In re estate of the deceased Ines Basa de Mercado. JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., petitionersappellants, vs. ATILANO G.

MERCADO, respondent-appellee
G.R. No. L-42226 July 26, 1935
I. Facts
-On May 29, 1931, the Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, ordered the publication of the notice of hearing of will and testament of Ines Basa,
the deceased, in accordance with by Sec. 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision
states that notice must be published three weeks successively previous to the time appointed for
the hearing on the will. The first publication was made on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20,
1931. The notices were published in Ing Katipunan, a weekly newspaper in the Province of
Pampanga.
-The hearing took place on the June 27, 1931, only twenty-one days after the date of the first
publication and not three full weeks before the day set for the hearing.
-On June 27, 1931, the trial judge, allowed and probated the last will and testament of the
deceased.
-On January 30, 1932, the same judge approved the account of the administrator of the estate,
declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the administration
proceedings.
-On April 11, 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed that
said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter
because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of the notice of
hearing prescribed in Sec. 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, contending that the notice was not
published for three full weeks before the day of the hearing. Also, they contended that Ing
Katipunan is not a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
II. Issues
1. Whether or not the mandate of Sec. 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding publication
of notice of hearing for three weeks successively was complied with.
2. Whether or not Ing Katipunan was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga.
III. Resolve
1. Yes, publication for three weeks successively was complied with as it was held that the
language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice should
be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words
the first publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for
the hearing. (The Supreme Court based their resolve from a commentary by the Supreme Court
of the State of Vermont talking about the same matter, as Section 630 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is taken from the Code of Civil Procedure of the said state.)

2. Yes, Ing Katipunan was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga in
view of the fact that:
a. It is published for the dissemination of local news and general information;
b. that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers (law does not require that
a newspaper has the largest number of subscribers to constitute a newspaper of general
circulation);
c. that it is published at regular intervals;
d. no attempt has been made to prove that it was a newspaper devoted to the interests or
published for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious
denomination.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. CAPT. FLORENCIO O. GASACAO,

Appellant
G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005
I. Facts
- Appellant was the Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc., a licensed local
manning agency, while his nephew and co-accused, Jose Gasacao, was the President. As the
crewing manager, appellants duties included receiving job applications, interviewing the
applicants and informing them of the agencys requirement of payment of performance or cash
bond prior to deployment.
-Ten private complainants alleged that appellant and Jose Gasacao conducted illegal recruitment
against them sometime in the months of May to December, 1999, by manners as defined under
Section 6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
- On August 4, 2000, appellant and Jose Gasacao were charged with Large Scale Illegal
Recruitment.
-On March 5, 2005, the RTC of Quezon City convicted appellant of Large Scale Illegal
Recruitment. The decision was affirmed and upheld by the Court of appeals on May 18, 2005.
-(In view of our topic) The accused contends that he is not aware that to require any bond or cash
deposit from worker to guarantee performance under the contract of his/her repatriation is illegal.
II. Issues
1. Whether error attended the trial courts findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.
2. (In view of our topic) Whether the appellants assertion that he was unaware of the prohibition
against the collection of bonds or cash deposits from applicants would be entertained by the
Supreme Court as a defense.
III. Resolve
1. The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable of
large scale illegal recruitment. There is no merit in appellants contention that he could not be
held liable for illegal recruitment since he was a mere employee of the manning agency, pursuant
to Section 6 of RA No. 8042 which provides that the persons criminally liable for the above
offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories, and that in case of juridical persons, the
officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. Further, it
reaffirmed its decision in People v. Cabais that an employee of a company or corporation
engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is
shown that he actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process.
2. The court find the excuse flimsy and self-serving, and re-iterated the established dictum that
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP., Respondent
G.R. No. 187521 March 14, 2012
I. Facts
- Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan
Development Project.
- On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HR
Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and
supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project.
- Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress
billing which the latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days from
receipt thereof.
-The parties further agreed that the extent of HRCCs completed works that would be indicated
in the monthly progress billings should be determined through a joint measurement conducted by
FFCCI and HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and the consultants.
-HRCC, on four occasions, submitted its monthly progress billings. FFCCI did not contest the
said progress billings submitted by HRCC despite the lack of a joint measurement of the latters
completed works as required under the Subcontract Agreement. Instead, FFCCI, together with
DPWH, proceeded to conduct its own verification of the works actually completed by HRCC
and, on separate dates, made payments to HRCC. These payments made were in accordance wtih
their (FFCCI & DPWH) billing reports, and not of HRCCs.
-In December, 2004, HRCC sent FFCCI a letter demanding the payment of its overdue billing,
based on the formers monthly progress billing. Later in the same month, HRCC then halted the
construction of the subcontracted project
- HRCC filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Complaint
against FFCCI for overdue obligation and other expenses. The CIAC, and subsequently the Court
of Appeals, ruled in favor of HRCC.
II. Issues
1. What are the effects of FFCCIs non-compliance with the joint quantification requirement on
the progress billings of HRCC?
2. Is HRCCs rescission of the Subcontract Agreement (in guise of a work stoppage) valid?
III. Resolve
1. SC first pointed out the terms of the agreement should prevail because the terms of the
contract are not ambiguous (Abad v. Goldloop Properties, Inc.), so that the explicit provision of
the Subcontract Agreement that requires the participation of HRCC in the joint measurement
should be complied with.
FFCCIs non-compliance with the joint quantification requirement on the progress billings of
HRCC is a waiver of right to demand the same. Waiver by FFCCI was clear when it did not

contest the said progress billings submitted by HRCC despite the lack of a joint measurement of
the latters completed works as required under the Subcontract Agreement. FFCCI, being the
main contractor of DPWH, has the responsibility to request the representative of DPWH to
conduct the said joint measurement. Also FFCCIs voluntary payment in favor of HRCC, albeit
in amounts substantially different from those claimed by the latter, is a glaring indication that it
had effectively waived its right to demand for the joint measurement of the completed works.
Waiver, as explained by the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v. Donato, is:
"a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver
the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a
capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right
shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it."
Rights and privileges that may be waived:
General Rule: Everyone has a right to waive any rights and privileges of any character or any
matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or
which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred
with statute, or guaranteed by constitution.
Exceptions:
-right or privilege does not rest solely on the individual or is not intended for his sole benefit
-waiver infringe public right or the right of others
-waiver is detrimental to the community at large
-the waiver of the right or privilege is forbidden by law or against public policy
2. No, the work stoppage is not valid as HRCC had impliedly waived its right to rescind the
Subcontract Agreement when on many instances it continued to work despite nonpayment by
FFCCI. SC pointed out Article 1191 of the Civil Code which states that: the power to rescind
obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what
is incumbent upon him.