Memorial For Petitioners

TC- P
Before
THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF
JEEVASTHAN
In the Matter of
WRIT PETITION (________/ 2015)
SUNITHA AND AJITH - -
PETITIONERS
RESPONDENT
V.
ST. MARTIN COLLEGE-
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
Table of Contents
Petitioners
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
II
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
IX
STATEMENT OF FACTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
XI
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
XII
PLEADINGS
I.
THE GOVERNING BODY HAS NO POWER TO FORMULATE THE CODE OF CONDUCT SINCE
SUCH POWERS HAVE TO BE EXERCISED BY THE UNIVERSITY OR
A. The Doctrine of Substantive Ultra Vires is applicable
II.
BY THE PRINCIPAL 1
B. The role of giving advice and making rules are entirely different -
THE PUNISHMENT OF DISMISSAL GIVEN BY THE PRINCIPAL IS LIABLE TO BE

SET-ASIDE
A. The procedure followed by the college violated principle of natural justice
(i) The principle of bias would apply with regard to approach of Enquiry
Commission
(ii) The findings of Commission are arbitrary and invalid -
(iii)There is an abuse of Administrative discretion on part of the college -
10
(iv) The Doctrine of legitimate expectation is violated by the principal and the
Enquiry Commission
11
12
RULE 10 IS IN VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA-
15
A. Rule 10 is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India -
15
B. Punishment given to the students is disproportionate and thus violates the

Doctrine of Proportionality III.
(i) Rule 10 is arbitrary in nature
15
(ii) Requirement to State reason
16
B. Rule 10 is in violation of Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India
18
C. Rule 10 is in violation of Article 19(1) (b) of the Constitution of India
20
D. Rule 10 violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India

PRAYER
23
XIII
I
MEMORANDUM FOR PETITIONERS
Index of Authorities
Petitioners
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
NATIONAL CASES CITED
S. NO.
1.
2.
CASE NAME
PAGE NO.
A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar v. Life Insurance Corporation of India,
3
AIR 1963 SC 1185
A.G. Kazi v. C.V. Jethwani, AIR 1967 Bom 235
19
3.
A.K. Mukopadhyay v. Union of India, (2005) ILR 1 Cal 27
4.
A.P.SRTC v. Shri Satyanarayan Transport (p) Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1303
5.
Additional District Magistrate (Revenue) Delhi Administration v. Sri

Ram, (2000) 5 SCC 451
Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, (1981) 4 SCC 335
6.
7.
18
Akshay Chaudhary v. University of Delhi and Anr., THE HIGH COURT

OF DELHI W.P. (C) No. 1897/2010 and C.M. No. 9422/2010
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454
13
10.
Association of Management of Private Colleges v. All India Council For

Technical Education and Other, (2013) 8 SCC 271
Awadhesi Kisan Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 Mah LJ 689
21
11.
Awadhoot v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Bom 28
21
12.
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24.
17
13.
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 SCC 625
11
14.
Bhagat Ram v. State of HP, (1983) 2 SCC 442
14
15.
Bhajan Kaur v. Delhi Administration, 1996 AIHC 5644
24
16.
Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees, AIR 1950 SC 188
17.
Brij Bassi Hitech Udhyog Ltd. v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1997) 117 (3)
PLR 538
Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12
17
8.
9.
18.
II
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Petitioners
Central Inland Water Transportation Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath

Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1571
Chandra Bali v. R, AIR 1952 All 795
16
Chandrabhan Chunnilal Gour v. Shrawan Kumar Khunnolal Gour, AIR

1980 Bom 48
Comptroller and Auditor General v. Kamlesh Vadilal Mehta (2003) 2
SCC 349
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC
374
D.D. Didolkar v. Nagpur University, AIR 1976 Bom 276
4
12
21
16
27.
Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC
600
Delhi Transport Corporation v. Shri Ramesh Chander, 179 (2011) DLT
263
Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725
28.
Dhanpatrai Periwal v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1954 CriLJ 1496
29.
32.
Dillip Kumar Parida v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Ors.,
LPA 360/2004
District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank, AIR 2005
SC 186
Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay,
(1989) 3 SCC 293
E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555
33.
Emperor v. Shankar Papayya, (1943) 45 BOMLR 310
22
34.
Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Workmen,

(1972) 1 SCC 40
Foremost Diaries v. State, AIR 1986 Raj 116
14
16
37.
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981)

1 SCC 608
Francis v. Union Territory, AIR 1981 SC 746
38.
Ganpati Singh v. State of Ajmer AIR 1955 SC 188
26.
30.
31.
35.
36.
III
5
16
25
17
16
25
Petitioners
39.
Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik (2005) 13 SCC 300
40.
Himal Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 227
41.
Hind Construction Engg. Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1965SC 917
14
42.
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641
2,15,18
43.
K. C. Malhotra (Dr.) v. H. P. University, Shimla, AIR 1995 HP 156
17
44.
Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123
25
45.
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295
24
46.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC 304
15
47.
Kokila Devi v. The State of Jharkhand and Ors., 2015 (1) AJR 248
15
48.
Krishna Swami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605
17
49.
Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 2000 SC 1069
50.
Laghu Udyog Bharti v. Union of India AIR 1999 SC 2596
51.
LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah (Prof.), (1992) 3 SCC 637
20
52.
M. Bassi v. Union of India, 1985 Lab IC (Del) 526
15
53.
M. Gopalan v. State of Kerala, 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 6726
25
54.
17
55.
M/s Steel Authority of India v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., 2015 SCC
OnLine Jhar 204
Mallela Venkata Rao v. State of A.P, 2000 (6) ALD 555 (FB)
56.
Malu v. State of Kerala, 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 19349
17
57.
Management of Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank v.

Secretary, Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank Employees
Association and Anr, (2007) 4 SCC 669
Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, AIR 1957 SC 425
12
58.
IV
Petitioners
59.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248
60.
Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balvant Rao Chavan, AIR 1989 SC

1582
Maya Devi v. Raj Kumari Batra, (2010) 9 SCC 486.
61.
62.
18,19
1
17
63.
Ministry of I&B, Govt. of India v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC

161
Mohd. Yasin v. Town Area Committee, AIR 1952 SC 115
2,4
64.
Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666
16
65.
21
67.
Mr. T. Sriranga Rao and Sri S. Srinivas v. The Director General of Police,
The Commissioner of Police, Dy. Commissioner of Police, Central Zone
and The Andhra Pradesh Non-Gazetted Officers' Association, 2013 (6)
ALD 207
Municipal Corporation Greater Bombay v. Nagpal Printing Mills, AIR
1988 SC 1009
N.C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 3 SCC 611
68.
N.P. Nathwani v. The Commissioner of Police, 1976 (78) BOMLR 1
22
69.
Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of M.P., (1974) 4 SCC 788
70.
16
71.
Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. of 2012,

(2012) 10 SCC 1
O.K. Ghosh and another v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812
72.
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180
24
73.
Prabha Shanker Dubey v. State of M.P, AIR 2004 SC 486
74.
Ram Pal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, AIR 2004 SC 1657
75.
Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1951 SC 270
19
76.
Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1
12
77.
Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, UOI, (2012) 5 SCC 1
66.
V
20
4
13
1,17,18
22
19,24
Petitioners
78.
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2386
13
79.
80.
Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram Secondary

School, AIR 1993 SC 2155
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124
20
81.
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889
82.
S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594.
17
83.
16
84.
S.M. Rao v. Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Bangalore,

2003 SCC OnLine Kar 491
Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (1987) 2 SCC 295
85.
Sales Tax Officer v. Abraham, AIR 1967 SC 1823
86.
Sardar Singh v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 213
13
87.
88.
Secy. To Govt. Transport Department v. Munuswamy Mudaliar, AIR

1988 SC 2232
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
20
89.
Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223.
10
90.
Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 537
16
91.
State of A.P. v. Sunita Industries (2005) 13 SCC 573
92.
State of Bihar v. R.B.H.R.M.L. Jute Mills, AIR 1960 SC 378
22
93.
State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, 1974 (1) SCR 771
94.
State of Karnataka v. H Ganesh Kamath, AIR 1983 SC 550
95.
State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, AIR 1987 SC 251
15
96.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya , AIR 1961 SC 751
97.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Renusagar Power Co., AIR 1988 SC 1737
VI
Petitioners
98.
State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) SCR 284
25
99.
State of W.B. v. Ashok Dey, (1972) 1 SCC 199
23
100. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002)8 SCC 481
19
101. Tahir Hussain v. District Board, Muzaffarnagar AIR 1954 SC 630
102. U.P. Awas EvamVikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, AIR 1995 SC 724
11
103. Union of India v. B.N. Jha, (2003) 4 SCC 531
104. Union of India v. Rajpal Singh, (2009) 1 SCC 216
105. Union of India v. S. Srinivasan, (2012) 7 SCC 683
106. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398
16
107. UOI v. G. Ganayutham (Dead) by LRs., AIR 1997 SC 3387
12
108. Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal (2001) 2 SCC 423
FOREIGN CASES CITED

S. NO.
CASES CITED
PAGE NO.
1.
Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Properties, (1852) 3 HAC 759
2.
R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, (2001) 1 AC 119
3.
Secy. of State for Education & Science v. Tame side Metropolitan Borough
10
Council, 1977 AC 2014; (1976) WLR 641

4.
Sharp v. Dawes, 46 LJQB 104
21
5.
Watson & British Boxing Board Of Control Ltd, (2000) EWCA Civ. 2116
6.
Winters v. New York, 333 US 507 (1948)
20
STATUTES AND RULES CITED

S. No.
1.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
The Constitution of India, 1950
VII
Petitioners
2.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
3.
National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2005
REPORTS REFERRED
Letter from the Director of Department of Human Resource and Development,

Department of Higher Education Communition Dated- 08/07/15. No.- 1826/2015-U1A
BOOKS REFERRED
1 H. M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Universal Law Publishing Co., Fourth

Edition.
1 Halsburys Law of India, Administrative Law, Lexis Nexis Butterworths.
1 M P Jain & S N Jain, Principles of Administrative Law, Lexis Nexis, Seventh Edition.
1 M.P. Jain, Treatise on Administrative Law, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur.
2 Samaraditya Pal, Indias Constitution Origin and Evolution, LexisNexis.
2 J.K. Verma, B.R. Ghaiyes, Law and Procedure of Departmental Enquiries, In Public
and Private Sectors, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow.
34 Halsburys Laws of India, Constitutional Law-I, Lexis Nexis Butterworths.
C. K. Thakker, Administrative Law. Eastern Book Company, Second Edition.
Durga Das Basu, Comments on the Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis, Eighth Edition.
T.K. Tope, Constitutional Law of India, (Justice Sujata V. Manohar, Third Ed., Eastern
Book Company, Lucknow) (1982) 2010.
DICTIONARIES REFERRED
Henry Campbell Black, Blacks Law Dictionary in Bryan A. Garner (Thomson West
2006), 8th Edition.
Justice C. K. Thakker, Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon, Ashoka Law House.
P Ramnatha Aiyars, Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, Wadhwa.
DATABASES REFERRED
http://www.manupatra.com
http://www.heinonline.com
https://www.scconline.in/default.aspx
https://www.jstor.com
VIII
Statement of Jurisdiction
Petitioners
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The counsels on behalf of the Petitioners have endorsed their pleadings under the aegis of
Article 2261 of the Constitution of India. The Petitioners would humbly contest the grounds
that have been invoked under the aegis of Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
INDIA CONST. Art. 226.

Power of High Court to issue certain writs(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation
to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders
or writs, including [writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or
any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.]
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person
may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the
cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner,
is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1) without(a) Furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim
order, and
(b) Giving such party an opportunity of being heard,
Makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application
to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose
of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which
the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day
of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application
is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or as the case may be, the expiry of the
next day, stand vacated.
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the
Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.
IX
Statement of Facts
Petitioners
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Jeevasthan is a state in the Indian Union. The University of Jeevasthan established in 1952 has
45 Post Graduate Department of Studies and Research and 250 affiliated colleges. St. Martin
College is a catholic institution affiliated to the University. There are 1700 students in the
college, out of which 950 are girls.
B. According to Section 40 of Jeevasthan University Act, 1952 the guidelines for formation of a
governing body for management of every private college are being incorporated. Stating that
the Governing Body is for giving advice on all matters relating to the administration of the
college.
C. In 2013, St. Martin College got recognition as a minority educational institution under National
Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004.
D. The Governing Body of the college formulated and published a Code of Conduct for Students.
According to Paragraph 10 of the code, no male and female student shall sit on the same
bench.
E. Sunitha and Ajith are third year B.Com students of the college and on 06.08.2015 they were
suspended by the Principal stating that they had violated Paragraph 10 of the ncode.
F. This action caused a lot of protest from the large section of the society therefore, the Principal
on 18.08.2015 appointed a commission to inquire into the allegations against Sunitha and
Ajith. The single member who was appointed in this commission was Dr. Sreejith Raju, Head
of the Department of Political Science, of the same college.
G. Opportunity was given to them to adduce and rebut evidence, including right to cross
examination. In these proceedings the only eye witness was Sarmila Bai, a 75 year old sweeper
of the college. She deposed before the commission that on 04.08.2015, she saw both of them
sitting together on the same bench and Ajiths hand was on the shoulder of Sunitha. During
cross examination Ajith showed Sarmila Bai a 500 rupee note which she was not able to
identify correctly and recognized it as a 100 rupee note.
H. The commission submitted in report with a finding that they had violated the code which was
based on the oral evidence of Sarmila Bai. The principal dismissed them from the college.
I. Aggrieved by this Ajith and Sunitha has filed a writ petition on the grounds that governing
body is not the correct authority to formulate the code of conduct and there is an infringement
of the fundamental rights with error of law being apparent on the face of record.
X
Statement of Facts
Petitioners
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The following issues are presented before the Honble High Court of Jeevasthan:I.
WHETHER GOVERNING BODY HAS POWER TO FORMULATE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE
STUDENTS?
II.
WHETHER PUNISHMENT IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE GRAVITY OF THE ALLEGED

MISCONDUCT?
III. WHETHER RULE 10 IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14, 19 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF INDIA?
XI
Summary of Pleadings
Petitioners
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
I.
The Petitioners humbly submits before the Honble High Court that the Governing body is
not within its powers while, formulating the Code of Conduct for the students as the
Jeevasthan University Act, 1952, Section 40 empowers it to give advice on all administrative
matters relating to the college but here in the present the Governing body has gone beyond
its powers conferred by the act and has formulated the Code of Conduct. The petitioners
asserts that the Governing body has no power to formulate the Code of Conduct hence, this
act should be declared as ultra vires.
II.
The Petitioners further humbly submits that the punishment of dismissal is liable to be set
aside as the procedure followed by the enquiry commission and the Principal violated the
basic principles of natural justice. The finding of Commission was based on the irrelevant
consideration and ignored the relevant consideration. The Principal dismissed the students,
which is highly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and that too based on an
inappropriate finding of the Enquiry Commission.
III. It is further submitted that the Rule 10 of the Code of Conduct violates the basic fundamental
rights guaranteed under Article 14, Article 19 and Article 21 of the Constitution. The said
rule is arbitrary in nature as it does not have any reasonable objective to be achieved and also
does not lay down any criteria to be followed in case of its violation. The said Rule also
unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and expression and freedom of assembly and it
also directly infringes the personal liberty given under Article 21 of the Constitution and fails
to satisfy the test of Article 14 and Article 19.
XII
Pleadings
Petitioners
PLEADINGS
I.
THE GOVERNING BODY HAS NO POWER TO FORMULATE THE CODE
OF
CONDUCT SINCE
SUCH POWERS HAVE TO BE EXERCISED EITHER BY THE UNIVERSITY OR BY THE PRINCIPAL.
1.
It is most humbly submitted before this Honble High Court that the governing body of the
St. Martin College has no power to formulate the Code of Conduct of the students. The
governing body of the college derives its existence from Section 40 of the Jeevasthan
University Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred as Act) which mandates such a body only to
render an advice and not to formulate any regulation.2
A. The Doctrine of substantive ultra vires is applicable.
2.
Doctrine of substantive ultra vires means that the act done by the concerned body is holding
a delegated legislation which has gone beyond the scope of the power conferred by the parent
statute, or it is in conflict with the delegated statute and hence it is invalid.3
3.
According to the Principle of substantive ultra vires the authority exercising discretionary
power must act according to law, confining itself within the ambit and scope of, and not
exceeding the powers conferred on it by law and if the authority steps out of the limits set by
the controlling statute, then the act is invalid.4
4.
Here, in the present case the respondents governing body has exceeded the power that was
conferred upon it by the parent statute that is the Act of 1952 Section 40 which prescribes
the role of governing body as an advice5 giving body and it has gone beyond the power and
formulated6 the code of conduct for students of the college.
5.
In the case of Additional District Magistrate (Revenue) Delhi Administration v. Sri Ram7 the
Honble Apex Court held that the conferment of rule-making power by an act on an authority
does not enable the rule-making authority to make a rule which is beyond the scope of the
2
3
4
5
6
7
Moot Proposition 2.
HALSBURYS LAWS OF INDIA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Volume 1, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2006 (2004).
Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1232, See also Marathwada University v. Seshrao
Balvant Rao Chavan, AIR 1989 SC 1582.
Supra Note 2. 3.
Id 3.
(2000) 5 SCC 451.
1
Pleadings
Petitioners
enabling act, or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto. Rules have to be

consistent with the provisions of the parent statute.8
6.
The power conferred upon the governing body is a subordinate legislation which has been
exceeded and in such cases the view of the Honble Apex Court has been that:
A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of
immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature.
Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which
plenary legislation is questioned. In addition it may also be questioned on
the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It
may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other
statute. That is because subordinate legislation must yield to plenary
legislation. It may also be questioned on the ground that it is unreasonable,
unreasonable not in the sense that it is not being reasonable, but in the sense
that it is manifestly arbitrary.9
7.
The two conditions propounded by the Honble Apex Court which have to be fulfilled when
such excess of power is being done, are being laid down in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Renusagar Power Co.10 these conditions are:
(i) Excess power must conform to provisions of the statute under which it is framed and,
(ii) It must also come within the scope and purview of the rule-making power of the authority
framing the rule.
These, conditions are not getting fulfilled in the present case by the respondent colleges
governing body.
8.
If the subordinate legislative authority remains within the bounds of the power delegated, the
delegated legislation is valid, however, if the authority exceeds the power delegated, then the
courts will certainly declare it ultra vires.11 Thus, establishing the fact that the above doctrine
which comes under the ambit of the Doctrine of ultra vires is having the applicability in
totality.
9
10
11
Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen AIR 1960 SC 12, See also State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya,
AIR 1961 SC 751; State of Karnataka v. H Ganesh Kamath, AIR 1983 SC 550.
Indian Express Newspaper v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
AIR 1988 SC 1737.
Mohammad Yassin v. Town Area Committee. Jalalabad, AIR 1952 SC 115, See also Tahir Hussain v. District
Board, Muzaffarnagar AIR 1954 SC 630; Ganpati Singh v. State of Ajmer AIR 1955 SC 188.
2
Pleadings
9.
Petitioners
The Doctrine of ultra vires is applicable to executive actions also. It is not restricted only to
the source of authority under the executive acts but it also extends to wrong interpretation of
rules.12
10.
It is a fundamental principle of law that a public authority cannot act outside the powers,
which means ultra vires, and it has been rightly described as the central principle and
foundation of large part of administrative law.13 Yet another ground for interference of an
administrative act is based on the Doctrine of ultra vires. It is settled law that administrative
authorities are bound to act within four corners of the statute created by it. 14 Administrative
authorities, particularly at the field sometimes exercise the powers without adequately
appreciating the policy, objective and the limits behind the exercise of powers conferred on
them. This makes administrative action vulnerable to being declared ultra vires by the
courts.15
11.
Administrative decision or direction contrary to statutory regulation, being ultra vires would
be ineffective.16 In the present case inconsistency is there between the code of conduct
formulated and the statute which brings the formulating authority into existence therefore, in
the case of inconsistency between the regulations and provision of the statute mentioned
therein, the inconsistent provisions contained in the regulations would be inoperative and not
the provision of the statute.17 This Doctrine was first accepted by the Apex Court in the case
of A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar v. Life Insurance Corporation of India18 . Similarly, a rule
must be in accord with the parent statute as it cannot travel beyond it.19
12.
In the case of Prabha Shanker Dubey v. State of M.P20 that where the statute or rule provides
that power should be exercised in a specific manner, it should be done only in that manner.
Any breach of the said rule, makes the action ultra vires. Thus, a rule repugnant to, or
12
T.K. TOPE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (Justice Sujata V. Manohar, Third Ed., Eastern Book Company,
Lucknow) (1982) 2010.
13
C.K. THAKKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Second Edition, Eastern Book Company, 2012 (1992).
14
3 DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 8th
Ed. See also Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N. Narasimhaih, AIR 2008 SC 1797.
15
B. C. SHARMA, THE LAW OF ULTRA VIRES, Eastern Law House, (2004) pg. 32.
16
Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik, (2005) 13 SCC 300.
17
Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal (2001) 2 SCC 423, See also State of A.P. v. Sunita Industries, (2005)
13 SCC 573.
18
AIR 1963 SC 1185.
19
Union of India v. S. Srinivasan, (2012) 7 SCC 683.
20
AIR 2004 SC 486, See also Ram Pal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, AIR 2004 SC 1657; Union of India v. Rajpal Singh,
(2009) 1 SCC 216.
3
Pleadings
Petitioners
inconsistent with or in contravention of, or in excess of, or overruling the provisions of the
parent act is ultra vires.21
13.
There is a difference between the framing of policy which is an administrative function and
an exercise of a statutory function. The appointment of auditors for auditing the accounts of
Government corporations and PSUs is a function statutorily assigned to the CAG under the
Companies Act and it cannot be urged that the CAG is free to act untrammeled, and
unreasonably.22
14.
In the case of Mohd. Yasin v. Town Area Committee23 the Supreme Court held that the byelaws were beyond the powers conferred on the committee and were ultra vires on that ground
if the power conferred was only to charge fee.
15.
In the case of Chandra Bali v. R24 the validity of certain rules framed under the Northern
India Ferries Act was questioned. The act authorized the making of rules for the purpose of
maintaining order and ensuring safety of passengers and property. The delegate, however,
framed rules forbidding the establishment of private ferries within a distance of two miles
from the boundaries of another ferry. The court held that the rules were outside the scope of
delegated power and therefore, ultra vires.
16.
Where the parent act conferred power on the commissioner of police to make rules for
regulating assemblies and processions at public places and the rule empowered the
commissioner to refuse permission to hold meetings, it was held that the rule went beyond
the act and was ultra vires.25
17.
The State Government having rule making power to carry out the purpose of the Act made
rules prescribing the last date for filing declaration forms by dealers in order to get the benefit
of confessional rates on interstate sales. The court struck down the rules as it found that the
statute authorized the making of rules only for prescribing what particulars were to be
mentioned in the forms etc. and not for prescribing a time limit for filing the forms.26
21
22
23
24
25
26
Municipal Corporation Greater Bombay v. Nagpal Printing Mills AIR 1988 SC 1009, See also Laghu Udyog Bharti
v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2596; Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2000 SC 1069.
Comptroller and Auditor General v. Kamlesh Vadilal Mehta, (2003) 2 SCC 349.
AIR 1952 SC 115.
AIR 1952 All 795.
Himal Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 227.
Sales Tax Officer v. Abraham AIR 1967 SC 1823.
4
Pleadings
18.
Petitioners
In the case of Chandrabhan Chunnilal Gour v. Shrawan Kumar Khunnolal Gour27 it was
decided that when a statute provides for the necessity of previous sanction of the
commissioner for the transfer of property of a public trust, any transfer without such sanction
is invalid and a sanction obtained ex post facto is not recognized by law.
B. The role of giving advice and making rules are entirely different.
19.
The role given to the Governing body was advisory and it performed the role as a rule making
body. These roles are different in their entirety as propounded in the case of Watson & British
Boxing Board Of Control Ltd28:
There is a difference in principle between making Rules and giving advice,
but it is not one which assists the Board. Had the Board simply given advice
to all involved in professional boxing as to appropriate medical
precautions, it would be strongly arguable that there was insufficient
proximity between the Board and individual boxers to give rise to a duty of
care. The Board, however, went far beyond this. It made provision in its
Rules for the medical precautions to be employed and made compliance
with these Rules mandatory. As Mr. Morris accepted, by reason of its
control over boxing the Board was in a position to determine, and did in
fact determine, the measures that were taken in boxing to protect and
promote the health and safety of boxers.
20.
The governing body is not the competent authority to make the rules due to the advisory role
assigned to it even if the principal of the college acts on the same code of conduct formulated
by the governing body which is incompetent and legalize it. In the case of Roshan Lal Tandon
v. Union of India29 it was being held that if one has regard to the above the orders on approval
by the power conferring body would not cure the defect and legalize the order.
21.
When directions given by Authority are not supported by any statutory mandate, then order
cannot be sustainable.30 Therefore, the crucial question is whether the concerned authority
27
28
29
30
AIR 1980 Bom 48.

(2000) EWCA Civ 2116.
AIR 1967 SC 1889, See also State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, 1974 (1) SCR 771.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. Shri Ramesh Chander, 179 (2011) DLT 263.
5
Pleadings
Petitioners
has the power to make the rule in question.31 Thus, when an order is made by some authority
that order has been termed as illegal32 by the judiciary.
22.
In the case of Association of Management of Private Colleges v. All India Council For
Technical Education and Other33 it was held that:
Even such technical institutes can only be regulated by the University in
question and the AICTE can only function in an advisory role to the UGC
in the matter of regulation over the field of technical education carried on
through affiliated institutes/colleges. The upshot of these decisions is that
when it comes to the regulation of technical education carried on by
institutes/colleges affiliated to a university, the power to regulate is with the
University in question and is to be exercised in accordance with the
directions and guidelines issued by the UGC.
23.
Any, consultation cannot be made as a biding opinion34. The role of the experts is purely
advisory and they do not figure either under the Act or any rule as members entitled to
participate in the selection process.35
24.
Hence, the respondent colleges Governing body does not have any power to formulate a
code of conduct for the students as the very act from which it comes into the existence
prescribes for it an advisory role. The code should be declared as ultra vires as the authority
to formulate vest in other bodies not in the governing body.
II .
THE PUNISHMENT OF DISMISSAL GIVEN BY THE PRINCIPAL IS LIABLE TO BE SET-ASIDE.
25.
The Petitioner humbly submits before the Honble High Court that the punishment of
dismissal as awarded by the Principal is liable to be set aside as, the procedure followed and
the punishment given by the authorities are in a violation of principle of natural justice and
Doctrine of proportionality respectively.
A. The Procedure followed by the College violated Principle of Natural Justice.
26.
The Petitioners humbly submits to this Honble High Court that the College authorities,
namely Enquiry Commission and Principal, being quasi-judicial authorities have to act
31
32
33
34
35
Foremost Diaries v. State, AIR 1986 Raj 116.

Dhanpatrai Periwal v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1954 CriLJ 1496.
(2013) 8 SCC 271.
Mallela Venkata Rao v. State of A.P., 2000 (6) ALD 555 (FB).
Dillip Kumar Parida v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Ors., LPA 360/2004.
6
Pleadings
Petitioners
judicially.36 But the procedure which both the authorities followed was against the basic
notions of reasonableness and fairness and thus violates the principles of natural justice.
27.
The students were dismissed from the college especially when they were in their final year
of college merely because they sat on the same bench.37 The Enquiry Commission, first of
all, does not derive its existence from any law or statute. It was merely established on the
discretion of the Principal of the College. The single member commission was biased and
had prejudice while adjudicating the dispute. Its finding was not based on the relevant
considerations and on the contrary he left out the relevant consideration placed before him
at the time of cross examination by one of the student. The Principal, on the other hand,
abused his discretionary powers by dismissing the students on the basis of inappropriate
findings of the enquiry commission.
(i) Principle of Bias would apply with regard to the approach of enquiry commission.
28.
The first Principle of natural justice consists of the rule against bias or interest and is based
on the three maxims: 1) No man shall be judge of his own cause 2) Justice should not only
be done but undoubtedly be seen to be done 3) Judges, like Caesars wife should be above
suspicion.38
29.
The Honble Supreme Court in the case of A.P.SRTC v. Shri Satyanarayan Transport (p)
Ltd.39 said that bias means anything which tends or may be regard as tending to cause such
a person to decide a case otherwise than on evidence. Further in the case of Secy. To Govt.
Transport Department v. Munuswamy Mudaliar,40 Justice Mukherjee stated that any
predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of
the dispute is bias.
30.
When an officer, superior to the enquiry commission, directed him to initiate disciplinary
proceeding was held vitiated and the court held that the authority has to apply his own mind
while concluding the dispute and he cannot do so at the instance of the higher authority.41
36
37
38
39
40
41
Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees, AIR 1950 SC 188.

Supra Note 2 at 4.
Supra Note 14 at
AIR 1965 SC 1303.
AIR 1988 SC 2232.
Union of India v. B.N. Jha, (2003) 4 SCC 531.
7
Pleadings
31.
Petitioners
It is well settled that any least pecuniary interest will disqualify a person from acting as a
judge.42 Halsbury Laws of England,43states that if there is a presumption that any financial
interest, however small, in the matter in dispute disqualifies a person from adjudicating.
Therefore, appointing a professor as the enquiry officer is a gross misconduct on the part of
the respondent.
32.
The case of Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Properties,44 is the classic example of the
application of rule against pecuniary interest. Lord Campbell said that even in the remotest
degree Lord Cottenham could not be influenced by the pecuniary interest but still it is of the
last importance that the rule against pecuniary interest shall be held sacred. The principle to
be deduced from the above judgment is even the least pecuniary interest in the cause
disqualifies a judge. Further in the case of Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand,45 wherein, the
Supreme Court of India followed the same ratio and stated that any pecuniary interest,
whether big or small, shall disqualify a person to be acting as a judge.
33.
There is also possibility of official biasness on part of professor. The Official Bias generally
arises when the decision maker is part and parcel of the department and interested in
upholding the departmental or institutional policy.46 If any question is required to be decided
or adjudicated, the doctrine nemo debet esse judex in propria causa would apply and a party
to the cause shall be precluded from determining that controversy.47
34.
In the case of A.K. Mukopadhyay v. Union of India,48 the court quashed the findings of
disciplinary proceedings because the disciplinary authority was acting under the direct
control of commandant. Further in the cases of Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana,49
and Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram Secondary School,50 the
Honble Supreme Court of India led down that for establishing the plea of bias the petitioner
has to show only a reasonable likelihood of bias, and not actual bias. This means that even a
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, (2001) 1 AC 119.

1 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, ( 4th Edition, LexisNexis Butterwoths Wadhwa, Nagpur)Pg.- 82-83.
(1852) 3 HLC 759.
AIR 1957 SC 425.
1 M.P. JAIN, TREATISE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, (LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur), (1996) pg. 422433.
Supra Note 3 at pg.- 289.
(2005) ILR 1 Cal 27.
AIR 1987 SC 454.
AIR 1993 SC 2155.
8
Pleadings
Petitioners
small hint of biasness shall vitiate the whole proceedings and it is not necessary for any
person to prove actual biasness.
35.
Hence, by going through the above cited judicial pronouncements and legal provisions, the
petitioner humble submits before the court that there is high probability of bias in the
proceedings of enquiry commission as the professor is the employee of the respondent and
hence any further findings of the commission should be quashed on the face of it.
(ii) The Findings of Commission are arbitrary and invalid.
36.
The power conferred on the commission was to be exercised on the considerations relevant
to the purpose for which it is conferred. The commission was set up in order to look into the
matter of petitioners because the action of suspension was criticized heavily by the citizens
of Jeevasthana.51 Instead, the commission takes into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous
factors into consideration and also left out the relevant consideration while adjudicating the
dispute.
37.
The approach of commission seems to be hell bent on deciding the matter against the
students. The finding of the commission was based only on the oral evidence of Sarmila Bai.
She is a 75 year old lady and also has poor eye sight. At the time of cross examination, Ajith
showed the Rs. 500 note to her which she identified as a Rs. 100 note.52 This proves that she
does not possess good eye sight and therefore such oral evidence cannot be trusted upon
while giving decision. But the commission ignored this relevant factor and gave its finding
based on improper oral evidence. In the leading case of Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West
Bengal,53 Honble Justice Chinnappa Reddy stated that, The proposition that the decision
must be arrived at after taking into account all relevant considerations, eschewing all
irrelevant considerations cannot for a moment be doubted.
38.
The commission never enquired for any corroborative evidences in order to support the claim
of the oral evidence of Sarmila Bai. It is a rule of caution devised to seek assurance and dispel
any lingering doubt and the necessity of such corroboration arises where the evidence of eye
51
52
53
Supra Note 2 at 3.
Id 4.
(1987) 2 SCC 295.
9
Pleadings
Petitioners
witnesses, though ex facie acceptable, is not of such a character upon which implicit reliance
can be placed.54
39.
Therefore, the commission should not have decided the issues on the mere basis of oral
evidence of Sarmila Bai as it was proved that she had poor eye-sight and also there are no
corroborative evidences in order to support her deposition. Rendering the finding of the
commission as invalid since, mala fide intention appears on its part.
(iii) There is an abuse of Administrative Discretion on part of Principal of the College.
40.
The Code of Conduct drafted by the Governing Body does not have any rule specifying the
penalty or punishment that will be attracted in consequence to the violation of code of
conduct thus, the Principal has exercised his Administrative Discretion while giving the
punishment.
41.
Lord Diplock in the case of Secy. of State for Education & Science v. Tame side Metropolitan
Borough Council,55said that, the very concept of administrative discretion involves a right
to choose between more than one possible course of action on which there is a room for
reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. The term
discretion itself implies vigilance, care, caution and circumspection. When the
discretionary power is bestowed upon any administrative authority, it also imposes
responsibility that such discretion is exercised honestly, properly and reasonably. 56 When
this discretionary power is conferred on an administrative authority, it must be exercised
according to law and if such power is used improperly and unreasonably, there is an abuse
of power.
42.
In the leading case of Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India,57 the Honble Supreme
Court said:
A repository of power acts ultra vires either, when he acts in excess of his
power in the narrow sense or when he abuses his power by acting in bad
faith or for an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without
regard to relevant considerations or with gross unreasonableness.
54
55
56
57
J.K. VERMA, B.R. GHAIYES, LAW AND PROCEDURE OF DEPARTMENTAL ENQUIRIES (IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS), (Volume II, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow), (2012).
1977 AC 2014; (1976) WLR 641.
DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, Sweet & Maxwell.1995, 296-299.
(1990) 3 SCC 223.
10
Pleadings
43.
Petitioners
The Principal of the college has abused his discretionary power because his action of
dismissing the students is judicial in nature and he being the decision making authority ought
to follow the fair and reasonable manner in order to arrive at the proper, reasonable and just
decision. He dismissed the students on the basis of the findings of the enquiry commission
which itself arbitrary and invalid. The ground on which he decided the fate of the students is
irrelevant and arbitrary and thus abuses his discretionary power and also violates the
Principles of natural justice.
(iv) The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation is violated by the Principal and the enquiry
commission.
44.
The Halsburys Laws of England,58 explains the Doctrine as:

A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain
way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in
private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise from a
representation or promise made by the authority including an Implied
representation or from consistent past practice.59
45.
The same is reiterated in the case of Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO.60 Further in a case,
the Supreme Court referred the legitimate expectation as those expectations which travel
beyond enforceable legal rights, provided they have some reasonable basis.61 The Doctrine
imposes a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking into consideration all relevant
factors relating to such legitimate expectation.
46.
Here, in the present case also the expectation of the petitioners were being shattered as proper
treatment was not being given to them as the proceeding of the enquiry commission were
vitiated from the beginning and the attitude of the respondents principals decision was also
based on this. They, were not given a just, fair and reasonable treatment from the concerned
authorities in the present case thus the treatment of the authorities was not up to the legitimate
expectation of the petitioners.
58
Supra Note 43 at pg. 151-152.

Id.
60
(2005) 1 SCC 625.
61
U.P. Awas EvamVikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, AIR 1995 SC 724.
59
11
Pleadings
Petitioners
B. Punishment given to the students is disproportionate and thus violates the Doctrine
of Proportionality.
47.
The Petitioner humbly submits before the Honble High Court that the punishment of
dismissing both the students merely because they sat together on a same bench is highly
disproportionate. This action of Principal violates the doctrine of proportionality and thus
calls for judicial review of the said order of Principal. The proportionality is a Principle
where the court is concerned with the process, method or manner in which the decision maker
has ordered his priorities and reached a conclusion or arrived at decision.62 According to De
Smith63, the proportionality involves balancing test64 which permits scrutiny of the
excessive onerous penalties or infringement of rights, interests and manifest imbalance of
relevant considerations.
48.
In the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service,65 Lord Diplock
propounded this doctrine. According to him, if an action taken by an authority is grossly
disproportionate then such decision is not immune from the judicial scrutiny. Apart from the
fact that it is improper and unreasonable exercise of power, it shocks the conscience of the
court and amounts to evidence of bias and prejudice. The Doctrine of Proportionality
ordains that administrative measures should not be more drastic than are necessary for
attaining the desired result.66
49.
The Wednesbury Principle as held in the case of Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India67
that:
The principle is often misunderstood to mean that any administrative
decision which is regarded by the Court to be unreasonable must be struck
down. The correct understanding of the Wednesbury principle is that a
decision will be said to be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense if (i) it is
based on wholly irrelevant material or wholly irrelevant consideration, (ii)
it has ignored a very relevant material which it should have taken into
62
Supra Note 3 at pg. 889, See Also: UOI v. G. Ganayutham (Dead) by LRs., AIR 1997 SC 3387
Supra Note 56 at pg. 601-605.
64
Management of Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank v. Secretary, Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Association and Anr, (2007) 4 SCC 669
65
1985 AC 374.
66
Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law, Pg. 306-308 (10th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2009).
67
(2006) 2 SCC 1.
63
12
Pleadings
Petitioners
consideration, or (iii) it is so absurd that no sensible person could ever have

reached it.68
50.
In this disputed case, the penalty given to the students in excessive and procedure which was
followed by the college while coming to the decision is also arbitrary. For merely sitting with
the opposite gender the college has dismissed the students, which violates the balancing test
of the doctrine of proportionality and hence violates fundamental rights.
51.
Further in the leading case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors.,69 the Court elaborately
dealt on the Doctrine of Proportionality. In this case an Army Officer did not obey the lawful
command of his superior officer by not eating food offered to him. Court-martial proceedings
were initiated against him and a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one year was imposed.
He was also dismissed from the service, with added disqualification that he would be unfit
for future employment. Honble Justice Venkatachaliah observed :
The sentence has to suit the offence and offender. It should not be
vindictive and unduly harsh. It should not be as disproportionate to the
offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive
evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of
the judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise,
within the exclusive province of the court martial, if the decision of the court
even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence
would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are
recognized grounds of judicial review.70
52.
In the case of Akshay Chaudhary v. University of Delhi and Anr
71
it was being held that
permanent suspension should be quashed and rustication from one academic year will suffice
as the students are the final year students and have shown adequate remorse for the offence
of ragging which they have committed.
53.
Again in the case of Sardar Singh v. Union of India,72 a jawan of Indian Army was sentenced
to rigorous imprisonment for three months and was also dismissed from service merely
68
69
70
71
72
Id.
AIR 1987 SC 2386.
N.C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 4 SCC 611.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI W.P. (C) No. 1897/2010 and C.M. No. 9422/2010 Decided On: 08.09.2010.
(1991) 3 SCC 213.
13
Pleadings
Petitioners
because he purchased eleven bottles of rum but he was entitled for only four bottles of rum.
The Honble Supreme Court held the action arbitrary and punishment severe and hence set
aside the order.
54.
In the case of Hind Construction Engg. Co. Ltd. v. Workmen,73 some workers remained
absent from duty treating a particular day as holiday. They were dismissed from the service.
The industrial tribunal set aside the action. The Supreme Court confirmed the order of the
tribunal and held that it is impossible to think that any reasonable employer would have
imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire permanent staff in this manner.74
55.
In Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Workmen,75 it was alleged

that an employee of the Federation issued legal notices to the federation and to the
International Chamber of Commerce with a view to bring discredit to the Federation, the
employer. After holding a domestic enquiry, his services were terminated. Holding the
punishment as disproportionate to the misconduct, the Industrial Tribunal quashed the action.
The Supreme Court confirmed the order of tribunal and stated that the federation had made
the mountain out of a mole hill and made a trivial matter into one involving loss of its prestige
and reputation.76
56.
In the case of Bhagat Ram v. State of HP,77 an inquiry was instituted against a Forest guard
and he was held guilty for negligence in performance of his duty resulting in illegal cutting
of 17 trees. A penalty of removal was imposed on him. Setting aside the penalty, the court
observed that the penalty must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and if
any penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution.78
57.
Hence, by going through these cited judicial pronouncements and the legal positions adopted
in Indian jurisprudence as well as in foreign jurisprudence, the punishment is liable to be set
aside in order to protect the basic conscience of natural justice and also to protect the two
innocent students who were unfairly dismissed from the college at their final year of the
studies.
73
74
75
76
77
78
AIR 1965 SC 917.

Id.
(1972) 1 SCC 40.
Id.
(1983) 2 SCC 442.
Id.
14
Pleadings
Petitioners
III. RULE 10 IS IN VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

58.
It is most humbly submitted before this Honble High Court that Rule 10 of the Code of
Conduct is in violation of the fundamental rights mentioned under Article 14, 21 and 19(1)(a)
and (b) of the Constitution. The said rule infringes the rights guaranteed by these articles.
A. Rule 10 is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
59.
Rule 10 of the Code of Conduct is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as

this rule is arbitrary in its very nature, not full filing the duty of state reasons hence calling
upon the Honble Court to follow the theory of guided power.
(i). Rule 10 is arbitrary in nature
60.
The expression arbitrary means act done in an unreasonable manner as fixed or done
capriciously or at pleasure without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature
of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment depending on the
will alone.79 Wherever, there is arbitrariness in the State action whether it be of the Legislature
or of the Executive or of an authority under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into
action.80 In India arbitrariness is not a separate ground since it will come within the embargo
of Article 14.81
61.
The very basic essence of a co-educational institution is failing due to this rule even the
Ministry of Human Resource and Development, Department of Higher Education has stated
that boundaries between girls and boys should be relaxed in the form Gender Champions82
as Gender socialization of both boys and girls begins early, and it is important to initiate
change processes at a young age to shape attitudes and transform behaviors. Schools and
colleges play a major role in this regard, because students spend large amounts of time
engaged with peers in such settings. Creating positive social norms in educational institutions
that value girls and their rights is important to improve the well-being of girls and achieve
long-term and sustainable social change.
79
80
81
82
Kokila Devi v. The State of Jharkhand and Ors., 2015 (1) AJR 248.
M. Bassi v. Union of India, 1985 Lab IC (Del) 526.
Supra Note 9, See also Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC 304; State of M.P. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal, AIR 1987 SC 251.
Letter from the Director of Department of Human Resource and Development, Department of Higher Education
Communition Dated- 08/07/15. No.- 18-26/2015-U1A.
15
Pleadings
62.
Petitioners
The Courts have interpreted Constitution of India Article 14 to mean that every state action
must be reasonable, just, fair and non-arbitrary.83 Article 14 developed by the Supreme Court
in recent years states that it embodies 'a guarantee against arbitrariness' on the part of the
administration.84
63.
In the case of Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 201285 the court
discussed in relation to Article 14 that:
A State action has to be tested for constitutional infirmities qua Article 14
of the Constitution. The action has to be fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory, transparent, non-capricious, unbiased, without favouritism
or nepotism, in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable
treatment. It should conform to the norms which are rational, informed with
reasons and guided by public interest, etc. All these principles are inherent
in the fundamental conception of Article 14. This is the mandate of Article
14 of the Constitution of India.
64.
In the present case, the Rule prohibits opposite genders to sit in the same bench and there is
no reason for such rule, the governing body has framed an unreasonable rule in the code of
conduct.
65.
A law which includes a subordinate legislation and empowers an administrative authority to

impose arbitrary restrictions upon the exercise of a fundamental right, at his discretion, may
be struck down as arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14.86 Even in cases where there
is no fundamental right, the authorities who exercise their statutory power, the power should
be exercised in conformity with Article 14 bona fide and non-arbitrary.87
(ii). Requirement to State reasons
66.
Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for their erection and the actual
conclusions. They would also demonstrate how the mind of the maker was activated and
actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusions
83
84
85
86
87
E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555; See also Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh;,AIR
1991 SC 537; Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725; Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress,
1991 Supp (1) SCC 600; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398.
Central Inland Water Transportation Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1571, See also Mohini
Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666.
(2012) 10 SCC 1.
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608.
S.M. Rao v. Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Bangalore, 2003 SCC OnLine Kar 491.
16
Pleadings
Petitioners
reached. Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violating Article 14 or unfair procedure
offending Article 21.88
67.
In the case of Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of M.P.89 it was being held that:
If power conferred by statute on any authority of the State is vagrant and
unconfined and no standards or principles are laid down by the statute to
guide and control the exercise of such power, the statute would be violative
of the equality clause, because it would permit arbitrary and capricious
exercise of power, which is the anti-thesis of equality before law.
68.
Where a court or other authority may be vested with wide discretionary power, for even
discretion has to be exercised only along well-recognized and sound juristic principles with
a view to promoting fairness, inducing transparency and aiding equity. 90 Recording of
reasons for formulating of rules by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose,
namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process
of decision-making.91
69.
Here in the present case, unguided power is vested in the form of formulation of such rule
and there is no set guidelines as to what should be done in case any of the rules of code of
conduct is violated and such unguided discretion leads to arbitrariness and hence violate
Article 14. So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, it should meet the test of
Article 1492 and therefore every action of the executive authority must be subject to rule of
law and must be informed by reason.
70.
Where unguided and unfettered discretion is conferred on any authority, whether it be the
executive or the judiciary, it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously by such
authority.93 It is now a basic requirement of Article 14 that the exercise of discretion must
always be guided by some standards or norms so that it does not degenerate into arbitrariness
and operate unequally on persons similarly situate.
88
89
90
91
92
93
Krishna Swami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605, See also M/s Steel Authority of India v. State of Jharkhand
& Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Jhar 204; K. C. Malhotra (Dr.) v. H. P. University, Shimla, AIR 1995 HP 156; Malu v.
State of Kerala, 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 19349; Brij Bassi Hitech Udhyog Ltd. v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1997)
117 (3) PLR 538.
(1974) 4 SCC 788.
Maya Devi v. Raj Kumari Batra, (2010) 9 SCC 486.
S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594.
Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293.
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24.
17
Pleadings
71.
Petitioners
If power conferred by statute on any authority of the State is vagrant and unconfined and no
standards or principles are laid down by the statute to guide and control the exercise of such
power, the statute would be violative of the principle of equality, because it would permit
arbitrary and capricious exercise of power, which is the anti-thesis of equality before law.94
72.
It is true that a discretionary power may not necessarily be a discriminatory power but where
a statute confers a power on an authority to decide matters of moment without laying down
any guidelines or principles or norms the power has to be struck down as being violative of
Article 14.95
B. Rule 10 is in violation of Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India.
73.
It is humbly submitted before the Honble High Court that Rule 10 of the Code of Conduct
for the students violates the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression96 of the
students. Thus, hampering their day to day life within the college premises.
74.
The Honble Supreme Court construed the freedom of expression as: (i) it helps an individual
to attain self fulfilment, (ii) it assists in the discovery of truth, (iii) it strengthens the capacity
of an individual in participating in decision-making and (iv) it provides a mechanism by
which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social
change.97 All members of society should be able to form their own beliefs and communicate
them freely to others.98 Therefore the essence of such freedom is that people should be able
to communicate freely. And since in the present case free communication is restricted by the
said rule and such restriction is unreasonable since it does not fall into any of the criteria's
mention under Article 19(2). Therefore such rule is violative of Article 19(1) (a).
75.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India99 the SC stated that when the constitution makers
framed the PART III of the constitution, they inscribed certain basic rights which inhere in
every human being and which are essential for the unfolding and development of his full
personality. These rights represented basic values of civilized society. And in this disputed
case the students are not getting the freedom to mix with the opposite gender in order to have
94
95
96
97
98
99
Supra Note 89.

Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, (1981) 4 SCC 335.
INDIA CONST. ART. 19(1) (a).
Supra Note 9.
Id.
(1978) 1 SCC 248.
18
Pleadings
Petitioners
an overall development of their personality because of an unreasonable restriction put on

them through the Rule 10 of the Code of conduct.
76.
The word fundamental has two different connotations. The essential character of
fundamental right is secured by limiting the legislative power and by providing that any
transgression of the limitation would render the offending law pretend void.100 Hence the
law or the rule of code of conduct framed by the Governing Body should be held void
because it abridges the scope of limitation rendered by Article 19(2).
77.
The petitioner further submits that as it is established by the above contested argument that
the free speech and expression is being restricted by the said rule, then the restriction should
fall under the purview of reasonable restriction mentioned under Article 19(2).
The
petitioner submits that this rule does not fall under any of the restriction mention under
Article 19(2) and thus does not satisfy the provision of Article 19(2).
78.
These fundamental rights are different from the statutory rights in a sense as the statutory
rights can be taken away by the legislature whereas the legislature cannot take away the
fundamental rights and can only impose the reasonable restriction on those fundamental
rights.101 But the law does not even fall under the purview of reasonable restriction as it is
arbitrary on the face of it. It is the Right which is fundamental and not the restrictions and it
is the duty of the Supreme Court and all the courts in India to guard and defend those rights,
zealously.102 Right to live and freedom are essential and primary rights attached to the
person. If a man is free then only he can exercise his other auxiliary rights mentioned in the
constitution.103
79.
Article 19(1) (a) protects not only the right of primary expression but also freedom of
secondary propagation of ideas and the freedom of circulation. It is necessary for selfexpression, which is an important means of attaining free conscience and self-fulfillment.104
A statue limiting the right to free speech and expression if found to be vague would be
declared void.105
100
Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, UOI, (2012) 5 SCC 1.

Supra Note 14.
102
Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1951 SC 270; See also Supra Note 99; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of
Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481.
103
A.G. Kazi v. C.V. Jethwani, AIR 1967 Bom 235.
104
Ministry of I&B, Govt. of India v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161; See also Romesh Thappar v. State
of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
105
Winters v. New York, 333 US 507 (1948).
101
19
Pleadings
80.
Petitioners
This Hon'ble Court in the case of LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah (Prof.)106 also further
strengthened the concept of freedom of speech and expression in the following terms:
A constitutional provision is never static, it is ever-evolving and everchanging and, therefore, does not admit of a narrow, pedantic or syllogistic
approach. The Constitution-makers employed a broad phraseology while
drafting the fundamental rights so that they may be able to cater to the needs
of a changing society. Therefore, constitutional provisions must receive a
broad interpretation and the scope and ambit of such provisions, in
particular the fundamental rights, should not be cut down by too astute or
too restricted an approach, unless the context otherwise requires.
81.
The Hon'ble Court discussed the content of expression freedom of speech and expression
in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India107 and held that:
There are three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the
reach of this most basic of human rights. The first is discussion, the second
is advocacy, and the third is incitement. Mere discussion or even advocacy
of a particular cause howsoever unpopular is at the heart of Article
19(1)(a). It is only when such discussion or advocacy reaches the level of
incitement that Article 19(2) kicks in.108
82.
In the present case, Rule 10 of the Code of Conduct prevents free exercise of the right. Also
the said rule restricts mere discussion by preventing a male and female to sit together in the
same bench and hence violative of the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a).
C. The Rule 10 is in violation of Article 19(1) (b) of the Constitution of India
83.
It is humbly submitted before the Honble court that the rule 10 of the code of conduct is in
violation of Article 19(1) (b) which states that there should be freedom to assemble
peacefully and without arms109 as, the rule does not allow male and female student to sit
together110 there is a violation of the said fundamental right.
106
107
108
109
110
(1992) 3 SCC 637.

(2015) 5 SCC 1.
Id.
INDIA CONST. ART. 19(1) (b).
Supra Note at 2 3.
20
Pleadings
84.
Petitioners
This rule should not be applied or formulated in a college campus as it is a gross irregularity
for supervising the conduct of the students in the college. There, daily conduct is getting
affected due to this rule and as the institution is a co-educational institution where there are
in total 1700 students out of which 950 are girls111 such a rule is a hampering there rights in
a very gross manner.
85.
Under, Article 19(1) (b) the right to assemble includes the right to hold meetings112 therefore,
such a rule restricts a meeting between a boy and girl by not allowing them to sit together on
the same bench that too in a co-educational institution.
86.
The word meeting implies a concurrence or coming face to face of at least two persons113
and prima facie114 this is done with a specific object in view.115 Therefore, this rule only acts
as a hurdle for the students of different genders in the college for having discussions for
academic purposes.
87.
We should avoid ourselves from construing the word meeting in a very narrow manner it is
an ordinary concern, and its purpose familiar; meetings are daily taking place between
friends.116 It is a number of people having a common duty or function who have come
together for any legal purpose, or the transaction of business of a common interest, an
assemblage.117
88.
In the case of Mr. T. Sriranga Rao and Sri S. Srinivas v. The Director General of Police, The
Commissioner of Police, Dy. Commissioner of Police, Central Zone and The Andhra
Pradesh Non-Gazetted Officers' Association118 it was being held that since the government
employees were holding a private meeting where only invited persons were allowed
therefore, the act of police commissioner in allowing them to do so safeguards there right
under Article 19(1) (b).
89.
The restriction laid down of this freedom under Article 19(3) will also not be applicable as
meeting between two students as the present case is cannot be construed as a public meeting
111
Id.
HALSBURYS LAWS OF INDIA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-I, Volume 34, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2007.
113
Sharp v. Dawes, 46 LJQB 104, See also Awadhesi Kisan Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 Mah LJ 689.
114
Awadhoot v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Bom 28.
115
D.D. Didolkar v. Nagpur University, AIR 1976 Bom 276.
116
P Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, (Justice Y V Chandrachud Ed., Book 3, 3 rd Edition, Wadhwa Nagpur,
2007) (1940). pg. 2968.
117
Justice C. K. Thakker, Encyclopedia Law Lexicon, Ashoka Law House, New Delhi (India) (2010).
118
2013 (6) ALD 207.
112
21
Pleadings
Petitioners
in the case of State of Bihar v. R.B.H.R.M.L. Jute Mills119 it was being held that for a meeting
to be regarded as a public meeting two conditions must be full filled:
(i) The object of the meeting must be to discuss or express views on matters of public interest,
and
(ii) The public or a section thereof is invited to attend such meeting. The place where such
meeting is held is irrelevant, namely, whether it is a public or a private place.
Which is not the case on the present matter as sitting of two people can nowhere, satisfy the
above laid down conditions.
90.
In the case of Emperor v. Shankar Papayya120 the term public assembly is being discussed
as under:
The expression 'public assembly' seems to be used in contra-distinction to
private assembly, and in my view an assembly, to be a public assembly, must
be qualified both as to its purpose, and as to its composition. To my mind a
public assembly is one the object of which is the furtherance of some public
purpose, and the constitution of which involves the admission of members
of the public, whether conditionally or unconditionally.
91.
The Honble apex court in the case of O.K. Ghosh and another v. E.X. Joseph121 held that
rule 4(a) of of the Central Civil Service Rules, 1955 should be struck down as it is in violation
of Article 191 (b) as it did not allowed the employees to conduct meetings.
92.
Similarly, in the case of N.P. Nathwani v. The Commissioner of Police122 the Honble
Bombay High Court has held that:
A family unit of five consisting of husband, wife and three children
cannot sit together for a dinner at a table without obtaining the prior
permission of the Police Commissioner and a Muslim cannot socially meet
his four wives at one time and place without obtaining the prior permission
of the Police Commissioner. None of the assemblies or meetings which I
have indicated above can normally have any rational connection with the
problem of preservation of the public order in this city; even so, respondent
119
120
121
122
AIR 1960 SC 378.

(1943) 45 BOMLR 310.
AIR 1963 SC 812.
1976 (78) BOMLR 1.
22
Pleadings
Petitioners
No. 1 in the exercise of the power conferred upon him under

Section 37(3) has thought fit to issue these general orders imposing a total
ban or a near-total ban taking within its sweep all the aforesaid types of
innocent assemblies or meetings. Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Bom. XXII of
1951), Section 37(3) A private meeting will construe from the fact that the
people who are invited will only attend it.
93.
Therefore, in the present matter a private meeting is being construed as a public meeting.
The rule when applied in general is restricting the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)
(b) in a very unreasonable manner and is defeating the whole purpose of a co-educational
institution as boys and girls are not allowed to sit together. The private meeting which is
between students of the college varying from academics to private discussions is being
regulated by the code of conduct in a gross manner.
D. The Rule 10 violates Article 21 of The Constitution of India.
94.
The petitioner humbly submits before the Honble High Court that the Rule 10 of Code of
Conduct violates the Article 21 of the Constitution of India as it snatches away the personal
liberty of the students as it restricts them from sitting on the bench where they want to sit and
with whom they want to sit. The rule says that no male and female shall sit on a same bench
which directly infringes the personal liberty of the students as they are not allowed to sit on
a bench where they want to sit just because a person of opposite sex is sitting on that bench
and also they are not allowed to sit with whom they want to sit.
95.
The term personal liberty refers to the right of freedom of a person to behave as they would
like.123 Honble Supreme Court of India while interpreting the expression personal liberty
said that the expression personal liberty is used as a compendious term to include within
itself all varieties of rights which goes up to make up the personal liberties of a man other
than those dealt within the several clauses of Article 19(1).124 While Article 19 (1) deals with
the particular species or attributes of that freedom, personal liberty in Article 21 takes on
and comprises the residue.125 Article 21 is not restricted to violation of right to life and liberty
123
124
125
Blacks Law Dictionary, Eighth edition.

Supra Note 14 at pg. 3103, See Also: Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1963 SC 1295; State of W.B. v. Ashok
Dey, (1972) 1 SCC 199; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180.
AIR 1963 SC 1295.
23
Pleadings
Petitioners
committed by state but it is also to be protected from being interfered with by private
individuals.126
96.
The Honble Supreme Court of India interpreted the term liberty as:
The term liberty, is subject to reasonable restrictions, with reference to
the other constitutional rights. Article 21 is the foundation of the
constitutional scheme. The procedure established by law for deprivation of
rights conferred by this article must be fair, just and reasonable. The rules
of justice and fair play require that State action should neither be unjust
nor unfair, lest it attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the
law which prescribed that procedure and, consequently, the action taken
there under. Any action taken by a public authority which is entrusted with
the statutory power has, therefore, to be tested by the application of two
standardsfirst, the action must be within the scope of the authority
conferred by law and, second, it must be reasonable. If any action, within
the scope of the authority conferred by law is found to be unreasonable, it
means that the procedure established under which that action is taken is
itself unreasonable. The law itself has to be reasonable and furthermore,
the action under that law has to be in accordance with the law so
established. Non-observance of either of this can vitiate the action, but if
the former is invalid, the latter cannot withstand127
97.
It is well settled that the validity of a law coming under Article 21 must be tested also with
reference to Arts. 14 and 19.128 Any law interfering with personal liberty of a person must
satisfy the triple test: 1) It must prescribe a procedure; 2) the procedure must withstand the
test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be
applicable to a given situation; and 3) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to
Article 14.129 As the test propounded by Article 14 pervades Article 21 as well, the law and
procedure authorizing interference with personal liberty must also be right and just and fair
126
127
128
129
Bhajan Kaur v. Delhi Administration, 1996 AIHC 5644.

Supra Note 100.
Supra Note 98.
Supra Note 3 at Pg- 3107.
24
Pleadings
Petitioners
and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. If the procedure prescribed does not satisfy the
requirements of Article 14, it would be no procedure at all.130
98.
The Honble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of Maneka Gandhi case 131, while
construing Article 21, opened up a new dimension and laid down that it imposed a limitation
upon law making as well, namely, that while prescribing a procedure for depriving a person
of his life or personal liberty, it must prescribe a procedure which is reasonable, fair and
just.132
99.
Hence, the Principle which can be derived from the above cited judicial pronouncements on
the claims of deprivation of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 is that in each case
where a person complains of the deprivation of his life or personal liberty, the court, in the
exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review, has to decide whether there is a law
authorizing such deprivation and whether, in the given case, the procedure prescribed by
such law is reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical and fanciful.133
100. The petitioners have already established in the previous sub-issues that the Rule 10 of the
Code of Conduct is arbitrary in nature, violating Article 14 and also violates the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) and Article 19(1) (b) of the Constitution. Thus
it is crystal clear that the Rule 10 of the Code of Conduct does not satisfy the tests of Article
14 and Article 19 and hence directly violating Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
101. Any action taken by public authority which is entrusted with the statutory power has,
therefore, to be tested by the application of two standardsfirst, the action must be within the
scope of the authority conferred by law and second, the action must be reasonable.134 Since,
the Rule 10 does not satisfy the twin test mentioned above, it can be inferred that it is
violating Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
130
131
132
133
134
District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank, AIR 2005 SC 186, See Also: State of W.B. v. Anwar
Ali Sarkar, (1952) SCR 284; Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123.
Supra Note 98.
Francis v. Union Territory, AIR 1981 SC 746.
Id.
5 DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 8th
Ed. See also M. Gopalan v. State of Kerala, 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 6726.
25
Prayer
Petitioners
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
counsels on behalf of the Petitioners humbly submit before the Honble Court to kindly pass the
Writ declaring and adjudging that:
I.
The Code of Conduct for students is drafted by an incompetent authority and should be
declared void.
II.
III.
The order of dismissal against the Petitioners should be set-aside.

The Rule 10 of the Code of Conduct is ultra vires to The Constitution of India and it must
be quashed.
And pass any other order which this Honble Court may deem it fit in the light of justice, equity
and good conscience.
And for this act of kindness of your lordship the petitioners shall as duty bound ever pray.
On behalf of Sunitha & Ajith
_______________________
Counsels for the Petitioners
XIII

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SUNITHA AND AJITH - -

ST. MARTIN COLLEGE-

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

THE PUNISHMENT OF DISMISSAL GIVEN BY THE PRINCIPAL IS LIABLE TO BE

A. The procedure followed by the college violated principle of natural justice

(ii) The findings of Commission are arbitrary and invalid -

(iii)There is an abuse of Administrative discretion on part of the college -

RULE 10 IS IN VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA-

A. Rule 10 is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India -

B. Punishment given to the students is disproportionate and thus violates the

(i) Rule 10 is arbitrary in nature

(ii) Requirement to State reason

B. Rule 10 is in violation of Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India

C. Rule 10 is in violation of Article 19(1) (b) of the Constitution of India

D. Rule 10 violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India

A.K. Mukopadhyay v. Union of India, (2005) ILR 1 Cal 27

A.P.SRTC v. Shri Satyanarayan Transport (p) Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1303

Additional District Magistrate (Revenue) Delhi Administration v. Sri

Akshay Chaudhary v. University of Delhi and Anr., THE HIGH COURT

Association of Management of Private Colleges v. All India Council For

Awadhoot v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Bom 28

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24.

Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 SCC 625

Bhagat Ram v. State of HP, (1983) 2 SCC 442

Bhajan Kaur v. Delhi Administration, 1996 AIHC 5644

Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees, AIR 1950 SC 188

Central Inland Water Transportation Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath

Chandrabhan Chunnilal Gour v. Shrawan Kumar Khunnolal Gour, AIR

Emperor v. Shankar Papayya, (1943) 45 BOMLR 310

Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Workmen,

Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981)

Ganpati Singh v. State of Ajmer AIR 1955 SC 188

Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik (2005) 13 SCC 300

Himal Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 227

Hind Construction Engg. Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1965SC 917

Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641

K. C. Malhotra (Dr.) v. H. P. University, Shimla, AIR 1995 HP 156

Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123

Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295

Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC 304

Krishna Swami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605

Laghu Udyog Bharti v. Union of India AIR 1999 SC 2596

LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah (Prof.), (1992) 3 SCC 637

M. Bassi v. Union of India, 1985 Lab IC (Del) 526

M. Gopalan v. State of Kerala, 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 6726

Malu v. State of Kerala, 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 19349

Management of Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank v.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248

Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balvant Rao Chavan, AIR 1989 SC

Ministry of I&B, Govt. of India v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC

Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666

N.P. Nathwani v. The Commissioner of Police, 1976 (78) BOMLR 1

Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of M.P., (1974) 4 SCC 788

Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. of 2012,

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180

Prabha Shanker Dubey v. State of M.P, AIR 2004 SC 486

Ram Pal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, AIR 2004 SC 1657

Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1951 SC 270

Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1

Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, UOI, (2012) 5 SCC 1

Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2386