GLOBAL FILIPINO NATION

Empowering Filipinos onshore and overseas

Change agent for effective governance
INTERIM
27 May 2010
REPORT
FOREIGN OBSERVERS CHALLENGE ELECTION LEGITIMACY
international organization of offshore and onshore Filipinos in 30 countries committed to "Building the Global
Filipino Nation for Good Governance." This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the GFN Convenors.
Questions about this Interim Report may be directed to globalfilipinos@gmail.com.]

1. THE ELECTION RESULTS TRANSMITTED FROM THE PRECINCTS DO NOT HAVE DIGITAL
SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS.

Based on industry standards, the digital signature on the precinct Election Return (ER) is a summary (hash
value) of the ER encrypted using the BEIs secret key. The digital signature serves two purposes:

a. It identifies the BEI personnel and the precinct number from which the ER came; and
b. It ensures that the precinct ER is not modified in any way by dagdag-bawas (immutability of
precinct data).

Because of the importance of digital signatures in maintaining data integrity and security,
REPUBLIC ACT 9369 states in SEC. 19 A. In the election of president, vice-president, senators and party-list
system; and B. In the election of local officials and members of the House of Representatives:

"Within one hour after the printing of the election returns, the chairman of the board of election
inspectors or any official authorized by the Commission shall, in the presence of watchers and
representatives of the accredited citizens' arm, political parties/candidates, if any, electronically
transmit the precinct results to the respective levels of board of canvassers, to the dominant majority
and minority party, to the accredited citizen's arm, and to the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP).

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 "The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official
election results and shall be used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a
candidate."

Also in SEC. 25. "Authentication of Electronically Transmitted Election Results. - The manner of
determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates shall conform with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7166 as may be supplement or modified by the provision of this Act, where applicable,
by appropriate authentication and certification procedures for electronic signatures as provided in
Republic Act No. 8792 [Electronic Commerce Act] as well as the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant thereto."

REPUBLIC ACT 8792, SEC. 5. Defines "e. Electronic Signature refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic
and/or sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated
with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures employed or
adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating or
approving an electronic data message or electronic document."

SEC. 8 also stipulates. "Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures. - An electronic signature on the electronic
document shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if that signature is proved
by showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable by the parties interested in the electronic
document, ..."

SEC. 9 provides. "Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures. - In any proceedings involving an electronic
signature, it shall be presumed that:
a. The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and
b. The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the
electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically signed electronic document
knows or has notice of defects in or unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic
signature is not reasonable under the circumstances.

FIRST ISSUE: Comelec Bid Bulletin No. 10 27 April 2009 Public Bidding / 2010 Elections Automation Project,
dated 15 April 2009, states: The digital signature shall be assigned by the winning bidder to all members of
the BEI and the BOC (whether city, municipal, provincial, district). For the NBOCs, the digital signatures shall
be assigned to all members of the Commission and to the Senate President and the House Speaker. The

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digital signature shall be issued by a certificate authority nominated by the winning bidder and approved by
the Comelec.

There were fears at that time that if Smartmatic gets a copy of the secret keys of the BEIs, it would
theoretically have the power to change the ERs. Smartmatic did not pinpoint a trusted third party, Digital
Certificate Authority, up to the time of the SECOND ISSUE.

SECOND ISSUE: Comelec Resolution 8786, dated March 4, 2010, no longer required the use of
digital signatures. The Resolution stated:

"WHEREAS, there is a need to amend or revise portions of Resolution No. 8739 in order to fine tune the
process and address procedural gaps;

x x x x x x x x

SEC. 40. Counting of ballots and transmission of results

f) Thereafter, the PCOS shall automatically count the votes and immediately display a
message WOULD YOU LIKE TO DIGITALLY SIGN THE TRANSMISSION FILES WlTH A BEI
SIGNATURE KEY?, with a YES or 'NO option;

g) Press NO option. The PCOS will display ARE YOU SURE YOU DO NOT WANT TO APPLY A
DIGlTAL SIGNATURE? with a YES and NO option;

h) Press YES option.

WHY WOULD COMELEC SUDDENLY REMOVE THIS VERY IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE SYSTEM?

1. The Bid Bulletin Specifications required Digital Signatures to be available by 11 November 2009
to Comelec personnel, from BEIs to the Board of Canvassers to the Operators of the Comelec
Server, its back-up and to the Servers of the dominant majority, minority, accredited citizens arm
and KBP- for lab and field test, mock election test, testing and sealing, and on election day.

2. The Technical Specifications in the same Bid Bulletin required:

" Component 1A- Election Management System (EMS)

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 2. The system shall require authorization and authentication of all users, such as, but
not limited to, usernames and passwords, with multiple user access levels. (For
customization)"

"Component 1B- Precinct-Count Optical Scan (PCOS)

7. The system shall require authorization and authentication of all operators, such as,
but not limited to, usernames and passwords, with multiple user access levels."

"Component 1C- Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS)

The consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) shall be secure, fast, accurate, reliable and
auditable, and able to:

1.12 Allow the BOCs to digitally sign all electronic results and reports before transmission;"

3. Makati Rep. Teodoro Locsin said on 26 May that he was wrong in his position on the absence of
the digital signatures of the Boards of Election Inspectors on the election returns. Locsin, at the
hearing of the House committee on suffrage and electoral reforms, said the digital signatures of
the precinct count optical scan machines were enough compliance with the law. He had said
earlier that the BEIs should have encoded their own signatures on the electronically transmitted
results. "I admit I was wrong. There is a real reason why a PCOS signature is a practical
equivalent of a digital signature," he said.

RA 9369 AND RA 8792 RECOGNIZED PEOPLE, NOT MACHINES, AS AUTHENTICATORS THROUGH

DIGITAL SIGNATURES. COMELEC HAD THE SAME PRESCRIPTION IN ITS BID BULLETIN AND ITS
PRONOUNCEMENTS until that issuance of Comelec Resolution 8786.

4. Observers are at a loss as to the valid operational justification to remove the digital signatures of
the BEIs.

The Comelec was quoted as saying "the move [not using the digital signatures] was aimed at
removing one step in the transmission process to minimize human intervention and protect the
results of the balloting.

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 Will three keys to be entered prior to transmitting significantly delay the transmission process,
given that the transmission has been observed to take several minutes?

Was the intent to protect the results and provide comforting assurance? Indeed what happened
in minds of objective observers is the REVERSE. No assurance can be made that the transmitted
results are the same as the actual votes.

5. The Philippine Computer Society (PCS) disclosed that Comelec considered the i-button key of the
BEI Chairman and the PINs of the two BEI members as sufficient equivalents for a digital
signature.

The PCS members did not agree that the i-button and PIN features were sufficient to protect the
authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and veracity of the transmission of the ERs. It was their
consensus that these features were not the security features contemplated by RA 9369.

MAJOR IMPLICATIONS:

1. There was a significant divergence from the law, including non-compliance with the provisions of
the Bid and the Automation Contract.

2. There is now a dark cloud on the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, veracity and accuracy of
the vote counts in the ERs.

3. The process prejudices the entire electoral process. Several voting result irregularities,
discrepancies in printouts vs. transmitted results, malfunctioning of PCOS machines, slowdown in
transmission, and worse, reports of unauthorized vote shaving and changing for a fee, have
come into light.

2. THE NUMBER OF DISENFRANCHISED VOTERS IS SUFFICIENT TO AFFECT GREATLY THE

RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS.

Voters Lists were posted on the walls outside the clustered precincts (with a maximum of 1000 registered
voters) only on voting day.

Although precinct assignments were mailed to individual voters by barangay captains, most received theirs
late in the voting day or not at all. Voters have great difficulty in locating and identifying their clustered
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 precincts. Long queues developed with voters waiting several (from one to six) hours before voting. As a
result, many, especially women and the elderly, decided to forego voting.

Comelec's consultant on queue management estimates the number of disenfranchised voters to range from 2
million to 8 million.

This number can easily affect the results in the presidential, vice presidential and senatorial race
especially the close ones.

3. THE AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM (AES) WAS IMPLEMENTED LIVE WITHOUT THE
APPROPRIATE FIELD TESTING, AND LAW-SPECIFIED TESTING IN ACTUAL ELECTIONS.

RA 9369 SEC. 6 states "for the regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately after
effectivity of this Act (in 2007), the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces
each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao ..."

"In succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented nationwide."

Furthermore, the Bid Specifications, Annex E, stated that "There shall be as many field tests as may be
necessary until the requirements for the tests have been satisfied provided that the tests shall not go beyond
December 5, 2009. All systems shall be tested on site, i.e. in selected locations nationwide covering different
test voting centers, test consolidation sites, and test canvassing sites. The test shall also include live
transmission of precinct results. COMELEC personnel shall operate all systems in the test."

No such tests were conducted by December 5, 2009. In fact, a precinct test using 10 sample ballots were
conducted in selected precincts starting in February 2010. No field tests in an entire municipality, city and
even province were conducted. This is further aggravated by the fact that 4,690 polling centers have no cell
phone signal from telecommunication firms affecting about 5 million registered voters.

Worse, on May3, seven days before elections, Comelec and Smartmatic discovered malfunctioning of
Compact Flash cards with erroneous votes for local elections. They hurriedly imported new ones and
reconfigured all 76,340 CF cards for use in May 10. This reconfiguration action was not fully tested and
certified, thereby resulting in documented irregularities where precinct transmissions showed 10 votes (used
during the testing) and other unexplained wrong data in many ERs.

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4. THE SOURCE CODE REVIEW WAS NOT COMPLETED AND INITIAL FINDINGS WERE NOT
ADDRESSED.

Comelec commissioned SysTest Lab of the USA to review the source code. SysTest Lab, after three months,
submitted a report with some 4,000 comments for action by Comelec. There was no official announcement
by Comelec whether these SysTest comments were addressed.

Comelec also opened up to political and other interested parties the review of the source codes in February
2010. No one agreed to it as only a part of the source code was made available, and one month's time was
given. To the parties, it would not be a real source code review but only a walk-through.

The lack of transparency in this source code review, among others, led the Supreme Court to order Comelec
to produce the relevant documentation on these items.

The non-transparent action led to suspicions and worries by citizen watchdogs that insufficient testing and
checking would happenleading to the use and non-recognition of a malicious code, the emergence of
irregularities, and possible manipulation of the vote results. Simple mistakes like registered voters reaching
153 million in the House server are indicators of such probable errors.

5. NO AUDIT WAS DONE ON THE AES PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. THERE WAS ONLY A
MANDATED RANDOM MANUAL AUDIT THAT, UP TO THIS WRITING, HAS NOT BEEN
COMPLETED.

RA 9369 Sec. 24 Random Manual Audit states "Where the AES is used, there shall be a random manual audit
in one precinct per congressional district randomly chosen by the Commission in each province and city. Any
difference between the automated and manual count will result in the determination of root cause and initiate
a manual count for those precincts affected by the computer or procedural error."

A Random Manual Audit (RMA) was conducted for 5 precincts for each congressional district or a total of 1,145
of the 76,340 precincts nationwide.

The RMA precincts were raffled 12 noon of election day but the choice of the RMA precincts was made public
only after the close of voting. As observed in Pampanga, the RMA in one precinct in Telabastagan was started
at 8pm election day and the results were not disclosed to the observers.

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 The results of 30 RMA precincts were released and announced as of 15 May 2010. Last 20 May, Comelec
announced results of about 300 RMA precincts were completed with few discrepancies.

PPCRV and Comelec announced some .07% discrepancies in about 400 ERs audited as of 21 May. No target
completion was announced.

This should be compared to the Bid Bulletin Specifications "Component 1B- PCOS Machine -

10. The system shall count the voters vote as marked on the ballot with an accuracy rating of at
least 99.995 %."

If in 400 ERs audited, .07% discrepancy is noted, how much more discrepancy can be expected for
the rest of the 76,340 ERs?

6. SEVERAL VOTER AND SECURITY FEATURES WERE DISABLED PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS.

5.1 RA 9369, SEC. 7. requires "Minimum System Capabilities ... (e) Provision for voter verified paper audit
trail;" so the voter can verify whether his votes were the same as those read and counted by the PCOS
machine. The AES disabled this feature. The voter was only notified that his vote was read through the
word "CONGRATULATIONS" shown in the PCOS LCD.

5.2 The same section requires "(k) Data retention provision;"

A memory card and Compact Flash Card designed to maintain the copy of the vote data and precinct,
candidates data per PCOS.

Comelec was reported to have started destroying the CFC cards 15 May.

5.3 The AES disabled the Ultra Violet scanning capability (to detect fake and unauthorized ballots) of the
PCOS when Comelec discovered that the ink used in printing the ballots were not sufficiently dense to
be read by this UV scanner.

Instead, Comelec procured 76,340 UV handheld scanners to take the PCOS UV feature. However,
during the elections, the UV lamps were not used.

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
There has been a noticeable improvement in the peace and order aspects of the elections compared to past national
elections. There was initial satisfaction with the early voting results. BUT later events put to question the
authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, veracity and accuracy of the vote counts in the ERs. The dark cloud rose from
disabling critical, legally specified security features, particularly relating to the digital signatures. Thus, no one (both
perceived winners and losers) can be sure whether the vote results are true and correct, and reflect the real will of
the Filipino people.

Accordingly, the Election Observers Team of Global Filipino Nation challenges the legitimacy of the
election results.

To resolve this very critical issue, GFN recommends the following:

1. In the short-term, impound PCOS machines, the memory and CF cards, and perform forensics on these
using the actual ballots.

2. Comelec would promptly comply with Supreme Court directing the Comelec to make public the
documents requested by Petitioner about Comelec's preparation and compliance with the requirements
of the law.

3. An independent, non-partisan qualified party would conduct a full-blown audit of the Automated System
(including recommended improvements to include automated registration, purging of voters lists,
precinct mapping, and Internet Voting) as inputs to the Advisory Council. The audit should cover:
a. Compliance with RA9369 and other related legal issuances covering national and local elections;
b. Compliance with the Terms of Reference and Project Specifications of the Bid;
c. Reasonableness of Pricing and Expenses involved in the Project vs. Contract, and approved
changes;
d. Evaluation of the Technology used;
e. Evaluation of Internal Controls of the System; and
f. Evaluation of Performance by Comelec and Smartmatic management and project staff.

4. With the lessons learned in the automation of 2010, the following projects should be pursued in
time for the 2013 elections:

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 a. As a priority, complete the computerization of the Automated Fingerprint Information System
(AFIS), started by Comelec several years ago, to complete and purge the Registered Voters List.
b. Complete the computerization of the Voters Registration Information System (VRIS) and that of
the Project of Precincts (POP) in order to prevent disenfranchisement, "flying and ghost" voters,
and "ghost" precincts.
c. Finalize the amendments and corresponding Implementation Rules and Regulations for RA 9369.

GLOBAL FILIPINO NATION is a non-partisan international organization of offshore and onshore Filipinos in 30
countries committed to "Building the Global Filipino Nation for Good Governance." It has been active for more than
eight years in major governance issues such as The Overseas Absentee Voting Law, the Dual Citizenship Law,
economic initiatives, and social issues and programs for migrant workers.

GFN 2010 ELECTIONS OBSERVERS TEAM

The GFN Team covered municipalities and cities in Pampanga, Quezon and Iloilo.

1. Victor S. Barrios is an international banker and economist. He has served as Sr. Adviser to initiatives of
multilateral financial institutions in over a dozen countries in Eastern Europe and Asia. He is a Convenor
of Global Filipino Nation.

2. Jun S. Aguilar, an OFW entrepreneur, is an engineer by profession who has served various international
companies in the Middle East for 13 years. He is CEO-President FMW Group Holdings Inc., Chair of the
Filipino Migrant Workers Group and Convenor of Global Filipino Nation.

3. Theodore B. M. Aquino, a California Registered Civil Engineer and a Global Filipino Nation Convenor, is
a strong advocate for Filipino Dual Citizenship rights and good governance. He has his own consulting
engineering practice in California and in several occasions provided pro bono consulting services to the
Republic of the Philippines through the UNDP TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate
Nationals) Programme.

4. Elsa A. Bayani served as an RN from U.K. and U.S.; Arkansas State Chair of National Federation of
Filipino American Association; and TV host Fox Network Asian American Focus, Little Rock Arkansas. An
advocate for children in prison, youth and the elderly, she serves as Chairman of Our Barangay Inc. to

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 connect 42,000 barangays to the Internet and a Convenor of Global Filipino Nation.

5. Tim C. Bayani, a registered criminologist, served the Arkansas State Dept. of Correction and Phil.
National Police Commission. He was the Dean of Criminology Manila College. He is a member of the FBI-
Law Enforcement Executive Dev. Association.

6. Robert Ceralvos company provides wifi products/services to projects in the US, notably Google. He has
been in the IT industry for almost thirty-years and founded several start-ups. He has been actively
involved with IT organizations and a Global Filipino Nation Convenor. His motto is: Technology to the
People.

7. Romeo Z. Cayabyab is a Sydney-based audit consultant and university lecturer specializing in treasury
operations, risk management, systems and operations control. He is also the founder and publisher of
the emanila.com group of websites including TheFilipinoAustralian.com.

8. Hermenegildo R. Estrella, Jr. is a Management Systems Advisor for public and private consulting
projects. He held senior management positions in IBM Philippines, Ayala Investment and Development,
and Citibank. He is currently a Board Member and Officer of My Wellness City and SIETAR Philippines.
He served as the IT/Election Specialist/Consultant of the Global Filipino Nation Foreign/ Election
Observers Group.

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ANNEX 1. INTERIM DETAILED ASSESSMENT

This Interim Assessment of the 2010 national elections can be divided into two areas:

1. Performance of Comelec and its deputized agencies vis-a-vis their roles, and in comparison with their
performances in the 2004 national and 2007 local elections.

2. Performance of Comelec's Automated Voting, Consolidating and Canvassing System (referred to as the
Automated Election System or AES) procured from Smartmatic-TIM compared to the actual live System
implementation, provisions of RA9369 governing such automation, System contract between Comelec
and Smartmatic-TIM, System Project Management, and the System deliverables.

TABLE I. PERFORMANCE OF COMELEC AND ITS DEPUTIZED AGENCIES

CRITERIA ACTUAL 2010 2004 /2007 2010 ASSESSMENT

1. Comelec
1.1 Registration of Voters Regular procedures Regular procedures No significant
with automated with automated improvement vs.
Purging of Lists registration using registration using 2004/2007
biometrics. biometrics.

Comelec claims purging Comelec claims purging

1.2 Voter Verification /
Checking of Names in Comelec
Lists and Precinct Assignments
of some 70,000 of of a similar number of
voters in current voter voters in that year's
list voter list
Voters Lists were Voters lists were posted Voters have great
posted on the walls on the walls outside of difficulty in locating and
outside the clustered each established identifying their
precincts (several precinct (up to 300 clustered precincts.
established precincts voters per precinct)
into one clustered prior to the voting day. Long queues developed
precinct for a maximum with voters waiting
of 1000 registered several hours before
voters) only on voting voting.
day. No mailing of precinct

12

1.3 Voting and Canvassing
(please see Table II)
1.4 Release of Results (time)
1.5 Accuracy of Results
assignments. The estimated number
Precinct assignments of disenfranchised
were mailed to voters in the election
individual voters by may range from 2
barangay (but mostly million to 8 million,
received during voting according to Comelec's
day only) consultant on queue
management.
Comelec website
provides finder This number may have
capability for precinct affected the results in
assignment per voter. the presidential, vice
presidential and
senatorial results.
80% of precinct votes Voting results Faster results at
reported by 13 May completed after more precinct and
Several winning local than a month municipal/city level
officials proclaimed than 2004/2007
starting 13 May
90% reported by 17
May
9 senators proclaimed
17 May.
Most of declared 2004 national results In suspense following
winners follow the questioned with announcement of
general trend of pre investigations ending Random Manual Audits
and post election up with "Hello Garci" and resolution of filed
surveys. investigations in 2005 cases.
Contract specified to 2006. (No resolution
99.99% accuracy. yet.) With the assessments
Two days after in Table 2, and awaiting
elections, several 2007 (12th position) a full blown audit, this
incidents of potential senatorial results criterion awaits
fraud and irregularities questioned and resolution.
13

2. Department of
Education
2.1 Performance as Board of
Election Inspectors
3. Philippine National
Police
3.1 Maintenance of Peace and
Order
4. Armed Forces of the
Philippines
4.1 Maintenance of Peace and
Order
4.2 Involvement in the
elections
TABLE II. PERFORMANCE OF THE COMELEC AES
MAJOR CRITERIA
1. Republic Act 9369
were reported, pending resolution.
documented and
protests filed (starting
17 May)
Performed their Performed their BEIs have shown their
assigned jobs despite assigned jobs despite best under pressure
procedural difficulties incidents of violence
and long voter queues and related electoral
to serve pressures
Very few incidents of Has a high level of More peaceful and
reported electoral reported of electoral orderly than 2004/2007
violence. related incidents,
especially in Mindanao
in the 2007 elections
No reported incidents
No reported Claimed involvement in Better performance in
involvement in election 2004 elections, 2010
fraud.
REQUIREMENT COMELEC ASSESSMENT
PERFORMANCE
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1.1 Sec 3 and 5. IT-capable
person
1.2 Sec 6. Use of AES
1.3 Sec 7. Minimum System
Capabilities
Trained and certified by In the observed
DOST; at least one Pampanga voting
member of the BEI, and centers, only one IT
to assist the BOC person (no certification
shown) covered one
voting center consisting
of several clustered
precincts
"for the regular national There was no use of the This is dangerous as
and local election, AES contracted in July Comelec's non
which shall be held 2009 in two urbanized compliance means an
immediately after cities and two untested and unaudited
effectivity of this Act, provinces each in system will be
the AES shall be used in Luzon, Visayas and implemented LIVE. May
at least two highly Mindanao. The AES lead to unforeseen
urbanized cities and was IMPLEMENTED LIVE difficulties and
two provinces each in NATIONWIDE in the erroneous results.
Luzon, Visayas and 2010 elections.
Mindanao ..."
"In succeeding regular
national or local
elections, the AES shall
be implemented
nationwide."
(a) Adequate security Passwords for the BEI
against unauthorized were provided. No
access observed passwords for
the IT personnel.
Digital signatures were This is leading to a
required but within two Legal standoff as to the
months before the authenticity, reliability
elections, these were and accuracy of the
not used. vote results.
15
(b) Accuracy in Use of encryption in
recording and reading transmission
of votes as well as in announced but an
the tabulation, incompletely secure
consolidation/canvassin transmission scheme is
g, electronic made available, but not
transmission, and utilized in the elections.
storage of results; The UV lamps were not
UV reading by PCOS provided nor used in
earlier provided but the Pampanga
later was disabled precincts.
when ink density of the
ballot was found
inadequate. An
external, handheld UV
lamp was procured to
check on the
authenticity of a ballot. There were reports that
stated some ERs
Tests using 10 sample contain votes of 10
ballots were made after voters, meaning that
the May 3 erroneous the votes transmitted
Compact Flash cards were the test votes.
(CFC) field tests. Not
all tests in 76,340
precincts where
supposedly all CFC
were reconfigured and
replaced, were
completed and
announced.

Transmission tests
were not conducted as
(c) Error recovery in stated by Provincial
case of non- Election Supervisor,
16
catastrophic failure of Regional Election
device; Officer and his Deputy.

(d) System integrity Back up PCOS

which ensures physical machines are used
stability and within a province.
functioning of the vote
recording and counting
process ; Only a UPS is provided
to ensure the PCOS will
(e) Provision for voter not lose power.
verified paper audit
trail;

Voter only notified in

the PCOS screen that
his vote is read.

The announced
capability for the voter
to verify that his vote
choices were recorded
by the PCOS was
disabled. Only the 30 copies of the ER
word were printed for each
"CONGRATULATIONS" precinct and distributed
(f) System auditability was shown in the PCOS to authorized parties.
which provides LCD.
supporting The results of 30 RMA
documentation for NO VOTE RECEIPT WAS precincts were released
verifying the PROVIDED FOR. and announced as of 15
correctness of reported May 2010.
election results; Only a printed Election Last 20 May, Comelec
Return tape was announced results of
prepared after the about 300 RMA
counting. precincts were
17
 completed with few
discrepancies.
A Random Manual Audit
was conducted for 5
precincts for each
congressional district or
a total of 1,145 of the
(g) An election 76,340 precincts
management system nationwide.
for preparing ballots
and programs for use in
the casting and
counting of votes and
to consolidate, report
and display election An Election
result in the shortest Management System
time possible; module was provided.

(h) Accessibility to No prior tests were

illiterates and disabled made instead
voters; implemented LIVE Comelec was reported
immediately. to have started
(i) Vote tabulating destroying the CFC
program for election, No specific tests were cards 15 May.
referendum or made.
plebiscite;

(j) Accurate ballot Election Return tapes

counters; were printed out (see
item f above)
(k) Data retention
provision; Tested under item b
above.

A memory card and

CFC card designed to
18
 maintain the copy of
(l) Provide for the the vote data and
safekeeping, storing precinct, candidates
and archiving of data per PCOS.
physical or paper
resource used in the Comelec provided
election process; facilities for storing
their copies of the
(m) Utilize or generate paper tapes, and the
official ballots as herein used ballots, unused
defined; ballots and other paper
paraphernalia.
(n) Provide the voter a
system of verification Printed official ballots
to find out whether or at the National Printing
not the machine has Office.
registered his choice;
and
Same as item e above.
(o) Configure access
control for sensitive
system data and
function.

"In the procurement of See item a above.

this system, the
Commission shall
develop and adopt an
evaluation system to An evaluation system
ascertain that the was provided but not
above minimum system announced nor
capabilities are met. released.
This evaluation system
shall be developed with
the assistance of an
advisory council."
19
1.4 Sec 8. Communication all electronic 4,690 polling centers
Channels for Electronic transmissions by and have no cell phone
Transmissions among the EAS and its signal from
related components telecommunication
shall utilize secure firms affecting about 5
communication million registered
channels ... to ensure voters. No announced results
authentication and of testing these
integrity of 5,600 Broadband facilities. Slowdown in
transmission." Global Area Network transmission was
(BGAN) equipment and noticed three days after
680 Very Small elections.
Aperture Terminals
have been assigned to
these areas.

See item 1.3 b above.

No specific
authentication and
integrity check were
released and As observed in
announced regarding Pampanga, there was
the public telecom only one modem used
facilities and facilities by several precincts in
utilized. a voting center, thus
delaying transmission.
Only 40,000 modems Transmission in
were contracted to observed precincts in
allow transmissions. Pampanga took about
30 minutes per ER.
1.5 Sec 9. Technical The Committee shall Comelec commissioned SysTest Lab submitted
Evaluation Committee certify, through an SysTest Lab of the USA a report with some
established to review the source 4,000 comments for
international code. action by Comelec. No
20
certification entity to official announcement
be chosen by the Comelec also opened by Comelec whether
Commission from the up to political and other these SysTest
recommendations of interested parties the comments were
the Advisory Council, review of the source addressed.
not later than three codes.
months before the date The lack of
of the electoral The source code copy transparency by the
exercises, categorically was put in escrow at Comelec led the
stating that the AES, the Central Bank. Supreme Court to order
including its hardware Comelec to produce the
and software relevant documentation
components, is on these items.
operating properly,
securely, and This action of Comelec
accurately, in led to suspicions and
accordance with the worries by citizen
provisions of this Act watchdogs that
based, among others, insufficient testing and
on the following checking are
documented results: happening, that may
lead to irregularities
Bid Specifications and possibly
"Annex E" stated that manipulation of the
"There shall be as vote results.
many field tests as may
1. The successful be necessary until the Tests were conducted
conduct of a field requirements for the only at precinct level.
testing process tests have been
followed by a mock satisfied provided that
election event in one or the tests shall not go
more beyond December 5,
cities/municipalities; 2009. All systems shall
be tested on site, i.e. in
selected locations
nationwide covering
21
 different test voting
centers, test
consolidation sites, and
test canvassing sites.
The test shall also
include live
transmission of precinct
results. COMELEC
personnel shall operate
all systems in the test.

No certification issued.
2. The successful
completion of audit on
the accuracy,
functionally and
security controls of the See above comment re
AES software; SysTest.

3. The successful Announcement made.

completion of a source
code review;

4. A certification that
the source code is kept No certification
in escrow with the announced.
Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas;

5. A certification that
the source code No announcement.
reviewed is one and the
same as that used by
the equipment; and

6. The development,
22
 provisioning, and
operationalization of a
continuity plan to
cover risks to the AES
at all points in the No announcement.
process such that a
failure of elections,
whether at voting,
counting or
consolidation, may be
avoided.

"If the Commission

decides to proceed with
the use of the AES
without the
Committee's
certification, it must
submit its reason in
writing, to the
Oversight Committee ,
no less than thirty (30)
days prior to the
electoral exercise
where the AES will be
used.
1.6 Sec 10. Procurement of With respect to the The PCOS machine was
Equipment and Materials May 10, 2010 election not used in the ARMM
and succeeding and 2007 elections. In
electoral exercises, the ARMM, two voting
system procured must machines, the DRE and
have demonstrated CCOS were used by two
capability and been different contractors.
successfully used in a
prior electoral exercise
here or board.
23

1.7 Sec 11. Continuity Plan
1.8 Sec 12. "Examination and
Testing of Equipment or Device
Participation in the
2007 pilot exercise
shall not be conclusive
of the system's fitness.
Activation of such Not done. Although a
continuity and Comelec Resolution
contingency measures was issued to cover
shall be undertaken in these.
the presence of
representatives of
political parties and
citizen's arm of the
Commission who shall
be notified by the
election officer of such Not know whether
activation. these were furnished.
"All political parties and
party-lists shall be
furnished copies of said
continuity plan at their
official addresses as
submitted to the No copy published.
Commission.
The list shall be
published in at least
two newspaper of
national of circulation
and shall be posted at
the website of the
Commission at least
fifteen (15) days prior
to the electoral activity
concerned."
The Commission shall
allow the political
24
of the AES and Opening of the
Source Code for Review"
parties and candidates
or their
representatives,
citizens' arm or their
representatives to No test by the parties
examine and test. were made prior to the
"The equipment or voting on election day.
device to be used in the The only test made was
voting and counting on after the
the day of the electoral reconfiguration of the
exercise, before voting CFCs using 10 sample
start. Test ballots and ballots.
test forms shall be
provided by the
Commission.
"Immediately after the
examination and
testing of the
equipment or device,
parties and candidates
or their
representatives,
citizen's arms or their
representatives, may
submit a written
comment to the No such minutes were
election officer who made.
shall immediately
transmit it to the
Commission for
appropriate action.
"The election officer
shall keep minutes of
the testing, a copy of
which shall be
submitted to the
25

1.9 Sec 13. Official Ballot
1.10 Sec 17. Notice of
Designation of Counting
Centers
Commission together
with the minute of
voting."
"Once an AES
technology is selected
for implementation, the
Commission shall
promptly make the
source code of that
technology available
and open to any
interested political
party or groups which
may conduct their own
review thereof."
The Commission shall Comelec first made the
prescribe the format of list of candidates on a
the electronic display vertical list format but
and/or the size and later shifted to a
form of the official horizontal list per
ballot, which shall position.
contain the titles of the
position to be filled
and/or the proposition
to be voted upon in an
initiative, referendum
or plebiscite.
The election officer No such lists were
shall post prominently posted in the
in his/her office, in the city/municipal halls, nor
bulletin boards at the provided the political
city/municipal hall and parties.
in three other
conspicuous places in
the city/municipality,
the notice on the
26

1.11 Sec 18 and 19 Election
returns
designated counting
center(s) for at least
three weeks prior to
election day. The notice
shall specify the
precincts covered by
each counting center
and the number of
registered voters in
each of said precincts .
The election officer
shall also furnish a copy
of the notice to the
headquarters or official
address of the political Such lists were not also
parties or independent posted in the Comelec
candidates within the website nor published
same period. The in the local
election officer shall newspapers.
post in the Commission
website concerned the
said notice and publish
the notice in the local
newspaper. Where the
polling place or voting
center is also the
designated counting
center, such
information shall be
contained in the notice.
The Commission shall Comelec provided Some protestors have
prescribe the manner these in the BEI shown ERs with
and procedure of General Instructions; "Citibank Mastercard"
counting the votes and printed 30 copies marks and had prior
under the automated of the ERs. dates to elections, and
system: Provided, that several post dates
27

A. Distribution of ER copies
B. Electronic Transmission
apart from the marked.
electronically stored
result, thirty (30) copies
of the election return
are printed."
(as above) (as above)
"Within one hour after The BEI, in the
the printing of the observed voting
election returns, the centers of Pampanga,
chairman of the board transmitted the vote
of election inspectors or results to the Comelec
any official authorized server, the PPCRV and
by the Commission KBP.
shall, in the presence of
watchers and
representatives of the
accredited citizens'
arm, political
parties/candidates, if
any, electronically
transmit the precinct
results to the
respective levels of
board of canvassers, to
the dominant majority
and minority party, to This transmission step
the accredited citizen's of precinct to Comelec
arm, and to the The canvassed election Server was not
Kapisanan ng mga results were provided for by RA
Brodkaster ng Pilipinas transmitted to the 9369. The problem
(KBP). Comelec server. would be that anyone in
"The election results at control of the Comelec
the city/municipality Server would already
canvassing centers know the trend of the
shall be transmitted in voting prior to the
the same manner by precinct results going
28

1.12 Sec. 20 Canvassing by
Provincial, City, District and
Municipal Boards of
Canvassers
the election officer or to the municipal/city as
any official authorized mandated.
by the commission to
the district or provincial This is now the legal
canvassing centers. subject in the National
Canvassing as digital
signatures as required
"The election returns by RA 9369 were not
transmitted purposely utilized upon
electronically and orders of the Comelec.
digitally signed shall be
considered as official
election results and
shall be used as the
basis for the
canvassing of votes
and the proclamation of
a candidate."
"Within one hour after The canvassed election In the first hours of
the canvassing, the results were canvassing in the City
Chairman of the district transmitted first to the of San Fernando, what
or provincial Board of Comelec server, then to was shown in the
Canvassers or the city the various canvassing projected canvass, after
board of canvassers of centers. the election, were only
those cities which the number of precincts
comprise one or more reporting without vote
legislative districts shall results.
electronically transmit
the certificate of
canvass to the
commission sitting as
the national board of
canvassers for senators
and party-list
representatives and to
the Congress as the
29
 National Board of
Canvassers for the
president and vice No such measures were
president, directed to released nor
the President of the announced.
Senate.
"The Commission shall Comelec Resolution
adopt adequate and 8786 instructed the
effective measures to BEIs not to indicate
preserve the integrity their digital signatures
of the certificates of for the transmission.
canvass transmitted
electronically and the See 1.11 B above
results in the storage assessment.
devices at the various
levels of the boards of
canvassers.
"The certificates of
canvass transmitted
electronically and
digitally signed shall be
considered as official
election results and
shall be used as the
basis for the
proclamation of a
winning candidate."
1.13 Sec. 24 Random Manual Where the AES is used, Same as item 1.3 f Same as item 1.3 f
Audit there shall be a random above. above.
manual audit in one
precinct per The RMA precincts were PPCRV and Comelec
congressional district raffled 12 noon of announced some .07%
randomly chosen by election day. As discrepancies in about
the Commission in each observed in Pampanga, 400 ERs audited as of
province and city. Any the RMA in one precinct 21 May. No target
difference between the in Telabastagan was completion was
30
 automated and manual started at 8pm election announced.
count will result in the day.
determination of root
cause and initiate a
manual count for those
precincts affected by
the computer or
procedural error."
1.14 Sec. 26 Stakeholder The Commission shall, Comelec initiated the
education and training not later than six stakeholder education
months before the and training program
actual automated together with
election exercise, concerned peoples'
undertake a groups and
widespread stakeholder organizations through
education and training print, radio and TV
program, through media.
newspaper of general
circulation, radio,
television and other
media forms, as well as
through seminars,
symposia, fora and
other nontraditional
means, to educate the
public and fully inform
the electorate about
the AES and inculcate
values on honest,
peaceful, orderly and
informed elections.
1.15 Sec. 30 Rules and The Commission shall No implementing rules
Regulations promulgate rules and and regulations were
regulation for the provided for the
implementation and implementation and
enforcement of this Act. enforcement of this Act.
31
2. Contract Between
Comelec and Smartmatic-
TIM
2.1 Compliance to RA9369
provisions
2.2 Reasonableness of Pricing
Contract indicated As stated in the various
provisions and items in this column,
attachments that there were many
comply with RA 9369, required specifications
the Terms of Reference that were disregarded,
and Project disabled and not
Specifications of the provided for in the
Bid. actual implementation.
Total Smartmatic Comelec agreed to all Although this pricing is
Contract is P7,191.4 these pricing below the P11,230
million provisions. million budget, there
are certain items that
are way above industry
price levels.
10%: Project This will be difficult to
Initialization, Set up justify considering it is
Project Management only initialization and
Team and Project set-up, and considering
Systems including all the main software is
SW licenses and only P42 million.
firmware- P719
million The cost of 20 PCOS
units is about P1.0
5%: Delivery of million. The balance of
Development Set (20 P358 million would be
PCOS units)- P359 difficult to justify.
million
The actual services and
equipment for
5%: Report on transmission is only
Transmission and P199.9 million, logistics
32
 Logistics- P359 million is P916 m, so it would
again be difficult to
5%: Delivery of justify such as report.
Functional System and
Software- P359 million The Project is for a
year, and certainly this
Project Management- amount is extravagant
P99.9 million as no such Project team
would justify such an
amount for their
services.

One PCOS is leased for

82,200 PCOS machines P45,419, which is
(lease) P3,346 almost the purchase
million price of one available in
the market, further
should be lower as a
big volume is ordered.

Total software P42

million

Electronic
Transmission
P199.9 m

Logistics P916
million

2.3 Compliance to contract See items 3 and 4 See items 3 and 4 See items 3 and 4
provisions below. below. below.
3. Project Management
3.1 Project Manager Requirement for the No Project Manager of Questions arising from
Project Manager: Smartmatic has been the IT community have
Minimum fifteen (15) identified, shown nor been raised whether
33
 years relevant IT quoted during the the Smartmatic and
experience; entire election period, Comelec Project
At least ten (10) up to the present. Managers are really
years experience in qualified and
managing large-scale experienced to perform
multi-site IT the required work, as
development and shown by project delays
implementation and non-compliance to
projects involving key and critical aspects
relational databases of the automation.
and wide area
networks;
With actual
experience in
assisting in the bid
processes of any
government agency
following RA 9184
Philippine
government
procurement rules,
regulations and
processes

3.2 Completion of planned A time schedule was There had been delays These delays led to
activities posted in the Comelec in the deliveries of the insufficient testing, to
website. PCOS machines and note particularly the
completion of activities. one that led to the
Monday May 3 episode
Light penalties were that rushed the Final
charged to Smartmatic. Testing and Sealing of
the PCOS machines and
reconfigured CF cards.

Such delays are now

being considered as
34

4. Deliverables
4.1 Compliance to quality of
project specifications
4.2 Adherence to timetables
Canvass and proclamation
of winners
critical to the resolution
of protests regarding
irregularities found out
in the voting results.
Several certifications Only the certification by Lack of transparency by
were required and SysTest was announced Comelec and
specified. but not published. Smartmatic on these
requirements puts to
doubt the test quality
and implementation
results of the whole
system.
See item 3.2 above See item 3.2 above See item 3.2 above
As provided for in the Canvass about 90% by
Project Timetable: 17 May
Finish by 05.13.10 Proclamation of 9 of 12
senators made 17 May.
35