G.R. No.

L-16887

November 17, 1920

MIGUEL
R.
CORNEJO, petitioner,
vs.
ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor of Rizal,
and the PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL,
composed of ANDRES GABRIEL, PEDRO
MAGSALIN and CATALINO S. CRUZ, respondents.
The petitioner in this case, the suspended municipal
president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by these proceedings
inmandamus to have the provincial governor and the
provincial board of the Province of Rizal temporarily
restrained from going ahead with investigation of the
charges filed against him pending resolution of the
case, and to have an order issue directed to the
provincial governor commanding him to return the
petitioner to his position as municipal president of
Pasay. The members of the provincial board have
interposed a demurrer based on the ground that this
court has no right to keep them from complying with
the provisions of the law. The provincial governor has
filed an answer to the petition, in which he alleges as
a special defense that numerous complaints have
been received by him against the conduct of Miguel
R. Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay; that these
complaints were investigated by him; that he came to
the conclusion that agreeable to the powers conferred
upon provincial governors, the municipal president
should be temporarily suspended, and that an
investigation is now being conducted by the provincial
board.
Counsel for petitioner has argued, with much
eloquence, that his client has been deprived of an
office, to which he was elected by popular vote,
without having an opportunity to be heard in his own
defense. The respondents reply that all that the
provincial governor and the provincial board have
done in this case is to comply with the requirements
of the law which they are sworn to enforce. Obviously,
therefore, we should first have before us the
applicable provisions of the Philippine law bearing on
the subject of suspension of public officers.

Under the title of "Provincial supervision over

municipal officers," Article IV of Chapter 57 of the
Administrative Code, provides:
The provincial governor shall receive and
investigate complaints against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption, or other form of maladministration
in office. for minor delinquency he may
reprimand the offender; and if a more severe
punishment seems to be desirable, he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, and he may in such
case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the
board, if in his opinion the charge be one
affecting the official integrity of the officer in
question. Where suspension is thus effected,
the written charges against the officer shall
be filed with the board within ten days.
Trial of municipal officer by provincial board.
When written charges are preferred by a
provincial governor against a municipal
officer, the provincial board shall, at its next
meeting, regular or special, furnish a copy of
said charges to the accused official, with a
notification of the time and place of hearing
thereon; and at the time and place
appointed, the board shall proceed to hear
and investigate the truth or falsity of said
charges, giving the accused official full
opportunity to be heard. The hearing shall
occur as soon as may be practicable, and in
case suspension has been effected, not later
than fifteen days from the date the accused
is furnished a copy of the charges, unless
the suspended official shall, on sufficient
grounds, request an extension of time to
prepare his defense.
Action by provincial board. If, upon due
consideration, the provincial board shall
adjudge that the charges are not sustained,

the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall

adjudge that the accused has been guilty of
misconduct which would be sufficiently
punished by reprimand, or further reprimand,
it shall direct the provincial governor to
deliver such reprimand in pursuance of its
judgment; and in either case the official, if
previously suspended, shall be reinstated.
If in the opinion of the board the case is one
requiring more severe discipline, it shall
without unnecessary delay forward to the
Chief of the Executive Bureau certified
copies of the record in the case, including
the charges, the evidence, and the findings
of the board, to which shall be added the
recommendation of the board as to whether
the official ought to be suspended, further
suspended, or finally dismissed from office;
and in such case the board may exercise its
discretion to reinstate the official, if already
suspended, or to suspend him or continue
his suspension pending final action.
The trial of a suspended municipal official
and the proceedings incident thereto shall be
given preference over the current and
routine business of the board.
Action by Chief of Executive Bureau.
Upon receiving the papers in any such
proceeding the Chief of the Executive
Bureau shall review the case without
unnecessary delay and shall make such
order for the reinstatement, dismissal,
suspension, or further suspension of the
official, as the facts shall warrant.
Disciplinary suspension made upon order of
the chief of the Executive Bureau shall be
without pay and in duration shall not exceed
two months. No final dismissal hereinunder
shall take effect until recommended by the
Department Head and approved by the
Governor-General.

With the foregoing legal provisions in mind, certain

aspects of the case can be disposed of without
difficulty. Thus it cannot be seriously contended that
the courts should interfere with an orderly
investigation which is about to be conducted by the
provincial board. Nor can there be any doubt as to the
meaning of the law. A very minute and extensive
procedure is provided by the Legislature for central
and provincial supervision of municipal officers. The
provincial governor, in receiving and investigating
complaints against such officers, may take three
courses. For a minor delinquency he may reprimand
the offender; but if the maladministration in office is
more serious he may temporarily suspend the officer,
and thereafter may file written charges against the
officer with the provincial board. The procedure
followed before the provincial board and later on
appeal to the Chief of the Executive Bureau, while
interesting, does not concern us. The important fact is
that the law, in permitting a provincial governor
temporarily to suspend a municipal officer, makes no
mention of a formal hearing of the charges.
In the exercise of this disciplinary power by the
provincial governor, all that he can do before the
presentation of formal charges is either to reprimand
the officer or to suspend him temporarily from office.
In the latter case the provincial governor's action is
not a finality. The law is especially careful to guard the
rights of officer charged with maladministration in
office. But the point is made that, notwithstanding the
provisions of the law and notwithstanding long official
practice, the temporary suspension of a municipal
officer, without an opportunity to be heared in his own
defense, is in contravention of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of Rights concerning due process of
law.
So much has been written on the subject of due
process of law that is would be futile to enter into its
intricate mazes. It is self-evident, however, that, in
ordinary cases, to condemn without a hearing violates
the due process of law clause of the American
Constitution and of the Philippine Bill of Rights. It is
for this reason that we can well understand the logic

of those who cling to this through and to whom a

contemplated violation of the Constitution is most
repugnant. It is but fair, in ordinary cases, that a public
official should not be removed or suspended without
notice, charges, a trial, and an opportunity for
explanation. But not permitting our judgment to be
unduly swayed by sympathy for the petitioner's brave
fight, and recalling again that the courts have
ordinarily to give effect to legislative purposes, it is
further only fair to mention certain exceptions to the
due process of law rule, which would seem to include
the instant case.
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing
with an administrative proceeding and not with a
judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading
American writer on constitutional Law, has well said,
due process of law is not necessarily judicial process;
much of the process by means of which the
Government is carried on, and the order of society
maintained, is purely executive or administrative,
which is as much due process of law, as is judicial
process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it
is otherwise since they rest upon different principles.
(Weimer vs. bunbury [1874],
30 Mich., 201;
Den. vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. [1856],
18 How., 272 followed in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco
[1910], 16 Phil., 534; Tan Te vs. Bell {1914], 27 Phil.,
354; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus [1915], 31 Phil., 218 and
other Philippine cases). In certain proceedings,
therefore, of an administrative character, it may be
stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a
notice and hearing are not essential to due process of
law. Examples of special or summary proceedings
affecting the life, liberty or property of the individual
without any hearing can easily be recalled. Among
these are the arrest of an offender pending the filing
of charges; the restraint of property in tax cases; the
granting of preliminary injunction ex parte; and the
suspension of officers or employees by the GovernorGeneral or a Chief of a Bureau pending an
investigation. (See Weimer vs. Bunbury, supra; 12
C.J., 1224; Administrative Code, sec. 694.)

Again, for this petition to come under the due process

of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider
an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in
the United States, that a public office is not property
within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of
due proces of law, but is a public trust or agency. In
the case of Taylor vs.Beckham ([1899], 178, U. S.,
548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said that: "Decisions are
numerous to the effect that public offices are mere
agencies or trust, and not property as such." The
basic idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as
in the United States, is that of a popular
representative government, the officers being mere
agents and not rulers of the people, one where no
one man or set of men has a proprietary or
contractual right to an office, but where every officer
accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law
and holds the office as a trust for the people whom he
represents.
Coming now to the more specific consideration of the
issue in this case, we turn to the article by Prof. Frank
J. Goodnow, generally considered the leading
authority in the United States on the subject of
Administration Law, in Vol. 29, Cyclopedia of Law and
Procedure, and find the rules as to suspension of
public officers laid down very concisely as follows:
"Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to
the person suspended." (P. 1405.) The citation by
Professor Goodnow to support his conclusion is State
of Florida, ex rel. Attorney-General vs.Johnson
([1892], 30 Fla., 433; 18 L. R. A., 410). It was here
held by the Supreme Court of Florida that the
governor could, under section 15 of the executive
article of the Constitution, suspend an officer for
neglect of duty in office without giving previous notice
to the officer of the charge made against him.
A later compilation of the pertinent authorities is to be
found in 22 Ruling Case Law, pp. 564, 565. On the
subject of suspension of public officers it is heared
said:

The suspension of an officer pending his trial

for misconduct, so as to tie his hands for the
time being, seems to be universally accepted
as fair, and often necessary. . . . Notice and
hearing are not prerequisite to suspension
unless required by statute and therefore
suspension without such notice does not
deprive the officer of property without due
process of law. Nor is a suspension wanting
in due process of law or a denial of the equal
protection of the laws because the evidence
against the officer is not produced and he is
not given an opportunity to confront his
accusers
and
cross-examine
the
witnesses.lawph!l.net
The case to support the first sentence in the above
enunciation of the rule is State vs. Megaarden (85
Minn., 41), which in turn is predicated on
State vs. Peterson ([1892], 50 Minn., 239). In a
discussion of the subject more general than specific, it
was said:
The safety of the state, which is the highest
law, imperatively requires the suspension,
pending his trial, of a public officer,
especially a custodian of public funds,
charged with malfeasance or nonfeasance in
office. Suspension does not remove the
officer, but merely prevents him, for the time
being, from performing the functions of his
office; and from the very necessities of the
case must precede a trial or hearing. Such
temporary suspension without previous
hearing is fully in accordance with the
analogies of the law. It is a constitutional
principle that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty or property except by due process
of law, which includes notice and a hearing,
yet it was never claimed that in criminal
procedure a person could not be arrested
and deprived of his liberty until a trial could
reasonably be had, or that in civil actions ex
parte and temporary injunctions might not be
issued and retained in proper case, until a

trial could be had, and the rights of the

parties determined. We have no doubt,
therefore, of the authority of the legislature to
vest the governor with power to temporarily
suspend a county treasurer pending the
investigation of the charges against him, of
official misconduct.
The case cited by the editors of Ruling Case Law as
authority for their second sentence is that of
Griner vs.Thomas ([1907], 101 Texas, 36; 16 Ann.
Cas., 944). The holding of the court here was that it is
within the power of the legislature to authorize the
temporary suspension of a public officer during the
pendency of valid proceedings to remove such officer
and as an incident to such proceedings,
notwithstanding the fact that the constitution has
given power to remove such officer only for cause and
after a hearing. Notice and hearing are not
preprequisites to the suspension of a public officer
under a statute which does not provide for such notice
and hearing.
The third case cited by Ruling Case Law comes from
the United States Supreme Court. (Wilson vs. North
Carolina [1897], 169 U.S, 586.) An examination of the
decision, however, shows that while it tends to
substantiate the rule, the facts are not exactly on all
fours with those before us. Without, therefore,
stopping to set forth the facts, only the following from
the body of the decisioned be noted, viz.:
In speaking of the statute and the purpose of
this particular provision the Supreme Court
of the State said: "The duty of suspension
was imposed upon the Governor from the
highest motives of public policy to prevent
the danger to the public interests which
might arise from leaving such great powers
and responsibilities in the hands of men
legally disqualified. To leave them in full
charge of their office until the next biennial
session of the legislature, or pending
litigation which might be continued for year,

would destroy the very object of the law. As

the Governor was, therefore, by the very and
spirit of the law, required to act and act
promptly, necessarily upon his own findings
of fact, we are compelled to hold that such
official action was, under the circumstances,
due process of law. Even if it were proper,
the Governor would have no power to direct
an issue like a chancellor."
The highest court of the State has held that
this statue was not a violation of the
constitution of the State; that the hearing
before the Governor was sufficient; that the
office was substantially an administrative
one, although the commission was designed
by a statute subsequent to that which
created it, a court of record; that the officer
taking office under the statute was bound to
take it on the terms provided for therein; that
he was lawfully suspended from office; and
that he was not entitled to a trial by jury upon
the hearing of this case in the trial court. As a
result the court held that the defendant had
not been deprived of his property without
due process of law, nor had he been denied
the equal protection of the laws.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are of opinion the plaintiff in error was

not deprived of any right guaranteed to him
by the Federal Constitution, by reason of the
proceedings before the Governor under the
statute above mentioned, and resulting in his
suspension from office.
The procedure was in accordance with the
constitution and laws of the State. It was
taken under a valid statute creating a state
office in a constitutional manner, as the state
court has held. What kind and how much of
a hearing the officer should have before
suspension by the Governor was a matter for

the state legislature to determine, having

regard to the constitution of the State. (There
can also be cited as supporting authority
State ex rel. Wendling vs. Board of Police
and Fire Commissioners [1915], 159 Wis.,
295; Sumpter vs. State {1906], 81 Ark., 60;
Gray vs. McLendon [1901], 134 Ga., 224;
State vs. Police Commissioners, 16 Mo.
App., 947; Preston vs. City of Chicago
[1910], 246 III., 26; and People vs. Draper
[1910], 124 N.Y.S., 758, where it was held
that the legislature has the right to authorize
an officer to remove an appointive or elective
officer without notice or hearing.)
Certain intimations have been made that under the
procedure prescribed by the law an injustice might be
done municipal officers. Such suppositions are not
unusual even as to cases before the courts, but in this
as in all other instances, the presumption always is
that the law will be followed and that the investigation
and the hearing will be impartial. In the language of
Justice Trent in Severino vs. Governor-General
([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 402), "the presumption is just
as conclusive in favor of executive action, as to its
correctness and justness, as it is in favor of judicial
action." We entertain no doubt that the provincial
governor, fully conscious of the trust reposed in him
by the law, will act only in cases where strong reasons
exist for exercising the power of suspension and upon
a high consideration of his duty.
The suggestion that an unfriendly governor might
unduly delay the hearing is also without much force.
The same might be said of any administrative officer,
or in fact of any judicial officer. The presumption,
again, is that every officer will do his duty promptly,
and if he does not, certainly a remedy can be found to
make him do so. Not only this, but the law before us
expedites the proceedings by fixing a short period of
ten days within which the provincial governor must lay
the charges before the provincial board, which must
be heard by the latter body within fifteen days. Of
more compelling force is the suggestion from the
other side that the public interest might suffer

detriment by postponing the temporary suspension

until after the hearing.
Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is
that the provisions of section 2188 of the
Administrative Code are clear and that they do not
offend the due process of law clause of the Philippine
Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is our duty to apply the
law without fear or favor. Petition denied with costs.
So ordered.
G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995
SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE
LIMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and
HON. RAMON B. ERENETA, Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, respondents.
In
this
Petition
for Certiorari,
Prohibition
and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez
and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution
No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission
("Commission") and the authority of the Commission
to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the
Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA")
while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the
Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the
Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in
Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners
were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by
public respondents Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and
Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner,
respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7
June 1994. 1 Resolution No. 94-3710 needs to be
quoted in full:
RESOLUTION NO. 94-3710

WHEREAS, Section 17 of Book V of

Executive Order 292 provides that ". . . as
an independent constitutional body, the
Commission may effect changes in the
organization as the need arises;"
WHEREAS, the Commission finds it
imperative to effect changes in the
organization to streamline its operations
and improve delivery of public service;
WHEREAS, the Commission finds it
necessary to immediately effect changes
in the organization of the Central Offices in
view of the need to implement new
programs in lieu of those functions which
were transferred to the Regional Offices;
WHEREFORE,
foregoing
premises
considered, the Commission hereby
RESOLVES to effect the following
changes in its organization, specifically in
the Central Offices:
1. The OCSS [Office of Career Systems
and Standards], OPIA [Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit] and OPR [Office of
Personnel Relations] are merged to form
the Research and Development Office
(RDO).
2. The Office for Human Resource
Development (OHRD) is renamed Human
Resource Development Office (HRDO).
3. The following functions and the
personnel assigned to the unit performing
said functions are hereby transferred to
HRDO:
a. Administration of the Honor
and Awards program under
OCSS;

b.
Registration
and
Accreditation of Unions under
OPR; and

The changes in the organization and in

operations shall take place before end of
July 1994.

c. Accreditation of Agencies to
take
final
action
on
appointments under OPIA.

Done in Quezon City, July 07, 1994.

4. The Office for Central Personnel

Records (OCPR) is renamed Management
Information Office (MIO).
5. The Information technology functions of
OPM and the personnel assigned to the
unit are transferred to MIO.
6. The following functions of OPM and the
personnel assigned to the unit performing
said functions are hereby transferred to
the Office of the Executive Director:
a. Financial Audit and Evaluation;
b. Internal Management and Improvement;
c. Research and Statistics; and
d. Planning and Programming.
7. The library service and its personnel
under OCPR are transferred to the Central
Administrative Office.
8. The budget allocated for the various
functions shall be transferred to the Offices
where the functions are transferred.
Records, fixtures and equipment that go
with the functions shall be moved to where
the functions are transferred.
Annex A contains the manning list for all
the offices, except the OCES.

(Signed)
Patricia
Chairman

A.

Sto.

Tomas

(Signed)
Did
not
participate
Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr., Thelma P.
Gaminde
Commissioner Commissioner
Attested
(Signed)
Carmencita
Giselle
Board Secretary V 2

by:
B.

Dayson

During the general assembly of officers and

employees of the Commission held in the morning of
28 July 1994, Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised
of objections of petitioners, expressed the
determination of the Commission to implement
Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher
authority.
Petitioners then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution
dated 23 August 1994, the Court required public
respondents to file a Comment on the Petition. On 21
September 1994, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion
for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
alleging that petitioners had received Office Orders
from the Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez
to Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to
Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying
that public respondents be restrained from enforcing
these Office Orders. The Court, in a Resolution dated
27 September 1994, granted this Motion and issued
the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioners.

The Commission filed its own Comment, dated 12

September 1994, on the Petition and then moved to
lift the Temporary Restraining Order. The Office of the
Solicitor General filed a separate Comment dated 28
November 1994, defending the validity of Resolution
No. 94-3710 and urging dismissal of the Petition.
Petitioners filed separate Replies to these Comments.
The Commission in turn filed a Rejoinder
(denominated "Comment [on] the Reply").
The principal issues raised in this Petition are the
following:
(1) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had
legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the
extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems
and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of
Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and
Development Office]; and
(2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated
petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure.
I
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure
and organization of the Commission in the following
terms:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission The
Commission shall have the following offices:
(1)
The
Office
Director . . .

of

the

(2)
The
Merit
Board . . .

System

Executive

Protection

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs . . .

(4)
The
Office
Management . . .

of

Planning

and

(5) The Central Administrative Office . . .

(6) The Office
Records . . .

of

Central

Personnel

(7) The Office of Position Classification and

Compensation . . .
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination
and
Placement . . .
(9) The Office of Career Systems and
Standards shall provide leadership and
assistance in the formulation and evaluation
of personnel systems and standards relative
to performance appraisal, merit promotion
and employee incentive benefits and
awards.
(10) The Office of
Development . . .

Human

Resource

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and

Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules
and regulations for the effective conduct of
inspection and audit of personnel and
personnel management programs and the
exercise of delegated authority; provide
technical and advisory services to Civil
Service Regional Offices and government
agencies in the implementation of their
personnel programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall
provide leadership and assistance in the
development and implementation of policies,
standards, rules and regulations governing
corporate officials and employees in the
areas
of
recruitment,
examination,
placement, career development, merit and

awards systems, position classification and

compensation,
performance
appraisal,
employee welfare and benefits, discipline
and other aspects of personnel management
on the basis of comparable industry
practices.
(13) The Office
Affairs . . .
(14)
The
Office
Administration . . .

of

the

of

Corporate

Retirement

(15) The Regional and Field Offices. . . .

(Emphases in the original)
Immediately after the foregoing listing of offices of the
Commission and their respective functions, the 1987
Revised Administrative Code goes on to provide as
follows:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each
office of the Commission shall be headed by
a Director with at least one (1) Assistant
Director, and may have such divisions as are
necessary to carry out their respective
functions. As an independent constitutional
body, the Commission may effect chances in
the organization as the need arises.
xxx xxx xxx 3
(Emphasis supplied)
Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions
reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as well
each of the other Offices listed in Section 16 above,
consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of which
Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each
Section, Division and Office comprises a group of
positions within the agency called the Civil Service
Commission, each group being entrusted with a more
or less definable function or functions. These
functions are related to one another, each of them

being embraced by a common or general subject

matter. Clearly, each Office is an internal department
or organizational unit within the Commission and that
accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all
the other Offices within the Commission constitute
administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Put a little
differently, these offices relate to the internal structure
of the Commission.
What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission
do? Examination of Resolution No. 94-3710 shows
that thereby the Commission re-arranged some of the
administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the
Commission and, among other things, merged three
(3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new
grouping called the "Research and Development
Office (RDO)." The same Resolution renamed some
of the Offices of the Commission, e.g., the Office for
Human Resource Development (OHRD) was
renamed Human Resource Development Office
(HRDO); the Office for Central Personnel Records
(OCPR) was renamed Management Information
Office
(MIO).
The
Commission
also reallocated certain functions moving some functions
from one Office to another; e.g., the information
technology function of OPM (Office of Planning and
Management) was transferred to the newly named
Management Information Office (MIO). This reallocation or re-assignment of some functions carried
with it the transfer of the budget earmarked for such
function to the Office where the function was
transferred. Moreover, the personnel, records, fixtures
and equipment that were devoted to the carrying out
of such functions were moved to the Offices to where
the functions were transferred.
The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting
Resolution No. 94-3710 were described in that
Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in
the organization to streamline [the Commission's]
operations and improve delivery of service." These
changes in internal organization were rendered
necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization
and devolution of the Commission's functions effected
by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and

ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission

throughout the country, to the end that the
Commission and its staff may be brought closer
physically to the government employees that they are
mandated to serve. In the past, its functions had been
centralized in the Head Office of the Commission in
Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service employees all
over the country were compelled to come to Manila
for the carrying out of personnel transactions. Upon
the other hand, the dispersal of the functions of the
Commission to the Regional Offices and the Field
Offices attached to various governmental agencies
throughout the country makes possible the
implementation of new programs of the Commission
at its Central Office in Metropolitan Manila.
The Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner
de Lima to the CSC Regional Office No. 3 was
precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director filing
an application for retirement, thus generating a need
to find a replacement for him. Petitioner de Lima was
being assigned to that Regional Office while the
incumbent Regional Director was still there to
facilitate her take over of the duties and functions of
the incumbent Director. Petitioner de Lima's prior
experience as a labor lawyer was also a factor in her
assignment to Regional Office No. 3 where public
sector unions have been very active. Petitioner
Fernandez's assignment to the CSC Regional Office
No. 5 had, upon the other hand, been necessitated by
the fact that the then incumbent Director in Region V
was under investigation and needed to be transferred
immediately to the Central Office. Petitioner
Fernandez was deemed the most likely designee for
Director of Regional Office No. 5 considering that the
functions previously assigned to him had been
substantially devolved to the Regional Offices such
that his reassignment to a Regional Office would
result in the least disruption of the operations of the
Central Office. 4
It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was
moved by quite legitimate considerations of
administrative efficiency and convenience in
promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 94-

3710 and in assigning petitioner Salvador C.

Fernandez to the Regional Office of the Commission
in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M.
de Lima to the Commission's Regional Office in
Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga. It is also
clear
to
the Court that the changes introduced and formalized
through Resolution No. 94-3710 re-naming of
existing Offices; re-arrangement of the groupings of
Divisions and Sections composing particular Offices;
re-allocation of existing functions (and related
personnel; budget, etc.) among the re-arranged
Offices are precisely the kind of internal changes
which are referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code), quoted above, as "chances in
the organization" of the Commission.
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710
effected the "abolition" of public offices, something
which may be done only by the same legislative
authority which had created those public offices in the
first place.
The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this
case, to accept this argument. The term "public office"
is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by that individual for
the benefit of the public. 5 We consider that Resolution
No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as
that term is used in the law of public officers. 6 It is
essential to note that none of the "changes in
organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710
carried with it or necessarily involved the termination
of the relationship of public employment between the
Commission and any of its officers and employees.
We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987
Revised Administrative Code having mentioned
fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service
Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to
cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization

of the commission until it might please Congress to

change such internal organization regardless of the
ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole.
To
the
contrary,
the
legislative
authority
had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out
"changes in the organization," as the need [for such
changes] arises." 7 Assuming, for purposes of
argument merely, that legislative authority was
necessary to carry out the kinds off changes
contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the
Court is not saying that such authority is necessary),
such legislative authority was validly delegated to the
Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The
legislative standards to be observed and respected in
the exercise of such delegated authority are set out
not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"),
but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V,
Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code which required the Civil Service
Commission
as the central personnel agency of
the Government [to] establish a
career service, adopt measures to
promote
efficiency
[and] responsiveness . . . in the civil
service . . . and that personnel
functions shall be decentralized,
delegating
the
corresponding
authority to
the departments,
offices and agencies where such
functions
can
be
effectively
performed. (Emphasis supplied)
II.
We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their
right to security of tenure was breached by the
respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710
and ordering petitioners' assignment to the
Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V.
Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution
declared that "no officer or employee of the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for

cause provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend

that they were unlawfully removed from their positions
in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of
Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot, without
their consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of
the Commission.
We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the
Commission are not appointments to a specified
public office but rather appointments to particular
positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed
to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the
position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position
of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth.
In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to
the position of Director IV, without specification of any
particular office or station. The same is true with
respect to the other persons holding the same
position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987
Revised
Administrative
Code
recognizes
reassignment as a management prerogative vested in
the Commission and, for that matter, in any
department or agency of government embraced in the
civil service:
Sec. 26. Personnel Actions. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As used in this Title, any action denoting
the movement or progress of personnel in
the civil service shall be known as
personnel action. Such action shall include
appointment
through
certification,
promotion, transfer, re-instatement, reemployment,
detail,
reassignment,
demotion, and separation.All personnel
actions shall be in accordance with such
rules, standards, and regulations as may
be promulgated by the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx

(7) Reassignment. An employee may

be re-assigned from one organizational
unit
to
another
in
the
same
agency, Provided,
That
such
reassignment shall not involve a reduction in
rank status
and
salary.
(Emphasis
supplied)
It follows that the reassignment of petitioners
Fernandez and de Lima from their previous positions
in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and
Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the
Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their
subsequent assignment from the RDO to the
Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III
had been effected with express statutory authority
and did not constitute removals without lawful cause.
It also follows that such re-assignment did not involve
any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to
security of tenure considering that they retained their
positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy
the same rank, status and salary at their new
assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head
Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila.
Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested
right to serve at the Commission's Head Office.
Secondly, the above conclusion is compelled not only
by the statutory provisions relevant in the instant
case, but also by a long line of cases decided by this
Court in respect of different agencies or offices of
government.
In one of the more recent of these cases, Department
of Education Culture and Sports, etc., et al. v. Court
of Appeals, et al., 8 this Court held that a person who
had been appointed as "Secondary School Principal
II" in the Division of City Schools, District II, Quezon
City, National Capital Region, and who had been
stationed as High School Principal in the Carlos Albert
High School in Quezon for a number of years, could
lawfully be reassigned or transferred to the Manuel
Roxas High School, also in Quezon City, without

demotion in rank or diminution of salry. This Court

held:
The aforequoted provision of Republic Act
No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which
provides that except for cause and in the
exigencies of the service no teacher shall be
transferred without his consent from one
station to another, finds no application in the
case at bar as this is predicated upon the
theory that the teacher concerned is
appointed not merely assigned to a
particular station. Thus:
The rule pursued by plaintiff
only
goes
so
far
as
the appointed indicates a
specification. Otherwise, the
constitutionally
ordained
security of tenure cannot shield
her. In appointments of this
nature,
this
Court
has
consistently rejected the officer's
demand to remain even as
public service dictates that a
transfer be made in a
particular
station.
Judicial
attitude toward transfers of this
nature is expressed in the
following statement in Ibaez, et
al. vs. Commission on Elections,
et
al.
(G.R.
No.
L-26558, April 27, 1967; 19
SCRA 1002 [1967]);
That security of tenure is an essential and
constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil Service
System, is not open to debate. The mantle of its
protection extends not only against removals without
cause but also against unconsented transfer which,
as repeatedly enunciatEd, are tantamount to
removals which are within the ambit of the
fundamental guarantee.However, the availability of
that security of tenure necessarily depends, in the

first
instance,
upon
the
nature
of
the
appointment (Hojilla vs. Marino, 121 Phil. 280 [1965].)
Such that the rule which proscribes transfers without
consent as anathema to the security of tenure is
predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is
appointed not merely assigned to a particular
station (Miclat v. Ganaden, et al., 108 Phil. 439
[1960]; Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 118 Phil. 728
[1963]). [Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138 (1969)]
The
appointment of
Navarro
as
principal does not refer to any particular
station or school. As such, she could be
assigned to any station and she is not
entitled to stay permanently at any specific
school. (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA
623) When she was assigned to the Carlos
Albert High School, it could not have been
with the intention to let her stay in said
school
permanently.
Otherwise,
her
appointment would have so stated.
Consequently, she may be assigned to any
station or school in Quezon City as the
exigencies of public service require even
without consent. As this Court ruled
inBrillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138,
143
Plaintiff's confident stride
falters. She took too loose a view
of
the
applicable
jurisprudence. Her refuge behind
the mantle of security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution is
not impenetrable. She proceeds
upon the assumption that she
occupies her station in Sinalang
Elementary
School
by
appointment.
But
her
first
appointment as Principal merely
reads thus: "You are hereby
appointed
a
Principal
(Elementary School) in the
Bureau of Public Schools,
Department
of

Education", without mentioning

her station. She cannot therefore
claim security of tenure as
Principal of Sinalang Elementary
School
or
any
particular
station. She may be assigned to
any station as exigency of public
service requires, even without
her consent. She thus has no
right
of
choice. 9(Emphasis
supplied; citation omitted)
In the very recent case of Fernando, et
al. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas,
etc.,
et
a1., 10 the Court addressed appointments of
petitioners as "Mediators-Arbiters in the National
Capital Region" in dismissing a challenge
on certiorari to resolutions of the CSC and orders of
the Secretary of Labor. The Court said:
Petitioners were appointed as Mediator
Arbiters in the National Capital Region. They
were not, however, appointed to a specific
station or particular unit of the Department of
Labor in the National Capital Region (DOLENCR). Consequently, they can always be
reassigned from one organizational unit to
another of the same agency where, in the
opinion of respondent Secretary, their
services may be used more effectively. As
such they can neither claim a vested right to
the station to which they were assigned nor
to security of tenure thereat. As correctly
observed
by the
Solicitor
General,
petitioners' reassignment is not a transfer for
they were not removed from their position as
med-arbiters. They were not given new
appointments to new positions. It indubitably
follows, therefore, that Memorandum Order
No. 4 ordering their reassignment in the
interest of the service is legally in
order.11 (Emphases supplied)

In Quisumbing v. Gumban, 12 the Court,

dealing with an appointment in the Bureau of
Public Schools of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, ruled as
follows:
After a careful scrutiny of the
records, it is to be underscored
that the appointment of private
respondent Yap is simply that of a
District Supervisor of the Bureau of
Public Schools which does not
indicate a specific station (Rollo, p.
13). A such, she could be assigned
to any station and she is no entitled
to stay permanently at any specific
station (Bongbong v. Parado, 57
SCRA 623 [1974]; Department of
Education, Culture and Sports v.
Court of Appeals [G.R. 81032,
March 22, 1990] citingBrillantes v.
Guevarra [27 SCRA 138 [1969]). 13
Again, in Ibaez v. Commission on Elections, 14 the
Court had before it petitioners' appointments as
"Election Registrars in the Commission of Elections,"
without any intimation to what city, municipality or
municipal district they had been appointed as
such. 15 The Court held that since petitioners "were
not appointed to, and consequently not entitled to any
security of tenure or permanence in, any specific
station," "on general principles, they [could] be
transferred as the exigencies of the service required,"
and that they had no right to complain against any
change in assignment. The Court further held that
assignment to a particular station after issuance of the
appointment was not necessary to complete such
appointment:
. . . . We cannot subscribe to the theory
that an assignment to a particular station,
in the light of the terms of the
appointments in question, was necessary
to complete the said appointments. The

approval thereof by the Commissioner of

Civil Service gave those appointments the
stamp of finality.With the view that the
respondent Commission then took of its
power in the premises and the demand of
the mission it set out to accomplish with
the appointments it extended, said
appointments were definitely meant to be
complete as then issued. The subsequent
assignment
of
the
appointees
thereunder that the said respondent
Commission held in reserve to be
exercised as the needs of each locality
justified did not in any way detract from
the
perfection
attained
by
the
appointments
beforehand. And
the
respective appointees were entitled only to
such security of tenure as the appointment
papers concerned actually conferred
not in that of any place to which they may
have been subsequently assigned. . . . As
things stand, in default of any particular
station stated in their respective
appointments, no security of tenure can
be asserted by the petitioners on the basis
of the mere assignments which were
given to them. A contrary rule will erase
altogether the demarcation line we have
repeatedly
drawn
between appointment and assignment as
two distinct concepts in the law of public
officers. 16 (Emphases supplied)

appointed "Physician in the Municipal Maternity and

Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals." He was first
assigned to the Municipal Maternity and Charity
Clinics in Batulati, Davao, and later to the
corresponding clinic in Saug, Davao and then to Catil,
Davao. He was later assigned to the Municipality of
Padada, also of Davao Province. He resisted his last
assignment and brought mandamus against the
Secretary of Health to compel the latter to return him
to his station in Catil, Davao as Municipal Health
Officer
thereof.
The
Court,
applying Miclat
v. Ganaden dismissed this Petition holding that his
appointment not being to any specific station but as a
physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity
Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals, he could be transferred
or assigned to any station where, in the opinion of the
Secretary of Health, his services may be utilized more
effectively. 19

The petitioner, in Miclat v. Ganaden, 17 had been

appointed as a "Welfare Office Incharge, Division of
Urban, Rural and Community Administration, Social
Welfare Administration." She was assigned as Social
Welfare Incharge of the Mountain Province, by an
office order of the Administrator, Social Welfare
Administration. After a little more than a year;
petitioner was assigned elsewhere and respondent
Ganaden transferred to petitioner's first station in
Baguio City. The Court ruled that petitioner was not
entitled to remain in her first station, In Jaro
v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 18 petitioner Dr. Jaro had been

4. Concededly, transfers there are which

do not amount to removal. Some such
transfer can be effected without the need
for charges being preferred, without trial or
hering, and even without the consent of
the employee.

To be stressed at this point, however, is

that the appointment of Sta. Maria is that
of "Dean, College of Education, University
of the Philippines." He is not merely a
dean "in the university." His appointment
is to a specific position; and, more
importantly,
to
a
specific
station. 21 (Citations omitted; emphases
supplied)

The clue to such transfers may be found

in the "nature of the appointment." Where
the appointment does not indicate a
specific station, an employee may be

For all the foregoing we conclude that the

reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima
from their stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively,
to the Research Development Office (RDO) and from

Also noteworthy is Sta. Maria v. Lopez 20 which

involved the appointment of petitioner Sta. Maria as
"Dean, College of Education, University of the
Philippines." Dean Sta. Maria was transferred by the
President of the University of the Philippines to the
Office of the President, U.P., without demotion in rank
or salary, thereby acceding to the demands of student
activists who were boycotting their classes in the U.P.
College of Education. Dean Sta. Maria assailed his
transfer as an illegal and unconstitutional removal
from office. In upholding Dean Sta. Maria's claim, the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, laid
down the applicable doctrine in the following terms:

transferred or reassigned provided the

transfer affects no substantial change in
title, rank and salary. Thus one who is
appointed "principal in the Bureau of
Public Schools" and is designated to head
a pilot school may be transferred to the
post of principal of another school.
And the rule that outlaws unconsented
transfers as anathema to security of
tenure applies only to an officer who is
appointed not merely assigned to a
particular station. Such a rule does not
prescribe a transfer carried out under a
specific statute that empowers the head of
an agency to periodically reassign the
employees and officers in order to improve
the service of the agency. The use of
approved techniques or methods in
personnel management to harness the
abilities of employees to promote optimum
public service cannot-be objected to. . . .
5. The next point of inquiry is whether or
not Administrative Order 77 would stand
the test of validityvis-a-vis the principles
just enunciated.
xxx xxx xxx

the RDO to the Commissions Regional Offices in

Regions V and III, respectively, without their consent,
did not constitute a violation of their constitutional
right to security of tenure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is hereby
DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued by this Court on 27 September 1994 is hereby
LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23226

March 4, 1925

VICENTE
SEGOVIA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO NOEL, respondent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The question to be decided on this appeal is whether
that portion of Act No. 3107 which provides, that
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty- five years, should be given
retroactive or prospective effect.

Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of

Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907. He
continuously occupied this position until having
passed sixty-five mile- stones, he was ordered by the
Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the
office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary
justice of the peace has acted as justice of the peace
for the municipality of Dumanjug.
Mr. Segovia being desirous of avoiding a public
scandal and of opposing physical resistance to the
occupancy of the office of justice of the peace by the
auxiliary justice of the peace, instituted friendly quo
warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy
the office of justice of the peace, to oust the latter
therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as justice of
the peace of Dumanjug. To this complaint, Pedro Noel
interposed a demurrer on the ground that it did not
allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
because Act No. 3107 was constitutional and because
Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old had
automatically ceased to be justice of the peace. On
the issue thus framed and on stipulated facts,
judgment was rendered by Honorable Adolph
Wislizenus, Judge of First Instance, overruling the
demurrer, and in favor of petitioner and against
respondent.
Proceeding by way of elimination so as to resolve the
case into its simplest factors, it will first be noted that
the petitioner abandons the untenable position,
assumed by him in one portion of his complaint, to the
effect that section 1 of Act No. 3107 is
unconstitutional in that it impairs the contractual right
of the petitioner to an office. It is a fundamental
principle that a public office cannot be regarded as
the property of the incumbent, and that a public office
is not a contract.
It will next be noted that, while the respondent as
appellant assigns three errors in this court, the first
two relating to preliminary matters are ultimately
renounced by him in order that there may be an
authoritative decision on the main issue. The third
error specified and argued with ability by the
provincial fiscal of Cebu, is that the trial judge erred in
declaring that the limitation regarding the age of
justices of the peace provided by section 1 of Act No.
3107 is not applicable to justices of the peace and

auxiliary justices of the peace appointed and acting

before said law went into effect.
Coming now to the law, we find on investigation the
original provision pertinent to the appointment and
term of office of justices of the peace, in section 67 of
Act No. 136, wherein it was provided that justices of
the peace shall hold office during the pleasure of the
Commission. Act No. 1450, in force when Vicente
Segovia was originally appointed justice of the peace,
amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law by making
the term of office of justices and auxiliary justices of
the peace two years from the first Monday in January
nearest the date of appointment. Shortly after
Segovia's appointment, however, the law was again
amended by Act No. 1627 by providing that "all
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace shall hold office during good behavior and
those now in office shall so continue." Later amended
by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately
codified in sections 203 and 206 of the Administrative
Code.
Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides that
"one justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice of
the peace shall be appointed by the GovernorGeneral for the City of Manila, the City of Baguio, and
for each municipality, township, and municipal district
in the Philippine Islands, and if the public interests
shall so require, for any other minor political division
or unorganized territory in said Islands." It was this
section which section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended by
adding at the end thereof the following proviso:
"Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the
peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years." But section 206
of the Administrative Code entitled "Tenure of office,"
and reading "a justice of the peace having the
requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during
good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished
or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice,"
was left unchanged by Act No. 3107.
A sound canon of statutory construction is that a
statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is made manifest either by the express terms
of the statute or by necessary implication. Following
the lead of the United States Supreme Court and
putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to
receive a construction making it act retroactively,

unless the words used are so clear, strong, and

imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to
them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot
be otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to
be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. As
our Civil Code has it in article 3, "Law shall not have a
retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided."
(Farrel vs. Pingree [1888], 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843;
Greer vs. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495;
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. vs. Struthers
Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306; Montilla vs.
Agustinian Corporation [1913], 24 Phil., 220; In re will
of Riosa [1918], 39 Phil., 23.)
The same rule is followed by the courts with reference
to public offices. A well-known New York decision held
that "though there is no vested right in an office, which
may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent
has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to
be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in
which the purpose is stated." (People ex rel. Ryan vs.
Green [1874], 58 N.Y., 295.) In another case, a new
constitutional provision as to the advanced age which
should prevent the incumbents of certain judicial
offices from retaining them was held prospective; it
did not apply to persons in office at the time of its
taking effect. (People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb., 198; II
Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Chap. XVII,
particularly pages 1161, 1162; Mechem on Public
Officers, sec. 389.)
The case at bar is not the same as the case of
Chanco vs. Imperial ( [1916], 34 Phil., 329). In that
case, the question was as to the validity of section 7
of Act No. 2347. The law under consideration not only
provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until
they have reached the age of sixty-five years, but it
further provided "that the present judges of Courts of
First Instance ... vacate their positions on the taking
effect of this Act: and the Governor-General, with the
advice and consent of the Philippine Commission,
shall make new appointments of judges of Courts of
First Instance ... ." There the intention of the
Legislature to vacate the office was clearly expressed.
Here, it is not expressed at all.
The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section
203 of the Administrative Code, gives no indication of
retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of
operating upon existing rights. A proviso was merely
tacked on to section 203 of the Administrative Code,

while leaving intact section 206 of the same Code

which permits justices of the peace to hold office
during good behavior. In the absence of provisions
expressly making the law applicable to justices of the
peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions
impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the
courts would not be justified in giving the law an
interpretation which would legislate faithful public
servants out of office.
Answering the question with which we began our
decision, we hold that the proviso added to section
203 of the Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No.
3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices of
the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years, should be given
prospective effect only, and so is not applicable to
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went into force.
Consequently, it results that the decision of the trial
court is correct in its findings of fact and law and in its
disposition of the case.

JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte. Its purpose
was to obtain the extraordinary legal writ of quo
warranto. The petition was denied by the trial court
and the plaintiff appealed. The question presented by
the appeal are:
(a) Is the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far
as it provides that "justices of the peace shall
be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of 65 years," valid and
constitutional, when applied to justices of the
peace appointed under Act No. 2041, section
1, to serve "during good behavior?" And,
(b) Is the present action barred by the
statutes of limitations?
The facts involved in the decision of those questions
are as follows:
(a) That the said Julio Agcaoili was
appointed as justice of the peace of the
municipality of Laoag, of the Province of
Ilocos Norte, by His Excellency, Francis
Burton Harrison, on the 25th day of March,
1916, with authority "to have and to hold the
said office with all the powers, privileges, and
emoluments thereunto of right appertaining
unto him, subject to the conditions
prescribed by law.

G.R. No. L-24806

February 13, 1926

JULIO
AGCAOILI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ALBERTO SUGUITAN, defendant-appellee.

The conditions prescribed by law" to which

the appointee was "subject" at the time of his
appointment, are found in section 1 of Act
No. 2041 (vol. 8 Public Laws, 153). Said
section is amendment to section 67 of Act
No. 136, and provides among other things
for the "appointment and term of the justices
of the peace." It provides that one justice of
the peace and one auxiliary justice shall be
appointed by the Governor-General, etc., for

each municipality organized according to the

Municipal Code. Said section further
provides that "All justices of the peace and
auxiliary
justices
shall
hold
office
during good behavior . . . ." Said Act No.
2041 was adopted, the Philippine Legislature
was composed of the United States
Commission
and
the
House
of
Representatives.
(b) That on the 17th day of March, 1923, the
Philippine Legislature, composed of the
Senate and House of Representatives,
adopted Act No. 3107, which was "an Act to
amend and repeal certain provisions of the
Administrative Code relative to the
judiciary in order to reorganize the latter;
increasing the number of judges for certain
judicial districts; increasing the salaries of
judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting
the Secretary of Justice with authority to
detail a district judge temporarily to a district
or province other than his own;regulating the
salaries of justices of the peace; abolishing
the municipal court and justice of the peace
court of the City of Manila and creating in
lieu thereof a municipal court with three
branches; regulating the salaries of clerks of
court and other subordinate employees of
Courts of First Instance, and for other
purposes.
Notwithstanding the fact that the title of said Act No.
(3107), so far as the same relates to justice of the
peace, provides only for "regulating the salaries of
justices of the peace," said Act in section 203
provides for "the appointment and distribution of
justices of the peace" with the proviso in said section
". . . That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
shall be appointed to serve until they have reached
the age of sixty-five years." Attention is here called to
the fact again that there is nothing in the title of the
Act, which, in the slightest degree, indicates that said
Act contains provisions for "appointment of justices of
the of the peace" nor as to the period during which

they may serve after appointment. Attention is also

invited to the fact that the same section (203) contains
provisions for the jurisdiction of justices of the peace
while section 207 contains provisions defining
the"qualifications for justices of the peace." Section
210 of said Act provides for the "filling of vacancies in
the office of justices of the peace." There is nothing in
the title of the Act which in any way indicates that the
Act contains said provisions. Attention is here called
to the provision of the Act of Congress of the 29th day
of August, 1916, and to section 3 thereof, which
provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject, and that the
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." The
effect of a violation of said provision of said Act of
Congress will be discussed later.
(c) That on the 9th day of April, 1923, the
Undersecretary of Justice sent the following
letter to the said Julio Agcaoili, through the
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Third Judicial District, of the Province of
Ilocos Sur. Said letter is in the words and
figures following:
MANILA, April 9, 1923
SIR: In view of the provision of
section 203 of the Administrative
Code as amended by section 1 of
Act No. 3107, which, in part,
provides that justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years,
and in view of the fact that the
record shows that you are over
sixty-five years of age already, I
have the honor to hereby advise
you that, upon receipt hereof, you
cease to be a justice of the peace
by operation of said amendment of
the Administrative Code.

Respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS P. TORRES
Undersecretary of Justice
Said letter was received by Julio Agcaoili, the justice
of the peace, on the 26th day of April, 1923. It was
handed to him by the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte.
(d) It will be noted that in the letter of April 9, 1923, the
Secretary of Justice directed or ordered Julio Agcaoili,
then justice of the peace, "upon receipt of said letter,
to cease to be a justice of the peace." Against the
order contained in said letter of April 9th, Julio Agcaoili
entered a protest dated April 28, 1923, in the following
language:
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF COURT OF
LAOAG,
ILOCOS
NORTE
P. I.
April 28, 1923
The
Hon.
LUIS
TORRES
Undersecretary
of
Justice
of
the Philippine Islands
SIR: The undersigned, Julio Agcaoili, justice
of the peace of Laoag, capital of the
Province of Ilocos Norte, has the honor to
state that on April 26, 1923, he received,
through the clerk of the Court of First
Instance
of
Ilocos
Norte,
your
communication of April 9, 1923, informing
the undersigned that, having attained the
age of 65 years, he ceased to be justice of
the peace of Laoag under the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 3107, amending section
203 of the Administrative Code, which is Act
No. 2711 enacted in the year 1919, and
which section 1 of said Act No. 3107
provides in part that the justices of the peace
and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be

appointed to serve until they attain the age of

65 years.
With all due respect, the undersigned has
the honor to state that he believes that the
aforecited part of the provision of section 1 of
Act No. 3107 does not include those justices
of the peace who had already been
appointed justices of the peace, like the
undersigned, before the passage and
enactment of said Act No. 3107 and the
amended Administrative Code, nor can this
be the intention of the legislator, for if it were
so, it should have so stated in order that the
justices of the peace already appointed, who
were discharging the functions of the office
and who had attained the age of 65 years
when said Act was passed and enacted,
should cease from their office.
The undersigned was appointed of the
peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, and
therefore under Act No. 2041, enacted
February 3, 1911. Section 1 of this Act, which
amended section 67 of Act No. 136, was not
amended by any subsequent Act and
provides: All justices if the peace and
auxiliary justices shall hold office during good
behavior and those now in office who have
not the qualifications required by this Act
shall continue in office until their successors
are appointed.
Has section 203 of the Administrative Code
amended or repealed section 1 of Act No.
2041? The undersigned believes that it has
not, judging from the context of both laws,
nor was it repealed because if this were the
case the Governor- General would have
renewed the appointments of all the justices
of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace under said section 203 of the
Administrative Code.

The undersigned was appointed justice of

the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916,
under the said Act No. 2041 and continues in
the discharge of the duties of the office up to
the present time, without the GovernorGeneral having renewed his appointment
under said section 203 of the Administrative
Code.
Then Act No. 3107 came, section 1 of which
amends section 203 of the Administrative
Code.
Has this amendment retroactive effect? In
the first place the legislature could not give
or have given this Act such a character, and
if it had intended to do so, it would have so
stated; and in the second place, because not
only is such express declaration lacking in
the law but Act No. 3107 very clearly
provides that the justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices of the peace to be
appointed shall hold office until they attain
the age of 65 years.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.)
JULIO
AGCAOILI
Justice of the Peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte
A further protest against the said order of the
Secretary of Justice was made by Julio Agcaoili on
the 7th day of July, 1923, and is couched in the
following language:
I, Julio Agcaoili, Justice of the Peace of the
Municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, do
hereby state that on this day, July 7, 1923,
Mr. Buenaventura Ocampo, Provincial Fiscal
of Ilocos Norte, appeared at my office and
thereupon showed me the telegram of
Undersecretary of Justice Torres, addressed
to said provincial fiscal. After reading said
telegram I asked the provincial fiscal to

furnish me a copy thereof and he furnished

me a copy of the telegram.
Said telegram of the Undersecretary of
Justice in substance orders the provincial
fiscal; to cause me to deliver the office and
all the documents and records thereof to the
auxiliary justice of the peace, because
according to said Undersecretary of Justice I
must cease from the office under Act No.
3107, and that I be prosecuted for violation
of article 370 of the Penal Codeshould I fail
to comply with the telegram sent to me on
the 2d instant by the same Undersecretary of
Justice.
I do also state that I have never had any
malicious intention to disobey the orders of
the Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres,
one given telegram and the other by letter. I
only desired to study the spirit of the law and
this is the reason why I did not leave the
office until the present time, because I was
from the office of the justice of the
peace under the provision of Act No. 2041
under which I was appointed justice of the
peace of the capital, and which Act was not
repealed by any subsequent one, nor by Act
No. 3107, which Act No. 2041 provides that
the justices of the peace to be appointed
under it, should hold office during good
behavior. This Act does not say anything as
to limitation of age, and therefore I believe
myself entitled to continue in, and retain the
office.
I do also state that lest the Undersecretary of
Justice should think that I do not duly respect
the constituted authorities, I now deliver
under protest the office of the justice of the
peace of Laoag and all its documents and
records, as well as the furniture therein
contained, to Mr. Alberto Suguitan, auxiliary
justice of the peace, in the presence of the

provincial fiscal, in compliance with the

telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice,
Hon. Torres, received by me through the
provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte. I make
under protest the delivery of the office and its
documents and records because I think, as I
have stated, that I must not cease from the
office of justice of the peace, and in order
that my right may be defined, I shall institute
an action in the proper court of justice to
decide the case.
(Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI
I received the things of the office.
(Sgd.) ALBERTO SUGUITAN
In the presence of:
(Sgd.) BUENA V. OCAMPO Provincial Fiscal
Julio Agcaoili patiently waited in vain for a resolution
by the Secretary of Justice of the protest which he
presented on the 28th day of April and on the 7th day
of July, 1923; and not having received any reply to his
protest, filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte
on the 23d day of April, 1925, which petition was
amended by the filing of another petition in the same
court on the 8th day of September, 1925.
A careful reading of the two protests (April 28, 1923,
and July 7, 1923) shows that they contain arguments
in support thereof which, in all equity and justice,
demanded a reply, but no reply was forthcoming. The
arguments in support of his protests find a counterpart
and are fully supported in the decision of this court in
the case of Segovia vs. Noel, of March 4, 1925 (47
Phil., 543), wherein the Supreme Court held that the
Act No. 3107 could not be applied to and enforced
against justices of the peace who had been appointed
prior to the 17th day of March, 1923. Had the
Secretary of Justice answered said protests, the great

injustice which has been done to Julio Agcaoili

perhaps might have been avoided.

upon by this court. (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40

Phil., 883, 889.)

(e) That Julio Agcaoili being threatened with a criminal

prosecution unless he turned his office over to the
auxiliary justice of the peace, and to avoid scandal,
disgrace and humiliation which might come to him by
virtue of said prosecution, on the 7th day of July,
1923, still protesting, delivered the possession of his
office, as justice of the peace, to the auxiliary justice
of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. It is a
matter of common knowledge that Julio Agcaoili had
been entrusted with the highest office in his province
which the people could confer upon him.

In the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, supra, it

was decided that said provision of the Jones Law was
mandatory and not directory and its violation was fatal
to any provision of the law to which no reference was
made in the title. In the decision of this court in the
case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, the decisions of
the courts of many of the states of the Union were
followed. Many of the constitutions of the States of the
Union contain similar provision to that quoted above
from the Jones Law. Among such states may be
mentioned Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming.

The petitions presented by Julio Agcaoili in the Court

of First Instance, the first on the 23d day of July,
1925, and the second on the 8th day of September,
1925, contain, in resume, the foregoing facts. To the
petition the respondent Alberto Suguitan answered
and set up the defense of prescription. Upon the issue
thus presented, the Honorable Fermin Mariano,
judge, sustained the defense of prescription and
denied the petition for the extraordinary legal remedy
of quo warranto. From that judgment Julio Agcaoili
appealed, and now contends in a vigorous and logical
argument that his remedy has not prescribed.
Considering the first question suggested above,
attention is again called to one of the provisions of
section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress, August
29, 1916, vol. 12, Public Laws of the Philippine
Islands). The "Jones Law" is the constitution of the
Philippine Islands providing a government therefor.
Subparagraph 16 of section 3 of the Jones law
provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
Under said provision, may the legislature adopt a law
which contains in the title of the Act? The effect of
violating said provision of the Jones Law has been
brought before the courts many times. The effect of
violating said provision has already been passed

Mr. Justice Sutherland, now an Associate Justice of

the Supreme Court of the United States, in his
valuable work on "Statutory Construction," vol. 1, 2nd
ed.) at section 111, states the reason and the purpose
of such a constitutional provision. He says:
In the construction and application of this
constitutional restriction the courts have kept
steadily in view the correction of the mischief
against which it was aimed. The object is to
prevent the practice, which was common in
all legislative bodies where no such
restriction existed, of embracing in the same
bill incongruous matters having no relation to
each other, or to the subject specified in the
title, by which measures were often adopted
without attracting attention. Such distinct
subjects represented diverse interests, and
were combined in order to unite the
members of the legislature who favor either
in support of all. These combinations were
corruptive of the legislature and dangerous
to the state. Such omnibus bills sometimes

included more than a hundred sections on as

many different subjects, with a title
appropriate to the first section, and for other
purposes.
The failure to indicate in the title of the bill
the object intended to be accomplished by
the legislation often resulted in members
voting ignorantly for measures which they
would not knowingly have approved. And not
only were legislators thus misled, but the
public also; so that legislative provisions
were stealthily pushed through in the closing
hours of a session, which, having no merit to
commend them, would have been made
odious
by
popular
discussion
and
remonstrance if their pendency had been
seasonably announced. The constitutional
clause under discussion is intended to
correct these evils; to prevent such
corrupting aggregations of incongruous
measures, by confining each act to one
subject; to prevent surprise and inadvertence
by requiring that subject or object to be
expressed in the title.
The Supreme court of the State of Alabama, in
discussing the effect of the violation of a similar
provision of the constitution of that state in the cases
of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) and Lindsay vs.
United States Savings and Loan Association (120
Ala., 156), had the following to say, quoting with
approval, what Mr. Justice Cooley in his Constitutional
Limitations, at page 143, had said upon that question:
The object sought to be accomplished, and
the mischief proposed to be remedied by this
provision, are well known. . . . Legislative
assemblies for the dispatch of business often
pass bills by their titles only, without requiring
them to be read. A specious title sometimes
covered a legislation which, if its real
character had been disclosed, would not
have commanded assent. To prevent

surprise and fraud on the legislature is one

of the purposes this provision was intended
to accomplish. Before the adoption of this
provision, the title of a statute was often no
indication of its subject or contents. . . .
An evil this constitutional requirement was
intended to correct was the blending in one
and the same statute of such things as were
diverse in their nature, and were connected
only to combine in favor of all the advocates
of each, thus often securing the passage of
several measures, no one of which could
have succeeded on its own merits. Mr.
Cooley thus sums up his review of the
authorities, defining the objects of this
provision: It may, therefore, be assumed as
settled, that the purpose of these provisions
was: First, to prevent hodge-podge, or logrolling legislation; second, to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by
means of provisions in bills of which the titles
gave no information, and which might
therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication
of legislative proceedings as is usually
made, of the subjects of legislation that are
being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon, by
petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.
(49 Ala., 330, 331.)
The purposes of constitutional requirement
must be borne steadily in mind, when it
becomes necessary to determine whether
there has been legislative observance of it.
The exposition of these purposes by Judge
Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the
states in which a like limitation prevails. . . .
(120 Ala., 172.)

In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) the

Supreme Court of the State of California had occasion
to discuss the question now before us and said:

vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269); Board of Public Education

for the City of Americus vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 232);
Spier vs. Baker (120 Cal., 370).

At the least, then two heterogeneous

subjects are embraced in the act, one of
which is not expressed in the title, and they
cannot be segregated. The title does not
express the objects of legislation embodied
in the provisions of the act. It is, therefore,
narrower than the body of the act, and fails
to impart that notice of the measures
enacted, which the Constitution requires. To
prohibit such legislation was the sole end
and aim of the constitutional requirement.
The practice, says the Supreme Court of
Missouri, of comprising in one bill subjects of
a diverse and antagonistic nature, in order to
combine in its support members who were in
favor of particular measures, but neither of
which could command the requisite majority
on its own merits, was found to be not a
corruptive influence in the Legislature itself,
but destructive of the best interests of the
State. But this was not more detrimental than
that other pernicious practice, by which,
through
dexterous
and
unscrupulous
management, designing men inserted
clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true
meaning of which the titles gave no
indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged
them on to their passage. These things led
to fraud and injury, and it was found
necessary to apply a corrective in the shape
of a constitutional provision. (City of St. Louis
vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) The provision has
been framed in the constitutions of many of
the States of the Union; and the courts,
whenever it has come before them, have
liberally construed it as the will of the people
in the interests of honest legislation.

Mr. Justice Sutherland, in a further discussion of the

question, at section 112 of his work on Statutory
Construction, said:

Decisions to the same effect are found in the following

cases: City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel (42 Mo., 578);
Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk [Tenn.], 504); Ryerson

The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to

cure the evil and mischief which has been
pointed out depends on judicial enforcement;
on this constitutional injunction being
regarded as mandatory, and compliance with
it essential to the validity of legislation. The
mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn
official obligation of legislators; it might be
expected to continue notwithstanding that
the obligation is formulated and emphasized
in this constitutional injunction, if it be
construed as addressed exclusively to them,
and only directory. It would, in a general
sense, be a dangerous doctrine to announce
that any of the provisions of the constitution
may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere
will or pleasure of the legislature, unless it is
clear beyond all question that such was
intention of the framers of that instrument. It
would seem to be a lowering of the proper
dignity of the fundamental law to say that it
descends to prescribing rules of order in
unessential matters which may be followed
or disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this:
That whatever constitutional provision can
be looked upon as directory merely is very
likely to be treated by the legislature as if it
was devoid of moral obligation, and to be
therefore habitually disregarded.
In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes, supra, Mr. Chief
Justice Nicholson, in discussing the effect of the
violation of a constitutional provision like the one
before us, said:

* * * This is a direct, positive, and imperative

limitation upon the power of the Legislature.
It matters not that a bill has passed through
three readings in each house, on three
different days, and has received the approval
of the Governor; still it is not a law of the
State if it embraces more than one
subject. . . .
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Walker
vs. State, supra, said:
It is settled law of this court, founded on
reasoning which seems to us unanswerable,
that this provision of the Constitution is not a
mere rule of legislative procedure, directory
to the general assembly, but that it is
mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to
declare void any statute not conforming to
it. . . .
Mr. Justice Cooley in his valuable work on
Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179. 180) states that
our courts have held, without exception, that such
constitutional provision is mandatory.
Considering that the great weight of authority is to the
effect that the provision like the one above quoted
from the Jones Law is mandatory; and considering
that there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which
indicates in the slightest degree that said Act contains
a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of the
peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years," we are forced to
the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and
contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law,
and that said law (3107) cannot be applied to justices
and auxiliary justices of the peace who were
appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923; and
that when Julio Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of
threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as
justice of the peace, he was forced to do so illegally,
without just cause, and should therefore be restored

to his position as justice of the peace of the

municipality of Laoag, without delay.
With reference to the second question above
suggested, in re prescription or limitation of the action,
it may be said that originally there was no limitation or
prescription of action in an action for quo warranto,
neither could there be, for the reason that it was an
action by the Government and prescription could not
be plead as a defense to an action by the
Government. The ancient writ of quo warranto was a
high prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by
the King against any one who usurped or claimed any
office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to inquire by
what authority the usurper supported his claim, in
order to determine the right. Even at the present time
in many of the civilized countries of the world the
action is still regarded as a prerogative writ and no
limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the action.
As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary
statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no
application to quo warranto proceeding brought to
enforce a public right. (McPhail vs. People ex rel.
Lambert, 160 Ill., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 306; People ex
rel. Moloney vs. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 175 Ill.,
125; 64 L. R. A., 366.)
In all public matters a writ of quo warranto is a writ of
right at the suit of the state, and issues as a matter of
course upon demand of the proper officer (State ex
rel. Washington County vs. Stone, 25 Mo., 555;
Commonwealth vs. Allen, 128 Mass., 308), and the
court has no authority to withhold leave to file a
petition therefor.
If the statute of limitation or prescription cannot run
against the state, it is difficult to understand how in
the same action they may be used as a defense
against a public officer who has been forcibly, with
threats and intimidation, ousted from a public office by
the Government itself as was done in the present
case. The principle that acts of limitation do not bind
the King (the State) or the people, applies to
proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being that the

representative of the state may file an information on

behalf of the people at any time; and the lapse of time
constitutes no bar to the proceeding, in conformity
with the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi. (Catlett
vs. People ex rel. States's Attorney, 151 Ill., 16.) For
the state to claim that the statutes of limitation do not
apply to it and yet insist that it may plead such
statutes to bar the action of quo warranto brought by
one of its public officials whom it itself has ousted
from office, appears to us to be unjust, unfair,
unreasonable, and not within the contemplation of
sound jurisprudence.
So much of the general rule concerning limitation of
action in quo warranto proceedings. Is there a statute
in the Philippine Islands of limitation, limiting the
action of a public official of the Government who has
been duly appointed and qualified, and who has, by
force and intimidation, been ousted from such office,
to defeat his action of quo warranto?
On the 7th day of August, 1901, the United States
Philippine Commission adopted Act No. 190 which
had been considered privately and publicly for several
months theretofore. Its provisions were published
throughout the Philippine Islands long prior to its
adoption. While said Act was adopted on the 7th day
of August, 1901, it did not take effect, even though it
had been published, until the 1st day of October,
1901. (Act No. 212.) An examination of said Act (190)
shows that it provides remedies for the usurpation of
office or franchise, etc. (secs. 197-216). Said Act No.
190 was published in both English and Spanish.
Section 216, in English, provided that "Nothing herein
contained shall authorize an action against a
corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same
be commenced within five years after the act
complained of was done or committed; nor shall an
action be brought against an officer to be ousted from
his office unless within one year after the cause of
such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose." The
same section (216), as published in Spanish, reads
as follows: "Ninguna de estas disposiciones facultara
la iniciacion de un juicio contra una corporacion por la
perdida de sus derechos de concesion, a menos que

el juicio se lleve a efecto dento de los cinco aos

siguente a la comision u omision del hecho objeto de
la accion. Tampocose podra iniciar un juicio la
persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporaciuon
para desposeerla, a menos que se lleve a efecto
dentro del ao siguente a la fecha de la comision del
hecho que dio motivo a su privacion, o que se puso
en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo."

they appeared in Spanish in the Public Laws of the

Philippine Islands, but the reading of the three or four
sections immediately preceding section 216 will show
that they refer specifically to corporations only. The
appellant, therefore, was justified in believing that said
section 216 as it appeared in Spanish was correct. At
least the Government should give him credit with
having in good faith.

Said section (216), as published in Spanish and

translated into English, reads as follows: "Nothing
herein contained shall authorize an action against a
corporation for forfeiture of its corporate rights, unless
the same be commenced within five years after the
commission or omission complained of took place.
Neither may an action be brought against an officer to
oust him from office, unless the same is commenced
within one year after the commission of the act which
caused the deprivation thereof, or after the right to
hold the office arose."

But, even granting that the appellant is bound by the

provisions of section 216 as it appears in English, is
the same applicable to the appellant? By reference to
said section above quoted in English, it will be seen
that after the word "committed" there is a semicolon.
Does that which follows the semicolon have reference
to the same subject matter which precedes it? A
semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in
the English language, to indicate a separation in the
relation of the thought, a degree greater than that
expressed by a comma, and what follows that
semicolon must have relation to the same matter
which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the
purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is
used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a
thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a
mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of
introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon
are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide
sentences and parts of the sentences, the only
difference being that the semicolon makes the
division a little more pronounced than the comma.
The punctuation used in a law may always be referred
to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of
a doubtful statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch
as all of the provisions of said section 216 which
precede the semicolon refer to corporations only, that
which follows the semicolon has reference to the
same subject matter, or to officers of a corporation.

Said section 216, as above quoted in Spanish, was

published in vol. 1 of the Public Laws of the Philippine
Islands and distributed to the public officers
throughout the Philippine Islands. It is a fact of
general information that even now, in 1926, the
Spanish copy of the Public Laws are consulted by the
people in remote parts of the Philippine Islands for the
purpose of knowing what the law is. It is not strange,
therefore, that the appellant did not believe that said
section 216 applied to public officers; that it only
applied to officers of corporations as it appeared in
the Spanish translation. Is it just and fair and
reasonable for the Government of the Philippine
Islands to oust one of its officers from an office to
which he had been legally appointed, by force and
intimidation and without just cause, and then to defeat
his action in quo warranto by invoking the provisions
of a public statute, different from the one which the
Government itself had furnished its public officers?
The appellant is familiar with the Spanish but not with
the English language. He naturally relied upon the
Spanish version of the law for his information as to
what the law really was. Not only had the appellant
the right to rely upon the provisions of section 216 as

But even granting, for the sake of the argument, that

the word "officer" as used in the latter part of said
section applies to public officers who have been
ousted from their position, and not only to officers of
corporations, then we have the question presented:
Had the one year mentioned in said section expired

on the 23d day of April, 1925, when the first

complaint, was filed in the present action? When did
the year begin to run if said section is applicable to
the appellant?
It will be remembered that on the 7th day of July,
1923, the appellant was ousted from his office as
justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. Not
only did he surrender his office on that date under
protest, but also on the 28th day of April, 1923, when
he was notified by the Secretary of Justice that he
cease to be a justice of the peace of his municipality,
he then protested and gave a long and lucid argument
in support of his protest. In all justice to him, did he
not have a right, without any legal action to protect his
right, to await the solution of his protest of the 28th
day of April, 1923? He had a right to believe that the
grounds upon which his protest was based would be
convincing to the Secretary of Justice and that he
would not be removed. Until this very hour the record
contains no reply from the Secretary of Justice and no
answer whatever to the legal grounds presented by
the appellant upon his right to continue as justice of
the peace and not to be ousted.
In our opinion even granting that section 216 is
applicable to the appellant, the period of prescription
had not begun and run at the time of the
commencement of the present action. He was
justified in delaying the commencement of his action
until an answer to his protest had been made. He had
right to await the answer to his protest, in the
confident belief that it would be resolved in his favor
and that action would unnecessary.
It is contended, however, that the question before us
was answered and resolved against the contention of
the appellant in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo (38
Phil., 624). In that case no question was raised nor
was it even suggested that said section 216 did not
apply to a public officer. That question was not
discussed nor referred to by any of the parties
interested in that case. It has been frequently decided
that the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid,

and invoked and applied for many years in cases

where its validity was not raised or passed on, does
not prevent a court from later passing on its validity,
where the question is squarely and properly raised
and presented, Where a question passes the court
sub silentio, the case in which the question was so
passed is not binding on the Court (McGirr vs.
Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563), nor should it be
considered as a precedent. (U. S. vs. Noriega and
Tobias, 31 Phil., 310; Chicote vs. Acasio, 31 Phil.,
401; U. S. vs. More, 3 Cranch [U. S.], 159, 172; U. S.
vs. Sanges, 144 U. S., 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146
U. S., 82.) For the reasons given in the case of McGirr
vs. Hamilton and Abreu, supra, the decision in the
case of Bautista vs. Fajardo, supra, can have no
binding force in the interpretation of the question
presented here.
The present case is anomalous under American
sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance
with the law to the judiciary to serve "during good
behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly served
the Government for a number of years the legislature
adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without giving any
reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to
be such when he should reach the age of 65 years.
Said law contained no express provision or method
for its enforcement. The Executive Department,
through its Undersecretary of Justice, without any
authority given in said law, notified the said officer that
he was no longer an officer in the judicial department
of the Government and must vacate his office and
turn the same over to another, who was designated
by said Undersecretary. When the officer protested
against such arbitrary action, giving reasons therefor,
and without answering said protest, he was
threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not
immediately vacate his office. The history of this case
reads more like a story of the Arabian Nights than like
a procedure under a well-organized Government. It
seems impossible to believe, and we could not
believe it, were the facts not actually supported by the
record.

Why the Undersecretary of Justice did not follow the

orderly procedure marked out by Act No. 190 is not
explained. The appellant was given no hearing. Even
his protest, couched in most humble and respectful
language, fell upon deaf ears. Absolute indifference
was shown to the respectful protest and the able
argument given in support thereof. The only answer to
his protest was a threat of a criminal prosecution if he
did not vacate his office. His humility was met with
austereness. His humble petition was met with a
threat. His patient waiting for a reply to his protest
was ended by a demand that he be prosecuted for
refusing to comply with an order by one who was not
willing to follow the well-defined and well-beaten road
of "due process of law" by preferring charges and
giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard and to
defend his right. Nothing of that character took place.
The whole procedure, from beginning to end, in
ousting the appellant from an office to which he had
been legally appointed and against whom no
complaint has been made, is anomalous in the
jurisprudence under the American flag.
Believing as I do, that the success of free institutions
depends upon a rigid adherence to the fundamentals
of the law, I have never yielded, and I hope that I may
never yield, to considerations of expediency in
expounding it. There is also some plausible reason for
the latitudinarian constructions which are resorted to
for the purpose of acquiring power some evil to be
avoided, or some good to be attained by pushing the
powers of the Government beyond their legitimate
boundary. It is by yielding to such influences that the
courts and legislatures are gradually undermining and
finally overthrowing constitutions. It is by yielding to
such influences that constitutions are gradually
undermined and finally overthrown. It has been, and
is my purpose, so far as it is possible for me, to follow
the fundamental law does not work well the people or
the legislature may amend it. If, however, the
legislature or the courts undertake to cure defects in
the law by forced and unnatural constructions, they
inflict a would upon the constitution of the state which
nothing can cure. One step taken by the legislature or
the judiciary in enlarging the powers of the

Government, opens the door for another which will be

sure to follow; and so the process goes on until all
respect for the fundamental law is lost and the powers
of the Government are just what those in authority are
pleased to call them. (Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 3
Comstock [N. Y.], 547, 568.) I cannot give my consent
to a rule or doctrine which will permit a Government to
throw an honest and efficient official out of office
without reason and without authority of law, refuse to
consider a protest, and then permit the application of
a law to prevent a recovery of that which he has lost
illegally and without reason.
The judgment appealed from should be revoked, and
a judgment should be entered ordering the restoration
of the appellant to the office from which he was
illegally rejected. We should follow the effect of the
doctrine announced solemnly by this court in the case
of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543). So ordered.

tone of morality in public service. It was declared to

be the state policy "in line with the principle that a
public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto." 2 Nor was it the first statute of its kind to deal
with such a grave problem in the public service that
unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the postwar era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in
favor of the State of any property found to have been
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or
employee. 3
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public
officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval
or after his assumption of office "and within the month
of January of every other year thereafter", as well as
upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and
file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a
true detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal
and family expenses and the amount of income taxes
paid for the next preceding calendar: . . ." 4

G.R. No. L-20387

January 31, 1968

JESUS
P.
MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and employees
from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the

In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical

submission "within the month of January of every
other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities after an officer or employee had
once bared his financial condition upon assumption of
office was challenged for being violative of due
process as an oppressive exercise of police power
and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right
to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable
search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court
in the decision appealed from sustained plaintiff, then
as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of first
instance. For it, such requirement of periodical
submission of such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police
power and is thus offensive to the due process
clause.

We do not view the matter thus and accordingly

reverse the lower court.
1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of
evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. For in
this action for declaratory relief filed with the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan on January 31, 1962,
plaintiff, after asserting his belief "that it was a
reasonable requirement for employment that a public
officer make of record his assets and liabilities upon
assumption of office and thereby make it possible
thereafter to determine whether, after assuming his
position in the public service, he accumulated assets
grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes, the
herein plaintiff [having] filed within the period of time
fixed in the aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334
the prescribed sworn statement of financial condition,
assets, income and liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that
the provision on the "periodical filing of sworn
statement of financial condition, assets, income and
liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared
his financial condition, upon assumption of office, is
oppressive and unconstitutional." 6
As earlier noted, both the protection of due process
and the assurance of the privacy of the individual as
may be inferred from the prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure and selfincrimination were relied upon. There was also the
allegation that the above requirement amounts to "an
insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of
public officials, premised as it is "on the unwarranted
and derogatory assumption" that they are "corrupt at
heart" and unless thus restrained by this periodical
submission of the statements of "their financial
condition, income, and expenses, they cannot be
trusted to desist from committing the corrupt practices
defined. . . ." 7 It was further asserted that there was
no need for such a provision as "the income tax law
and the tax census law also require statements which
can serve to determine whether an officer or
employee in this Republic has enriched himself out of
proportion to his reported income." 8

Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the

then Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of
Justice as defendants, where after practically
admitting the facts alleged, they denied the erroneous
conclusion of law and as one of the special affirmative
defenses set forth: "1. That when a government
official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is
deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to
give information about his personal affair, not only at
the time of his assumption of office but during the time
he continues to discharge public trust. The private life
of an employee cannot be segregated from his public
life. . . ." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was a
violation of his constitutional rights against selfincrimination as well as unreasonable search and
seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in
question cannot be attacked on the ground that it
impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of
his life and liberty because said provision merely
seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the
interest or general welfare in honest and clean public
service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the
police power." 10
On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for
judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all his
material allegations were admitted. Then on March
10, 1962, an order was issued giving the parties thirty
days within which to submit memoranda, but with or
without them, the case was deemed submitted for
decision the lower court being of the belief that "there
is no question of facts, . . . the defendants [having
admitted] all the material allegations of the
complaint." 11
The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962,
the lower court declaring "unconstitutional, null and
void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it
required periodical submittal of sworn statements of
financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official
or employee of the government after he had once
submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming
office; . . . ." 12

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was the
holding of this Court that in the absence of a factual
foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely
"on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail." In the present
case likewise there was no factual foundation on
which the nullification of this section of the statute
could be based. Hence as noted the decision of the
lower court could be reversed on that ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate
however, for as likewise made clear in the above
Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed
sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom
of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity
of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider."
Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration in the above case, we expressly
affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a
situation where the nullity of a statute, executive
order, or ordinance may not be readily apparent but
the threat to constitutional rights, especially those
involving the freedom of the mind, present and
ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there should
not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that
evidence be presented." Also, in the same Resolution,
Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when
freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom
that commands a momentum of respect; when
property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment
that commands respect. This dual standard may not
precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality
in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a
hierarchy of values within the due process clause. 15
2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the
above requirement for a periodical submission of
sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an

invasion of liberty protected by the due process

clause.
Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement
of policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 there is an
enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful in
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law. They include persuading,
inducing, or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of
the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly
any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself, or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the government
and any other party, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity, has to intervene under the law;
requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift,
present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for
himself or for another, from any person for whom the
public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured
or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government
permit or license, in consideration for the help given
or to be given; accepting or having any member of his
family accept employment in a private enterprise
which has pending official business with him during
the pendency thereof or within one year after its
termination; causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence; neglecting or
refusing, after due demand or request, without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time
on any matter pending before him for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring
his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of
or discriminating against any other interested party;
entering, on behalf of the Government, into any

contract or transaction manifestly and grossly

disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby; having
directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction in connection
with which he intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interests;
becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal
gain, or having a material interest in any transaction
or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or
group of which he is a member, and which exercises
discretion in such approval, even if he votes against
the same or does not participate in such action;
approving or granting knowingly any license, permit,
privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified
for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or
dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled and
divulging valuable information of a confidential
character, acquired by his office or by him on account
of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
releasing such information in advance of its
authorized release date. 18
After which come the prohibition on private
individuals, 19 prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and
prohibition on Members of Congress. 21 Then there is
this requirement of a statement of assets and
liabilities, that portion requiring periodical submission
being challenged here. 22 The other sections of the Act
deal with dismissal due to unexplained wealth,
reference
being
made
to
the
previous
statute, 23 penalties for violation, 24 the vesting of
original jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance as
the
competent
court, 25 the
prescription
of
26
offenses, the prohibition against any resignation or
retirement pending investigation, criminal or
administrative or pending a prosecution, 27 suspension
and loss of benefits, 28 exception of unsolicited gifts or
presents of small or insignificant value as well as
recognition of legitimate practice of one's profession
or
trade
or
occupation, 29 the
separability
30
clause, and its effectivity. 31

Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service. It is
intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public
trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be
pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions
then prevailing called for norms of such character.
The times demanded such a remedial device.
The statute was framed with that end in view. It is
comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and
explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices
were prohibited and penalized. More than that, an
effort was made, so evident from even a cursory
perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes.
One such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it
becomes much more difficult by those disposed to
take advantage of their positions to commit acts of
graft and corruption.
While in the attainment of such public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is permissible,
there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and
undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the
statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only
question raised, is that portion of the statute requiring
periodical submission of assets and liabilities, after an
officer or employee had previously done so upon
assuming office, so infected with infirmity that it
cannot be upheld as valid?
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a
valid exercise of the police power? In the aforesaid
Ermita-Malate
Hotel
decision, 33 there
is
a
reaffirmation of its nature and scope as embracing the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, education, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth
by Justice Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary
power in the state which enables it to prohibit all

things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of

society." 34
Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the
power to promote the general welfare and public
interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation to persons
and property as may promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare of each
inhabitant; 36 to preserve public order and to prevent
offenses against the state and to establish for the
intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood calculated to
prevent conflict of rights. 37 In his work on due
process, Mott 38 stated that the term police power was
first used by Chief Justice Marshall. 39
As currently in use both in Philippine and American
decisions then, police power legislation usually has
reference to regulatory measures restraining either
the rights to property or liberty of private individuals. It
is undeniable however that one of its earliest
definitions, valid then as well as now, given by
Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney does not
limit its scope to curtailment of rights whether of
liberty or property of private individuals. Thus: "But
what are the police powers of a State? They are
nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its
dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine
law, or a law to punish offenses, or to establish courts
of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be
recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own
limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that
is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to
govern men and things within the limits of its
domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley and Burdick were
of a similar mind. 41
What is under consideration is a statute enacted
under the police power of the state to promote
morality in public service necessarily limited in scope
to officialdom. May a public official claiming to be
adversely affected rely on the due process clause to
annul such statute or any portion thereof? The answer

must be in the affirmative. If the police power extends

to regulatory action affecting persons in public or
private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance
can invoke the protection of due process which
permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as
such requirement is observed.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public
office is a public trust and as such not amounting to
property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there
can be no disputing the proposition that from the
standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the
Constitution the mantle of protection afforded by due
process could rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly
held in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line with the then
pertinent statutory provisions 43 that procedural due
process in the form of an investigation at which he
must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to
defend himself must be observed before a civil
service officer or employee may be removed. There
was a reaffirmation of the view in even stronger
language when this Court through Justice Tuason
in Lacson v. Roque 44declared that even without
express provision of law, "it is established by the great
weight of authority that the power of removal or
suspension for cause can not, except by clear
statutory authority, be exercised without notice and
hearing." Such is likewise the import of a statement
from the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion,
speaking for the Court in Meneses v. Lacson; 45 "At
any rate, the reinstatement directed in the decision
appealed from does not bar such appropriate
administrative action as the behaviour of petitioners
herein may warrant, upon compliance with the
requirements of due process."
To the same effect is the holding of this Court
extending the mantle of the security of tenure
provision to employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations entrusted with governmental
functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v.
Montelibano, 46 it
stressed:
"That
safeguard,
guarantee, or feeling of security that they would hold
their office or employment during good behavior and
would not be dismissed without justifiable cause to be

determined in an investigation, where an opportunity

to be heard and defend themselves in person or by
counsel is afforded them, would bring about such a
desirable condition." Reference was there made to
promoting honesty and efficiency through an
assurance of stability in their employment relation. It
was to be expected then that through Justice
Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could
categorically affirm: "As the removal of petitioner was
made without investigation and without cause, said
removal is null and void. . . ."
It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit
holding of the applicability of due process guaranty to
be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Via, 48 where
the opinion of Justice Endencia for the Court
contained the following unmistakable language:
"Evidently, having these facts in view, it cannot be
pretended that the constitutional provision of due
process of law for the removal of the petitioner has
not been complied with."
Then came this restatement of the principle from the
pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus compelled
to conclude that the positions formerly held by
appellees were not primarily confidential in nature so
as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the
confidence reposed in them. The inevitable corollary
is that respondents-appellees, Leon Piero, et al.,
were not subject to dismissal or removal, except for
cause specified by law and within due
process. . . ." 49 In a still later decision, Abaya v.
Subido, 50 this Court, through Justice Sanchez,
emphasized "that the vitality of the constitutional
principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken
by sanctioning cancellation" of an employee's
eligibility or "of his dismissal from service without
hearing upon a doubtful assumption that he has
admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil Service
rules." Equally emphatic is this observation from the
same case: "A civil service employee should be heard
before he is condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to
this rule with such unrelenting grasp that by now it
would appear trite to make citations thereof."

If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this

Court, due process may be relied upon by public
official to protect the security of tenure which in that
limited sense is analogous to property, could he not
likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee
to strike down what he considers to be an
infringement of his liberty? Both on principle, reason
and authority, the answer must be in the affirmative.
Even a public official has certain rights to freedom the
government must respect. To the extent then, that
there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be
permissible if the due process mandate is not
disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the
rule and restraint the exception, the question raised
cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine
case, Rubi
v.
Provincial
Board, 51 liberty
as
guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude.
The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare." In accordance
with this case therefore, the rights of the citizens to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any avocation, are all deemed
embraced in the concept of liberty. This Court in the
same case, however, gave the warning that liberty as
understood in democracies, is not license. Implied in
the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good, the peace and
order of society and the general well-being. No one
can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as
quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is freedom to do
right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and
the upright and honorable conscience of the
individual."

The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by

Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a social
organization, 52implying the absence of arbitrary
restraint not immunity from reasonable regulations
and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the
community. 53 It was Linton's view that "to belong to a
society is to sacrifice some measure of individual
liberty, no matter how slight the restraints which the
society consciously imposes." 54 The above statement
from Linton however, should be understood in the
sense that liberty, in the interest of public health,
public order or safety, of general welfare, in other
words through the proper exercise of the police
power, may be regulated. The individual thought, as
Justice Cardozo pointed out, has still left a "domain of
free activity that cannot be touched by government or
law at all, whether the command is specially against
him or generally against him and others." 55

requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo,

must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any
official action marred by lack of reasonableness.
Correctly has it been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea
of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for
justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever
branch 'in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a
narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions
based on such a clause requiring a 'close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society.' Questions of due process are not to be
treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrases." 56

Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn

statement of assets and liabilities after he had filed
one upon assumption of office beyond the power of
government to impose? Admittedly without the
challenged provision, a public officer would be free
from such a requirement. To the extent then that there
is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is
affected. It cannot be denied however that under the
Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as
due process is observed.

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to

ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public
service with its ever-present temptation to heed the
call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and
oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public
officials and employees to file such sworn statement
of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming office. The due process
clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There
was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police
power.

Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an

express recognition of privacy, specifically that of
communication and correspondence which "shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or when
public safety and order"60 may otherwise require, and
implicitly in the search and seizure clause, 61 and the
liberty of abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such
statutory requirement of further periodical submission
of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities deserves
to be further looked into.

4. The due process question touching on an alleged

deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long
way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff
that the provision on the periodical submission of a
sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of
the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be
said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom.
The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let
alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most

In that respect the question is one of first impression,

no previous decision having been rendered by this
Court. It is not so in the United States where, in the
leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice
Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court,
stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of
the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms
the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons,

The more crucial question therefore is whether there

is an observance of due process. That leads us to an
inquiry into its significance. "There is no controlling
and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty
or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What
then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any action for that
matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient
to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process

comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by

civilized men." 58
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does
not likewise compel respect for his personality as a
unique individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. As Laski so very aptly
stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing
reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that
they are the basis on which his civic obligations are
built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his
isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his
will to others, he surrenders his personality. If his will
is set by the will of others, he ceases to be master of
himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer master
of himself is in any real sense free." 59

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create
a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
After referring to various American Supreme Court
decisions, 64 Justice Douglas continued: "These cases
bear witness that the right of privacy which presses
for recognition is a legitimate one."
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute
which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of
married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees."65 It has wider
implications though. The constitutional right to privacy
has come into its own.1wph1.t
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy
as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving
of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of
the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from
the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual
has become increasingly important as modern society
has developed. All the forces of a technological age
industrialization, urbanization, and organization
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to

maintain and support this enclave of private life marks

the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society." 66
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be
said that the challenged statutory provision calls for
disclosure of information which infringes on the right
of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the
rational relationship such a requirement possesses
with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in
precluding assent to an objection of such character.
This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a
position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection;
it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a
further compulsory revelation of his assets and
liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and
sources of income, the amounts of personal and
family expenses, and the amount of income taxes
paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would
be a private sphere.
5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that
insofar as the challenged provision requires the
periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial
condition, it would be violative of the guarantees
against unreasonable search and seizure and against
self-incrimination?
His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United
States. 67 In that case, petitioner Davis was convicted
under an information charging him with unlawfully
having in his possession a number of gasoline ration
coupons representing so many gallons of gasoline, an
offense penalized under a 1940 statute. 68 He was
convicted both in the lower court and in the Circuit
Court of Appeals over the objection that there was an
unlawful search which resulted in the seizure of the
coupons and that their use at the trial was in violation
of Supreme Court decisions. 69In the District Court,
there was a finding that he consented to the search
and seizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not
disturb that finding although expressed doubt
concerning it, affirming however under the view that

such seized coupons were properly introduced in

evidence, the search and seizure being incidental to
an arrest, and therefore reasonable regardless of
petitioner's consent.
In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme
Court, through Justice Douglas emphasized that the
Court was dealing in this case "not with private papers
or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which
never became the private property of the holder but
remained at all times the property of the government
and subject to inspection and recall by it." 70 He made
it clear that the opinion was not to be understood as
suggesting "that officers seeking to reclaim
government property may proceed lawlessly and
subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the
right to inspect under the regulations subjects a
dealer to a general search of his papers for the
purpose of learning whether he has any coupons
subject to inspection and seizure. The nature of the
coupons is important here merely as indicating that
the officers did not exceed the permissible limits of
persuasion in obtaining them." 71
True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice
Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy joined, critical of
what it considered "a process of devitalizing
interpretation" which in this particular case gave
approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and
expressing the regret that the Court might be "in
danger of forgetting what the Bill of Rights reflects
experience with police excesses."
Even this opinion, however, concerned that the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonial
compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every
man is under obligation to give testimony. But that
obligation can be exacted only under judicial
sanctions which are deemed precious to AngloAmerican civilization. Merely because there may be
the duty to make documents available for litigation
does not mean that police officers may forcibly or
fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to

be let alone except under responsible judicial

compulsion is precisely what the Fourth Amendment
meant to express and to safeguard." 72
It would appear then that a reliance on that case for
an allegation that this statutory provision offends
against the unreasonable search and seizure clause
would be futile and unavailing. This is the more so in
the light of the latest decision of this Court in Stonehill
v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through Chief Justice
Concepcion, after stressing that the constitutional
requirements must be strictly complied with, and that
it would be "a legal heresy of the highest order" to
convict anybody of a violation of certain statutes
without reference to any of its determinate provisions
delimited its scope as "one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding
"the sanctity, of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence. . . ." Such is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the
so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure has been
shown to exist by such requirement of further
periodical submission of one's financial condition as
set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater
plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his
invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According
to the Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself." 74 This constitutional
provision gives the accused immunity from any
attempt by the prosecution to make easier its task by
coercing or intimidating him to furnish the evidence
necessary to convict. He may confess, but only if he
voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but only
if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent,
and the prosecution is powerless to compel him to
talk. 76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It
may be documentary. Neither then could the accused
be ordered to write, when what comes from his pen

may
constitute
evidence
of
guilt
or
innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search or
seizure of his house, papers or effects for the purpose
of locating incriminatory matter. 78
In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection
based on the guaranty against self-incrimination is far
from decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason
stated: "What the above inhibition seeks to [prevent]
is
compulsory
disclosure
of
incriminating
facts." 79 Necessarily then, the protection it affords will
have to await, in the language of Justice J. B. L.
Reyes, the existence of actual cases, "be they
criminal, civil or administrative." 80 Prior to such a
stage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the
validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an
infringement of the non-incrimination clause. What
was said in an American State decision is of
relevance. In that case, a statutory provision requiring
any person operating a motor vehicle, who knows that
injury has been caused a person or property, to stop
and give his name, residence, and his license number
to the injured party or to a police officer was sustained
against the contention that the information thus
exacted may be used as evidence to establish his
connection with the injury and therefore compels him
to incriminate himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If
the law which exacts this information is invalid,
because such information, although in itself no
evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of
crime against the informant, then all police regulations
which involve identification may be questioned on the
same ground. We are not aware of any constitutional
provision designed to protect a man's conduct from
judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But,
even if a constitutional right be involved, it is not
necessary to invalidate the statute to secure its
protection. If, in this particular case, the constitutional
privilege justified the refusal to give the information
exacted by the statute, that question can be raised in
the defense to the pending prosecution. Whether it
would avail, we are not called upon to decide in this
proceeding." 81

6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the

allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its
face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being
unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in
the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is
not the province of the courts to supervise legislation
and keep it within the bounds of propriety and
common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern." 83 There can be no possible
objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any
Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret
and apply them regardless of whether or not they are
wise or salutary." 84 For they, according to Justice
Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate
policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the
law." 85
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion
in Gonzales
v. Commission
on
Elections, 86 that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken may
be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it
ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has
in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of
each department and confined its jurisdiction to such
a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable
under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of
law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be
courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their
controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The
attack on the validity of the challenged provision
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if
valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July
19, 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and void
Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it
requires periodical submittal of sworn statements of

financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official

or employee of the government after he had once
submitted such a sworn statement . . . is reversed."
Without costs.

ALFREDO
L.
AZARCON, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
and
JOSE
C.
BATAUSA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over
a private individual who is charged with malversation
of public funds as a principal after the said individual
had been designated by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue as a custodian of distrained property? Did
such accused become a public officer and therefore
subject to the graft courts jurisdiction as a
consequence of such designation by the BIR?
These are the main questions in the instant
petition for review of respondent Sandiganbayans
Decision[1] in Criminal Case No. 14260 promulgated
on March 8, 1994, convicting petitioner of
malversation of public funds and property, and
Resolution[2] dated June 20, 1994, denying his motion
for new trial or reconsideration thereof.

the
formers
premises.[4] From
this
set
circumstances arose the present controversy.

x x x It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of

Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main
Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or
his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10,
Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the
goods, chattels or effects and other personal property
of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon
and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon
ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or
remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by
taxpayer Ancla. The Warrant of Garnishment was
received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.[5]
Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for
Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of
the National Internal Revenue, assumed the
undertakings specified in the receipt the contents of
which are reproduced as follows:
(I), the undersigned, hereby acknowledge to have
received from Amadeo V. San Diego, an Internal
Revenue Officer, Bureau of Internal Revenue of the
Philippines, the following described goods, articles,
and things:

Kind of property

---

Isuzu dump truck

Motor number

---

E120-229598

Chassis No.

---

SPZU50-1772440

Number of CXL

---

Color

---

Blue

The Facts
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated
an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. [3] His
services were contracted by the Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at its
concession
in
Mangagoy,
Surigao
del
Sur.Occasionally, he engaged the services of subcontractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at

of
Owned By

---

Mr. Jaime Ancla

the same having been this day seized and left in (my)
possession
pending
investigation
by
the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly
authorized representative. (I) further promise that (I)
will faithfully keep, preserve, and, to the best of (my)
ability, protect said goods, articles, and things seized
from defacement, demarcation, leakage, loss, or
destruction in any manner; that (I) will neither alter nor
remove, nor permit others to alter or remove or
dispose of the same in any manner without the
express authority of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and that (I) will produce and deliver all of
said goods, articles, and things upon the order of any
court of the Philippines, or upon demand of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any authorized
officer or agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.[6]
Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter
dated November 21, 1985 to the BIRs Regional
Director for Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City stating
that
x x x while I have made representations to retain
possession of the property and signed a receipt of the
same, it appears now that Mr. Jaime Ancla intends to
cease his operations with us. This is evidenced by the
fact that sometime in August, 1985 he surreptitiously
withdrew his equipment from my custody. x x x In this
connection, may I therefore formally inform you that it
is my desire to immediately relinquish whatever
responsibilities I have over the above-mentioned
property by virtue of the receipt I have signed. This
cancellation shall take effect immediately. x x x .[7]
Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the
truck to the security manager of PICOP, Mr. Delfin
Panelo, and requested him to prevent this truck from
being taken out of the PICOP concession. By the time
the order to bar the trucks exit was given, however, it
was too late.[8]
Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter
dated May 27, 1986, to wit:
An analysis of the documents executed by you
reveals that while you are (sic) in possession of the

dump truck owned by JAIME ANCLA, you voluntarily

assumed the liabilities of safekeeping and preserving
the unit in behalf of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. This is clearly indicated in the provisions of
the Warrant of Garnishment which you have signed,
obliged and committed to surrender and transfer to
this office. Your failure therefore, to observe said
provisions does not relieve you of your responsibility.[9]
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that
On 11 June 1986, Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue
Document Processor of Revenue Region 10 B,
Butuan City, sent a progress report to the Chief of the
Collection Branch of the surreptitious taking of the
dump truck and that Ancla was renting out the truck to
a certain contractor by the name of Oscar Cueva at
PICOP (Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, the same company which engaged
petitioners earth moving services), Mangagoy,
Surigao del Sur. She also suggested that if the report
were true, a warrant of garnishment be reissued
against Mr. Cueva for whatever amount of rental is
due from Ancla until such time as the latters tax
liabilities shall be deemed satisfied. x x x However,
instead of doing so, Director Batausa filed a lettercomplaint against the (herein Petitioner) and Ancla on
22 January 1988, or after more than one year had
elapsed from the time of Mrs. Calos report.[10]
Provincial
Fiscal
Pretextato
Montenegro
forwarded the records of the complaint x x x to the
Office of the Tanodbayan on May 18, 1988. He was
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor and granted
authority to conduct preliminary investigation on
August 22, 1988, in a letter by Special Prosecutor
Raul
Gonzales
approved
by
Ombudsman
(Tanodbayan) Conrado Vasquez.[11]
Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla,
petitioner Azarcon was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to
Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in the
following Information[12]filed on January 12, 1990, by
Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual:
That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of
Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Alfredo L. Azarcon, a private individual but

who, in his capacity as depository/administrator of

property seized or deposited by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, having voluntarily offered himself to act as
custodian of one Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor
No. E120-22958, Chasis No. SPZU 50-1772440, and
number CXL-6 and was authorized to be such under
the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, has
become a responsible and accountable officer and
said motor vehicle having been seized from Jaime C.
Ancla in satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum
of EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
ONE PESOS and 59/100 (P80,831.59) became a
public property and the value thereof as public fund,
with grave abuse of confidence and conspiring and
confederating with said Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, (sic)
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert to his personal use and benefit the
aforementioned motor vehicle or the value thereof in
the aforestated amount, by then and there allowing
accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw
and tow away the said Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with the
authority, consent and knowledge of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Butuan City, to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the amount
of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation
before the Sandiganbayan on May 14, 1991, alleging
that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the
preliminary investigation; and (2) the petitioner was
not a public officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he
was being charged with malversation under Article
217
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code.[13] The
Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation
on May 22, 1991.[14] After the reinvestigation, Special
Prosecution
Officer
Roger
Berbano,
Sr.,
recommended the withdrawal of the information [15] but
was overruled by the Ombudsman.[16]
A motion to dismiss was
March 25, 1992 on the
Sandiganbayan did not have
person of the petitioner since
officer.[17] On May 18, 1992,
denied the motion.[18]

filed by petitioner on
ground that the
jurisdiction over the
he was not a public
the Sandiganbayan

When the prosecution finished presenting its

evidence, the petitioner then filed a motion for leave
to file demurrer to evidence which was denied on

November 16, 1992, for being without merit.[19] The

petitioner then commenced and finished presenting
his evidence on February 15, 1993.
The Respondent Courts Decision
On
March
8,
1994,
respondent
Sandiganbayan[20] rendered
a
Decision,[21] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo
Azarcon y Leva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of Malversation of Public Funds defined and
penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of
the Revised Penal Code and, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in view of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its
maximum period to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion
Temporal. To indemnify the Bureau of Internal
Revenue the amount of P80,831.59; to pay a fine in
the same amount without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; to suffer special perpetual
disqualification; and, to pay the costs.
Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet
been brought within the jurisdiction of this Court up to
this date, let this case be archived as against him
without prejudice to its revival in the event of his
arrest or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, through new counsel,[22] filed a motion
for new trial or reconsideration on March 23, 1994,
which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution[23] dated December 2, 1994.
Hence, this petition
The Issues
The petitioner submits the following reasons for
the reversal of the Sandiganbayans assailed Decision
and Resolution:

I. The Sandiganbayan does not have

jurisdiction over crimes committed solely by
private individuals.
II. In any event, even assuming arguendo that
the appointment of a private individual as a
custodian or a depositary of distrained property
is sufficient to convert such individual into a
public officer, the petitioner cannot still be
considered a public officer because:
[A]
There is no provision in the National Internal Revenue
Code which authorizes the Bureau of Internal
Revenue to constitute private individuals as
depositaries of distrained properties.
[B]
His appointment as a depositary was not by virtue of
a direct provision of law, or by election or by
appointment by a competent authority.
III. No proof was presented during trial to prove that
the distrained vehicle was actually owned by the
accused Jaime Ancla; consequently, the governments
right to the subject property has not been established.
IV. The procedure provided for in the National Internal
Revenue Code concerning the disposition of
distrained property was not followed by the B.I.R.,
hence the distraint of personal property belonging to
Jaime C. Ancla and found allegedly to be in the
possession of the petitioner is therefore invalid.
V. The B.I.R. has only itself to blame for not promptly
selling the distrained property of accused Jaime C.
Ancla in order to realize the amount of back taxes
owed by Jaime C. Ancla to the Bureau.[24]
In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the controversy. Corollary to this is the
question of whether petitioner can be considered a
public officer by reason of his being designated by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depositary of
distrained property.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
It is hornbook doctrine that in order (to) ascertain
whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions
of the law should be inquired into. [25] Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the
statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be
presumed or implied.[26] And for this purpose in
criminal cases, the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the law at the time of commencement
of the action.[27]
In this case, the action was instituted with the
filing of this information on January 12, 1990; hence,
the applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March
23, 1983, but prior to their amendment by R.A. No.
7975 on May 16, 1995. At that time, Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606 provided that:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise:

In case private individuals are charged as coprincipals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees.
x x x x x x x x x.
The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify
the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have
jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a
co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee who has been charged with a
crime within its jurisdiction.
Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual?
The Information does not charge petitioner
Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory to a public officer committing an offense
under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Thus, unless
petitioner be proven a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the
crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines
who are public officers:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by
law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine
of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxxxxxxxx

Who are public officers. -- For the purpose of applying

the provisions of this and the preceding titles of the
book, any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of
the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any
rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public
officer.
Thus,
(to) be a public officer, one must be -(1) Taking part in the performance
functions in the government, or

of public

Performing in said Government or any of its

branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or class; and

(2) That his authority to take part in the performance

of public functions or to perform public duties must be
-a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority.[28]
Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing
the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by
the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity
constituting public functions, he obviously may not be
deemed authorized by popular election.The next
logical query is whether petitioners designation by the
BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as
appointment by direct provision of law, or by
competent authority.[29] We answer in the negative.
The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in
effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly
owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner
Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to
sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively designated
petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs.
Rastrollo,[30] a public officer.[31] This is based on the
theory that
(t)he power to designate a private person who has
actual possession of a distrained property as a
depository of distrained property is necessarily
implied in the BIRs power to place the property of a
delinquent tax payer (sic) in distraint as provided for
under Sections 206, 207 and 208 (formerly Sections
303, 304 and 305) of the National Internal Revenue
Code, (NIRC) x x x.[32]
We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is
not applicable to the case before us simply because
the facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous
to those obtaining here. While the cited case involved
a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of
attached property in the hands of the debtor, the case
at bench dealt with the BIRs administrative act of
effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of
taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property
which was received by petitioner Azarcon. In the cited
case, it was clearly within the scope of that courts
jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the judicial

deposit and give the depositary a character equivalent

to that of a public official.[33] However, in the instant
case, while the BIR had authority to require petitioner
Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the
NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a
public officer.

of the Revised Penal Code x x x defines the

individuals covered by the term officers under Article
217[39] x x x of the same Code.[40] And accordingly,
since Azarcon became a depository of the truck
seized by the BIR he also became a public officer
who can be prosecuted under Article 217 x x x.[41]

It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework,

which mandates a limited government, that its
branches and administrative agencies exercise only
that power delegated to them as defined either in the
Constitution or in legislation or in both. [34]Thus,
although the appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President, x x x [35] the quantum of
powers possessed by an administrative agency
forming part of the executive branch will still be limited
to that conferred expressly or by necessary or fair
implication in its enabling act. Hence, (a)n
administrative officer, it has been held, has only such
powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
[36]
Corollarily, implied powers are those which are
necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser
degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to
other matters not embraced therein, nor are not
incidental thereto.[37] For to so extend the statutory
grant of power would be an encroachment on powers
expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution. [38] It
is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by
the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a
constructive distraint by requiring any person to
preserve a distrained property, thus:

The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the

RPC reads:

xxxxxxxxx
The constructive distraint of personal property
shall be effected by requiring the taxpayer or
any person having possession or control of such
property to sign a receipt covering the property
distrained and obligate himself to preserve the
same intact and unaltered and not to dispose of
the same in any manner whatever without the
express authority of the Commissioner.
xxxxxxxxx
However, we find no provision in the NIRC
constituting such person a public officer by reason of
such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a
private individual to act as a depositary cannot be
stretched to include the power to appoint him as a
public officer. The prosecution argues that Article 222

Officers included in the preceding provisions. -- The

provisions of this chapter shall apply to private
individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have
charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds,
revenues, or property and to any administrator or
depository of funds or property attached, seized or
deposited by public authority, even if such property
belongs to a private individual.
Legislative intent is determined principally from
the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to
an injustice.[42] This is particularly observed in the
interpretation of penal statutes which must be
construed with such strictness as to carefully
safeguard the rights of the defendant x x x.[43] The
language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private
individual who has in his charge any of the public
funds or property enumerated therein and commits
any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of
Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise
be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring
public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it
expressed or implied that a private individual falling
under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.
After a thorough review of the case at bench, the
Court thus finds petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his coaccused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals
erroneously charged before and convicted by
Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction
over them. The Sandiganbayans taking cognizance of
this case is of no moment since (j)urisdiction cannot
be conferred by x x x erroneous belief of the court that
it had jurisdiction.[44] As aptly and correctly stated by
the petitioner in his memorandum:

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the

petitioner did not cease to be a private individual
when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished
dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged
him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for
malversation of public funds or property, the
prosecution was in fact charging two private
individuals without any public officer being similarly
charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken
below as well as the Decision rendered by
Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.[45]
WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and
Decision
of
the
Sandiganbayan
are
hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for
lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman),
Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Davide,

Jr.,

G.R. No. 111091 August 21, 1995

ENGINEER CLARO J. PRECLARO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
On 14 June 1990, petitioner was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A.
No. 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information
against him read as follows:
That on or about June 8, 1990, or sometime
prior thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer, being then the Project Manager/
Consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division,
Industrial Technology Development Institute,
Department of Science and Technology, a
component of the Industrial Development
Institute (ITDI for brevity) which is an agency
of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST for brevity), wherein the
Jaime Sta. Maria Construction undertook the
construction of the building in Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, with a total cost of
SEVENTEEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED
NINETY
FIVE
THOUSAND
PESOS
(P17,695,000.00) jointly funded by the
Philippine and Japanese Governments, and
while the said construction has not yet been
finally completed, accused either directly
requested and/or demanded for himself or
for another, the sum of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), claimed
as part of the expected profit of FOUR
HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P460,000.00) in connection with the
construction of that government building
wherein the accused had to intervene under
the law in his capacity as Project
Manager/Consultant of said construction
said offense having been committed in
relation to the performance of his official
duties.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On 20 July 1990, during arraignment, petitioner
pleaded "not guilty" to the charges against him.
On 30 June 1993, after trial on the merits, the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

finding accused Claro Preclaro y Jambalos
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
MONTH, as the minimum, to TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as the maximum,
perpetual disqualification from public office
and to pay the costs of this action.
SO ORDERED. 2
The antecedent facts are largely undisputed.
On 1 October 1989, the Chemical Mineral Division of
the Industrial Technology Development Institute
(ITDI), a component of the Department of Science
and Technology (DOST) employed Petitioner under a
written contract of services as Project Manager to
supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA)
Building at the DOST Compound in Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. 3
The contract was to remain in effect from October 1,
1989 up to the end of the construction period unless
sooner terminated. 4 Petitioner was to be paid a
monthly salary drawn from counter-part funds duly
financed by foreign-assisted projects and government
funds duly released by the Department of Budget and
Management. 5
In November 1989, to build the aforementioned CMD
Structure, DOST contracted the services of the Jaime
Sta. Maria Construction Company with Engr.
Alexander Resoso, as the company's project
engineer. 6
How petitioner committed a violation of the Anti-Graft
& Corrupt Practices Act is narrated in the Comment of
the Solicitor General and amply supported by the

records. The
reproduced:

material

portions

are

hereunder

xxx xxx xxx

3. In the month of May, 1990, Alexander
Resoso, Project Engineer of the Sta. Maria
Construction Company, was in the process
of evaluating a Change Order for some
electricals in the building construction when
petitioner approached him at the project site
(p. 11, 25, Ibid.).
4. Unexpectedly, petitioner made some
overtures that expenses in the Change
Order will be deductive (meaning, charged to
the contractor by deducting from the contract
price), instead of additive (meaning, charged
to the owner). Petitioner intimated that he
can forget about the deductive provided he
gets P200,000.00, a chunk of the
contractor's profit which he roughly
estimated to be around P460,000.00 (pp. 1213, 22, Ibid.).
5. Having conveyed the proposal to Jaime
Sta. Maria, Sr., the owner of Sta. Maria
Construction Company, Resoso thereafter
asked petitioner if he wanted a rendezvous
for him to receive the money. Petitioner
chose Wendy's Restaurant, corner E. Delos
Santos Avenue and Camias Street, on June
6, 1990 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening
(p. 14, Ibid.).
6. However, Sta. Maria, Sr. asked for two (2)
more days or until the 8th of June, perceiving
financial constraints (Ibid.).
7. Petitioner relented, saying "O.K. lang with
me because we are not in a hurry." (p.
15, Ibid.) Petitioner was thereafter asked to
bring along the result of the punch list
(meaning, the list of defective or correctible

works to be done by the contractor) (p.

15, Ibid.; p. 10, TSN, 18 Oct. 1991).

q. When Dave Preclaro arrived,

what did he do?

8. On 7 June 1990, Sta. Maria, Sr. and

Resoso proceeded to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to report the incident (p.
15, 35, Ibid.).

a. We asked him his order and

we talked about the punch list.

9. The NBI suggested an entrapment plan to

which Sta. Maria, Sr. signified his conformity
(p. 16, TSN, 12 Oct. 1990). Accordingly, Sta.
Maria, Sr. was requested to produce the
amount
of
P50,000.00
in
P500.00
denomination to represent the grease money
(p. 37, TSN, 6 Sept. 1990).
10. The next day, or on 8 June 1990, Resoso
delivered the money to the NBI. Thereafter,
the money was dusted with flourescent
powder and placed inside an attache case
(pp. 16-17, Ibid.). Resoso got the attache
case and was instructed not to open it.
Similarly, he was advised to proceed at the
Wendy's Restaurant earlier than the
designated time where a group of NBI men
awaited him and his companion, Sta. Maria,
Jr. (pp. 17-18, Ibid.).
11. Hence, from the NBI, Resoso passed by
the Jade Valley Restaurant in Timog,
Quezon City, to fetch Sta. Maria, Jr. (Ibid.).
12. At around 7:35 p.m., Resoso and Sta.
Maria, Jr. arrived at the Wendy's Restaurant.
They were led by the NBI men to a table
previously reserved by them which was
similarly adjacent to a table occupied by
them (pp. 18-19, Ibid.).
13. Twenty minutes later, petitioner arrived.
Supposedly, the following conversation took
place, to wit:
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

q. What was his comment about

the punch list?
a. He told us that it is harder to
produce small items than big ones.
q. How long did you converse
with Engr. Claro Preclaro?
a. I think thirty minutes or so.
q. Was Preclaro alone when he
came?
a. Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. CAOILI:
q. When you talk[ed] about his
punch list, did you talk about
anything else?
a. Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr., they
were conversing with Dave Preclaro
and he told [him], "O, paano na."
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
q. Who said "Paano na?"
a. Engineer Sta. Maria, [Jr.]. And
then Preclaro told [him], "Paano,
How will the money be arranged
and can I bring it?" he said.

And then Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr.

told him it was arranged on two
bundles on two envelopes.
And then Dave Preclaro told,
"Puede" and he asked Jimmy Sta.
Maria, Jr. if there is express teller
and could he deposit during night
time but Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr.
told him, "I do not have any
knowledge or I do not have any
express teller you can deposit. I
only know credit card."
PROS. CAOILI:
q. When Engr. Sta. Maria
intervened and interviewed him that
way, was there anything that
happened?
a. Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. handed
two envelopes to Preclaro.
q. Did Claro Preclaro receive
these two envelopes from Engineer
Sta. Maria?
a. Yes, sir. (pp. 19-21, Ibid., See
also pp. 13-14, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990.)
14. From the moment petitioner received the
two envelopes with his right hand, thereafter
placing them under his left armpit, he was
accosted by the NBI men (p. 22, TSN, 12
Oct. 1990).
15. A camera flashed to record the event.
Petitioner instinctively docked to avoid the
taking of pictures. In such manner, the two
envelopes fell (p. 23, Ibid.).

16. The NBI men directed petitioner to pick

up the two envelopes. Petitioner refused.
Hence, one of the NBI men picked up the
envelopes and placed them inside a big
brown envelope (p. 27, Ibid.)
17. Petitioner was thenceforth brought to the
NBI for examination (p. 28; Ibid.).
18. At the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section,
petitioner's right palmar hand was tested
positive of flourescent powder. The same
flourescent powder, however, cannot be
detected in petitioner's T-shirt and pants (p.
5, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990). 7
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, as brought out at the outset, an information was
filed against petitioner which, after due hearing,
resulted in his conviction by the Sandiganbayan. Not
satisfied with the decision, petitioner instituted the
present petition for review, ascribing to the
Sandiganbayan the following errors:
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE,
INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION, THE [PETITIONER]
NOT BEING A PUBLIC OFFICER; and
2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS
OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED HAVE BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE GUILT OF THE
[PETITIONER]
HAS
NOT
BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
We find the petition unmeritorious.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that he is not a
public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft

& Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019 as amended),

because he was neither elected nor appointed to a
public office. Rather, petitioner maintains that he is
merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on
contractual basis for a particular project and for a
specified period 8 as evidenced by the contract of
services 9 he entered into with the ITDI. Petitioner, to
further support his "theory," alleged that he was not
issued any appointment paper separate from the
abovementioned contract. He was not required to use
the bundy clock to record his hours of work and
neither did he take an oath of office. 10
We are not convinced by petitioner's arguments.
Petitioner miscontrues the definition of "public officer"
in R.A. No. 3019 which, according to Sec. 2(b) thereof
"includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exemption service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government. . . ."
The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in
Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive.
The terms "classified, unclassified or exemption
service" were the old categories of positions in the
civil service which have been reclassified into Career
Service and Non-Career Service 11 by PD 807
providing for the organization of the Civil Service
Commission 12 and by the Administrative Code of
1987. 13
Non-career service in particular is characterized by
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the
usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the
career service;and (2) tenure which is limited to a
period specified by law, or which is coterminous
with that of the appointing authority or subject to
his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of
a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.

The Non-Career Service shall include:

(1) Elective officials and their personal or
confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank
who hold their positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal or confidential
staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and
boards with fixed terms of office and their
personal or confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose
employment in the government is in accordance
with a special contract to undertake a specific
work or job, requiring special or technical skills
not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in
no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his
own responsibility with a minimum of direction
and supervision from the hiring agency; and
(5) Emergency and
(Emphasis ours.) 14

seasonal

personnel.

From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident

that petitioner falls under the non-career service
category (formerly termed the unclassified or
exemption service) of the Civil Service and thus is a
public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft
& Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).

Act because his intervention "was not required by law

but in the performance of a contract of services
entered into by him as a private individual
contractor," 15 is erroneous. As discussed above,
petitioner falls within the definition of a public officer
and as such, his duties delineated in Annex "B" of the
contract of services 16 are subsumed under the
phrase "wherein the public officer in his official
capacity
has
to
intervene
under
the
law." 17 Petitioner's allegation, to borrow a cliche, is
nothing but a mere splitting of hairs.
Among petitioner's duties as project manager is to
evaluate
the
contractor's
accomplishment
reports/billings 18hence, as correctly ruled by the
Sandiganbayan he has the "privilege and authority to
make a favorable recommendation and act favorably
in behalf of the government," signing acceptance
papers and approving deductives and additives are
some examples. 19 All of the elements of Sec. 3(b) of
the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act are, therefore,
present.
Anent the second issue, we likewise find Petitioner's
allegations completely bereft of merit.
Petitioner insists that the prosecution has failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that
the charges against him should be rejected for being
improbable, unbelievable and contrary to human
nature.
We disagree.

The fact that petitioner is not required to record his

working hours by means of a bundy clock or did not
take an oath of office became unessential
considerations in view of the above-mentioned
provision of law clearly including petitioner within the
definition of a public officer.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that

which produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required or "that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." 20 We
have extensively reviewed the records of this case
and we find no reason to overturn the findings of the
Sandiganbayan.

Similarly, petitioner's averment that he could not be

prosecuted under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices

Petitioner enumerates the alleged improbabilities and

inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses. We shall examine the testimonies referred

to with meticulousness.
Petitioner asserts that it was improbable for him to
have demanded P200,000.00 from Engr. Resoso,
when he could have just talked directly to the
contractor himself. It is quite irrelevant from whom
petitioner demanded his percentage share of
P200,000.00 whether from the contractor's project
engineer, Engr. Alexander Resoso or directly from the
contractor himself Engr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. That
petitioner made such a demand is all that is required
by Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and this element has
been sufficiently established by the testimony of Engr.
Resoso, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said when you were computing your
Change Order Mr. Preclaro or Dave
Preclaro whom you identified approached
you, what did you talk about?
A He mentioned to me that we are
deductive in our Change Order three and
four so after our conversation I told this
conversation to my boss that we are
deductible in the Change Order three and
four and then my boss told me to ask why it
is deductive.
Q Did you ask the accused here, Dave
Preclaro why it is considered deductive?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was his answer if any?
A I asked him that my boss is asking me to
ask you how come it became deductive
when my computation is additive and he
told me that I have done so much for your
company already and then he picked up
cement bag paper bag and computed our

alleged profit amounting to One Hundred

Sixty Thousand Pesos and then he told me
that he used to use some percentage in
projects maximum and minimum and in our
case he would use a minimum percentage
and multiply to 60 and . . .

Q What did you answer him when he told

you that?
A He told me to forget the deductive and
electrical and after that I told my boss what
he told me.

A My boss told me to ask Dave to postpone

the meeting on June 6 to be postponed on
June 8 at the same place and same time
because my boss is having financial
problem.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Q Who is your boss?

Q Did you relay the postponement to Dave

Preclaro?

Q What is 460?

A Santa Maria Sr.

A Yes sir. I told what my boss told me.

A P460,000.00 and he said take of the butal

and get two Hundred Thousand Pesos.

Q What was the reaction of your boss when

you relayed the message to Mr. Preclaro?

Q What was his reaction?

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
What is the translation now?
WITNESS:
A And he said disregard the excess and I
will just get the P200,000.00. (Emphasis
ours.)

Q What was the answer of Dave?

A Dave told me "O.K. lang with me"

because we are not in a hurry. Any way we
are the ones to sign the acceptance papers
and my boss instructed me that on Friday to
ask Dave to bring along the result of the
punch list and if possible also to bring along
the acceptance papers to be signed by
Dave, Lydia Mejia and Dr. Lirag the director.

A And he told me, Wendy's Restaurant at

3:00 o'clock.

Q What happened next after meeting with

Preclaro to relay the postponement if any?

Q When?

A Nothing happened. The next day,

Thursday the boss instructed me to go with
him to the NBI to give a statement.

A The next day he told me to ask Dave

where and when to pick up the money so
the next day I asked Dave "Where do you
intend to get the money, the Boss wanted to
know."

PROS. CAOILI:
Q What does he mean by that if you know?
A June 6 Wednesday.
A I do not know sir.
He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and
tell it to your boss. (Emphasis ours.)
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
Q What is P200,000.00?
A It is Two Hundred Thousand Pesos.
PROS. CAOILI:

Q When he told you that did you comply

with June 6 appointment?
A I told my boss what he told me again that
the meeting will take place at Wendy's
Restaurant corner Edsa and Camias Street
at around 8:00 o'clock p.m. June 6,
Wednesday.
Q What did your boss tell you?
A The next day he told me to ask Dave.
Q What did your boss tell you?

Q Did you go to the NBI and report to the

incident to the NBI?
A Yes sir.
Q Did you give a statement before any of
the agents of the of the NBI?
A Yes sir. 21
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, petitioner's alleged refusal to see Mr. Jaime
Sta. Maria Sr. when the latter tried to arrange

meetings with him regarding his demand 22 does not

weaken the cause against petitioner. It does not at all
prove that petitioner did not ask for money.
Conceivably petitioner did not muster enough courage
to ask money directly from the contractor himself.
Getting the amount through the project engineer
would be safer because if Mr. Sta. Maria, Sr. had
refused to give money, petitioner could always deny
having made the demand.
Petitioner contends that the percentage demanded in
the amount of P200,000.00 is too high considering
that the estimated profit of the contractor from the
CMD project is only P460,000.00. In petitioner's
words, this would "scare the goose that lays the
golden egg." 23 We reject this argument. The
aforementioned contractor's profit is petitioner's own
computation as testified to by Engr. Resoso:

Hundred Thousand Pesos. (Emphasis

ours.)

P200,000.00 which would increase the

contractor's loss to P480,000.00!

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:

It might have been different if the changes

were
additive
where
STA.
MARIA
CONSTRUCTION would have earned more,
thereby providing motive for the petitioner to
ask for a percentage! 26

What is the translation now?

WITNESS:
A And he said disregard the excess and
I will just get the P200,000.00.
PROS. CAOILI:
Q What does he mean by that if you
know?
A I do not know sir.

xxx xxx xxx

A I asked him that my boss is asking me
to ask you how come it became
deductive when my computation is
additive and he told me that I have done
so much for your company alreadyand
then he picked up cement bag paper
bag and computed our alleged profit
amounting to One Hundred Sixty
Thousand Pesos and then he told me
that he used to use some percentage in
projects maximum and minimum and in
our case he would use a minimum
percentage and multiply to 460
and . . . (Emphasis ours.)
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Q What is 460?
A P460,000.00 and it ended to P215
thousand or P20,000.00 and he said
take of the butal and get the Two

He just said, I will get the P200,000.00

and tell it to your boss. 24
xxx xxx xxx
The records, however, do not show the true and
actual amount that the Sta. Maria Construction will
earn as profit. There is, therefore, no basis for
petitioner's contention as the actual profit may be
lower or higher than his estimation.
Besides, as related by Engr. Resoso, petitioner
considers the P200,000.00 percentage proper
compensation since he has allegedly done so much
for the Sta. Maria construction company. 25

But this is precisely what petitioner was bargaining for

P200,000.00 in exchange for forgetting about the
deductive 27 and thus prevent the Sta. Maria
Construction from incurring losses.
Petitioner's contention that it was impossible for him
to make any demands because the final decision
regarding accomplishments and billing lies with the
DOST technical committee is unacceptable. Petitioner
is part of the abovementioned technical committee as
the ITDI representative consultant. This is part of his
duties under the contract of services in connection
with which he was employed by the ITDI. Even,
assuming arguendo that petitioner does not make the
final
decision,
as
supervisor/consultant,
his
recommendations will necessarily carry much weight.
Engr. Resoso testified thus:
PROS. CAOILI:
Q As a Project Engineer to whom do you
present your billing papers accomplishment
report or purchase order?
A The billing paper was being taken cared of
by the, of our office. I personally do my job
as supervision in the construction.

Petitioner also argues that:

According to STA. MARIA, SR., they were
deductive by P280,000.00 (Id., pp. 34-35).

Q Do you have any counterpart to supervise

the project from the government side?
A Yes, we have.

If STA. MARIA CONSTRUCTION was

deductive in the amount of P280,000.00,
why would the petitioner still demand

Yes, the DOST have a technical Committee

Infra-Structure Committee and also the ITDI
as its own representative.
Q Who composed the Technical Committee
of the DOST?

architect and the contractor. We had weekly

meetings.
Q What matters if any do you consult with Mr.
Claro Preclaro?
ATTY. JIMENEZ:

A A certain Engineer Velasco, Engineer

Sande Banez and Engineer Mejia.

No basis.

Q How about the ITDI?

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

A The ITDI representative composed of

Dave Preclaro.

They met on problems on Mondays.

Q Who is this Dave Preclaro?

A He is the consultant of ITDI. (Emphasis
ours.)

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
But there is no mention of Preclaro specifically.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

xxx xxx xxx

With the representative of DOST and Preclaro

ATTY. CAOILI:

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Q As Project Engineer do you consult to any

body regarding your job?

Does that also mean that Preclaro is also

among the representatives he is going to
consult with?

A First if there is any problem in the site I

consult my boss.

Q How about with the other consultants

representing the ITDI and DOST?

Witness may answer the question.

A The Infra-structure Committee of DOST and

the Infra-structure Committee of ITDI, the

Petitioner also claims that the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses regarding the entrapment itself
are conflicting, doubtful or improbable:
(aaa) according to RESOSO, only FOUR (4)
P500 bills were dusted with flourescent
powder and used in the alleged entrapment.
Contradicting RESOSO, STA. MARIA, SR.
said that he gave fifty thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos in P500 denomination to the NBI. 29
There is no such inconsistency. Said witnesses were
testifying on two different subjects. Engr. Sta. Maria,
Sr.'s testimony touched on the amount he gave the
NBI for use in the entrapment while Engr. Resoso's
declaration referred only to the number of bills dusted
with flourescent powder.
Petitioner, likewise, misappreciated the following
testimony of Resoso:
PROS. CAOILI:

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

Q With whom do you discuss this problem?

xxx xxx xxx

Well any way. . .

PROS. CAOILI:

A In the construction site we have meeting every

Monday to discuss any problem.

A Every Monday meeting we tackle with

accomplishment
report
the
billing
papers. 28 (Emphasis ours.)

Read back the question.

Q What did he do with the two envelopes

upon receiving the same?
A Then he asked Jaime Sta. Maria, Jr. if
there is bank teller express, if he could
deposit the money but Mr. Sta. Maria said,
"I do not have, I only have credit cards." 30

COURT STENOGRAPHER:
Reading back the question as ordered by the
Court.
WITNESS:

Petitioner intended to deposit the money in his own

account not that of Mr. Sta. Maria, Jr. He was merely
inquiring from the latter if there was an express teller
nearby where he could make the deposit. Mr. Sta.
Maria Jr. himself testified as follows:

A He asked me if there
was express teller. I told
him I do not know then he
asked me whether it is
possible to deposit at the
Express Teller at that time.
I told him I don't know
because I have no express
teller card and he asked
me how am I going to
arrange, how was it
arranged if I will bring it,
can I bring it. Then I told
him that it was placed in
two envelopes consisting
of 500 Peso bills and then
he said "Okay na yan." 31
The failure of the NBI to take photographs of the
actual turn-over of the money to petitioner is not fatal
to the People's cause. The transaction was witnessed
by several people, among whom were Engr. Resoso,
Mr. Sta. Maria Jr. and the NBI agents whose
testimonies on the circumstances before, during and
after the turn-over are consistent, logical and credible.
According to NBI Agent Francisco Balanban Sr., they
purposely took no photographs of the actual turn-over
so as not to alert and scare off the petitioner. During
cross-examination Agent Balanban Jr. stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, of course, this entrapment
operation, you made certain preparation
to make sure that you would be able to
gather evidence in support of the
entrapment?

A That is right sir.

Q And that photographer was precisely
brought along to record the entrapment?

So was it your intention to take

photographs only at the time that he is
already being arrested?
A Yes sir. 32

A Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q From the beginning to the end, that
was the purpose?
A At the time of the arrest sir.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
From the time of the handing over of the
envelopes until the entrapment would
have been terminated?
A No sir we plan to take the photograph
only during the arrest because if we
take photographs he would be alerted
during the handing of the envelopes.
(Emphasis ours.)
Q So you did not intend to take
photographs of the act of handing of the
envelopes to the suspect?

Petitioner insists that when his hands were placed

under ultra-violet light, both were found negative for
flourescent powder. This is petitioner's own
conclusion which is not supported by evidence. Such
self-serving statement will not prevail over the clear
and competent testimony and the report 33 submitted
by the forensic expert of the NBI Ms. Demelen R. dela
Cruz, who was the one who conducted the test and
found petitioner's right palmar hand positive for
flourescent powder, the same hand he used,
according to witnesses Resoso and Sta. Maria Jr., to
get the money from the latter.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. dela Cruz since when have you been
a Forensic Chemist at NBI?
A Since 1981 sir.

A We intended but during that time we

cannot take photographs at the time of
the handling because the flash will alert
the suspect. (Emphasis ours.)

Q JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Why did you not position the

photographer to a far distance place
with camera with telescopic lens?

Admitted Your Honor.

A We did not Your Honor.

Madam Witness did you conduct a forensic

examination in the person of one Dave
Preclaro y Jambalos?

Q By the way, is the defense willing to admit

that the witness is a competent as . . . .

PROS. CAOILI:

A Yes sir.
Q As a matter of fact you even brought
photographer for the purpose?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

A Yes sir.

A Right hand sir.

Q If that person whom you examined is here

in court would you be able to recognize him?

Q What other examination did you conduct?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
We admit that the accused is the one
examined by the witness.
ATTY. CAOILI:
Did you prepare the result of the examination
in writing?
A Yes sir.
PROS. CAOILI:
Showing to you Physic Examination No. 90961 which for purposes of identification has
already been marked as Exh. H what relation
has this have with the report that you
mentioned a while ago?
A This is the same report that I prepared sir.
Q How did you conduct such flourescent
examination?
A The left and right hands of the accused
were placed under the ultra violet lamp sir.
Q What was the result?
A It gave a . . . under the ultra violent lamp
the palmer hands of the suspect gave
positive result for the presence of flourescent
powder.
Q What palmar hands?

A And also the clothing, consisting of the tshirts and the pants were examined. Under
the ultra violet lamp the presence of the
flourescent powder of the t-shirts and pants
cannot be seen or distinguished because the
fibers or the material of the cloth under the
ultra violet lamp was flouresce.
Q Please tell the Court why the t-shirts and
pants under the ultra violent lamp was
flouresce?
A The materials or the fibers of the clothings
it could have been dyed with flourescent
dyes sir.34
xxx xxx xxx
What we find improbable and contrary to human
experience is petitioner's claim that he was set up by
Engr. Sta. Maria Sr. and Engr. Resoso for no other
purpose but revenge on account, for petitioner's
failure to recommend the Sta. Maria Construction to
perform the extra electrical works. 35
The Sandiganbayan has aptly ruled on this matter,
thus:
For another, the claim of accused that there
was ill-will on the part of the construction
company is hardly plausible. It is highly
improbable for the company to embark on a
malicious prosecution of an innocent person
for the simple reason that such person had
recommended the services of another
construction firm. And it is extremely
impossible for such company to enlist the
cooperation and employ the services of the
government's chief investigative agency for
such an anomalous undertaking. It is more in

accord with reason and logic to presuppose

that there was some sort of a mischievous
demand made by the accused in exchange
for certain favorable considerations, such as,
favorable
recommendation
on
the
completeness of the project, hassle-free
release of funds, erasure of deductives, etc.
Indeed, the rationale for the occurrence of
the meeting and the demand for money is
infinite and boundless. 36
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
Engr. Sta. Maria Sr., who was then engaged in the
construction of another DOST building, would not risk
his business or livelihood just to exact revenge which
is neither profitable nor logical. As we aptly stated
in Maleg v. Sandiganbayan: 37
It is hard to believe that the complainant who
is a contractor would jeopardize and
prejudice his business interests and risk
being
blacklisted
in
government
infrastructure projects, knowing that with the
institution of the case, he may find it no
longer advisable nor profitable to continue in
his construction ventures. It is hardly
probable that the complainant would weave
out of the blue a serious accusation just to
retaliate and take revenge on the accused.
From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that
on the basis of the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented during the trial, the guilt of
petitioner has been established beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision
Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

of

the

set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioners

provisional liberty was fixed.
JOSE
JINGGOY
ESTRADA, petitioner,vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD
DIVISION),
PEOPLE
THE PHILIPPINES and
OFFICE
OF
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

E.
OF
THE

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its
application to a particular party may be
unconstitutional. This is the submission of the
petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of
the Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the
charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent
Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the
impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, then President of the Republic of the
Philippines, five criminal complaints against the
former President and members of his family, his
associates, friends and conspirators were filed with
the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman
issued a Joint Resolution[1] finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of
several criminal Informations against the former
President and the other respondents therein. One of
the Informations was for the crime of plunder under
Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents
was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then
mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April
18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the
case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was

On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to

Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on the
ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is
unconstitutional and that it charged more than one
offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the
motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a
warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On
its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in
custody of the law.

Motion.[6] Petitioners alternative prayer to post bail

was set for hearing after arraignment of all
accused. The court held:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1)
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24,
2001 filed by accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada; (2)
MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION
TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April
2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward
S. Serapio.

On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a Very Urgent

Omnibus Motion[2] alleging that: (1) no probable cause
exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for
plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly
involved in illegal gambling and not in a series or
combination of overt or criminal acts as required in
R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a
matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded
from the Amended Information and be discharged
from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed
that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be
fixed by respondent court.[3]

Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH

AND SUSPEND of accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that
he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for
want of probable cause and (2) discharged from
custody immediately which is based on the same
grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND
SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative
prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed
to post bail be SET for hearing together with the
petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio
scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused.[7]

On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to

Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix
Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses
Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the
Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A
Non-Bailable Offense As To Him.[4]

The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner

moved
for
reconsideration
of
the
Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and
proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to
make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a
plea of not guilty for him.[8]

On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to

Strike Out So-Called Entry of Appearance, To Direct
Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes
Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending
Incidents.[5]

Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that

respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:

On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan

issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to
Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus

1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional

on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying
him the equal protection of the laws;

2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide

complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged
offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which
and with whom he is not even remotely connected contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal,
not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due
process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement
in jueteng in one count of the information which
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in
defiance of the principle of proportionality.[9]
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in
seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and
denies him the equal protection of the laws.[10]
The
contention
deserves
our
scant
attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the
Anti-Plunder Law, has been settled in the case
of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[11] We take off from the
Amended Information which charged petitioner,
together with former President Joseph E. Estrada,
Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie Atong Ang, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as
follows:

Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe

a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does,
of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized
under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of
R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to
January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY w
ith his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY,
RELATIVES
BY
AFFINITY
OR
CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION,
AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS
AND
SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17],
more
or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF
OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY
OR
A combination OR
A series
of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES
OR MEANS, described as follows:

AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and
OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a.
ASIONG SALONGA AND a.k.a JOSE VELARDE,
together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong
Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN
DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly

or
indirectly,
on SEVERAL
INSTANCES,
MONEY
IN
THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING
IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY

FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY

HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance
with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG
ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda
T.
Ricaforte,
Edward
Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING,
misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public
funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
[P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO
HUNDRED
MILLION
PESOS
[P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the Province of
Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with
coaccused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES;
(c) by
directing,
ordering
and
compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL
GAIN
AND
BENEFIT,
the
Government
Service
Insurance
System
(GSIS) TO
PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK
MORE OR LESS, and the Social
Security System (SSS),329,855,000
SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR
LESS,
OF
THE
BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE

HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND

SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY
CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR
LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY
FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED
FIFTY
PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY,
OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SEVEN
MILLION
FIVE
HUNDRED
SEVENTY
EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND
FIFTY
CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50];
AND
BY
COLLECTING
OR
RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES
BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES
OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT
OF
ONE
HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED
THOUSAND
PESOS
[P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME
JOSE VELARDE;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY
FORM
OF
PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS

[P3,233,104,173.17] AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE
AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001[12]
Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is
unconstitutional as applied to him is principally
perched on the premise that the Amended Information
charged him with only one act or one offense which
cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial
of his right to bail.
Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful
examination of the Amended Information will show
that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first
paragraph charges former President Joseph E.
Estrada with the crime of plunder together with
petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the
second paragraph spells out in general terms how the
accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder;
and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)
describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the
crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A.
No. 7080, and state the names of the accused who
committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate
act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in
the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal
gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this
sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with
former President Estrada, is charged with the act of
receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling
amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners
posture, the allegation is that he received or collected
money
from
illegal
gambling on
several

instances. The phrase on several instances

means the petitioner committed the predicate act
in series. To insist that the Amended Information
charged the petitioner with the commission of only
one act or offense despite the phrase several
instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay, pretzel
interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not
utilize the exact words combination or series as they
appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan,[13] we held that where these two
terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical,
meaning, the word series is synonymous with the
clause on several instances. Series refers to a
repetition of the same predicate act in any of the
items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word
combination contemplates the commission of at least
any two different predicate acts in any of said
items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act
under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioners stand that in
the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding
probable cause to charge him with plunder together
with the other accused, he was alleged to have
received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is
way below the minimum of P50 million required under
R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by
the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman,
recommending the filing of charges against petitioner
and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent Jose Jinggoy Estrada, the present Mayor
of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also
surreptitious collection of protection money from
jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from
the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact
that
Mayor
Estrada, on
at
least
two
occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an

emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul

totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000
and another P1 million in February, 2000. An
alleged listahan of jueteng recipients listed him as one
Jingle Bell, as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec.
2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI].[14]
Hence, contrary to the representations of the
petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2
million was delivered to petitioner as jueteng haul
on at least two occasions. The P2 million is,
therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is
specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the
conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
xxxxxxxxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in
confabulation with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward
Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and
received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545
million from jueteng collections of the operators
thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, in
exchange for protection from arrest or interference by
law enforcers; x x x.[15]
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the
petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to
establish any probable cause against him for
plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has
found probable cause against the petitioner for which
reason it issued a warrant of arrest against
him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is
now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable
cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The
issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that the plunder law
does not provide sufficient and complete standards to
guide the courts in dealing with accused alleged to
have contributed to the offense.[16] Thus, he posits the
following questions:

For example, in an Information for plunder which cites

at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose
on one who is clearly involved in only one such
criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be
a lesser penalty? What if another accused is shown to
have participated in three of the ten specifications,
what would be the penalty imposable, compared to
one who may have been involved in five or seven of
the specifications? The law does not provide the
standard or specify the penalties and the courts are
left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to
say what the law is rather than to apply what the
lawmaker is supposed to have intended.[17]
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he
labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is
charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has
not conspired with the other accused named in subparagraphs
(b)
to
(d)
of
the
Amended
Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought
to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A.
No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable
penalty on an accused similarly situated as he
is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second
paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to
have conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the crime of plunder. His alleged
participation consists in the commission of the
predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information. If these allegations are proven,
the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be
no different from that of the former President for in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The
imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7080, viz:
Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with the members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates
or
other
persons,
amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of

plunder and shall be punished by reclusion

perpetua to death. Any person who participated with
the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance
of
mitigating
and
extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court.
III.
Petitioner
also
faults
the
respondent
Sandiganbayan for sustaining the charge against
petitioner for alleged offenses and with alleged
conspirators, with which and with whom he is not
even remotely connected contrary to the dictum that
criminal liability is personal, not vicarious results in the
denial of substantive due process.[18]
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand,
that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate
act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other
predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d)
because he is indicted as a principal and as coconspirator of the former President. This is
purportedly clear from the first and second
paragraphs of the Amended Information.[19]
For better focus, there is a need to examine
again
the
allegations
of
the
Amended
Information vis--vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two
paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other coaccused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph
names all the accused, while the second paragraph
describes in general how plunder was committed and
lays down most of the elements of the crime
itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail
the predicate acts that constitute the crime and
name in particular the co-conspirators of former
President Estrada in each predicate act. The
predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-

paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated

in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a)
alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several
instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of
those who conspired with former President Estrada in
committing
the
offense. This
predicate
act
corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of
the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of
diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of
the tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense
described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1
(d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention
petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the
former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two
predicate acts - that of ordering the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social
Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of
Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving
commissions from such purchase from the Belle
Corporation which became part of the deposit in the
Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI
Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2]
and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was
allegedly committed by the former President in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally,
sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the
former President unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with
John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same
under his account name Jose Velarde at the
Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the
offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1
(d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended
Information, it is clear that all the accused named in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual
acts, conspired with former President Estrada to
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is

worded, however, it is not certain whether the

accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with
each other to enable the former President to amass
the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of
clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the
conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the
former President as related in the second paragraph
of the Amended Information in relation to its subparagraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be
held accountable only for the predicate acts he
allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of
the Amended Information which were allegedly done
in conspiracy with the former President whose design
was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more
than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the
respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for
including the predicate acts alleged in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information
in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A
study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the
law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing
multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was
enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former
President
Marcos
and
his
alleged
cronies. Government
prosecutors
found
no
appropriate law to deal with the multitude and
magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the
former President to acquire illegal wealth.[20] They
also found that under the then existing laws such as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised
Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved
different transactions, different time and different
personalities. Every transaction constituted a
separate crime and required a separate case and
the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down
into several criminal and graft charges. The
preparation of multiple Informations was a legal
nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and
independent cases were filed against practically the
same accused before the Sandiganbayan. [21] R.A. No.
7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law[22] was enacted precisely

to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in

the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt
terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal
enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not
in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a
period of time, that may involve so many persons,
here and abroad, and which touch so many states
and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions
sought to be penalized do not involve simple
cases of malversation of public funds, bribery,
extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of
an entire nation resulting in material damage to
the national economy. The above-described crime
does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus,
the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard
against the possible recurrence of the depravities of
the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with
similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting
influence of power.
There is no denying the fact that the plunder of
an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy is made up of a complex and
manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
therefore, different parties may be united by a
common purpose. In the case at bar, the different
accused and their different criminal acts have a
commonalityto help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Subparagraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information
alleged the different participation of each accused in
the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy
charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to
receive protection money from illegal gambling, that
each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise
tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to
purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and

acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for

former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of
several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly
involves two structures: (1) the so-called wheel or
circle conspiracy, in which there is a single person or
group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more
other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the
chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of
narcotics or other contraband, in which there is
successive communication and cooperation in much
the same way as with legitimate business operations
between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.[23]
From a reading of the Amended Information, the
case at bar appears similar to a wheel
conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while
the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that
encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall
conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would
dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the
ground that the allegation of conspiracy in the
Amended Information is too general. The fear is even
expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the
innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by
American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on
conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal
law and in common law. Under Philippine law,
conspiracy should be understood on two
levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime
in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only
when the law fixes a penalty for its commission
such as in conspiracy to commit treason,
rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under

American criminal law, the agreement or

conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense.
[24]
The essence of conspiracy is the combination of
two or more persons, by concerted action, to
accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some
purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal
or unlawful means.[25] Its elements are: agreement to
accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or
more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose;
and requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense.[26]
A study of the United States Code ought to
be instructive. It principally punishes two (2)
crimes of conspiracy[27] conspiracy to commit any
offense
or
to
defraud
the United
States, and conspiracy
to
impede
or
injure
officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec.
371,[28] as follows:
Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
the United States. If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or
more of such persons to any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is
the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only,
the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed
the maximum punishment provided for such
misdemeanor.
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is
penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two
or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession,
or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation,
or threat, any person from accepting or holding any

office, trust or place of confidence under the United

States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to
induce by like means any officer of the United States
to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are
required to be performed, or to injure him in his
person or property on account of his lawful discharge
of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the
lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so
as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the
discharge of his official duties, each of such persons
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than six years, or both.
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1)
conspiracy to commit any offense against the United
States; and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United
States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to
commit any offense against the United Statesrefers to
an act made a crime by federal laws. [29] It refers to an
act punished by statute.[30] Undoubtedly, Section 371
runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws,
whether criminal or regulatory.[31] These laws cover
criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic,
racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank
robbery, etc. and also include customs violations,
counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail
fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws
governing interstate commerce and other areas of
federal regulation.[32] Section 371 penalizes the
conspiracy to commit any of these substantive
offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally
separate and distinct from the substantive
offense,[33] hence, the court rulings that acquittal on
the substantive count does not foreclose prosecution
and conviction for related conspiracy.[34]
The conspiracy to defraud the government
refers primarily to cheating the United States out of
property or money. It also covers interference with or
obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by
deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are
dishonest.[35] It comprehends defrauding the United
States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud be
declared criminal or not.[36]

The basic difference in the concept of

conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American
case law on how conspiracy should be alleged will
reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to
include
particularities
of
time,
place,
circumstances or causes, in stating the manner
and means of effecting the object of the
conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the
scope of a bill of particulars. [37] An indictment for
conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the
agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the
agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts
performed in furtherance of the agreement. [38] To
allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to
state that they agreed to do the matters which are set
forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a
conspiracy is to allege an agreement.[39] The gist of
the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement,
and where conspiracy is charged, it is not
necessary to set out the criminal object with as
great a certainty as is required in cases where
such object is charged as a substantive offense.[40]
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a
substantial difference on how Philippine courts
and American courts deal with cases challenging
Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground
that they lack particularities of time, place,
circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as
aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the
Information as a mode of committing a crime or it
may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself.
When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself,
the sufficiency of the allegations in the
Information charging the offense is governed by
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information
for this crime must contain the following averments:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused, the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of

the commission of the offense; and the place where

the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information.
The complaint or information to be sufficient must
state the name of the accused, designate the offense
given by statute, state the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, the name of the offended
party, the approximate date of the commission of the
offense and the place where the offense was
committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how
the acts or omissions constituting the offense should
be made in order to meet the standard of
sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by
its name given by statute or by reference to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
[41]
The information must also state the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances.[42] The acts
or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment.[43] No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged.[44] Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information.
[45]
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to
the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.
[46]
The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of
the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[47]
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a
crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements

of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or

information. For example, the crime of conspiracy to
commit treason is committed when, in time of war, two
or more persons come to an agreement to levy war
against the Government or to adhere to the enemies
and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit
it.[48] The elements of this crime are: (1) that the
offender owes allegiance to the Government of the
Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the
Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other
person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy
war against the government, or (b) adhere to the
enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that
the offender and other person or persons decide to
carry out the agreement. These elements must be
alleged in the information.
The
requirements
on
sufficiency
of
allegations are different when conspiracy is not
charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode
of committing the crime as in the case at
bar. There
is less
necessity of
reciting
its
particularities in the Information because conspiracy
is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The
conspiracy is significant only because it changes the
criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy
and makes them answerable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of their participation in the
crime.[49] The liability of the conspirators is collective
and each participant will be equally responsible for
the acts of others,[50] for the act of one is the act of all.
[51]
In People
v.
Quitlong,[52] we
ruled
on
how conspiracy as the mode of committing the
offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the
crime charged, the information must set forth the facts
and circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that the
accused can properly prepare for and undertake his
defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more accused persons is
that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an
ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied

by competent proof, an allegation, however, of

conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal
liability to an accused for the act of another or
others, is indispensable in order to hold such
person, regardless of the nature and extent of his
own participation, equally guilty with the other or
others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the
individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes
of secondary importance, the act of one being
imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA
442). Verily, an accused must know from the
information whether he faces a criminal responsibility
not only for his acts but also for the acts of his coaccused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver
all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the
parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts
connecting all the accused with one another in
the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary
to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive
offense. It is enough that the indictment contains
a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive
of the offense in ordinary and concise language,
with as much certainty as the nature of the case
will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended,
and with such precision that the accused may
plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. It is said,
generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient if it
follows the words of the statute and reasonably
informs the accused of the character of the offense he
is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the
language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of the respective
statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxxxxxxxx

x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons

come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to
life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to
actually pursue it.Verily, the information must state
that the accused have confederated to commit the
crime or that there has been a community of
design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to
commit the felony among the accused. Such an
allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of
the words conspired or confederated or the
phrase acting in conspiracy, must aptly appear in
the information in the form of definitive acts
constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to
commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the
community of design among the accused must be
conveyed such as either by the use of the term
conspire or its derivatives and synonyms or by
allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just
inferred, in the information on which basis an
accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is
not to be confused with or likened to the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly
alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may
be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the
accused.
x x x x x x x x x.
Again, following the stream of our own
jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy
as a mode in the commission of an offense in
either of the following manner: (1) by use of the
word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude, etc;[53] or (2) by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy
in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is intended, and with such precision
as would enable the accused to competently enter a
plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same
facts.[54]

The allegation of conspiracy in the

information must not be confused with the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual
cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a
common purpose or design, a concerted action or
concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and
actually pursue it.[55] A statement of this evidence is
not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of
the Amended Information alleged in general terms
how the accused committed the crime of
plunder. It used the words in connivance/conspiracy
with his co-accused. Following the ruling inQuitlong,
these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of
the accused with the former President in committing
the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioners plea for
bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the
instant petition before this Court, petitioner filed with
respondent Sandiganbayan an Urgent Second Motion
for Bail for Medical Reasons. Petitioner prayed that he
be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical
condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes
back to his place of detention. The motion was
opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which
petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27,
2001,
respondent
Sandiganbayan
conducted
hearings on the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V.
Anastacio,
a
cardiologist
of
the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness
for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the
Supreme Court an Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate
Resolution of Jose Jinggoy Estradas Petition for Bail
on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. Petitioner

reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with

respondent Sandiganbayan.[56]
On the same day, we issued a Resolution
referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for
resolution and requiring said court to make a report,
not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21,
2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court
submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its
Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying
petitioners motion for bail for lack of factual basis.
[57]
Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr.
Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner
failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the
court that the medical condition of the accused
requires that he be confined at home and for that
purpose that he be allowed to post bail.[58]
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under
our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when
the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.[59]
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to

bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or
denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue
of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong. This requires that the trial court
conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution
and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to
present their respective evidence. The burden of
proof lies with the prosecution to show strong
evidence of guilt.[60]
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the
petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing
that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The
hearings on which respondent court based its
Resolution of December 20, 2001involved the
reception of medical evidence only and which
evidence was given in September 2001, five months
ago. The records do not show that evidence on
petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent
Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine
if the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to
warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed
for failure to show that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

Bermudez as acting mayor effective January 25, 1956

until notice to the contrary. Councilor Bermudez was
not also in good health so he designated the third
ranking councilor Jose L. Martinez to act as mayor
effective on the same date.
Martinez accepted the designation and assumed the
office on January 25, 1956, his first official act being
to separate from the service the petitioners as
policemen of the municipality. Petitioners immediately
filed their protest invoking the right to continue in
office under the provisions of Republic Act 557, but far
from heeding their protest, Acting Mayor Martinez
appointed Eduardo M. Duaso municipal policemen in
lieu of Benito Codilla who immediately qualified by
taking his oath of office. The appointment was
approved by the President of the Philippines and the
Commissioner of Civil Service. Martinez also
appointed Juanito Redoble vice Perfecto Melendres,
the appointment having been authorized by the
Commission of Civil Service. Redoble also assumed
office soon thereafter. Policarpio Lagura was also
appointed vice Leonardo Castor, his appointment
having been issued by incumbent Mayor Baloyo who
in the meantime returned to office. He also
immediately qualified by taking the oath of office.

G.R. No. L-14569

November 23, 1960

BENITO
CODILLA,
ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE L. MARTINEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On January 24, 1956, Hermenegildo C. Baloyo,
mayor of Tagum, Davao, left for Negros Occidental to
attend to a sick brother. Thereupon, he designated
the vice-mayor to act in his place effective January
25, 1956 until further advice on his part. The vicemayor in turn fell sick of certain lung trouble in view of
which he designated ranking councilor Macario

On February 15, 1956, Benito Codilla and his

companions filed a petition for mandamus before the
Court of First Instance of Davao against Acting Mayor
Martinez and incumbent Mayor Baloyo alleging that
their separation from the service of municipal
policemen was illegal because being civil service
employees their employment cannot be terminated
except for cause, and so they prayed that
respondents be ordered to restore them to their
former positions with payment of their back salaries.
They also prayed for their moral and exemplary
damages to the tune of P7,000.00 and for attorney's
fees in the amount of P1,000.00. They included as corespondents the policemen who were appointed in
their places.

Respondents in their answer set up the defense that

the appointments of petitioners having been made
under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code
in a temporary capacity, because they are not civil
service eligibles, the same were valid only for three
months and so their continuance in office after the
expiration of that period was illegal; that even
assuming that Acting Mayor Martinez had no authority
to terminate their employment, his action action was
validated when incumbent Mayor Baloyo endorsed
and ratified the same by his subsequent official
actuation; and that, not being civil service eligibles,
petitioners may be separated from them service under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 557 upon the
expiration of the term of three months given to them in
their appointments.
On the strength of the stipulation of facts and
additional evidence submitted by the parties, the trial
court rendered judgment dismissing the petition on
the ground that the separation of petitioners from the
service was made in accordance with law. Hence the
present appeal.
One peculiar thing that appears dominant in the
present case is the fact that the official who assumed
office as acting mayor of Tagum, Davao, by
designation made by the ranking municipal councilor
is Jose L. Martinez who was only then
the third ranking councilor of the municipality for
which reason petitioners argued from the very start
that their separation was illegal because the
designation
of
Martinez
as
acting
mayor
was not made in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code and
Section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code under
which such designation should be made by the
provincial governor with the consent of the provincial
board. Nevertheless, the trial court did not consider
the designation of Martinez as acting mayor entirely
void, or one that would make him a usurper, but at
most a de facto officer whose acts maybe given
validity in the eye of the law. Thus, the trial court said:
"Although his designation was irregular, still he was
acting under a color of authority, as distinguished from

a usurper who is "one who has neither title nor color

of right of an office." . . . The acts of Jose L. Martinez
are therefore official acts of a de facto officer. If they
are made within the scope of the authority vested by
the law in the office of the mayor of Tagum, such acts
of a de facto office are here present.
An officer de facto is to be distinguished from
an officer de jure, and is one who has the
reputation or appearance of being the officer
he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the
law, has no right or title to the office he
assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a
mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the
former holds by some color of right or title
while the latter intrudes upon the office and
assumes to excercise its functions without
either the legal title or color of right to such
office. (McQuillin , Municipal Corporations,
Vol. 3, 3rd ed., pp. 376-377.)
To constitute a de facto officer, there must be
an office having a de facto existence, or at
least one recognized by law and the claimant
must be in actual possession of the office
under
color
of
title
or
authority.
State vs. Babb, 124 W. Va. 428, 20 S.E. (2d)

683.
(McQuillin,
Municipal
Corporations, supra footnote No. 11, p. 383.)
Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the
validity of the official actuation of Acting Mayor
Martinez is the fact that all his official acts done under
his designation were subsequently endorsed and
ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to
office. This ratification served to cure any legal
infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor Martinez may have
suffered because of his irregular designation.
This brings us to the question whether the termination
of employment of petitioners as municipal policemen
was made contrary to the law which safeguards the
rights of an employee to his office in the government
service. While it may be gleaned from the surrounding
circumstances that the hand of politics has intervened
in the separation of petitioner who apparently had
been for sometime serving the government as
policemen during the previous administration, we
cannot escape the fact that they were merely given
temporary appointments for the reason that they do
not have civil service eligibility thus making their
status as employee wholly dependent upon the grace
of the ruling power. And this we say because, as we
ruled in a series of cases, "A temporary appointment

is similar to one made in acting capacity, the essence

of which lies in its temporary character and its
terminability at the pleasure of the appointment
power." 1 We also postulated that "The replacement
of non-eligibles is lawful under and pursuant to
Section 682 of the Revised Administrative
Code." 2 Petitioners cannot, therefore invoke in their
favor the provisions of Republic Act No. 557 because
this Act only guarantees the tenure of office of police
who are eligibles. Non-eligibles do not come under its
protection. (Orais, et al. vs. Ribo, et al., supra.)
Hence, much as we sympathize with the petitioners,
our hand is stayed by the inexorable provisions of the
law.