REPORTING (FIRST BATCH) Nov 6

1.
Carlos
Reyes,
et
al.
vs.
Atty.
Jeremias
Vitan
AC No. 5835, 6051, 6441, 6995
Promulgated:August 10, 2010
This refers to the undated Petition filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) on July 28, 2009 byAtty. Jeremias R. Vitan, praying that
he be reinstated as member in good standing of the Philippine
Bar and be allowed to resume the practice of law, claiming that
he had already served the penalty of suspension imposed on
him, and that he is now reformed.
As background, four (4)
administrative cases were filed against Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, in each of
which he was found guilty and meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law.
HELD:
The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I.
De Dios, issued the guidelines on the lifting of orders of suspension, and
has advised strict observance thereof. However, the Court will not
hesitate to withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that
respondent, as an officer of the Court, is still not worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and of the public.
Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the Court Resolved to
GRANT Respondents Petition for Reinstatement, effective upon
his submission to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to
the fact:
1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on
him successively;
2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared as
counsel in any court during the periods of suspension, as follows:
(a) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to
November 13, 2005;
(b) One (1) year suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April
18, 2008;
(c) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004
to May 12, 2005; and
(d) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the
Resolution dated March 6, 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
of the Decision dated July 27, 2006.
3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as
ordered by the Court in the following cases, attaching proofs thereof:
(a) In A.C. No. 5835 the sum of P17,000 with interest of 12% per annum
from the date of promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall
have been returned; and
(b) In A.C. No. 6441 the amount of P30,000.
Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is further directed to FURNISH copies of the
Sworn Statement to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive
Judge(s), as mandated in Maniago.
Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the
Respondent under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
2.Spouses
Olbes
vs.
AC-5365. April 27, 2005

Atty.

VICTOR

V.

DECIEMBRE

Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes
for security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty.
Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different
maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a
case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses
Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of
the Bar Confidant of this Court.In the report, Commissioner Dulay
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened
with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned
in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. A lawyer is
an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed
by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to
be a fearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney
becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable
instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers
should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the
legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional
Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling
up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed
upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan
supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a
brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his
material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable
practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal
laws.
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by
respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of
suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild.

His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is

reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the
detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective
immediately.
CONTEMPT
3.People vs de luna et al GR 10236-48, Jan. 31, 1958
BAR
FLUNKERS;
OATH
AS
LAWYERS
PUBLICCONSTITUTES CONTEMPT OF COURT.

BEFORE

NOTARY

FACTS:
Although the defendants know that they did not pass the bar
examination, they sought admission to the Bar under the Bar Flunkers
Act. They were subsequently notified of the resolution of the Supreme
Court denying their petitions. This notwithstanding, they took their oaths
as lawyers before a notary public and formally advised the Court, not
only of such fact, but, also that they will practice in all courts of the
Philippines.
HELD: The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and
may be taken only before the Supreme Court by those authorized by the
latter to engage in such practice. The resolution of the Supreme
Court denying appellees' petition for admission to the Bar
implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said oath, as
well as prohibition of the taking thereof. By taking oaths before a
notary public, appellees expressed clearly their intent to, and did,
in fact, challenge and defy the authority of the Supreme Court to
pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether
or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder
and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect
due to the courts of justice and the Supreme Court, in particular,
in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court. Such acts, therefore, constitute contempt of court.
4. Leslie Ui vs. Atty. Iris Bonifacio AC No. 3319 June 8, 2000
Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
IrisBonifacio on grounds of immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is
having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui, whom
they begot two children. Accordingto petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted to
him about the relationship between them and Atty.Bonifacio. This led
Leslie Ui to confront said respondent to stop their illicit affair but of tono
avail. According however to respondent, she is a victim in the situation.
Whenrespondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but
withchildren to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in Amoy,
China.Moreover, the two got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing
their relationship.When respondent knew of the real status of Carlos Ui,
she stopped their relationship.Respondent further claims that she and
Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter livedwith his children to allow
them to gradually accept the situation. Respondent howeverpresented a
misrepresented copy of her marriage contract.
Ruling:The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have
the right toenjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing
the bar examinations. It is aprivilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyerviolates his oath and the dictates
of legal ethics. One of the conditions prior to admissionto the bar is that
an
applicant
must
possess
good moral character. More importantly,possession
of
good
moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to theenjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
therevocation of such privilege. A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly
immoral conduct, orby reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the barshould have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity. In the case at bar, Atty.Bonifacio was not proven to
have conducted herself in a grossly immoral manner.Thus, the case is
dismissed. But she is reprimanded and given a stern warning with
regardsto the of her marriage contract with an inculcated date

5. Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4,
2014.
Attorney; Quantum of proof in administrative cases. An administrative
complaint for dishonesty was filed against Atty. Molina for having advised
his clients to enforce a contract on complainants client who was never a
party to the agreement. The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint
held that when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two
things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly
preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the
complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis. The
allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in this case, either
in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare allegations are
not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still
cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act

was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is presumption of
good faith. Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881,
June 4, 2014.
6. Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P13-3132, June 4, 2014.
Court personnel; Dishonesty. Ampong was dismissed from the Civil
Service Commission for dishonesty, however, remained employed in the
RTC. The Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision
that Ampong was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating
and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for
Teachers on behalf of one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of
dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a)
cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits;
and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government
agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong
should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every employee of the
Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty.
Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here,
Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial
employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the
Judiciary. Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M.
No. P-13-3132, June 4, 2014.
7, Alberto Valdez v. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25,
Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No. P-13-3123, June 10, 2014
W/N sheriff macusi is liable for simple neglect of duty and violation of
civil service law.
Yes- dismissed from the service and forfeiture of retirement benefits
Conflict of interest exist when: the courts personel objective ability or
independence to perform official duties is impaired or may reasonably
appear to be impared.
8. Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, AsturiasBalamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014.
A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required period.

Facts: RTC Judge Pedro Sunga of San Fernando, Pampanga received

information about irregularities in the disposition of jueteng cases before
the MTC's of the said region. Upon investigation, Judge Sunga discovered
that of the 55 jueteng cases filed in July 1999, 53 were assigned to
Branch 1 of the MTC of San Fernando presided by Judge Daniel Liangco.
Noting that statistical improbability that 53 out of 55 jueteng cases
should be assigned to only 1 Branch, Judge Sunga demanded a written
explanation as to how such a situation had come about. In his letter,
Judge Liangco explained that it has been his practice to automatically
take over all jueteng cases without the need for raffling. The reason he
cited is that the accused in such cases are deprived of their liberty and
that by automatically assigning these cases to his branch, the accused
can file motions for bail and the same can be entertained immediately
without waiting for the raffle. In short, because of the need for
provisional liberty, all jueteng cases are considered to be automatically
raffled to his branch so that he may entertain motions for bail and the
accused can be immediately released upon filing of the bond. The
Supreme Court ordered further investigation of the case and placed
Judge Liangco on preventive suspension.
Held: GUILTY. Judge Liangco clearly violated Supreme Court Circular No. 7
which provides: "All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings
where there are two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to
the different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch
without being raffled." There is no connection at all between
respondents alleged desire to facilitate the release of such accused on
bail and his questionable act of retaining the records of the cases for
direct assignment to his own sala. For after granting bail to the accused,
his alleged purpose of immediately extending provisional liberty to the
accused shall already have been served. There is thus no need or
justification to retain the records of the cases and consider them raffled
off to his own sala. The questioned acts of respondent Judge Liangco
constitute a clear breach of his duty as a judge. The Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that: A judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. Respondent judges manner of automatically assigning
jueteng cases to its own branch without the benefit of raffle, casts doubt
on his integrity as a judge and erodes the confidence of the people in the
judicial system. A judges official conduct and his behavior in the
performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of
impropriety and must be beyond reproach. Judge Liangco was suspended
from service for 6 months without pay and issued the warning that
similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Judge Regencia is guilty of undue delayrendering a decision, sternly

warned.
9. Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, G.R. No. 27072, January
9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1 (1970)
W/N lawyers should be cited for contempt.
First case- yes.expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the
court. The inadvertence of Santiagos used of words cant be used as
shield to absolve him.
Second case- yes- even if the idea of language used in the 4 th mr both
lawyers should be adhering to canon 16.
CONTEMPT
10. Delgra v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 24981. January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 237
(1970).
11. Orbe v. Inting, G.R. No. 28998, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 579 (1970).
12. In re Arajiles, Adm. Case No. 960, September 74, 1970, 35 SCRA 61
(1970.)
13. Marquez vs. Clores-Ramos, AM No. P-96-1182, July 19, 2000
It cannot be overemphasized that every employee of the judiciary should
be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public
servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not
only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and
private dealings with other people, to preserve the Courts good name
and standing. This is because the image of a court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
personnel. Thus, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and
every one in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true
temple of justice.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court
personnel must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to his duties in the judicial branch but also to his behavior
outside the court as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality; a court employee is also judged by his private morals. These
exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly adhered
to and laid down by the Court to those in the service of the judiciary.
Respondent, as a court stenographer, did not live up to her commitment
to lead a moral life. Her act of maintaining relation with Atty. Burgos
speaks for itself.
14. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Liangco, A.C. 5355, December
13, 2011

15. Sebastian vs. Calis, A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999 In the light of
the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct
for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and
dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney
requires that he should be a person of good moral character.This
requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a
lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral
character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit
to continue in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.We
must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained
and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to
be heard.
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply
with the orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued
by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional
conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo
Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and
unconscionable conduct toward complainant.

16. In Re: Petition Of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyers Oath, B.M. No. 712,
March 19, 1997

Yes, after very careful evaluation of the case, the court resolve to allow
petitioner, Al Caparino Argosino to take the lawyers oath, sign the Roll
of Attorneys and practice the legal profession. The court recognizes that
Mr.Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber.
On the contrary, the various certification shows that he is a devout
catholic with genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The
court also persuaded that Mr.Argosino has extended all efforts to alone
for the death of Raul Camaligan.
The court also prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking
judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious
and uncalculating.
17. De Guzman vs. De Dios, A.C. No. 4943. January 26, 2001
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or
consent to its commission and to conduct herself as a lawyer according
to the best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a
source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension,
disbarment, or other disciplinary action.
18. ULEP vs. Legal Clinic, Inc. Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts. He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation
of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the
adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing
or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all
other like self-laudation.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession.
Exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation:
1. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include
only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented."
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine,
trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession.
2. The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced.
3. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm
or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
4. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law.

19. Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, G.R. No. L-12426,

February 16, 1959
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution
of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments
in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p.
665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144).
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the
Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the
reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and
other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to
establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director
are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
20.Aguirre vs. Rana, B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer
of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without
a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
21. Burbe vs. Magulta, AC No. 99-634,June 10, 2002
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rules
16.01 and 18.03 which state that respectively: Rule 16.03 - A lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he
has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Practice of Law a Profession, Not a BusinessLawyering is
not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood is
not a professional but a secondary consideration. Duty to public service
and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration
of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they

owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which

emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained
without making much money. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their
clients and properties that may come into their possession. Lawyers who
convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.
POWER TO CONTROL AND REGULATE THE PRACTICE OF LAW
22. In re: Cunanan, March 18, 1985RA 972 Bar Fluners Act of 1953
Objectives: to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from:
(a) Insufficiency of reading materials and (b) inadequate preparation. By
its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession.

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded

everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function. Admission to
practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court.

If the legislature cannot indirectly control the action of the courts

by requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it
is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments,
compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders,
or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a
judicial inquiry.
HELD: In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a
judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it
is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor
executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the
case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article
VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
RATIONALE: The public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved
by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one
of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially
of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to
such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the
statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is
grossly exaggerated.
23. Javellana vs. DILG, et. al., G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992
FACTS: Javellana is an incumbent member of the City Council or
Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession who
has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing
authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of
Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38
in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58.

As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice

their profession shall always be subject to the restrictions provided for in
Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the practice of any
profession should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian
concerned as a body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal
mayors, as the case may be.

c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession

or engagement in private employment and the official duties of the
concerned official shall arise thereby;
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of
1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
HELD: Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article
VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the
statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and
authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government
Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of
conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the
discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their
profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
24. Frias vs. Bautista-Lozada, A.C. No. 6656, May 4, 2006
The court held that the defense of prescription does not lie in
administrative proceedings against lawyers. And in the 2004 case
of Heck v. Santos, we declared that an administrative complaint against
a member of the bar does not prescribe
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact
that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward,
they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this
Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the
time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot
escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement
is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them
from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath.

The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of

administrative complaints against lawyers from this Court which has the
inherent power to regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in
the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain
administrative complaints against lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided
by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court.
25. Cruz vs. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007
RULE 138-A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE Section 1. Conditions
for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in
any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic
of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by
this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an
inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In
inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior
courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a
law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.

CASES ON REQUIREMENT OF CITIZENSHIP

39. AM No. 6732, October 22, 2013

Embido vs. Pey, Jr.

26. Re: Application for Admission to the Bar Vicente D. Ching, B.M. No.
914, October 1, 1999 **

40. AC No 9532, October 8, 2013

Pitcher vs. Gagate

Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the

citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to
elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when
it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
"(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens.

41. AC No. 4945, October 8, 2013

Tria-Samonte vs. Obias

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV
of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be
followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under
Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized
to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

46. AM OCA 09-3138/ MTJ 05-1618 October 22, 2013

Report on Financial Audit, etc. vs. Salubre, et al.

27. In The Matter Of The Disqualification Of Bar Examinee Haron S.

Meling In The 2002 Bar Examinations And For Disciplinary Action As
Member Of The Philippine Sharia Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, B.M. No.
1154, June 8, 2004
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:It has been held that good
moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate
in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.
28. Advincula vs. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007 As may be
gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good
moral character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership
in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral
character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.
[6]
In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr., we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from
any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty
of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege. It should
be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four
ostensible purposes, namely:
(1) to protect the public;
(2) to protect the public image of lawyers;
(3) to protect prospective clients; and
(4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes
conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare.
29. Villanueva vs. Sta. Ana, CBD CASE No. 251, July 11, 1995
30. Cordova vs. Cordova, A.M. No. 3249, November 29, 1989
31. Tapucar vs. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998
32. Bacarro vs. Pinatacan, Adm. Case No. 559-SBC January 31, 1984
33. Ventura vs. Atty. Samson, A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012
34. Leda vs. Tabang, A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992
35. Laguitan vs. Tinio, A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989
37. AC No. 9401 October 22, 2013
De Leon vs. Pedrena
38. AM RTJ 11-2259/11-2264/11-2273 October 22, 2013
Peralta et al. vs. Omelio

42. AM P-13-3155, October 21, 2013

Baguio vs. Arnejo
43. AM RTJ 13-2359 October 23, 2013
Gedriaga vs. Clemens
44. AM RTJ 13-1834, October 2, 2013
Carbojosa vs. Patricio
45. AM RTJ - 05-1962, October 25, 2013
Tuldague vs. Pardo

The above rule is not without exceptions, as we explained in the case of

Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, where we said that death of the
respondent necessitates the dismissal of theadministrativecaseupon a
consideration of any of the following factors: first, the observance
ofrespondent right to due process; second, the presence of exceptional
circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian
reasons; and third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed.
None of these exceptional considerations are present in the case.
47. Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991) Black defines "practice
of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments
of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with
the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an
office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing
and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
48. GR L-27654, February 18, 1970
In the Matter of Procedure for Disciplinary
Action Against Atty. Raul Almacen
Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full
opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be
unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of
the Supreme Court is to decide only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the
particular facts and parties involved. It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded
said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous,
grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as
of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer,
he should have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to
notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of
paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to
blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended
indefinitely.
49. In Re: Felizardo de Guzman, January 21, 1974
50. A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Martinez

51. AC No. 5485, March 16, 2005

Canoy vs. Ortiz
52. GR No. L-19450
People vs. Villanueva
HELD:
Aside from the CFIs reasons (which the Court considered as
plausible), Court said that Counsel for the accused misinterpreted
Rule 138, Sec. 35
oHe claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor
in the case was engaging in private practice.
o
COURT: The isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules.

State vs. Cotner: Practice is more than an isolated

appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise.

State vs. Bryan: Practice of law to fall within the

prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily
and demanding payment for such services.

Appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive

as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.

Observation of the Solicitor General: Private practice of

law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.

In addition, It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule

had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

The Court states that if such will be allowed, it would open the door of
harassment to the lawyers just by mere filing of numerous criminal
complaints against them. Criminal and civil cases are altogether different
from administrative matters, and each must be disposed of according to
the facts and the law applicable to it. In this case, since the crime of child
abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet
attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption
of innocence.
56. Basa Air Base Savings and Loan Association, Inc. vs. Judge Gregorio
Pimentel, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1648; August 22, 2002- Agree in the
Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator stating that
respondent failed to observe Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which mandates that a judge shall dispose of the courts
business promptly and resolve cases within ninety (90) days from the
submission of the last pleading required. Respondent admitted his failure
but pleads for compassion on the ground that he was a newly-appointed
judge and he merely inherited most of the cases pending before
him. Such cannot be a valid excuse. Judges burdened with heavy
caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the reglementary
period within which to decide their cases if they think that they cannot
comply with their judicial duty.
For partiality, gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment be dismissed for lack of merit, the respondent cannot be
held liable. A judges mere error in the interpretation or application of the
law per se will not warrant the imposition of an administrative sanction
against him for no one is infallible. Good faith and absence of malice,
corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that
will protect a judicial officer from the charge of rendering an unjust
decision. Complainant has not shown by clear and competent evidence
that respondent was moved by bad faith, corruption, vengeance or some
other ill-motive in acquitting the accused.

53. 399 SCRA 601 (2003)

Borja vs. Sulyap, Inc.
HELD:

Isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to Borja (in entering

into a compromise agreement) does not constitute a prohibited
private practice of law by a public official.

Private practice of a profession (specifically the law

profession) does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;

Rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the

same nature habitually or customarily holding ones
self to the public as a lawyer.
IN THIS CASE:

It was never established that he habitually or customarily held

himself to the public as a lawyer.

57. Ignacio E. Maylas, Jr. vs. Judge Manuel Sese, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2012;
August 4, 2006

54. AC No. 4219, December 8, 2003

Schulz vs. Flores
IN THIS CASE:

Client had relied upon him to file the complaint with

dispatch so that he would not be preempted by the adverse
party - But he failed him.
o
As a consequence, client was made a party-defendant.
o
EFFECTS:

Prejudiced his clients interest,

Adversely affected the confidence of the community in the

legal profession,

Eroded the publics trust in the judicial system. As an attorney,

respondent is sworn to do his level best and.

60. Imelda R. Marcos vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-072062; January 18, 2011

55. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 121, Caloocan City in Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-69655 To 56 for
Child Abuse, A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31, 2008

66. Florante A. Miano Vs. Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2408. March 2, 2016

No, SSP Velasco is not liable for the commission of Indirect Contempt of
Court.
A charge of indirect contempt must be filed in the form of a verified
petition if it is not initiated directly by the court against which the
contemptuous act was committed. On previous occasions, we clarified
that such petition is in the nature of a special civil action. Certified true
copies of related documents must be submitted with the petition and
appropriate docket fees must be paid.
In the case at bar, though the language of the SSP Velasco are
irresponsible, such did not necessarily degrade the administration of
justice as to be considered contumacious. The salutary rule is that the
power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position in a case under
consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contempt that
justifies the courts exercise of the power of contempt.
We note that SSP Velasco's statement was made in support of his
argument for the imposition of preventive suspension, i.e., to prevent the
respondent from using her current position to alter the course of the
investigation and the disposition of the appealed criminal cases.
SECOND ISSUE-NO, the decision of the RTC convicting the respondent
Judge for criminal complaint is not a ground for her suspension.

68. Magtibay v. Judge Indar, 695 Phil. 617 (2012)

Agree in the Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator.

He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative for any
of his official acts, no matter how erroneous as long as he acts in good
faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance,
bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively
sanctioned.
58. Lourdes B. Ferrer and Prosperidad Arandez vs. Judge Romeo Rabaca,
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580; October 6, 2010
59. Margie Macias Corpus vs. Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena, A.M. No. RTJ-041861; July 30, 2004

61. A.C. No. 6289. December 16, 2004

JULIAN MALONSO vs. ATTY. PETE PRINCIPE
62. A.C. No. 7022, June 18, 2008, MARJORIE F. SAMANIEGO,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ANDREW V. FERRER, RESPONDENT.
63 476 SCRA 85 [2005]
Garcia vs. Bala,
64. Mary Rose A. Boto Vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Vincent L.
Villena, et al. A.C. No. 9684. March 16, 2016
65. Josephine E. Lam vs. Nila M. Garcia
A.M. No. P-15-3300. February 10, 2016

67. Prosecutor Visbal v. Judge Buban, 443 Phil. 705, 708 (2003)
69. AC No. 5581 January 14, 2014
Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera
70. A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016
PATRICK A. CARONAN v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. ATTY. PATRICK A.
CARONAN, RESPONDENT.
HELD:The SC ruled that respondent, whose real name is Richard A.
Caronan be barred from admission to the Bar and that the name Patrick
A. Caronan be stricken off from the roll of attorneys as the real Patrick
Caronan never took the Bar and whose name was falsely used by
respondent. Under Sec. 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for
the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course. SC pointed out that respondent
never finished college and that the practice of law is a privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character. Respondent exhibited his dishonesty
and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he
assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother.
Section 6. Pre-Law No applicant for admission to the bar examination
shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied

the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he

had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelors degree in arts or sciences
with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration:
political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and economics.

71.
G.R.
No.
91958
January
24,
1991
WILFREDO D. LICUDAN and CRISTINA LICUDAN-CAMPOS, petitioners,
vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. TEODORO O.
DOMALANTA,
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN RESOLVING WHETHER OR NOT A
LAWYERS FEES ARE REASONABLE AND FAIR:

The time spent and the extent of the services

rendered or required;
The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

The skill demanded;

The probability of losing other employment as a

result of acceptance of the proferred case;

The customary charges for similar services and the

schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he
belongs;

The amount involved in the controversy and the

benefits resulting to the client from the service;

The contingency or certainty of compensation;

The character of the employment,

occasional or established, and;

whether

The professional standing of the lawyer

72. 275 Phil. 1,11(1991)

Lizaso v. Amante
HELD:The SC ruled that respondent be suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law in his failure to account and to return
the money of petitioner which constituted dishonest and
immoral conduct. Under Rule 101 set in The Lawyer and
Society of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The SC emphasized that
conduct is not limited to the performance of a lawyers
professional responsibilities.
Note: For suspension of lawyers, the Court can exercise its power to
discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an
attorney and client. In the case at bar, petitioner and respondent did not
have that attorney-client relationship, but regardless of that, the Court
still exercised jurisdiction to discipline respondent.
73. G.R. No. 113591 February 6, 1995 AGUIDO LACSON, JR., ET AL.,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.
Atty fortes is liable for misconduct. His false and unfound primise did
immesurable disservice to the court. He has put the court to dishonour.
74. A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 February 4, 2015 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 113740-RTJ]
JILL
M.
TORMIS,
Complainant,
v.
JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES
75.
A.C.
No.
10583
February
[Formerly
CBD
ROBERTO
BERNARDINO,
vs.
ATTY.
VICTOR
REY
SANTOS,
76.A.C.
No.
[Formerly
CBD
ATTY.
JOSE
MANGASER
CARINGAL,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS,

18,

2015
09-2555]
Complainant,

Respondent.
10584
10-2827]
Complainant,

In the Matter Of The Integration Of The Bar Of The Philippines,

January 9, 1973
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire
lawyer
population
of
the
Philippines.
This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names
appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar)
perforce must include all lawyers.
The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the
exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over
the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a
mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote
public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of
law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,
moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it
is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective
action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body;
no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses;
therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to
the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions,
the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a
rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the
Integrated Bar.
Freedom of Association.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he
is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and in cohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Regulatory Fee.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation,
while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may
impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to
push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily
includes the power to impose such an exaction.
Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because
although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will
give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not
had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they
have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in
a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.
Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory
power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young
and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new
regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.