RepublicofthePhilippines

SupremeCourt
Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

DENISB.HABAWELandALEXIS G.R.No.174759
F.MEDINA,

Petitioners,
Present:

CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,

LEONARDODECASTRO,

BERSAMIN,
versus
DELCASTILLO,and

VILLARAMA,JR.,JJ.

Promulgated:
THECOURTOFTAXAPPEALS,

FIRSTDIVISION,
September7,2011
Respondent.
xx

DECISION

BERSAMIN,J.:
FoundguiltyofdirectcontemptbytheFirstDivisionoftheCourtofTaxAppeals(CTAFirstDivision),
andsanctionedwithimprisonmentforaperiodoftendaysandafineofP2,000.00,thepetitionershavecometo
theCourtforreliefthroughcertiorari,claimingthattheCTAFirstDivisionsfindingandsentenceweremadein
graveabuseofitsdiscretionbecausethelanguagetheyusedintheirmotionforreconsiderationastheattorneys
[1]

forapartywascontumacious.Specifically,theyassailtheresolutiondatedMay16,2006, wherebytheCTA
FirstDivisiondisposedasfollows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina of the
PonceEnrileReyesandManalastasLawOfficesguiltyofDIRECTCONTEMPT.Eachcounselis

herebyORDEREDTOPAYafineofTwoThousandPesosandtoSUFFERIMPRISONMENTforaperiodoften
(10)days.

[2]
SOORDERED.

[3]
and the resolution dated July 26, 2006, whereby the CTA First Division denied their motion for
reconsiderationandreiteratedthepenalties.

Antecedents
ThepetitionerswerethecounselofSurfieldDevelopmentCorporation(Surfield),whichsoughtfromtheOffice
[4]

oftheCityTreasurerofMandaluyongCitytherefundofexcessrealtytaxespaidfrom1995until2000. After

oftheCityTreasurerofMandaluyongCitytherefundofexcessrealtytaxespaidfrom1995until2000. After
[5]

theCityGovernmentofMandaluyongCitydenieditsclaimforrefund, Surfieldinitiatedaspecialcivilaction
for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No.
MC032142entitledSurfieldDevelopmentCorporationv.Hon.CityTreasurerofMandaluyongCity,andHon.
[6]

City Assessor of Mandaluyong City, and assigned to Branch 214. Surfield later amended its petition to
[7]

includeitsclaimforrefundoftheexcesstaxespaidfrom2001until2003.

OnOctober15,2004,theRTCdismissedthepetitiononthegroundthattheperiodtofiletheclaimhad
alreadyprescribedandthatSurfieldhadfailedtoexhaustadministrativeremedies.TheRTCruledthatthegrant
[8]

ofataxrefundwasnotaministerialdutycompellablebywritofmandamus.

Surfield,representedbythepetitioners,elevatedthedismissaltotheCTAviapetitionforreview(CTAACNo.
5 entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City Assessor, Mandaluyong
[9]

City). The appeal was assigned to the First Division, composed of Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta,
AssociateJusticeLovellR.BautistaandAssociateJusticeCaesarA.Casanova.

[10]

In its decision dated January 5, 2006,

the CTA First Division denied the petition for lack of

[11]

jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust the remedies provided under Section 253

[12]
and Section 226
of

RepublicActNo.7160(LocalGovernmentCode).

[13]

Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield,

[14]

jurisdictionpursuanttoSection7(a)(3)ofRepublicActNo.9282

insisting that the CTA had

andarguingthattheCTAFirstDivision

manifesteditslackofunderstandingorrespectforthedoctrineofstaredecisisinnotapplyingtherulinginTyv.
Trampe(G.R.No.117577,December1,1995,250SCRA500),totheeffectthattherewasnoneedtofilean
appealbeforetheLocalBoardofAssessmentAppealspursuanttoSection22ofRepublicActNo.7160.

On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for reconsideration. On the issue of
jurisdiction,theCTAFirstDivisionexplainedthatthejurisdictionconferredbySection7(a)(3)ofRepublicAct
No.1125,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.9282,referredtoappealsfromthedecisions,orders,orresolutions
oftheRTCsinlocaltaxcasesanddidnotincludetherealpropertytax,anadvaloremtax,therefundofexcess
paymentofwhichSurfieldwasclaiming.Accordingly,theCTAFirstDivisionruledthatthejurisdictionofthe
CTA concerning real property tax cases fell under a different section of Republic Act No. 9282 and under a
separatebookofRepublicActNo.7160.

Inaddition,theCTAFirstDivision,takingnoticeofthelanguagethepetitionersemployedinthemotionfor
reconsideration, required them to explain within five days from receipt why they should not be liable for
indirectcontemptorbemadesubjecttodisciplinaryaction,thusly:


IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
AndinsofarasthemeritsofthecaseareconcernedletthisResolutionbeconsideredasthefinaldecisiononthe
matter.

However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross ignorance of the law for the
HonorableCourttohaveheldthatithasnojurisdictionoverthisinstantpetitionthegrossnessofthisHonorable
CourtsignoranceofthelawismatchedonlybytheunequivocalexpressionofthisHonorableCourtsjurisdiction
over the instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis as
derogatory, offensive and disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to observe and maintain the
respectduetothecourtsofjusticeandjudicialofficerstheyvowsolemnlytoconductthemselveswithallgood
fidelitytothecourts.Asamatteroffact,thefirstcanonoflegalethicsenjoinsthemtomaintaintowardsthecourtsa
respectfulattitude,notforthesakeofthetemporaryincumbentofthejudicialoffice,butforthemaintenanceofits
superior importance. Therefore, petitioners counsel is hereby ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from
receiptofthisResolutionwhyheshouldnotbeheldforindirectcontemptand/orsubjecttodisciplinaryaction.

[15]
SOORDERED.
[16]

The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006,

in which they appeared to apologize but

nonethelessjustifiedtheirlanguageas,amongothers,necessarytobluntlycalltheHonorableCourtsattentionto
[17]

thegrievousnessoftheerrorbycallingaspadebyspade.

Initsfirstassailedresolution,theCTAFirstDivisionfoundthepetitionersapologywantinginsincerity
andhumility,observingthattheychosewordsthatweresostrong,whichbringsdisreputetheCourtshonorand
integrityforbrazenlypointingtotheCourtsallegedignoranceandgraveabuseofdiscretion,towit:

In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F.
Medinaaskedforapology.Infact,thecounselsbrazenlypointedtheCourtsallegedignoranceandgraveabuseof
discretion.Theirchosenwordsaresostrong,whichbringsdisreputetheCourtshonorandintegrity.Wequote:

a) Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the
undersignedcounselfounditnecessarytobluntlycalltheHonorableCourtsattentiontothegrievousness
oftheerrorbycallingaspadeaspade.Theadvocacyneededastrongarticulationofthegravityofthe
erroroftheHonorableCourtinavoidingthesubstantialandtranscendentalissuesbythesimpleexpedient
ofdismissingthepetitionforallegedlackofjurisdiction,inviolationofSection14,ArticleVIIIofthe
Constitution,whichrequiresthattheDecisionmustexpressclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawon
whichtheDecisionwasbased(par.3oftheCompliancedocket,p.349)

b)SincetheHonorableCourtsimplyquotedSection7(a)(5)andittotallyignoredSection7(a)(3),to
perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court
concerningrealproperty taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of theCTA,theundersigned
counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new
provision,Section7(a)(3).Hence,thestatementsthatitwasgrossignoranceofthelawfortheHonorable
Court to have held that it has not [sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts
ignoranceofthelawismatchedonlybytheunequivocalexpressionofthisHonorableCourtsjurisdiction
overtheinstantcase were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counselsperceptionthatwas
influencedbyitsfailuretounderstandwhytheHonorableCourttotallyignoredSection7(a)(3)inruling
[18]
onitslackofjurisdiction(par.10oftheCompliancedocket,p.353)

Accordingly,theCTAFirstDivisionadjudgedbothofthepetitionersguiltyofdirectcontemptofcourt
for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to
sufferimprisonmentoftendaysandtopayP2,000.00asfine.
[19]

Seeking reconsideration,

the petitioners submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct contempt

because:(a)thephrasegrossignoranceofthelawwasusedinitslegalsensetodescribetheerrorofjudgment
and was not directed to the character or competence of the decision makers (b) there was no unfounded
accusationorallegation,orscandalous,offensiveormenacing,intemperate,abusive,abrasiveorthreatening,or
vile, rude and repulsive statements or words contained in their motion for reconsideration (c) there was no
statementintheirmotionforreconsiderationthatbroughttheauthorityoftheCTAandtheadministrationofthe
[20]

lawintodisreputeand(d)theyhadrepeatedlyofferedtheirapologyintheircompliance.

Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to reconsider, which declared
throughitssecondassailedresolutionthat:

The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the phrases used. The scurrilous attacks
madeintheguiseofpointingouterrorsofjudgmentalmostalwaysresulttothedestructionofthehighesteemand
[21]
regardtowardstheCourt.

anddisposedthusly:

WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Each counsel is
herebyORDEREDTOPAYafineofTwoThousandPesosandtoSUFFERIMPRISONMENTforaperiodoften
(10)days.

[22]
SO,ORDERED.

Issues

Arguingthattheyweremerelypromptedbytheir(z)ealousadvocacyandanappallingerrorcommittedbythe
CTAFirstDivisiontofranklydescribesucherrorasgrossignoranceofthelaw,thepetitionersnowattribute
graveabuseofdiscretiontotheCTAFirstDivisioninfindingthat:

I
THE PETITIONERS LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND COMPLIANCE WAS
CONTUMACIOUS

II
THEPETITIONERSWERENOTSINCEREINTHEIRAPOLOGYANDWEREARROGANT

III
THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY THE SUPREME COURT
AND

IV
THEPETITIONERSWEREGUILTYBEYONDREASONABLEDOUBTOFDIRECTCONTEMPT.

Thepetitionerscontinuetopositthatthephrasegrossignoranceofthelawwasusedinitsstrictlegalsenseto
emphasize the gravity of the error of law committed by the CTA First Division and that the statements
described by the CTA First Division as abrasive, offensive, derogatory, offensive and disrespectful should be
viewedwithinthecontextofthegeneraltoneandlanguageoftheirmotionforreconsiderationthattheiroverall
language was tempered, restrained and respectful and should not be construed as a display of contumacious

language was tempered, restrained and respectful and should not be construed as a display of contumacious
attitudeorasafloutingorarrogantbelligerenceindefianceofthecourttobepenalizedasdirectcontemptthat
theCTAFirstDivisiondidnotappreciatethesincerityoftheirapologyandthattheymerelypointedoutthe
errorinthedecisionoftheCTAFirstDivision.

Foritspart,theCTAFirstDivisioncontendsthatareadingofthemotionforreconsiderationandthecharacter
ofthewordsusedthereinbythepetitionersindicatedthattheirstatementsreflectednohumility,norwerethey
expressiveofacontriteheartandthattheirsubmissionsinsteadreflectedarroganceandsarcasm,thattheyeven
[23]

tooktheopportunitytoagainderidethepublicrespondentonthemannerofhowitwrotethedecision.

TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)opinesthatsubmittingapleadingcontainingderogatory,offensive
and malicious statements to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending constitutes direct
contemptandthattheCTAFirstDivisiondidnotabuseitsdiscretioninfindingthepetitionersliablefordirect
[24]

contemptunderSection1,Rule71oftheRulesofCourt.

Ruling

Wedismissthepetitionforcertiorari,anddeclarethattheCTAFirstDivisiondidnotabuseitsdiscretion,least
ofallgravely,infindingthatthepetitionerscommitteddirectcontemptofcourt.

Canon11oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitymandatesallattorneystoobserveandmaintainthe
respectduetothecourtsandtojudicialofficersandtoinsistonsimilarconductbyothers.Rule 11.03 of the
CodeofProfessionalResponsibilityspecificallyenjoinsallattorneysthus:

Rule11.03.Alawyershallabstainfromscandalous,offensiveormenacinglanguageorbehaviorbeforetheCourts.

Itisconcededthatanattorneyoranyotherpersonmaybecriticalofthecourtsandtheirjudgesprovidedthe
criticismismadeinrespectfultermsandthroughlegitimatechannels.Inthatregard,wehavelongadheredto
[25]

thesentimentaptlygivenexpressiontointheleadingcaseofInre:Almacen:

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This
rightisnotdiminishedbythefactthatthecriticismisaimedatajudicialauthority,orthatitisarticulated
byalawyer.Suchrightisespeciallyrecognizedwherethecriticismconcernsaconcludedlitigation,because
thenthecourtsactuationarethrownopentopublicconsumption.
xxx
Courtsandjudgesarenotsacrosanct.Theyshouldandexpectcriticalevaluationoftheirperformance.
Forliketheexecutiveandthelegislativebranches,thejudiciaryisrootedinthesoilofdemocraticsociety,
nourishedbytheperiodicappraisalofthecitizenswhomitisexpectedtoserve.

Wellrecognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticizeinproperlyrespectfultermsandthroughlegitimatechannelstheactsofcourtsandjudges.xxx
xxx
Hence,asacitizenandasofficerofthecourt,alawyerisexpectednotonlytoexercisetheright,butalsoto
considerithisdutytoavailofsuchright.Nolawmayabridgethisright.Norisheprofessionallyanswerable

considerithisdutytoavailofsuchright.Nolawmayabridgethisright.Norisheprofessionallyanswerable
forascrutinyintotheofficialconductofthejudges,whichwouldnotexposehimtolegalanimadversionasa
citizen.xxx
xxx
Butitisthecardinalconditionofallsuchcriticismthatitshallbebonafide,andshallnotspilloverthewalls
ofdecencyandpropriety.Awidechasmexistsbetweenfaircriticism,ontheonehand,andabuseandslanderof
courtsandthejudgesthereof,ontheother.Intemperateandunfaircriticismisagrossviolationofthedutyof
[26]
respecttocourts.Itissuchamisconductthatsubjectsalawyertodisciplinaryaction.(emphasissupplied)

Thetestforcriticizingajudgesdecisionis,therefore,whetherornotthecriticismisbonafideordoneingood
faith,anddoesnotspilloverthewallsofdecencyandpropriety.

Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a) [i]t is gross
[27]

ignoranceofthelawfortheHonorableCourttohaveheldthatithasnojurisdictionovertheinstantpetition

(b)[t]hegrossnessoftheHonorableCourtsignoranceofthelawismatchedonlybytheunequivocalexpression
[28]

ofthisHonorableCourtsjurisdiction

and(c)theHonorableCourtslackofunderstandingorrespectforthe

[29]

doctrineofstaredecisis.

The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of court meriting prompt
penalty.

Weagree.

By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as
attorneys,anddisregardedtheirsworndutytorespectthecourts.Animputationinapleadingofgrossignorance
[30]

againstacourtoritsjudge,especiallyintheabsenceofanyevidence,isaseriousallegation,

andconstitutes

directcontemptofcourt.Itissettledthatderogatory,offensiveormaliciousstatementscontainedinpleadings
orwrittensubmissionspresentedtothesamecourtorjudgeinwhichtheproceedingsarependingaretreatedas
directcontemptbecausetheyareequivalenttoamisbehaviorcommittedinthepresenceoforsonearacourtor
[31]

judgeastointerrupttheadministrationofjustice.
[32]

statements are not read in open court.

Thisistrue,evenifthederogatory,offensiveormalicious
[33]

Indeed, in Dantes v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa,

where the

petitionersmotionforclarificationstatedthattherespondentjudgesdecisionconstitutedgrossnegligenceand
ignorance of the rules, and was pure chicanery and sophistry, the Court held that a pleading containing
derogatory,offensiveormaliciousstatementswhensubmittedbeforeacourtorjudgeinwhichtheproceedings
arependingisdirectcontemptbecauseitisequivalenttoamisbehaviorcommittedinthepresenceoforsonear
[34]

acourtorjudgeastointerrupttheadministrationofjustice.

In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners statements were strong,
[35]

tactless and hurtful,

regards the statements not contemptuous, or not necessarily assuming the level of

contempt for being explanations of their position in a case under consideration and because an unfavorable

contempt for being explanations of their position in a case under consideration and because an unfavorable
[36]
decisionusuallyincitesbitterfeelings.

Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however, for the
characterization that the statements were strong, tactless and hurtful, although obviously correct, provides no
ground to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such strong, tactless and hurtful statements
[37]

wereusedtoexplaintheirclientspositioninthecase.

Thestatementsmanifestedadisrespecttowardsthe

CTA and the members of its First Division approaching disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of their strong,
tactless and hurtful language minimized on the basis that snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by
counselsarenotconsideredcontemptuousconsideringthatunfavorabledecisionusuallyincitebitterfeelings.
[38]

BybrandingtheCTAandthemembersofitsFirstDivisionastotallyunawareorignorantofSection7(a)

(3)ofRepublicActNo.9282,andmakingtheotherequallyharshstatements,thepetitionersplainlyassailedthe
legal learning of the members of the CTA First Division. To hold such language as reflective of a very
deliberatemoveonthepartofthepetitionerstodenigratetheCTAandthemembersofitsFirstDivisionisnot
altogetherunwarranted.

ThepetitionersdisdaintowardsthemembersoftheCTAFirstDivisionforrulingagainsttheirsidefound
firmconfirmationintheircompliance,inwhichtheyunrepentantlyemphasizedsuchdisdaininthefollowing
tellingwords:

3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the
undersignedcounselfounditnecessarytobluntlycalltheHonorableCourtsattentiontothegrievousnessof
theerrorbycallingaspadeaspade.Theadvocacyneededastrongarticulationofthegravityoftheerrorof
the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient of
dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution,whichrequiresthattheDecisionmustexpressclearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhich
theDecisionwasbased.
xxx
10.SincetheHonorableCourtsimplyquotedSection7(a)(5),andittotallyignoredSection7(a)(3),toperfunctorily
find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property
taxesevidentlydonotfallwithinthejurisdictionoftheCTA,theundersignedcounselformedaperceptionthat
the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the
statementsthatitwasgrossignoranceofthelawfortheHonorableCourttohaveheldthatithasnojurisdiction,as
wellas,thegrossnessoftheHonorableCourtsignoranceofthelawismatchedonlybytheunequivocalexpression
of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned
counsels perception that was influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored
[39]
Section7(a)(3)inrulingonitslackofjurisdiction.(emphasissupplied)

Wemighthavebeenmoreunderstandingofthemilieuinwhichthepetitionersmadethestatementshad
theyconvincedusthattheCTAFirstDivisiontrulyerredinholdingitselfbereftofjurisdictionovertheappeal
oftheirclient.Butourreviewofthetextofthelegalprovisionsinvolvedrevealsthattheerrorwascommitted
bythem,notbytheCTAFirstDivision.ThisresultbecameimmediatelyevidentfromareadingofSection7(a)
(3) and Section 7(a)(5) of Republic Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their claim that the CTA
reallyhadjurisdiction,towit:

Section7.Jurisdiction.TheCTAshallexercise:

Section7.Jurisdiction.TheCTAshallexercise:

(a)Exclusiveappellatejurisdictiontoreviewbyappeal,ashereinprovided:
xxx
(3)Decisions,ordersorresolutionsoftheRegionalTrialCourtsinlocaltaxcasesoriginallydecidedor
resolvedbythemintheexerciseoftheiroriginalorappellatejurisdiction(emphasissupplied)
xxx
(5)Decisions of the Central Board ofAssessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
overcasesinvolvingtheassessmentandtaxationofrealpropertyoriginallydecidedbytheprovincialorcity
boardofassessmentappeals(emphasissupplied)
xxx

As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the (d)ecisions, orders or resolutions of the
RegionalTrialCourtsinlocaltaxcasesoriginallydecidedorresolvedbythemintheexerciseoftheiroriginal
or appellate jurisdiction. The provision is clearly limited to local tax disputes decided by the Regional Trial
Courts. In contrast, Section 7(a)(5) grants the CTA cognizance of appeals of the (d)ecisions of the Central
BoardofAssessmentAppealsintheexerciseofitsappellatejurisdictionovercasesinvolvingtheassessment
and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals. In its
resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the CTA First Division forthrightly explained why, contrary to the
petitionersurging,Section7(a)(3)wasnotapplicablebyclarifyingthatarealpropertytax,beinganadvalorem
[40]

tax,couldnotbetreatedasalocaltax.

It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated and simply admitted their
blatanterroruponbeingsoinformedbytheCTAFirstDivisionabouttheuntenabilityoftheirlegalpositionon
thematter,buttheystillpersistedbygoingonintheircompliancedatedMarch27,2006toalsoblametheCTA
FirstDivisionfortheirperceptionabouttheCTAFirstDivisionsbeingtotallyobliviousofSection7(a)(3)due
tothetersenessoftheDecisiondated05January2006,viz:

12.Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable Court was grossly ignorant of
Section7(a)(3)becausefromthetersenessoftheDecisiondated05January2006,theundersignedcounsel
perceivedtheHonorableCourtasbeingtotallyobliviousofSection7(a)(3).Hadthereasonsdiscussedinthe
Resolutiondated15March2006beenarticulatedinthe05January2006decision,therewouldhavebeenno
[41]
basisforundersignedcounselstohaveformedtheabovementionedperception.
(emphasissupplied)

The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the petitioners contemptuous and
offensivelanguage.Noattorney,nomatterhisgreatfameorhighprestige,shouldeverbrandacourtorjudgeas
grosslyignorantofthelaw,especiallyiftherewasnosincereorlegitimatereasonfordoingso.Everyattorney
mustuseonlyfairandtemperatelanguageinarguingaworthypositiononthelaw,andmusteschewharshand
intemperate language that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession. Truly, the Bar should
strive to win arguments through civility and fairness, not by heated and acrimonious tone, as the Court aptly
[42]

instructedinSladePerkinsv.Perkins,

towit:

The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of the remarks of the
counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking of the action of the trial judge. We desire to express our
opinionthatexcessivelanguageweakensratherthanstrengthensthepersuasiveforceoflegalreasoning.We
have noticed a growing tendency to use language that experience has shown not to be conducive to the
orderlyandproperadministrationofjustice.Wethereforebespeaktheattorneysofthiscourttodesistfrom
such practices, and to treat their opposing attorneys, and the judges who have decided their cases in the
lowercourtadverselytotheircontentionswiththatcourtesyallhavearighttoexpect.(emphasissupplied)

lowercourtadverselytotheircontentionswiththatcourtesyallhavearighttoexpect.(emphasissupplied)

Wedonothesitatetopunishthepetitionersforthedirectcontemptofcourt.Theythrewoutselfrestraintand
courtesy,traitsthatinthemosttryingoccasionsequatetorarevirtuesthatallmembersoftheLegalProfession
should possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility of their profession. They wittingly banished the
idealthateventhehighestdegreeofzealousnessindefendingthecausesofclientsdidnotpermitthemtocross
[43]

thelinebetweenlibertyandlicense.

Indeed,theCourthasnotlackedinfrequentlyremindingtheBarthat

language, though forceful, must still be dignified and though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting
[44]

advocatesandinkeepingwiththedignityoftheLegalProfession.

Itisalwaysworthwhiletobearinmind,

too,thatthelanguagevehicledidnotrunshortofexpressionsthatwereemphatic,yetrespectfulconvincing,
[45]

yetnotderogatoryandilluminating,yetnotoffensive.

Noattorneyworthyofthetitleshouldforgetthathis

firstandforemoststatusasanofficeroftheCourtcallsuponhimtoberespectfulandrestrainedinhisdealings
withacourtoritsjudge.Clearly,thepetitionerscriticismoftheCTAFirstDivisionwasnotbonafideordone
ingoodfaith,andspilledoverthewallsofpropriety.

Thepowertopunishcontemptofcourtisexercisedonthepreservativeandnotonthevindictiveprinciple,and
onlyoccasionallyshouldacourtinvokeitsinherentpowertopunishcontemptofcourtinordertoretainthat
[46]

respectwithoutwhichtheadministrationofjusticemustfalterorfail.

WereiteratethatthesanctiontheCTA

FirstDivisionhasvisiteduponthepetitionerswaspreservative,forthesanctionmaintainedandpromotedthe
properrespectthatattorneysandtheirclientsshouldbeartowardsthecourtsofjustice.

Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of apology was probably feigned, for
they did not relent but continued to justify their contemptuous language, they do not merit any leniency.
Nonetheless,thepenaltyofimprisonmentfortendaysandafineofP2,000.00isexcessivepunishmentofthe
directcontemptofcourtforusingcontemptuousandoffensivelanguageandvergesonthevindictive.TheCourt
foregoestheimprisonment.

The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in pleadings and other
written submissions to the courts of law, including this Court, has not been uniform.The treatment has dealt
withcontemptuousandoffensivelanguageeitherascontemptofcourtoradministrativeorethicalmisconduct,
orasboth.Thesanctionhasrangedfromawarning(tobemorecircumspect),areprimandwithsternwarning
againstarepetitionofthemisconduct,afineofP2,000.00,afineofP5,000.00,andevenindefinitesuspension
fromthepracticeoflaw.

Thesanctionhasusuallybeensetdependingonwhethertheoffensivelanguageisviewedascontemptof
[47]

courtorasethicalmisconduct.InRe:LetterDated21February2005ofAtty.NoelS.Sorreda,

the errant

lawyer who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters and compliance to this Court was

lawyer who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters and compliance to this Court was
indefinitelysuspendedfromthepracticeoflaw.Althoughhewasfurtherdeclaredguiltyofcontemptofcourt,
the Court prescribed no separate penalty on him, notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and did not
apologizeforhisactionsthatresultedfromcasesthatweredecidedagainsthisclientsforvalidreasons.InRe:
[48]

ConvictionofJudgeAdoracionG.Angeles,

thecomplainingStateProsecutor,despitehisstrongstatements

tosupporthispositionnotbeingconsideredasdirectcontemptofcourt,waswarnedtobemorecircumspectin
language. In contrast, Judge Angeles was reprimanded and handed a stern warning for the disrespectful
languagesheusedinherpleadingsfiledinthisCourt,whichdeclaredsuchlanguagetobebelowthestandard
[49]

expectedofajudicialofficer.InNuezv.Atty.ArturoB.Astorga,

Atty.AstorgawasmetedaP2,000.00 fine

forconductunbecomingofalawyerforhurlinginsultinglanguageagainsttheopposingcounsel.Obviously,the
[50]

language was dealt with administratively, not as contempt of court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar,

the

CourtprescribedahigherfineofP5,000.00coupledwithasternwarningagainstAtty.Alarwho,inhismotion
forreconsiderationandtoinhibit,castinsultsanddiatribesagainsttheNLRCFirstDivisionanditsmembers.
Yetagain,thefinewasadisciplinarysanction.

DespitehavingearlierdirectedthepetitionersthroughitsresolutionofMarch15,2006thattheyshouldexplain
withinfive(5)daysfromreceiptofthisResolutionwhy(they)shouldnotbeheldforindirectcontemptand/or
[51]

subjecttodisciplinaryaction,
[52]

under Section 1,

theCTAFirstDivisionwascontentwithpunishingthemfordirectcontempt

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, and did not anymore pursue the disciplinary aspect. The

Courtconcurswiththeoffendedcourtstreatmentoftheoffensivelanguageasdirectcontempt.Thus,weimpose
on each of them a fine of P2,000.00, the maximum imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into
considerationthefactthattheCTAisasuperiorcourtofthesamelevelastheCourtofAppeals,thesecond
highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier clarified, is deleted. Yet, they are warned
againstusingoffensiveorintemperatelanguagetowardsacourtoritsjudgeinthefuture,fortheymaynotbeas
lightlytreatedastheynoware.

ACCORDINGLY,weDISMISSthepetitionforcertiorariUPHOLDtheresolutionsdatedMay16,2006and
July 26, 2006 and MODIFY the penalty imposed on Attorney Denis B. Habawel and Attorney Alexis F.
MedinabydeletingthepenaltyofimprisonmentandsentencingthemonlytopaythefineofP2,000.00each.

SOORDERED.

LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR: