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Documente Cultură
xxx According to
this provision, the
general rule is
that any person,
before
being
convicted of any
criminal offense,
shall be bailable,
except when he
is charged with a
capital
offense
and the evidence
of his guilt is
strong.
Of
course,
only
those persons
who have been
either arrested,
detained
or
otherwise
deprived
of
their
liberty
will ever have
occasion
to
seek
the
benefits of said
provision. But in
order
that
a
person
can
invoke
the
constitutional
precept, it is not
necessary that
he should wait
until a formal
complaint
or
information is
filed
against
him. From the
moment he is
placed
under
arrest,
detention
or
restraint by the
officers of the
law,
he
can
claim
this
guarantee
of
the
Bill
of
Rights, and this
right he
retains unless
and until he is
charged with a
capital offense
and evidence of
his
guilt
is
strong.
And in the case of
Manigbas vs. Luna, 52
O.G. 1405, it was held:
xxx the right to
bail only accrues
when a person is
arrested
or
deprived of his
liberty.
The
purpose of bail
is
to
secure
one's
release
and it would be
incongruous to
grant bail to
one
who
is
free. Thus, `bail
is the security
required
and
given
for
the
release
of
a
person who is in
the custody of
the law.'
Without
surrendering
himself, he filed the
motion in which he asks
that the court fix the
amount of the bail bond
for his release pending
trial. It is, therefore, clear
that the petitioner is a
free man and is under
the jurisprudence not
entitled to admission to
bail.
MIRANDA VS.
TULIAO 486 SCRA
377 (2006)
the new Presiding Judge
(I am allowing you to hate me for this digest.
Sobrang gulong-gulo ako. Ill just attach the Anastacio D. Anghad took
original. The issue raised by the petitioners kasi is over the case
not about bail, but the court discussed it in such a
way that bail got included. They contrasted.
Basically, it just says the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused when he/she submits
motions, etc even if hes not detained. But the
exception is the petition for admission to bail
the accused has to be held in detention in such
case. Since were in a hurry, I think thats the only
thing we need, or so I make myself believe.)
Facts:
two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,
Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1
Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B.
Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and
SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City, but the venue was later transferred to the
RTC of Manila which convicted all of the accused and
sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except
SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time,
being at large. The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court on automatic review where we accused therein was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested.
On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon,
and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz
and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder
against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and
submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of
arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash
the warrants of arrest.
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and
issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the
ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by
the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the
resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.
Petitioners
counter
3
law.
CORTES VS
CATRAL 279
SCRA 1 (1997)
FACTS: Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral for
granting bail without hearing.
1.
2.
3.
Segundo
Catral
acquitted Jimmy
Siriban, rumors in
Aparri
spread
that the wife of
Judge
Segundo
Catral went to
Jimmy
Siribans house to
get the envelop
ISSUE:
WON
the
allegations of the
complainant
would
warrant
the
imposition
of
administrative
sanction
against
respondent judge.
HELD/RATIO: YES.
Bail should be fixed
according
to
the
circumstances of each
case. The amount fixed
should be sufficient to
ensure the presence of
the accused at the trial
yet reasonable enough to
comply
with
the
constitutional
provision
that bail should not be
excessive.
Therefore,
whether bail is a matter
of right or of discretion,
reasonable
notice
of
hearing is required to be
given to the prosecutor
or fiscal or at least he
must be asked for his
recommendation
because in fixing the
amount of bail, the judge
is required to take into
account a number of
factors such as the
applicants character and
reputation, forfeiture of
other bonds or whether
he is a fugitive from
justice.
When the accused is
charged
with
an
offense
punishable
by death, reclusion
perpetua
or
life
imprisonment,
the
judge is mandated to
conduct a hearing,
whether summary or
otherwise
in
the
discretion
of
the
court, not only to
take into account the
guidelines set forth in
Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court,
but
primarily
to
determine
the
existence of strong
PEOPLE VS.
MANALLO 400
SCRA 129 (2003)
the
prosecutions
evidence but rather on
the weakness of the
evidence for the defense
HELD/RATIO: NO. Even a
cursory reading of the
decision of the trial court
will readily show that it
convicted appellant of
the crime charged in light
of the testimony of
Rosaldiza and Dr. LoriaFlorece and the physical
evidence adduced by the
prosecution.
The trial court considered
appellants flight from
the scene of the crime,
his having jumped bail
and for eluding arrest for
six
long
years
as
evidence of his guilt for
the crime charged
BAIL-RELATED (copypaste):
The Court cannot write
finis to this case without
making of record its
concern and displeasure
at
the
egregious
procedural lapse of the
trial court in granting bail
to appellant. It bears
stressing that he was
charged
with
rape
punishable by reclusion
perpetua
to
death.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure reads:
SEC. 5. Burden of proof
in Bail application. At
the
hearing
of
an
application for admission
to bail filed by any
person who is in custody
for the commission of an
offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua to
death, the prosecution
has
the
burden
of
showing that evidence of
guilt
is
strong.
The
evidence
presented
during the bail hearings
shall
be
considered
automatically reproduced
at the trial, but upon
motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for granted his motion for
additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside bail
without
even
of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.
affording
the
prosecution a chance
to be heard thereon
(please see previous case for the duties of the trial court in and
adduce
its
resolving a motion or petition for bail)
evidence in opposition
thereto, the trial court
In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on Mayheld
in
abeyance
8, 1992. There was no specific date and time for the resolution thereof and
hearing of said motion. And yet, on the same day thateven
allowed
the
the motion was filed, the trial court granted the saidappellant to remain free
motion and fixed the bail bond for the provisional on his bond in the
liberty of the appellant in the amount of P50,000.00 amount
of
only
without any factual basis therefore stated in theP50,000.00. Patently, the
order. Even when the public prosecutor prayed the courtprosecution was deprived
on June 17, 1992, for the cancellation of the property bond of its right to due
of the appellant on the ground that the trial court
process.
A bail application does
not only involve the right
of
the
accused
to
temporary liberty, but
likewise the right of the
State to protect the
people and the peace of
the
community
from
dangerous
elements.
These two rights must be
balanced by a magistrate
in the scale of justice,
hence, the necessity for
hearing to guide his
exercise of jurisdiction.
1)
2) In
holddeparture
Order of
this Court
dated
April 10,
1997
stands;
and
d)
Approva
l of the
bail
bonds
shall be
made
only
after the
arraign
ment to
enable
this
Court to
immedia
tely
acquire
jurisdicti
on over
the
accused;
Petitioner filed a motion
to quash the informations
against
him.
Pending
resolution of his motion,
he asked the trial court to
suspend the arraignment
scheduled on May 23,
1997. He filed a motion
in which he prayed that
the amounts of bail
bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case
and that the same be
done
prior
to
his
arraignment.
the
trial
court,
in
separate orders, denied
petitioners motions to
reduce bail bonds, to
quash the informations,
and
to
suspend
arraignment. Accordingly,
petitioner was arraigned
during which he pleaded
not guilty to the charges
against him and then
ordered him released
upon posting bail bonds
in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to
the conditions in the May
16, 1997 order and the
"hold-departure" order of
April 10, 1997. The pretrial conference was set
on June 7, 1997.
The Court of Appeals
declared conditions (a)
and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of accused. In the second
condition (d) on the ground that the issue had becomeplace, the trial court
moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of could
ensure
the
Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the presence of petitioner at
May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes the arraignment precisely
petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of by granting bail and
his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void ordering his presence at
and that his arraignment was also invalid because it was any
stage
of
the
held pursuant to such invalid condition.
proceedings,
such
as
arraignment. Under Rule
114, 2(b) of the Rules on
ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment
Criminal Procedure, one
invalid.
of the conditions of bail is
that "the accused shall
HELD: CONDITION IS VOID.
appear before the proper
court
whenever
so
bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the required by the court or
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. these Rules," while under
For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, Rule 116, 1(b) the
there would then be no need for the arraignment of the presence of the accused
at the arraignment is
8
required
to condition the grant of
bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to
place him in a position
where he has to choose
between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail
because until his motion
to quash can be resolved,
his arraignment cannot
be
held,
and
(2)
foregoing the filing of a
motion to quash so that
he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be
released on bail. These
scenarios certainly
hearing shall be
considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.
The bail hearing did not
proceed
because
petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion
to quash the amended
Information
on
the
grounds that as against
him,
the
amended
Information
does
not
allege a combination or
series of overt or criminal
acts
constitutive
of
plunder; as against him,
the amended Information
does not allege a pattern
of criminal acts indicative
of an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. By
way
of
riposte,
the
prosecution objected to
the
holding
of
bail
hearing until petitioner
agreed to withdraw his
motion to quash. The
prosecution
contended
that
petitioners motion to
quash the amended
Information
was
antithetical
to
his
petition for bail.
He also filed a petition for
Habeas
Corpus.
(Andaming nyang finile.
Ang
hirap
tuloy
isummarize)
Meanwhile,
Jose
Jinggoy Estrada filed
with the Sandiganbayan
a motion praying that
said court resolve his
motion to fix his bail.
the
Sandiganbayan
issued
a
Resolution
denying
petitioners
motion to quash the
amended
Information.
The motion to fix bail
filed by Jose Jinggoy
Estrada was also denied
by the
Sandiganbayan.
Jose Jinggoy Estrada
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
for
the
HELD/RATIO:
(3) Whether
a
joint
hearing of the petition for
(I will not include the issues regarding the charging of more bail of petitioner and
1. NO.
The
than one offense, etc. anymore. Bail na lang tayo)
those
of
the
other
arraignment
of
accused is mandatory;
an accused is not
ISSUES:
a prerequisite to
(4) Whether the People
the conduct of
waived their right to
hearings on his
(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraignedadduce evidence in
petition for bail. A
before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; opposition to the petition
person is allowed
for bail of petitioner and
to petition for bail
to adduce strong
as soon as he is
(2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash thefailed
evidence of guilt of
deprived of his
amended Information during the pendency of his petition petitioner for the crime
liberty by virtue
for bail;
charged
of his arrest or
10
strong, he may be granted provisional
liberty even prior to arraignment; for
CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)
in such a situation, bail would be
authorized
under
the
circumstances.
In
fine,
the
voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait
Sandiganbayan committed a grave
for his arraignment before filing a petition for
abuse of its discretion amounting to
bail.
excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
arraignment of petitioner before
proceeding with the hearing of his
in cases where it is authorized, bail should be
petition for bail.
granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion
to quash.
2. YES. The Court finds that no such
inconsistency exists between an
However, the foregoing pronouncement should
application of an accused for bail and
not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is
petition for bail should at all times precede
the security given for the release of a
arraignment, because the rule is that a person
person in the custody of the law,
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
furnished by him or a bondsman, to
voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon
guarantee his appearance before any
as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a
court as required under the conditions
complaint or information is filed against him.
set forth under the Rules of Court. Its
The
purpose is to obtain the provisional
Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be
liberty of a person charged with an
understood in light of the fact that the accused
offense until his conviction while at
in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a
the
same
time
securing
his
motion to quash the informations filed against
appearance at the trial. As stated
him. Hence, we explained therein that to
earlier, a person may apply for bail
condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
from the moment that he is deprived
arraignment would be to place him in a
of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
position where he has to choose between (1)
voluntary surrender.
filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
On the other hand, a motion to quash an
release on bail because until his motion to
Information is
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot
be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion
to quash so that he can be arraigned at once
and thereafter be released on bail. This would
undermine his constitutional right not to be put
on trial except upon a valid complaint or
Information sufficient to charge him with a
crime and his right to bail.
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be
first arraigned before the conduct of hearings
on his application for bail. For when bail is a
matter of right, an accused may apply for and
be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The
ruling in Lavides also implies that an
application for bail in a case involving an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death may also be heard even before an
accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds
in such case that the accused is entitled to bail
because the evidence against him is not
3.
11
4.
12
be denied such
an
opportunity,
there would be a
violation
of
procedural
due
process, and the
order of the court
granting
bail
should
be
considered void
on that ground.
3 In
The
court's discretion
to grant bail in
capital offenses
must
be
exercised in the
light
of
a
summary of the
evidence
presented by the
prosecution;
otherwise,
it
would
be
uncontrolled and
might
be
capricious
or
whimsical.
Hence,
the
court's
order
granting
or
refusing
bail
must contain a
summary of the
evidence for the
prosecution
followed by its
conclusion
whether or not
the evidence of
guilt is strong.
13
OCAMPO V BERNABE
MORAN, C.J.:
1
the discretion is
directed to
the
weight of evidence
cannot properly be
weighed if not duly
exhibited
or
produced
before
the court (Ramos
vs.
Ramos,
45
Phil., 362), it is
obvious
that
a
proper exercise of
judicial discretion
requires that the
evidence of guilt
be submitted to
the
court,
the
petitioner
having
the right of crossexamination and to
introduce his own
evidence
in
rebuttal.
affidavits or
recital
of
their
contents are not
sufficient
since
they
are
mere
hearsay evidence,
unless
the
petitioner fails to
object thereto.
n from an
indictment
for
a
capital
offense is
conclusive
against
accused
which has
been
considered
in section
34
b(2)
(b)the
determinat
ion as to
whether
the proof is
evident or
the
presumptio
n
great
must,
on
an original
application
,
be
determine
d from the
evidence
adduced
on
the
application
no matter
which side
bears the
burden of
proof.
Where
accused
under
a
capital
indictment
bears the
burden of
proof
he
should
offer
the
witnesses
whose
names are
endorsed
on
the
indictment,
although
he is not
limited to
such
witnesses.
The court
should
hear
all
material
and
relevant
5 The
accused, should be
presented (1) by
the petitioner in an
application for bail.
(Ex
parte
Tully
[Fla.], 66 S., 296;
Rigdon vs. State,
41 Fla., 308; 26 S.,
711;
Ex
parte
Heffren, 27 Ind.,
87. (2) But the
petitioner,
by
proper procedure,
may
test
the
probative force of
the testimony for
15
We do not see
that the addition of
the provision Sec. 7,
Rule
114
has
materially
changed
the nature of the
hearing on a petition
for bail to the extent
of
depriving
the
Court of its discretion
to
confine
the
evidence
to
the
extent necessary for
the
proper
determination of the
question of whether
or not the evidence
of guilt is strong. The
only change that has
been introduced is
that such evidence
shall be considered
automatically
reproduced at the
trial in order to avoid
unnecessary
repetition.
The prosecution
had
had
three
months since the
hearing started until
the questioned order
was issued and had
called 27 witnesses
just to lay a sufficient
corroborative
basis
16
MAMOLO V NARISIMA
BELLOSILLO, J.:
1
for bail -x x x
(w)hile
the
determination
of
whether or not
evidence of guilt is
strong is a matter
of
judicial
discretion,
this
discretion by the
nature of things
may
rightly
be
exercised
only
after the evidence
is submitted to the
court
at
such
hearing. Whether
the motion for bail
of an accused who
is in custody in a
summary
proceeding or in
the course of a
regular trial the
prosecution must
be
given
an
opportunity
to
present, within a
reasonable
time,
all the evidence
that it may desire
to introduce before
the
court
may
resolve the motion
for bail. If the
prosecution should
be denied of such
an
opportunity,
there would be a
violation
of
procedural
due
process, and the
order of the court
granting
bail
should
be
considered void on
that ground x x x
(E)ven where the
prosecutor refuses
to
adduce
evidence
in
opposition to the
application
to
grant and fix bail,
the court may ask
the
prosecution
such questions as
would
ascertain
the strength of the
states evidence or
judge
the
adequacy of the
amount of bail x x
The failure of
respondent Judge
to adhere to a
basic, fundamental
procedure cannot
be
lightly
overlooked.
As
correctly perceived
by
OCA,
this
omission
by
respondent
constitutes
gross
ignorance of the
law
since
it
resulted
in
depriving
the
prosecution
the
time-tested
and
enduring
procedural
due
process.
It is an oftrepeated
dictum
that a judge should
exhibit more than
just
a
cursory
acquaintance with
the statutes and
procedural
rules.
For the role of
judges
in
the
administration
of
justice requires a
continuous study
of the law and
jurisprudence.
Indubitably,
the
industry of a judge
in keeping abreast
with the law and
court rulings will
enhance the faith
of our people in
the administration
of justice since
litigants will be
confidently
and
invariably assured
that the occupants
of
the
bench
cannot justly be
accused
of
a
deficiency in their
grasp
of
legal
principles.
17
OTHER ISSUES
WON
the
evidence now on
record
is
sufficient to hold
appellant
Saturnino Tuppal
guilty
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
the
crime of robbery
with
homicideYES
11
WON
conspiracy
among
accused
established-
the
the
was
YES
After accused
Ben
Tuppal
announced
the
hold-up,
coaccused
Danilo
Tuppal
took
Florfinas handbag
containing
P2,500.00.
Appellant
Saturnino
Tuppal
then shot Florfina
with a handgun,
hitting her on the
left side of her
abdomen.
4 Their
concerted
action shows their
unity of purpose
to rob the victim,
at all cost. These
concerted acts of
appellant and his
co-accused
manifestly disclose
concurrence
of
wills,
unity
of
action,
joint
purpose
and
common
design.
Hence,
although
appellant did not
himself
shoot
Bartolo Atuan, Jr.,
he is still liable for
Bartolos death as
principal because
the existence of
conspiracy makes
the act of one the
act of all.
The
charges
against appellant
and
his
coaccused,
constitute only one
special indivisible
or composite crime
as
defined
in
Article 294 (1) of
the Revised Penal
Code.
the
prosecution amply
established
the
following elements
of robbery with
homicide: (a) the
taking of personal
property
is
perpetrated
by
means of violence
or
intimidation
against a person,
(b) the property
of homicide, in its
generic sense, is
committed.
18
DE LA CAMARA V ENAGE
FERNANDO, J.:
1
The
answer
Lopez Enage,
2 The
filed by respondent
Judge on March 5,
1971 set forth the
circumstances
concerning
the
issuance of the
above order and
the other incidents
of the case, which,
to his mind would
disprove
any
charge that he was
guilty
of
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
It
stressed,
moreover, that the
challenged
order
would
find
support
in
circulars of the
Department
of
Justice
given
sanction by this
Court. He sought
the dismissal of
the petition for
lack of merit.
Before
conviction, every
person is bailable
except if charged
with
capital
offenses when the
evidence of guilt is
strong.
Such
a
right flows from
the presumption of
innocence in favor
of every accused
who should not be
subjected to the
loss of freedom as
thereafter
he
would be entitled
to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable
doubt. Thereby a
regime of liberty is
honored
in
the
observance
and
not in the breach.
It is not beyondthe
realm
of
probability,
however, that a
person
charged
with
a
crime,
Nor
is
there
any
justification then for imputing
his inability to fix a lesser
amount by virtue of an alleged
reliance on a decision of this
Tribunal. Even if one were
charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result
is that there was a clear reading
of the Abano opinion when such
a meaning was ascribed to it.
No doctrine refinement may
elicit approval if to do so would
be to reduce the right to bail to
a barren form of words. Not only
is the order complained of
absolutely bereft of support in
law, but it flies in the face of
common sense. It is not too
much to say that it is at war
with the command of reason.
20
VILLASENOR v. ABANO
21 SCRA 321 (1967)
1
Sanchez, J; Sept.
29, 1967
Villasenor
- he is earning
a mere
gov. employee,
1
FACTS
2
Reynaldo
Villasenor
wasthe
charged
with
murder
of Police
Sergeant
Madla
CFIwhich
ofbond
Marinduque.
admitted
to
a before
P60,000-bail
was
to
P40,000.
posted
a property
and reduced
wasHe
setwas
at
provisionalHe
liberty.
Before
arraignment,
Fiscal
the information,
charging
the
accusedProv.
withMurder.
Directamended
Assault Upon
an Agent of 3
a
Person
in
Authority
with
3Sept.
Aug. 7 - Judge Abano sua ponte cancelled Villasenors
4
bond 9and
ordered
his
arrest. to reconsider,
- After
hearing
onimmediate
Villasenors motion
4
a
salary of P210
a
month
sole
breadwinner
a family
of
five. and ofthe
Sec.
12,may,
Rule upon
114
provides
that
"the
court
good cause
shown,
either
increase
or
reduce
the
amount"
of
the
bail,
and
that
"defendant
may
be
committed
to
custody
unless
he
gives
bail
in
the
increased
amount
he
is
called
upon to furnish."
We
are notinability
to consider
solely
of a
defendant
secure
bail the
in
ato bycertain
amount.
This
circumstance
does not
make itself
the
amount
excessive.
Guidelines
used by the
courts
in determining
the amount
of bail
The
purpose of bail as
provided in the
definition under
Sec. 1, Rule 114 the
security
required
and
given
for
the
release
of
a
person who is in
the custody of
the law, that he
will
appear
before any court
in
which
his
appearance may
be required as
stipulated in the
bail
bond
or
recognizance.
Sept.
15
- Villasenor
asked
the
court
the original
bond
previously
given
be
reinstated.
Judge
Abano
resolved
to
fix
"the
bond
anew
realthat
property
in the
amount
of
P60,000.00,
but
toin
be
posted
only
by
residents
ofand
the
province
Marinduque
actually
staying
with
properties
which
"must be
the
possession
ownership
ofofsaid
residents
forin five
years." therein"
6Judge
Villasenor
filed
a ofinjunction
petition
certiorari
with
a
prayer
for preliminary
seeking
to set
aside
orders
Aug. 7, for
Sept.
9 and
Sept.
15
and toAbanos
reinstate
the bail
previously
approved
by
Judbe
Abano.
Heexcess
Judge
Abano
having
actedabuse
without
any or in
of jurisdiction
and
with grave
of
discretion
incharges
issuing
the disputed
orders.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
Note:
*Since the two orders of Aug. 7 and Sept. 9 was replaced
with the order of Sept. 15, they became functus officio
(retains no legal authority because his or its duties and
functions have been completed)
**This is a 1967 case hence the reference to a different
ROC.
HELD/RATIO
1.
The
condition of bail
as
provided
under
Sec.
2,
Rule
114
defendant
shall
answer
the
complaint
or
information in the
court in which it
is filed or to
which it may be
transferred
for
trial, and after
conviction, if the
case is appealed
to the Court of
First
Instance
upon application
supported by an
undertaking
or
bail, that he will,
surrender himself
in execution of
such judgment as
the
appellate
court
may
render, or that, in
case cause, is to
be tried anew or
remanded for a
new trial, he will
appear in the
court to which it
may
be
remanded
and
submit himself to
the orders and
processes
thereof.
The
following
principles should
be considered in
fixing the amount
of bail:
the
amount
should
be high enough
to
assure
the
presence
of
defendant when
required but no
higher than is
reasonably
calculated
to
fulfill this purpose
the good
of the public as
well as the rights
of the accused
the need
for a tie to the
jurisdiction
and
the
right
to
freedom
from
unnecessary
restraint
before
conviction under
the
circumstances
surrounding each
particular
accused
Certain
guidelines in bail
fixing, which may
be
summarized
as follows: (1)
ability
of
the
accused to give
bail; (2) nature of
the offense; (3)
Penalty for the
offense charged;
(4) character and
reputation of the
accused;
(5)
health
of
the
accused;
(6)
character
and
strength of the
evidence;
(7)
probability of the
accused
appearing in trial;
(8) forfeiture of
other bonds; (9)
whether
the
2.
his
clerk
of court
isby
toreturn
send
noticesinstances
by when
registered
mail
accompanied
cards;
that
trial
comes,
the
return
cards
many
have
not
yet
been
received
inin
court;
that
the
parties
fail
to
appear;
there
is no
way
ofwhen
knowing
whether
the
notices
have
been
duly
received;
that
he
cannot
order
the
confiscation
of
the
bond
and
the
arrest
of
the
accused,
because
he
is
not
sure
whether
the
bondsmen
have
been
duly
notified;
that
sending
telegrams
to
people
outside
the
province
is
costly,
and
the
court
cannot
afford
to
incur much expenses.
We
read
Sec.in9, the
Rule
114
to mean
that
the
directive
that
bondsmen
be
resident
householders
or
freeholders
Philippines
but
aPhilippines,
minimum
requirement.
Reason
for
this
isisof
that
in
criminal
cases,
residing
outside
thebondsmen
are not within
the reach
of the
processes
of its
courts.
It
is not intended
to tie
the
hands
ofPhilippines.
a judge
to
approve
bail so
as up
itpowers
is
offered
by
resident
householder
or
freeholder
within
the
For
a court
haslong
broad
essential
to its
judicial
function.
Judge
Abano
onlycomes
wanted
tothe
make
when
the
proper
time
for
court
to that
order
the
sureties
to
produce
the
person
of sure
defendant,
no
undue
delay
will be
incurred.
If bondsmen
reside
in
far
away
places,
even
if within
Philippines,
the
purpose
of
bail
may
be
frustrated.
There
is the
insufficiency
of the
mails
as
an the
effective
means
of
communication.
And
then,
there
is
the
problem
of
complying
with
the
constitutional
mandate
of
speedy
If notice to sureties is not served, no
trial
cantrial.
be had.
5be
Furthermore,
reading
of exacted
his
petition
fails
of an
averment
that
requisite
that
bondsmen
residents
ofthe
and
actually
staying
in Marinduque
would
cause
him
prejudice.
3.
NO
Judge Abano - he relied on Circular 2, dated January 23,
1964, of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice,
addressed, among others, to Judges of First Instance.
That circular recites that it had been brought to the
attention of the Department of Justice that in certain
provinces, unscrupulous persons who are spurious
landowners, have been accepted as sureties. The
Secretary then suggested that it may be a good policy
not to accept as bail bonds real properties not covered
by certificate of title unless they have been declared
for taxation purposes in favor of the person offering
them as bond for at least five (5) years.
Its purpose is to prevent the commission of frauds in
connection with the posting of personal bail bonds and
to protect the interests of the Government. If the
bondsman is not the owner, bail fails of its purpose,
prejudice to the government sets in.
We note that the order of September 15, 1964 spoke of
properties in general. Failure of specificness on the part
of Judge Abana then could have been a case of
oversight. To obviate
accused, or of his
flight to avoid
punishment." Of
importance then
is the possible
penalty that may
be meted
5charged
Villasenor
with a
is
capital
offense,
direct
assault
upon
an
agent of a person in
authority
with
murder. A complex
crime, it may call for
the imposition of the
capital
22
PEOPLE v. ASUNCION
161 SCRA 490
Padilla, J; May 24, 1988
1
FACTS
Rolando
Abadina
(former
colonel
AFP) was
charged
before
the
with
the
offense
of of
Violation
of PD
1866
[Illegal
Possession
Firearms
and
Ammunitions]
The
2 RTC
information
read
that
he wilfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously
had
in of
possession
and
under
his from
custody
firearms
,the
ammunitions
and
magazines
without
first
securing
necessary
license
and/or
permit
the
lawful authority.
2the
Upon
Abanias
Judge
Asuncion
dismissed
Information
on motion,
the
ground
that
it did not
allege
sufficient
facts
to
constitute
an
offense,
since
the
possession
of loose
firearms
and
explosives
is
not
illegal
per se, aor
in view
of Executive
Order
No.
107
which
gives
holders
possessors
of unlicensed
firearms
and
ammunition
period
ofwithin
six
(6)
months
from
its
effectivity,
extended
to
31
December
1987
by
Executive
Order
No.
222,
which
to
surrender
the
same to or
the
proper
authorities,
without
incurring
any
criminal
liability
therefor,
except
if
the
unlicensed
firearm
ammunition
is
carried
outside
of
one's
residence,
not
for
the
purpose
of
surrendering
the
same,
or
used
in
the
commission
of
any
other
offense,
and there
is noammunition
allegation
inenumerated
said
information
that
the
firearms
and
therein
carried
outside
the
accused's
residence
or
used
inwere
the
commission
of some
other crime.
ISSUES
1.
2.
3.
HELD/RATIO:
1.
2Orders
It may
be
true
there
nothing
in Executive
Nos.
107
andthat
222firearms
that isexpressly
legalizes
the
unlicensed
possession
of
and
ammunition,
but
this
Court
had
2
context.
People
vs. Feliciano - SC
ruled that RA No.
482
legalized
mere unlicensed
possession
of
firearms
and
ammunition
for
the limited period
specified in said
law,
and
punished only (1)
the
use
of
unlicensed
firearm
or
ammunition,
or
(2) the carrying
of such firearm or
ammunition
on
the
person,
except
to
surrender them.
The Court said:
People
vs. Lopez - It will
be seen that sec
2 (of RA NO 4)
excluded
from
the operation of
sec 1 up to
August 31, 1946,
possession
of
firearms
and
ammunition
so
long as they were
not used for any
purpose
other
than self-defense
or carried for any
purpose
other
than
of
surrendering
them
to
the
proper
authorities. The
Government does
not dispute this
interpretation.
Although the law
does
not
categorically
state
that
criminal liability
was temporarily
lifted for mere
possession
of
filing
firegems
and ammunition,
that is the only
construction
compatible with
the spirit and
purposes of the
enactment
as
revealed by its
Feliciano
ruling
was
reiterated
in
People
vs.
Tabunares:
RA
No. 482, in effect
legalized
mere
unlicensed
on
within one year
from said date,
and
punished
only (1) the use
of
a
or
ammunition
or
(2) the carriage
thereof on the
person except for
purpose
of
surrender.
Appellant's
conviction cannot
stand, since it is
rested solely on
unlicensed
possession on or
about November
6, 1950.
2.
NO. It is necessary
for the prosecution
to allege in the
information
that
the firearms and
ammunition,
subject matter of
this
case,
were
brought out of the
residence of the
accused or were
conditions,
and
hence,
should
be
alleged and
proved.
used by him in the commission or another
1 offense
3information
v.charging
Austria
-illegal
inPeople
order
that
an
Prosecution
these
circumstances
are notof essential
possession
of
ingredients
of- the
crime
of illegal possession
firearms
firearm
and
and ammunition.
ammunition,
under
Republic
Act itNo.
482,
may
be
deemed
sufficient,
must
allege
that
the
2
accused
was
using
thehis person
firearm
or unlicensed
carrying
it
in
at was
the
People
v. of
Lopez
Under
RA No.
4,of the
usewas
or the
time
carrying
firearms
and/or
ammunition
an
apprehended
by
the
ingredient,
if not
the
sole
ingredient,
the offense;
i.e.
authoritieshewith
said
the
very acts
which
were
punished,
subject
to certain
23
People
v.have
Austria
- effect
thean
presentation
of evidence
cannot
the
of validating
amerely
void
information,
oritThe
proving
offense
which
does
not
legally exist.
was
notdoes
defective
butspeaking,
doesinformation
not
charge
any
offense
at not
all.
Technically
that
information
exist in contemplation
of
law.
The Court is not unaware that accuse- Abadilla,
rightly or wrongly, is identified with the violent arm
of the past regime. To many, he is regarded with
unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of that
regime. The Court, however, is not swayed by
appellations or approbriums.
firearm.
3.
NO.
The
information
is
fatally defective.
24
GARCIA v. CA
266 SCRA 678
Davide, Jr., J; January 27, 1997
his view that
the State is
the offended
party in
public
offenses.
1
FACTS
Jose Garcia charging
filed with
Pros.
Office
anDelia
Affidavit of
Complaint
histhe
wife,QC
Adela
Santos
alias
3
4
5
6
7
1-
Ass.
Pros.committed
Cabanilla
filed
withSantos
the
RTC
of Bigamy
QC an
information
charging
Adela
with
allegedly
as
follows
: in
the
above-named
accused,
being
previously
united
lawful
marriage
with
REYNALDO
QUIROCA,
and(or
without
the
said
marriage
having
been
dissolved,
before
the
absent
spouse
has
been
declared
presumptively
dead
by
a
judgment
rendered
in theunlawfully
proper
proceedings),
did
then
and
there
wilfully,
feloniously
contract
ahas
second
marriage
with
JOSE
G.and
GARCIA,
which
marriage
[sic]
discovered
in
1989,
to
the
damage
and
prejudice
of
the
said
offended
party
in
such
amount
as may be awarded under the provisions of the
Civil
Code.
Adela
Santos
filedoffense
a Motion
to Quash
alleging
prescription
of
the
ground.
that
by
admission
inashis
testimony
incontended
civil
and
in Garcias
hisearly
complaint
filed
with
theShe
Civil
Service
commission,
Garcia
discovered
the
commission
ofcase
the
offense
as
as
1974.
Since
the
penalty
prescribed
under
Art.
329
of
the
RPC
for
the
offense
of
bigamy
is
prision
mayor,
which
is
classified
as
an
afflictive
penalty
under
Art.
25
of
the
same
Code,
then
offense
Art.
92
of theshould
Code.prescribe in 15 years as provided in said
TC
granted
the
motion
to quash
and
dismissed
the
criminal
case.
The
complainant
having
discovered
first
marriage
of
accused
tohas
one
Reynaldo
Quiroca
in 1974
when
hethe
was
informed
of already
itin
by
one
Eugenia
Balingit,
the
offense
prescribed
when
the
information
was filed
this
case
on
November
15,
1991 charged
Garcia
moved
for reconsideration
arguing
that Adelas
many
trips
abroad
suspended
the
running
ofin the
prescriptive
period.
These
tripsCommissioner
were
enumerated
certification
issued
by
Ass.
Morals
of
BID.
TC disallowed
reconsideration
ofset
its itorder,
finding
no
urgent
or that
justifiable
aside.
The from
trial
court
held
trips
ofreason
are
notto
the
kind
of
absence
the
Philippines
which
will
interrupt
the
period
of
prescription
of the
offense
charged.
Garcia appealed to CA. He contended that:
(1)
1-
2-
3-
(2)
People
v.
Alagao - that
in
resolving
the motion to
quash
a
criminal
complaint or
information,
the
facts
alleged in the
complaint or
information
should
be
taken as they
are.
The
information
in this case
mentioned
that
the
bigamy was
discovered in
1989.
The
factual
bases of the
motion
to
quash,
viz.,
the
Garcias
testimony in
Civil
Case
and
his
complaint
filed with the
CSC are not
conclusive
because the
testimony is
hearsay
evidence,
hence
inadmissible,
while
the
complaint is
vague.
The
prescriptive
period
was
interrupted
several times
by
the
Adela's
numerous
trips abroad.
1-
Counsel
for
Adela
has
already
stated
that
he represent
only
Delia
Garcia
and
not
Adela
Santos.
Consequently
, her counsel
could not ask
for the quash
of
the
information
in favour of
Adela Santos
alias
Delia
Santos. The
counsel
should have
sought
a
dismissal of
the case in
favour
of
Delia Garcia
alone.
2discovered
CA
concluded
that
Garcia
Adelas
first
marriage
in
1974.
Since
the
information
was
filed
in
court
onyears
Jan.
8,
1992
or
18
after
the only
discovery
of
the
offence,
then
the
15-year
prescriptive
period
had
certainly
lapsed.
further
that
theIt quash
ofheld
an
information
based
on
prescription
of
the
offense
could
be
invoked
before
or
after
arraignment
and
eventhe
on criminal
appeal,
for
under
89(5)
of
RPC,
liability
ofextinguished
aArt.
person
is
totally
by
the
prescription
the crime, which is of
a
mode
of
extinguishing
criminal
liability.
Thus,
prescription
is
not
deemed
waived
even
if not pleaded
as a defese.
ISSUE
1.
2.
WON a Motion to
Quash
cannot
go
beyond
what
is
stated
in
the
information
3.
WON
the
factual
bases of the Motion
to Quash are not
conclusive.
4.
HELD/RATIO
1.
and
a private
crime.
In
both
cases
then,
the
discovery
may
be
by
the
offended
party,
the
authorities,
or
their
agents.
It isoftrue
Bigamy
is a publicbetween
offense. aHowever,
Art.
91
RPCthat
makes
no distinction
public crime
25
It
is
reasonable
to assume
thatpublic
the
offended
party
in
the
commission
a the
crime,
or private,
is
the
party
to whom
the
offender
iswhich
civilly
liable,
light
of
Art.
100 of
of
RPC,
expressly
provides
that
"every
person
criminally
liable
for in
a
felony
is the
alsooffender
civilly
liable."
private
individual
to
whom
is civillyThe
liable
is the
offended
party.
1
2. NO
2
3
Even
People
v. 2,
Alagao,
which
he5 cites,
mentions
the
exceptions
to
the Sec.
rule
provided
par.
(f)
and
(h)
of(a)
Sec.
and
4as
and
of exception
thein
old
Rule
117
viz.,jeopardy.
extinction
of criminal
liability,
and
(b)
double
His
claim
that
the
of
extinction
can
no
longer
be
raised
due
to
the
implied
repeal
of
the
former
Section
4,
Rule
117
of
the
Rules
of
Court
occasioned
byof its
nonreproduction
after
its revision,
is equally
without
merit.
No
repeal,
express
or
implied,
the
said
Section
4
ever
took
place.
While
there
is
no
provision
inliability,
newSection
Rule
117
that prescribes
the
contents
of
athe
motion
to
quash
based
on
extinction
of
25 thereof
encapsulizes
thecriminal
former
Sections
3,4,
and
of
the old
Rule
117.
Sec.
2,counsel.
Rule
117
Form
and signed
contents.
The
motion
to
quash
shall
be
in
writing
by -the
or
his
It -shall
specify
distinctly
theaccused
factual
and
legal
grounds
therefor
the
court
shall
consider
no
grounds
other and
than
those
stated
therein,
except
lack of
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged.
Sec. 12,
Rule 110
as
"the
person
against
whom
or
against
whose
property,
the
offense
was
committed."
2define
Art. 91
does term
not
the
offended
party.
We
find
its definition
in
4.
1NO
Weabroad
agree with
the
of Appeals
that
these
trips
didArticle
not Court
constitute
the Philippines.
"absence"
contemplated
in
91.
These
were
brief,
and
in every case
Adela
returned
totrips
the
Besides,
were
made
long
after
the
Garcia
discovered
the offense
and
even
ifconsidered,
the
aggregate
number
ofthese
days
of was
these
trips
are
still
the information
filed
well
beyond
the
prescriptive
period.
It
is clear
from this
Section
that
a motion
to double
quash
may
be
based
onoffactual
and
legal
grounds,
and
since
extinction
criminal
liability
and
jeopardy
retained
as that
among
the new
grounds
for
a
motion
toare
quash
in
Section
3 of
the
Rule
117,
it
necessarily
follows
facts
outside
the
information
itself
may
be
introduced
to
prove
such
grounds.
As
a
matter
of
fact,
inquiry
into
such
facts
may
be
allowed
where
the
ground
invoked
is
that
the
allegations
in
the
information
do
not
constitute
the offense charged.
4People
As v.
a
general
proposition
thetoinformation
court held
in
De
lathe
Rosa
that a charged,
motion
on the
ground
that
the
allegations
of the
do
not
constitute
offense
orquash
any offense
for
that
should
be
resolved
on
the
basis
alone
ofv.matter,
said
allegations
whose
truth
and
veracity
are
hypothetically
admitted.
However,
as
held
in
People
Navarro,
additional
facts
not
alleged
the
information,
admitted
denied
by the
prosecution
maybut
be
invokedor
innot
support
of
motion
to quash.
3.
1NO
Garcia
cannot
be allowed
disown
statements
he
made
under
oath
and intoopen
when
it
serves
his
purpose.
Besides,
he court
never
denied
having
given
the
pertinent
testimony.
He
did,
however,
term
it marriage
vague
in which
that
itEugenia
was
whether respondent
the
Balingit
disclosed
totoprior
him
was
that
entered
intonot
byclear
the
private
with
Reynaldo
Quiroca.
is
immaterial
whom
the
private
respondent
was
first
married;
is
relevant
case
is It
that
the petitioner
was
informed
ofin athis
prior
marriage
contracted
by what
the
private
respondent.
26
1
FACTS
Petitioners
Angelina
Lopez, Aurora
(heirs
of Sps.
Manuel
Mejia
Gloria
Lazatin)
RoySps.)
Villasor
(administrator
ofand
the intestate
estate Villasor
of and
the said
Petitioners,
together
with with
the other
heirs
of Sps.
Mejia,
entered
contract
Trinidad
Lazatin
for
the
development
and
subdivision
of
3
parcels
of
land
belong under
tointo
saidathe
intestate
estate.
Lazatin
transferred
his
rights
contract
to the
Terra
Development
Corporation.
3action
Months later,
in CFI QC
3.
filed
an
opposition
thereto.
City
Judge
denied
municipal
courts
saiddefendants
motion to quash
and5 reset
arraignment
of all
the
on March
of thethe
same
year.
have
jurisdiction
only
over
criminal
offenses
committed
within
their
respective
territorial
jurisdiction.
9prohibition.
Petitioners
ISSUE
that
the committed
act
of
falsification
charged
was
outside the
jurisdiction
of
Angeles
City.territorial
2.
2case,
theportion
present
the
of
the Inrecord
ofwhich
the
reinvestigation
was submitted
to the
respondent
judge
for
consideration
in
connection
with
the
resolution
ofbeyond
motion
tothat
quash
shows
questioncharged
the
offense
was
committed
far
beyond
jurisdiction
of
Angeles the
City.territorial
3.
YES
Petitioners
are
not
charged
having
used
awith
falsified
document,
in
violation
of
last
paragraph
of the
Art. The
172
of
the
RPC.
charge
against
them isfalsified
that of
having
a
private.
1.
2.
As
a of
general
rule,toaannul
court
of equity
will
not
issue
a
writ
certiorari
an
order
of
a lower
court
denying
motion
to
quash,
noritfrom
issue
a the
writ
of
prohibition
to
prevent
said
court
proceeding
with
the acase
after
such
denial,
being
rule
that
upon
such
denial
the
defendant
should
enter
his
plea
of
not
guilty
and
go
to
trial
and,
if
convicted,
raise
on
appeal
the
same
legal
questions
his
motion
to quash.
as
wellthe
as covered
in other
jurisdictions
however,
thisInisthis
no
longer
hard
andby
fast
rule.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimate
analysis, intended to annul void proceedings; to
prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice.
28
UY v. CA
276 SCRA 371
Bellosillo, J; Jan. 28, 1997
Whether the RTC of
Manila acquired
FACTS
Company owned by the husband of Consolacion
jurisdiction over the
Leong. During Rosas employment, she was regarded violations of the
Bouncing Checks Law
by the
Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. A
NO
few months before she was to give birth, Rosa HELD/RATIO:
1acquired
It
isrule
a
fundamental
for
jurisdiction
tothat
be
by
courts
in
criminal
cases
the
resigned. She helped her husband manage their
offense
should
have
been
committed
or
any
one
of
its
essential
ingredients
took
place
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction
lumber business. The friendly relations between Rosa
of
the jurisdiction
court.
Territorial
in criminal
cases
is
territory
where
the
courtor
has
jurisdiction
to
take
and Consolacion continued. The two later agreed to
cognizance
to
try
the
offensetherein
allegedly
committed
by
the
accused.
Furthermore,
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court
form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute
over
criminal
case
isthe
determined
by thecomplaint
allegations
in
the
or
information.
And
once
itcognizance
ismay
so shown,
additional capital for the expansion of Rosas lumber
the
validly
takecourt
of
case.
However,
if
the
evidence
adduced
during
trial
show
that
the
business and the latter as industrial partner. Various
offense
was
committed
somewhere
else,
the
court
should
dismiss
the
action
for
want
of
jurisdiction.
sums of money amounting to P500k were claimed to
have given by Consolacion for the business; however
because of the trust they had for each other, no receipt The crime of estafa and
was ever issued.Thereafter a lumber store with the violation of B.P. Blg.
warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with22 have to be treated as
1
offenses
the funds contributed by Consolacion evidenced by separate
The
of of
estafa
and crimes
violation
the
Bouncing
Law
are
2 Checks
different
offenses
having
various receipts. But, unfortunately, the friendship
different
elements
and,
necessarily,
for
a
court
to
acquire
jurisdiction
each
of
the
essential
ingredients
of
each
between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the
crime has to be
satisfied.
partnership documents were never processed. As a 2
In
the are
crime
of
estafa,
deceit
and
result, Consolacion asked for the return of her
damage
essential
elements
the
offense
and of
havewith
to
be
established
satisfactory
proof
to
warrant
conviction.
investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the
For
violation
of
the
Bouncing
Checks
Law,
the
elements
of
deceit
and
damage
are
neither
essential
purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
nor required.
Rather,
the
elements
of and
B.P.
Blg.
22 drawing
areof(a)
the
making,
issuance
any
check
to
apply
to
account
or knows
for
value;
(b)
maker,
drawer
2
or
issuer
at
the the
time
issuance
that
he ofdoes
not
Consolacion
a complaint
for
estafa
for violation of
have
sufficient
funds
the Bouncingfiled
Checks
Law before
the
RTC ofand
Manila.
in
or
credit
with
the
drawee
bank
for
the
payment
such
check
in check
fullofupon
its
presentment;
and,
(c)
3
the
is
subsequently
dishonored
by funds
the
drawee
bank
for
Dec. The
10 offenses
for
anviolation
Information
for 22
and
several
other
insufficiency
of
informations
of
BP
blg.
were
filed
against
or
credit
or
would
Rosa.
were
subsequently
consolidated
and
have
been
tried jointly.
dishonored
for
the
samedrawer,
reason had
not
the
without
valid
reason,
the bank
toordered
stop
payment.
under BP Blg. 22.
Rosa a- evidence
trial
court
never
over
the
offenses
under
B.P.
Blg.
22.of
None
of
the
essential
elements
constitutive
of acquired
violation
of
B.P.
Blg.
22
was
shown
to
have
been
committed
injurisdiction
the
City
of
Manila.
The
presented
established
that
(a)
complainant
was
a resident
Makati;
(b)
petitioner
was
resident
of
Caloocan
City;
(c)
place
of
business
of
alleged
partnership
was
in
Malabon;
(d)
the
drawee
bank
was
located
inlocated
Malabon;
and,
(5) the checks were all deposited for collection in
Makati.
Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said
evidence would only show that none of the essential
elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila
1evidence
Peoplethat
was
(1)
Even
if there
is no what
showing
of any
the
essential
took
place
or
committed
iningredients
Manila,
is critical
is
the offense
fact that
the
court
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
estafa
case
because
the incidental
same
is the
or case.
main
case
and
that
themerely
cases
for
violations
of
the
Bouncing
Checks
are
to principal
the
estafa
(2)Knowledge
on
the
part
of the
maker
or is
drawer
of the
check
ofLaw
the
insufficiency
his
by
itself
a
continuing
eventuality
whether
thefunds
accused
besome
within
one
territory
or
another
(3)of
respondent
relies
on
the
doctrine
of
jurisdiction
by
estoppelit
took
5
years
of
trial
before
petitioner
raised
the
issue
of
jurisdiction.
ISSUES
1
Doctrine of Estoppel not applicable
Sec.
3,
Rule
117provides
that
the
accused
may
move
to
quash
the
complaint
or
information
on
any
of
the
following
grounds:
(b)
that
the
court
trying
the
case
hasover
no
jurisdiction
the
offense
charged
or
the
person
of
accused.
Moreover,
under
Sec.
8, he
Rule
113over
itto
is the
provided
that
the
failure
of
the
accused
to
assert
any
ground
of
a
motion
to
quash
before
pleads
the
complaint
or
information,
either
because
he
did
not infile
a
motion
to
quash
or failed
allege
the
same
said
motion,
shall
be deemed
atowaiver
of
the
of
a
motion
to
quash,
except
grounds
ofprovided
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged
asgrounds
for
in par. b
Sec.
3,
Rule
117.the
2court
Rosa
timely
questioned
the jurisdiction
of Trial
the
in afails
memorandum
before
the
Regional
Court
and
thereafter
succeeding
pleadings.
if
a party
to file ainmotion
to quash,
he mayEven
still
question
jurisdiction
court
laterstage
on.
Moreover,
these
objections
may
be
raised
or
consideredthe
motu
propio
byofthethe
court
at any
29
or
knowledge
of
insufficiency of funds
occurred in Manila,
which are essential
elements necessary
for the Manila Court
to acquire jurisdiction
over the offense.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
a continuing offense
however
1transitory
ItB.P.
may
true
that
Blg.be
22
is or
a
continuing
offense
and
such
the
case
thea being
theory
is
that
person
indicted
with
a
transitory
offense
may
be the
validly
tried
in
any
jurisdiction
where
offense
was
in
part
committed.
However
that
knowledge
by
the
maker
or
drawer
of the fact
The
records dealings
clearly
indicate
that
business
were conducted
in
a
restaurant
ingiven
Manila
where
sums
of
money
were
to
Rosar;
hence,
the
acquisition
of
jurisdiction
by
the
lower court
over The
estafa
case.
various
charges
for
violation
of are
B.P. on
Blg.
22
however
a
different
plain.
There
is
no
scintilla
of
evidence to show
that
jurisdiction
over the violation
of B.P. Bldg. 22 had
been acquired. No
proof
has
been
offered
that
the
checks were issued,
delivered, dishonored
of the proceedings or on appeal.
4
30
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO
279 SCRA 393
Panganiban, J
preliminary
investigation from
1
FACTS
receipt of the copy of
T/Sgt.
Sanchez,
PC
Investigator
filed
a
complaint
for
qualified
theft
directly
with
the
RTC
of
Naga
City
against
minor Carlos Barbosa.
1 the Order.
2
Prov.
Pros.
a
motion
to issued
setfiled
aside
the
orders
by
PAO,
as counsel
for
Barbosa,
filed
aSgt.
Motion
Quash
the
Judge
Navarro
stating
Complaint
onfilethe
ground or
that
Sanchez
is not
(1)
that
she has
no
authorized
to
a complaint
information
intoCourt.
authority
to
designate
a
particular
prosecutor
to
handle
the
case;
3
(2)
that
thewithout
court
will
be
acting
or
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
should
it
Judge
Manio,
Jr.,
as
presiding
judge
of
RTC
and
the
pairing
judge
of
Judge
Navarro,
issued
an
order
insists
on
Pros.
remanding
case for preliminary
investigation
and
Llaguno
to
conduct
assigned
thethe
adjudication
to Prosecutor
Cajot.
the
preliminary
investigation;
and (3)
that
thecase
record
of
said
be
4
forwarded
to
the
Prov.
Pros.
Office
for
it
conduct
the
preliminary
Before
Pros.
Cajot
could
conduct
required
preliminary
investigation,
Sgt.
filedOffice.
athe
motion
to withdraw
the
investigation.
A
complaint
with
the Sanchez
Prosecution
Supplemental
Motion
to
withdraw
the
was
also
filed
so case
that
the
same
may
not
5
remain
pending
with
the
court
while
the
case
is
under
preliminary
Pros.
issued
an release
order to
and
approved
bycomplaint
the Prov.
investigation.
Pros.,
granting
the
withdraw
the
and Cajot
ordering
the
of
accused
from
detention.
A copy
of motion
said order
wasthe
furnished
the RTC.
2
6
Judge
Navarro
denied
both
motions
on
grounds
that:
(1)
the
case
of
Abugotal
v.
Tiro
which
prohibits
the
courts
from
appointing
a
particular
fiscal
to
conduct
the
required
preliminary
investigation,
iswhile
not
in
point
as
the
said
Judge
Navarro
ordered
the Prov.
Pros. Cajot
to
case
refers
to
reinvestigation
the
instant
case
refers
toare
preliminary
explain
why
encroached
onPros.
the and
jurisdiction
of the
investigation;
and
(2)
court
is
apprehensive
that
if
the
Motion
to
Amend
court over
thethey
case.
Orders
granted,
there
is
nothing
that
will
the
Prov.
Pros.
from
implementing
the
orders
issued
by
Pros.
Cajotprevent
and
the
latter
will
just
act
in
conformity
with
his
previous
action.
7
3
Pros.
Cajot explained
asserting
the court
jurisdiction
of the
prosecutors
office
in
the conduct
ofOffice
preliminary
Prov.
Pros. was denied.
motion
investigation
and
that
when
the
ordered
the
reconsideration
records
ofdivested
case
be
remanded
to theand
of the
Prosecutor
to
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation,
the
court
itself
of
its
control
jurisdiction
over the case.
8
9
Judge
issued
an order
setting
aside
order
of
Pros.Navarro
Cajot
Ass.
Llaguno,
who
was
appearing
in and
herordered
sala,
to Pros.
conduct
the the
required
preliminary
investigation.
4petition
Petitioner
filed the
the
seeking
annulment
of
the
assailed
order
of Judge
Navarro.
preliminary
investigation,
Judge
Navarro
clearly
encroached
on
an
executive
function.
Preliminary
investigation
is an
executive,
not
a
judicial,
function.
As
thedirect
officer
authorized
to
and
control
the
prosecution
of all
criminal
actions,
a
prosecutor
is
primarily
responsible
for
ascertaining
whether ground
there
is
sufficient
to
engender
a been
wellfounded
belief
that
an
offense
has
committed
and guilty
that
the
accused
is
probably
thereof.
An
RTC judge
has no
authority
to
conduct
a
preliminary
investigation.
This
means
that
he
cannot
directly
order
an
assistant
prosecutor,
particularly
over
the
objections
of
the
latters
superiors,
to
conduct
a
preliminary
investigation.
To
allow
him toindo
sothe
is
to
authorize
him
to
meddle
executive
and
administrative
functions
of
the
provincial
or
city
prosecutor.
There
is
a
hierarchy
ofexecutive
officials
in
the
prosecutory
arm
ofSecretary
the
branch
headed
by
the
of
Justice
and
his
team
of prosecutors.
Mere
suspicion
or officials
belief
that
the
will
notissaid
adequately
perform
their
official
duties
no judges
reason
for
the
interference
in
or
disregard
of
such
hierarchy.
4Decree
AbugotalPresidential
v.
Under
77,Tirothe
authority No.
to conduct
the
preliminary
investigation of the
Pros. Llaguno
a order
motionmight
for the
reconsideration
taking
exception
to file
the
on
that
any
resolution
she
may
issue
runground
counter
with
theISSUE May a regional
previous
of her
and
thus
render
policies
disorganized,
procedures
disorderly
and
chaotic, order
resulting
tosuperiors
the
embarrassment
ofoffice
the trial court judge name or
administration
of Justice.
10
designate a particular
Pros.
Cajot
filed
anot
motion
fororder
reconsideration
alleging:
(a)
that granting
he
issue
an
of withdraw.
dismissal
but
anthe
order
the
motion
toto
Therefore,
there
is did
no
more
complaint
speakand
of assistant prosecutor to
before
court;
(b)
the
prosecutor,
in conducting
the
preliminary
investigation,
has
the
exclusive
power
authority
to
dismiss
the
complaint
immediately
if
he
finds
grounds
continue
the(c)
inquiry,
otherwise
files
thetoInformation
ifwith
he finds
cause
to conduct the preliminary
hold no
thehe
respondent
trial;
the
finding/recommendation
offor
the
investigating
prosecutor
is subject
to review
only
by the
Pros
and
thefor
action
of
the remanded
latter,
by
the
Secretary
of
Justice;
(d)
when
the
Court
the
case
to Prov.
the
Pros.
Office
the (e)
required
preliminary
investigation;
the investigation of the case?
Court
divested
itself
of
its
control
and
jurisdiction
over
the
case;
and
the
filing
of
information
is
within
the
discretionary authority of the fiscal.
1
11reconsideration
Judge comply
Navarro
denied
both
motions
for HELD/RATIO:
NO
and
reiterated
itsofprevious
order
to Pros.
Llaguno
with
the
order
the court,
granting
her
15
days to conduct
the
In setting aside
2
3
It
isdismiss
true
that
after
arule
case
has
already
been
filed
in
court
and
the
court
thereby
acquires
jurisdiction
over
it,
fiscals
as
acase
are
divested
of
the
power
to
a
criminal
action
without
the
consent
of
the
court.
In
the
at
bench,
the
RTC
had
not
yet
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
complaint
filed
directly
before
it
by
Sgt.
Sanchez
who
was
not
aby
prosecutor.
Neither
was
he
authorized
thehowever,
Provincial
Prosecutor
to
file
such
case
directly
with
respondent
court.
We are not persuaded by Judge Navarros contention that
31
the
order ofgranted
Pros.
which
withdrawal
of Cajot
the
complaint,
and
subsequently
ordering to required
Pros.
Llaguno
conduct
the
objective, that is, to determine
whether there exists
sufficient ground to engender a
well founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
DISPOSITION the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Orders of
Respondent Judge Gloriosa S. Navarro
are SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
32
Offensesof
resulting
from
violations
this
Act after
shall
prescribe
one
year
their
commission.
Facts:
2alleging
May
Meaning, there is
2, 1922
accused filed a special motion, by the accused as to the
that the crime
5 has prescribed under the
provision of Section 71 of Act 3030 (enacted March
9, 1922), thus praying for absolution
prescription of the crime,
Therefore,
as
on
March 9th of this
year, 1922, when Act
No. 3030 went into
effect, providing in its
section
71
that
offense
resulting
from the violations
thereof
shall
prescribe one year
after
their
commission,
the
accused
and
the
Attorney-General had
already filed their
respective briefs in
this court for the
prosecution of the
appeal taken from
the judgment of the
court below, and the
hearing of the case
had already been
held, this court itself,
without the necessity
of any motion of the
accused, or of the
Attorney-General,
should have declared
the crime in question
to have prescribed, in
view of the provision
of
said
section.
Consequently, as this
court had not up to
that time made such
pronouncement, the
accused are perfectly
justified in asking, as
they have done in
their motion of May
2d of this year, that
the offense having
prescribed, they be
absolved from the
complaint. This duty
is imperative upon
the courts of justice
at any moment that
the offense appears
to have prescribed
under the provision
of the law. With
particular reference
to the present case,
this
conclusion
is
necessarily reached
from the letter as
well as the spirit of
the provisions of the
Penal Code relative to
prescription,
and
15
33
applicable to special
laws.
15
It cannot be
maintained
that said article
22 of the Penal
Code
refers
only
to
penalties and is
not applicable
to appeals and
proceedings,
because
the
prescription of
the
crime
is
intimately
connected with
that
of
the
penalty, for the
length of time
fixed by the
law
for
the
prescription
depends upon
the gravity of
the offense, as
may
be
seen
from Title VI of
Book I of the
Penal
Code,
containing, as its
heading
indicates,
"General
Provisions
Regarding
Felonies
and
Misdemeanors,
the
Persons
Liable and the
Penalties,"
without
distinguishing
between
the
penalties and the
decision absolving a
defendant because of
prescription. (US v.
Rama)
fixes the time within which such
action must necessarily be
commenced in order that the
prosecution may be legal and
the proper penalty may lawfully
be imposed. but however said
provision may be considered,
the
same
must
have
a
retroactive effect, as will be
seen later on.
34
Facts:
1.
By the dismissal of the case by the court below upon shall be a bar to another
motion of the defendant, the latter has not been in
prosecution
for
the
jeopardy
offense charged, or for
8
But when the case id dismissed with the charged in the complaint
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the or information.
same offense; because, his action in having the
case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional rights or privilege, for the reason
that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding
to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment
of conviction against him.
2.
jurisdiction,
upon
valid
complaint
or
Besides,
under section 2,
Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court
the prosecution
may
appeal
because
the
defendant would
not be placed in
double jeopardy,
not only when
the
defendant
has not yet been
placed
in
jeopardy in the
court below, but
also
when,
although
a
defendant
had
already been in
former jeopardy,
the appeal by the
prosecution
would no place
him in danger
again of being
convicted by the
appellate
court
by
the
same
offense, because
the question for
the
appellate
court to decide is
not the guilt or
innocence of the
defendant.
o For example,
when after a
judgment of
conviction
rendered by
the
lower
court
had
become final
the
court
reconsiders
its
decision
and renders
another
acquitting the
defendant, in
which
the
question
raised in the
appeal is not
the guilt or
innocence of
the appellee,
but
the
jurisdiction of
the court to
render
the
second
3.
35
offense.
Assuming
, arguendo, that
the
defendant
had been already
in jeopardy in the
court below and
that
appeal
would put him in
double jeopardy,
it is well settled
in this jurisdiction
that the right of
the
defendant
not to be put
twice in jeopardy
is
deemed
waived if not set
up in time as a
defense
or
ground
for
a
motion
to
dismiss. As the
defendant
has
not set up said
right or objected
on that ground to
36
shows;
partnership
or
Facts:
association, the liability
1and 2Roberto
informations were filed against Agapito Gonzalesshall devolve upon the
Pangilinan: the first
for violation of Section
president,
manager,
9
10
nd
7 , in relation to Section 11 11, of RA 3060, the 2 for
administrator,
or
any
violation of Art 201(3) of RPC
2 Judge, upon motion ofnd accused to quash office thereof responsible
information, dismissed the 2
information on thefor the violation.
ground of double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the 2 information causes double
11
Those
who
in
jeopardy. Peoples contention: The accused could
theaters,
fairs,
not invoke the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy, when there had been no
cinematographs, or any
conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of
criminal proceedings in another case for the
other place open to
1
or
immoral
The
two
(2)
informations
with
which the accused
was charged, do not
make out only one
offense, contrary to
private respondent's
allegations. In other
words, the offense
defined in section 7
of Rep. Act No. 3060
punishing
the
exhibition of motion
pictures
not
duly
passed by the Board
of Censors for Motion
Pictures
does
not
include or is not
included
in
the
offense defined in
Article 201 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code
punishing
the
exhibition of indecent
and immoral motion
pictures. The two
(2) offenses do not
constitute
a
jeopardy to each
other.
o the elements of
the
two
(2)
offenses
are
different.
The
gravamen of the
offense defined in
Rep. Act No. 3060
is
the
public
exhibition of any
motion
picture
which has not
been previously
passed by the
distinct
and
unrelated
provisions of law,
and
if
one
provision requires
proof
of
an
additional fact or
element which the
other does not, an
acquittal
or
conviction
or
a
dismissal of the
information under
one does not bar
prosecution under
the other. (People
v. Bacolod, 89 Phil.
621;
People
v.
Alvarez, 45 Phil.
24).
Phrased
elsewhere, where
two different laws
(or articles of the
same code) define
two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one
of
them
is
no
obstacle
to
a
prosecution of the
other,
although
both offenses arise
from
the
same
facts, if each crime
involves
some
important
act
which is not an
essential element
of
the
other.
(People v. Alvarez,
45 Phil. 472).
37
People v. Pineda
February 16, 1993
Melo, J.
Facts:
1.
for
the
same
criminal act, a
circumstance
recognized under
Section 2(h) Rule
117 of the Old
Rules
as
suggested in the
motion to quash,
because
this
plea
is
understood to
presuppose
that the other
case
against
private
respondent has
been
dismissed
or
otherwise
terminated
without
her
express
consent, by a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction,
upon a valid
complaint
or
information,
and after the
defendant had
pleaded to the
charge
(People of the
Philippines
versus
Hon.
Maximiano
C.
Asuncion, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 8383742,
April
22,
1992; Section 7,
Rule 117, 1985
Rules on Criminal
Procedure,
as
amended). In the
Asuncion
case,
Justice
Nocon
said that:
.
.
.
according
to a long
line
of
cases, in
order
that
a
defendan
t
may
successfu
lly allege
former
jeopardy,
it
is
necessar
y that he
had
previousl
y
been
(1)
convicted
or
(2)
acquitted
, or (3) in
jeopardy
of being
convicted
of
the
offense
charged,
that
is,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
2.
case
was
dismissed
or
otherwise
terminated
without
the
express consent
of the accused
(People
vs.
Declaro, G.R. No.
64362, February
9,
1989,
170
SCRA 142; See
also People vs.
Santiago,
174
SCRA 143; People
vs. Gines, G.R.
No. 83463, May
27, 1991, 197
SCRA 481; Que
vs. Cosico, 177
SCRA 410 [1989];
Caes
vs.
Intermediate
Appellate Court,
179 SCRA 54;
Lamera vs. Court
of Appeals, 198
SCRA
186
[1991]). (Herrera,
Remedial
Law,
1992 Ed., Volume
4, p. 417).
Citing cases, both old
and of recent vintage,
Justice Herrera continues
to submit the idea that:
The first jeopardy is
said to have validly
terminated
upon
conviction, acquittal
or dismissal of the
case or otherwise
terminated
without
the express consent
of defendant (People
vs. Garcia, 30 SCRA
150;
People
vs.
Ledesma, 73 SCRA
77; People vs. Pilpa,
79
SCRA
81;
Buscayno vs. Military
39
Facts:
2prosecution
After arraignment (on which Caballas pled not guilty),
motioned to amend the information from
3
The proceedings
in
the
case,
however,
may
not
be
considered
to
have
been
rendered useless
because by it
more than by a
mere preliminary
investigation, the
court has arrived
at
a
better
supported finding
that the proper
complaint should
have been for
frustrated
murder; that the
crime
of
frustrated
murder has been
committed
and
that
there
is
reason to believe
that the accused
Edgardo Caballas
might have been
the one who had
committed
the
same.
IN VIEW OF ALL
THE
FOREGOING,
this
case
is
hereby
dismissed
to
give way to the
filing
of
a
complaint
for
frustrated
murder.
Since
the proceedings
from
the
preliminary
examination up
to the conclusion
of the trial hereof
has amounted to
a
compliance
with
the
requirements of
a
preliminary
investigation first
and
second
stage, let the
records hereof be
forwarded to the
Court
of
First
Instance
at
Calauag, Quezon,
to reinstating it
before the order
become final or
to
the
subsequent filing
of
a
new
information
for
the
same
offense.
(Page
454.)
2
1
40
The
Jaca
ruling
was
reiterated
in
People
vs.
Manlapas et al.,
L-17993, August
24, 1962, 5 SCRA
883,
887;
Republic
vs.
Agoncillo, et al.,
L-27257, August
31,
1971,
40
SCRA 579, 587;
and People vs.
Hon. Surtida, et
al.,
L-24420,
January 26, 1972,
43 SCRA 29, 37.
Moreover,
as
stated
in
the
aforementioned
case of Republic
vs. Agoncillo, et
al.
(supra,
p.
588):
...
the
authoritative
pronouncement
in the ... case of
People
vs.
Obsania
(L24447, June 29,
1968, 23 SCRA
1249),
with
Justice Castro as
ponente,
had
made
clear
beyond
doubt
that
authority
and, therefore,
null
and
void,
the
proceedings
before
the
Municipal Court have not
been lawfully terminated,
Accordingly, there is no
second proceeding to speak
of and no double jeopardy. A
continuation
of
the
proceedings
against
the
accused for serious physical
injuries is in order.
41
Esmea v. Pogoy
February 20, 1981
Aquino, J.
notified
Arraigned
Facts:
on
1 A grave coercion case was filed agains Esmea, et. 01.23.79
al. for having allegedly forced Rev.Fr. Thomas Tibudan NO TRIAL priest absent
to withdraw P5,000 because the priest lost it in a game BEST REASON OF ALL:
of cards.
FISCAL LOST RECORD
2 Because of many different reasons12, the hearingOF CASE
was reset many times, until the respondent judge *applause
(siguro napikon) issued an order setting the trial for* -the last time on
hearing
August 16, 1973
on
3 However, on said date, priest was allegedly sick,06.19.79
and again motioned to reset the date. Counsel formoved
accused opposed and invoked the right of theagain.
<kaya
accused to have a speedy trial
ayun,
4 Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the casenapikon
as to the four accused who were present because it na si
"has been dragging all along and the accused are judge.>
ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with
his witness. The court noted that there was no medical
certificate indicating that the complainant was really
sick.
15
It is the practice
of some judges
before issuing an
order
of
provisional
dismissal in a
case wherein the
accused
had
already
been
arraigned
to
require
the
accused and his
counsel to sign
the minutes of
the session or
any
available
part of the record
to
show
the
conformity of the
accused or his
lack of objection
to the provisional
dismissal.
15
The
judge
specifies in the
order
of
provisional
dismissal that the
accused and his
counsel signified
their
assent
thereto.
That
procedure leaves
no
room
for
doubt as to the
consent of the
accused
and
precludes
jeopardy
from
attaching to the
dismissal.
Issue: W/N the revival of the case would place the accused
in double jeopardy
Held/Ratio: YES.
12
The
petitioners
were insisting on a
trial. They relied on
their
constitutional
right
to
have
a
speedy
trial.
The
fiscal was not ready
because his witness
The dismissal of
a criminal case upon
motion
of
the
accused because the
prosecution was not
prepared
for
trial
since
the
complainant and his
witnesses did not
appear at the trial is
a
dismissal
equivalent
to
an
acquittal that would
bar
further
prosecution of the
defendant for the
same
offense
(Salcedo
vs.
Mendoza,
L-49375,
February 28, 1979,
88
SCRA
811;
Lagunilia vs. Hon.
Reyes,
etc.
and
Motas, 111 Phil. 1020
citing
People
vs.
Tacneng, 105 Phil.
1298 and People vs.
Robles,
105
Phil.
1016. See Taladua vs.
Ochotorena, L-25595,
February 15, 1974,
55
SCRA
528;
Acebedo
vs.
Sarmiento, L-28025,
December 16, 1970,
36 SCRA 247; Baesa
vs. Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Sur, L30363, January 30,
1971, 37 SCRA 437;
People vs. Cloribel,
120 Phil. 775; People
vs. Abao 97 Phil. 28;
People vs. Labatete,
107 Phil. 697)
42
People v. Villalon
December 21, 1990
Regalado, J.
Facts:
43
2.
3.
Wrong
st
rd
44
st
or
additional
offense.
Had
these
new
informations
not been filed,
there
would
obviously have
been no cause
for the instant
petition.
Accordingly,
their complaint
about
the
supposed
procedural
lapses involved
in the motion to
dismiss
filed
and granted in
Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to
3644-M-93 does
not impress us as
a candid
presentation of
their real position.
2.
the absence of
notice
and
hearing does not
divest a trial court
of authority to
pass
on
the
merits
of
the
motion. It is only
an
irregularity.Beside
s,
when
petitioners were
given by Judge
Villajuan
the
opportunity to file
a
motion
for
reconsideration,
even
assuming
the
alleged
procedural
infirmity in his
issuance of the
order of dismissal,
the same was
thereby deemed
cured.
3.
4.
2nd?
Corollary issues:
1.
2. Whether
3. Whether
4.
1.
double
original information.
offense
is not Petition dismissed.
in the
45
he
had
no
objection to the
dismissal of the
case
was
equivalent to a
declaration
of
conformity to its
dismissal or to an
express
consent
to its termination
within
the
meaning
of
section 9 of Rule
117. He could not
thereafter revoke
that
conformity
since the court
had already acted
upon
it
by
dismissing
the
case.
He
was
bound
by
his
counsel's assent
to the dismissal
Later,
the
cases were revived.
The
accused
contended that the
revival of the cases
would place her in
double
jeopardy.
That contention was
rejected
because
the
provisional
dismissal did not
place
the
in
jeopardy. There was
no jeopardy in such
dismissal
because
the
words
"No
objection" conveyed
the Idea of full
concurrence
with
the dismissal and
was equivalent to
saying "I agree."
46
proceedings,
the
assistant
provincial
fiscal
filed
an
information for rape against the
accused,
embodying
the
allegations
of
the
above
complaint, with an additional
averment that the offense was
committed "with lewd designs".
People v. Obsania
Petition Granted,
assailed order
set aside.
47
48
double jeopardy
is available so
long as the acts
which constitute
or have given
rise to the first
offense under a
municipal
ordinance are the
same acts which
constitute
or
have given rise to
the
offense
charged under a
statute.
It
is
perhaps
important to note
that
the
rule
limiting
the
constitutional
protection
against
double
jeopardy
to
a
subsequent
prosecution
for
the same offense
is not to be
understood with
absolute
literalness.
The
Identity
of
offenses
that
must be shown
need
not
be
absolute Identity:
the
first
and
second offenses
may be regarded
as
the
"same
offense"
where
the
second
offense
necessarily
includes the first
offense
or
is
necessarily
included in such
first offense or
where the second
offense
is
an
attempt
to
commit the first
or a frustration
thereof. 14 Thus,
for
the
constitutional
plea of double
jeopardy to be
available, not all
the
technical
elements
constituting the
first offense need
be present in the
technical
definition of the
second offense.
The
law
here
seeks to prevent
harrassment
of
an
accused
person
by
multiple
prosecutions for
offenses
which
though different
from one another
are nonetheless
each constituted
by a common set
or
overlapping
sets of technical
elements.
Petition denied.
49
The defendants
wereofprosecuted
in the municipal court of
Manila
for the crime
malicious mischief.
After
presentation
of evidence
forthe
the
prosecution,
the
municipal
court
dismissed
case
on the
ground
that
the
prosecution
failed
to
prove
that
removal
or revenge.
destruction
the
property
in
question
had been
inspired
byof resentment,
rancor,
or
desires
for
Subsequently, the same fiscal who filed the
information
in
the
municipal
court,
filed
the
Counsel
for defendants
a motion
tojeopardy.
nullify the
second information
on the filed
grounds
of double
Contented
for the
the second
appellant
there
is no in
double
jeopardy
since
information
an
offense different
from
that
included
the
information
filed in the
municipal
court. charges
The
against
jeopardy
accused
againstdouble
the second
punishment
for the
same rule
act not
but
being
tried
for
theprotecting
same offense.
A brief formed
comparison
thefor
two
informations,
the act
act
complained
of in the
the of
case
coercion
is the same
which
basis
of
the information
for
malicious mischief.
The
rule
against
double
jeopardy
prohibits
prosecution
for several
the
same
offense
it seems
basic
that
an
accused
should
be
shielded
being
prosecuted
for
offenses
made
out
from
a
single
act.
Otherwise,
an
unlawful
actagainst
or
omission,
may
give
rise
to
several
prosecutions
depending
upon
the
ability
of
prosecuting
officer
to
imagine
as
many
offenses
as
can
be
justified
by
said
act
or
omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential
elements.
The case at bar is an occasion for reminding
prosecuting
officers
to
be
careful
and
comprehensive in criminal investigations with the
view to determining definitely, before filing the
necessary information, the offenses in fact and in
law committed, in order to avoid situations
smacking of persecutions.
50
CONRADO MELO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF THE FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL
MORAN, C.
J. either shall
under
constitute
a act.
bar to
1where
The rule is
another
prosecution
for
the same
after the
1
Petitioner
Conrado
Melo Obillo,
was charged
on
December
27, 4
1949,
with
foraInstance
having
allegedly
inflicted
upon
Benjamin
kitchen
knife
and
with intent
tofrustrated
kill
at the homicide,
Court ofwith
First
of
Rizal.
Same
offense,
under
the to
general
rule,
has
been
interpreted
mean
not
onlyalways
that
the
2
second
offense
charged
is
exactly
the
same
as
the
one
alleged
in
the
first
On December
29,
1949,
atdied
8 a.m.,
accused
pleaded
information,
but
also
not
guilty
the
offense
charged
andthe
at wounds.
10:15
p.m.
of the
the
two
offenses
are
same
day,to
Benjamin
Obillo
from
his
identical.
3
4
Evidence
of
death3, was
available
to the4,the
prosecution
only
on January
1950
and January
1950
and
amended
information
was
filed
charging
accused
with consummated
homicide.
6
Motion was denied by the respondent court; hence,
instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent
court from further entertaining the amended information
2
3
There theis
identity
between
two
offenses
when
evidence
to
support
a
conviction
for
onesufficient
offense
would
be
to
warrant
a conviction
for the other.
The
accused
then filed
a jeopardy.
motion to nullify the amended
information
claiming
double
Rule
106, it and
section
13,
2d
paragraph,
under
this
provision,
wasproper
proper
for
the
court
to
dismiss
the
information
order
the
filing
of
a
new
one
for
reason
that
offense
was
not
charged
in the
former
and
it
did
not or
place
the
accused
in
a second
jeopardy
for the
the
same
identical
offense.
No person
be an
twice
put Meaning
in jeopardy
of
punishment
forshall
the
same
offense.
when
a
person
is
charged
with
offense
and
theor
case
is
terminated
either
by
acquittal
or
conviction
inlatter
any
manner
without
the
consent
of
the
accused,
the
cannot be
charged
with
the same
or
identical offense.
It
is noticed
that
the
of
theact
constitutional
inhibition
isand
against
a protection
secondthat
jeopardy
for
same
offense,
only
if an
isthe
punished
by
a lawthe
an exception,
ordinance,
conviction
or
acquittal
On
the
other
hand, the rule of
identity
does
not
apply,
when
the
second offense was
not in existence at
the time of the first
prosecution, for the
simple reason that in
such case there is no
possibility for the
accused, during the
first prosecution, to
be convicted for an
offense that was in
existent.
that
first
prosecution a new
fact supervenes for
which the defendant
is responsible, which
changes
the
character
of
the
offense and, together
with
the
facts
existing at the time
constitutes a new
and distinct offense.
The accused cannot
be said to be in
second jeopardy if
indicted for the new
offense.
51
of double jeopardy. By
the motion to
quash was granted
2
He
wasoffrom
prosecuted
for frustrated
murder
arising
allegedly
having
assaulted,
attacked,
and physical
hit
with
ordered
the
a
piece
the
party,
which
he
was and
previously
tried
andoffended
sentenced
forforslight
injuries,
hiswood
plea being
one
of guilt.
dismissal of the case
3
The
information
for frustrated
murder
was
based
on and immediate release
the
second
medical
certificate
by the
the
same
physician
which
much
thorough
second
time,
the
effect
that
the more
victimgiven
did suffer
a greater
injury to
than
was
atwas
first
ascertained.
of the appellee.
4
1
The lower
court,
presided
bythere
Honorable
Judge
Nestor B.
Alampay,
considering
that
no
supervening
For
double
fact
that
negate
the
defense
double
not
to
exist, jeopardy
therethe
is
sustained
the
motion
to
quash
in was
an order
ofjeopardy,
June 21,
then
1968.
Thewould
people
appealed.
indispensable
requirement
the
existence
offorof
awhich
new
fact
5
supervenes
the
defendant
is
responsible
changing
the
character
of
the
The
accused
Yorac
was
charged
with slight
physical
crime
imputedwith
to him
injuries
before
the
City
Court
Bacolod.
The
accused
and
together
the
plead
guilty
on
April
16,
1968
resulting
in his
being
facts
existing
penalized
to suffer
ten
days
of of
arresto
menor.
previously
constituting
a new
and
distinct
offense.
6
2
On
AprilCourt
18,
1968,
the provincial
fiscal
filed information
at
the
of act
First
Instance
of
Negros
Occidental,
charging
the
same
with
frustrated
murder
No
person
be twice
arising
from
the
upon
another
medical
certificate
put
in shall
jeopardy
of
dated
April
17,
1968.defendant
punishment
for
the
same offense.
A constitutional
be put
in jeopardy
same offense
was not
the to
basis
for Yorac.
atwice
motion
to nullify for
by this,
the
accused,
nowright
appellee,
Rodrigo
A
defendant
in a
criminal
case
should
therefore,
be or
judged
either
guilty
not
guilty
and
left
alone
inthereafter
peace,
in
the
latter
case
the
State
being
precluded
taking
an appeal.from
The
Same
offense,
means
offense
charged
or acquitted or the
case
against
him
terminated
without
his express consent,
or any attempt to
commit the same or
frustration thereof or
for;
any
offense
which
necessarily
includes
or
is
necessarily included
in
the
offense
charged in the former
complaint
or
information.
1
It follows that after
the first prosecution
a
new
fact
supervenes on which
defendant may be
held liable, resulting
in
altering
the
character
of
the
crime and giving rise
to a new and distinct
offense, the accused
cannot be said to be
in second jeopardy if
indicted for the new
offense.
2the
Although
therethe
is
indispensable
requirement
existence
of of
a new
fact defendant
which
supervenes
for
the
is
responsible
changing
the
character
of him
the
crime
imputed
to
and
together
with
the
existing
facts
previously
constituting
a
new
and distinct offense.
52
1
2
This
is a petition
to City
review
the
dated
November
17,
1972,
of
the
Court
of Manila,
Branch
dismissing
information
for order,
homicide
thru
reckless
imprudence
filed
against
Francisco
GapaXI,
y
Mallares
on the
the
ground
of respondent
double
jeopardy.
Respondent
court
that imprudence
the privatefor
respondent
having
previously
tried
and
of
physical
injuries
thruheld
reckless
theserious
death
of
the been
victim
would
place
the convicted
accused in
double
jeopardy.
2
It
follows
that after
the
first
prosecution
a
new
fact
supervenes
on
which
defendant
may
be
held
liable,
resulting
in
altering
the
character
of
crime
and
giving
rise
to
a
new
and
distinct
offense,
the
accused
cannot
be
said
tonew
be
in
second
jeopardy
if
indicted
for
the
offense.
However,
article
365 of
the
Penal Code
punishes
the negligent
state the
of
mind
and
resulting
injury.not
The
case
at
bar,
therespondent
incident
on October
17,
1972.
On
the
following
day, occurred
October 18,
wasvictim
filed
against
physical
injuries
thru
reckless
imprudence.
the information
same
day, 3
the
Diolito
de la
Cruz died. forOnserious
The
trialthat
4
concluded
once
prosecuted
for court
and
convictedcannot
of
negligence,
the
On
October
20, charge
1972, of
private
respondent
was
accused
again
arraigned
on
the
serious
physical
injuries
be
prosecuted
thru
reckless
imprudence.
He
pleaded
guilty
and
was
same
negligence
sentenced
to oneserving
month and
one day of arresto mayor,
although
forfor the
a
different
resulting
and
commenced
sentence.
injury.
On October was
24, 1972,
information
for homicide thru reckless
imprudence
filed against
respondent.
Well-settled
is
the
rule
that
one
who
been
charged
withhas
an
offense
cannot
be
charge
again
with
the
same
orthough
identical
offense
the
latter
be
lesser
or
greater
than
the
former.
upon
motion
of
respondent,
issued
and
order5
However, it must
be pointed that, the
rule of identity does
not apply when the
second offense was
not in existence at
the time of the first
prosecution, for the
reason that in such
case there is no
possibility for the
accused, during the
first
prosecution, to be
convicted for an
offense that was then
in existent.
1
Accordingly,
where
the
accused
was
charged with physical
injuries
and
after
conviction,
the
injured person dies,
the
charge
for
homicide against the
same accused does
not put him twice in
jeopardy.
2Cruz
Asdied
stated,
the
victim
Diolito
dewas
la
on the
day
the information
filed,
and
the
accused
was
arraigned
two
days
after,1972.
or on
October
20,
When
the
information
for
homicide
thru
reckless
imprudence
was
filed
on October
24,
1972,
the
accusedprivate
respondent
was
already
in jeopardy.
53
precluded
looking
into the from
question
of
petitioners
negligence.
In
line
with
this, on
the
petitioner
insists
1983, thee Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed
he
was acquitted
a
finding
that
he that
was
neither
criminally
negligent
nor
charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
recklessly imprudent.
2
imprudence
resulting
homicide.
On
arraignment,
petitionerin
pleaded
not guilty to the charge.
3
He
argues
that
when
3
the
latter
isliability
not
proved,
civil
cannot
be
demanded
and
concludes
thatcivil
his
Petitioner
was
acquitted
by
the
trial
court
of
homicide
acquittal
bars
any
through
reckless
imprudence
without
ruling
on
his
civil
action.
liability.
1information
June 1,
4
that
the declare
trial
shows
judgement
didcourts
not
of
clearly
non-existence
the
negligence
petitioners
or
imprudence.
argue
that
They
his
deemed
acquittal
based
must
be
on
reasonable
doubt.
On
appeal
from
civil
aspect
of
the
judgement
in
Criminal
Case
no.the
066,
the
appellate
court
found
the
petitioner
Manantan
civilly
liable
and
ordered
himand
to
indemnify
private
respondents
Marcelino
Nicolas
5
Maria
Nicolas
for
a
total
of
174,400.00
for
the
death
of
their son, Ruben Nicolas.
Inquiry by the lower courts
decision in Criminal Case
No.
066
supports
the
conclusion
of
the
appellate court that
the
acquittal
was
based on reasonable
doubt
hence
petitioners
civil
liability
was
not
extinguished by his
discharge.
a
toforenforce
civil
liability
thelies.
same
actsuit
or omission
Petitioner
argues
the
trial
courts
finding
that
he
was
neither
imprudent
nor
negligent
was
the basis
of
his
acquittal
and that
not
doubt.
Hence,
upon
finding
him
liable
forreasonable
indemnity
the
appellate
court
only
hisdamages,
acquittal
in 8
suspicion,
but
alsonot
put
him
in placed
doubleand
jeopardy.
Furthermore,
petitioner
that
2
the
Court
ofdamages
Appeals
made
a argues
mistake
in
awarding
and
since
Preliminary,
petitioners
that placed
the decision
of the
private
respondents
appellate
awarding claim
indemnity
him in double
did indemnity,
not their
payclaims
the
jeopardy iscourt
misplaced.
corresponding
filing
fees
for
for
damages
when
civil
case
was
institutedaction.
with the
criminal
3
4
5
6
The constitution
provides
that no person shall be twice put in 9
jeopardy
for the same
offense.
Private
respondents
argue
that
under the
rules
of awarded
court,
filing
the
damages
are
For
double
jeopardy
to exist
elements
are prior
established.
a
first fees
lien for
on the
First
is the
a
jeopardy
must
have
attached
tosame
the
judgement.
second.
The
first
jeopardy
must
have
been
terminated.
Lastly,
second
jeopardy
must
be
for
the
offense as the first.
10
In
the instant
case,
hadCase
onceNo.
been
in
by the
filingpetitioner
of by
Criminal
066placed
and the
jeopardy
was
terminated
his discharge.
However,
petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. No.
19240
offense.with a second criminal offense identical to the first
At
the information,
time
of the
filing
of
the
implied
institution
of civil
actions
with
criminal
actions
was
governed
by
Rule1964,
111,
section
of the
Rules
of 1Court.
11
As the
pointed
out by
the
respondents,
under
said rule,
it
was
not
required
that
the the
damages
by
offended
party
be
stated
insought
the
complaint
or
information.
Records
clearly
showto
that
no second
criminal
offense 12
was
being
imputed
petitioner
on
appeal
therefore
there
was
no
second
jeopardy
of. jeopardy
Petitioners
claim
of having
been
placed to
in speak
double
is
incorrect.
Thus,is the
civil
action
impliedly
instituted
together
with
the
criminal
action,
the
actual
damages
claimed
by
the
offended
parties,
as
in
this
case,
are
not
in the
computation
of
filing included
fees.
8 Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
13
Filingof
fees
are
to
different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
be
paid
only
ifmoral,
other
items
damages
such
astemperate,
nominal,
or
exemplary
damages
are
alleged
in
the
complaint
or
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
information,
ifa they
are
so oralleged,
shall
constitute
first
lien not
on
the
judgement.
not the author of the act of omission complained of. 14
The
rules
of
criminal
procedure
This closes the door to civil liability. Second is an
guarantee
that
filing
fees
for the
award
of
damages
are
first
lien
on
the
judgement,
the
effect
of
the
enforcement
of
said
lien institution
mustaction.
retro of
actthe
to
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
the
criminal
accused, in this case if the guilt of the accused has not
Therefore,
we
been satisfactorily established, he is not exempted15
find no basis for
petitioners
allegations
that
the
from civil liability which may be proved by the
filing fees were not
paid or improperly
preponderance of evidence only.
paid and that the
appellate
court
acquired
no
jurisdiction.
The
instant petition is
dismissed for lack of
merit.
54
SAMSON V. CA
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
1
10
proceeds, constituted a
written representation
that the true payees
participated
in
the
indorsement
and
cashing of the checks
aforesaid, when in truth
and in fact the true
payees had no direct
intervention
in
the
proceedings (Art. 171,
Revised Penal Code).
Even
if
such
indorsement
and
identification
were
extraneous
to
the
official
duties
of
appellant, he would be
nevertheless liable as a
private person under
Article
172
of
the
Revised Penal Code.
Decisions of this Court
and of the Supreme
Court of Spain assert
the juridical standing of
the crime of falsification
by imprudence since in
falsifying
public
or
mercantile
document,
of intent to cause
damage is not required
because what the law,
seeks to repress is the
prejudice to the public
confidence
in
these
documents.
3 As
a complement we
have also the following
rule:
"An
offense
charged
necessarily
evidence submitted by
appellant himself and
the result has proven
beneficial
to
him.
Certainly,
having
alleged
that
the
falsification has been
willful, it would be
incongrous to allege at
the same time that it
was committed with
imprudence
for
a
charge
of
criminal
intent is incompatible
with the concept of
negligence.
55
2 The
considered
indispensable
interdictions
against
needless delays and for
orderly discharge of
5
judicial
business.
Petitioner's failure to
seasonably
file
the
Petition and its failure
to comply with the
aforequoted Circulars of
the Court necessitate
the
denial
of
the
Petition.
WON THE
INFORMATION
AGAINST PETITIONER
IS SUFFICIENT- YES
10
15
15
2 The
It may be noted
that foreign shipowners
and manning agencies
had
generally
expressed
their
conformity
to
the
inclusion
of
Filipino
seafarers within the
coverage of the Social
Security Act even prior
to the signing of the
DOLE-SSS
Memorandum
of
Agreement.
56
57
10
11
The quantum of
evidence
on
the
criminal aspect of the
case is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, while
in the civil aspect of the
action, the quantum of
evidence
is
preponderance
of
evidence. Under Section
3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Rules
of
Criminal
Procedure,
the
said
rules shall govern the
procedure
to
be
observed in action, civil
or criminal.
The
prosecution
presents its evidence
not only to prove the
guilt of the accused
beyond
reasonable
doubt but also to prove
the civil liability of the
accused to the offended
party.
After
the
prosecution has rested
accused
in
double
jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the
offended party or the
accused or both may
appeal
from
the
judgment on the civil
aspect of the case
within
the
period
therefor.
If
demurrer
is
granted
and
the
accused is acquitted by
the court, the accused
has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil
aspect of the case
unless the court also
declares that the act or
omission
1 The
58
59
19. Yu
constitutional
right
against
double
jeopardy, filed a petition
for
prohibition
with
application
for
temporary
restraining
order and/or writ of
preliminary
injunction
with the Regional Trial
Court
of
Manila,
primarily to enjoin the
State prosecutors from
conducting
the
preliminary
investigation.
On June 6, 2001,
eleven
(11)
Informations for murder
involving the killing of
the same members of
the Kuratong Baleleng
gang were filed before
the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon. The new
Informations charged as
principals
thirty-four
(34) people, including
respondent Lacson and
his
twenty-five
(25)
other co-accused. The
criminal cases were
assigned to Judge Ma.
Theresa L. Yadao.
The
Court
of
Appeals
issued
a
temporary
restraining
order enjoining Judge
Yadao from issuing a
warrant of arrest or
conducting
any
proceeding or hearing
in Criminal Cases Nos.
01-101102
to
01101112.
On
August
24,
2001, the Court of
Appeals (Special Third
Division), rendered the
now assailed Decision.
It
characterized
the
termination of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-9981689 as provisional
dismissal,
and
considered
Criminal
Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01101112
as
mere
revivals of the same.
respondent
Lacson
himself who moved to
dismiss
the
subject
cases
for
lack
of
probable cause before
then
Judge
Agnir,
hence, it is beyond
argument
that their
dismissal
bears
his
express consent.
61
provisionally dismissed
without the express
consent of the accused
or over his objection,
the new rule would not
apply. The case may be
revived or refiled even
beyond the prescribed
periods subject to the
right of the accused to
oppose the same on the
ground
of
double
jeopardy or that such
revival or refiling is
barred by the statute of
limitations.
1.
2.
3.
4 The
Information
for
the
same offense or an
offense
necessarily
included therein. There
would be no need of a
new
preliminary
investigation. However,
in a case wherein after
the
provisional
dismissal of a criminal
case,
the
original
witnesses
of
the
prosecution or some of
them
may
have
recanted
their
testimonies
or
may
have died or may no
longer be available and
new witnesses for the
State have emerged, a
new
preliminary
investigation must be
conducted before an
Information is refiled or
a new Information is
filed. A new preliminary
investigation is also
required if aside from
the original accused,
other
persons
are
charged under a new
criminal complaint for
the same offense or
necessarily
included
therein; or if under a
new criminal complaint,
the original charge has
been upgraded; or if
under a new criminal
complaint, the criminal
liability of the accused
is upgraded from that
as an accessory to that
as a principal. The
accused
must
be
accorded the right to
submit
counteraffidavits and evidence.
After all, the fiscal is
not called by the Rules
of
Court
to
wait
in
ambush; the role of a
fiscal is not mainly to
prosecute
but
essentially to do justice
to every man and to
assist the court in
dispensing that justice.
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or make
exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly
or impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot
and should not do.
The
contention
that
no
case. Such notice may
notice of any motion for
be
served
on
the
the
provisional
offended party or the
dismissal of Criminal
heirs of the victim
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
through
the
private
to Q-99-81689 or of the
prosecutor, if there is
hearing thereon was
one, or through the
served on the heirs of
public prosecutor who
the victims at least
in turn must relay the
three days before said
notice to the offended
hearing as mandated by
party or the heirs of the
Rule 15, Section 4 of
victim to enable them
the Rules of Court. It
to confer with him
must be borne in mind
before the hearing or
that in crimes involving
appear in court during
private interests, the
the hearing. The proof
new rule requires that
of such service must be
the offended party or
shown
during
the
parties or the heirs of
hearing on the motion,
the victims must be
otherwise,
the
given adequate a priori
requirement of the new
notice of any motion for
rule will become illusory
the
provisional
dismissal of the criminal
62
Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. The
fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants
rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending
actions.
The
retroactive
application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive
application
of
procedural
statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws. It has
been held that a person has no
vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure.
63
apply.
Before the Court are the following motions of the
7
The absence of a
respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion; (b) Motion for
provision
in Section 8
Reconsideration; (c) Supplement to Motion for
giving
it
prospective
Reconsideration; (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments
application only does
2 RESPONDENT asserts that pursuant to a long line
not
proscribe
the
of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice
prospective application
in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP
thereof; nor does it
should be applied prospectively and retroactively
imply that the Court
without reservations, only and solely on the basis of
intended the new rule
its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that
to be given retroactive
case law on the retroactive application of penal laws
and prospective effect.
should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a
If the statutory purpose
branch of criminal law.
is clear, the provisions
of the law should be
3 The respondent insists that Section 8 was
construed
as
is
purposely crafted and included as a new provision to
conducive
to
fairness
reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a
and justice, and in
speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly,
harmony
with
the
prospective application thereof would in effect give
general
spirit
and
policy
the petitioners more than two years from March 29,
of the rule. It should be
1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus
construed so as
violating the respondents right to due process and
the
the
the
the
6 The
the
of
Quezon
City
is
hereby DIRECTED to
CONSOLIDATE Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 and to
RE-RAFFLE the same
with dispatch to one of
the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City designated
as a special court,
exclusively to try and
decide heinous crimes.
64
CONDRADA V. PEOPLE
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
1
10
11
12
moved
for
the
postponement of the
trial several times in
good faith and for valid
reasons. He likewise
argues that the revival
of the case does not
place
the
petitioner
twice in jeopardy for the
same offense because
the dismissal of the
case on May 31, 1999
was
made
at
petitioners instance.
ISSUES:
A
permanent
dismissal of a criminal
case may refer to the
termination of the case
on the merits, resulting
in either the conviction
or acquittal of the
accused;
to
the
dismissal of the case
due to the prosecutions
failure to prosecute; or
to the dismissal thereof
on
the
ground
of
unreasonable delay in
the
proceedings,
in
violation
of
the
accuseds
right
to
speedy disposition or
trial of the case against
him. In contrast, a
provisional dismissal of
a criminal case is a
dismissal
without
prejudice
to
the
reinstatement
thereof
before the order of
dismissal becomes final
or to the subsequent
filing
of
a
new
information
for
the
offense
within
the
periods allowed under
the Revised Penal Code
or the Revised Rules of
Court.
The
proscription
against
double
jeopardy
presupposes that an accused has been previously
charged with an offense, and the case against him is
terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or
dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As
a general rule, the following requisites must be
65
this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the
aforecited exceptions. The prosecution had not yet
presented evidence at the time the case was dismissed
on May 31, 1999. Moreover, as previously explained,
said dismissal was temporary in nature, as the case
was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from
the date of dismissal
present
for
double
jeopardy to attach: (1) a
valid indictment,
Petitioner is not in
danger of being twice
put in jeopardy with the
reinstatement
of
Criminal
Case
No.
10770
because
as
earlier stated, said case
was
provisionally
dismissed by the trial
court upon his motion.
Thus, the requirement
that the dismissal of the
case must be without
the consent of the
accused is not present
in