HEIRS OF JOSE MALIGASO, SR.

, namely, ANTONIO
MALIGASO, CARMELO MALIGASO and
JOSE MALIGASO, JR., Petitioners,
- versus SPOUSES SIMON D. ENCINAS and
ESPERANZA E. ENCINAS,
Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court of the Decision [1] dated November
26, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated April 28, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision [3] dated April 2,
2001 of Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon,
Sorsogon,
which
affirmed
the
Decision[4] dated August 22, 2000 of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon dismissing the
Spouses Simon D. Encinas and Esperanza E.
Encinas (respondents) complaint for unlawful detainer.

also attacked the validity of OCT No. 543 and TCT No.
T-4773, alleging that it was thru fraud that Maria was
able to register Lot No. 3517, including the disputed
area, under her name. The petitioners likewise moved
for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming that the
allegations therein indicate that it was actually an
action for reconveyance. Further, laches had already
set in view of the respondents failure to assail their
possession for more than thirty (30) years.[8]
In an August 22, 2000 Decision,[9] the dispositive
portion of which is quoted below, the MTC dismissed
the respondents complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered
1.

Dismissing the instant

case;

2.

Adjudicating
the
possessory rights over the
litigated portion to the
defendants;

Respondents are the registered owners of Lot No. 3517

of the Cadastral Survey of Sorsogon, which has an area
of 2,867 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4773.[5] The subject
matter of this controversy is a portion of Lot No. 3517
with an area of 980 square meters, which the Heirs of
Jose Maligaso, Sr. (petitioners) continue to occupy
despite having received two (2) notices to vacate from
the respondents.

3.

Ordering the Register

of Deeds to cause the
annotation of the equitable
title of defendants, who are
entitled to their fathers
rightful inheritance which is
part of the property in
plaintiffs TCT No. T-4773 as
a lien or encumbrance;

Lot No. 3517 was previously covered by

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 543, which was
issued in the name of Maria Maligaso Ramos (Maria),
the petitioners aunt, on February 7, 1929. Sometime in
May 1965, Maria sold Lot No. 3517 to Virginia Escurel
(Virginia). Three (3) years later, on April 5,
1968, Virginia sold Lot No. 3517 to the respondents,
resulting to the cancellation of OCT No. 543 and
issuance of TCT No. T-4773.[6]

4.

Ordering the plaintiffs

to
pay
defendants
the
amount of [P]10,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and

On March 16, 1998 and June 19, 1998 or approximately

thirty (30) years from the time they purchased Lot No.
3517, the respondents issued two (2) demand letters
to the petitioners, asking them to vacate the contested
area within thirty (30) days from notice.[7] The
petitioners refused to leave, claiming that the subject
area was the share of their father, Jose Maligaso, Sr.
(Jose, Sr.), in their grandparents estate. Thus, the
respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against them with the MTC, alleging that the
petitioners occupation is by mere tolerance and had
become illegal following their refusal to vacate the
property despite being demanded to do so twice.
The petitioners, in their defense, denied that their
possession of the disputed area was by mere tolerance
and claimed title thereto on the basis of their fathers
successional rights. That the petitioners occupation
remained undisturbed for more than thirty (30) years
and the respondents failure to detail and specify the
petitioners supposedly tolerated possession suggest
that they and their predecessors-in-interest are aware
of their claim over the subject area. The petitioners

5.

The cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[10]
The MTC gave more weight to the petitioners
possession of the contested area than the respondents
title as the former is founded on Jose Sr.s successional
rights and even held that the registration of Lot No.
3517 in Marias name created a trust in Jose Sr.s favor
insofar as the disputed portion is concerned. The MTC
also held that the respondents are barred by laches
from pursuing their cause of action against the
petitioners given their inaction for more than thirty (30)
years despite being fully aware of the petitioners
adverse possession and claim over the subject
property.
The RTC dismissed the respondents appeal and
affirmed the MTCs Decision dated August 22, 2000. In a
Decision[11] dated April 2, 2001, the RTC found the
respondents allegations relative to the petitioners
merely tolerated possession of the subject area to be
wanting. The RTC also concluded, albeit implicitly, that
the petitioners possession is a necessary consequence
of their title as evidenced by their occupation in the
concept of an owner for a significant period of time.
The dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED with the modification
that the annotations and the payment
of attorney[]s fees as ordered by the
Court a quo be deleted. The instant
appeal is DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
[12]

Consequently, the respondents filed with the CA a

petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. This was given due course and the RTCs
Decision dated April 2, 2001 was reversed and set
aside. In its Decision[13] dated November 26, 2007, the
CA had a different view and rationalized the grant of
possession to the respondents as follows:
The rule is well-entrenched that a
person who has a Torrens title over the
property is entitled to the possession
thereof. In like manner, prior physical
possession by the plaintiff is not
necessary in unlawful detainer cases as
the same is only required in forcible
entry cases. Moreover, the allegations
in the answer of [the] defendant as to
the nullity of plaintiffs title is unavailing
and has no place in an unlawful
detainer suit since the issue of the
validity of a Torrens title can only be
assailed in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. This may be
gleaned from Spouses Apostol vs.
Court of Appeals and Spouses
Emmanuel, where the Supreme Court
held that:
xxx
In the case at bench, petitioners are
the registered owners of Lot No. 3517
and, as a consequence of such, are
entitled to the material and physical
possession thereof. Thus, both the MTC
and
RTC
erred
in
ruling
that
respondents prior physical possession
and actual possession of the 980square meter disputed portion of Lot
No.
3517
should
prevail
over
petitioners Torrens title over the said
property. Such
pronouncement
contravenes the law and settled
jurisprudence
on
the
matter.
[14]
(Citation omitted)
The CA denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution dated April 28, 2008.
[15]

As earlier intimated, the petitioners anchor

their possession of the subject property on their fathers
right thereto as one of his parents heirs. The
petitioners insist on the nullity of the respondents title,
TCT No. T-4773, as the inclusion of the contested area

in its coverage was never intended. The petitioners

accuse Maria of fraud for having registered Lot No.
3517 in her name, including the portion that their
father allegedly inherited from his parents, thus,
reneging on her promise to cause the registration of
such portion in his name. It was their father who had a
legitimate claim over the subject area and Maria never
acquired any right thereto. Therefore, respondents
purchase of Lot No. 3517 did not include the portion
occupied by the petitioners, who succeeded to Jose Sr.s
rights thereto.
On the other hand, the respondents cause of action is
based on their ownership of Lot No. 3517, which is
evidenced by TCT No. T-4773, and on their claim that
they merely tolerated the petitioners occupation
thereof. According to the respondents, their being
registered owners of Lot No. 3517, including the
portion possessed by the petitioners, entitles them to
the possession thereof and their right to recovery can
never be barred by laches. They also maintain that the
petitioners cannot collaterally attack their title to the
subject property.
The point of inquiry is whether the respondents
have the right to evict the petitioners from the subject
property and this should be resolved in the
respondents
favor.
Between
the
petitioners
unsubstantiated self-serving claim that their father
inherited the contested portion of Lot No. 3517 and the
respondents Torrens title, the latter must prevail. The
respondents title over such area is evidence of their
ownership thereof. That a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein and that a person who has
a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession
thereof[16] are fundamental principles observed in this
jurisdiction. Alternatively put, the respondents title and
that of their predecessors-in-interest give rise to the
reasonable presumption that the petitioners have no
right over the subject area and that their stay therein
was merely tolerated. The petitioners failed to
overcome this presumption, being inadequately armed
by a narration that yearns for proof and corroboration.
The petitioners harped that the subject area was their
fathers share in his parents estate but the absence of
any evidence that such property was indeed
adjudicated to their father impresses that their claim of
ownership is nothing but a mere afterthought. In fact,
Lot No. 3517 was already registered in Marias name
when Jose Sr. built the house where the petitioners are
now presently residing. It is rather specious that Jose
Sr. chose inaction despite Marias failure to cause the
registration of the subject area in his name and would
be contented with a bungalow that is erected on a
property that is supposedly his but registered in
anothers name. That there is allegedly an unwritten
agreement between Maria and Virginia that Jose Sr.s
and the petitioners possession of the subject area
would remain undisturbed was never proven, hence,
cannot be the basis for their claim of ownership. Rather
than proving that Jose Sr. and the petitioners have a
right over the disputed portion of Lot No. 3517, their
possession uncoupled with affirmative action to
question the titles of Maria and the respondents show
that the latter merely tolerated their stay.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are

summary proceedings designed to provide for an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
the right to the possession of the property involved.
The avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, which have purposely been made
summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy
and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal
possessor of property from unjustly continuing his
possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the
maintenance of peace and order in the community.
[17]
The said objectives can only be achieved by
according the proceedings a summary nature.
However, its being summary poses a limitation on the
nature of issues that can be determined and fully
ventilated. It is for this reason that the proceedings are
concentrated on the issue on possession. Thus,
whether the petitioners have a better right to the
contested area and whether fraud attended the
issuance of Marias title over Lot No. 3517 are issues
that are outside the jurisdiction and competence of a
trial court in actions for unlawful detainer and forcible
entry. This is in addition to the long-standing rule that
a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which
an ejectment proceeding, is not an exception.
In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion,
[18]
a similar allegation possession of the property in
dispute since time immemorial was met with rebuke as
such possession, for whatever length of time, cannot
prevail over a Torrens title, the validity of which is
presumed and immune to any collateral attack.
In this case, the trial court found that
respondent owns the property on the
basis of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
12892, which was issued in the name
of Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x married
to Nenita L. Songco. It is a settled rule
that the person who has a Torrens title
over a land is entitled to possession
thereof. Hence, as the registered owner
of the subject property, respondent is
preferred to possess it.
The validity of respondents
certificate of title cannot be attacked
by
petitioner in
this
case
for
ejectment. Under
Section
48
of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, a
certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled, except
in a direct proceeding for that purpose
in accordance with law. The issue of the
validity of the title of the respondents
can only be assailed in an action
expressly
instituted
for
that
purpose. Whether or not petitioner has
the right to claim ownership over the
property is beyond the power of the
trial court to determine in an action for
unlawful detainer.[19] (Citations omitted)
In Salandanan,[20] the prohibition against the collateral
attack of a Torrens title was reiterated:

In Malison, the Court emphasized that

when [a] property is registered under
the Torrens system, the registered
owners title to the property is
presumed and cannot be collaterally
attacked, especially in a mere action
for unlawful detainer. In this particular
action
where
petitioners
alleged
ownership cannot be established,
coupled with the presumption that
respondents title to the property is
legal, then the lower courts are correct
in ruling that respondents are the ones
entitled to possession of the subject
premises.[21] (Citation omitted)
Given the foregoing, the petitioners attempt to
remain in possession by casting a cloud on the
respondents title cannot prosper.
Neither will the sheer lapse of time legitimize the
petitioners refusal to vacate the subject area or bar the
respondents from gaining possession thereof. As ruled
in Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants
Association, Inc.,[22] laches does not operate to deprive
the registered owner of a parcel of land of his right to
recover possession thereof:
It is not disputed that at the core of this
controversy is a parcel of land
registered under the Torrens system. In
a long line of cases, we have
consistently ruled that lands covered
by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. So
it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation
vs. Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of
acquisitive prescription is baseless
when the land involved is a registered
land because of Article 1126 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Act 496 (now,
Section 47 of Presidential Decree No.
1529).
xxxx
Petitioners would take exception from
the above settled rule by arguing that
FETA
as
well
as
its
predecessor[-]in[-]interest,
Don
Dionisio M. Fabella, are guilty of laches
and should, therefore, be already
precluded from asserting their right as
against them, invoking, in this regard,
the rulings of this Court to the effect
that while a registered land may not be
acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue
of the registered owners inaction and
neglect, his right to recover the
possession thereof may have been
converted into a stale demand.
While, at a blush, there is apparent
merit in petitioners posture, a closer
look at our jurisprudence negates their
submission.

To start with, the lower court found that

petitioners possession of the subject lot
was merely at the tolerance of its
former
lawful
owner. In
this
connection, Bishop
vs.
Court
of
Appeals teaches that if the claimants
possession of the land is merely
tolerated by its lawful owner, the
latters right to recover possession is
never barred by laches.
As
registered
owners of the lots in
question, the private
respondents have a
right to eject any
person
illegally
occupying
their
property. This right is
imprescriptible. Even if
it be supposed that
they were aware of the
petitioners occupation
of the property, and
regardless
of
the
length
of
that
possession, the lawful
owners have a right to
demand the return of
their property at any
time as long as the
possession
was
unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all. This
right is never barred by
laches.[23] (Citations
omitted)
It is, in fact, the petitioners who are guilty of
laches. Petitioners, who claimed that Maria fraudulently
registered the subject area inherited by their father,
did not lift a finger to question the validity of OCT No.
543, which was issued in 1929. Petitioners waited for
the lapse of a substantial period of time and if not for
the respondents demands to vacate, they would not
have bothered to assert their fathers supposed
successional rights. The petitioners inaction is contrary
to the posture taken by a reasonably diligent person
whose rights have supposedly been trampled upon and
the pretense of ignorance does not provide justification
or refuge. Maria was able to register Lot No. 3517 in
her name as early as 1929 and respondents acquired
title in April 5, 1968 and knowledge of these events is
imputed to the petitioners by the fact of registration.
In fine, this Court finds no cogent reason to
reverse and set aside the findings and conclusions of
the CA.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition is DENIED and the Decision dated November
26, 2007 and Resolution dated April 28, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

HEIRS OF ANACLETO B. NIETO, namely, SIXTA P.

NIETO, EULALIO P. NIETO, GAUDENCIO P. NIETO,
and CORAZON P. NIETO-IGNACIO, represented by
EULALIO P. NIETO,
Petitioners, - versus MUNICIPALITY
OF
MEYCAUAYAN,
BULACAN,
represented by MAYOR EDUARDO ALARILLA,
Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated October 30,
2001, which dismissed the petition for review of the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan. The latter dismissed a complaint to recover
possession of a registered land on the ground of
prescription and laches.
The antecedents are as follows:
Anacleto Nieto was the registered owner of a
parcel of land, consisting of 3,882 square meters,
situated at Poblacion, Meycauayan, Bulacan and
covered by TCT No. T-24.055 (M). The property is being
used
by
respondent, Municipality ofMeycauayan,
Bulacan, which constructed an extension of the public
market therein.
Upon Anacletos death on July 26, 1993, his
wife, Sixta P. Nieto, and their three children, namely,
Eulalio P. Nieto, Gaudencio Nieto and Corazon NietoIgnacio, herein petitioners, collated all the documents
pertaining to his estate. When petitioners failed to
locate the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24.055
(M), they filed a petition for the issuance of a second
owners copy with the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan. In that
case, petitioners discovered that the missing copy of
the title was in the possession of the respondent.
Consequently, petitioners withdrew the petition and
demanded from respondent the return of property and
the certificate of title.
On February 23, 1994, petitioners formally demanded
from respondent the return of the possession and full
control of the property, and payment of a monthly rent
with interest from January 1964. Respondent did not
comply with petitioners demand.[2]
On December
28,
1994,
petitioners
filed
a
complaint[3] for recovery of possession and damages
against respondent alleging that the latter was in
possession of the owners copy of TCT No. T-24.055 (M).
They averred that, in 1966, respondent occupied the
subject property by making it appear that it would
expropriate the same. Respondent then used the land
as a public market site and leased the stalls therein to
several persons without paying Anacleto Nieto the
value of the land or rent therefor. Petitioners prayed
that respondent be ordered to surrender to them the
owners copy of TCT No. T-24.055 (M), vacate the
property, and pay them the rents thereon from 1966
until the date of the filing of the complaint for the total

of P1,716,000.00, and P10,000.00 a month thereafter,

as
well
as P300,000.00
as
moral
damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
In its Answer,[4] respondent alleged that the property
was donated to it and that the action was already timebarred because 32 years had elapsed since it
possessed the property.
Respondent and counsel failed to appear during the
scheduled pre-trial conference.[5] Upon petitioners
motion, respondent was declared as in default and
petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex
parte. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
which the RTC granted. Respondent was then allowed
to cross-examine petitioners lone witness and present
its own evidence. However, despite notice, respondent
failed again to appear during the scheduled hearing.
Hence, the RTC considered respondent to have waived
its right to cross-examine petitioners witness and
present its own evidence. The case was then submitted
for decision.
On August 1, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the complaint as well as respondents
counterclaims for damages. For lack of proof, the RTC
disregarded respondents claim that Anacleto Nieto
donated the property to it in light of the fact that the
title remained in the name of Anacleto. Nonetheless,
the RTC did not rule in favor of petitioners because of
its finding that the case was already barred by
prescription. It held that the imprescriptibility of actions
to recover land covered by the Torrens System could
only be invoked by the registered owner, Anacleto
Nieto, and that the action was also barred by laches.

Petitioners appealed the case to the Court of

Appeals (CA). On October 30, 2001, the CA rendered a
Decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
According to the CA, the petition involved a pure
question of law; hence, petitioners should have filed a
petition directly with this Court.[6]
Accordingly, petitioners elevated the case to
this
Court
through
a
petition
for
review
on certiorari, raising the following issues:
A. Are lands covered by the Torrens
System subject to prescription?
B. May the defense of [l]aches be
invoked in this specific case?
C. May the defense of imprescriptibility
only be invoked by the registered
owner to the exclusion of his
legitimate heirs?[7]
The petition is meritorious.
Respondent argues that the action of petitioner
to recover possession of the property is already barred
by prescription.
We do not agree.

An action to recover possession of a registered

land never prescribes in view of the provision of
Section 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of a registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.[8] It follows that an action by the registered
owner to recover a real property registered under the
Torrens System does not prescribe.
Despite knowledge of this avowed doctrine, the
trial court ruled that petitioners cause of action had
already
prescribed on
the
ground
that
the
imprescriptibility to recover lands registered under the
Torrens System can only be invoked by the person
under whose name the land is registered.
Again, we do not agree. It is well settled that
the rule on imprescriptibility of registered lands not
only applies to the registered owner but extends to the
heirs of the registered owner as well.[9] Recently
in Mateo v. Diaz,[10] the Court held that prescription is
unavailing not only against the registered owner, but
also against his hereditary successors because the
latter step into the shoes of the decedent by operation
of law and are the continuation of the personality of
their predecessor-in-interest. Hence, petitioners, as
heirs of Anacleto Nieto, the registered owner, cannot
be barred by prescription from claiming the property.
Aside from finding that petitioners cause of
action was barred by prescription, the trial court
reinforced its dismissal of the case by holding that the
action was likewise barred by laches.
Laches has been defined as the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to
assert his right has either abandoned or declined to
assert it.[11]
In a number of cases, the Court has held
that an action to recover registered land covered by
the Torrens System may not be barred by laches.
[12]
Laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement
of an imprescriptible legal right.[13] Laches, which is a
principle based on equity, may not prevail against a
specific provision of law, because equity, which has
been defined as justice outside legality, is applied in
the absence of and not against statutory law or rules of
procedure.[14]
In recent cases, [15] however, the Court held
that while it is true that a Torrens title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose
his right to recover possession of his registered
property by reason of laches.
Yet, even if we apply the doctrine of laches to
registered lands, it would still not bar petitioners claim.
It should be stressed that laches is not concerned only
with the mere lapse of time. [16] The following elements
must be present in order to constitute laches:

(1)

conduct on the part of the

defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation of which complaint
is made for which the complaint
seeks a remedy;
(2) delay
in
asserting
the
complainants
rights,
the
complainant
having
had
knowledge or notice, of the
defendants conduct and having
been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his suit;
and
(4) injury
or
prejudice
to
the
defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or
the suit is not held to be barred.
[17]

We note that the certificate of title in the name

of Anacleto Nieto was found in respondents possession
but there was no evidence that ownership of the
property was transferred to the municipality either
through a donation or by expropriation, or that any
compensation was paid by respondent for the use of
the property. Anacleto allegedly surrendered the
certificate of title to respondent upon the belief that
the property would be expropriated. Absent any
showing that this certificate of title was fraudulently
obtained by respondent, it can be presumed that
Anacleto
voluntarily
delivered
the
same
to
respondent. Anacletos delivery of the certificate of title
to respondent could, therefore, be taken to mean
acquiescence to respondents plan to expropriate the
property, or a tacit consent to the use of the property
pending its expropriation.
This Court has consistently held that those who
occupy the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, are
necessarily bound by an implied promise that the
occupants will vacate the property upon demand.
[18]
The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but
whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner.
In such case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the
demand to vacate.[19] Upon the refusal to vacate the
property, the owners cause of action accrues.
In this case, the first element of laches
occurred the moment respondent refused to vacate the
property, upon petitioners demand, on February 23,
1994. The filing of the complaint on December 28,
1994, after the lapse of a period of only ten months,
cannot be considered as unreasonable delay
amounting to laches.

Moreover, case law teaches that if the

claimants possession of the land is merely tolerated by
its lawful owner, the latters right to recover possession
is never barred by laches. Even if it be supposed that
petitioners were aware of respondents occupation of
the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand
the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at
all.[20]
Furthermore, the doctrine of laches cannot be
invoked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and
injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly
by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches
when by doing so, manifest wrong or injustice would
result.[21]
Finally, we find that the rentals being prayed
for by petitioners are reasonable considering the size
and location of the subject property. Accordingly, the
award of rentals is warranted.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, dated August 1,
1995,
is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent
is ORDERED (a) to vacate and surrender peaceful
possession of the property to petitioners, or pay the
reasonable
value
of
the
property;
(b)
to
pay P1,716,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the
use of the property from 1966 until the filing of the
complaint and P10,000.00 monthly rental thereafter
until it vacates the property, with 12% interest from
the filing of the complaint until fully paid; and (c) to
return to petitioners the duplicate copy of TCT No. T24.055 (M).

certificate of title was issued. No formal deed of sale

was executed, but since the sale in 1928, or for more
than 30 years, vendee Catalino Agyapao and his son,
defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino, had been in
possession of the land, in the concept of owner, paying
the taxes thereon and introducing improvements.

SIMEON B. MIGUEL, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FLORENDO CATALINO, defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from the judgment in Civil Case No. 1090
of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, dismissing the
plaintiffs' complaint for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land, registered under Act 496, in the name of
one Bacaquio,1 a long-deceased illiterate non-Christian
resident of Mountain Province, and declaring the
defendant to be the true owner thereof.
On January 22, 1962, appellants Simeon, Emilia and
Marcelina Miguel, and appellant Grace Ventura brought
suit in the Court below against Florendo Catalino for
the recovery of the land above-described, plaintiffs
claiming to be the children and heirs of the original
registered owner, and averred that defendant, without
their knowledge or consent, had unlawfully taken
possession of the land, gathered its produce and
unlawfully excluded plaintiffs therefrom. Defendant
answered pleading ownership and adverse possession
for 30 years, and counterclaimed for attorney's fees.
After trial the Court dismissed the complaint, declared
defendant to be the rightful owner, and ordered the
Register of Deeds to issue a transfer certificate in lieu
of the original. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court,
assailing the trial Court's findings of fact and law.
As found by the trial Court, the land in dispute is
situated in the Barrio of San Pascual, Municipality of
Tuba, Benguet, Mountain Province and contains an area
of 39,446 square meters, more or less. It is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 31, which was issued on
28 December 1927 in the name of Bacaquio (or
Bakakew), a widower. No encumbrance or sale has ever
been annotated in the certificate of title.
The plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura2 is the only child
of Bacaquio by his first wife, Debsay, and the other
plaintiffs-appellants, Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina, all
surnamed "Miguel", are his children by his third wife,
Cosamang. He begot no issue with his second wife,
Dobaney. The three successive wives have all died.
Bacaquio, who died in 1943, acquired the land when
his second wife died and sold it to Catalino Agyapao,
father of the defendant Florendo Catalino, for P300.00
in 1928. Of the purchase price P100.00 was paid and
receipted for when the land was surveyed, but the
receipt was lost; the balance was paid after the

On 1 February 1949, Grace Ventura, by herself alone,

"sold" (as per her Transferor's Affidavit, Exhibit "6")
anew the same land for P300.00 to defendant Florendo
Catalino.
In 1961, Catalino Agyapao in turn sold the land to his
son, the defendant Florendo Catalino.
This being a direct appeal from the trial court, where
the value of the property involved does not exceed
P200,000.00, only the issues of law are reviewable by
the Supreme Court, the findings of fact of the court a
quobeing deemed conceded by the appellant (Jacinto v.
Jacinto, 105 Phil. 1218; Del Castillo v. Guerro, L-11994,
25 July 1960; Abuyo, et al. v. De Suazo, L-21202, 29
Oct. 1966; 18 SCRA 600, 601). We are thus constrained
to discard appellant's second and third assignments of
error.
In their first assignment, appellants assail the
admission in evidence over the objection of the
appellant of Exhibit "3". This exhibit is a decision in
favor of the defendant-appellee against herein plaintiffappellant Grace Ventura, by the council of Barrio of San
Pascual, Tuba, Benguet, in its Administrative Case No.
4, for the settlement of ownership and possession of
the land. The decision is ultra vires because barrio
councils, which are not courts, have no judicial powers
(Sec. 1, Art. VIII, Constitution; see Sec. 12, Rep. Act
2370, otherwise known as the Barrio Charter).
Therefore, as contended by appellants, the exhibit is
not admissible in a judicial proceeding as evidence for
ascertaining the truth respecting the fact of ownership
and possession (Sec. 1, Rule 128, Rules of Court).
Appellants are likewise correct in claiming that the sale
of the land in 1928 by Bacaquio to Catalino Agyapao,
defendant's father, is null and void ab initio, for lack of
executive approval (Mangayao et al. vs. Lasud, et al., L19252, 29 May 1964). However, it is not the provisions
of the Public Land Act (particularly Section 118 of Act
2874 and Section 120 of Commonwealth Act 141) that
nullify the transaction, for the reason that there is no
finding, and the contending parties have not shown,
that the land titled in the name of Bacaquio was
acquired from the public domain (Palad vs. Saito, 55
Phil. 831). The laws applicable to the said sale are:
Section 145(b) of the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu, providing that no conveyance or
encumbrance of real property shall be made in that
department by any non-christian inhabitant of the
same, unless, among other requirements, the deed
shall bear indorsed upon it the approval of the
provincial governor or his representative duly
authorized in writing for the purpose; Section 146 of

the same Code, declaring that every contract or

agreement made in violation of Section 145 "shall be
null and void"; and Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913,
extending the application of the above provisions to
Mountain Province and Nueva Vizcaya.
Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio
remained, in law, the owner of the land until his death
in 1943, when his title passed on, by the law on
succession, to his heirs, the plaintiffs-appellants.
Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the
appealed decision, we are of the opinion that the
judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florendo
Catalino must be sustained. For despite the invalidity
of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of defendantappellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to
enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without
protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and
the appellants, in turn, while succeeding the deceased,
also remained inactive, without taking any step to
reivindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the
present suit was commenced in court. Even granting
appellants' proposition that no prescription lies against
their father's recorded title, their passivity and inaction
for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the
defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense
of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of
plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and the
Court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with
favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and
inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time,
effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes
and making improvements thereon for 30 long years,
only to spring from ambush and claim title when the
possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an
opportunity to make easy profit at his expense. In Mejia
de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277, 281, this Court
laid down a rule that is here squarely applicable:
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and
circumstances, we are constrained to find,
however, that while no legal defense to the
action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the
defendant and that is, the equitable defense of
laches. We hold that the defense of
prescription
or
adverse
possession
in
derogation of the title of the registered owner
Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the
equitable defense of laches. Otherwise stated,
we hold that while defendant may not be
considered as having acquired title by virtue of
his and his predecessors' long continued
possession for 37 years, the original owner's
right to recover back the possession of the
property and title thereto from the defendant
has, by the long period of 37 years and by
patentee's
inaction
and
neglect,
been
converted into a stale demand.
As in the Gamponia case, the four elements of laches
are present in the case at bar, namely: (a) conduct on

the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he

claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (b)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases
his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the
suit is not held to be barred. In the case at bar,
Bacaquio sold the land in 1928 but the sale is void for
lack of the governor's approval. The vendor, and also
his heirs after him, could have instituted an action to
annul the sale from that time, since they knew of the
invalidity of the sale, which is a matter of law; they did
not have to wait for 34 years to institute suit. The
defendant was made to feel secure in the belief that no
action would be filed against him by such passivity,
and also because he "bought" again the land in 1949
from Grace Ventura who alone tried to question his
ownership; so that the defendant will be plainly
prejudiced in the event the present action is not held to
be barred.
The difference between prescription and laches was
elaborated in Nielsen & Co., Inc. vs. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, 17 December 1966,
18 SCRA p. 1040, as follows:
Appellee is correct in its contention that the
defense of laches applies independently of
prescription. Laches is different from the
statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned
with the fact of delay, whereas laches is
concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription
is a matter of time; laches is principally a
question of inequity of permitting a claim to be
enforced, this inequity being founded on some
change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory;
laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas
prescription applies at law. Prescription is
based on fixed time laches is not, (30 C.J.S., p.
522. See also Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,
Vol. 2, 5th ed., p. 177) (18 SCRA 1053).
With reference to appellant Grace Ventura, it is well to
remark that her situation is even worse than that of her
co-heirs and co-plaintiffs, in view of her executing an
affidavit of transfer (Exh. 6) attesting under oath to her
having sold the land in controversy to herein
defendant-appellee, and the lower Court's finding that
in 1949 she was paid P300.00 for it, because she,
"being a smart woman of enterprise, threatened to
cause trouble if the defendant failed to give her
P300.00 more, because her stand (of being the owner
of the land) was buttressed by the fact that Original
Certificate of Title No. 31 is still in the name of her
father, Bacaquio" (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 24).
This sale, that was in fact a quitclaim, may not be
contested as needing executive approval; for it has not

been shown that Grace Ventura is a non-christian

inhabitant like her father, an essential fact that cannot
be assumed (Sale de Porkan vs. Yatco, 70 Phil. 161,
175).
Since the plaintiffs-appellants are barred from
recovery, their divestiture of all the elements of
ownership in the land is complete; and the Court a quo
was justified in ordering that Bacaquio's original
certificate be cancelled, and a new transfer certificate
in the name of Florendo Catalino be issued in lieu
thereof by the Register of Deeds.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision
is hereby affirmed, with costs against the plaintiffsappellants.

CONCORDIA MEJIA DE LUCAS, Plaintif-Appellee,

vs. ANDRES GAMPONIA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Vizcaya, Honorable Jose de Venecia,
presiding, and appealed directly to this court as
judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts and
only questions of law are raised in the appeal.
By the stipulation of the parties it appears that on
March 13, 1916, free patent No. 3699 was issued over
the land subject of the action in the name of Domingo
Mejia. This patent was transcribed in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1916
and certificate of title No. 380 issued in the name of
Domingo Mejia. On March 24, 1916, after the issuance
of the patent but before the registration of the same,
patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to Zacarias
Ciscar, who immediately took possession thereof and
enjoyed its fruits. Upon his death the property was
included in the distribution of his estate and
adjudicated to Roque Sanchez. Roque Sanchez in turn
sold the land on January 21, 1940 to Andres
Gamponia, Defendant herein.
Sanchez
was
in
possession and enjoyment of the land from the time he
acquired it by inheritance from Ciscar up to the time he
sold it to Defendant Andres Gamponia, the latter has
also possessed and enjoyed the property from the time
he bought it to date.
Domingo Mejia, upon his death, left no descendants or
ascendants and his only surviving kin was his brother
Pedro Mejia. Pedro Mejia is now also dead and is
survived by his daughter Concordia Mejia de
Lucas, Plaintif herein. Upon the above facts the court a

quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias

Ciscar is null and void, as the sale was made only 11
days after the issuance of a patent in violation of the
provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. The Court
further held that since the land is registered land no
title in derogation to that of the registered owner could
have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or his
successors in interest, namely, Roque Sanchez
and Defendant Andres Gamponia.
The main defense presented in the answer, is
that Plaintifs right of action has already prescribed by
virtue
of
the
possession
of
the
land
by
the Defendant and his predecessors in interest for a
period of 37 years. This defense was overruled by the
court a quo on the ground that as the land is
registered, with a certificate of title in the name of
patentee Domingo Mejia, title thereto may not be
acquired by the Defendant and his predecessors in
interest against said registered owner. This ruling is
evidently based on Section 46 of the Land Registration
Act, which provides that no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and
circumstances, we are constrained to find, however,
that while no legal defense to the action lies, an
equitable one lies in favor of the Defendant and that is,
the equitable defense of laches. No hold that the
defense of prescription or adverse possession in
derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo
Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of
laches.
Otherwise,
stated,
we
hold
that
while Defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors
long continued possession for 37 years, the original
owners right to recover back the possession of the
property and the title thereto from the Defendant has,
by the long period of 37 years and by patentees
inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand.
In Go Chi Gun, et al., vs. Co Cho, et al., (96 Phil., 622)
we held that the equitable defense of laches requires
four elements:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) conduct
on the part of the Defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complaint seeks a
remedy; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(2)
delay
in
asserting the complainants rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice, of the Defendants
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the Defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (4) injury or prejudice to
the Defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
All the four elements mentioned above are present in
the case at bar. The first element is present because on
March 24, 1916 Domingo Mejia sold the land which was
covered by a free patent title dated March 13, 1916
and said sale or conveyance was made in violation of
Section 35 of the Public Land Act. The second element
is also present because from the date of the sale on
March 24, 1916 the patentee and vendor Domingo
Mejia could have instituted the action to annul the
conveyance and obtain back the possession and

ownership of the land, but notwithstanding the

apparent invalidity of the sale, neither patentee nor his
successors in interest, his brother, or the latters
daughter, Plaintif herein, who should have known of
the invalidity of the sale because it is a matter of law
and had all the opportunity to institute an action for
the annulment of the sale, instituted no suit to annul
the sale or to recover the land for a period of 37 years.
Again the Defendant and his predecessors in interest,
the original vendee and purchaser Zacarias Ciscar, as
well as vendees successors in interest, Roque
Sanchez, and later, Andres Gamponia, never expected
or believed that the original patentee or his successors
in interest would bring an action to annul the sale.
These circumstances constitute the third element of
laches. The fourth element is also present, not only
because Zacarias Ciscar paid for the land but this same
land was divided among the heirs of Zacarias Ciscar in
the proceedings for the settlement of his estate (Civil
Case No. 301 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya) and Roque Sanchez, to whom the land was
adjudicated, sold the property for P800 to the
present Defendant Andres Gamponia. All of these
transfer from Zacarias Ciscar to his heirs, to Roque
Sanchez and to Defendant Andres Gamponia, acts
which covered a period of 37 years, would all have to
be undone and the respective rights and obligations of
the parties affected adjusted, unless the defense is
sustained.
It is to be noted that all the above complications would
never had been occasioned had the original patentee
and his successors in interest not slept on their rights
for more than a generation. Add to this the fact that
the original conveyance made by the patentee is not
absolutely null and void. The prohibition against the
sale of free patents is for a period of seven years
(Section
35,
Act
No.
926); chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryafter that period of time a
patentee would be free to dispose of the land. Within
seven years from the conveyance the original patentee
could have brought an action to recover back his
property. Since nothing of this sort was done by him, it
was certainly natural for the purchase to have
assumed that the original patentee gave up his right to
recover back the property and acquiesced in vendees
right and title. The successor in interest of the original
purchaser must also have believed in good faith that
the patentee and his successors in interest were
reconciled to the idea of allowing the property to stay
in the hands of the successors in interest. By this
inaction for a period of 37 years to the consequent
prejudice that annulment of the original sale would
entail upon so many successive owners, the equitable
principle now stands up as a bar.
The reason upon which the rule is based is not alone
the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce
the right has existed, but the changes of condition
which may have arisen during the period in which

there has been neglect. In other words, where a court

of equity finds that the position of the parties has to
change that equitable relief cannot be afforded without
doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third
persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will
not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from
the consequences of his own neglect. (Penn Mutual
Life Inc. Co., et al., vs. City of Austin et al., U. S. 962.)
In effect, the principle is one of estoppel because it
prevents people who have slept on their rights from
prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed
reliance on the inaction of the original patentee and his
successors in interest.
The equitable defense of laches has been held to exist
in this jurisdiction for periods less than the period in
the case at bar. Thus in the case of Gonzales vs.
Director of Lands, 52 Phil. 895, it was held in a
cadastral case that the owner of a lot who failed to
appear in the proceedings, as a result of which his land
was declared public property, who brings an action 10
years later, is guilty of laches and inexcusable
negligence and his action under Section 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure can no longer be maintained. In
another case where the Plaintif loaned money to a
couple and when the wife died and the conjugal
properties divided between her heirs and her husband,
the vendor did not present his claim against the estate
and only did so four years later against the widower, it
was held that the lender was guilty of laches in so far
as the estate of the deceased spouse is concerned
because it would be inequitable and unjust to permit
him to revive any claims which he may have had,
which claims he did not present during the distribution
of the estate of the deceased wife. (Yaptico vs. Marina
Yulo, et al., 57 Phil., 818). In a third case (Kambal vs.
Director of Lands, 62 Phil., 293), cadastral proceedings
for compulsory registration of certain parcels of land in
Cotabato were instituted. These proceedings included
two lands belonging to the Petitioner. Petitioner failed
to claim said lands in said proceedings and in 1917 the
titles
to
the
lands
of
the Petitioner were
cancelled. Petitioner alleges that he came to know by
accident of the cancellation of his titles in the year
1933 or 1935. It was held that because of the lapse of
16 years from the date the decision was rendered in
the said registration case to the filing of the petition,
no relief can be granted the Petitioner as he has been
guilty of laches. In the three cases decided previously
by this Court, the periods of inaction were from 10 to
16 years. In the case at bar it was a full period of 37
years.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
one is hereby entered absolving the Defendant from
the action. Without costs.