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L-6898
LUIS
MANALANG, petitioner,
vs.
AURELIO QUITORIANO, EMILIANO MORABE, ZOSIMO
G. LINATO, and MOHAMAD DE VENANCIO,respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner
Luis
Manalang
contests,
by quo
warranto proceedings, the title of the incumbent
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, and
seeks to take possession of said office as the person
allegedly entitled thereto.
The original respondent was Aurelio Quitoriano, who, at the
time of the filing of the petition (August 4, 1953), held said
office, which he assumed on July 1, 1953, by virtue of a
designation made, in his favor, as Acting Commissioner of
the National Employment Service, by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. Subsequently, or on October
22, 1953, petitioner included, as respondents, Emiliano
Morabe, who, on September 11, 1953, was designated
Acting commissioner of National Employment Service, and
Zosimo G. Linato, the Collecting, Disbursing and Property
Officer of said National Employment Service hereinafter
referred to, for the sake of brevity, as the Service in order
to restrain him from paying, to respondent Morabe, the
salary of the Commissioner of said Service. Still later, or on
January 21, 1954, Mohamad de Venancio, who was
designated Acting Commissioner of said Service, and
assumed said office, on January 11 and 13, respectively, of
the same year, was included as respondent.
It appears that, prior to July 1, 1953, and for some time prior
thereto, petitioner, Luis Manalang, was Director of the
Placement Bureau, an office created by Executive Order No.
392, dated December 31, 1950 (46 Off. Gaz., No. 12, pp.
5913, 5920-5921), avowedly pursuant to the powers vested
in the President by Republic Act No. 422. On June 20, 1952,
Republic Act No. 761, entitled "An Act to Provide for the
Organization of a National Employment Service," was
approved and became effective. Section 1 thereof partly
provides:
. . . In order to ensure the best possible
organization of the employment market as an
integral part of the national program for the
achievement and maintenance of maximum
DR.
JOSE
CUYEGKENG,
ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
DR. PEDRO M. CRUZ, as member of Board of Medical
Examiners, respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This quo warranto proceeding was initiated on November 25,
1950. The prayer in the petition, as amended on December
1, 1959, reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered in favor of the petitioners:
October
16,
Hon.
Enrique
C.
Assistant
Executive
Office
of
the
Republic
of
the
Malacaang, Manila
1959
Quema
Secretary
President
Philippines
Dear Sir:
In compliance with your request as contained in
your letter of October 15, addressed to the
Executive Council of the Philippine Medical
Association, and pursuant to a decision reached
by the said Council at a special meeting held
yesterday, please be informed that the nominee
who placed 13th in our order of priority for
recommendation as members of the Board of
Medical Examiners, namely, Dr. Rosita RiverRamirez, is now being recommended as No. 12.
With the disqualification of Dr. Dionisio R. Parulan
(No. 11) by virtue of his candidacy to an elective
post, we hereunder enumerate our twelve
recommendees in the modified order:
1.
Dr.
Cesar
Filoteo
2.
Dr.
Jose
Cuyegkeng
3.
Dr.
Edgardo
Caparas
4.
Dr.
Antonio
Guytingco
5.
Dr.
Pedro
N.
Mayuga
6.
Dr.
Benjamin
Roa
7.
Dr.
Jose
Cocjin
8.
Dr.
Timoteo
Alday
9.
Dr.
Dominador
Jacinto
10.
Dr.
Alejandro
Gaerlan
11.
Dr.
Oscar
Chacon
12. Dr. Rosita Rivera-Ramirez
Thank you for your interest on this matter.
FOR
THE
EXECUTIVE
S/ALBERTO
Z.
T/ALBERTO Z. ROMUALDEZ, MD.
COUNCIL
ROMUALDEZ
THE
PRESIDENT
Of the twelve(12) names submitted in your abovementioned letter of October 16, 1959, Dr. Antonio
Guytingco and Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan, government
physicians, happen to be both personal physicians
of the President. For this reason, the President
decided on renewing the appointment of Dr. Pedro
M. Cruz, also a government physician, whose term
under the old law would not have expired until
August 7, 1960, were it not for the enactment of
Republic Act No. 2382.
The
Executive
Philippine
Medical
1850 Taft Avenue, Manila
Council
Association
Gentlemen:
The President wishes me to thank you for your
letter of October 16, 1959, submitted a revised list
of recommendees for appointment as members of
the Board of Medical Examiners under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2382.
Very
truly
(Sgd.) Enrique C. Quema
t/ENRIQUE
C.
Assistant Executive Secretary
The members
Government
Physicianof this Court are split into three (3) groups in
their views on the issues thus raised by the pleadings.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, upon which the
petitioners and the intervenors rely, provides:
U. P.
yours,
QUEMA
Railroad et al. vs. Willis [1947] 305 Ky. 224, 203 S. W. 2nd
18; Bradley vs. Board of Zoning Adjustment [1926], 255
Mass. 160, 150 N. E. 892) is in point for the constitutions of
Kansas, Kentucky and Massachusetts contain no provision
identical or analogous to that found in our fundamental law,
vesting in the President all executive powers not conferred
upon others, all explicitly stating that all officers of the
Government whose appointment are not otherwise provided
for in the character of said states shall be appointed by him.
The authority of the chief executive of those states to appoint
the officers involved in said cases springs mostly from
statutes, unlike the President of the Philippines, whose
appointing power emanates from our Constitution.
The third group, which is bigger than any of the two (2)
groups already adverted to, deems it unnecessary, either to
inquire into the constitutionality of said section 13, or to
determine whether the same is mandatory or directory, for
the reasons presently to be stated.
The letter to the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical
Association dated November 18, 1959, informing the
Association of the action taken by the President, states that
he "had decided to appoint in the Board two graduates from
the University of the Philippines, two government physicians
irrespective of alma mater". The list submitted by the
Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association
included two (2) government physicians, namely, Dr. Antonio
Guytingco and Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan, both of whom were
"personal physicians of the President". Believing, perhaps,
that their appointment to the Board may either deprive him
completely of the benefits of their professional services, or
impair the quality or usefulness thereof, or that a choice in
favor of his two (2) personal doctors, as representatives of
the government physicians in said Board, may smack of, or
be misconstrued as, an act of nepotism, it was deemed best
to appoint to the Board only one of them so that the other
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act,
the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,"
violates the constitutional proscription against appointment
or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government
or
any
subdivision,
agency
or
instrumentality
thereof,
including
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The section expresses the policy against the concentration
of several public positions in one person, so that a public
officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and
thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an
affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a
public officer or employee, like the head of an executive
department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, 6 ". . . . should be allowed
to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the
distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He
should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention
and energy among too many positions of responsibility,
which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency . . . ."
Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, "(t)he
basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a local
elective official will work for his appointment in an executive
position in government, and thus neglect his constituents . . .
." 7
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the
President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this
is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to
prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude
that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of
the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an
elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest
of the body politic is of no moment.
CASTRO, J.:
Paragraph 3, Section 23 of Rep. Act 2260, also provides:
This is a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent
Jovito O. Claudio, mayor of Pasay City, to appoint the
petitioner Basilio M. Pineda chief of police of the city, on the
A. Promotion (next-in-rank)
In reply, Claudio for the first time disclosed his reasons for
not appointing Pineda to the vacant position. In his letter to
Subido on September 20, he explained: .
As a native of Pasay and having been an official
hereof for the past eight (8) years I am fully
cognizant of the performance in office of Messrs.
Basilio Pineda, Jaime Valencia, Roland C. Siquijor
and Abelardo Tesoro and they cannot boast of any
improvement they have introduced to lift the
sagging inefficiency of the local police
organization. The actual members of untrained
and undisciplined men still persist.
xxx
xxx
denied,
The Facts
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath
of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.52
EPILOGUE
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case involves the appointment and transfer of
career executive service officers (CESOs). More specifically,
it concerns the appointment of respondent Josefina G.
Bacal, who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of
Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorneys Office, which
has a CES Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made
without her consent, to the Office of the Regional Director of
the PAO.
In its decision[1] rendered on March 25, 1999, the
Court of Appeals declared respondent Josefina G. Bacal
entitled to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public
Attorneys Office. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration,
but their motion was denied by the appeals court in its
resolution dated July 22, 1999. Hence this petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners contend that the transfer of
respondent to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO
is appropriate considering her rank as CESO III.
The background of this case is as follows:
Respondent Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career
Executive Service Examinations in 1989. On July 28, 1994,
she was conferred CES eligibility and appointed Regional
Director of the Public Attorneys Office. On January 5, 1995,
she was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos to the
rank of CESO III. On November 5, 1997, she was
designated by the Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public
Attorney. On February 5, 1998, her appointment was
confirmed by President Ramos so that, on February 20,
1998, she took her oath and assumed office.
....
if comparable to that of an Assistant IV
Appointment to CES Rank
There are six (6) ranks in the CES ranking structure. The
highest rank is that of a Career Executive Service Officer I
(CESO I), while the lowest is that of CESO VI.
The appropriate CESO rank to which a CES eligible may be
appointed depends on two major qualification criteria,
namely: (1) level of managerial responsibility; and, (2)
performance.
Performance is determined by the officials performance
rating obtained in the annual CESPES. On the other hand,
managerial responsibility is based on the level of the general
duties and responsibilities which an eligible is performing, as
follows:
Levels of Duties and Rank Equivalent
Responsibilities
if level of managerial responsibilities I
are comparable to that of an Under-
secretary
if comparable to that of an Assistant II
Secretary
if comparable to that of a Bureau III
....
The rank classification in the Service will allow for mobility or
flexibility of assignments such that the government could
utilize the services or special talents of these career
executives wherever they are most needed or will likely
create the greatest impact. This feature is especially relevant
in a developing country which cannot afford to have its
scarce executive manpower pegged to particular positions.
Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of
the better to cope with the exigencies of public
thus the distinguishing feature of the Career
Service. To
attain
this
objective,
the
Reorganization Plan provides:[14]
personnel,
service, is
Executive
Integrated
and her daughter Pia. They left Geneva for New York en
route to Havana on April 15, 1987. On the same day, the
DFA approved her application for a leave of absence with
pay from April 27 to May 1, 1987 (Ibid.).
On September 16, 1987, the DFA sent her a cable (GE202/87) requesting clarification on "why Mission paid for
plane ticket of infant Pia de Perio-Santos (petitioner's
daughter) Geneva-New York-Geneva per CV 216/87 when
she was not authorized to accompany her adopting mother
at government expense.(Ibid.)
Petitioner replied that the air fare tickets were for her only
and did not include her daughter whose trip was paid from
her personal funds (p. 86, Rollo).
On September 21, 1987, the DFA required her to refund the
amount representing her daughter's round-trip ticket since
DFA received a copy of the "facture" from the travel agency
showing that the amount of SFr.1,597 was in payment of (a)
1 billet adulte-Geneva/New York/Geneva SFr. 950, and (b) 1
billet enfant-Geneva/New York/Geneva SFr. 673; and that
the sum of SFr. 673 represented the cost of her daughter's
portion of the ticket (p. 86, Ibid.).
Instead of refunding only the sum of Sfr. 673 to the
Government, petitioner returned the full amount of SFr.1,597
(Annex E, pp. 38 and 86, Rollo). She thereafter claimed
payment for one round-trip economy plane ticket (GenevaNew York-Geneva) in the amount of SFr. 2,996 to which she
was entitled under the Foreign Service Personnel Manual on
Travel, Per Diems and Daily Allowance Abroad.
On October 5, 1987, Deputy Armando Maglaque, and some
MISUNPHIL employees filed administrative charges against
her for "incompetence; inefficient; corrupt and dishonest
activities; rude and uncouth manners; abusive and highhanded behavior; irregular and highly illegal transactions
involving funds of the mission." The charges were referred to
Ambassador Luis Ascalon for initial investigation (Comment,
p. 182, Rollo). Petitioner explained the circumstances of the
purchase of the discounted tickets. On November 26, 1987,
Ambassador Ascalon submitted his findings which, with the
complaints, were referred to a 5-man Ad Hoc Investigation
Committee for preliminary investigation (p. 86, Rollo). The
DULFO, Antonio 78
MARIANO, Eleuterio 79
G.R. No. 96298
RENATO
M.
LAPINID, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY and JUANITO JUNSAY, respondents.
FLORES, Nestor 80
DE GUZMAN, Alfonso 80
VER, Cesar 80
It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5)
and Villegas (79) have an edge over that of
protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).
CRUZ, J.:
The issue raised in this case has been categorically resolved
in a long line of cases that should have since guided the
policies and actions of the respondent Civil Service
Commission. Disregard of our consistent ruling on this
matter has needlessly imposed on the valuable time of the
Court and indeed borders on disrespect for the highest
tribunal. We state at the outset that this conduct can no
longer be countenanced.
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine
Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the
Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988.
This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by
private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier
representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May
9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement
Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should
be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other
comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto.
On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had not acted
on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service Commission
and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds
he had earlier raised before the PPA. In a resolution dated
February 14, 1990, the Commission disposed as follows:
After a careful review of the records of the case,
the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. In
the comparative evaluation sheets, the parties
were evaluated according to the following criteria,
namely: eligibility; education; work experience;
productivity/performance/ attendance; integrity;
initiative/leadership;
and
physical
characteristics/personality traits. The results of the
evaluation are as follows:
JUNSAY, Juanito 79.5
VILLEGAS, Benjamin 79
LAPINID, Renato 75
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
ANTONIO
LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
HONORIO ROMERO, ET AL., respondents. Cruz, Puno
and Lacson for petitioner.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
January 3, 1921
ANDRES
vs.
FERMIN MARIANO, defendant.
BORROMEO, plaintiff,
MALCOLM, J.:
Quo warranto proceedings have been instituted in this court
to determine the right of the plaintiff and of the defendant to
the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
The only facts, and these are undisputed ones, which need
be noticed, are the following: Andres Borromeo was
appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth
Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and
took possession of the office on that date. On February, 25,
1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial
District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the
Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since
the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to
the Twenty-first Judicial District.
Judges of First Instance are appointed by the GovernorGeneral with the consent of the Philippine Senate to serve
until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, secs. 65,
66, 148.) One Judge of First Instance is commissioned for
each judicial district, except the night. (Sec. 154.) The oath
of office of the judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to
which the affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its
records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be
detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty in a
district other than their own for the purpose of trying land
registration cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The
concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code,
to which particular attention is addressed by the AttorneyGeneral, is, "but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent
a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed
to be judge of another district." A Judge of First Instance can
be removed from office by the Governor-General only if in
the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall
exist involving serious misconduct or inefficiency in office.
(Sec. 173.)
The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court
to give effect to the general legislative intent if that can be
discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the
object intended to be accomplished by the statute is once
clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it
FELICIANO, J.:
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners do not disputed the fact that private respondent
Manapat had, at the time of his second retirement on 27
December 1989, rendered a total of thirty-five (35) years of
government service, with the result that he had complied
with the requirement for retirement under each and every
one of the four (4) modes of retirement provided in Section
12 of C.A. No. 186 as amended, quoted above, to wit:
Section 12(a) 30 years of
government service and attainment of
age 57 years;
12(b) 30 years of
government service
"regardless of age;"
12(c) 20 years of
government service
"regardless of age;"
and
12(e) 15 years of
government service
and attainment of
age 65 years.
Petitioners, however, insist that a government employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
years, with at least fifteen (15) years of service in the
government, has no choice save to retire under the
provisions of Section 12(e) of C.A. No. 186 as amended (i.e.,
R.A. No. 660), retirement thereunder being "automatic and
compulsory."
The Court is unable to agree. While Section 12(e) of C.A.
No. 186 as amended provides that "[r]etirement shall be
automatic and compulsory at the age of 65 years," there is
nothing in the statute to suggest that a government
employee who, like private respondent Manapat, happens to
satisfy the requirements not only of Section 12(e). but also
Section 12(a), 12(b) and 12(c), must necessarily retire under
Section 12(e). We find it very difficult to understand why a
government employee who reaches the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) but who has served a total,
not of fifteen (15) years (the minimum required under 12[e])
but rather thirty-five (35) years (i.e., more than the years of
service specified under 12[a], 12[b] and 12[c]), should be
regarded as deprived of the right to retire under 12(c) (i.e.,
R.A. No. 1616 as amended), where the required number of
years of services is only twenty (20).
The interpretation urged by petitioners is conspicuously at
war with the basic policy purpose of C.A. No. 186 as
amended by R.A. No. 1616 which is, of course, to create an
added incentive for qualified government employees to
remain in the service of the government. The basic principles
for the construction of statutes tell us that a statute must be
read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected
in the statute. Under this principle of effectiveness,
retirement statutes, in case of a real as distinguished from a
merely ostensible doubt or ambiguity, must be so construed
as to give meaning and effect to their humanitarian purposes
and so as reasonably to benefit employees who had opted to
stay in the services of the government for so many
years. 3 Thus, we read Section 12(c) as applicable in respect
of private respondent Manapat who had complied with the
requirement of that subsection of at least twenty (20) years
of service. The benefits of Section 12(c) are, under its