The use of intimidation and violence was the main reason for Nazi political

success in the years 1928-33. Assess this view using your own knowledge of
the issue.
There were numerous reasons for Nazi political success which included party reorganization, the unstable
economic and political conditions of the country, all boosting the implications and aims of the Nazi ideology,
which promised to rid the country of the most prominent issues such as scrapping the Treaty of Versailles,
gaining Lebensraum, establishing a strong means of government by placing one single, all-powerful
autocrat, as opposed to the weak and volatile democratic governments which have interminably failed the
people. The growing fear of communism also enhanced the Nazis appeal, as did the promises of higher
wages and better pensions for the middle classes. All of these factors were crucial for the political success of
the Nazis. Therefore, the use of violence and intimidation were in no way the most important reason for the
Nazis political success before 1933. Though the SA was admittedly used to disperse opposition meetings,
their main purpose had never been intimidation, but the display of order and discipline to the public that
questioned the Nazis motives and intentions. Without the right circumstances and party reorganization, and
with the sole use of violence and intimidation, it is doubtful that the Nazis would have come to power.
As it was mentioned, violence and intimidation, though they were not crucial to Nazi success, did
indeed aid the party to a small extent, dispersing communist meetings and thus slightly disadvantaging their
enemy. For instance, in 1932, 75 communists and 84 Nazis were killed in street fights. They had also
targeted Jews, who were the richest group of people, and most of whom were die-hard communists who
believed that private ownership was theft. This may have led to the rich landowners voting for the NSDAP,
and hence contributing to the Nazi success. However, violence and intimidation alone were not the main
reason for Nazi electoral triumph. The policy of legality was evidence for the fact that Hitler knew that trying
to gain power by force, as was attempted in the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, would not lead to success, but
rather to the dissipation of support for the NSDAP due to the blatancy of the partys extremism and violence.
In addition, violence would be useless with the lack of a clear, appealing ideology, an effective propaganda
machine, as well as the right circumstances for the ideology to be appealing. In later years, after the election
of Hitler as chancellor, however, violence became increasingly important for the Nazis to remain in power.
They had began using both the SA and the SS more blatantly, and besides assaulting the Communists, they
also persecuted the Jews in organized pogroms. However, the Nazis would have been successful even if
there was a lack of violence, and perhaps they would have been even more popular. Hence, violence and
intimidation were not essential for Nazi political success both before and after Hitlers appointment as
chancellor, quite on the contrary, it did the opposite - it scared away potential voters who were repelled by
the street brutality.
Party reorganization which occurred throughout the years was crucial to the success of the Nazis later
in the 1930s. To begin with, after becoming the partys most noteworthy and influential orator, Hitler replaced
Drexler and hence provided a popular figurehead for the party, in addition to changing the party name from
DAP - German Workers Party, to NSDAP - the National Socialist German Workers Party in 1921. In
February of 1920 at the Hofbrauhaus meeting in Munich, the party set out the 25 Point Programme which
expressed their beliefs and ideology in simple, vague terms which could have easily been interpreted by the
common folk. In addition, the Sturmabteilung, or the SA, was created. They were the partys hooligan military
wing who engaged in street fights with communists and were widely seen as aggressive and violent. Hitler
saw this as a weakness, reorganizing the group, placing Captain Franz von Pfeffer in 1926, and then Ernst
Rohm, a respected German military officer in 1930, as its head, and adopting the aforementioned policy of
legality, which would give the impression of organization, discipline and strength to the people. This occurred
following the failure of the Munich Putsch of 1923 which proved to Hitler that attempting to seize power by
force was not an option and that he had to come to power utilizing the benefits of the democratic system
which allowed him to openly promote his ideas, use propaganda, and so forth. To add, at the Bamberg
Conference of 1926, the Fuhrerprinzip which stressed complete obedience to Hitler was adopted, in addition
to the reconfirmation of complete abidance to the 25 Point Programme. In order to improve the
administration, Hitler appointed trusty Gauleiters to the large Gaue, or districts and dismissed those who
proved to be unloyal or simply inefficient. The SA were also better disciplined, taking part in organized

parades and rallies, yet this did not completely stop them from getting involved in fights and assaults. The
youth was also targeted in a successful attempt to raise a nation of Nazi sympathisers. For this purpose
groups such as the Nazi Students Association were formed, and hence allowed the Nazi ideology to be
spread to an ever wider section of society - they were successful: in 1930, over two thirds of the partys
members were under 40. What really allowed the party to become a mass movement, in addition to the
aforementioned factors, was the creation of various Nazi professional bodies for jurists, doctors, teachers,
students, and others in 1928 and 29. The party also attempted to appeal to the disenchanted working and
middle classes by founding agrarian groups such as the Agrarpolitischer Apparat (AA) in 1930. WIthout the
correct circumstances and a relevant ideology, reorganization would mean nothing. Yet as a combination of
factors, the reorganization was able to reach its full potential, as opposed to remaining dormant, and hence
helped the Nazis rise to power, using violence only to a very small extent.
The Nazi ideology, along with the reorganization of the party and the correct circumstances, was
another very important factor which allowed the NSDAP to gain electoral success. It appealed to a large
section of the population ranging from the young to the old, form socialists to nationalists, and so on. The
largely ignored middle classes were enticed by the promises of ending the economic crisis, ridding the
country of the Treaty of Versailles, taking power away from the Zionists, Lebensraum and the establishment
of a strong governmental system where a strong, efficient leader, Hitler, would be placed as head of country
with little to no hinges in the executive process. Additionally, support for the established middle-class parties,
the DVP and the DDP, collapsed in the early 1930s, suggesting that the middle-class voters defected to the
Nazis in large numbers, falling to under 5 percent of the vote by 1932. Most importantly, the NSDAP
promised to protect the people from communism which was feared by both the middle and the upper
classes, and thus, seeing the NSDAP as the only viable alternative who could both suppress the
communists and enforce a familiar, traditional German lifestyle. To the farmers the Nazis promised protection
against food imports from abroad, to the businessmen they promised proper rewards for enterprise, and to
the unemployed, which by 1932 had reached 5.6 million, they had promised a massive governmentsponsored job-creation scheme. Thus it is evident how broad the Nazi appeal was, even including
Protestants, minorities, women, and the working class.
Without effective propaganda, or campaign, their views would have remained unheard, as they were in the
early 20s. Benefitting from the surrounding unrest, they depicted themself as the Volkspartei (peoples
party) with the aims of furthering the interests of the nation as a whole, rather than being sectional like the
other parties. They campaigned ferociously, using modern technology and methods such as planes, rallies,
speeches over radios, parades, and so forth, to promote their agenda. One of the NSDAPs most important
assets was Hitler himself. His speeches alone gathered tens of thousands of people even before the party
came to power. For example, the annual Nuremberg Rallies gathered up to 700,00 people after 1933. This is
the contrary of the use of violence and intimidation. It was rather the gaining of popular support through the
spread of the Nazi ideology in combination with the aforementioned factors which let Hitler and his party
enjoy such extensive political success. Propaganda was used even more extensively after 1933, Josef
Goebbels being appointed Minister of Enlightenment and regular broadcasts of Hitlers speeches taking
place. These were all necessary factors to maintain a high level of support for the party.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, came the economic and political unrest which paved the way
for the Nazis and allowed their ideology to become relevant and appealing. The constant creation and
collapses of coalition governments, and with the failure of these same governments to deal with the
economic crisis, the extremist ideas were made extremely tempting, especially the idea of having a single,
decisive leader. The crisis which had been growing steadily since 1923 was pushed over the brink in 1929
with the beginning of the Great Depression caused by the Wall Street Crash. The middle and working
classes who were most affected by this economic crisis were disregarded by the SPD, DDP, and generally
by the parties of the grand coalition, who favored the Junkers even over the unemployed. This caused a
large section of these classes to vote for the NSDAP and favor the idea of having a Fuhrer who could restore
the old traditional values as well as bring back the pre-war stability. During the crisis, Germany was hit hard
with rising unemployment, falling output, deflation, wage cuts, and intense pressure on the government
finances. Worst affected were areas of heavy industry such as the Ruhr and Hamburg. There, in some
places, one in two workers lose their jobs by 1932, unemployment having reached 6 million, meaning that
30% of the workforce was unemployed. This only added to the peoples dismay and acted as a further

initiative for them to vote for extremists, leading to polarization. This meant that the communists, the KPD,
also became popular, yet they did not have the same appeal as the Nazis did, and so most voted for the
NSDAP who promised to protect the people from the Zionist threat. After the success in the March 1933
elections having won 44 percent of the total vote, the use of violence became more broadly used and
accepted, even more so after the Enabling Act was passed in the same month. The SA was used to arrest
communists, social democrats, and Jews. They were at first sent to makeshift camps, but after numerous
protests, Hitler reacted by establishing concentration camps for the detainees run by Himmlers SS. This
was indeed much more important to sustaining power than gaining it in the period of 1928-1933. The
circumstances were hence crucial for the Nazi ideology to be appealing, and for the violence to even be
effective.
To conclude, violence was indeed important after Hitler and the NSDAP came to power in 1933, as it
dispersed opposition, and hence gave the illusion of large political support. Before that, however, violence
and intimidation were barely used by the Nazis, as it was not just avoided, but was actually
counterproductive in their efforts to legitimately come to power, rather than take it by force. Violence and
intimidation were also not the main reasons for the Nazis political success, but it was rather a combination
of all the factors such as the circumstances, the ideology, as well as the reorganization of the party that
effectively complemented each other and enhanced the others functionalities.