Sunteți pe pagina 1din 85

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

FELICIANO VS. PASICOLAN


2 SCRA 888 (1961)
This is a petition for writ
respondent Judge to decide
by the petitioner in which
P10,000.000 the amount of
trial.

of mandamus to compel the


on the merits of a motion filed
he asks that the Court fix at
the bail for his liberty pending

Heres what happened:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of kidnapping. When


he found out that an Information had been filed and that a
warrant of arrest had been issued against him, he went
into hiding. His lawyer, at the instance of his wife, fined a
motion asking that the
Court fix the amount of the bond at P10K for the
petitioners release pending trial, but the Provincial Fiscal
of Pampanga opposed the motion on the ground that the
filing was premature because the petitioner had been
arrested. The respondent Judge dismissed the motion on
the ground that the petitioner does not have the right
to ask for the court to admit him to bail pending his
arrest or surrender.
The petitioner contends that as, under the Constitution, "all
persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong," Article III, Section 1, paragraph
(16), Constitution of the Philippines, and that the words "all
persons" used in said constitutional provision have been
interpreted to mean "all persons, without distinction,
whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any
criminal offense".
ISSUE: WON the judge erred in not granting the petition for
admission to bail.
HELD/RATIO: No.
There is no question as to the soundness of the rule
invoked by petitioner. Such is the law in this jurisdiction.
But, the rule is subject to the limitation that the person
applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of
the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.
In the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634,
this Court held:

xxx According to
this provision, the
general rule is
that any person,
before
being
convicted of any
criminal offense,
shall be bailable,
except when he
is charged with a
capital
offense
and the evidence
of his guilt is
strong.
Of
course,
only
those persons
who have been
either arrested,
detained
or
otherwise
deprived
of
their
liberty
will ever have
occasion
to
seek
the
benefits of said
provision. But in
order
that
a
person
can
invoke
the
constitutional
precept, it is not
necessary that
he should wait
until a formal
complaint
or
information is
filed
against
him. From the
moment he is
placed
under
arrest,
detention
or
restraint by the
officers of the
law,
he
can
claim
this
guarantee
of
the
Bill
of
Rights, and this
right he

retains unless
and until he is
charged with a
capital offense
and evidence of
his
guilt
is
strong.
And in the case of
Manigbas vs. Luna, 52
O.G. 1405, it was held:
xxx the right to
bail only accrues
when a person is
arrested
or
deprived of his
liberty.
The
purpose of bail
is
to
secure
one's
release
and it would be
incongruous to
grant bail to
one
who
is
free. Thus, `bail
is the security
required
and
given
for
the
release
of
a
person who is in
the custody of
the law.'
Without
surrendering
himself, he filed the
motion in which he asks
that the court fix the
amount of the bail bond
for his release pending
trial. It is, therefore, clear
that the petitioner is a
free man and is under
the jurisprudence not
entitled to admission to
bail.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

MIRANDA VS.
TULIAO 486 SCRA
377 (2006)
the new Presiding Judge
(I am allowing you to hate me for this digest.
Sobrang gulong-gulo ako. Ill just attach the Anastacio D. Anghad took
original. The issue raised by the petitioners kasi is over the case
not about bail, but the court discussed it in such a
way that bail got included. They contrasted.
Basically, it just says the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused when he/she submits
motions, etc even if hes not detained. But the
exception is the petition for admission to bail
the accused has to be held in detention in such
case. Since were in a hurry, I think thats the only
thing we need, or so I make myself believe.)
Facts:
two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,
Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1
Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B.
Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and
SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City, but the venue was later transferred to the
RTC of Manila which convicted all of the accused and
sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except
SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time,
being at large. The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court on automatic review where we accused therein was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested.
On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon,
and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz
and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder
against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and
submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of
arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash
the warrants of arrest.
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and
issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the
ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by
the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the
resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.

and issued a Joint Order


reversing the Joint Order
of
Judge
Tumaliuan.
Consequently, he ordered
the cancellation of the
warrant of arrest issued
against
petitioner
Miranda.
He
likewise
applied this Order to
petitioners
Ocon
and
Dalmacio.
On 12 November 2001,
this
Court
issued
a
Resolution resolving to
grant the prayer for a
temporary
restraining
order
against
Judge
Anghad
from
further
proceeding
with
the
criminal cases. Shortly
after
the
aforesaid
resolution, Judge Anghad
issued a Joint Order
dated 14 November 2001
dismissing
the
two
Informations for murder
against petitioners. On
19 November 2001, this
Court
took
note
of
respondents
cash
bond evidenced by O.R.
No. 15924532 dated 15
November
2001,
and
issued the temporary
restraining order while
referring the petition to
the Court of Appeals for
adjudication
on
the
merits.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF
ERROR
With all due respect, the
Honorable
Court
of
Appeals gravely erred in
reversing and setting
aside the Joint Order of
Judge
Anastacio
D.
Anghad dated August 17,
2001,
September
21,
2001, October 16, 2001
and November 14, 2001
issued in criminal cases
numbered 36-3523 and
36-3524; and, erred in
upholding, affirming and
reinstating
the
Order
dated July 6, 2001 issued
by then Acting Presiding

Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an Proceeding


from
this
accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not premise, the Court of
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Appeals
ruled
that
petitioners Miranda, Ocon
Dalmacio
cannot
Court: A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he and
seek
any
judicial
relief
does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may besince they were not yet
acquired either through compulsory process, such as arrested or otherwise
warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance,deprived of their liberty
such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It at the time they filed
is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction their "Urgent Motion to
preliminary
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes complete
to
of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. investigation;
reinvestigate;
to
recall
No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must
first be placed in the custody of the law before the court and/or quash warrants of
4
3
arrest."
may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such
as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or
by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before
custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a
distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law
is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
8
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by
9
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is acquired upon
10
his arrest or voluntary appearance.
One can
be under the custody of the law but not yet
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by
virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused
escapes custody after his trial has commenced.
11
Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived
of his own will and liberty, binding him to
12
become obedient to the will of the law.
Custody of the law is literally custody over the
body of the accused. It includes, but is not
limited to, detention.
Therefore,
in
narrow
cases
involving
special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of
the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over
the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for
bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the

Petitioners
counter
3
law.

the finding of the


Court of Appeals by
arguing
that
jurisdiction over the
person of the accused
is required only in
applications for bail.
Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that
such jurisdiction over
their person is required
before the court can act
on their motion to quash
the warrant for their
arrest, such jurisdiction
over their person was
already acquired by the
court by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion.

. If we allow the granting of bail to


persons not in the custody of the law, it
is foreseeable that many persons who
can afford the bail will remain at large,
and could elude being held to answer for
the commission of the offense if ever he
is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we
allow the quashal of warrants of arrest
to persons not in the custody of the law,
it would be very rare that a person not
genuinely entitled to liberty would
remain scot-free. This is because it is
the same judge who issued the warrant
of arrest who will decide whether or not
he followed the Constitution in his
determination of probable cause, and he
can easily deny the motion to quash if
he really did find probable cause after
personally examining the records of the
case.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

CORTES VS
CATRAL 279
SCRA 1 (1997)
FACTS: Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral for
granting bail without hearing.

1.

Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, a


crime that is supposedly not bailable) without
hearing. Catral says:In one of them, the case was
frustrated homicide, and the prosecutor
recommended bail of 200K, plus the circumstantial
evidence were weak.
In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag,
Criminal Case 08-866 for murder, the inquest judge
issued a warrant of arrest for the accused with no
bail recommended. When the case was elevated to
the Regional Trial Court upon information filed by
the provincial prosecutor, the information made no
mention of a bailbond. In the hearing of the
petition to determine whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce
evidence and recommended bail in the sum of
P200,000.00 instead.
Respondent
judge
acting
on
the
said
recommendation and again guided by the provision
of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in
conjunction with the evidence extant on the record
approved the recommendation of Prosecutor
Apolinar Carrao. A duplicate copy of trial
prosecutor
Apolinar
Carraos
letter
dated
September 3, 1996 addressed to the provincial
prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented by the
respondent to disprove the accusation that he
granted bail to the accused without conducting any
hearing.

2.

Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegal


possession
of
firearms
case
from
180K
(recommended by prosecutor) to 30K without
hearing.
Catral says: bailbond recommended was 180K.
accused filed for reduction and there was no
opposition from prosecutor.

3.

Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide


case was granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by
Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is
because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio
Bong Decierto.
Catral says: he was acting on the recommendation of
the OIC provincial prosecutor and mindful of the
guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount of bailbond
coupled by the fact that the evidence on record is
merely

circumstantial and there was no eyewitness to the


commission of crime granted bailbond in the sum
of P14,800.00.
4. . Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong
Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted
by Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy
Siriban appealed and it was elevated to the RTC
Branch 08, the sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge

Segundo
Catral
acquitted Jimmy
Siriban, rumors in
Aparri
spread
that the wife of
Judge
Segundo
Catral went to
Jimmy
Siribans house to
get the envelop

ISSUE:
WON
the
allegations of the
complainant
would
warrant
the
imposition
of
administrative
sanction
against
respondent judge.
HELD/RATIO: YES.
Bail should be fixed
according
to
the
circumstances of each
case. The amount fixed
should be sufficient to
ensure the presence of
the accused at the trial
yet reasonable enough to
comply
with
the
constitutional
provision
that bail should not be
excessive.
Therefore,
whether bail is a matter
of right or of discretion,
reasonable
notice
of
hearing is required to be
given to the prosecutor
or fiscal or at least he
must be asked for his
recommendation
because in fixing the
amount of bail, the judge
is required to take into
account a number of
factors such as the
applicants character and
reputation, forfeiture of
other bonds or whether
he is a fugitive from
justice.
When the accused is
charged
with
an
offense
punishable
by death, reclusion
perpetua
or
life
imprisonment,
the
judge is mandated to
conduct a hearing,
whether summary or
otherwise
in
the
discretion
of
the
court, not only to
take into account the
guidelines set forth in
Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court,
but
primarily
to
determine
the
existence of strong

evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused.

motion for reduction of


bail. The hearing of the
motion was conducted on
Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an August 21, 1995 with the
accused charged with murder, without havingprosecution, not having
conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of
interposed
any
guilt against the accused is strong.
opposition,
and
submitting the resolution
In a crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor of the motion to the
recommended the sum of P200,000.00 as bailbond forsound discretion of the
instead.
each accused. The records do not reveal whether a hearing court
was actually conducted on the application for bail although Respondent judge then
respondent judge implies that there was one, stating that issued an order granting
acting on this recommendation of the provincial a reduced bailbond of
prosecutor and taking into account the guidelines P50,000.00 for accused
prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Circular 12-94, Ahmed
Duerme
the court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed the amount inasmuch
as
the
of P200,000.00 for the provisional liberty of each of the evidence was not so
accused.
strong to warrant the
Subsequently, counsel for accused Ahmed Duerme filed a fixation of said amount.
5

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

filed a petition for bail. In the hearing of the petition to


determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against
the accused was strong, the fiscal opted not to
introduce evidence and recommended the sum of
P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge, acting on
said recommendation and again guided by the
provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in
conjunction with the evidence extant on record,
issued an order granting bail to the accused in the sum
of P200,000.00. Unable to post the said bond, accused
through counsel filed a motion to reduce bail. In the
course of the hearing of the petition, the public
prosecutor manifested that he had no objection to the
sum of P50,000.00 as bail for the accused. Respondent
judge, then
guided by the factual setting and the supporting
evidence extant on record reduced the bail bond from
P200,000.00 to P50,000.00 as recommended by the
prosecutor. Once again, the order granting the bail of
P200,000.00, as well as the reduced bail bond of
P50,000.00, did not contain a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution.
the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in
cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application of bail to the sound
discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The
importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a
few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or

The order granting the


reduced
bailbond,
however, did not contain
a
summary
of
the
evidence
for
the
prosecution.
In another murder case,
after
conducting
a
preliminary investigation,
the inquest judge issued
a warrant of the arrest for
the accused with no bail
recommended. When the
case was elevated to the
Regional Trial Court, the
information
made
no
mention of a bailbond.
Consequently,
accused
through counsel

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien
ask searching questions from which it may infer the
strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it
against the accused.
The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing.
Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right
of cross examination and to introduce evidence in his
own rebuttal.
The procedural lapse of respondent judge is
aggravated by the fact that even though the accused
in Criminal Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed Duerme,
have yet to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail
in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew
that the accused were still at large as he even had to
direct their arrest in the same order where he
simultaneously granted them bail. At this juncture,
there is a need to reiterate the basic principle that the
right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is
in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty and it would be premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition for bail for some whose
freedom has yet to be curtailed.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

PEOPLE VS.
MANALLO 400
SCRA 129 (2003)

ISSUE (in the case): WON


the trial court gravely
in
convicting
FACTS: Spouses Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay and their erred
nine-year old daughter Rosaldiza Nabor tenanted and lived accused-appellant not on
in a coconut plantation located in Barangay Salugan, the basis of the strength
of
Camilig, Albay.
Rosaldiza helped in the household chores by washing the
familys dirty laundry every Saturday at the barangay
reservoir. The route to the reservoir was uninhabited. Going
there was quite a long trek. It usually took Rosaldiza fifteen
minutes to negotiate the grassy path from the reservoir to
their house.
In 1989, Romeo engaged the services of Alex Manallo, as
coconut gatherer. Alex helped the Nabor couple gather
coconut produce once a week.
One day, in 1992, Rosaldiza went to the reservoir to wash
her clothes and to take a bath. On her way back home,
Manallo suddenly appeared from the bushes, grabbed her
and raped her. Alex dressed up and warned her not to tell
her parents, brothers and sisters of the incident, otherwise,
he would kill them all. Rosaldiza put on her clothes and ran
home. Rosaldiza related to her mother what had happened
to her.
Medico-Legal. Then Rosaldiza and Liliosa went back to the
police station and executed their respective sworn
statements. An information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Legaspi City, charging Alex with rape.
No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of
Alex. He filed, on May 8, 1992, a motion for bail with no
specific date and time for the hearing thereof. Upon the
filing of said motion, the Executive Judge issued an
order granting the motion and fixing his bail bond at
P50,000.00. On the same day, Alex posted a property
bond which was immediately approved by the court.
Alex was forthwith released from detention.
At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, duly assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. Trial was set on June
18, 1992. The prosecution prayed the trial court to cancel
the bond of Alex considering that his petition for bail was
granted without due hearing. However, the trial court held
in abeyance resolution of the motion until after the
prosecutor shall have presented its witnesses on June 18,
1992. The trial court stated that the evidence to be
adduced by the prosecution would be its evidence in Alexs
petition for bail and trial on the merits. On June 18, 1992,
the trial court issued an order that Alex would remain free
on his bond until June 22, 1992, the date set for the
hearing on his petition for bail. However, Alex failed to
attend the trial on said date. The trial court issued and
order for his arrest. However, Alex could no longer be
found at his address. It was only six years thereafter, or on
January 22, 1998, that he was arrested.
He denied raping Rosaldiza and claimed that they were
lovers. He was found guilty. (short story version.)

the
prosecutions
evidence but rather on
the weakness of the
evidence for the defense
HELD/RATIO: NO. Even a
cursory reading of the
decision of the trial court
will readily show that it
convicted appellant of
the crime charged in light
of the testimony of
Rosaldiza and Dr. LoriaFlorece and the physical
evidence adduced by the
prosecution.
The trial court considered
appellants flight from
the scene of the crime,
his having jumped bail
and for eluding arrest for
six
long
years
as
evidence of his guilt for
the crime charged
BAIL-RELATED (copypaste):
The Court cannot write
finis to this case without
making of record its
concern and displeasure
at
the
egregious
procedural lapse of the
trial court in granting bail
to appellant. It bears
stressing that he was
charged
with
rape
punishable by reclusion
perpetua
to
death.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure reads:
SEC. 5. Burden of proof
in Bail application. At
the
hearing
of
an
application for admission
to bail filed by any
person who is in custody
for the commission of an
offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua to
death, the prosecution
has
the
burden
of
showing that evidence of
guilt
is
strong.
The
evidence
presented
during the bail hearings
shall
be
considered
automatically reproduced
at the trial, but upon

motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for granted his motion for
additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside bail
without
even
of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.
affording
the
prosecution a chance
to be heard thereon
(please see previous case for the duties of the trial court in and
adduce
its
resolving a motion or petition for bail)
evidence in opposition
thereto, the trial court
In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on Mayheld
in
abeyance
8, 1992. There was no specific date and time for the resolution thereof and
hearing of said motion. And yet, on the same day thateven
allowed
the
the motion was filed, the trial court granted the saidappellant to remain free
motion and fixed the bail bond for the provisional on his bond in the
liberty of the appellant in the amount of P50,000.00 amount
of
only
without any factual basis therefore stated in theP50,000.00. Patently, the
order. Even when the public prosecutor prayed the courtprosecution was deprived
on June 17, 1992, for the cancellation of the property bond of its right to due
of the appellant on the ground that the trial court

process.
A bail application does
not only involve the right
of
the
accused
to
temporary liberty, but
likewise the right of the
State to protect the
people and the peace of
the
community
from
dangerous
elements.
These two rights must be
balanced by a magistrate
in the scale of justice,
hence, the necessity for
hearing to guide his
exercise of jurisdiction.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


LAVIDES VS CA
G.R. 129670
February 1, 2000
3) The

FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for


child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for
stronger deterrence and special protection against child
abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties
for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made
without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted
by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents
of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police
that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted
by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners
room at the Metropolitan Hotel in
Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time
the police received reports of petitioners activities.
When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with
Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear,
whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of complainant and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an
information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
was filed against petitioner.
petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate
Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse
Resolution of the
Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail
as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged.
nine more informations for child abuse were filed against
petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel,
and by three other minor children
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed
separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the
above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post
bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following
conditions:

1)

The accused shall not be entitled to


a waiver of appearance during the trial of
these cases. He shall and must always be
present at the hearings of these cases;

2) In

the event that he shall not be


able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited,
warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases
shall proceed to trial in absentia;

holddeparture
Order of
this Court
dated
April 10,
1997
stands;
and

d)
Approva
l of the
bail
bonds
shall be
made
only
after the
arraign
ment to
enable
this
Court to
immedia
tely
acquire
jurisdicti
on over
the
accused;
Petitioner filed a motion
to quash the informations
against
him.
Pending
resolution of his motion,
he asked the trial court to
suspend the arraignment
scheduled on May 23,
1997. He filed a motion
in which he prayed that
the amounts of bail
bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case
and that the same be
done
prior
to
his
arraignment.
the
trial
court,
in
separate orders, denied
petitioners motions to
reduce bail bonds, to
quash the informations,
and
to
suspend
arraignment. Accordingly,
petitioner was arraigned
during which he pleaded
not guilty to the charges
against him and then
ordered him released
upon posting bail bonds
in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to
the conditions in the May
16, 1997 order and the
"hold-departure" order of
April 10, 1997. The pretrial conference was set
on June 7, 1997.
The Court of Appeals
declared conditions (a)

and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of accused. In the second
condition (d) on the ground that the issue had becomeplace, the trial court
moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of could
ensure
the
Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the presence of petitioner at
May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes the arraignment precisely
petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of by granting bail and
his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void ordering his presence at
and that his arraignment was also invalid because it was any
stage
of
the
held pursuant to such invalid condition.
proceedings,
such
as
arraignment. Under Rule
114, 2(b) of the Rules on
ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment
Criminal Procedure, one
invalid.
of the conditions of bail is
that "the accused shall
HELD: CONDITION IS VOID.
appear before the proper
court
whenever
so
bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the required by the court or
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. these Rules," while under
For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, Rule 116, 1(b) the
there would then be no need for the arraignment of the presence of the accused
at the arraignment is
8

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be


put on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to
bail.
The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May
16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his
appearance at the trial but that he must be present at
the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance
with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule
114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear
at the trial without justification despite due notice to
him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express
waiver of his right to be present on the date specified
in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in
absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in
absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial
but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a)
at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of
guilt, (b) during trial whenever necessary for
identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case
the accused may appear by counsel or representative.
At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is
required and cannot be waived.
IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF
PETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment
did not emanate from the invalid condition that
"approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the
arraignment." Even without such a condition, the
arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum,
although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner
is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent
proceedings against him are valid.

required
to condition the grant of
bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to
place him in a position
where he has to choose
between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail
because until his motion
to quash can be resolved,
his arraignment cannot
be
held,
and
(2)
foregoing the filing of a
motion to quash so that
he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be
released on bail. These
scenarios certainly

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN


396 SCRA 443 (2003)

(YOU MAY HATE ME FOR THIS, TOO.)

considering that under


Section 8, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court,
whatever evidence is
adduced during the bail

Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by


petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition
for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash,
and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal
Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the
accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada,
Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the
Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a nonstock, non-profit foundation established in February 2000
ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational
opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but
deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to
research and advance studies of young Muslim educators
and scientists.
Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its
behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200
Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson.
Accused by Singson. Informations filed.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused,
including petitioner. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001,
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4,
2001. For his part, petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy
Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail
as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent
Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the
resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier
than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the
Sandiganbayan
denied
the
motion
of
the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the
petition for bail can and should be heard before
petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even
before the other accused filed their respective
petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set
the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners
petition for bail on May 21 to 25,
2001.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the
attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused
during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of
waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its
inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed
the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing

hearing shall be
considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.
The bail hearing did not
proceed
because
petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion
to quash the amended
Information
on
the
grounds that as against
him,
the
amended
Information
does
not
allege a combination or
series of overt or criminal
acts
constitutive
of
plunder; as against him,
the amended Information
does not allege a pattern
of criminal acts indicative
of an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. By
way
of
riposte,
the
prosecution objected to
the
holding
of
bail
hearing until petitioner
agreed to withdraw his
motion to quash. The
prosecution
contended
that
petitioners motion to
quash the amended
Information
was
antithetical
to
his
petition for bail.
He also filed a petition for
Habeas
Corpus.
(Andaming nyang finile.
Ang
hirap
tuloy
isummarize)
Meanwhile,
Jose
Jinggoy Estrada filed
with the Sandiganbayan
a motion praying that
said court resolve his
motion to fix his bail.
the
Sandiganbayan
issued
a
Resolution
denying
petitioners
motion to quash the
amended
Information.
The motion to fix bail
filed by Jose Jinggoy
Estrada was also denied
by the
Sandiganbayan.
Jose Jinggoy Estrada
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
for
the

nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying


his motion to fix bail.

HELD/RATIO:
(3) Whether
a
joint
hearing of the petition for
(I will not include the issues regarding the charging of more bail of petitioner and
1. NO.
The
than one offense, etc. anymore. Bail na lang tayo)
those
of
the
other
arraignment
of
accused is mandatory;
an accused is not
ISSUES:
a prerequisite to
(4) Whether the People
the conduct of
waived their right to
hearings on his
(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraignedadduce evidence in
petition for bail. A
before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; opposition to the petition
person is allowed
for bail of petitioner and
to petition for bail
to adduce strong
as soon as he is
(2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash thefailed
evidence of guilt of
deprived of his
amended Information during the pendency of his petition petitioner for the crime
liberty by virtue
for bail;
charged
of his arrest or
10
strong, he may be granted provisional
liberty even prior to arraignment; for
CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)
in such a situation, bail would be
authorized
under
the
circumstances.
In
fine,
the
voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait
Sandiganbayan committed a grave
for his arraignment before filing a petition for
abuse of its discretion amounting to
bail.
excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
arraignment of petitioner before
proceeding with the hearing of his
in cases where it is authorized, bail should be
petition for bail.
granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion
to quash.
2. YES. The Court finds that no such
inconsistency exists between an
However, the foregoing pronouncement should
application of an accused for bail and
not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is
petition for bail should at all times precede
the security given for the release of a
arraignment, because the rule is that a person
person in the custody of the law,
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
furnished by him or a bondsman, to
voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon
guarantee his appearance before any
as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a
court as required under the conditions
complaint or information is filed against him.
set forth under the Rules of Court. Its
The
purpose is to obtain the provisional
Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be
liberty of a person charged with an
understood in light of the fact that the accused
offense until his conviction while at
in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a
the
same
time
securing
his
motion to quash the informations filed against
appearance at the trial. As stated
him. Hence, we explained therein that to
earlier, a person may apply for bail
condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
from the moment that he is deprived
arraignment would be to place him in a
of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
position where he has to choose between (1)
voluntary surrender.
filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
On the other hand, a motion to quash an
release on bail because until his motion to
Information is
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot
be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion
to quash so that he can be arraigned at once
and thereafter be released on bail. This would
undermine his constitutional right not to be put
on trial except upon a valid complaint or
Information sufficient to charge him with a
crime and his right to bail.
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be
first arraigned before the conduct of hearings
on his application for bail. For when bail is a
matter of right, an accused may apply for and
be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The
ruling in Lavides also implies that an
application for bail in a case involving an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death may also be heard even before an
accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds
in such case that the accused is entitled to bail
because the evidence against him is not

the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless


grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will
not interfere with the exercise by the
Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of
its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take
into account not only the convenience of the
State, including the prosecution, but also that
of the accused and the witnesses of both the
prosecution and the accused and the right of
accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan
must also consider the complexities of the
cases and of the factual and legal issues
involving petitioner and the other accused.
After all, if this Court may echo the observation
of the United States Supreme Court, the State
has a stake, with every citizen, in his being
afforded our historic individual protections,
including
those
surrounding
criminal
prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not
become careless or complacent when that
fashion has become rampant over the earth.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the Information. An
accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as
a general rule, before arraignment.
These two reliefs have objectives which are not
necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the
right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty
when charged with an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when
charged with an offense punishable by such penalties
but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not
to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
validity of the Information charging him with such
offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion
to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the
ground that the same does not charge any offense is
granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is
ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may
become moot and academic.

3.

No. There is no provision in the Revised Rules of


Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more
petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a
petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously
with the trial of the case against the other accused. The
matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of
two or more petitions for bail filed by two different
accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly
with the trial against another accused is addressed to

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


motions filed by the parties, which incidents
had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail
hearings. The bail hearing was eventually
scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10,
2001 but the hearing did not push through due
to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on
petitioners application for bail is therefore not
imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to
the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to
blame therefor, as is evident from the following
list of motions filed by him and by the
prosecution.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight
of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right
of cross-examination and to introduce his own

11

4.

No. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had


refused to present evidence to prove his guilt
for purposes of his bail application and that the
Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing
thereon is not borne by the records. The
prosecution did not waive, expressly or even
impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner.
It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had
already scheduled the hearing dates for
petitioners application for bail but the same
were reset due to pending incidents raised in
several
evidence in rebuttal.
Accordingly,
petitioner
cannot
be
released from detention until the
Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of
his application for bail and resolve the
same in his favor. Even then, there must
first be a finding that the evidence
against petitioner is not strong before
he may be granted bail.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

12

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

PEOPLE V SAN DIEGO


CAPISTRANO, J.:

be denied such
an
opportunity,
there would be a
violation
of
procedural
due
process, and the
order of the court
granting
bail
should
be
considered void
on that ground.

In criminal case No. Q-8711, Court of First


Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, the
information charged the defendants, Mario Henson,
Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza, Rogelio Lazaro
and Bienvenido Wijangco, as principals of the
murder of Jesus Lapid with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
and abuse of superior strength and with the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, aid of
armed men and craft or fraud.

The prosecution and the defense agreed


that the motions for bail of the defendants would
be considered in the course of the regular trial
instead of in a summary proceeding.

3 In

the course of the regular trial, after the


prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the
trial court resolved the motions for bail granting
the same despite the objection of the prosecution
on the ground that it still had material witnesses to
present.

The orders granting bail in the amount of


P50,000 for each defendant on the ground that the
evidence of guilt was not strong must have made
Fiscal Oscar Inocentes very angry because in his
motion for reconsideration of the orders granting
bail he used contumacious language for which he
was forthwith cited for contempt. Fortunately, after
the fiscal had submitted his answer and
explanation, the trial judge, in a forgiving mood,
did not punish him for contempt on condition that
the contumacious words be deleted from his
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution was deprived of
procedural due process- YES, HENCE THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS ARE NULL AND VOID

The
court's discretion
to grant bail in
capital offenses
must
be
exercised in the
light
of
a
summary of the
evidence
presented by the
prosecution;
otherwise,
it
would
be
uncontrolled and
might
be
capricious
or
whimsical.
Hence,
the
court's
order
granting
or
refusing
bail
must contain a
summary of the
evidence for the
prosecution
followed by its
conclusion
whether or not
the evidence of
guilt is strong.

We are of the considered opinion that


whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is
in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a The orders of October 7,
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular 9 and 12, 1968, granting
to
the
five
trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity bail
to present, within a reasonable time, all the defendants are defective
evidence that it may desire to introduce before thein form and substance
because they do not
court should resolve the motion for bail.
contain a summary of the
6
If, as in the criminal case involved in the evidence presented by
instant special civil action, the prosecution should the

prosecution. They only


contain
the
court's
conclusion
that
the
evidence of guilt is not
strong.
Being
thus
defective in form and
substance, the orders
complained of cannot,
also on this ground, be
allowed to stand.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

13

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

OCAMPO V BERNABE
MORAN, C.J.:
1

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Eduardo


Ocampo to set aside an order issued by the Fourth
Division of the People's court denying his application for
bail.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The petitioner was arrested by the Counter


Intelligence Coprs of the Armed Forces of the United
States and confined in Muntinglupa Prisons since July
30, 1945, and pursuant to Executive Order No. 6555 he
was turned over to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and later on filed with the Peoples Court his
application for bail under Act No. 682.

3 At the hearing of the application, the special prosecutor

stated that petitioner with having pointed out Placido


Trinidad as a guerilla to the Japanese and for that reason
Placido Trinidad was shot to death.

No evidence, however, was presented by the special


prosecutor and all that he did at the hearing was to
recite the contents of an affidavit which has no
referrence to count No. 4, and to state further that he
had 27 more affidavits.

the discretion is
directed to
the
weight of evidence
cannot properly be
weighed if not duly
exhibited
or
produced
before
the court (Ramos
vs.
Ramos,
45
Phil., 362), it is
obvious
that
a
proper exercise of
judicial discretion
requires that the
evidence of guilt
be submitted to
the
court,
the
petitioner
having
the right of crossexamination and to
introduce his own
evidence
in
rebuttal.

5 Petitioner made an objection stating that a mere recital1 Mere


is not a evidence and that evidence cannot be
considered strong which has not been subjected to the
test of cross-examination.

6 He testified in his own behalf in denying all the charges

preferred against him and stated that said charges are


mere intrigues of his political enemy Marcelo Trinidad.

affidavits or
recital
of
their
contents are not
sufficient
since
they
are
mere
hearsay evidence,
unless
the
petitioner fails to
object thereto.

Under all these circumstances, the Fourth division of


the People's Court composed of Judges Jose Bernabe, 2 And this is the
Emilio Rilloraza and Angel Gamboa, issued an order
prevailing doctrine
dated February 23, 1946, denying the application for
in
the
United
bail.
States. In some
states
of
the
8 Hence, this petition for certiorari.
American
union,
the
burden
of
ISSUE: WON no proof was presented by the
showing that proof
special prosecutor to show that the evidence of
is evident or the
guilt is strong, thus, the People's Court
presumption great,
committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying
lies
on
the
the application for bail -YES.
prosecution while
in others on the
9 We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of
petitioner, but the
rule seems to be
Prisons
uniform
to
the
(76 Phil., 756), that all persons shall before conviction
effect
that
no
be bailable except when charge is a capital offense and
matter which side
the evidence of guilt is strong. the general rule,
bears the burden
therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not
of
proof,
the
yet charges, are, before their conviction, entitled to
evidence of guilt
provisional release on bail, the only exception being
should be adduced
where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence
before the court
of guilt is found to be strong.
for
a
proper
10 At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden
determination
of
of showing that the case falls within the exception is on
its probative force
the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7.
In corpus Juris
11 The determination of whether or not the evidence of 3Secundum
the rule
guilt is strong is, as stated in Herras Teehankee case, a
is summarized as
matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very
follows:
nature of things, may rightly be exercise only after the
o Unless the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since
presumptio

n from an
indictment
for
a
capital
offense is
conclusive
against
accused
which has
been
considered
in section
34
b(2)
(b)the
determinat
ion as to
whether
the proof is
evident or
the
presumptio
n
great
must,
on
an original
application
,
be
determine
d from the
evidence
adduced
on
the
application
no matter
which side
bears the
burden of
proof.
Where
accused
under
a
capital
indictment
bears the
burden of
proof
he
should
offer
the
witnesses
whose
names are
endorsed
on
the
indictment,
although
he is not
limited to
such
witnesses.
The court
should
hear
all
material
and
relevant

evidence offered by either party, such as the


grand jury minutes, and should consider the
evidence as a whole. (8 C.J.S., section 46 [b], p.
94.).

Upon the hearing it is proper to require the prisoner


to begin the evidence, although it imposes upon him the
necessity of producing evidence upon which the state
intended to rely for his conviction on the final trial. But
the accused will not by this procedure be denied the
opportunity of cross-examining the people's witnesses.
(Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind., 87. To the same effect,
Rigdon vs. State, 41 Fla., 308; 26 So., 711; ex parte
Nathan[Fla.]; 50 so., 38." (39 L. R. A., New Series, pp.
752, 774, 775.).

5 The

evidence for the state, as well as that for the


14

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


1

Where on a motion to admit to bail


after the indictment, the evidence of the
witnesses who testified before the grand jury
does not make a prima facie case against the
accused, he is entitled to bail, and it is an error
to refuse bail upon the statement of the district
attorney that he has other evidence which he
will not disclose for fear of weakening the
state's case. (In ex parte Reynald, 37 Texas, 1.)

And this is in conformity with the


former rulings of this Court. (MARCOS V. CRUZ
AND HERRAS CASE)

True that in the same case of Herras


Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra, we
said that the hearing of an application for bail
should be summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court. By "summary hearing"
we meant such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of the evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court
"does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or against
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome
of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered and admitted." (8 C. J. S.,
93,94.)

The course of the inquiry may be left to


the discretion of the court which may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses and
reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount
of corroboration particularly on details that are
not essential to the purpose of the hearing.

Objection has been made long ago to


this method of hearing wherein the regular trial
is anticipated though to a limited extent at
least. but the objection was dismissed.

It appearing in the instant case that on


the hearing of the application for bail filed by
the petitioner no proof was offered by the
prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt
is strong, the Fourth Division of the People's
Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying the bail applied for.

accused, should be
presented (1) by
the petitioner in an
application for bail.
(Ex
parte
Tully
[Fla.], 66 S., 296;
Rigdon vs. State,
41 Fla., 308; 26 S.,
711;
Ex
parte
Heffren, 27 Ind.,
87. (2) But the
petitioner,
by
proper procedure,
may
test
the
probative force of
the testimony for

the state in order


to fully present his
case
for
the
purposes of the
hearing. Ex parte
Tully, supra; Ex
parte
Heffren,
supra. (6 C.J., p.
984, fn. 50 [a],
section
214.).chanroblesvir
tuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtual
law library

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

15

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


SIAZON V JUDGE
MAKALINTAL, J.:

At the outset it should be mentioned that the


instant petition is formally defective in that the
petitioner appears to be the State Prosecutor handling
the case below instead of the People of the Philippines,
who should properly be represented in this proceeding
by the Solicitor General. (BUT FOR SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE, THIS INFIRMITY IS
OVERLOOKED. SC PROCEEDS).

At the outset, let it be stated that after the


arraignment of the accused and before the
commencement of the trial, the applications for bail,
were heard

The Court ruled and ordered a joint hearing of the


cases on the merits and of the applications for bail. On
this same occasion the Court also considered the
motion filed by the prosecution to discharge the
defendant Angelico Najar. Without any objection on the
part of the defense, said motion to discharge was
granted and accused Najar was discharged to become
state witness pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court.

As the trial progressed, with the prosecution


presenting several witnesses whose testimonies have
not established evidence directly linking the accused
Escribano and Padilla to the conspiracy alleged in the
informations in these cases, the defense on August 2,
1971 filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of
the order given in open Court ordering a joint hearing
of the cases on the merits and of the applications for
bail, to which the prosecution also filed its opposition.

The Court reconsidered its previous order and


ordered that the applications for bail be first heard to
which the prosecution gave its assent.

ISSUE: whether or not a proceeding in an


application for bail is still summary in nature as it
was under the old rule - YES

As a general proposition, all persons shall before


conviction be bailable except when the charge is a
capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.

At the hearing of the application for bail the burden


of showing that the case falls within the exception is on
the prosecution, according to Section 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court. T

he determination of whether or not the evidence of


guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, which in
the very nature of things may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Neither under the old nor under the new Rules
is there any specific provision defining what kind of
hearing it should be, but in the two cases cited at the
footnote hereof it was stated that the hearing should
be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court.

"By 'summary hearing,' this Court added, "we


mean such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of the evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not

sit to try the merits


or to enter into any
nice inquiry as to the
weight that ought to
be allowed to the
evidence
for
or
against accused, nor
will it speculate on
the

outcome of the trial


or on what further
evidence may be
therein offered and
admitted.' (8 C.J.S.
93, 94.) T

The course of the


inquiry may be left to
the discretion of the
court
which
may
confine
itself
to
receiving
such
evidence
as
has
reference
to
substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the
examination
and
cross-examination of
witnesses
and
reducing
to
a
reasonable minimum
at the amount of
corroboration
particularly on details
that are not essential
to the purposes of
the hearing."

We do not see
that the addition of
the provision Sec. 7,
Rule
114
has
materially
changed
the nature of the
hearing on a petition
for bail to the extent
of
depriving
the
Court of its discretion
to
confine
the
evidence
to
the
extent necessary for
the
proper
determination of the
question of whether
or not the evidence
of guilt is strong. The
only change that has
been introduced is
that such evidence
shall be considered
automatically
reproduced at the
trial in order to avoid
unnecessary
repetition.

The prosecution
had
had
three
months since the
hearing started until
the questioned order
was issued and had
called 27 witnesses
just to lay a sufficient
corroborative
basis

for the testimony of its principal witness, Angelico


Najar. The plea that this witness will reveal the names
of persons who have some knowledge of circumstances
which tend to connect the two accused with thecrimes
and who presumably will also be called to testify, and
whose willingness to do so may thereby be adversely
influenced by such revelation, does not appear to be
convincing, since the record of the cases already
contains the testimony which Najar gave at the
preliminary investigation, aside from his three sworn
statements consisting of 16 pages typed single-space
in question and answer form. (TANGGAPIN NA KASI
NILA NA INSUFFICIENT NGA DAW)

witness while not to


be disregarded, must
nevertheless
be
equated
with
the
purpose
of
the
hearing, which is to
determine
whether
the
accused
falls
within the exception
to the general rule
that
he
is
constitutionally
entitled to bail before
conviction.

The proviso that any witness may be recalled at6


To
allow
the
the trial for additional examination underscores, if
prosecution
to
anything, the difference between the hearing for
conduct the hearing
purposes of the petition for bail and the trial on the
as if it were a fullmerits. This is as it should be, because one has for its
dress trial on the
purpose, from the endpoint of the prosecution, to show
merits who defeat
the purpose of the
that strong evidence of guilt exists while the
proceeding.
contemplates proof beyond reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITIVE:
The right of the prosecution to control the quantum 7
the
petition
is
of evidence and the order of presentation of the

dismissed and the


temporary
restraining
order
issued by this Court
is
lifted,
with
instructions to the
respondent Court to
resume the hearing
forthwith
for
the
presentation
of
Angelico Najar as
witness
for
the
prosecution, without
prejudice
to
said
Court's allowing, in
the exercise of its
discretion,
the
presentation of such
other prosecution as
it
may
deem
advisable,
in
the
interest of justice.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

16

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

MAMOLO V NARISIMA
BELLOSILLO, J.:
1

On 16 May 1994 a criminal complaint for murder


was filed against Antonio Balagot and Ariel Acha for the
murder of Daniel Mamolo,Jr., son of complainant

After Judge Rogelio R. Narisma conducted the


requisite preliminary examination he issued the
corresponding warrants of arrest against the accused.
Respondent Judge recommended no bail since murder is
a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was strong.
Acha was later arrested while Balagot surrendered to
the PC Provincial Command in Cotabato.

Subsequently, Balagot through counsel filed a


Petition For Admission to Bail and set the same for
hearing. At the scheduled hearing defense counsel
informed the court that Balagot was ill and asked the
court to dispense with the submission of his petition
and, instead, to allow Balagot to be treated at the
hospital (SPECIAL TREATMENT???).

MAMOLO:claims that despite the fact that


respondent Judge recommended no bail for both
accused he nevertheless allowed Balagot to put a bail of
P150,000.00 without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to present its evidence to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.

MAMOLO: also avers that on several occasions he


saw respondent Judge and counsel for accused Balagot
together and engaged in a series of private talks at a
nearby restaurant.

In his Memorandum of 21 July 1995, approved by


Court Administrator Ernani Cruz Pao, Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez found that respondent
Judge disregarded procedural due process in granting
bail to the accused. He opined that the prosecutions
waiver to present evidence ought to have prompted
respondent Judge to ask the prosecution to present its
witnesses at another date set for the purpose (of
asking) clarificatory questions from which he may infer
the strength of the evidence of guilt of the accused..
ISSUE:
WON
JUDGE
NARISIMA
ACTED
INAPPROPRIATELY IN RECOMMENDING THE BAIL
FOR BALAGOT?-YES

The procedure of conducting a hearing on the


application for admission to bail should provide the
basis for judges to determine whether the prosecutions
evidence is weak or strong. In the case at bench, while
respondent conducted a hearing on Balagots petition
for bail such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the
prosecution to guide respondent in the proper
determination of the petition.

The deferential attitude of the prosecution cannot


excuse respondents disregard of his peremptory duty.
It is worthy to note that in the resumption of the hearing
in the afternoon of 25 May 1994 the prosecution
prefaced its submission with a statement of its serious
vehement objection to the petition for bail.
Such manifestation ought to have alerted respondent of
the next appropriate steps in resolving the petition. In
Borinaga v. Tamin we delineated a clear guideline on the
exercise of judicial discretion in hearing petitions

for bail -x x x
(w)hile
the
determination
of
whether or not
evidence of guilt is
strong is a matter
of
judicial
discretion,
this
discretion by the
nature of things
may
rightly
be
exercised
only
after the evidence
is submitted to the
court
at
such
hearing. Whether
the motion for bail
of an accused who
is in custody in a
summary
proceeding or in
the course of a
regular trial the
prosecution must
be
given
an
opportunity
to
present, within a
reasonable
time,
all the evidence
that it may desire
to introduce before
the
court
may
resolve the motion
for bail. If the
prosecution should
be denied of such
an
opportunity,
there would be a
violation
of
procedural
due
process, and the
order of the court
granting
bail
should
be
considered void on
that ground x x x
(E)ven where the
prosecutor refuses
to
adduce
evidence
in
opposition to the
application
to
grant and fix bail,
the court may ask
the
prosecution
such questions as
would
ascertain
the strength of the
states evidence or
judge
the

adequacy of the
amount of bail x x

The failure of
respondent Judge
to adhere to a
basic, fundamental
procedure cannot
be
lightly
overlooked.
As
correctly perceived
by
OCA,
this
omission
by
respondent
constitutes
gross
ignorance of the
law
since
it
resulted
in
depriving
the
prosecution
the
time-tested
and
enduring
procedural
due
process.

It is an oftrepeated
dictum
that a judge should
exhibit more than
just
a
cursory
acquaintance with
the statutes and
procedural
rules.
For the role of
judges
in
the
administration
of
justice requires a
continuous study
of the law and
jurisprudence.
Indubitably,
the
industry of a judge
in keeping abreast
with the law and
court rulings will
enhance the faith
of our people in
the administration
of justice since
litigants will be
confidently
and
invariably assured
that the occupants
of
the
bench
cannot justly be
accused
of
a
deficiency in their
grasp
of
legal
principles.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

17

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


PEOPLE V. TUPPAL
QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the joint decision of the Regional Trial


Court (RTC) of Ilagan, Isabela, finding appellant
Saturnino Tuppal guilty of robbery with homicide and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

Appellants conviction stemmed from four charges


filed on August 21, 1992, by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Isabela

Appellant remained at large for almost nine (9)


years after the filing of the aforesaid cases. It was only
on March 5, 1998 that appellant was arrested in Cainta,
Rizal and in connection with another case for robbery.

OTHER ISSUES
WON
the
evidence now on
record
is
sufficient to hold
appellant
Saturnino Tuppal
guilty
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
the
crime of robbery
with
homicideYES

Appellant was arraigned. Assisted by counsel, he


The court a
pleaded not guilty to the charges. The cases were then 1
quo
found
the
consolidated and trial ensued.
prosecutions
5 The prosecutions evidence established that:
evidence credible.
It
disbelieved
6 On the evening of December 22, 1989, the spouses
appellants
bare
Bonifacio and Florfina Solito and their four-year-old
denials.
child, Efren, attended the wedding of Florfinas younger
sister, Loida Atuan, at Barangay Banguro, Reina
Eyewitness Florfina
Mercedes, Isabela. At about 11:30 P.M., the Solitos
Solitos testimony
accompanied by Bartolo Atuan, Jr., Florfinas 26-year-old
on
the
hold-up
brother, left the wedding reception. They had barely
incident
was
traveled some 300 meters away and were in front of the
replete
with
house of Felix Sacang, when they were waylaid by
material
details.
appellant and his four companions, now the coShe testified that
accused.After Ben Tuppal announced a heist, Danilo
after being shot in
the abdomen, she
Tuppal immediately ran off with Florfinas handbag
grappled
with
containing P2,500.00 in cash. Appellant then shot
appellant
for
Florfina with a short firearm, hitting her in the abdomen.
Bartolo Atuan, Jr., tried to shield Florfina from further
possession of the
harm but Marcelo Tuppal then shot Bartolo, killing him
gun.
Meanwhile,
on the spot.
co-accused Danilo
Tuppal dashed off
7 Florfina took advantage of the situation and scurried
with her bag and
towards a nearby banana plantation. The malefactors
its
contents,
gave pursuit and continued to fire at her hitting her
according to her.
further at the buttocks and in the arm. She pretended to
She also described
be dead and fell to the ground. The ploy worked
the firearm used in
because she heard accused Pedro Tuppal say, Let us
shooting her and
go, she is already dead.
killing her brother.
8 In the meantime, upon hearing the gunshots,
These details could
Bonifacio Solito and his son Efren scampered towards
not have sprung
the house of Felix Sacang. Co-accused Ben Tuppal ran
from
her
after both father and son. He aimed the gun at them,
imagination,
but
but the gun jammed and did not fire.
only from her vivid
recollection of the
9 In the present cases, appellant raised the defense of
fatal
incident
denial and alibi.
implicating
the
appellant and his
CRIMPRO ISSUE:
brothers as the
WON the fact that the trial court had held during
malefactors.
the bail hearing that the prosecution evidence
was weak, it is estopped from rendering a 2
Appellants
contrary ruling after the trial.- NO
defense of alibi is
untenable.
10 Said findings should not be construed as an
immutable evaluation of the prosecutions evidence.

11

It is settled that the assessment of the prosecution


evidence presented during bail hearings in capital
offenses is preliminary and intended only for the
purpose of granting or denying applications for the
provisional release of the accused.

WON
conspiracy
among
accused
established-

the
the
was
YES

After accused
Ben
Tuppal
announced
the
hold-up,
coaccused
Danilo
Tuppal
took
Florfinas handbag
containing
P2,500.00.
Appellant
Saturnino
Tuppal
then shot Florfina
with a handgun,
hitting her on the
left side of her
abdomen.

4 Their

concerted
action shows their
unity of purpose
to rob the victim,
at all cost. These
concerted acts of
appellant and his
co-accused
manifestly disclose
concurrence
of
wills,
unity
of
action,
joint
purpose
and
common
design.
Hence,
although
appellant did not
himself
shoot
Bartolo Atuan, Jr.,
he is still liable for
Bartolos death as
principal because
the existence of
conspiracy makes
the act of one the
act of all.

The
charges
against appellant
and
his
coaccused,
constitute only one
special indivisible
or composite crime
as
defined
in
Article 294 (1) of
the Revised Penal
Code.

the
prosecution amply
established
the
following elements
of robbery with
homicide: (a) the
taking of personal
property
is
perpetrated
by
means of violence
or
intimidation
against a person,
(b) the property

taken belongs to another, (c) the taking is characterized


by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime

of homicide, in its
generic sense, is
committed.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

18

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

DE LA CAMARA V ENAGE
FERNANDO, J.:
1
The
answer
Lopez Enage,

An order of respondent Judge Manuel


fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the
sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for
certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional mandate
prohibiting excessive bail.

2 The

merit of the petition on its face is thus apparent.


Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the above order
by reducing the amount of bail to P40,000.00 cannot be
granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had escaped
from the provincial jail, thus rendering this case moot
and academic.

It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of


lower court judges, to set forth anew the controlling and
authoritative doctrines that should be observed in fixing
the amount of the bail sought in order that full respect
be accorded to such a constitutional right. (I.E.,
MASYADONG MAGANDA ANG PONENCIA KO PARA LANG
MASAYANG! DI KO NAMAN KASALANAN NA NAKATAKAS
SILA EH!- FERNANDO, HAHAHA)

Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of


Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested on
November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of
Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of
fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of
the Tirador Logging Co

5 Thereafter, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the

filed by respondent
Judge on March 5,
1971 set forth the
circumstances
concerning
the
issuance of the
above order and
the other incidents
of the case, which,
to his mind would
disprove
any
charge that he was
guilty
of
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
It
stressed,
moreover, that the
challenged
order
would
find
support
in
circulars of the
Department
of
Justice
given
sanction by this
Court. He sought
the dismissal of
the petition for
lack of merit.

Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated


murder and another for multiple murder against2
Respondent
petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and
Judge submitted a
Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid
supplemental
occurrence.
answer wherein he
alleged
that
6 Then on January 14, 1969, came an application for
petitioner escaped
bail filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on
from the provincial
the assertion that there was no evidence to link him
jail on April 28,
with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise
1971
and
had
mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the
since
then
trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution
remained at large.
resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the
There
was
a
filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its
reiteration then of
evidence.
the dismissal of
7 Respondent Judge issued an order granting
this petition for
petitioner's application for bail, admitting that there was
lack of merit, to
a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that
which
petitioner
petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity, but
countered
in
a
fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive
pleading, and filed
amount of
with this Court the
P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the
next day with this
information
charging
multiple
murder
and
plea:
"The
P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated
undersigned
murder.
counsel, therefore,
vehemently
8 Then came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the
interpose
Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being
opposition,
on
informed of such order, sent a telegram to respondent
behalf
of
Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and
petitioner,
to
suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or
respondent's
property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a
motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount.
prayer
for
Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence
dismissal of the
this petition.
present petition for
lack of merit. For,
the issue in this

case is not alone


the
fate
of
petitioner Ricardo
de la Camara. The
issue
in
the
present
petition
that calls for the
resolution of this
Honorable Tribunal
is the fate of
countless
other
Ricardo
de
la
Camaras
who
maybe
awaiting
the
clear-cut
definition
and
declaration of the
power
of
trial
courts in regard to
the fixing of bail."
(HOW TOUCHING.
BLEH)
ISSUE: WON THE
BAIL
RECOMMENDED
WAS EXCESSIVE
AND VIOLATIVE
OF
THE
CONSTITUTIONYES

Before
conviction, every
person is bailable
except if charged
with
capital
offenses when the
evidence of guilt is
strong.
Such
a
right flows from
the presumption of
innocence in favor
of every accused
who should not be
subjected to the
loss of freedom as
thereafter
he
would be entitled
to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable
doubt. Thereby a
regime of liberty is
honored
in
the
observance
and
not in the breach.
It is not beyondthe
realm
of
probability,
however, that a
person
charged
with
a
crime,

especially so where his defense is weak, would just


no
such
5
Where,
prohibition,
the
simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the
however, the right
right
to
bail
hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee
to bail exists, it
becomes
that such an intent would be thwarted
should
not
be
meaningless.
It
rendered nugatory
4 Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this
would have been
by requiring a sum
right to one charged with a capital offense when
more forthright if
that is excessive.
evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather
no mention of such
So the Constitution
than await the outcome of the proceeding against him
a guarantee were
commands. It is
with a death sentence, an ever-present threat,
found
in
the
temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to
understandable
fundamental law.
be resisted.
why. If there were
19
be condoned. That is why he is
not entitled to the relief prayed
CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)
for. What respondent Judge did,
however,
does
call
for
repudiation from this Court.

It is not to be lost sight of that the


United States Constitution limits itself to a
prohibition against excessive bail.

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than


that the challenged order of August 10, 1970
fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail
that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of
P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder, there being fourteen victims,
and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense
of multiple frustrated murder, there being
twelve victims, is clearly violative of
constitutional provision

.Under the circumstances, there being


only two offenses charged, the amount
required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for
frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in
this case that the Department of Justice did
recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the
two offenses.

Villaseor v. Abano: The guidelines


in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in
the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1)
ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of
the offense; (3) penalty for the offense
charged; (4) character and reputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused; (6)
character and strength of the evidence; (7)
probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8)
forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the
accused wasa fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond
for appearance at trial in other cases."
Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this
decisive consideration appearing at the end of
the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with
the court called upon to rule on the question of
bail. We must stress, however, that where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking
bail would amount to a refusal thereof and
render nugatory the constitutional right to bail,
we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory
powers to provide the required remedy."

No attempt at rationalization can


therefore give a color of validity to the
challenged order. There is grim irony in an
accused being told that he has a right to bail
but at the same time being required to post
such an exorbitant sum.

It is no wonder that the resulting


frustration left resentment and bitterness in its
wake. Petitioner's subsequent escape cannot

Nor
is
there
any
justification then for imputing
his inability to fix a lesser
amount by virtue of an alleged
reliance on a decision of this
Tribunal. Even if one were
charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result
is that there was a clear reading
of the Abano opinion when such
a meaning was ascribed to it.
No doctrine refinement may
elicit approval if to do so would
be to reduce the right to bail to
a barren form of words. Not only
is the order complained of
absolutely bereft of support in
law, but it flies in the face of
common sense. It is not too
much to say that it is at war
with the command of reason.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

20

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

VILLASENOR v. ABANO
21 SCRA 321 (1967)
1
Sanchez, J; Sept.
29, 1967
Villasenor
- he is earning
a mere
gov. employee,
1
FACTS
2

Reynaldo
Villasenor
wasthe
charged
with
murder
of Police
Sergeant
Madla
CFIwhich
ofbond
Marinduque.
admitted
to
a before
P60,000-bail
was
to
P40,000.
posted
a property
and reduced
wasHe
setwas
at
provisionalHe
liberty.

Before
arraignment,
Fiscal
the information,
charging
the
accusedProv.
withMurder.
Directamended
Assault Upon
an Agent of 3
a
Person
in
Authority
with

3Sept.
Aug. 7 - Judge Abano sua ponte cancelled Villasenors
4
bond 9and
ordered
his
arrest. to reconsider,
- After
hearing
onimmediate
Villasenors motion
4

Judge Abano resolved to admit him to bail provided he


puts ups a cash bond of P60,000.

a
salary of P210
a
month
sole
breadwinner
a family
of
five. and ofthe

Sec.
12,may,
Rule upon
114
provides
that
"the
court
good cause
shown,
either
increase
or
reduce
the
amount"
of
the
bail,
and
that
"defendant
may
be
committed
to
custody
unless
he
gives
bail
in
the
increased
amount
he
is
called
upon to furnish."
We
are notinability
to consider
solely
of a
defendant
secure
bail the
in
ato bycertain
amount.
This
circumstance
does not
make itself
the
amount
excessive.
Guidelines
used by the
courts
in determining
the amount
of bail

The
purpose of bail as
provided in the
definition under
Sec. 1, Rule 114 the
security
required
and
given
for
the
release
of
a
person who is in
the custody of
the law, that he
will
appear
before any court
in
which
his
appearance may
be required as
stipulated in the
bail
bond
or
recognizance.

Sept.
15
- Villasenor
asked
the
court
the original
bond
previously
given
be
reinstated.
Judge
Abano
resolved
to
fix
"the
bond
anew
realthat
property
in the
amount
of
P60,000.00,
but
toin
be
posted
only
by
residents
ofand
the
province
Marinduque
actually
staying
with
properties
which
"must be
the
possession
ownership
ofofsaid
residents
forin five
years." therein"

6Judge
Villasenor
filed
a ofinjunction
petition
certiorari
with
a
prayer
for preliminary
seeking
to set
aside
orders
Aug. 7, for
Sept.
9 and
Sept.
15
and toAbanos
reinstate
the bail
previously
approved
by
Judbe
Abano.
Heexcess
Judge
Abano
having
actedabuse
without
any or in
of jurisdiction
and
with grave
of
discretion
incharges
issuing
the disputed
orders.

ISSUES:

1.

WON the P60k-bond fixed by Judge Abano transgress


the constitutional injunction that excessive bail shall
not be required.

2.

WON the requirement that the property bond be


posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque
1
actually staying therein collides with Sec. 9, Rule 114 .
WON it is beyond the power of Judge Abano to require
that properties be offered as bond must be in
possession and ownership of the sureties for at least
five years.

3.

Note:
*Since the two orders of Aug. 7 and Sept. 9 was replaced
with the order of Sept. 15, they became functus officio
(retains no legal authority because his or its duties and
functions have been completed)
**This is a 1967 case hence the reference to a different
ROC.
HELD/RATIO

1.

NO. The court has the power to grant bail in


bailable cases and the discretion to fix the
amount thereof. In the instant case, there is no
abuse of discretion.

Sec. 9. Qualification of sureties. The necessary


qualifications of sureties to a bail bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each of them must be a resident householder or
freeholder within the Philippines.

The
condition of bail
as
provided
under
Sec.
2,
Rule
114
defendant
shall
answer
the
complaint
or
information in the
court in which it
is filed or to
which it may be
transferred
for
trial, and after
conviction, if the
case is appealed
to the Court of
First
Instance
upon application
supported by an
undertaking
or
bail, that he will,
surrender himself
in execution of
such judgment as
the
appellate
court
may
render, or that, in
case cause, is to
be tried anew or
remanded for a
new trial, he will
appear in the
court to which it

may
be
remanded
and
submit himself to
the orders and
processes
thereof.

The
following
principles should
be considered in
fixing the amount
of bail:

the
amount
should
be high enough
to
assure
the
presence
of
defendant when
required but no
higher than is
reasonably
calculated
to
fulfill this purpose

the good
of the public as
well as the rights
of the accused

the need
for a tie to the
jurisdiction
and
the
right
to
freedom
from
unnecessary
restraint
before
conviction under
the
circumstances
surrounding each
particular
accused

Certain
guidelines in bail
fixing, which may
be
summarized
as follows: (1)
ability
of
the
accused to give
bail; (2) nature of
the offense; (3)
Penalty for the
offense charged;
(4) character and
reputation of the
accused;
(5)
health
of
the
accused;
(6)
character
and
strength of the
evidence;
(7)
probability of the
accused
appearing in trial;
(8) forfeiture of
other bonds; (9)
whether
the

accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested;


and (10) if the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases

The principal factor considered, to the


determination of which most other factors are
directed, is the probability of the appearance of the
21

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated July 5, 1946 of


the Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48
of July 18, 1963, directed prosecuting attorney's to
recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year
of imprisonment, corresponding to the medium
period of the penalty prescribed for the offense
charged, unless circumstances warrant a higher
penalty

2.

NO. The posture taken by respondent judge

1 does not offend the good sense of justice.


Judge
Abano
it has
been
his
experience
that "itthe
is
hard
to send
notices
to
people
outside
province."
He- explains
that
the
usual procedure
of
2
3
4

his
clerk
of court
isby
toreturn
send
noticesinstances
by when
registered
mail
accompanied
cards;
that
trial
comes,
the
return
cards
many
have
not
yet
been
received
inin
court;
that
the
parties
fail
to
appear;
there
is no
way
ofwhen
knowing
whether
the
notices
have
been
duly
received;
that
he
cannot
order
the
confiscation
of
the
bond
and
the
arrest
of
the
accused,
because
he
is
not
sure
whether
the
bondsmen
have
been
duly
notified;
that
sending
telegrams
to
people
outside
the
province
is
costly,
and
the
court
cannot
afford
to
incur much expenses.
We
read
Sec.in9, the
Rule
114
to mean
that
the
directive
that
bondsmen
be
resident
householders
or
freeholders
Philippines
but
aPhilippines,
minimum
requirement.
Reason
for
this
isisof
that
in
criminal
cases,
residing
outside
thebondsmen
are not within
the reach
of the
processes
of its
courts.
It
is not intended
to tie
the
hands
ofPhilippines.
a judge
to
approve
bail so
as up
itpowers
is
offered
by
resident
householder
or
freeholder
within
the
For
a court
haslong
broad
essential
to its
judicial
function.
Judge
Abano
onlycomes
wanted
tothe
make
when
the
proper
time
for
court
to that
order
the
sureties
to
produce
the
person
of sure
defendant,
no
undue
delay
will be
incurred.
If bondsmen
reside
in
far
away
places,
even
if within
Philippines,
the
purpose
of
bail
may
be
frustrated.
There
is the
insufficiency
of the
mails
as
an the
effective
means
of
communication.
And
then,
there
is
the
problem
of
complying
with
the
constitutional
mandate
of
speedy
If notice to sureties is not served, no
trial
cantrial.
be had.

5be
Furthermore,
reading
of exacted
his
petition
fails
of an
averment
that
requisite
that
bondsmen
residents
ofthe
and
actually
staying
in Marinduque
would
cause
him
prejudice.
3.

NO
Judge Abano - he relied on Circular 2, dated January 23,
1964, of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice,
addressed, among others, to Judges of First Instance.
That circular recites that it had been brought to the
attention of the Department of Justice that in certain
provinces, unscrupulous persons who are spurious
landowners, have been accepted as sureties. The
Secretary then suggested that it may be a good policy
not to accept as bail bonds real properties not covered
by certificate of title unless they have been declared
for taxation purposes in favor of the person offering
them as bond for at least five (5) years.
Its purpose is to prevent the commission of frauds in
connection with the posting of personal bail bonds and
to protect the interests of the Government. If the
bondsman is not the owner, bail fails of its purpose,
prejudice to the government sets in.
We note that the order of September 15, 1964 spoke of
properties in general. Failure of specificness on the part
of Judge Abana then could have been a case of
oversight. To obviate

accused, or of his
flight to avoid
punishment." Of
importance then
is the possible
penalty that may
be meted

5charged
Villasenor
with a

is
capital
offense,
direct
assault
upon
an
agent of a person in
authority
with
murder. A complex
crime, it may call for
the imposition of the
capital

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


misunderstanding, we take it upon ourselves to clarify
that order. We do say now that the order of September
15, 1964 is to be understood as excluding properties
covered by Torrens titles from the requirement that
properties to be offered as bond must be "in the
possession and ownership of the sureties for at least
five years."
DISPOSITION we vote to dismiss the petition for
certiorari, and to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction issued herein.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

22

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

PEOPLE v. ASUNCION
161 SCRA 490
Padilla, J; May 24, 1988
1
FACTS

Rolando
Abadina
(former
colonel
AFP) was
charged
before
the
with
the
offense
of of
Violation
of PD
1866
[Illegal
Possession
Firearms
and
Ammunitions]
The
2 RTC
information
read
that
he wilfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously
had
in of
possession
and
under
his from
custody
firearms
,the
ammunitions
and
magazines
without
first
securing
necessary
license
and/or
permit
the
lawful authority.

2the
Upon
Abanias
Judge
Asuncion
dismissed
Information
on motion,
the
ground
that
it did not
allege
sufficient
facts
to
constitute
an
offense,
since
the
possession
of loose
firearms
and
explosives
is
not

illegal
per se, aor
in view
of Executive
Order
No.
107
which
gives
holders
possessors
of unlicensed
firearms
and
ammunition
period
ofwithin
six
(6)
months
from
its
effectivity,
extended
to
31
December
1987
by
Executive
Order
No.
222,
which
to
surrender
the
same to or
the
proper
authorities,
without
incurring
any
criminal
liability
therefor,
except
if
the
unlicensed
firearm
ammunition
is
carried
outside
of
one's
residence,
not
for
the
purpose
of
surrendering
the
same,
or
used
in
the
commission
of
any
other
offense,
and there
is noammunition
allegation
inenumerated
said
information
that
the
firearms
and
therein
carried
outside
the
accused's
residence
or
used
inwere
the
commission
of some
other crime.

ISSUES

1.

WON judge erred in hooding that the possession of


loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se
during the period covered by Executive Orders Nos.
107 and 222.

2.

WON it was not necessary for the prosecution to allege


in the information that the firearms and ammunition,
subject matter of this case, were brought out of the
residence of the accused or were used by him in the
commission or another offense

3.

WON under the allegation in the information,


prosecution may prove that the accused earned the
firearms and ammunition outside of his residence

HELD/RATIO:

1.

NO. EO No. 107, as amended by EO No. 222, is


similar to RA Nos. 4 and 482. We will not give it a
different meaning because there is no basis for
1 such a difference.
Prosecution
- without
nothing ais
contained
in of
said
executive
orders
which
legalizes
the
possession
firearms
and
ammunition
permit;
that
executive
orders
merely
authorized
holders
or
possessors
of
unlicensed
firearms
and
ammunition
tosaid
surrender
the
same
within
a specified
filing
period
without
incurring
criminal
liability;
and
that
illegal
possession
ofExecutive
firearms
and
ammunition
is
still
penalized
under
Pres.
Decree
No.
1866
which
was
not
repealed
by
said
Order Nos. 107 and 222.

2Orders
It may
be
true
there
nothing
in Executive
Nos.
107
andthat
222firearms
that isexpressly
legalizes
the
unlicensed
possession
of
and
ammunition,
but
this
Court
had
2

Sterling Assault Rifle, Armalite Rifle, Carbine, Cal 357


Revolver and Cal 45, Pistol

ruled that a criminal


liability
was
temporarily
LIFTED
for mere possession'
of
unlicensed
firearms
and
ammunition
during
the period covered,
although such person
is not exempt from
criminal liability filing
within
the
period
provided, he carries
the
firearm
and
ammunition (unless it
is for the purpose of
surrendering
the
same) or he commits
any other offense
with the use of such
unlicensed
firearm
and ammunition.

context.

People
vs. Feliciano - SC
ruled that RA No.
482
legalized
mere unlicensed
possession
of
firearms
and
ammunition
for
the limited period
specified in said
law,
and
punished only (1)
the
use
of
unlicensed
firearm
or
ammunition,
or
(2) the carrying
of such firearm or
ammunition
on
the
person,
except
to
surrender them.
The Court said:

People
vs. Lopez - It will
be seen that sec
2 (of RA NO 4)
excluded
from
the operation of
sec 1 up to
August 31, 1946,
possession
of
firearms
and
ammunition
so
long as they were
not used for any
purpose
other
than self-defense
or carried for any
purpose
other
than
of
surrendering
them
to
the
proper
authorities. The
Government does
not dispute this
interpretation.
Although the law
does
not
categorically
state
that
criminal liability
was temporarily
lifted for mere
possession
of
filing
firegems
and ammunition,
that is the only
construction
compatible with
the spirit and
purposes of the
enactment
as
revealed by its

Feliciano
ruling
was
reiterated
in
People
vs.
Tabunares:
RA
No. 482, in effect
legalized
mere
unlicensed
on
within one year
from said date,
and
punished
only (1) the use
of
a
or
ammunition
or
(2) the carriage
thereof on the
person except for
purpose
of
surrender.
Appellant's
conviction cannot
stand, since it is
rested solely on
unlicensed
possession on or
about November
6, 1950.

2.

NO. It is necessary
for the prosecution
to allege in the
information
that
the firearms and
ammunition,
subject matter of
this
case,
were
brought out of the
residence of the
accused or were

conditions,
and
hence,
should
be
alleged and
proved.
used by him in the commission or another
1 offense
3information
v.charging
Austria
-illegal
inPeople
order
that
an
Prosecution
these
circumstances
are notof essential
possession
of
ingredients
of- the
crime
of illegal possession
firearms
firearm
and
and ammunition.
ammunition,
under
Republic
Act itNo.
482,
may
be
deemed
sufficient,
must
allege
that
the
2
accused
was
using
thehis person
firearm
or unlicensed
carrying
it
in
at was
the
People
v. of
Lopez
Under
RA No.
4,of the
usewas
or the
time
carrying
firearms
and/or
ammunition
an
apprehended
by
the
ingredient,
if not
the
sole
ingredient,
the offense;
i.e.
authoritieshewith
said
the
very acts
which
were
punished,
subject
to certain
23

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


1

People
v.have
Austria
- effect
thean
presentation
of evidence
cannot
the
of validating
amerely
void
information,
oritThe
proving
offense
which
does
not
legally exist.
was
notdoes
defective
butspeaking,
doesinformation
not
charge
any
offense
at not
all.
Technically
that
information
exist in contemplation
of
law.
The Court is not unaware that accuse- Abadilla,
rightly or wrongly, is identified with the violent arm
of the past regime. To many, he is regarded with
unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of that
regime. The Court, however, is not swayed by
appellations or approbriums.

DISPOSITION the petition is DENIED. The orders


appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED.

firearm.

3.

NO.
The
information
is
fatally defective.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

24

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

GARCIA v. CA
266 SCRA 678
Davide, Jr., J; January 27, 1997
his view that
the State is
the offended
party in
public
offenses.

1
FACTS
Jose Garcia charging
filed with
Pros.
Office
anDelia
Affidavit of
Complaint
histhe
wife,QC
Adela
Santos
alias

3
4
5
6
7

Sanots with Bigamy, violation of CA No. 142, as


amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public
Documents. Later, Santos informed Ass. City Pros.
Cabanilla that he would limit his action to bigamy.

1-

Ass.
Pros.committed
Cabanilla
filed
withSantos
the
RTC
of Bigamy
QC an
information
charging
Adela
with
allegedly
as
follows
: in
the
above-named
accused,
being
previously
united
lawful
marriage
with
REYNALDO
QUIROCA,
and(or
without
the
said
marriage
having
been
dissolved,
before
the
absent
spouse
has
been
declared
presumptively
dead
by
a
judgment
rendered
in theunlawfully
proper
proceedings),
did
then
and
there
wilfully,
feloniously
contract
ahas
second
marriage
with
JOSE
G.and
GARCIA,
which
marriage
[sic]
discovered
in
1989,
to
the
damage
and
prejudice
of
the
said
offended
party
in
such
amount
as may be awarded under the provisions of the
Civil
Code.
Adela
Santos
filedoffense
a Motion
to Quash
alleging
prescription
of
the
ground.
that
by
admission
inashis
testimony
incontended
civil
and
in Garcias
hisearly
complaint
filed
with
theShe
Civil
Service
commission,
Garcia
discovered
the
commission
ofcase
the
offense
as
as
1974.
Since
the
penalty
prescribed
under
Art.
329
of
the
RPC
for
the
offense
of
bigamy
is
prision
mayor,
which
is
classified
as
an
afflictive
penalty
under
Art.
25
of
the
same
Code,
then
offense
Art.
92
of theshould
Code.prescribe in 15 years as provided in said
TC
granted
the
motion
to quash
and
dismissed
the
criminal
case.
The
complainant
having
discovered
first
marriage
of
accused
tohas
one
Reynaldo
Quiroca
in 1974
when
hethe
was
informed
of already
itin
by
one
Eugenia
Balingit,
the
offense
prescribed
when
the
information
was filed
this
case
on
November
15,
1991 charged
Garcia
moved
for reconsideration
arguing
that Adelas
many
trips
abroad
suspended
the
running
ofin the
prescriptive
period.
These
tripsCommissioner
were
enumerated
certification
issued
by
Ass.
Morals
of
BID.
TC disallowed
reconsideration
ofset
its itorder,
finding
no
urgent
or that
justifiable
aside.
The from
trial
court
held
trips
ofreason
are
notto
the
kind
of
absence
the
Philippines
which
will
interrupt
the
period
of
prescription
of the
offense
charged.
Garcia appealed to CA. He contended that:

(1)

TC erred in quashing the information on the ground


of prescription

1-

Bigamy was a public offense; the offended


party is not the first or second (innocent)
spouse but the State whose law was
transgressed. Thus, the prescriptive period of
Bigamy should commence from the day the
State, being the offended party, discovered the
offense, which in this case was on Aug. 28,
1991 when he filed his complain before the
Pros. Office. He added that the interchanging
use in Art. 91 of the RPC of the terms "offended
party," "authorities," and "their agents"
supports

2-

3-

(2)

People
v.
Alagao - that
in
resolving
the motion to
quash
a
criminal
complaint or
information,
the
facts
alleged in the
complaint or
information
should
be
taken as they
are.
The
information
in this case
mentioned
that
the
bigamy was
discovered in
1989.
The
factual
bases of the
motion
to
quash,
viz.,
the
Garcias
testimony in
Civil
Case
and
his
complaint
filed with the
CSC are not
conclusive
because the
testimony is
hearsay
evidence,
hence
inadmissible,
while
the
complaint is
vague.
The
prescriptive
period
was
interrupted
several times
by
the
Adela's
numerous
trips abroad.

Counsel for Adela


is barred from
filing the motion
to
quash
the
information

1-

Counsel
for
Adela
has
already
stated
that
he represent
only
Delia
Garcia
and
not
Adela
Santos.
Consequently
, her counsel
could not ask
for the quash
of
the
information
in favour of
Adela Santos
alias
Delia
Santos. The
counsel
should have
sought
a
dismissal of
the case in
favour
of
Delia Garcia
alone.

2discovered
CA
concluded
that
Garcia
Adelas
first
marriage
in

1974.
Since
the
information
was
filed
in
court
onyears
Jan.
8,
1992
or
18
after
the only
discovery
of
the
offence,
then
the
15-year
prescriptive
period
had
certainly
lapsed.
further
that
theIt quash
ofheld
an
information
based
on
prescription
of
the
offense
could
be
invoked
before
or
after
arraignment
and
eventhe
on criminal
appeal,
for
under
89(5)
of
RPC,
liability
ofextinguished
aArt.
person
is
totally
by
the
prescription
the crime, which is of
a
mode
of
extinguishing
criminal
liability.
Thus,
prescription
is
not
deemed
waived
even
if not pleaded
as a defese.

ISSUE

1.

WON the prescription


for Bigamy should
have been counted
from the time the
State discovered its
commission.

2.

WON a Motion to
Quash
cannot
go
beyond
what
is
stated
in
the
information

3.

WON
the
factual
bases of the Motion
to Quash are not
conclusive.

4.

WON, assuming the


prescriptive
period
started in 1974, said
period
was
interrupted
several
times.

HELD/RATIO

1.

NO. The prescription


should have been
counted from the

time the offended party (first or second innocent

1 spouse) discovered its commission.

and
a private
crime.
In
both
cases
then,
the
discovery
may
be
by
the
offended
party,
the
authorities,
or
their
agents.

It isoftrue
Bigamy
is a publicbetween
offense. aHowever,
Art.
91
RPCthat
makes
no distinction
public crime
25

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


1

It
is
reasonable
to assume
thatpublic
the
offended
party
in
the
commission
a the
crime,
or private,
is
the
party
to whom
the
offender
iswhich
civilly
liable,
light
of
Art.
100 of
of
RPC,
expressly
provides
that
"every
person
criminally
liable
for in
a
felony
is the
alsooffender
civilly
liable."
private
individual
to
whom
is civillyThe
liable
is the
offended
party.

Neither may the petitioner be heard to cast


doubt on the meaning of his statements in his
3
sworn complaint filed before the CSC. We find no
hint of vagueness in them. In any event, he has not
denied that he in fact discovered in 1974 that the
private respondent had been previously married.

in the criminal case because the information therein


describes him as the offended party who suffered

1
2. NO

2
3

Even
People
v. 2,
Alagao,
which
he5 cites,
mentions
the
exceptions
to
the Sec.
rule
provided
par.
(f)
and
(h)
of(a)
Sec.
and
4as
and
of exception
thein
old
Rule
117
viz.,jeopardy.
extinction
of criminal
liability,
and
(b)
double
His
claim
that
the
of
extinction
can
no
longer
be
raised
due
to
the
implied
repeal
of
the
former
Section
4,
Rule
117
of
the
Rules
of
Court
occasioned
byof its
nonreproduction
after
its revision,
is equally
without
merit.
No
repeal,
express
or
implied,
the
said
Section
4
ever
took
place.
While
there
is
no
provision
inliability,
newSection
Rule
117
that prescribes
the
contents
of
athe
motion
to
quash
based
on
extinction
of
25 thereof
encapsulizes
thecriminal
former
Sections
3,4,
and
of
the old
Rule
117.
Sec.
2,counsel.
Rule
117
Form
and signed
contents.
The
motion
to
quash
shall
be
in
writing
by -the
or
his
It -shall
specify
distinctly
theaccused
factual
and
legal
grounds
therefor
the
court
shall
consider
no
grounds
other and
than
those
stated
therein,
except
lack of
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged.

Sec. 12,
Rule 110
as
"the
person
against
whom
or
against
whose
property,
the
offense
was
committed."

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

Garcia even admits that he is the offended party

damage and prejudice.

2define
Art. 91
does term
not
the
offended
party.
We
find
its definition
in

4.
1NO
Weabroad
agree with
the
of Appeals
that
these
trips
didArticle
not Court
constitute
the Philippines.
"absence"
contemplated
in
91.
These
were
brief,
and
in every case
Adela
returned
totrips
the
Besides,
were
made
long
after
the
Garcia
discovered
the offense
and
even
ifconsidered,
the
aggregate
number
ofthese
days
of was
these
trips
are
still
the information
filed
well
beyond
the
prescriptive
period.

DISPOSTION the instant petition is DENIED for lack of


merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.14324 is
AFFIRMED.

It
is clear
from this
Section
that
a motion
to double
quash
may
be
based
onoffactual
and
legal
grounds,
and
since
extinction
criminal
liability
and
jeopardy
retained
as that
among
the new
grounds
for
a
motion
toare
quash
in
Section
3 of
the
Rule
117,
it
necessarily
follows
facts
outside
the
information
itself
may
be
introduced
to
prove
such
grounds.
As
a
matter
of
fact,
inquiry
into
such
facts
may
be
allowed
where
the
ground
invoked
is
that
the
allegations
in
the
information
do
not
constitute
the offense charged.

4People
As v.
a
general
proposition
thetoinformation
court held
in
De
lathe
Rosa
that a charged,
motion
on the
ground
that
the
allegations
of the
do
not
constitute
offense
orquash
any offense
for
that
should
be
resolved
on
the
basis
alone
ofv.matter,
said
allegations
whose
truth
and
veracity
are
hypothetically
admitted.
However,
as
held
in
People
Navarro,
additional
facts
not
alleged
the
information,
admitted
denied
by the
prosecution
maybut
be
invokedor
innot
support
of
motion
to quash.

3.
1NO
Garcia
cannot
be allowed
disown
statements
he
made
under
oath
and intoopen
when
it
serves
his
purpose.
Besides,
he court
never
denied
having
given
the
pertinent
testimony.
He
did,

however,
term
it marriage
vague
in which
that
itEugenia
was
whether respondent
the
Balingit
disclosed
totoprior
him
was
that
entered
intonot
byclear
the
private
with
Reynaldo
Quiroca.
is
immaterial
whom
the
private
respondent
was
first
married;
is
relevant
case
is It
that
the petitioner
was
informed
ofin athis
prior
marriage
contracted
by what
the
private
respondent.

These facts were discovered only by the herein


complainant in the year 1974 where they separated
from each other because of her illicit relations with
several men continued use of her alias name "DELIA",
without proper authority from the Courts; and
committing a series of fraudulent acts; her previous
marriage to a certain "Reynaldo Quiroca" is evidenced

by a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Manila

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

26

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

LOPEZ v. CITY JUDGE


18 SCRA 616
Dizon, J; Oct. 29, 1966
information to the
effect that the
offense was
committed within the
territorial jurisdiction
of Angeles City

1
FACTS

Petitioners
Angelina
Lopez, Aurora
(heirs
of Sps.
Manuel
Mejia
Gloria
Lazatin)
RoySps.)
Villasor
(administrator
ofand
the intestate
estate Villasor
of and
the said

Petitioners,
together
with with
the other
heirs
of Sps.
Mejia,
entered
contract
Trinidad
Lazatin
for
the
development
and
subdivision
of
3
parcels
of
land
belong under
tointo
saidathe
intestate
estate.
Lazatin
transferred
his
rights
contract
to the
Terra
Development
Corporation.

3action
Months later,
in CFI QC

3.

petitioners and other co-heirs filed an


for the recission of said contract for
4
allegedand
gross
wilful
of its
Lazatin
TDC and
filed with
theviolation
Fiscals Office
of terms.
the City of

WON the prayer for


writs of certiorari and
prohibition is proper

Angeles a complaint against petitioners for an alleged


violation Art. 172 in relation to those of Art. 171, par. 4, HELD/RATIO
of the RPC.
1. NO. It is settled
5
law
in
criminal
After
conducting
a preliminary
examination,
City
Fiscal
filed
an
information
charging
petitioners
with
the
crime
actions
that
the
of
falsification
of
a
private
document
upon
the
allegation that
they made it appear in the contract
mentioned
that Aurora
place where the
Villasor was the guardian of the minor George Mejia
criminal
offense
and that Angelina Lopez was similarly the guardian of
was committed not
the minor Alexander Mejia, when in truth and in fact
only
determines
they knew that they were not the guardians of said
the
venue
of the
minors on the date of the execution of the document.
action but is an
6
essential element
Upon
petition
oftoreinvestigated
the
parties
thus
charged,
thethem
City
Fiscal
of
Angeles
the
case
to give
an
opportunity
present
exculpatory
evidence,
and
after
the
conclusion
the
reinvestigation
the
of jurisdiction. The
petitioners
moved
forofthe
dismissal
of Court
the
case
mainly
on
the
ground
that
the
City
of
Angeles
had
no
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
because
the
private
document
the
alleged
false
oflimits
factthat
was
signed
by
City
Court
of
them
outside
thestatement
territorial
of contained
said city.
(Makati
and QC)
Angeles
has
no
7
Resolution
this
motion
to was
delayed.
The
City
jurisdiction
over
Court had of
set
criminal
case
for
arraignment;
petitioners
secured
from
saidon
court
several
postponements
ofthe
the
arraignment.
In
view
of
the
City
Fiscal's
continued
failure
to act
the
motion
to
dismiss
the
case,
petitioners
withthat
the
City
Court
a
motion
to
quash
upon
the ground
said
court
had
the
offense
no
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged.
1 charged.
8
Under
the
provisions
of
Section
of
the
The
complainants
with
the
conformity
of
the
City
Judiciary
Act86
oforiginal
1948,
Fiscal

filed
an
opposition
thereto.
City
Judge
denied
municipal
courts
saiddefendants
motion to quash
and5 reset
arraignment
of all
the
on March
of thethe
same
year.
have
jurisdiction
only
over
criminal
offenses
committed
within
their
respective
territorial
jurisdiction.

9prohibition.
Petitioners

filed the present action for certiorari and2

ISSUE

that
the committed
act
of
falsification
charged
was
outside the
jurisdiction
of
Angeles
City.territorial

2.

NO. The argument


of the respondents
refers to the now
obsolete demurrer
1 to an information.
The
motion
to for
quash
now
provided
in
Rule
117
the
Rules
of
isofscope
manifestly
broader
in
theCourt
demurrer,
as than
itthe
is
not
limited
to
defects
apparent
upon
face
of
the
complaint
or
information
but
extends to
issues
arising
out
of
extraneous
facts,
as
shown
by
the
circumstance
that,
among
the
grounds
for
a Section
motion
to
quash,
2 for
of
said Rule
provides
former
jeopardy
or
acquittal,
extinction
of
action
or
liability,
insanity
of
thecriminal
accused
etc.,
which
necessarily
involve
questions
of
fact
the
determination
of
which
a in
preliminary
trial
is required.

2case,
theportion
present
the
of
the Inrecord
ofwhich
the
reinvestigation

was submitted
to the
respondent
judge
for
consideration
in
connection
with
the
resolution
ofbeyond
motion
tothat
quash
shows
questioncharged
the
offense
was
committed
far
beyond
jurisdiction
of
Angeles the
City.territorial

3.

YES

Petitioners
are
not
charged
having
used
awith
falsified
document,
in
violation
of
last
paragraph
of the
Art. The
172
of
the
RPC.
charge
against
them isfalsified
that of
having
a
private.

WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction to try 3 US


- that
the v. Infante
crime
of
falsification
of
a
private
document
defined
and
and decide the criminal case for alleged falsification of
penalized
by
Art.
304
of the
Penal
Code
(now
par
2,
Article
172
of
the
RPC)
is
consummated
when
such
document
is
a private document allegedly done by the parties
actually intent
falsified
with
the
to
prejudice
a
third
person,
whether
such
falsified
document
is
or is
not
thereafter
named in the info even if the acts of falsification was
put
towhich
the
illegal
use
for
it was
intended.
allegedly done in Makati and QC, and thus outside the
jurisdiction of said court
4falsification
The
act
of
the
signing
of
document
and
the
coetaneous
intent
to
cause
damage
was
committed
and
consummated
outside
the
territorial
WON the motion to quash was improper, and should
jurisdiction
of and
the
City
of whether
Angeles,
that
the
falsified
private
document
was
not be allowed since by filing the said motion, the
thereafter
not
put
the put
illegal
use
for towhich
it orother
was
intended,
or
signed
by
the
contracting
party
petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of the
within
the territorial
jurisdiction
of is
the
City
of Angeles
not
essential
element
of
the
crime
allegation of the
falsification
of
the
private
document,
nor
could
it
in
any
way change the fact
27

1.

2.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


1

As
a of
general
rule,toaannul
court
of equity
will
not
issue
a
writ
certiorari
an
order
of
a lower
court
denying
motion
to
quash,
noritfrom
issue
a the
writ
of
prohibition
to
prevent
said
court
proceeding
with
the acase
after
such
denial,
being
rule
that
upon
such
denial
the
defendant
should
enter
his
plea
of
not
guilty
and
go
to
trial
and,
if
convicted,
raise
on
appeal
the
same
legal
questions
his
motion
to quash.
as
wellthe
as covered
in other
jurisdictions
however,
thisInisthis
no
longer
hard
andby
fast
rule.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimate
analysis, intended to annul void proceedings; to
prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice.

DISPOSITION judgment is hereby


rendered declaring that the offense
charged in the information filed in
Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the City
Court of Angeles City is not within the
jurisdiction of said court and that,
therefore,
said
court
is
hereby
restrained and prohibited from further
proceedings therein.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

28

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

UY v. CA
276 SCRA 371
Bellosillo, J; Jan. 28, 1997
Whether the RTC of
Manila acquired
FACTS
Company owned by the husband of Consolacion
jurisdiction over the
Leong. During Rosas employment, she was regarded violations of the
Bouncing Checks Law
by the
Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. A
NO
few months before she was to give birth, Rosa HELD/RATIO:
1acquired
It
isrule
a
fundamental
for
jurisdiction
tothat
be
by
courts
in
criminal
cases
the
resigned. She helped her husband manage their
offense
should
have
been
committed
or
any
one
of
its
essential
ingredients
took
place
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction
lumber business. The friendly relations between Rosa
of
the jurisdiction
court.
Territorial
in criminal
cases
is
territory
where
the
courtor
has
jurisdiction
to
take
and Consolacion continued. The two later agreed to
cognizance
to
try
the
offensetherein
allegedly
committed
by
the
accused.
Furthermore,
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court
form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute
over
criminal
case
isthe
determined
by thecomplaint
allegations
in
the
or
information.
And
once
itcognizance
ismay
so shown,
additional capital for the expansion of Rosas lumber
the
validly
takecourt
of
case.
However,
if
the
evidence
adduced
during
trial
show
that
the
business and the latter as industrial partner. Various
offense
was
committed
somewhere
else,
the
court
should
dismiss
the
action
for
want
of
jurisdiction.
sums of money amounting to P500k were claimed to
have given by Consolacion for the business; however
because of the trust they had for each other, no receipt The crime of estafa and
was ever issued.Thereafter a lumber store with the violation of B.P. Blg.
warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with22 have to be treated as
1
offenses
the funds contributed by Consolacion evidenced by separate
The
of of
estafa
and crimes
violation
the
Bouncing
Law
are
2 Checks
different
offenses
having
various receipts. But, unfortunately, the friendship
different
elements
and,
necessarily,
for
a
court
to
acquire
jurisdiction
each
of
the
essential
ingredients
of
each
between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the
crime has to be
satisfied.
partnership documents were never processed. As a 2
In
the are
crime
of
estafa,
deceit
and
result, Consolacion asked for the return of her
damage
essential
elements
the
offense
and of
havewith
to
be
established
satisfactory
proof
to
warrant
conviction.
investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the
For
violation
of
the
Bouncing
Checks
Law,
the
elements
of
deceit
and
damage
are
neither
essential
purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
nor required.
Rather,
the
elements
of and
B.P.
Blg.
22 drawing
areof(a)
the
making,
issuance
any
check
to
apply
to
account
or knows
for
value;
(b)
maker,
drawer
2
or
issuer
at
the the
time
issuance
that
he ofdoes
not
Consolacion
a complaint
for
estafa
for violation of
have
sufficient
funds
the Bouncingfiled
Checks
Law before
the
RTC ofand
Manila.
in
or
credit
with
the
drawee
bank
for
the
payment
such
check
in check
fullofupon
its
presentment;
and,
(c)
3
the
is
subsequently
dishonored
by funds
the
drawee
bank
for
Dec. The
10 offenses
for
anviolation
Information
for 22
and
several
other
insufficiency
of
informations
of
BP
blg.
were
filed
against
or
credit
or
would
Rosa.
were
subsequently
consolidated
and
have
been
tried jointly.
dishonored
for
the
samedrawer,
reason had
not
the
without
valid
reason,
the bank
toordered
stop
payment.
under BP Blg. 22.

CA affirmed the decision

Rosa a- evidence
trial
court
never
over
the
offenses
under
B.P.
Blg.
22.of
None
of
the
essential
elements
constitutive
of acquired
violation
of
B.P.
Blg.
22
was
shown
to
have
been
committed
injurisdiction
the
City
of
Manila.
The
presented
established
that
(a)
complainant
was
a resident
Makati;
(b)
petitioner
was
resident
of
Caloocan
City;
(c)
place
of
business
of
alleged
partnership
was
in
Malabon;
(d)
the
drawee
bank
was
located
inlocated
Malabon;
and,
(5) the checks were all deposited for collection in
Makati.
Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said
evidence would only show that none of the essential
elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila

1evidence
Peoplethat
was
(1)
Even
if there
is no what
showing
of any
the
essential
took
place
or
committed
iningredients
Manila,
is critical
is
the offense
fact that
the
court
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the

estafa
case
because
the incidental
same
is the
or case.
main
case
and
that
themerely
cases
for
violations
of
the
Bouncing
Checks
are
to principal
the
estafa
(2)Knowledge
on
the
part
of the
maker
or is
drawer
of the
check
ofLaw
the
insufficiency
his
by
itself
a
continuing
eventuality
whether
thefunds
accused
besome
within
one
territory
or
another
(3)of
respondent
relies
on
the
doctrine
of
jurisdiction
by
estoppelit
took
5
years
of
trial
before
petitioner
raised
the
issue
of
jurisdiction.

ISSUES

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check
or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the
issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of
proof on the records that at the time of issue,
petitioner or complainant was in Manila.

1
Doctrine of Estoppel not applicable

Sec.
3,
Rule
117provides
that
the
accused
may
move
to
quash
the
complaint
or
information
on
any
of
the
following
grounds:
(b)
that
the
court
trying
the
case
hasover
no
jurisdiction
the
offense
charged
or
the
person
of
accused.
Moreover,
under
Sec.
8, he
Rule
113over
itto
is the
provided
that
the
failure
of
the
accused
to
assert
any
ground
of
a
motion
to
quash
before
pleads
the
complaint
or
information,
either
because
he
did
not infile
a
motion
to
quash
or failed
allege
the
same
said
motion,
shall
be deemed
atowaiver
of
the
of
a
motion
to
quash,
except
grounds
ofprovided
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged
asgrounds
for
in par. b
Sec.
3,
Rule
117.the

2court
Rosa
timely
questioned
the jurisdiction
of Trial
the
in afails
memorandum
before
the
Regional
Court
and
thereafter
succeeding
pleadings.
if
a party
to file ainmotion
to quash,
he mayEven
still

question
jurisdiction
court
laterstage
on.
Moreover,
these
objections
may
be
raised
or
consideredthe
motu
propio
byofthethe
court
at any

29

or
knowledge
of
insufficiency of funds
occurred in Manila,
which are essential
elements necessary
for the Manila Court
to acquire jurisdiction
over the offense.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
a continuing offense
however

1transitory
ItB.P.
may
true
that
Blg.be
22
is or
a
continuing
offense
and
such
the
case
thea being
theory
is
that
person
indicted
with
a
transitory
offense
may
be the
validly
tried
in
any
jurisdiction
where
offense
was
in
part
committed.
However
that
knowledge
by
the
maker
or
drawer
of the fact

The
records dealings
clearly
indicate
that
business
were conducted
in
a
restaurant
ingiven
Manila
where
sums
of
money
were
to
Rosar;
hence,
the
acquisition
of
jurisdiction
by
the
lower court
over The
estafa
case.
various
charges
for
violation
of are
B.P. on
Blg.
22
however
a
different
plain.
There
is
no
scintilla
of
evidence to show
that
jurisdiction
over the violation
of B.P. Bldg. 22 had
been acquired. No
proof
has
been
offered
that
the
checks were issued,
delivered, dishonored
of the proceedings or on appeal.
4

Calimlim v. Ramirez Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an


exception
to
theingeneral
rule the Court
1the
Inruling
Calimlim
v. general
Ramirez,
held
that
Sibonghanoy
case
an
exception
toof
the
rule
the
lack
of
jurisdiction
athe
court
may
bethat
raised
atis The
any
stage
of
the
proceedings,
even
on
appeal.
Court
stated
further
that
Tijam
v.
Sibonghanoy
is anhad
exceptional
case
because
of
the
presence
of
laches.
The
Court
said:
A
rule
that
been
settled
by
unquestioned
acceptance
and
upheld
in
decisions
so
numerous
to
cite
is
that
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court over
the
subject
matter
of the
action
isby
matter
of law
and
may
not
be
conferred
consent
agreement
ofmay
theeven
parties.
The
lack
of
jurisdiction
of
a court
be raised
at
any
stage
oforthe
proceedings,
on
appeal.
This
doctrine
has
been
qualified
by
recent
pronouncements
which
stemmed
principally
from
the
ruling
in
the
cited
case
of
Sibonghanoy.
It which
is said
to be
regretted,
however,
that
the holding
in
case
had
been
applied
to
situations
were
obviously
not
contemplated
therein.in
The
exceptional
circumstance
involved
Sibonghanoy
which
justified
the
departure
from
the
accepted
concept
of has
non-waivability
ofand,
objection
to
jurisdiction
been
ignored
instead
a
blanket
doctrine
had
been
repeatedly
upheld
that general
rendered
thethe
supposed
ruling
in
Sibonghanoy
not
as
exception,
but
rather
the
rule,
virtually
overthrowing
altogether
the
time-honored
principle
that
the
issue
of
jurisdiction
is
not
lost
by
waiver
or
by
estoppel.
Instant case different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy

It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having


been raised for the first time in a motion to

dismiss filed almost 15 years after the questioned


ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer
be raised for being barred by laches.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial


court in the present case. As soon as the accused
discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail
or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss.
They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in
a memorandum before the lower court.

DISPOSITION REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without


prejudice to the filling of appropriate charges against
petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction
when warranted.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

30

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

PEOPLE v. NAVARRO
279 SCRA 393
Panganiban, J
preliminary
investigation from
1
FACTS
receipt of the copy of
T/Sgt.
Sanchez,
PC
Investigator
filed
a
complaint
for
qualified
theft
directly
with
the
RTC
of
Naga
City
against
minor Carlos Barbosa.
1 the Order.
2
Prov.
Pros.
a
motion
to issued
setfiled
aside
the
orders
by
PAO,
as counsel
for
Barbosa,
filed
aSgt.
Motion
Quash
the
Judge
Navarro
stating
Complaint
onfilethe
ground or
that
Sanchez
is not
(1)
that
she has
no
authorized
to
a complaint
information
intoCourt.
authority
to
designate
a
particular
prosecutor
to
handle
the
case;
3
(2)
that
thewithout
court
will
be
acting
or
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
should
it
Judge
Manio,
Jr.,
as
presiding
judge
of
RTC
and
the
pairing
judge
of
Judge
Navarro,
issued
an
order
insists
on
Pros.
remanding
case for preliminary
investigation
and
Llaguno
to
conduct
assigned
thethe
adjudication
to Prosecutor
Cajot.
the
preliminary
investigation;
and (3)
that
thecase
record
of
said
be
4
forwarded
to
the
Prov.
Pros.
Office
for
it
conduct
the
preliminary
Before
Pros.
Cajot
could
conduct
required
preliminary
investigation,
Sgt.
filedOffice.
athe
motion
to withdraw
the
investigation.
A
complaint
with
the Sanchez
Prosecution
Supplemental
Motion
to
withdraw
the
was
also
filed
so case
that
the
same
may
not
5
remain
pending
with
the
court
while
the
case
is
under
preliminary
Pros.
issued
an release
order to
and
approved
bycomplaint
the Prov.
investigation.
Pros.,
granting
the
withdraw
the
and Cajot
ordering
the
of
accused
from
detention.
A copy
of motion
said order
wasthe
furnished
the RTC.
2
6
Judge
Navarro
denied
both
motions
on
grounds
that:
(1)
the
case
of
Abugotal
v.
Tiro
which
prohibits
the
courts
from
appointing
a
particular
fiscal
to
conduct
the
required
preliminary
investigation,
iswhile
not
in
point
as
the
said
Judge
Navarro
ordered
the Prov.
Pros. Cajot
to
case
refers
to
reinvestigation
the
instant
case
refers
toare
preliminary
explain
why
encroached
onPros.
the and
jurisdiction
of the
investigation;
and
(2)
court
is
apprehensive
that
if
the
Motion
to
Amend
court over
thethey
case.
Orders
granted,
there
is
nothing
that
will
the
Prov.
Pros.
from
implementing
the
orders
issued
by
Pros.
Cajotprevent
and
the
latter
will
just
act
in
conformity
with
his
previous
action.
7
3
Pros.
Cajot explained
asserting
the court
jurisdiction
of the
prosecutors
office
in
the conduct
ofOffice
preliminary
Prov.
Pros. was denied.
motion
investigation
and
that
when
the
ordered
the
reconsideration
records
ofdivested
case
be
remanded
to theand
of the
Prosecutor
to
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation,
the
court
itself
of
its
control
jurisdiction
over the case.

8
9

Judge
issued
an order
setting
aside
order
of
Pros.Navarro
Cajot
Ass.
Llaguno,
who
was
appearing
in and
herordered
sala,
to Pros.
conduct
the the
required
preliminary
investigation.

4petition
Petitioner
filed the
the
seeking
annulment
of
the
assailed
order
of Judge
Navarro.

preliminary
investigation,
Judge
Navarro
clearly
encroached
on
an
executive
function.
Preliminary
investigation
is an
executive,
not
a
judicial,
function.
As
thedirect
officer
authorized
to
and
control
the
prosecution
of all
criminal
actions,
a
prosecutor
is
primarily
responsible
for
ascertaining
whether ground
there
is
sufficient
to
engender
a been
wellfounded
belief
that
an
offense
has
committed
and guilty
that
the
accused
is
probably
thereof.
An
RTC judge
has no
authority
to
conduct
a
preliminary
investigation.
This
means
that
he
cannot
directly
order
an
assistant
prosecutor,
particularly
over
the
objections
of
the
latters
superiors,
to
conduct
a
preliminary
investigation.
To
allow
him toindo
sothe
is
to
authorize
him
to
meddle
executive
and
administrative
functions
of
the
provincial
or
city
prosecutor.
There
is
a
hierarchy
ofexecutive
officials
in
the
prosecutory
arm
ofSecretary
the
branch
headed
by
the
of
Justice
and
his
team
of prosecutors.
Mere
suspicion
or officials
belief
that
the
will
notissaid
adequately
perform
their
official
duties
no judges
reason
for
the
interference
in
or
disregard
of
such
hierarchy.

4Decree
AbugotalPresidential
v.
Under
77,Tirothe
authority No.
to conduct
the
preliminary
investigation of the

Pros. Llaguno
a order
motionmight
for the
reconsideration
taking
exception
to file
the
on
that
any
resolution
she
may
issue
runground
counter
with
theISSUE May a regional
previous
of her
and
thus
render
policies
disorganized,
procedures
disorderly
and
chaotic, order
resulting
tosuperiors
the
embarrassment
ofoffice
the trial court judge name or
administration
of Justice.
10
designate a particular
Pros.
Cajot
filed
anot
motion
fororder
reconsideration
alleging:
(a)
that granting
he
issue
an
of withdraw.
dismissal
but
anthe
order
the
motion
toto
Therefore,
there
is did
no
more
complaint
speakand
of assistant prosecutor to
before
court;
(b)
the
prosecutor,
in conducting
the
preliminary
investigation,
has
the
exclusive
power
authority
to
dismiss
the
complaint
immediately
if
he
finds
grounds
continue
the(c)
inquiry,
otherwise
files
thetoInformation
ifwith
he finds
cause
to conduct the preliminary
hold no
thehe
respondent
trial;
the
finding/recommendation
offor
the
investigating
prosecutor
is subject
to review
only
by the
Pros
and
thefor
action
of
the remanded
latter,
by
the
Secretary
of
Justice;
(d)
when
the
Court
the
case
to Prov.
the
Pros.
Office
the (e)
required
preliminary
investigation;
the investigation of the case?
Court
divested
itself
of
its
control
and
jurisdiction
over
the
case;
and
the
filing
of
information
is
within
the
discretionary authority of the fiscal.

1
11reconsideration
Judge comply
Navarro
denied
both
motions
for HELD/RATIO:
NO
and
reiterated
itsofprevious
order
to Pros.
Llaguno
with
the
order
the court,
granting
her
15
days to conduct
the
In setting aside

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


murder charge filed against private respondents is
vested in the petitioner or his assistants. As chief
of the office, petitioner has the right to designate
as in fact he did the assistant fiscal who conducted
the investigation. While it is true that an assistant
fiscal or state prosecutor may file an information
only in a case in which he himself conducted the
preliminary investigation, he may furthermore do
so only with the prior authority or approval of the
city of provincial fiscal or chief state prosecutor.
These provisions of law show in bold relief the
degree of control over his assistants that petitioner
exercises as chief of the office. Where, however,
the interest of justice so requires and the court
orders a reinvestigation of a criminal case pending
before it, the court cannot at the same time choose
the fiscal who will conduct the reinvestigation. This
is a prerogative vested in the city fiscal as head of
office, and certainly beyond the powers of the
1 court to do
Preliminary
investigation
should
befor
distinguished
as to
whether
it itis isanan
investigation
for
the
determination
of
a
ground
theissuance
filing
of
the
or
investigation
for the
determination
ofarrest.
a sufficient
probable
cause
forof
the
of
a information
warrant
of
Thein
first
kind
preliminary
investigation
is
executive
nature.
It
is
akind
part of
the
prosecutions
job.
The
second
preliminary
investigation
whichis isjudicial
more
properly
called
preliminary
examination
in
nature
and
is lodged
with the
judge.

2
3

It
isdismiss
true
that
after
arule
case
has
already
been
filed
in
court
and
the
court
thereby
acquires
jurisdiction
over
it,
fiscals
as
acase
are
divested
of
the
power
to
a
criminal
action
without
the
consent
of
the
court.
In
the
at
bench,
the
RTC
had
not
yet
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
complaint
filed
directly
before
it
by
Sgt.
Sanchez
who
was
not
aby
prosecutor.
Neither
was
he
authorized
thehowever,
Provincial
Prosecutor
to
file
such
case
directly
with
respondent
court.
We are not persuaded by Judge Navarros contention that

Abugotal applies only to reinvestigations, and not


to preliminary investigations. This distinction is
insubstantial and even tenuous. Both the
preliminary investigation and reinvestigation are
conducted in the same manner and for the same

31

the
order ofgranted
Pros.
which
withdrawal
of Cajot
the
complaint,
and
subsequently
ordering to required
Pros.
Llaguno
conduct
the
objective, that is, to determine
whether there exists
sufficient ground to engender a
well founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
DISPOSITION the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Orders of
Respondent Judge Gloriosa S. Navarro
are SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

32

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


People v. Moran
January 27, 1923
Araullo, C.J.
5

Offensesof
resulting
from
violations
this
Act after
shall
prescribe
one
year
their
commission.

Facts:

March 31, 1922

SC affirmed judgment of CFI of Pangasinan convicting the


accused herein for violation of the Election Law

2alleging
May

Meaning, there is

no need for an allegation

2, 1922
accused filed a special motion, by the accused as to the
that the crime
5 has prescribed under the
provision of Section 71 of Act 3030 (enacted March
9, 1922), thus praying for absolution
prescription of the crime,

Issue # 1: Whether or not the prescription provided in


section 71 of Act 3030 refers only to that act and not to
any other.
Held/Ratio: NO.

Said act was amendatory to several


provisions of the Election law, as such Act 3030
rather than being an integral part of the former
election law is in conjunction with the latter the
only Election Law in force

While it is true that Sec.72 provided that


the act shall take effect on the date of its approval
(March 9, 1922), the meaning of such expression
(effectivity) in connection with prescription is that
prescription can be invoked from that date,
as was done by the accused, and not that
such provision may have a retroactive effect
from that same date.

Issue #2 (more crimpro relevant): Whether or not


such provisions may be applied retroactively in
favor of the accused.
Held/Ratio: YES.

While it is a rule of general application that unless


the defense of prescription is pleaded in the trial court,
it will be deemed to have been waived and cannot later
be raised, yet this rule is not of absolute application in
criminal cases, for if the prescription of the crime, as
well as of the penalty whereby criminal responsibility is
extinguished, may, as is the case here with regard to
the former, be provided by statute after the
termination of all the proceedings in the trial court, as
well as in the appellate court, and when the case has
already been submitted for discussion and is awaiting
only the final judgment; and if the prescription of the
crime is but the extinguishment of the right of the
State to prosecute and punish the culprit, it is beyond
question that, once the State has lost or waived such
right, the accused may, at any stage of the proceeding,
ask and move that the same be dismissed and that he
be absolved from the complaint. And not only that,
the right to prosecute and punish the criminal having
been lost by the prescription of
the crime expressly provided by the statute, the State
itself, the Government through the proper court,
is in duty bound to make a pronouncement to
that effect.

the Court may by itself


render a

Therefore,
as
on
March 9th of this
year, 1922, when Act
No. 3030 went into
effect, providing in its
section
71
that
offense
resulting
from the violations
thereof
shall
prescribe one year
after
their
commission,
the
accused
and
the
Attorney-General had
already filed their
respective briefs in
this court for the
prosecution of the
appeal taken from
the judgment of the
court below, and the
hearing of the case
had already been
held, this court itself,
without the necessity
of any motion of the
accused, or of the
Attorney-General,
should have declared
the crime in question
to have prescribed, in
view of the provision
of
said
section.
Consequently, as this
court had not up to
that time made such
pronouncement, the
accused are perfectly
justified in asking, as
they have done in
their motion of May
2d of this year, that
the offense having
prescribed, they be
absolved from the
complaint. This duty
is imperative upon
the courts of justice
at any moment that
the offense appears
to have prescribed
under the provision
of the law. With
particular reference
to the present case,
this
conclusion
is
necessarily reached
from the letter as
well as the spirit of
the provisions of the
Penal Code relative to
prescription,
and

from that of section 71 of the aforesaid Act No. 3030,


for once the offense or the penalty has prescribed, the
State has no right to prosecute the offender, or to
punish him, and if he has already been punished, it has
no right to continue holding him subject to its action by
the imposition of the penalty. The plain precept
contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the
retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are
favorable to persons accused of a felony or
misdemeanor, even if they may be serving sentence,
would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice
were not under obligation to fulfill such duty,
irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied
for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the
prescription of the crime and the penalty.

Article 22 of the Penal Code


can only be invoked
when the provisions of some other penal law than the
provisions of the Penal Code are under consideration. In
other words, the provisions of article 22 can only be
invoked with reference to some other penal law. It has no
application to the

provisions of the Penal Code except in relation with


some other law. It is not believed, therefore, that the
Legislature in enacting article 7 of the Penal Code
intended to provide that article 22 should not be

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


extinguishing of the criminal responsibility
dealt with in said Title VI of said Book, which
title comes next to Title V, treating of the
penalties incurred by those who evade service
of sentence and those who, while serving
sentence, or after having been convicted by a
final judgment not yet served, commit some
other crime.

15

And aside from this intimate connection


between the prescription of the crime and that
of the penalty, a statute declaring the
prescription of the crime has no other
object and purpose than to prevent or
annul the prosecution of the offender
and, in the last analysis, the imposition of
the penalty.
Moreover, if the provisions relative to the
prescription of ownership and to the
prescription of actions in civil matters are part
of the civil law, it cannot be denied that the
provisions relative to the prescription of crimes
and of penalties are penal laws or form part
thereof.

SO, IS PRESCRIPTION SUBSTANTIVE OR


PROCEDURAL?
With regard to the question whether
prescription must be considered as a matter of
procedural or formal law, or as a substantive
law for the purpose of the retroactivity of laws,
we must state, with reference to the present
case, that the prescription provided in section
71 of Act No. 3030 is of the nature both of a
substantive law, in so far as it gives a person
accused of any of the crimes therein referred
to, the right not to be prosecuted nor punished
after the lapse of the period of one year from
the commission of said crimes, within which
the criminal action must be commenced, and
of a procedural or adjective law in so far as it

33

applicable to special
laws.

15

It cannot be
maintained
that said article
22 of the Penal
Code
refers
only
to
penalties and is
not applicable
to appeals and
proceedings,
because
the
prescription of
the
crime
is
intimately
connected with
that
of
the
penalty, for the
length of time
fixed by the
law
for
the
prescription
depends upon

the gravity of
the offense, as
may
be
seen
from Title VI of
Book I of the
Penal
Code,
containing, as its
heading
indicates,
"General
Provisions
Regarding
Felonies
and
Misdemeanors,
the
Persons
Liable and the
Penalties,"
without
distinguishing
between
the
penalties and the

decision absolving a
defendant because of
prescription. (US v.
Rama)
fixes the time within which such
action must necessarily be
commenced in order that the
prosecution may be legal and
the proper penalty may lawfully
be imposed. but however said
provision may be considered,
the
same
must
have
a
retroactive effect, as will be
seen later on.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

34

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


People v. Salico
October 13, 1949
Feria, J.
substance to sustain a

Facts:

conviction, and after the


CFI of Occidental Negros dismissed the complaint
for homicide against defendant on the ground that it defendant had pleaded to
was not able to prove that the offense was committed
7
the
charge,
the
within its territorial jurisdiction
Issue: Whether this appeal would place the defendant in
conviction or acquittal of
double jeopardy.
the defendant or the
Held/Ratio: NO.
dismissal of the case

1.

By the dismissal of the case by the court below upon shall be a bar to another
motion of the defendant, the latter has not been in
prosecution
for
the
jeopardy
offense charged, or for
8

Section 9, Rule 113 basically states thatany attempt to commit


when a defendant when a defendant has been
convicted or acquitted or the case against him is the same or frustration
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
or
for
any
express consent, upon a valid complaint orthereof,
information by a court of competent jurisdictionoffense which necessarily
and after he has pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the includes or is necessarily
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
included in the offense
prosecution for the same offense.

But when the case id dismissed with the charged in the complaint
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the or information.
same offense; because, his action in having the
case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional rights or privilege, for the reason
that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding
to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment
of conviction against him.

Court cited: Ruling Case Law and American


Jurisprudence; Carrol v. State; Craig v. US

2.

The appeal by the prosecution in the present case


would not place the defendant in double jeopardy.

As a necessary corollary of the above


conclusion that the defendant not been in jeopardy
in the court below, because the case was
dismissed upon the defendant's own motion, this
appeal by the prosecution would not place the
defendant in double jeopardy, since a person who
has not been once, cannot be put twice in jeopardy.

As in, literally, they didnt know whether the municipality


of
Victorias is within Negros Occ. stupid, much?

8 Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. - When


a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of a defendant, by a court of
competent

jurisdiction,

upon

valid

complaint

or

information or other formal charge sufficient in form and

Besides,
under section 2,
Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court
the prosecution
may
appeal
because
the
defendant would
not be placed in
double jeopardy,
not only when
the
defendant
has not yet been
placed
in
jeopardy in the
court below, but
also
when,
although
a
defendant
had
already been in
former jeopardy,
the appeal by the
prosecution
would no place
him in danger
again of being
convicted by the
appellate
court
by
the
same
offense, because
the question for
the
appellate
court to decide is
not the guilt or
innocence of the
defendant.
o For example,
when after a
judgment of
conviction
rendered by
the
lower
court
had
become final
the
court
reconsiders
its
decision
and renders
another
acquitting the
defendant, in
which
the
question
raised in the
appeal is not
the guilt or
innocence of
the appellee,
but
the
jurisdiction of
the court to
render
the
second

judgment. Or, as in the present case, when


the question involved in the appeal is
whether or not the lower court erred in
dismissing the case on the ground that
the evidence for the prosecution does not
show that the place where the offense
was committed was within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. This court by
reversing the appealed decision in such
cases cannot convict the appellee, but
only remand the case to the lower court
for further proceeding. The fact that the
lower court has to proceed to the trial of the
case against the defendant on the merits and
may after the trial either acquit or convict him,
would not place the defendant in double
jeopardy, because the further proceeding by
the court below is not a new trial of a case
against the defendant, but a mere continuation
of the former trial in order that the lower court
may decide the case on the merits or the guilt
or innocence of the defendant.

3.

Assuming arguendo that the defendant had been


already in jeopardy in the court below and would be
placed in the double jeopardy by the appeal, the
defendant has waived his constitutional right not to be
put in danger of being convicted twice for the same

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


defendant has waived his right to object to the
appeal on the ground that it would place him in
double jeopardy; because the Congress has no
power to make the judgment of the Court of
First Instance unappealable by the mere fact
that the defendant had already been in
jeopardy, inasmuch as section 2, Article VIII, of
the Constitution provides that the Congress
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal all
final decisions and orders of the inferior courts
in all cases in which an error or question of law
is involved, as in the present case.
Besides, section 9, Rule 113, of the Rules of
Court provides that "when a defendant shall
been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the defendant
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid complaint or information . . . and after the
defendant has pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense, etc." It does
not say that it shall be a bar if the defendant
sets up the defense of double jeopardy in the
same way that section 2 of Rule 118 does not
provide that the prosecution cannot appeal if
the defendant set up the defense of double
jeopardy; and yet the defendant shall have to
set up that defense if prosecuted again for the
offense, for otherwise it is deemed waived and
the defendant may be prosecuted and
convicted for the same offense.

35

offense.

Assuming
, arguendo, that
the
defendant
had been already
in jeopardy in the
court below and
that
appeal
would put him in
double jeopardy,
it is well settled
in this jurisdiction
that the right of
the
defendant
not to be put
twice in jeopardy
is
deemed
waived if not set
up in time as a
defense
or
ground
for
a
motion
to
dismiss. As the
defendant
has
not set up said
right or objected
on that ground to

the appeal by the


prosecution, this
court can not
motu
proprio
dismiss
the
appeal, in the
same way that if
the
defendant
appeals from a
judgment
of
conviction,
waiving his right
not to be put
twice in jeopardy,
the
appellate
court can not
motu
proprio
dismiss
the
appeal.
The
provision
of
section 2, Rule
118, can not be
construed
to
mean that this
Court can not
entertain
an
appeal by the
prosecution even
if the

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

36

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

People v. City Court of Manila Br. VI


September 24. 1987
Padilla, J.

plays, scenes, acts, or

jeopardy must have


attached prior to the
second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have
been
validly
terminated; and (3)
the second jeopardy
must be for the same
offense,
or
the
second
offense
includes
or
is
necessarily included
in
the
offense
charged in the first
information, or is an
attempt to commit
the
same
or
a
frustration thereof
1
All
these
requisites
do
not
exist in this case.

shows;

partnership
or
Facts:
association, the liability
1and 2Roberto
informations were filed against Agapito Gonzalesshall devolve upon the
Pangilinan: the first
for violation of Section
president,
manager,
9
10
nd
7 , in relation to Section 11 11, of RA 3060, the 2 for
administrator,
or
any
violation of Art 201(3) of RPC
2 Judge, upon motion ofnd accused to quash office thereof responsible
information, dismissed the 2
information on thefor the violation.
ground of double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the 2 information causes double
11
Those
who
in
jeopardy. Peoples contention: The accused could
theaters,
fairs,
not invoke the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy, when there had been no
cinematographs, or any
conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of
criminal proceedings in another case for the
other place open to
1

same offense. The respondent, on the other


hand, argues that conviction or acquittal in,
or dismissal or termination of a first case is
not necessary, so long as he had been put in
jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in
the first case of the same offense.
Held/Ratio: NO.

It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of


double
jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first

It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or


cause to be exhibited in any motion picture theater or
public place, or by television within the Philippines any
motion picture, including trailers, stills, and other pictorial
advertisements in connection with motion pictures, not
duly passed by the Board; or to print or cause to be printed
on any motion picture to be exhibited in any theater, or
public place or by television, a label or notice showing the
same to have been previously passed by the said Board
when the same has not been previously authorized, except
motion pictures imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine
Government and/or its departments and agencies, and
newsreels.
10

Any violation of Section seven of this Act shall be


punished by imprisonment of not less than six months but
not more than two years, or by a fine of not less than six
hundred nor more than two thousand pesos, or both at the
discretion of the court. If the offender is an alien he shall
be deported immediately. The license to operate the movie
theater or television shall also be revoked. Any other kind
of violation shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than one month nor more than three months or a fine of
not less than one hundred pesos nor more than three
hundred pesos, or both at the discretion of the court. In
case the violation is committed by a corporation,

public view, shall exhibit


indecent

or

immoral

The
two
(2)
informations
with
which the accused
was charged, do not
make out only one
offense, contrary to
private respondent's
allegations. In other
words, the offense
defined in section 7
of Rep. Act No. 3060
punishing
the
exhibition of motion
pictures
not
duly
passed by the Board
of Censors for Motion
Pictures
does
not
include or is not
included
in
the
offense defined in
Article 201 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code
punishing
the
exhibition of indecent
and immoral motion
pictures. The two
(2) offenses do not
constitute
a
jeopardy to each
other.
o the elements of
the
two
(2)
offenses
are
different.
The
gravamen of the
offense defined in
Rep. Act No. 3060
is
the
public
exhibition of any
motion
picture
which has not
been previously
passed by the

Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion


picture may not be indecent or immoral but if it has
not been previously approved by the Board, its
3
public showing constitutes a criminal offense. On
the other hand, the offense punished in Article 201
(3) of the Revised Penal Code is the public showing
of indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or
shows, not just motion pictures.
The nature of both offenses also shows their
essential difference. The crime punished in Rep.
Act No. 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which
criminal intent need not be proved because it is
presumed, while the offense punished in Article
201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se,
in which criminal intent is an indispensable
ingredient.

It is a cardinal rule that the protection


against double jeopardy may be invoked only for
the same offense or Identical offense. A single
act may offend against two (or more) entirely

distinct
and
unrelated
provisions of law,
and
if
one
provision requires
proof
of
an
additional fact or
element which the
other does not, an
acquittal
or
conviction
or
a
dismissal of the
information under
one does not bar
prosecution under
the other. (People
v. Bacolod, 89 Phil.
621;
People
v.
Alvarez, 45 Phil.
24).
Phrased

elsewhere, where
two different laws
(or articles of the
same code) define
two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one
of
them
is
no
obstacle
to
a
prosecution of the
other,
although
both offenses arise
from
the
same
facts, if each crime
involves
some
important
act
which is not an
essential element
of
the
other.
(People v. Alvarez,
45 Phil. 472).

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

37

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

People v. Pineda
February 16, 1993
Melo, J.
Facts:

Basically: Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty


on August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a
partial payment of P130,850.00. About two years later,
or on August 17, 1971, an application for registration
under the Land Registration Act was submitted by
Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the
same lot and that it was unencumbered. For those
reasons, the corresponding title was issued in her
name but she allegedly disposed of the half portion of
the property to nine other persons.

Hence she was charged with estafa and


falsification of public documents on 2 separate
informations

She moved to quash the information for


falsification on the ground that such was a necessary
means to commit estafa, and a separate conviction
would constitute double jeopardy.
4 Judge Pineda granted said petition.
Issue: Whether or not quashing the information was correct
(whether or not there would be double jeopardy)
Held/Ratio: NO.

1.

Assuming in gratia argumenti that falsification was


indeed necessary to commit estafa, which ordinarily
constitutes a complex crime under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code and thus susceptible to challenge
via a motion to quash under Section 2 (e), Rule 117
vis-a-vis Section 12, Rule 110 (Moran, Rules of Court,
Vol. 4, 1980 Ed., p. 42; 230), still, it was serious error
on the part of the magistrate below to have
appreciated this discourse in favor of private
respondent since this matter was not specifically raised
in the motion to quash filed on October 28, 1975 (p.
16, Record). It was only in the motion for
reconsideration where private respondent pleaded this
additional ground after her motion to quash was denied

At any rate, it is virtually unacceptable to


suppose that private respondent concocted the
sinister scheme of falsification in 1971 precisely to
facilitate the commission of estafa in 1973 such
that both crimes emanated from a single criminal
impulse. Otherwise, an unfounded verisimilitude of
this nature will run afoul with what this Court
already observed in People vs. Penas (68 Phil. 533
[1939]; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed., p.
574) to the effect that the eleven estafas through
falsification which the same accused therein
committed between November 24, 1936 and
January 3, 1937 including the falsification which he
committed on January 8, 1937 were considered
distinct offenses, not one complex crime, because
they were committed on different dates, not to
mention the discrepancy in places where they were
accomplished.

It was similarly fallacious for the lower


court to have shared the notion that private
respondent is in danger of being convicted twice

for
the
same
criminal act, a
circumstance
recognized under
Section 2(h) Rule
117 of the Old
Rules
as
suggested in the
motion to quash,
because
this
plea
is
understood to
presuppose
that the other
case
against
private
respondent has
been

dismissed
or
otherwise
terminated
without
her
express
consent, by a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction,
upon a valid
complaint
or
information,
and after the
defendant had
pleaded to the
charge
(People of the
Philippines
versus
Hon.
Maximiano
C.
Asuncion, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 8383742,
April
22,
1992; Section 7,
Rule 117, 1985
Rules on Criminal
Procedure,
as
amended). In the
Asuncion
case,
Justice
Nocon
said that:
.
.
.
according
to a long
line
of
cases, in
order
that
a
defendan
t
may
successfu
lly allege
former
jeopardy,
it
is
necessar
y that he
had
previousl
y
been
(1)
convicted
or
(2)
acquitted
, or (3) in
jeopardy
of being
convicted
of
the
offense
charged,
that
is,

that the former case against him for the


same offense has been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express
consent, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information, and after the defendant had
pleaded to the charge.
Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging
the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the
invocation of double jeopardy since the first
jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction,
acquittal or termination of the case without the
consent of the accused (People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA
586 [1982]; Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 8 [1990])
Justice Oscar Herrera, in his book "Remedial Law"
enumerates the elements constitutive of first jeopardy, to
wit:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Court of competent jurisdiction;


Valid complaint or information;
Arraignment
4. Valid plea (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; 853)
The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the
38

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

Commission, 109 SCRA 273; People vs. Cuevo, 104


SCRA 319; Galman, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 72670, September 12, 1987.) (Vide, at page
423).

2.

At any rate, and inasmuch as this Court has


spoken quite recently in People vs. Asuncion,
(G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992), the
ambiguity
stirred
by
the
imprecise
observation in People vs. City Court of
Manila, a 1983 case, can now be considered
modified in that a prior conviction, or
acquittal, or termination of the case without
the express acquiescence of the accused is
still required before the first jeopardy can be
pleaded to abate a second prosecution.

case
was
dismissed
or
otherwise
terminated
without
the
express consent
of the accused
(People
vs.
Declaro, G.R. No.
64362, February
9,
1989,
170
SCRA 142; See
also People vs.
Santiago,
174
SCRA 143; People
vs. Gines, G.R.
No. 83463, May
27, 1991, 197
SCRA 481; Que
vs. Cosico, 177
SCRA 410 [1989];
Caes
vs.
Intermediate
Appellate Court,
179 SCRA 54;
Lamera vs. Court
of Appeals, 198
SCRA
186

[1991]). (Herrera,
Remedial
Law,
1992 Ed., Volume
4, p. 417).
Citing cases, both old
and of recent vintage,
Justice Herrera continues
to submit the idea that:
The first jeopardy is
said to have validly
terminated
upon
conviction, acquittal
or dismissal of the
case or otherwise
terminated
without
the express consent
of defendant (People
vs. Garcia, 30 SCRA
150;
People
vs.
Ledesma, 73 SCRA
77; People vs. Pilpa,
79
SCRA
81;
Buscayno vs. Military

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

39

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


People v. Mogol
Aguust 24, 1984
Guerrero, J.

Facts:

An information for serious physical injuries was


filed against accused Edgardo Caballas

2prosecution
After arraignment (on which Caballas pled not guilty),
motioned to amend the information from
3

serious PI to frustrated murder

Naturally, court denied

However, after the submission of evidence by both


prosecution and defense, no decision on the merits was
rendered, basically because the court thought now that
the crime was indeed frustrated murder and not
serious PI, to wit:
While considering the evidence of this case the
court realized that the evidence on the injuries
sustained by the accused and the circumstances
surrounding the infliction thereof overwhelmingly
point to the conclusion that the intention of the
assailant was to inflict more than just injuries.
Hence, the court is restricted by what it considers
a legal obstacle to the validity of whatever
judgement it renders, because whether it be one of
acquittal or conviction - it shall have so ordered on
a case outside its jurisdiction.
The evidence is positive and uncontradicted that
the person who inflicted the stab wounds on
Ernesto Sandoval had evidently not by accident
but by design, walked with the victim from a
certain point on Real Street up to some 400 meters
therefrom which is another spot on a quite
unfrequented side street; that it was in that spot
where the victim was stabbed four times, two of
which hit the victim - one, on the abdominal region
and another "penetrating and perforating the
posterior abdominal wall cutting the terminal
portion of the 10th rib"; that this was at about 7:00
o'clock in the evening of December 1971, at which
time it must have been dark already; that the
victim was alone, and that the attack was sudden
and treacherous.
It has also been shown that the knife used by the
assonant measures about 6 inches in length; that
the victim was not able to walk by himself after
having been stabbed but that he had to be carried
to the hospital and that while there, the victim
almost lost consciousness. By the medical
certificate issued by a physician of the hospital
(Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, Lopez, Quezon) the
duration of treatment has been placed at 30 days.
The Court believes that the foregoing evidence
would support prima facie a complaint for the
crime of frustrated murder and, as stated, prevents
it from rendering judgment in this case. It cannot
even rule that the parties have waived the
question of jurisdiction having proceeded with the
trial of the case up to its termination as this would
be legally erroneous.

The proceedings
in
the
case,
however,
may
not
be
considered
to
have
been
rendered useless
because by it
more than by a
mere preliminary
investigation, the
court has arrived
at
a
better
supported finding
that the proper
complaint should
have been for
frustrated
murder; that the
crime
of
frustrated
murder has been
committed
and
that
there
is
reason to believe
that the accused
Edgardo Caballas
might have been
the one who had
committed
the
same.
IN VIEW OF ALL
THE
FOREGOING,
this
case
is
hereby
dismissed
to
give way to the
filing
of
a
complaint
for
frustrated
murder.
Since
the proceedings
from
the
preliminary
examination up
to the conclusion
of the trial hereof
has amounted to
a
compliance
with
the
requirements of
a
preliminary
investigation first
and
second
stage, let the
records hereof be
forwarded to the
Court
of
First
Instance
at
Calauag, Quezon,

under the jurisdiction of which court the case for


frustrated murder pertains, through the office of
the Provincial Fiscal so that the latter may act on
this case and file the corresponding complaint as
above-recommended.

to reinstating it
before the order
become final or
to
the
subsequent filing
of
a
new
information
for
the
same
offense.
(Page
454.)

So, a new info/complaint for frustrated murder was


filed Issue: W/N the new info constitutes double
jeopardy
Held/Ratio: NO.

2
1

In the case of Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452 (1950),


this Court held that:
... the dismissal contemplated in the above-quoted
section of the rule (referring to Section 9. Rule 113
of the old Rules of Court, now Section 9, Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Court) is a definite or
unconditional dismissal which terminates the case,
and not a dismissal without prejudice as in the
present case. In the absence of any statutory
provision to the contrary, we find no reason why
the court may not, in the interest of justice, dismiss
a criminal case provisionally, i.e., without prejudice

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


for dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy
clause of the Constitution, it must have the
effect of an acquittal Thus: "The appealed
order of dismissal in this case now under
consideration did not terminate the action on
the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other
related cases the dismissal amounted to an
acquittal because the failure to prosecute
presupposed that the Government did not have
a case against the accused, who in the first
place, is presumed innocent."

There can be no question, as indeed it is


quite clear, that in the case at bar, the Order
of dismissal issued by the Municipal Court did
not actually terminate or put an end to the
prosecution
against
herein
private
respondent for the felonious act he was
alleged to have committed. On the contrary,
the dispositive portion of said Order
expressly directed that the records of the
case be forwarded to the Court of First
Instance so that the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal could file a complaint for frustrated
murder.

In any case, the dismissal Order was NOT


legal and valid. o
We hold and rule that
respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case for
serious physical injuries "to give way to the filing of
a complaint for frustrated murder." For it is the
duty of the respondent Judge to render the decision
as the evidence presented warrant under the
information as filed for serious physical injuries,
and not dismiss the case on his Idea or belief that
there was evidence of intent to kill the intended
victim. The Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
thereby rendering his Order of
November 29, 1972 null and void.
o Since the order of dismissal was without

40

The
Jaca
ruling
was
reiterated
in
People
vs.
Manlapas et al.,
L-17993, August
24, 1962, 5 SCRA
883,
887;
Republic
vs.
Agoncillo, et al.,
L-27257, August
31,
1971,
40
SCRA 579, 587;
and People vs.

Hon. Surtida, et
al.,
L-24420,
January 26, 1972,
43 SCRA 29, 37.
Moreover,
as
stated
in
the
aforementioned
case of Republic
vs. Agoncillo, et
al.
(supra,
p.
588):
...
the
authoritative
pronouncement
in the ... case of
People
vs.
Obsania
(L24447, June 29,
1968, 23 SCRA
1249),
with
Justice Castro as
ponente,
had
made
clear
beyond
doubt
that
authority
and, therefore,
null
and
void,
the
proceedings
before
the
Municipal Court have not
been lawfully terminated,
Accordingly, there is no
second proceeding to speak
of and no double jeopardy. A
continuation
of
the
proceedings
against
the
accused for serious physical
injuries is in order.

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

41

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

Esmea v. Pogoy
February 20, 1981
Aquino, J.
notified
Arraigned
Facts:
on
1 A grave coercion case was filed agains Esmea, et. 01.23.79
al. for having allegedly forced Rev.Fr. Thomas Tibudan NO TRIAL priest absent
to withdraw P5,000 because the priest lost it in a game BEST REASON OF ALL:
of cards.
FISCAL LOST RECORD
2 Because of many different reasons12, the hearingOF CASE
was reset many times, until the respondent judge *applause
(siguro napikon) issued an order setting the trial for* -the last time on
hearing
August 16, 1973
on
3 However, on said date, priest was allegedly sick,06.19.79
and again motioned to reset the date. Counsel formoved
accused opposed and invoked the right of theagain.
<kaya
accused to have a speedy trial
ayun,
4 Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the casenapikon
as to the four accused who were present because it na si
"has been dragging all along and the accused are judge.>
ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with
his witness. The court noted that there was no medical
certificate indicating that the complainant was really
sick.

not have place the


petitioners
in
jeopardy
if
respondent judge
had
taken
the
precaution
of
making sure that
the dismissal was
with their consent.
In this case, it is
not very clear that
the
petitioners
consented to the
dismissal of the
case.

15

It is the practice
of some judges
before issuing an
order
of
provisional
dismissal in a
case wherein the
accused
had
already
been
arraigned
to
require
the
accused and his
counsel to sign
the minutes of
the session or
any
available
part of the record
to
show
the
conformity of the
accused or his
lack of objection
to the provisional
dismissal.

15

The
judge
specifies in the
order
of
provisional
dismissal that the
accused and his
counsel signified
their
assent
thereto.
That
procedure leaves
no
room
for
doubt as to the
consent of the
accused
and
precludes
jeopardy
from
attaching to the
dismissal.

wenty-seven days later, or on September 12, 1979,


the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. He
attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath
attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of
influenza on August 16, 1979

Issue: W/N the revival of the case would place the accused
in double jeopardy
Held/Ratio: YES.

In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should


be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a
court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has
been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
information.

When these three conditions are present, the


acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal
or termination of the case without his express consent
constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is included
therein (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1980 Ed., p. 240).

Previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), previous


conviction (autrefois convict) or the dismissal or
termination of the case without his consent precludes
his subsequent indictment for the same offense as
defined in section 9

In the instant case, we hold that the


petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the
provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case.
That provisional dismissal would

12

Original date: 10.04.1978


Reason # 1: priest requested reset on
12.13.78 Reason # 2: accused not duly

The
petitioners
were insisting on a
trial. They relied on
their
constitutional
right
to
have
a
speedy
trial.
The
fiscal was not ready
because his witness

was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition


provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did
not expressly manifest their conformity to the
provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them
in jeopardy.

Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to


a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and,
therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still
place them in jeopardy. The use of the word
"provisional" would not change the legal effect of the
dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134;
Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299)
4 If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional
right to

1 speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but

for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion


for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order
of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his
evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the
defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion
shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an
acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela

vs. Lutero, 88 Phil.


299, 307 and People
vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714717).

The dismissal of
a criminal case upon
motion
of
the
accused because the
prosecution was not
prepared
for
trial
since
the
complainant and his
witnesses did not
appear at the trial is
a
dismissal
equivalent
to
an
acquittal that would
bar
further
prosecution of the
defendant for the
same
offense
(Salcedo
vs.
Mendoza,
L-49375,
February 28, 1979,

88
SCRA
811;
Lagunilia vs. Hon.
Reyes,
etc.
and
Motas, 111 Phil. 1020
citing
People
vs.
Tacneng, 105 Phil.
1298 and People vs.
Robles,
105
Phil.
1016. See Taladua vs.
Ochotorena, L-25595,
February 15, 1974,
55
SCRA
528;
Acebedo
vs.
Sarmiento, L-28025,
December 16, 1970,
36 SCRA 247; Baesa
vs. Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Sur, L30363, January 30,
1971, 37 SCRA 437;
People vs. Cloribel,
120 Phil. 775; People
vs. Abao 97 Phil. 28;
People vs. Labatete,
107 Phil. 697)

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

42

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

People v. Villalon
December 21, 1990
Regalado, J.
Facts:

Federico de Guzman was charged with estafa


through falsification of public documents for
allegedly forging the signature of Carrera to make
it appear that the former was made the latters
attorney-in-fact, and subsequently mortgaging the
parcel of land which Carrera owns.

De Guzman raised the issue of prescription


he claims that the crime has prescribed since more
than 10 years has elapsed from the time the crime
was committed.

Judge Villalon dismissed the complaint on basis


of prescription

Issue: W/N this appeal by the people would constitute


double jeopardy.
Held/Ratio: NO. PP v. City Court of Manila
As a general rule, the dismissal or
termination of a case after arraignment and
plea of the defendant to a valid information
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the complaint
or information (Sec. 9, Rule 113). However,
an appeal by the prosecution from the order
of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the
trial court shall not constitute double
jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon
motion, or with the express consent, of the
defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an
acquittal or based upon consideration of the
evidence or of the merits of the case; and
(3) the question to be passed upon by the
appellate court is purely legal so that
should the dismissal be found incorrect, the
case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.
Irrele on issue of whether the charge of estafa
thru falsification of a public document has
sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law
COURT: YES
The falsification of a public document
may be a means of committing estaga bacuase
before the falsified document is actually utilized
to defraud another, the crime of falsification has
already been consummated, damage or intent
to cause damage not being an element of the
crime of the falsification of public, official or

commercial documents. The damage to another


is caused by the commission of estafa, not by
the falsification of the public, official or
commercial document, hence, the falsification
of said document is only a necessary meanse to
commit the estafa.

43

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


People vs. Lagui
171 SCRA 305

Hizon lent money to Sorriano who in


turn issued a post dated check to answer for
the debt.

When they tried to encash the check,


the account was already closed.
3
He was charged with a violation under BP 22 and estafa

The RTC dismissed the BP 22 charge


because the information was fatally defective
and convicted him of the estafa charge

Upon appeal of the accused, the CA


reversed the estafa conviction

The people now is appealing the other


case (BP 22) saying that the info was not
fatally defective.

W/N info was fatally defective? NO


3 Elements of BP 22
1. Issuance of check for account or for value

2.
3.

At time of issue, maker does not have sufficient


funds or credit
Subsequently dishonored.

The judge said that the information failed to allege that


the accused knew when he issued the check that the then
did not have sufficient funds in the bank; the information
should have allege that the accused knew that he would
not have sufficient funds in the bank to pay the check in
full upon its presentment. ---

Wrong
st

rd

The presence of the 1 and 3 elements of the offense


constitutes prima facie evidene that the second
element exists. (Look at Sec 2 of Law.)
W/N if it wasnt, can he still be convicted? NO

Decision cannot be annulled or set


aside because it amounted to a judgment of
acquittal. It became final and executory upon
its promulgation. The state may not appeal
that decision for it would place the accused
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the offense
in violation of his constitutional rights against
double jeopardy.

Soriano had been arraigned, pleaded


not guilty, and was tried upon a valid and
sufficient information and case was dismissed
by trial court (without his consent), he has
been placed in jeopardy for the offense
charged so re-assesing the evidence against
him pursuant to the appeal of the govt would
put him in double jeopardy.

44

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


Galvez vs. CA
Oct. 24, 1994

Galvez, the incumbent mayor of San


Ildefonso, Bulacan was charged with 3 infos for
homicide and 2 infos for frustrated homicide.

The prosecution filled a motion to defer


arraingment to review the evidence to determine
the proper charges as well as change of venue
because complainants fear for their safety and to
prevent miscarriage of justice.

Before their arraignment, petitioners filed a


motion
to
withdraw
informations,
and
subsequently filed informations for murder and
illegal possession of firearms.

They filed a motion to quash saying the


court never acquired jurisdiction, which was denied
and judge set arraignment. Assailed resolution.

Which set of informations should Galvez be tried with? The 1

st

or

additional
offense.
Had
these
new
informations
not been filed,
there
would
obviously have
been no cause
for the instant
petition.
Accordingly,
their complaint
about
the
supposed
procedural
lapses involved
in the motion to
dismiss
filed
and granted in
Criminal Cases

Nos. 3642-M-93 to
3644-M-93 does
not impress us as
a candid
presentation of
their real position.

2.

the absence of
notice
and
hearing does not
divest a trial court
of authority to
pass
on
the
merits
of
the
motion. It is only
an
irregularity.Beside
s,
when
petitioners were
given by Judge
Villajuan
the
opportunity to file
a
motion
for
reconsideration,
even
assuming
the
alleged
procedural
infirmity in his
issuance of the
order of dismissal,
the same was
thereby deemed
cured.

3.

Sec 11 rule 119


governs the trial
stage vs sec 10
rule 114 governs
procedural
governance
for
prosecution
of
offenses, from the
filing of info to
just before the
trial.

4.

Sec 10 rule 114The


first
paragraph
provides the rule
for amendment of
the information or
complaint, while
the
second
paragraph refers
to the substitution
of the information
or
complaint.
Under the second
paragraph,
the
court can order
the
filing
of
another
information
to
charge the proper
offense, provided

2nd?
Corollary issues:

1.

Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original


informations is null and void on the ground that (a) there
was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and
6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (b) the appropriate
remedy which should have been adopted by the
prosecution was to amend the informations by charging
the proper offenses pursuant to Section
14
of Rule 110;

2. Whether

the order granting the withdrawal of the


original informations was immediately final and executory;

3. Whether

Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the


motion to quash and thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
new informations considering that (a) the designated
public prosecutor allegedly had no authority to file the
second set of informations; and (b) the filing thereof
constituted forum shopping; and

4.

Whether the arraignment proceeding held on


January 24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to
4007-M-93 was valid.

1.

considering that in the original cases before Branch


14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been
placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to
withdraw was filed and granted before they could
be arraigned, there would be no imperative need
for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the
real grievance of herein accused is not the
dismissal of the original three informations but the
filing of four new informations, three of which
charge graver offenses and the fourth, an

the accused would not be placed thereby in


jeopardy and that could only be true if the
proved does not necessarily include or
necessarily included in the offense charged

double
original information.
offense
is not Petition dismissed.
in the

45

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


People v. Pilpa
79 SCRA 82

he
had
no
objection to the
dismissal of the
case
was
equivalent to a
declaration
of
conformity to its
dismissal or to an
express
consent
to its termination
within
the
meaning
of
section 9 of Rule
117. He could not
thereafter revoke
that
conformity
since the court
had already acted
upon
it
by
dismissing
the
case.
He
was
bound
by
his
counsel's assent
to the dismissal

Was charged with frustrated murder and pleaded


not guilty

The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss


because intent to kill was not alleged in the
information which initially was not objected to by
the accuseds lawyer but subsequently changed his
mind.

A second information was then filed and a


motion to quash from the defense claiming double
jeopardy.

Judge granted the motion and prosecution now


appeals.

Whether the second information would place the accused twice


in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of frustrated murder?
NO

Under section 9 of Rule 117 the protection


against double jeopardy may be invoked in cases of (a)
previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), (b) conviction
(autrefois convict) of the same offense, or (c) when the
case against the accused has been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In any of these three cases, in order that there


be former kill jeopardy, it is in the first case that (a)
there was a valid competent or information (b) before a
court of competent jurisdiction, (c) and that the had
been and had entered his plea. When these conditions or
requotes are present, the acquittal or conviction of the
accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case
without his express consent constitutes res judicata and
is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof,or for carry offense which necessarily includes or
is included therein.

here is former jeopardy when in the first case


there was a valid COMPLAINT of information filed in a
court of competent jurisdiction and, after the defendant
had pleaded to the charge, he was acquitted or
convicted or the case against him was terminated
without his express consent

We hold that the oral manifestation at the


hearing made by the counsel of the accused that

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

Later,
the
cases were revived.
The
accused
contended that the
revival of the cases
would place her in
double
jeopardy.
That contention was
rejected
because
the
provisional
dismissal did not
place
the
in
jeopardy. There was
no jeopardy in such
dismissal
because
the
words
"No
objection" conveyed
the Idea of full
concurrence
with
the dismissal and
was equivalent to
saying "I agree."

46

proceedings,
the
assistant
provincial
fiscal
filed
an
information for rape against the
accused,
embodying
the
allegations
of
the
above
complaint, with an additional
averment that the offense was
committed "with lewd designs".

People v. Obsania

On November 22, 1964, barely a day


after the occurence of the alleged crime,
Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and
her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita
Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao,
Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery

After the case was remanded to the


Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further

Petition Granted,
assailed order
set aside.

The accused pleaded not


guilty upon arraignment, and
forthwith his counsel moved for
the dismissal of the case,
contending that the complaint
was fatally defective for failure to
allege "lewd designs" and that the
subsequent information filed by

the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not


cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo
granted the motion and ordered dismissal of
the action, ruling that "the failure of the
complaint filed by the offended party to allege
that the acts committed by the accused were
with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court
jurisdiction to try the case." From this order,
the fiscal brought the instant appeal

W/N lewd designs should be alledged in complaint?


NO

Rape does not require that specific


allegation.Lascivious intent inheres in rape
and the unchaste design is manifest in the
very act itself the carnal knowledge of a
woman through force or intimidation, or
when the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when the
woman is under twelve years of age.

W/N there is double jeopardy? NO

In order that the protection against


double jeopardy may inure in favor of an
accused, the following requisites must
have obtained in the original prosecution:
(a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or
the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

The court then discusses a long history


of jurisprudence and somewhat seemingly
conflicting rulings that is too long to put in
the digest. In the end through the accused
can be estopped or can waive double
jeopardy.

The application of the sister doctrines


of waiver and estoppel requires two sine
qua non conditions: first, the dismissal
must be sought or induced by the
defendant personally or through his
counsel;

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien
and second, such dismissal must not be on
the merits and must not necessarily
amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the
case at bar falls squarely within the
periphery of the said doctrines which have
been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of
our jurisprudence.
Petition granted, order set aside.

47

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


Ada v. Virola
172 SCRA
336

Ada was initially charged under BP 22 for


issuing 3 checks that bounced

Before prosecution rested its case, he was also


charged with estafa, which Ada tried to object to
but was arraigned nevertheless.

After prosecution rested its case, he filed a


motion to dismiss the later cases saying it was
violation is Double jeopardy right.

W/N there is double jeopardy? NO

It is a settled rule that to raise the


defense of double jeopardy, three requisites
must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense, or the second offense includes
or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or a frustration
thereof.

These requisites do not exist in the


case at bar. The prohibition is against a second
jeopardy for the same offense. The plea of
double jeopardy applies where the offenses in
the two informations are the same in law and
in fact. It is not necessarily decisive that the
two offenses may have material facts in
common, or that they are similar, where they
are not in fact the same. The test is not
whether the defendant has already been tried
for the same act, but whether he has been put
in jeopardy for the same offense. A single act
may offend against two (or more) entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if
one provision of law requires proof of an
additional fact or element while the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of
the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. In other words,
where two different laws (or articles of the
same Code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy
as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each
crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the other.

The 2 laws are distinct from each other.


There is no identity of offenses charged.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

48

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


People v. Relova
148 SCRA 304

double jeopardy
is available so
long as the acts
which constitute
or have given
rise to the first
offense under a
municipal
ordinance are the
same acts which
constitute
or
have given rise to
the
offense
charged under a
statute.

The Police, armed with a search warrant,


conducted a search on private respondents properties
and found out he was using devices to lower his
electric bill.

He was charged in violation of ordinance 1 and


pleaded not guilty.

He filed a motion to dismiss saying the offense has


already prescribed which was granted.

After 14 days, he was charged now under the RPC


309, theft of electrical power.

He filed a motion to quash on the ground of double


jeopardy. This was granted by the trial court.

W/N Doulbe Jeopardy bars the RPC information? YES

The basic difficulty with the petitioner's


position is that it must be examined, not under the
terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the
1973 Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
not available where the second prosecution is for
an offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although
both the first and second offenses may be based
upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception
to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses
spring from the same act or set of acts.

Put a little differently, where the offenses


charged are penalized either by different sections
of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charge: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an Identity
is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where
one offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute,
the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts
which the accused is said to have committed and
which are alleged to have given rise to the two
offenses: the constitutional protection against

It
is
perhaps
important to note
that
the
rule
limiting
the
constitutional
protection
against
double
jeopardy
to
a
subsequent
prosecution
for
the same offense
is not to be
understood with
absolute
literalness.
The
Identity
of
offenses
that
must be shown
need
not
be
absolute Identity:
the
first
and
second offenses
may be regarded
as
the
"same
offense"
where
the
second
offense
necessarily
includes the first
offense
or
is
necessarily
included in such
first offense or
where the second

offense
is
an
attempt
to
commit the first
or a frustration
thereof. 14 Thus,
for
the
constitutional
plea of double
jeopardy to be
available, not all
the
technical
elements
constituting the
first offense need
be present in the
technical
definition of the
second offense.
The
law
here
seeks to prevent
harrassment
of
an
accused
person
by
multiple
prosecutions for
offenses
which
though different
from one another
are nonetheless
each constituted
by a common set
or
overlapping
sets of technical
elements.
Petition denied.

49

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. MARIA DEL CARMEN et al.


PARAS J.
1

The defendants
wereofprosecuted
in the municipal court of
Manila
for the crime
malicious mischief.

After
presentation
of evidence
forthe
the
prosecution,
the
municipal
court
dismissed
case
on the
ground
that
the
prosecution
failed
to
prove
that
removal
or revenge.
destruction
the
property
in
question
had been
inspired
byof resentment,
rancor,
or
desires
for
Subsequently, the same fiscal who filed the
information

in

the

municipal

court,

filed

the

following information of coercion in the court of


First Instance of Manila against the defendants.
Issue: Whether or not there is double jeopardy?
Yes, the rule against double jeopardy prohibits
prosecution for the same offense it seems basic
that an accused should be shielded against
being prosecuted for several offenses made out
from a single act.
1

Counsel
for defendants
a motion
tojeopardy.
nullify the
second information
on the filed
grounds
of double

Contented
for the
the second
appellant
there
is no in
double
jeopardy
since
information
an
offense different
from
that
included
the
information
filed in the
municipal
court. charges

The
against
jeopardy
accused
againstdouble
the second
punishment
for the
same rule
act not
but
being
tried
for
theprotecting
same offense.

A brief formed
comparison
thefor
two
informations,
the act
act
complained
of in the
the of
case
coercion
is the same
which
basis
of
the information
for
malicious mischief.

The
rule
against
double
jeopardy
prohibits
prosecution
for several
the
same
offense
it seems
basic
that
an
accused
should
be
shielded
being
prosecuted
for
offenses
made
out
from
a
single
act.
Otherwise,
an
unlawful
actagainst
or
omission,
may
give
rise
to
several
prosecutions
depending
upon
the
ability
of
prosecuting
officer
to
imagine
as
many
offenses
as
can
be
justified
by
said
act
or
omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential
elements.
The case at bar is an occasion for reminding
prosecuting
officers
to
be
careful
and
comprehensive in criminal investigations with the
view to determining definitely, before filing the
necessary information, the offenses in fact and in
law committed, in order to avoid situations
smacking of persecutions.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

50

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

CONRADO MELO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF THE FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL
MORAN, C.
J. either shall
under
constitute
a act.
bar to
1where
The rule is
another
prosecution
for
the same
after the
1
Petitioner
Conrado
Melo Obillo,
was charged
on
December
27, 4
1949,
with
foraInstance
having
allegedly
inflicted
upon
Benjamin
kitchen
knife
and
with intent
tofrustrated
kill
at the homicide,
Court ofwith
First
of
Rizal.
Same
offense,
under
the to
general
rule,
has
been
interpreted
mean
not
onlyalways
that
the
2
second
offense
charged
is
exactly
the
same
as
the
one
alleged
in
the
first
On December
29,
1949,
atdied
8 a.m.,
accused
pleaded
information,
but
also
not
guilty
the
offense
charged
andthe
at wounds.
10:15
p.m.
of the
the
two
offenses
are
same
day,to
Benjamin
Obillo
from
his
identical.

3
4

Evidence
of
death3, was
available
to the4,the
prosecution
only
on January
1950
and January
1950
and
amended
information
was
filed
charging
accused
with consummated
homicide.

6
Motion was denied by the respondent court; hence,
instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent
court from further entertaining the amended information

Issue: Whether or not an accused who pleaded


guilty to the offense of frustrated homicide, upon
death of the offended party, could not rely on a plea
of double jeopardy, if the information amended is to
charge him with homicide? No, because the petition
is denied, and the respondent court may proceed to
the trial of the criminal case under the amended
information.

2
3

There theis
identity
between
two
offenses
when
evidence
to
support
a
conviction
for
onesufficient
offense
would
be
to
warrant
a conviction
for the other.

The
accused
then filed
a jeopardy.
motion to nullify the amended
information
claiming
double

Rule
106, it and
section
13,
2d
paragraph,
under
this
provision,
wasproper
proper
for
the
court
to
dismiss
the
information
order
the
filing
of
a
new
one
for
reason
that
offense
was
not
charged
in the
former
and
it
did
not or
place
the
accused
in
a second
jeopardy
for the
the
same
identical
offense.
No person
be an
twice
put Meaning
in jeopardy
of
punishment
forshall
the
same
offense.
when
a
person
is
charged
with
offense
and
theor
case
is
terminated
either
by
acquittal
or
conviction
inlatter
any
manner
without
the
consent
of
the
accused,
the
cannot be
charged
with
the same
or
identical offense.
It
is noticed
that
the
of
theact
constitutional
inhibition
isand
against
a protection
secondthat
jeopardy
for
same
offense,
only
if an
isthe
punished
by
a lawthe
an exception,
ordinance,
conviction
or
acquittal

On
the
other
hand, the rule of
identity
does
not
apply,
when
the
second offense was
not in existence at
the time of the first
prosecution, for the
simple reason that in
such case there is no
possibility for the
accused, during the
first prosecution, to
be convicted for an
offense that was in
existent.

that
first
prosecution a new
fact supervenes for
which the defendant
is responsible, which
changes
the
character
of
the
offense and, together
with
the
facts
existing at the time
constitutes a new
and distinct offense.
The accused cannot
be said to be in
second jeopardy if
indicted for the new
offense.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

51

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. RODRIGO YORAC


FERNANDO, J.

of double jeopardy. By
the motion to
quash was granted
2
He
wasoffrom
prosecuted
for frustrated
murder
arising
allegedly
having
assaulted,
attacked,
and physical
hit
with
ordered
the
a
piece
the
party,
which
he
was and
previously
tried
andoffended
sentenced
forforslight
injuries,
hiswood
plea being
one
of guilt.
dismissal of the case
3
The
information
for frustrated
murder
was
based
on and immediate release
the
second
medical
certificate
by the
the
same
physician
which
much
thorough
second
time,
the
effect
that
the more
victimgiven
did suffer
a greater
injury to
than
was
atwas
first
ascertained.
of the appellee.
4
1
The lower
court,
presided
bythere
Honorable
Judge
Nestor B.
Alampay,
considering
that
no
supervening
For
double
fact
that
negate
the
defense
double
not
to
exist, jeopardy
therethe
is
sustained
the
motion
to
quash
in was
an order
ofjeopardy,
June 21,
then
1968.
Thewould
people
appealed.
indispensable
requirement
the
existence
offorof
awhich
new
fact
5
supervenes
the
defendant
is
responsible
changing
the
character
of
the
The
accused
Yorac
was
charged
with slight
physical
crime
imputedwith
to him
injuries
before
the
City
Court
Bacolod.
The
accused
and
together
the
plead
guilty
on
April
16,
1968
resulting
in his
being
facts
existing
penalized
to suffer
ten
days
of of
arresto
menor.
previously
constituting
a new
and
distinct
offense.
6
2
On
AprilCourt
18,
1968,
the provincial
fiscal
filed information
at
the
of act
First
Instance
of
Negros
Occidental,
charging
the
same
with
frustrated
murder
No
person
be twice
arising
from
the
upon
another
medical
certificate
put
in shall
jeopardy
of
dated
April
17,
1968.defendant
punishment
for
the
same offense.

A constitutional
be put
in jeopardy
same offense
was not
the to
basis
for Yorac.
atwice
motion
to nullify for
by this,
the
accused,
nowright
appellee,
Rodrigo

A
defendant
in a
criminal
case
should
therefore,
be or
judged
either
guilty
not
guilty
and
left
alone
inthereafter
peace,
in
the
latter
case
the
State
being
precluded
taking
an appeal.from

A motion to nullify was filed by the accused on June


10, 1968 on the ground that, having been previously
convicted of slight physical injuries and having already4
served the penalty imposed on him for the same
offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder arising
out of the same act committed against the same
offended party, he would be placed in second jeopardy
if indicted for the new offense.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant, who had


already been convicted of slight physical injuries
and had served sentence therefore, may be
prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same
act committed against the same person? No,
because there is no supervening fact that had
occurred which justifies the application, for which
reason we are constrained to apply the general rule

The

Same

offense,

means

another prosecution for


the

offense

charged

after a defendant shall


have been convicted

or acquitted or the
case
against
him
terminated
without
his express consent,
or any attempt to
commit the same or
frustration thereof or
for;
any
offense
which
necessarily
includes
or
is
necessarily included
in
the
offense
charged in the former
complaint
or
information.
1
It follows that after
the first prosecution
a
new
fact
supervenes on which
defendant may be
held liable, resulting
in
altering
the
character
of
the
crime and giving rise
to a new and distinct
offense, the accused
cannot be said to be
in second jeopardy if
indicted for the new
offense.

2the
Although
therethe
is
indispensable
requirement
existence
of of
a new
fact defendant
which
supervenes
for
the
is
responsible
changing
the
character
of him
the
crime
imputed
to
and
together
with
the
existing
facts
previously
constituting
a
new
and distinct offense.

52

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, v. CITY COURT of MANILA, BRANCH XI and


FRANCISCO GAPAY y MALLARES,
RELOVA J.

1
2

This
is a petition
to City
review
the
dated
November
17,
1972,
of
the
Court
of Manila,
Branch
dismissing
information
for order,
homicide
thru
reckless
imprudence
filed
against
Francisco
GapaXI,
y
Mallares
on the
the
ground
of respondent
double
jeopardy.

Respondent
court
that imprudence
the privatefor
respondent
having
previously
tried
and
of
physical
injuries
thruheld
reckless
theserious
death
of
the been
victim
would
place
the convicted
accused in
double
jeopardy.
2

It
follows
that after
the
first
prosecution
a
new
fact
supervenes
on
which
defendant
may
be
held
liable,
resulting
in
altering
the
character
of
crime
and
giving
rise
to
a
new
and
distinct
offense,
the
accused
cannot
be
said
tonew
be
in
second
jeopardy
if
indicted
for
the
offense.
However,
article
365 of
the
Penal Code
punishes

the negligent
state the
of
mind
and
resulting
injury.not
The
case
at
bar,
therespondent
incident
on October
17,
1972.
On
the
following
day, occurred
October 18,
wasvictim
filed
against
physical
injuries
thru
reckless
imprudence.
the information
same
day, 3
the
Diolito
de la
Cruz died. forOnserious
The
trialthat
4
concluded
once
prosecuted
for court
and
convictedcannot
of
negligence,
the
On
October
20, charge
1972, of
private
respondent
was
accused
again
arraigned
on
the
serious
physical
injuries
be
prosecuted
thru
reckless
imprudence.
He
pleaded
guilty
and
was
same
negligence
sentenced
to oneserving
month and
one day of arresto mayor,
although
forfor the
a
different
resulting
and
commenced
sentence.
injury.

On October was
24, 1972,
information
for homicide thru reckless
imprudence
filed against
respondent.

On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila,

Well-settled
is
the
rule
that
one
who
been
charged
withhas
an
offense
cannot
be
charge
again
with
the
same
orthough
identical
offense
the
latter
be
lesser
or
greater
than
the
former.

upon

motion

of

respondent,

issued

and

order5

dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case


on the ground of double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not a person who has been
prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be
prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless
imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of
the same injuries he had suffered? No, the fact
remains that the victim Diolito de la Cruz died on
October 18 one day after the accident and arrest of
the respondent Gapay and that on October 20 the
accused
was
arraigned, pleaded
guilty and
sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached
and no new fact supervened after the arraignment
and conviction of the accused.

However, it must
be pointed that, the
rule of identity does
not apply when the
second offense was
not in existence at
the time of the first
prosecution, for the
reason that in such
case there is no
possibility for the
accused, during the
first

prosecution, to be
convicted for an
offense that was then
in existent.
1
Accordingly,
where
the
accused
was
charged with physical
injuries
and
after
conviction,
the
injured person dies,
the
charge
for
homicide against the
same accused does
not put him twice in
jeopardy.

2Cruz
Asdied
stated,
the
victim
Diolito
dewas
la
on the
day
the information

filed,
and
the
accused
was
arraigned
two
days
after,1972.
or on
October
20,
When
the
information
for
homicide
thru
reckless
imprudence
was
filed
on October
24,
1972,
the
accusedprivate
respondent
was
already
in jeopardy.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

53

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

GEORGE MANANTAN, v. THE COURT of APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and


MARIA NICOLAS
1
QUISIMBING
J.
Hence,
petitioners
acquittal
was
not
2

precluded
looking
into the from
question
of
petitioners
negligence.

In
line
with
this, on
the
petitioner
insists
1983, thee Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed
he
was acquitted
a
finding
that
he that
was
neither
criminally
negligent
nor
charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
recklessly imprudent.
2
imprudence
resulting
homicide.
On
arraignment,
petitionerin
pleaded
not guilty to the charge.
3
He
argues
that
when
3
the
latter
isliability
not
proved,
civil
cannot
be
demanded
and
concludes
thatcivil
his
Petitioner
was
acquitted
by
the
trial
court
of
homicide
acquittal
bars
any
through
reckless
imprudence
without
ruling
on
his
civil
action.
liability.

1information
June 1,
4

that
the declare
trial
shows
judgement
didcourts
not
of
clearly
non-existence
the
negligence
petitioners
or
imprudence.
argue
that
They
his
deemed
acquittal
based
must
be
on
reasonable
doubt.
On
appeal
from
civil
aspect
of
the
judgement
in
Criminal
Case
no.the
066,
the
appellate
court
found
the
petitioner
Manantan
civilly
liable
and
ordered
himand
to
indemnify
private
respondents
Marcelino
Nicolas
5
Maria
Nicolas
for
a
total
of
174,400.00
for
the
death
of
their son, Ruben Nicolas.
Inquiry by the lower courts
decision in Criminal Case
No.

066
supports
the
conclusion
of
the
appellate court that
the
acquittal
was
based on reasonable
doubt
hence
petitioners
civil
liability
was
not
extinguished by his
discharge.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate


court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.

Issues: Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any


further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his
negligence or reckless imprudence? Did the court a
quo err in finding that petitioners acquittal did not
extinguish his civil liability?
6
However,
found
that a
Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in
hypothesis
inconsistent
with
the it
negligence
the accused
presented
itself
before
the
court. of
failing to apply the Manchester Doctrine to CA-G.R.
7
CV No. 19240?
The foregoing clearly
shows that based
petitioners
acquittal
on
reasonable
doubt and

a
toforenforce
civil
liability
thelies.
same
actsuit
or omission
Petitioner
argues
the
trial
courts
finding
that
he
was
neither
imprudent
nor
negligent
was
the basis
of
his
acquittal
and that
not
doubt.
Hence,
upon
finding
him
liable
forreasonable
indemnity
the
appellate
court
only
hisdamages,
acquittal
in 8
suspicion,
but
alsonot
put
him
in placed
doubleand
jeopardy.
Furthermore,
petitioner
that
2
the
Court
ofdamages
Appeals
made
a argues
mistake
in
awarding
and
since
Preliminary,
petitioners
that placed
the decision
of the
private
respondents
appellate
awarding claim
indemnity
him in double
did indemnity,
not their
payclaims
the
jeopardy iscourt
misplaced.
corresponding
filing
fees
for
for
damages
when
civil
case
was
institutedaction.
with the
criminal
3

4
5
6

The constitution
provides
that no person shall be twice put in 9
jeopardy
for the same
offense.

Private
respondents
argue
that
under the
rules
of awarded
court,
filing
the
damages
are
For
double
jeopardy
to exist
elements
are prior
established.
a
first fees
lien for
on the
First
is the
a
jeopardy
must
have
attached
tosame
the
judgement.
second.
The
first
jeopardy
must
have
been
terminated.
Lastly,
second
jeopardy
must
be
for
the
offense as the first.
10
In
the instant
case,
hadCase
onceNo.
been
in
by the
filingpetitioner
of by
Criminal
066placed
and the
jeopardy
was
terminated
his discharge.
However,
petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. No.
19240
offense.with a second criminal offense identical to the first

At
the information,
time
of the
filing
of
the
implied
institution
of civil
actions
with
criminal
actions
was
governed
by
Rule1964,
111,
section
of the
Rules
of 1Court.

11

As the
pointed
out by
the
respondents,
under
said rule,
it
was
not
required
that
the the
damages
by
offended
party
be
stated
insought
the
complaint
or
information.

Records
clearly
showto
that
no second
criminal
offense 12
was
being
imputed
petitioner
on
appeal
therefore
there
was
no
second
jeopardy
of. jeopardy
Petitioners
claim
of having
been
placed to
in speak
double
is
incorrect.
Thus,is the
civil
action
impliedly
instituted
together
with
the
criminal
action,
the
actual
damages
claimed
by
the
offended
parties,
as
in
this
case,
are
not
in the
computation
of
filing included
fees.
8 Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with

13

Filingof
fees
are
to
different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
be
paid
only
ifmoral,
other
items
damages
such
astemperate,
nominal,
or
exemplary
damages
are
alleged
in
the
complaint
or
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
information,
ifa they
are
so oralleged,
shall
constitute
first
lien not
on
the
judgement.
not the author of the act of omission complained of. 14
The
rules
of
criminal
procedure
This closes the door to civil liability. Second is an
guarantee
that
filing
fees
for the
award
of
damages
are
first
lien
on
the
judgement,
the
effect
of
the
enforcement
of
said
lien institution
mustaction.
retro of
actthe
to
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
the
criminal
accused, in this case if the guilt of the accused has not
Therefore,
we
been satisfactorily established, he is not exempted15
find no basis for
petitioners
allegations
that
the
from civil liability which may be proved by the
filing fees were not
paid or improperly
preponderance of evidence only.
paid and that the
appellate
court
acquired
no
jurisdiction.
The

instant petition is
dismissed for lack of
merit.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

54

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

SAMSON V. CA
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
1

Rufino T. Samson was jointly charged with Amado


L. Cruz and Bonifacio Vergara and two others whose
names are unknown in two separate informations with
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
two checks of the Philippine National Bank

The mere assurance of


a former class, mate
would certainly not be a
satisfactory
identification to justify
disbursement of such a
large amount if the
funds
belonged
to
appellant.

The trio appealed from the decision and the Court


of Appeals affirmed the same but with a reduced
penalty with regard to appellants Cruz and Vergara.
Appellant Samson was only found guilty of committing 11 Under
the
facts
the crime through gross imprudence and was
found by the Court of
accordingly sentenced to 4 months of arresto mayor
Appeals, the acts of
in each of the two cases.
appellant constitute in
each case the crime of
3 Dissatisfied with his conviction, Samson sued out
estafa
through
the present petition for review contending (1) that the
falsification
of
a
acts done by him, as found by the Court of Appeals,
mercantile
document
do not constitute gross imprudence; (2) that there is
by reckless imprudence,
no such offense as estafa through (falsification by)
because in so far as the
negligence; and (3) that the Court of Appeals erred in
falsification
is
denying his motion for new trial.
concerned, his acts of
4 Espiridion Lascao, father of the late Felipe
endorsing
the
Lascao, a lieutenant of the USAFFE, who died during
respective checks by
the last World War, and his widow Rosanna Paras, are
way of identification of
Felipe Lascano's only legitimate surviving heirs,
the signatures of the
payees entitled to said
5 They filed their claim papers with the Red Cross
checks and their
Chapter in the Province of Sorsogon in the early part
of 1946.

On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the help


of his former classmate Rufino T. Samson in getting
the checks of the two claimants who were with him at
Camp Murphy .

They were successful in having the checks of the


two claimants. They went to Aristocrat restaurant and
Samson went on to watch a movie that night ( I know.
Weird.).

Just two days after cashing the checks, while at


Camp Murphy Samson was informed by Severino
Anda, one of those who were with the party which
cashed the checks, thus said cheeks were delivered to
the wrong parties. Worried by such news he left for
Sorsogon the following day to locate the real
claimants.

He found Espiridion too weak and too old to get


out of the house and saw Rosalina (I think this should
be Rosanna) in the school where she was teaching
and confirmed that the old mans check was never
claimed by them.
ISSUE (CRIMPRO): WON Samson can be
convicted of the crime of estafa through
falsification by imprudence despite the fact that
the information filed against him charges only a
willful act of falsification and contains no
reference to any act of imprudence on his partYES

10

Appellant was, or must have been aware that the


claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve
thousand pesos, and ordinary prudence required that
he should satisfy himself by all proper and adequate
means of the identity of the persons claiming said
amounts, since they we personally unknown to him.

proceeds, constituted a
written representation
that the true payees
participated
in
the
indorsement
and
cashing of the checks
aforesaid, when in truth
and in fact the true
payees had no direct
intervention
in
the
proceedings (Art. 171,
Revised Penal Code).

Even
if
such
indorsement
and
identification
were
extraneous
to
the
official
duties
of
appellant, he would be
nevertheless liable as a
private person under
Article
172
of
the
Revised Penal Code.
Decisions of this Court
and of the Supreme
Court of Spain assert
the juridical standing of
the crime of falsification
by imprudence since in
falsifying
public
or
mercantile
document,
of intent to cause
damage is not required
because what the law,
seeks to repress is the
prejudice to the public
confidence
in
these
documents.

The rule regarding


variance
between
allegation and proof in a
criminal case, is: "When
there
is
variance
between the offense
charged
in
the
complaint
or
information, and that
proved or established
by the evidence, and
the offense as charged,
is
included
in
or
necessarily includes the
offense
proved,
the
defendant
shall
be
convicted of the offense
proved included in that
which is charged, or of
the offense charged
included in that which is
proved" (Section 4, Rule
116. Rules of Court).

3 As

a complement we
have also the following
rule:
"An
offense
charged
necessarily

includes that which is proved, when some of the


a willful offense, upon
the theory that the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
greater includes the
this is alleged in the complaint or information,
lesser offense. This is
constitute the latter. And the offense charged is
the
situation
that
necessarily included in the offense proves, when the
obtains in the present
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
case.
a part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule
116, Idem.).
5
The fact that the
information does not
4 While a criminal negligent act is not a simple
allege
that
the
modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs.
falsification
was
*
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July
committed
with
28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a
imprudence is of no
quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be
moment for here this
said that conviction for the former can be had under
deficiency
appears
an information exclusively charging the commission of
supplied
by
the

evidence submitted by
appellant himself and
the result has proven
beneficial
to
him.
Certainly,
having
alleged
that
the
falsification has been
willful, it would be
incongrous to allege at
the same time that it
was committed with
imprudence
for
a
charge
of
criminal
intent is incompatible
with the concept of
negligence.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

55

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


STA. RITA V. CA
FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Sta. Rita was charged in the RTC with


violating Section 2(a) in relation to Sections 22(d) and
28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended,
otherwise known as the Social Security Law.

2 The

considered
indispensable
interdictions
against
needless delays and for
orderly discharge of
5
judicial
business.
Petitioner's failure to
seasonably
file
the
Petition and its failure
to comply with the
aforequoted Circulars of
the Court necessitate
the
denial
of
the
Petition.

Information alleged that petitioner, "as


President/General Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co., Inc. a
compulsorily (sic) covered employer under the Social
Security Law, as amended, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully fail, neglect and refuse and still fails,
neglects and refuses to remit to the Social Security
System contributions for SSS, Medicare and
Employees Compensation for its covered employees."
3 Petitioner Sta. Rita moved to dismiss said criminal 11 Besides, even if the
Petition had been filed
case
on
time
and
had
4 The RTC sustained petitioner's motion and
complied
with
the
dismissed the criminal case filed against him. It ruled
Circulars, it would still
that the Memorandum of Agreement entered into
have to be denied as
between the Department of Labor and Employment
petitioner has failed to
("DOLE") and the Social Security System ("SSS")
show that respondent
extending the coverage of Social Security, Medical
appellate
court
committed
any
Care and Employment Compensation laws to Filipino
reversible
error
in
seafarers on board foreign vessels was null and void
rendering the assailed
as it was entered into by the Administrator of the SSS
decision.
without the sanction of the Commission and approval
of the President of the Philippines, in contravention of
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended.

WON THE
INFORMATION
AGAINST PETITIONER
IS SUFFICIENT- YES

The Court agrees


with the CA that the
Information
filed
against petitioner was
sufficient as it clearly
stated the designation
of the offense by the
statute, i.e. violation of
the Social Security Law,
and
the
acts
or
omissions complained
of as constituting the
offense, i.e., petitioner's
failure to remit his
contributions
to
the
SSS. The CA found that
there is prima facie
evidence to support the
allegations
in
the
Information
and
to
warrant the prosecution
of petitioner.
WON
THE
QUESTIONED
MEMORANDUM
AGREEMENT (DOLESSS) IS VALID- YES

The People, through the Solicitor General, filed in


the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus assailing the order of
dismissal issued by the trial court.
6 Respondent appellate court granted the petition.

Contrary to the trial


court's
finding,
the
Memorandum
of
Agreement
was
approved by the Social
Security
Commission
per the Commission's
Resolution
No.
437,
dated 14 July 1988.
Upon the other hand,
the Memorandum of
Agreement is not a rule
or regulation enacted
by the Commission in
the exercise of the
latter's quasi-legislative
authority Under Section
4 (a) of R.A. No.
1161, as amended,
which reads as follows:

Thereafter, petitioner filed in this Court a motion


for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of
reglementary period within which to file a petition for
review on certiorari. The Court granted the motion
and gave petitioner until 9 June 1995 to file the
petition with warning that no further extension will be
given.

Despite the warning, the petition was filed only on


13 June 1995 or four (4) days after the due date.
Moreover, it failed to comply with requirement no. 2 of
Circular No. 1-88, as amended and Circular No. 19-91
of the Court as it did not contain an affidavit of service
of copies thereof to respondents. It was only on 14
July 1995, through an ex-parte manifestation, that the
affidavit of service was belatedly submitted to this
Court.

In the Petition for Review, petitioner Sta. Rita


contends that the Filipino seafarers recruited by B.
Sta. Rita Co. and deployed on board foreign vessels
outside the Philippines are exempt from the coverage
of R.A. No. 1161 under Section 8 (j) (5) thereof
WON THE PETITION MUST FAIL DUE TO NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL RULES
YES

10

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to


appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to
4
avail of the right must comply with the rules. These
rules, particularly the statutory requirement for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period
laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are

15

Sec. 4. Powers and


Duties
of
the
Commission. For the
attainment of its main
objectives as set forth
in section two hereof,
the Commission shall
have
the
following
powers and duties:

15

To adopt, amend and


rescind, subject to the
approval
of
the
President, such rules
and regulations as may

be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes


of this Act.

What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to


record the understanding between the SSS on the one
hand and the DOLE on the other hand that the latter
would include among the provisions of the Standard
Contract of Employment required in case of overseas
employment, a stipulation providing for coverage of
the Filipino seafarer by the SSS.

2 The

Memorandum of Agreement is not an


implementing rule or regulation of the Social Security
Commission which, under Section 4 (a) abovequoted,
is subject to the approval of the President. Indeed, as
a matter of strict law, the participation of the SSS in
the establishment by the DOLE of a uniform
stipulation in the Standard Contract of Employment
for Filipino seafarers was not necessary; the
Memorandum of Agreement related simply to the
administrative convenience of the two (2) agencies of
government.

The Standard Contract of Employment to be


entered into between foreign shipowners and Filipino
seafarers is the instrument by which the former

express their assent to


the inclusion of the
latter in the coverage of
the Social Security Act.
In other words, the
extension
of
the
coverage of the Social
Security
System
to
Filipino seafarers arises
by virtue of the assent
given in the contract of
employment signed by
employer and seafarer;
that
same
contract
binds petitioner Sta.
Rita or B. Sta. Rita
Company,
who
is
solidarily liable with the
foreign
shipowners/employers.

It may be noted
that foreign shipowners
and manning agencies
had
generally

expressed
their
conformity
to
the
inclusion
of
Filipino
seafarers within the
coverage of the Social
Security Act even prior
to the signing of the
DOLE-SSS
Memorandum
of
Agreement.

It is, finally, worthy


of special note that by
extending the benefits
of the Social Security
Act to Filipino seafarers
on
board
foreign
vessels, the individual
employment
agreements
entered
into with the stipulation
for
such
coverage
contemplated in the
DOLE-SSS

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


Memorandum of Agreement, merely give effect to the
constitutional mandate to the State to afford protection
to labor whether "local or overseas."
(CRIMPRO) WON THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL
CASE
AGAINST
STA.
RITA
CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDY-NO

The Court of Appeals properly held that the


reinstatement of the criminal case against petitioner
did not violate his right against double jeopardy since
the dismissal of the information by the trial court had
10
been effected at his own instance.
There are only
two (2) instances where double jeopardy will attach
notwithstanding the fact that the case was dismissed
with the express consent of the accused. The first is
where the ground for dismissal is insufficiency of
evidence for the prosecution; and the second is where
the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably
prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy
11
trial.
Neither situation exists in the case at bar.
There is no legal impediment to the reinstatement of
Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426 against petitioner Sta.
Rita. (AS IN ITO LANG ANG DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT,
ARGH.)

56

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

57

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

ANAMER SALAZAR V. PEOPLE


CALLEJO, SR., J.:

civil action separately


On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was
shall be allowed.
filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and
12
The criminal action
co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional
has a dual purpose,
Trial Court of Legazpi City.
namely,
the
2 petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans
punishment
of
the
of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation,
offender and indemnity
through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans
to the offended party.
of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant
The
dominant
and
Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank,
primordial objective of
Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one
the criminal action is
Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000.
the punishment of the
offender.
The
civil
3 Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the
action
is
merely
petitioners assurance that it was a good check. The
incidental
to
and
cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the
petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was
consequent
to
the
dishonored because it was drawn under a closed
conviction
of
the
account
accused. The reason for
(Account Closed).
this is that criminal
actions are primarily
4 The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She
intended to vindicate an
replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No.
outrage
against
the
365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch,
sovereignty of the state
which, however, was returned with the word DAUD
and to impose the
(Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).
appropriate penalty for
5 After the prosecution rested its case, the
the vindication of the
petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of
disturbance
to
the
Court alleging that she could not be guilty of the
social order caused by
crime as charged.
the offender. On the
6 The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to
the petitioners demurrer to evidence.

TC: rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of


the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the
private complainant the amount of the check as
payment for her purchase.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused


Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the
300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is
therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing
Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against
the accused.

In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the


orders of the trial court claiming that after her
demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court,
she was denied due process as she was not given the
opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was
not civilly liable to the private respondent. The
petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that
before being adjudged liable to the private offended
party, she should have been first accorded the
procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
ISSUE: WON SALAZAR SHOULD BE GRANTED
THE PROCEDURAL RELIEF IN RULE 33- YES

10

The reservation of the right to institute separately


the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts
presenting
its
evidence
and
under
circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

11

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas


Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such

other hand, the action


between the private
complainant and the
accused is intended
solely to indemnify the
former.

Unless the offended


party waives the civil
action or reserves the
right to institute it
separately or institutes
the civil action prior to
the
criminal
action,
there are two actions
involved in a criminal
case. The first is the
criminal action for the
punishment
of
the
offender. The parties
are the People of the
Philippines
as
the
plaintiff
and
the
accused. In a criminal
action,
the
private
complainant is merely a
witness for the State on
the criminal aspect of
the action. The second
is the civil action arising
from the delict. The
private complainant is
the plaintiff and the
accused
is
the
defendant. There is a
merger of the trial of
the two cases to avoid
multiplicity of suits.

The quantum of
evidence
on
the
criminal aspect of the
case is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, while
in the civil aspect of the
action, the quantum of
evidence
is
preponderance
of
evidence. Under Section
3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Rules
of
Criminal
Procedure,
the
said
rules shall govern the
procedure
to
be
observed in action, civil
or criminal.

The
prosecution
presents its evidence
not only to prove the
guilt of the accused
beyond
reasonable
doubt but also to prove
the civil liability of the
accused to the offended
party.
After
the
prosecution has rested

its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not


only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the
case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should
render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of
the case but also on the civil aspect thereof.

accused
in
double
jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the
offended party or the
accused or both may
appeal
from
the
judgment on the civil
aspect of the case
within
the
period
therefor.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state


whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did 7
After
the
not exist.
prosecution has rested
its case, the accused
5 The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a
has the option either to
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case
(a) file a demurrer to
where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
evidence
with
or
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
without leave of court
where the court declared that the liability of the
under Section 23, Rule
accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the
119 of the Revised
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
Rules
of
Criminal
crime of which the accused was acquitted. .
Procedure, or to (b)
adduce his evidence
6 If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt
unless he waives the
but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of
same
the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from
the judgment of acquittal as it would place the

If the court denies


the
demurrer
to
evidence
filed
with
leave of court, the
accused may adduce
evidence in his defense.
When the demurrer to
evidence is filed without
leave of court, the
accused
waives
his
right
to
present
evidence and submits
the case for judgment
on the basis of the
evidence
for
the
prosecution.

If
demurrer
is
granted
and
the
accused is acquitted by
the court, the accused
has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil
aspect of the case
unless the court also
declares that the act or
omission

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If
the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not
only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused
and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the
accused to the private offended party, said judgment
on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the
reason that the constitutional right of the accused to
due process is thereby violated

1 The

principles find universal acceptance and are


tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without
a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.

This is so because when the accused files a


demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet
adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the
evidence for the prosecution.

58

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

59

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., vs. PANFILO M. LACSON.


MAY 28, 2002
probable cause.
1
On May 28, 2001,
1 On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General
respondent
Lacson, et
5
The
records
of
the
Recaredo Sarmiento
al., invoking, among
case before us are not
35 announced, in a press conference, the killing of
others,
their
clear
whether
the
eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
(KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the flyover along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at
about 4:00 A.M. that day.

private offended parties


were notified of the
hearing on March 22,
1999 held by Judge
Agnir to resolve the
motions
filed
by
respondent Lacson and
the other accused.

On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the


news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that
the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a
rub-out or summary execution and not a shootout.

On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz,


another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit
corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes.
Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos Reyes from
the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested
up to the time they were killed in Commonwealth
Avenue.

On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of


Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he was
present when the KBG members were arrested in
Superville Subdivision.

On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A.


Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder
charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against
ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG.
The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed
murder charges against the same officers and
personnel.

On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed


before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations
for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047
to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and
twenty-five (25) other accused.

Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases


were
remanded
to
the
Ombudsman
for
reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended
Informations were filed against the same twenty-six
(26) suspects but the participation of respondent
Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory
(TACKLED IN LACSON
22. EXEC. SEC.)

Before the accused could be arraigned,


prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon
de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted
their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in
the murder of the KBG members.

On the other hand, private complainants Myrna


Abalora, Leonora Amora, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda
Montero, Margarita Redillas, Carmelita Elcamel and
Rolando Siplon also executed their respective
affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no
longer interested to prosecute these cases.

Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26)


accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five
separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in
abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3)
dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of

On March 27, 2001,


PNP Director Leandro R.
Mendoza indorsed to
the
Department
of
Justice
the
new
affidavits
of
P/Insp.
Ysmael

19. Yu

and P/S Insp.


Abelardo
Ramos
regarding the Kuratong
Baleleng incident for
preliminary
investigation. On the
strength
of
this
indorsement, Secretary
of Justice Hernando B.
Perez formed a panel to
investigate the matter..

constitutional
right
against
double
jeopardy, filed a petition
for
prohibition
with
application
for
temporary
restraining
order and/or writ of
preliminary
injunction
with the Regional Trial
Court
of
Manila,
primarily to enjoin the
State prosecutors from
conducting
the
preliminary
investigation.

On June 6, 2001,
eleven
(11)
Informations for murder
involving the killing of
the same members of
the Kuratong Baleleng
gang were filed before
the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon. The new
Informations charged as
principals
thirty-four
(34) people, including
respondent Lacson and
his
twenty-five
(25)
other co-accused. The
criminal cases were
assigned to Judge Ma.
Theresa L. Yadao.

The
Court
of
Appeals
issued
a
temporary
restraining
order enjoining Judge
Yadao from issuing a
warrant of arrest or
conducting
any
proceeding or hearing
in Criminal Cases Nos.
01-101102
to
01101112.

On
August
24,
2001, the Court of
Appeals (Special Third
Division), rendered the
now assailed Decision.
It
characterized
the
termination of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-9981689 as provisional
dismissal,
and
considered
Criminal
Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01101112
as
mere
revivals of the same.

Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised


Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal
cases against the respondent
ISSUE: whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the
filing of the eleven (11) informations against
the respondent Lacson involving the killing of
some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gangNO (AT LEAST NOT YET)

respondent
Lacson
himself who moved to
dismiss
the
subject
cases
for
lack
of
probable cause before
then
Judge
Agnir,
hence, it is beyond
argument
that their
dismissal
bears
his
express consent.

was not tackled by the


litigants at the RTC
level.

Nor was the fact of


notice to the offended
parties the subject of
proof after the eleven
(11) informations for
murder
against
respondent Lacson and
company were revived
in the RTC of Quezon
City presided by Judge
Yadao. There was hardly
any
proceeding
conducted in the case
for respondent Lacson
immediately
filed
a
petition for certiorari in
the
appellate
court
challenging,
among
others, the authority of
Judge Yadao to

Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new


rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this
The records of the
Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack 7
case, however, do not
of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof
reveal with equal clarity
of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional
and
conclusiveness
dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the
whether notices to the
accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after
offended parties were
notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year
given before the cases
period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether
against the respondent
there is any justification for the filing of the cases
Lacson were dismissed
beyond the 2-year period.
by then Judge Agnir.
6 There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact 8
The
issue
of
that the provisional dismissal of the cases against
whether or not the
respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was
reinvestigation is barred
by Section 8, Rule 117
60
the basis of the evidence of which
the trial court should make a
CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)
ruling on whether the Informations
in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 should be dismissed
or not. Pending the ruling, the trial
entertain the revived informations for multiple
court is restrained from issuing
murder against him.
any warrant of arrest against the
1 This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of
respondent
Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial
court. It was in the Court of Appeals where
respondent Lacson raised for the first time the
argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of
the multiple murder cases against him.

Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive


on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder
cases against respondent Lacson are being revived
within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date
of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge
Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the
Order were received by the various offended parties
or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule.

If the cases were revived only after the 2-year


bar, the State must be given the opportunity to
justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The
new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed
in courts. It can therefore present compelling
reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2year bar.

In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence


on the various requirements to determine the
applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not
in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the
cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson
should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires
that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson
should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and
to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of
the predicate facts upon which the application of the
new rule depends.

DISPOSITIVE: case at bar is remanded to the


RTC - Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State
prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce
evidence and be heard on whether the requirements
of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |


Martin | Vien

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

61

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


PEOPLE V LACSON
APRIL 1, 2003

provisionally dismissed
without the express
consent of the accused
or over his objection,
the new rule would not
apply. The case may be
revived or refiled even
beyond the prescribed
periods subject to the
right of the accused to
oppose the same on the
ground
of
double
jeopardy or that such
revival or refiling is
barred by the statute of
limitations.

Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for


Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28, 2002
ISSUE: WON SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS
APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-9981679 TO Q-99-81689- NO

Having invoked Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised


Rules of Criminal Procedure before the petitionerspanel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals,
the respondent is burdened to establish the essential
requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:

1.

the prosecution with the express conformity of


the accused or the accused moves for a provisional
(sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
8

2.

the offended party is notified of the motion for a


provisional dismissal of the case;

3.

the court issues an order granting the motion


and dismissing the case provisionally;

4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of


the order of provisional dismissal of the case. The
foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to
the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph of the new rule.

4 The

raison d etre for the requirement of the express


consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from subsequently
asserting that the revival of the criminal case will
place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or
for an offense necessarily included therein.

Although the second paragraph of the new rule


states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof
without the case having been revived, the provision
should be construed to mean that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without
the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the
timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order
of dismissal.

Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given


either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or
implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused
writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional
dismissal of the case No objection or With my
conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of
the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.
The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a
motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or
his failure to object to a provisional dismissal
does not amount to express consent.

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal


of a case is an express consent to such provisional
dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed
with the express consent of the accused, the case
may be revived only within the periods provided in the
new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is

The case may be


revived by the State
within
the
time-bar
either by the refiling of
the Information or by
the filing of a new

Information
for
the
same offense or an
offense
necessarily
included therein. There
would be no need of a
new
preliminary
investigation. However,
in a case wherein after
the
provisional
dismissal of a criminal
case,
the
original
witnesses
of
the
prosecution or some of
them
may
have
recanted
their
testimonies
or
may
have died or may no
longer be available and
new witnesses for the
State have emerged, a
new
preliminary
investigation must be
conducted before an
Information is refiled or
a new Information is
filed. A new preliminary
investigation is also
required if aside from
the original accused,
other
persons
are
charged under a new
criminal complaint for
the same offense or
necessarily
included
therein; or if under a
new criminal complaint,
the original charge has
been upgraded; or if
under a new criminal
complaint, the criminal
liability of the accused
is upgraded from that
as an accessory to that
as a principal. The
accused
must
be
accorded the right to
submit
counteraffidavits and evidence.
After all, the fiscal is
not called by the Rules
of
Court
to
wait
in
ambush; the role of a
fiscal is not mainly to
prosecute
but
essentially to do justice
to every man and to
assist the court in
dispensing that justice.

In this case, the


respondent has failed to
prove that the first and
second requisites of the
first paragraph of the

new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed


Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion
for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases.
For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of prosecution witnesses.

The respondent did not pray for the dismissal,


provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal
of the cases.

The respondents admissions made in the course


of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding
and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from
repudiating his admissions absent evidence of
palpable mistake in making such admissions.

To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or make
exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly
or impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot
and should not do.

The

Court also agrees

with the petitioners

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)


1

Since the conditions sine qua non for the


application of the new rule were not present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not
barred by the time limit set forth in the second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus
revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple
murder against the respondent.
WON THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117
OF
THE
REVISED
RULES
OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
SHOULD
BE
APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY- NO

The new rule is not a statute of limitations.


Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of
grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right
to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its
discretion

On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8


of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation
qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making
the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the timebar operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused.

The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce


the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the
right of the State to revive a criminal case against
the accused after the Information had been filed but
subsequently provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of
the timeline under the new rule, the State is
presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or
waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the
accused.

The Court agrees with the respondent that


procedural laws may be applied retroactively. In
Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , this Court held
that:Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage.

contention
that
no
case. Such notice may
notice of any motion for
be
served
on
the
the
provisional
offended party or the
dismissal of Criminal
heirs of the victim
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
through
the
private
to Q-99-81689 or of the
prosecutor, if there is
hearing thereon was
one, or through the
served on the heirs of
public prosecutor who
the victims at least
in turn must relay the
three days before said
notice to the offended
hearing as mandated by
party or the heirs of the
Rule 15, Section 4 of
victim to enable them
the Rules of Court. It
to confer with him
must be borne in mind
before the hearing or
that in crimes involving
appear in court during
private interests, the
the hearing. The proof
new rule requires that
of such service must be
the offended party or
shown
during
the
parties or the heirs of
hearing on the motion,
the victims must be
otherwise,
the
given adequate a priori
requirement of the new
notice of any motion for
rule will become illusory
the
provisional
dismissal of the criminal
62
Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. The
fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants
rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending
actions.
The
retroactive
application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive
application
of
procedural
statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws. It has
been held that a person has no
vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure.

DISPOSITIVE: M.R. GRANTED;


RTC DIRECTED TO FORTHWITH
PROCEED WITH THE CRIMINAL
CASES

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |


Martin | Vien

63

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien


PEOPLE V. LACSON
OCTOBER 7, 2003

apply.
Before the Court are the following motions of the
7
The absence of a
respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion; (b) Motion for
provision
in Section 8
Reconsideration; (c) Supplement to Motion for
giving
it
prospective
Reconsideration; (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments
application only does
2 RESPONDENT asserts that pursuant to a long line
not
proscribe
the
of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice
prospective application
in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP
thereof; nor does it
should be applied prospectively and retroactively
imply that the Court
without reservations, only and solely on the basis of
intended the new rule
its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that
to be given retroactive
case law on the retroactive application of penal laws
and prospective effect.
should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a
If the statutory purpose
branch of criminal law.
is clear, the provisions
of the law should be
3 The respondent insists that Section 8 was
construed
as
is
purposely crafted and included as a new provision to
conducive
to
fairness
reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a
and justice, and in
speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly,
harmony
with
the
prospective application thereof would in effect give
general
spirit
and
policy
the petitioners more than two years from March 29,
of the rule. It should be
1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus
construed so as
violating the respondents right to due process and

equal protection of the law.


ISSUE: APPLICATION OF THE TIME-BAR RULEPROSPECTIVE
OR
RETROACTIVE?ONLY
PROSPECTIVE. RAAR.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by


Court to excise the malaise that plagued
administration of the criminal justice system for
benefit of the State and the accused; not for
accused only.

the
the
the
the

The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution


that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed a timebar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal
cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the
offended party. In fixing the time-bar, the Court
balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State
and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process. The Court believed that the time limit is a
reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and
notice to the offended parties.

6 The

Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power


under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the
Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate
rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine
whether to give the said rules prospective or
retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the
Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to
actions pending before it if in its opinion their
application would not be feasible or would work
injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall

not to defeat but to


carry out such end or
purpose.
A
statute
derives its vitality from
the purpose for which it
is approved. To construe
it in a manner that
disregards or defeats
such purpose is to
nullify or destroy the
law. In Cometa v. Court
of Appeals, this Court
ruled that "the spirit
rather than the letter of
the statute determines
its construction; hence,
a statute must be read
according to its spirit or
intent." While we may
not read into the law a
purpose that is not
there, we nevertheless
have the right to read
out of it the reason for
its enactment. In doing
so, we defer not to the
"letter that killeth" but
to
the
"spirit
that
vivifieth, to give effect
to the lawmakers will."

The Court agrees


with the petitioners that
to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the
two-year
period
commenced to run on
March 31, 1999 when
the public prosecutor
received his copy of the
resolution
of
Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the
criminal
cases
is
inconsistent with the
intendment of the new
rule. Instead of giving
the State two years to
revive
provisionally
dismissed cases, the
State had considerably
less than two years to
do so.

the

In this case, when


Court
approved

Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied


to the State and to the
prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention
victims of crimes and
of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very
their heirs.
purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the
3
DISPOSITIVE:
State a period of two years from notice of the
respondent Panfilo M.
provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the
Lacsons
Omnibus
express consent of the accused. It would be a denial
Motion and Motion to
of the States right to due process and a travesty of
Set for Oral Arguments
are
DENIED.
The
justice for the Court to apply the new rule
respondents Motion for
retroactively in the present case as the respondent
Reconsideration and its
insists, considering that the criminal cases were
Supplement are
provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March
DENIED WITH FINALITY.
29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December
The Executive Judge of
1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will
the Regional Trial Court
result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences

of
Quezon
City
is
hereby DIRECTED to
CONSOLIDATE Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 and to
RE-RAFFLE the same
with dispatch to one of
the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City designated
as a special court,
exclusively to try and
decide heinous crimes.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

64

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

CONDRADA V. PEOPLE
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
1

Petitioner was charged with rape. When he was


arraigned on February 26, 1999, petitioner pleaded
not guilty to the charge against him.

On March 31, 1999, the date set by the trial court


for the initial hearing, the prosecution moved that the
same be postponed due to the absence of the
complainant and her witnesses. The hearing was reset
on April 29, 1999.

On April 29, 1999, the prosecution again moved to


postpone the hearing due to the absence of the
complainant and her witnesses.

Petitioner objected to the motion on the ground


that his right to speedy trial was being violated by
such postponements. The trial court granted the
prosecutions motion and reset the hearing on
May 31, 1999. It also directed that the subpoenae to
the complainant and her witnesses be coursed
through the National Bureau of Investigation which
handled the investigation of the case.

During the hearing on May 31, 1999, the


prosecution requested for another postponement.
Petitioner moved for at least a temporary dismissal of
the case. The prosecution manifested that it would not
object to a temporary dismissal. Thus, on the same
date, the trial court issued an order temporarily
dismissing the case.

On June 22, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion


for Reinstatement and/or Revival of Criminal Case No.
10770. Appended to said motion was the affidavit of
private complainant that the subpoenae sent to her
for the trial of the case did not reach her because in
the meantime she had transferred her residence.

The trial court set the hearing on the motion for


reinstatement on June 25, 1999.

Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the


revival or reinstatement of the case will place him in
double jeopardy. On September 29, 1999, the Court
issued a resolution reinstating the said case and
reiterating the issuance of a warrant of arrest for
petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said


resolution insisting that the reinstatement of the case
will place him in double jeopardy.

10

On January 14, 2000, the court issued a resolution


denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.
Consequently, Criminal Case No. 10770 is still pending
before the trial court.

11

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition on


February 1, 2000. He claims that Criminal Case No.
10770 cannot be revived because the dismissal of the
case on May 31, 1999 is permanent in character,
having been made in consideration of his right to
speedy trial.

12

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends


that the case was dismissed not because petitioners
right to speedy trial has been violated by the
postponements of the trial on several instances, but
because petitioner through counsel moved that the
case be dismissed at least even temporarily to which
the public prosecutor interposed no objection. The
Solicitor General points out that the prosecution

moved
for
the
postponement of the
trial several times in
good faith and for valid
reasons. He likewise
argues that the revival
of the case does not
place
the
petitioner
twice in jeopardy for the
same offense because
the dismissal of the
case on May 31, 1999
was
made
at
petitioners instance.
ISSUES:

A.Whether or not the


dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 10770 by
the trial court in its
Order of June 25,
1999 is permanent in
character so as to
operate
as
an
acquittal
of
the
petitioner
for
the
crime charged- NO
B.Whether or not the
reinstatement
of
Criminal Case No.
10770
places
the
petitioner in double
jeopardy.- NO

A
permanent
dismissal of a criminal
case may refer to the
termination of the case
on the merits, resulting
in either the conviction
or acquittal of the
accused;
to
the
dismissal of the case
due to the prosecutions
failure to prosecute; or
to the dismissal thereof
on
the
ground
of
unreasonable delay in
the
proceedings,
in
violation
of
the
accuseds
right
to
speedy disposition or
trial of the case against
him. In contrast, a
provisional dismissal of
a criminal case is a
dismissal
without
prejudice
to
the
reinstatement
thereof
before the order of
dismissal becomes final
or to the subsequent
filing
of
a
new
information
for
the
offense
within
the
periods allowed under
the Revised Penal Code
or the Revised Rules of
Court.

In the present case,


it is clear from the
records
that
the
dismissal ordered by
the trial court on May
31,
1999
was
a
temporary dismissal of
the case, and not a
permanent dismissal on
the ground that the
right of the accused to
speedy trial had been

violated by the delay in the prosecution of the said


case. The trial court apparently denied petitioners
motion to have Criminal
Case No. 10770 dismissed on the ground of his right
to speedy trial when despite said motion made in
open court on April 29, 1999, it ordered the resetting
of the hearing of the case on May 31, 1999. In
subsequently granting petitioners request for the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31,
1999, the trial court expressly stated that the same
was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from
the date of the temporary dismissal.

Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the dismissal


of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999 was
provisional or temporary, without prejudice to the
revival thereof within thirty days from the date of
dismissal. Thus, the Court finds that the reinstatement
thereof on June 25, 1999 did not place petitioner in
double jeopardy.

The
proscription
against
double
jeopardy
presupposes that an accused has been previously
charged with an offense, and the case against him is
terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or
dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As
a general rule, the following requisites must be
65

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the
aforecited exceptions. The prosecution had not yet
presented evidence at the time the case was dismissed
on May 31, 1999. Moreover, as previously explained,
said dismissal was temporary in nature, as the case
was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from
the date of dismissal

present
for
double
jeopardy to attach: (1) a
valid indictment,

(2) before a court of


competent jurisdiction,
(3) the arraignment of
the accused, (4) a valid
plea entered by him,
and
(5) the acquittal or
conviction
of
the
accused,
or
the
dismissal or termination
of the case against him
without
his
express
consent.
However,
there
are
two
exceptions
to
the
foregoing
rule,
and
double jeopardy may
attach even if the
dismissal of the case
was with the consent of
the accused: first, when
there is insufficiency of

evidence to support the


charge against him; and
second, where there
has
been
an
unreasonable delay in
the
proceedings,
in
violation
of
the
accuseds
right
to
speedy trial.

Petitioner is not in
danger of being twice
put in jeopardy with the
reinstatement
of
Criminal
Case
No.
10770
because
as
earlier stated, said case
was
provisionally
dismissed by the trial
court upon his motion.
Thus, the requirement
that the dismissal of the
case must be without
the consent of the
accused is not present
in

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin


| Vien

S-ar putea să vă placă și