that tried to
overthrow the government and to Beijings overseas Chinese policy, Malaysia had
openly described China as the greatest threat to its security. Therefore, it could be argued
that the higher the perceived military threat of China, the higher the likelihood for
Malaysia to strengthen its military cooperation with U.S.
Secondly was economic importance. During this period, the U.S was the largest
trading partner of Malaysia. However, there were certain economic policies of the U.S
2

such as policy over tin and rubber made their relation strained. In comparison, during
this period, China was not considered as an economic partner since Malaysia
independence until Malaysia established diplomatic relations with China in 1974 and
China opened up her economy in 1978, the economic relations started to grow slowly.
Thirdly was domestic politics during this period played a role especially during
Tunku Abdul Rahman premiership from 1957 to 1969 where pro-Western and anticommunist as the focus of his foreign policy. For Abdul Razak and Hussien Onn, the
orientations of the foreign policies by not taking side to any major powers that based on
non-alignment and neutrality. For Mahathir Mohammad, the orientation of the foreign
policies was different from his predecessor where he was not very keen looking to the
west but to the east. The domestic situation influenced Malaysias foreign policies and
hence the bilateral military relation between Malaysia with the U.S. and China where the
bilateral military relation was heavily towards the West especially the U.S. rather than to
China and other communist countries.
MALAYSIA-UNITED STATES AND MALAYSIA-CHINA DEFENCE
RELATIONS, 1990-2004
After the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the surrendered of CPM, there was a shift of
bilateral military cooperation between Malaysia with the U.S. and China especially the
bilateral military cooperation between Malaysia and China. Malaysia had established
diplomatic relation with China since 1974 but the bilateral military relation was not as
good as other aspects of bilateral cooperation such as economic and political fields. In
contrast, the bilateral military cooperation between Malaysia and the U.S. was a
continuing process since the Cold War.
The characteristics that best described the bilateral military cooperation between
Malaysia with the U.S from 1990 to 2004 were continued institutionalisation
(Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) 1994) and focused on counter
terrorism since 2001. In comparison, features of the bilateral military cooperation
between Malaysia with China can best described as still suspicious and distrust on South
China Sea disputes; started senior officials visits (1991); started proposal on defence
industry cooperation (1993); began defence relations (Defence Attach (DA) 1995)
without any Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in defence; and military proposal
on student exchange (2003) but not materialised.
The main contributing factors on the shift and variation of the bilateral military
cooperation between Malaysia with both countries from 1990-2004 were military threats,
economic importance and domestic politics.
The first and principal factor was military and political threats perception. The
U.S. was not considered as a military threat but a political pressure to Malaysia. There
was a shift in this period where in the previous period the U.S. was not considered as a
political pressure to Malaysia. However, the bilateral military cooperation was not
affected by this political pressure perception. In comparison, there was a shift from the
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previous period where China was considered a threat due to its support to CPM and
overseas Chinese policy and in this period China was considered as a potential military
threat on South China Sea territorial disputes with Malaysia with its expansionist policy
in the South China Sea and its military modernisation. Since the perception of China as a
potential military threat, the bilateral military cooperation between Malaysia and China
was uneven because of the suspicious and distrust of Malaysia on Chinas future
intention even the bilateral military cooperation was strengthening throughout this period.
Therefore, it could be argued that the higher the perceived military threat of China, the
higher the likelihood for Malaysia to strengthen its military cooperation with U.S.
Secondly was economic importance. During this period, the U.S was still the
largest trading partners of Malaysia as the previous period but declining. However, the
bilateral military cooperation was strengthening, deepening and broadening as compared
to the previous period and a source of arms acquisition. In comparison, China was not
considered as a major economic partner but the economic relations started to increase.
Therefore, even the economic importance of China was increasing during this period; the
bilateral military cooperation was not given a priority by both countries and at a slower
pace. It could be argued that the higher the economic importance of China to Malaysia,
the higher the likelihood for Malaysia to develop more comprehensive relations with
China including on military domain.
Thirdly, domestic politics in this period played a role. Mahathir was focussing on
economic development rather than security. The orientation of his foreign policies was
different from his predecessor where he was not very keen looking to the west but to the
east. Malaysia domestic politics played a role on the bilateral relations between Malaysia
with the U.S. and China especially on economic importance affected the bilateral military
cooperation. Despite Mahathirs viewed the U.S. as a political pressure and China was
not a threat; the bilateral military relation was still close to the U.S. rather than China.
MALAYSIA-UNITED STATES AND MALAYSIA-CHINA DEFENCE
RELATIONS, 2005- 2015
As a relatively smaller state, Malaysia was very concerned on the geo-strategic political
and security environment throughout the period from 2005 to 2015. The U.S. rebalancing
strategy to Asia and its containment policy towards China (Saunders, 2000: 47) with
Chinas military modernisations and expansionist policy on protecting its territorial claim
in South China Sea that could create instability in the Southeast Asia region including
Malaysia. Malaysia had to manage bilateral military cooperation with both countries.
The characteristics that best described the bilateral military cooperation between
Malaysia with the U.S from 2005 to 2015 were: continued institutionalisation (ACSA
renewed 2005); deepening military cooperation (i.e. more exercises, high level
interactions, arms acquisition, more naval port visits); Malaysia supported the U.S.
troops; expanding on South China Sea security and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
cooperation. In comparison, the features of the bilateral military cooperation between
Malaysia with China were: began institutionalised (MOU 2005); expanded to (Defence
4

and Security Consultation (DSC in 2006), arms acquisition (2009) and military exercises
(Table Top Exercise (TTX) in 2014 and Field Training Exercise (FTX) in 2015) despite
growing apprehensions on Chinas incursions over South China Sea disputes at James
Shoals since 2013.
Based on the characteristics of the relations between Malaysia with the U.S. and
China, the main contributing factors on the bilateral military cooperation between both
countries during this period were the potential military threat from China on South China
Sea disputes with Malaysia where China started to be more assertive to Malaysia with the
incursions of Chinese vessels at James Shoals in 2013, 2014 and 2015, secondly was the
economic dependence of Malaysia to China since 2009 and thirdly was domestic politics
of different foreign and defence policies of different leadership from Abdullah Badawi
from 2003 to 2009 and then Najib Razak from 2009. However, other contributing factors
on power asymmetry and concerned of the uncertainty on major powers relations were
also quite significant.
The first and principal factor was military and political threats perception. The
U.S. was still not considered as military threat to Malaysia but a source of political
pressure and irritation on Malaysia internal affairs since 1998. In comparison, since
Malaysia has territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, Malaysia was
concerned on any assertive action of China to these islands. China became more assertive
to Malaysia on claiming its territorial claim in South China Sea dispute with the first
incursion occurred in March 2013, then, second incursion occurred in January 2014, and
the third incursion in June 2015 at James Shoals that posed a potential military threat to
Malaysia. Therefore, the U.S. was considered as external power that intervened in the
internal affair of Malaysia that threatened her sovereignty as independent country but not
affected the bilateral military cooperation of both countries. Therefore, it could be
argued that the higher the perceived military threat of China, the higher the likelihood for
Malaysia to strengthen its military cooperation with U.S.
The second contributing factor was economic importance. The U.S. was still
considered as a key economic partner of Malaysia during this period and a source of arms
supplies. It could be argued that the economic importance of the U.S. especially on arms
trade led Malaysia to strengthen it military cooperation with the U.S. against the
backdrop of Malaysia growing concerns on Chinas incursion on South China Sea
disputes with Malaysia in 2013, 2014 and 2015. China was already the largest trading
partner of Malaysia since 2009, hence Malaysia needed to ensure a good relations
because the economic dependence on China. One of the approaches was through
increasing bilateral military cooperation with China despite the three China incursions on
the disputed territorial claim in South China Sea. The economic importance of China was
increasing during this period; and at the same time, the bilateral military cooperation was
accelerating at a very fast pace after the incursions in line with the economic relations.
Therefore, it could be argued that the higher the economic importance of China to
Malaysia, the higher the likelihood for Malaysia to develop more comprehensive
relations with China including on military domain.
5

Third, domestic politics was also played very important role especially the
leadership who guide the bilateral military cooperation between Malaysia with the U.S.
and China through foreign and defence policy. Under Abdullah and Najib, the bilateral
military cooperation with the U.S. was strengthening despite the political pressure and
irritation occurred during this period. Malaysia was also strengthening its relations with
China in all aspects including defence relations. Malaysia opted to have closer bilateral
military cooperation with both countries where she was strengthening its bilateral
military cooperation with the U.S. and at the same time accelerated its bilateral military
cooperation with China despite Chinas incursions in the South China Sea disputes with
Malaysia since 2013.
Malaysia still perceived that the power asymmetry exist in the Southeast Asia
between the major powers competing to be hegemony especially between the U.S. and
China during this period. Malaysia as a relatively smaller country with lesser economic
and military capability when compared to U.S. and China could not compete with them if
direct military confrontation occurred. Malaysia could not develop and afford to build-up
its military capability at par with the U.S. and China. Therefore, Malaysia needed to
balance either through balancing (direct balancing or indirect balancing) or could hedge
against China. Since Malaysia had power gap with China, she chose to hedge (or limited
bandwagoning) with China and at the same time sought closer military cooperation with
the U.S. as insurance if any military conflict occurs in the future with China. Therefore,
the higher the concern about the power asymmetry exists between Malaysia with the U.S.
and China, the higher the likelihood for Malaysia to enhance its military cooperation with
the U.S. and China.
Malaysia always had uncertainty of big power relations in the region between the
major powers. Malaysia was trying not to align with any major powers. Malaysia
concerned of the uncertainty in big power relations made Malaysia cautious and
suspicious on her relations with these major powers especially after the Chinas
incursions in the South China Sea disputes with Malaysia. China was considered a
potential military threat to Malaysia and at the same time there was a power asymmetry
existed between them. Malaysia could not compete with the increasing capability of
military and economy of China. Malaysia had to rely on western major powers
especially the U.S. as insurance if facing direct confrontation especially from China on its
territorial claim in South China Sea disputes with China. Therefore, it could be argued
that the higher the concerns about uncertainty in big power relations, the higher the
likelihood for Malaysia to simultaneously develop and enhance military cooperation with
both the U.S. and China.
CONCLUSION
Based on the characteristics of bilateral military cooperation between Malaysia with the
U.S. and China from 1957-2015 from different periods of 1957-1989, 1990-2004 and
2005-2015, factors that driving and limiting Malaysias bilateral military cooperation
between Malaysia with the U.S. and china could be discussed. The main contributing
factors on the shift and variation of the bilateral military cooperation between Malaysia
6

with both countries were: military threats, economic importance and domestic politics.
However, other contributing factors of power asymmetry and uncertainty on major
powers relations also played some roles.
The first and principal factor was military and political threats perception.
Malaysia considered the U.S. as a key security partner since 1957 till 2015. The U.S. was
not considered as a military threat to Malaysia and therefore the bilateral military
cooperation was very close especially as a source for arms acquisitions, doctrine, training
and exercises for Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF). However, the U.S. was also
considered as a source of political pressure and irritation since 1998 and continued till
2015. However, it was not affected the bilateral military cooperation between both
countries. In comparison, Malaysia had always suspicious and distrust on China. It was
due to Chinas support for the CPM insurgency that tried to overthrow the government
and to Beijings overseas Chinese policy from 1957 till 1989, Malaysia had openly
described China as the greatest threat to its security. Then later from 1970s, Malaysia was
concerned on potential assertive actions of China on claiming its territorial claim in South
China Sea with Malaysia until 2012. However, this perception was not really affected the
bilateral military cooperation and it was starting to develop and institutionalised since
1991. From 2013, China started to become more assertive on its territorial claim in
South China Sea with the first incursion in 2013, second incursion in 2014 and then the
third incursion in 2015. Despite these incursions and the growing concerns and
apprehension of Chinas potential military actions on this territorial claim, Malaysia was
accelerating its military cooperation with China. It could be argued that the potential
military threat of China on these disputed claims as the main factor of the stepping-up of
military cooperation with China, since China was considered as a potential military threat
to Malaysia and at the same time there was a power asymmetry exists between them.
Malaysia could not compete with the increasing military capability of China. Malaysia
had to rely on western major powers especially the U.S. as security umbrella for its
defence and security insurance if facing direct confrontation on its territorial claim in
South China Sea disputes with China. Therefore, it could be argued that the higher the
perceived military threat of China, the higher the likelihood for Malaysia to strengthen its
military cooperation with the U.S. However, even China was perceived as military
threat to Malaysia, other factors on economic importance and power asymmetry was also
need to be considered.
The second contributing factor was economic importance. The U.S was the
largest trading partners of Malaysia until 2008 but continue to be a major trading partner
of Malaysia and a source of arms acquisition for Malaysia that could be one of the factors
contribute to the strengthening of military cooperation between both countries. However,
there were certain economic policies of the U.S such as policy over tin and rubber in
1960s, 1970s and 1997 made their relation strained but was not really affected the
military cooperation. In comparison, China was not considered as an economic partner
since Malaysia independence (most of the trade was conducted unofficially by the private
companies) until Malaysia established diplomatic relations with China in 1974 and China
opened up her economy in 1978, the economic relations started to increase. However,
since 2009, China was the largest trading partner of Malaysia. This economic dependence
7

including potential oil and gas exploration on the disputed islands in South China Sea
contributed to the strengthening of bilateral relations between Malaysia with China
including military cooperation. However, China was not considered as a major arms
supplier to Malaysia. Malaysia had the perception that the low standard and quality of
Chinese arms compared to the Western countries. Malaysia needed to ensure a good
relation with China because of the economic benefit. One of the approaches was through
increasing bilateral military cooperation with China despite the three China incursions on
the disputed territorial claim in South China Sea. The economic importance of China was
increasing during this period; and at the same time, the bilateral military cooperation was
accelerating at a very fast pace after the incursions in line with the economic relations.
Therefore, it could be argued that the higher the economic importance of China to
Malaysia, the higher the likelihood for Malaysia to develop more comprehensive
relations with China including on military domain. However, there was a limit on how
far Malaysia to strengthen its military cooperation with China since China was
considered a potential military threat on disputed islands in South China Sea after the
incursions since 2013.
The third important factor was domestic politics especially the leadership who
guide the direction on the bilateral military cooperation of Malaysia through foreign and
defence policy. During Tunku Abdul Rahman from 1957 to 1969, his foreign policy was
pro-Western and anti-communist and there was no diplomatic relation established. For
Abdul Razak and Hussien Onn, their foreign policies were not taking side to any major
powers that based on non-alignment and neutrality with the establishment of diplomatic
relation with China in 1974. This affected the bilateral military cooperation where there
was no military cooperation exist with China but there were military cooperation with the
U.S. from 1957 till 1989. However, the bilateral military cooperation with the U.S. was
still continued but with China was still not developed yet until the end of CPM threat in
1989. During Mahathir Mohammad from 1981 till 2003, his foreign policies was
different from his predecessor where he was not very keen looking to the west but to the
east. He also did not consider China as a threat. However, Malaysia was still
strengthening its military cooperation with the U.S. and at the same time started to have
military cooperation with China since 1991. Under Abdullah Badawi from 2003 to 2009,
the bilateral military cooperation with the U.S. was strengthening and with China was
developing incrementally including MOU in defence in 2005. Under Najib Razak, the
bilateral military cooperation with the U.S. and China was accelerating simultaneously
based on economic dependence of China to Malaysia since 2009 to ensure the ruling
government survivability; economic prosperity; and there is no political interference from
the U.S. in Malaysia domestic affairs. Previously, Malaysia was very cautious on
statement about the disputed islands with China but after the Chinas incursion on South
China Sea territorial claim in 2015, Malaysia publicly expressed its concerns on Chinas
intention and military action on the disputed islands. Despite, all the incursions,
Malaysia was still stepping-up its military cooperation with China and at the same time
strengthening military cooperation with the U.S. It showed that even China was
considered a potential military threat on its sovereignty in South China Sea disputes; the
ruling elites downplayed the threat because of the economic importance of China.
8

Other factor was Malaysia still perceived that the power asymmetry exist in the
Southeast Asia region from 1957 till 2015 between the major powers competing to be
hegemony especially between the U.S. and China. Malaysia as a relatively small country
with lesser economic and military capability when compared to U.S. and China could not
compete with China if direct military confrontation occurred in the future. Malaysia
could not develop and afford to build-up its military capability at par with China.
Therefore, Malaysia needed to balance (either through direct balancing (internal
balancing by build up its military capability) or indirect balancing (alliance with other
countries) or could hedge against China (step-up military cooperation with China and at
the same time to strengthen its military cooperation with U.S.). Since Malaysia had
power gap with China, she chose to hedge (or limited bandwagoning) with China and
while at the same time had close military cooperation with the U.S. as insurance if any
military conflict occurs in the future. Therefore, the higher the concern about the power
asymmetry exists between Malaysia with the U.S. and China, the higher the likelihood
for Malaysia to enhance its military cooperation with the U.S. and China. However,
Malaysia needed to consider on the defence relations with both countries because
Malaysia perceived that she could not rely on any country and needed to be close with
both of them especially after the assertive actions of China towards Malaysia in South
China Sea disputes since 2013 with the hope that China would not be more assertive in
the future with Malaysia. Therefore, the higher the concern about the power asymmetry
exists between Malaysia with the U.S. and China, the higher the likelihood for Malaysia
to enhance its military cooperation with the U.S. and China.
In addition to that Malaysia was also concerned on uncertainty of big power
relations in the region between the major powers from 1957 till 2015. Malaysia was
trying not to align with any major powers. Malaysia concerned of the uncertainty in big
power relations made Malaysia cautious and suspicious on her relations with these major
powers especially after the Chinas incursions in the South China Sea disputes with
Malaysia since 2013. China was considered as a military threat to Malaysia and at the
same time there was a power asymmetry exists between them. Malaysia could not
compete with the increasing capability of military and economy of China. Malaysia had
to rely on western major powers especially the U.S. as security umbrella for its defence
and security and as insurance if facing direct confrontation especially from China on its
territorial claim in South China Sea disputes with China. Therefore, it could be argued
that the higher the concerns about uncertainty in big power relations, the higher the
likelihood for Malaysia to simultaneously develop and enhance military cooperation with
both the U.S. and China.
Therefore, potential military threat of China on South China Sea disputes was the
main factor of the stepping-up of bilateral military cooperation between Malaysia with
China and the U.S. as security insurance to Malaysia. At the same time Malaysia
leadership realised that there was power asymmetry exist where the military capability
was not at par with China. Malaysia was also weighed heavily on Chinas economic
importance and tried not to ruin this economic relation. Other factor includes concerned
of uncertainty of major powers relation in the region where Malaysia could not take any
side with any powers including the U.S. and China. All of these factors was considered
9

by the leadership to guide the direction of the bilateral military cooperation through
foreign and defence policy either to strengthened or decreased.
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