Jurisdiction

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent G.R. No. 191240 | July
30, 2014 THIRD DIVISION
FACTS: Phillip Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador were charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in an Information. Upon their arraignment, Phillip and Ramon
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. The RTC rendered a
Decision finding Phillip guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ordered him to pay Castillo, US$100,000.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine currency. Ramon was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Phillip appealed
his conviction to the CA, which overturned the RTC decision. Castillo filed a petition for review on
certiorari on the civil aspect of the case, arguing that the Court should have at least retained the amount of
damages to her.
ISSUE: Whether the acquitted accused remains liable for damages.
RULING: Yes. His acquittal was only based on failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIO: [I]n Manantan v. CA, we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the
accused as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of
any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act oromission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based
on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this
case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in
Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x xx.
A reading of the CA decision would show that Phillip was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [S]ince the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, [Phillip] is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore,
Inc., we explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows: o
x xx Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or"greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
In discrediting [Castillo's] allegation that she gave [Phillip] US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that:
(1) [Castillo] failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time and even
gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) [Castillo]failed to require respondent to sign a
receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was
allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3) [Castillo's] claim of trust as reason for not requiring [Phillip] to sign
a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4)
[Castillo's] behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of
someone who had been swindled.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO y CASTILIANO and EMILIO
LA'O y GONZALES, Respondents. G.R. No. 168918
March 2, 2009 THIRD DIVISION
FACTS: Herein respondents Dumlao and Lao, Aber P. Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman A. Cruz, Jr. and
Fabian C. Ver were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 Dumlao filed an MD

on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.7 o He stated that the prosecutions main
thrust against him was the alleged approval by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Board of
Trustees -- of which he was a member -- of the Lease-Purchase Agreement entered into by and among the
GSIS, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and respondent Lao. He argued that the
allegedly approved Board Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees, contrary to the
allegations in the information. Since the signatures of Fabian Ver, Roman Cruz, Aber Canlas and Jacobo Clave
did not appear in the minutes of the meeting held on 23 April 1982, he said it was safe to conclude that
these people did not participate in the alleged approval of the Lease-Purchase Agreement. This being the
case, he maintained that there was no quorum of the board to approve the supposed resolution authorizing
the sale of the GSIS property. There being no approval by the majority of the Board of Trustees, there can be
no resolution approving the Lease-Purchase Agreement. The unapproved resolution, he added, proved his
innocence. He further contended that the person to be charged should be Atty. Luis Javellana, who sold the
subject property to respondent Lao without the proper authority. He likewise wondered why he alone was
charged without including the other two signatories in the minutes of the meeting held on 23 April 1982.
SB granted the MD People filed a Rule 45 before the SC o Petitioner argues it was denied its right to
due process when the court a quo dismissed the case against respondent Dumlao after pre-trial and before it
could present its witnesses and formally offer its exhibits. The court a quo deprived it of the opportunity to
prove its case that the Resolution dated 23 April 1982 was passed by the GSIS Board of Trustees and that
the Lease-Purchase Agreement was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
ISSUE: Whether SB correctly dismissed the case.
HELD: NO.
Respondent Dumlao was charged, he being one of the members of the GSIS Board of Trustees who allegedly
approved the lease-purchase of the subject GSIS properties consisting of three parcels of land with an area
of 821 square meters, together with a five-storey building, in favor of respondent Lao, which lease-purchase
agreement was deemed by the Office of the Ombudsman to be grossly disadvantageous to the government.
A review of the Motion to Dismiss/Quash filed by respondent Dumlao reveals that the ground he invoked
was that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense." He contends that the alleged approved Board
Resolution was not approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees, contrary to the allegation in the information.
Since the signatures of four out of the seven members of the board did not appear in the minutes of the
meeting held on 23 April 1982, there was no quorum present or no majority that approved the supposed
resolution. This being the case, he asserts that there was no resolution adopted by the GSIS Board of
Trustees approving the sale of the subject properties to respondent Lao. The Sandiganbayan, basing its
resolution on the Pre-trial Stipulation entered into by the prosecution and respondent Dumlao, dismissed the
case against the latter, since it found that the GSIS Board of Trustees failed to approve or validly pass the
Lease-Purchase Agreement, because only three out of the seven members of the Board signed the minutes
of the meeting held on 23 April 1982. It explained that, "no amount of evidence can change the fact that the
Resolution dated April 23, 1982 was not validly passed by the Board of Trustees of GSIS since it was only
signed by three members of the Board. Thus, it never had the force and effect of a valid resolution and did
not in effect approve the Lease and Purchase Agreement subject matter hereof. Therefore, the prosecution
has no cause of action against herein movant-accused Hermenegildo C. Dumlao."
The ground raised by respondent Dumlao in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an
information is whether the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essentials elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde, or matters extrinsic of the Information,
are not be considered.11 The elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as
follows: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of
the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.12 After examining the information, we find that the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically
admitted, will prove all the elements of Section 3(g) as against respondent Dumlao.
It can be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did consider the ground invoked by
Dumlao (that the facts charged do not constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied respondent

Dumlaos motion. From the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it dismissed the case
because of insufficiency of evidence.
Quash. The grounds, as enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as
follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency
of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it
violated the prosecutions right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its
case and to prove the accuseds culpability. It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss
the case under the premises. Not only did it not consider the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even
dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus
without basis and untimely.
DAVID TIU, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO POSTANES, Respondents. G.R. No.
162370
April 21, 2009 FIRST DIVISION
FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by
respondent Edgardo Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, petitioner
David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave threats against Postanes. Consequently, an Information
for Slight Physical Injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-412, and an Information for Grave Threats,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-413, were filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City.
Upon motion of Pasion, Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413 were consolidated and jointly heard before
the MeTC of Pasay City, Branch 44. MeTC dismissed both charges; denied Tius ensuing MR Tiu
filed a Rule 65 before RTC o RTC granted This case is remanded to the Court of origin for
reconsideration of its Decision RTC then declared void the MeTCs judgment Postanes filed an MR
before RTC o RTC denied Postanes filed a Rule 65 before the CA Court of Appeals directed
respondents (Tiu and Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of RTC Pasay, Branch 115) to file their Comment on the
petition. The Court of Appeals found no reason to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Meanwhile, Tiu, through his counsel, filed with the MeTC a Motion for Compliance asking the MeTC to
enforce the RTC decision. He also filed a motion to inhibit MeTC Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas. Postanes,
on the other hand, filed a motion to suspend the proceedings and an Opposition to the motion for
compliance o MeTC granted Postanes motion to suspend the proceedings. o Presiding Judge Estrellita M.
Paas also inhibited herself from further hearing the case. Tiu filed with CA an MD the petition on the
ground of forum shopping. o CA issued a Reso stated that "action on the Motion to Dismiss Petition filed
by the private respondents, together with the petitioners Opposition thereto, and private respondents
Reply to Opposition shall be included in the preparation of the decision in the present petition. CA then
reversed RTC; denied Tius ensuing MR o n annulling the RTC decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC
"has granted upon the State, through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision
of acquittal which right the government does not have." o The Court of Appeals stated that the prosecution
had not been denied by the MeTC of its right to due process. Hence, it was wrong for the RTC to declare the
findings of the MeTC as having been arrived at with grave abuse of discretion, thereby denying Postanes of
his Constitutional right against double jeopardy. o The Court of Appeals opined that the MeTC evaluated and
passed upon the evidence presented both by the prosecution and the defense. The MeTC, however, believed
that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence of Postanes, thus acquitted him based on reasonable doubt. Tiu filed a Rule 45 before the SC
ISSUE: Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal of
Postanes by the MeTC
HELD: NO. At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor
General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his
counsel. Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this Court and
the Court of Appeals.20 Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-413 is without legal personality to
appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor
General represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must fail.
However, the Court opts to resolve the question of double jeopardy to finally put an end to this
controversy. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and
had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express
consent.21 These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against
Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea;22 and (4) the MeTC
dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal
from which no appeal can be had.23 Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to
reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional
proscription not to put any person "twice x xx in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."24 Further,
as found by the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due
process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal
by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case.25 Tiu also contends that since the
defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413 failed to submit a formal of evidence, the defense in effect had no
evidence to dispute the charge against Postanes. Tiu insists that though Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96413 were consolidated, the MeTC should not have considered the evidence offered in Criminal Case No. 96412 to dismiss Criminal Case No. 96-413. In doing so, the MeTC allegedly committed grave abuse of
discretion rendering its dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-413 (grave threats case) void. Tius arguments
fail to convince us. There is nothing in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure prohibiting the MeTC from
appreciating the evidence presented and formally offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving Criminal
Case No. 96-413, inasmuch as these two criminal cases were properly consolidated and jointly tried. In fact,
the MeTCs act of assessing the evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in deciding Criminal Case No. 96-413
is consistent with the avowed objective of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure "to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases" covered by these Rules. Besides, the testimonies of
Postanes, Aynaga,26 and Samson27 were properly offered at the time when these witnesses were called to
testify.28 Hence, while the affidavits as documentary evidence were not formally offered, there were

testimonial evidences supporting Postanes defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413. Contrary to the RTCs
finding, there is nothing capricious or whimsical in the act of the MeTC of considering the evidence formally
offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving the consolidated Criminal Case No. 96-413. Therefore, the
MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-413 for insufficient
evidence. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no need to discuss the forum shopping issue.
Rule 110
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA
and MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents 687 SCRA 151 | G.R. No. 178607 | December 5, 2012
SECOND DIVISION
FACTS:
T

In 2003, Jimenez, the president of Unlad Shipping & Management

Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City against Antzoulatos, et al., listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI),
for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment, alleging that Antzoulatos, et al. falsely
represented their stockholdings in TMSIs articles of incorporation to secure a license to
operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).

An Information was then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Mandaluyong. Subsequently, the City Prosecutor reconsidered resolution and filed a motion
with the RTC to withdraw the information.

The RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the

existence of probable cause to hold Antzoulatos, et al. for trial.

Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against

Antzoulatos, et al. Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for
deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest, which was denied.

Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a

request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest., which was denied for being moot
and academic. Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali,
for being biased or partial.

Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did
not resolve Alamils motion for reconsideration and the Jimenez's motion to expunge.

T
Sorongon.

The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D.

The RTC granted Alamils motion for reconsideration, and treated the
motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause.

Jimenez moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable

cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any
relief from the RTC, which was denied.

The RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since the

motion did not have the public prosecutors conformity.

T

Jimenez filed a notice of appeal. Alamil moved to expunge the Jimenez'

notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner
had no civil interest in the case.

The RTC denied the Jimenez's notice of appeal since Jimenez filed it
without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of
the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA.
Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records.

T
T

Jimenez elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari,
which was dismissed outright by the CA for Jimenezs lack of legal personality to file the
petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration that followed.

T
T

ISSUE:Whether Jimenez, the private complainant, has legal personality in assailing the RTC
Orders.

T
T
T
T

RULING: No.
RATIO:

It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by
the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is
dismissible.

Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions

commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this
Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12,
Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.

The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the
OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This
ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling
doctrine.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be
allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due
process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case

Rule 111
MAGESTRADO v. PEOPLE
Rule 111 Prejudicial Question

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against petitioner with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended
pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury against
petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against
petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner
alleged that the case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City and case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC
of Quezon City must be resolved first before Criminal Case (for perjury) may proceed since the issues in the
said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.
MeTC: denied motion for suspension of proceedings. The motion lacks merit as it appears that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. MR was likewise denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed petition for certiorari under rule 65 with a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, on the ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend
theproceedings in Criminal Case.
RTC: dismissed the petition. That there is no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of
the criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases. The civil cases are principally for determination
whether or not a loan was obtained by petitioner and whether or not he executed the deed of real estate
mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163, whereas the criminal case is for perjury
which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to support his petition for
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he committed perjury is the
issue in the criminal case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the affidavit of
loss was executed in support of the petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT. MR likewise
denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court arguing that the RTC judge gravely abused its discretion.
CA: dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners remedy should have been an appeal from the
dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari.
Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial Court Quezon City, had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in denying the Petition
for Certiorari and petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration on the ground of a prejudicial question
pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the prevailing jurisprudence.
HELD: NO
Petitioner harps on the need for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case for perjury pending
before MeTC based on a prejudicial question still to be resolved in Civil Case (for cancellation of mortgage)
and Civil Case (for collection of a sum of money) which are pending before other trial courts. For clarity, we
shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner in his complaint in Civil Cases.
FOR complaint for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages filed by petitioner against private
respondent with RTC. Petitioner alleges that he purchased a parcel of land covered by TCT thru private
respondent, a real estate broker. In the process of negotiation, petitioner was pressured to sign a Deed of
Sale prepared by private respondent. Upon signing the Deed of Sale, he noticed that the Deed was already
signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of vendor Spouses Guillermo and Amparo

Galvez. Petitioner demanded from private respondent a special power of attorney and authority to sell, but
the latter failed to present one. Petitioner averred that private respondent refused to deliver the certificate
of title of the land despite execution and signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the
consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to engage the services of one Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who agreed,
for P100,000.00 to facilitate the filing of cases against private respondent; to deliver to petitioner the
certificate of title of the land; and/or to cancel the certificate of title in possession of private
respondent.However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did nothing upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from
petitioner. In fact, petitioner was even charged with perjury before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all
because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.s wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that he discovered the existence of a
spurious Real Estate Mortgage which he allegedly signed in favor of private respondent. Petitioner
categorically denied signing the mortgage document and it was private respondent who falsified the same in
order to justify her unlawful withholding of TCT from petitioner.
On the other hand, for the complaint for a sum of money with a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment
filed by private respondent against petitioner before RTC. Private respondent alleges that petitioner
obtained a loan from her in the amount of P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or before 30 August
1997. As security for payment of the loan, petitioner executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a
parcel of land registered under TCT. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay the said obligation, to which
respondent agreed. But private respondent discovered sometime in February 1998 that petitioner executed
an affidavit of loss alleging that he lost the owners duplicate copy of TCT, and succeeded in annotating said
affidavit on the original copy of TCT on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Private respondent
further alleges that she also discovered that petitioner filed a petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate
copy of TCT with the RTC of Quezon City. Private respondent demanded that petitioner pay his obligation, but
the latter refused to do so.
As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case for perjury pending final outcome of Civil Cases we take
into consideration Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or
the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Prejudicial question, defined.A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
Rationale of Prejudicial Question.The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in
view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
When to apply. For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
Requisites of PQ.(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or

innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.
Determination of PQ is an exercise of discretion by the court.The court in which an action is pending
may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the
action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another court, especially where the
parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of
cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the
rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first
action are settled, the second action should be stayed.
Issue of order, as a rule, not subject to reversal on review. Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to
the courts discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on review unless it constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
IN THIS CASE. A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Cases are principally for the
determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner
executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT. On the other hand, Criminal Case
before MeTC, involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of
loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each
other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real
estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently
executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT.
MeTC, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil Cases before RTC, do not pose
a prejudicial question in the determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal. RTC, likewise,
did not err in ruling that MeTCdid not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion for
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case.
G.R. No. 192123. March 10, 2014.
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS: Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pullthrough operation. Dr.
Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team and was assisted by anesthesiologists including Dr.
Fernando Solidum. During the operation Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma
lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or
move.
Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with
the City Prosecutors Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
The RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries and to indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr.
Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of P500,000.00 as moral
damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs. The CA affirmed the conviction of
Dr. Solidum.
Issue : Whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.

The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt because the
circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable
lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of the
anesthetic agent to Gerald.
An action upon medical negligence whether criminal, civil or administrative calls for the plaintiff to
prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the
physician to the patient, as created by the physicianpatient relationship, to act in accordance with the
specific norms or standards established by his profession (b) the breach of the duty by the physicians
failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a
reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury and
(4) the damages suffered by the patient
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia
administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications.
However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr.
Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos
findings did not preclude the probability that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which could
or could not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and
had then led
Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that although the
anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its
corresponding side effects did occur.
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the
Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would
not immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because
the circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly
doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent
showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the
anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia
experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the
cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.
2) Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the unusual
decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and
severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law. In criminal prosecutions, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that
arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged
Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally
liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial
entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and
whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be
heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental
defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was
not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly,
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation

10

engaged in any kind of industry. The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business,
especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila,
being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr.
Solidum must be shown
to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald.
Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil
liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution
against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
SC REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010 ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P.
Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries and MAKES no
pronouncement on costs of suit.
CASUPANAN VS LAROYA CASE DIGEST G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
Topic: Criminal Procedure: Rule 111, Rules of Court
FACTS: As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario LlavoreLaroya and the
other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by AvelinoCasupanan, two cases were filed before the MCTC of
Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil
case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the
MCTC dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil
case is a separate civil action which can proceedindependently of the criminal case. Casupanan
and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the
RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and
therefore, the proper remedy should have been an appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this
petition.
Casupanan and Capitulos contention: that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the
private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend
that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of recklessimprudence, and
an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They
maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil
action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the
criminal case.
Laroyas contention: that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya
further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they
failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved
as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
ISSUE/HELD: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for recklessimprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in
the criminal case. AFFIRMATIVE
RATIO DICIDENDI:
The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that
the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is
without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states that it is

11

with prejudice. Thus, the MCTC's dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The
remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTC's order
dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is
erroneous.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the
Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes
of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the
civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And par 6,
sec 1 of Rule 111.
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents
its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action
before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its
trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation
under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to
recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule
111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover
damages ex-delicto.
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the
"offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As
stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the "offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for
quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the
criminal action, not to the accused.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for
quasi-delict without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously
and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend
the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In
some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer
or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in
the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states
that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed
instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against

12

the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period
may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the
same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan
and Capitulo is proper.
RULE 111, SEC. 4 Effect of death on civil actions
DOCTRINE: The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal
action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict
Please pay attention to second (issue2). Yung main case kasi hind nag focus sa rule 111 sec 4.Thanks
G.R. No. 112985 April 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
MARTIN L. ROMERO and ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS:
The case before the court is an appeal of accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez from the joint
judgment of the regional trial court butuan city. Convicting each of them of estafa under article 315 of the
rpc. In relation to P.D. No. 1689 and sentencing each of them to jointly and severally pay Ernesto A. Ruiz the
amount of (150,000)
Ruiz was a radio commentator in Butuan City. He learned about the business of Surigao San Andres Industrial
Development Corporation (SAIDECOR), when he interviewed Romero and Rodriguez regarding the
corporation's investment operations in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte. Romero was the president and
general manager of SAIDECOR, while Rodriguez was the operations manager.
SAIDECOR started its operation as a marketing business. Later, it engaged in soliciting funds and
investments from the public. The corporation guaranteed an 800% return on investment within fifteen (15)
or twenty one (21) days. Investors were given coupons containing the capital and the return on the capital
collectible on the date agreed upon. It stopped operations in September, 1989.
On September 14, 1989, Ruiz went to SAIDECOR office in Butuan City to make an investment. After handing
over the amount of P150k to Rodriguez, Ruiz received a postdated check instead of the usual redeemable
coupon. The check indicated P1,000,200.00 as the amount in words, but the amount in figures
was for P1,200,000.00, as the return on the investment. Ruiz did not notice the discrepancy.
When the check was presented to the bank for payment on October 5, 1989, it was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds, as evidenced by the check return slip issued by the bank. Romero and Rodriguez could
not be located and demand for payment was made only sometime in November 1989 during the preliminary
investigation of this case. Romero and Rodriguez responded that they had no money.

13

Romero and Rodriguez were both convicted for the crime of estafa. They claimed that they had sufficient
funds in the bank, but it was dishonored because what was recognized was the amount in figures
(P1,200,000.00) instead of the amount in words (P1,000,200.00).
However during the pendency of the appeal on November 12 1997, accused Ernesto Rudriguez died.
ISSUE 1:W/N the court erred in convicting Romero and Rodriguez on the basis of the dishonored check
HELD 1: No. There is no merit in this appeal. We sustain accused-appellant's conviction.
Accused-appellant relies on the fact that there was a discrepancy between the amount in words and the
amount in figures in the check that was dishonored. The amount in words was P1,000,200.00, while the
amount in figures was P1,200,000.00. It is admitted that the corporation had in the bank P1,144,760.00 on
September 28, 1989, and P1,124,307.14 on April 2, 1990. The check was presented for payment on October
5, 1989. The rule in the Negotiable Instruments Law is that when there is ambiguity in the amount in words
and the amount in figures, it would be the amount in words that would prevail.
However, this rule of interpretation finds no application in the case. The agreement was perfectly clear that
at the end of twenty one (21) days, the investment of P150,000.00 would become P1,200,000.00. Even if the
trial court admitted the stipulation of facts, it would not be favorable to accused-appellant.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not Ernesto Rodriguezs criminal liability and civil liability should be
extinguish?
HELD 2: YES. As provided in rule 111 section 4 of the rules of court it state that:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the
independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative
of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused
may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided
in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the
offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar Ernesto Rodriguez died during the appeal on November 12 1997, and as a consequence of
his death before final judgement, his criminal and civil liability ex delicto, were extinguished as provided for
under rule 111 sec 4 of the rules of court.

Lily Lim v Kou Co Ping

Principle: A single act or omission that cause damage to an offended party may gave rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the

14

criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and (2) independent civil liability, that is civil
liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may
be based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as felony. It may also be
based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of the Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Facts: FR Cement Corporation issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and
traders, Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt. Each withdrawal authority contained provision that it is valid for six months
from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department. Filcement and Tigerbilt sold their
withdrawal authorities to Co. On February Co then sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim. Using the
withdrawal authorities Lim withdrew cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. Sometime in April 1999,
FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified
the matter with Co and administrative manager of Fil-Cement, who explained that the plant implemented a
price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays the price difference or agrees to receive
lesser quantity of cement. Lim filed case of Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion against Co. The
Regional Trial Court acquitted Co. After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case the court also found
Co not civilly liable. Lim sought a reconsideration which the regional trial Court denied. On March 14, 2005
Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case. On April 19, 2005 Lim filed a complaint
for specific performance and damages before the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not there is no forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for
specific performance and damages while appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for
estafa?
Ruling: A single act or omission that cause damage to an offended party may gave rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and (2) independent civil liability, that is civil
liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may
be based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as felony. It may also
be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of the Article 33 of the Civil Code. Because of the distinct and
independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may
pursue two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentiaor res judicata. The criminal cases of estafa are based on culpa criminal while
the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. The first action is clearly a civil action ex
delicto, it having been instituted together with criminal action. On the other hand, the second action, judging
by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from contractual obligation
and fortortious conduct. The Civil Case involves only the obligation arising from contract and from tort,
whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense
charged.
Rule 112
FENEQUITO v. VERGARA, JR
July 18, 2012
677 SCRA 113
FACTS: On February 11, 2004, an Information for falsification of public documents was filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila (representing
Bernardo Vergara, Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito, Corazon E. Hernandez, and Lauro H. Rodriguez. On April 23,
2004, Fenequito, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the case based on Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC
issued an order granting the said motion. Upon appeal by the public prosecutor, however, the RTC set aside
the MeTC's order and directed the latter to proceed to trial. Fenequito, et al. filed an appeal before the CA,

15

which subsequently ruled that the RTC's assailed decision was interlocutory in nature and was therefore not
appealable. Hence, the instant petition for review.
ISSUE: WON decision was interlocutory
WON there is probable cause
HELD: 1. One of the grounds for the CA's outright dismissal of Fenequito et al.'s petition for review was
because of the latter's failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the
petition filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It is a settled rule that the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of
Court. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate
the orderly disposition of appealed cases. But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition,
the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. This is because Fenequito
et al. erroneously assumed that the RTC Decision is final and appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. An
order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon
its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined. Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the court
a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC
Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to be done on
its merits.
2. Yes. It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report No. 04803 that the document examiner found that the signatures appearing in the questioned Deed of Sale as
compared to the standard signatures "reveal divergences in the manner of execution and stroke structure
[which is] an indication that they WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON." The Court agrees
with the prosecutor's pronouncement in its Resolution dated September 22, 2003, that although the findings
of the PNP Crime Laboratory were qualified by the statement contained in the Report that "no definite
conclusion can be rendered due to the fact that questioned signatures are photocopies wherein minute
details are not clearly manifested," the fact that an expert witness already found that the questioned
signatures were not written by one and the same person already creates probable cause to indict petitioners
for the crime of falsification of public document.
In Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., this Court held:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on

16

common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
BURGUNDY REALTY VS. REYES
GR. 181021 December 10, 2012
FACTS:
Josefa Reyes offered her services to Burgundy Realty to be the latters real estate agent in buyaing parcels
of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. Burgundy Realty released the
amount of P23,423,327.50 for buying certain parcels of land. However, Reyes converted and
misappropriated the money for her personal use and benefit. Reyes denied the allegation. She alleged that it
was her sub-broker Mateo Elojorde who was depositing the money entrusted to him to his personal account.
On March 28, 2000, through a board resolution, petitioner allegedly authorized Reyes to institute, proceed,
pursue and continue with whatever criminal or civil action against Mateo Elejorde. After the Preliminary
Investigation, the Assistant Prosecutor of Makati recommended that Reye be indicted for Estafa. Reyes filed
a Petition for Review in the DOJ Secretary that reversed the recoomendation of the Assistant Prosecutor.
Hence the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Secretary of Justice was correct in reversing the recommendation of the Assistant Prosecutor.
HELD:
NO. It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary
investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its
purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely
determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after
trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties'
evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their
respective claims.
A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of
all the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount
of P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the
parcels of land. Petitioner wrote a demand letter for Reyes to return the same amount but was not heeded.
Hence, the failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to return the entrusted money, despite demand and the
duty to do so, constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation.
To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 22 Probable cause is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the

17

prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or
strong suspicion, that a thing is so.The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.
Rule 113
ANTIQUERA vs PEOPLE 12/11/2013
FACTS:
Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George Codes Antiquera and Corazon Olivenza
Cruz with illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The prosecution evidence shows that at
around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1
Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police
visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number
107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men
came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera
holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an
aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the
police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.
While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It
contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white
crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers
confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National
Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing RTC rendered a Decision.
RTC found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession
of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of
possessing drug paraphernalia
HELD: YES. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante
delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. 1. The police officers
claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street,
Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to
give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a
tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to
the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.; 2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice
anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked
through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal,

18

the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having
proceeded from an invalid search and seizure The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his
arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
RODEL LUZ y ONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing
with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers
license of the latter.Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Custodial Interrogation The roadside questioning of a motorist does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest.In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United
States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The
Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the
motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter
of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.Persons
shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case,
these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner
had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station
as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he
saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road,
Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for
violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said
motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were
issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and
kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about
two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened
the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the
accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets,
the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu. Arraigned on 2 July
2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for
the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of
evidence and extortion.

19

RTC convicted petitioner. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully
arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person
of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: whether the search and seizure of the alleged shabu was invalid?
HELD: YES. Ong was acquitted.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he
was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his
liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at
the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3
Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been
flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are
applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain
view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence
was not immediately apparent.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused.
Rule 114
ZUNO VS CABEBE
FACTS:
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno of the Department of Justice, against filed a complaint against
Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The
charges are knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
In his complaint, Zuno alleged that in a criminal case for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte against five police officers. Upon
arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Consequently, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right of the accused to a
speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an Order] granting bail to the
accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused
Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent judge issued the Order without the
accuseds application or motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon, respondent judge issued
an order inhibiting himself from further proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was patently
irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.

20

In his comment, respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he issued the Order dated
November 5, 2002 granting bail to the accused without any hearing, the same was premised on the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. There was delay in the proceedings due to complainants
frequent absences and failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court, resulting in the
cancellation of the hearings. The prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the accused. He added
that the administrative complaint filed against him is purely harassment. It is not the appropriate remedy to
question his alleged erroneous Order. Accordingly, and considering his forty (40) years of government
service, he prays that the administrative complaint be dismissed. One year later, respondent judge retired
from service.
Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law
and recommended that a fine of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the bail was granted properly
HELD:
NO. In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, we held that jurisprudence is replete with
decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of
bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether
it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail
is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong,
and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which
remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition
for bail, a hearing should still be held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in
violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as follows:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the
bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the
court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify.
Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under section 8 of this Rule, the court
must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation.
(18a)

In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for
the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);

21

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond
(Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail
must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate
his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused. Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did not
conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to
interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of
the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
GR No. 189122 March 17, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of
any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of
bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with
grave caution and only for strong reasons. Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a
sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
Issue:
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal
mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Held:
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.
Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is
exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear
and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Rule 115

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Rule 116
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALFREDO PANGILINAN y
TRINIDAD, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 171020 EN BANC March 14, 2007

FACTS:
Pangilinanwas charged with 2 informations for the rape of his daughter, AAA Pangilinan was arrested and
detained with no bail recommended
He then filed a petition for bailThe petition for bail was heard and prosecution presented evidence
RTC denied petitionDefense then presented its evidenceRTC (having discovered that Pangilinan was not
yet arraigned)
scheduled his arraignmentPangilinan
pleaded not guiltyRTC
convicted him; sentenced him to death

ISSUE: Whether the belated arraignment was valid

HELD: YES.
On the first assigned error, appellant assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he
was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural
error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be
informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect
in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.19 In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment,
conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.20 The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to
apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him.21
Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question is: Were
appellants rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the
proceedings?

23

We do not think so. Appellants belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural
defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his
client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses. His counsels active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was
fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and
informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was
subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial
court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that
appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this
procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.
In People v. Cabale22 and People v. Atienza23 where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances,
we held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for
decision, the error is non- prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellants rights and interests were
not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated.
Daan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner was one of the accused charged for three counts of malversation of public funds involving
the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by
falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the
construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon
when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were
also indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same
with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary
surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said
accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered
to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.
The prosecution accepted the said offer of the petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the said Motion for Plea Bargain on the main ground that no cogent
reason was presented to justify its approval. MR was likewise denied.
Hence this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea
bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely affixed
his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount
involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.
ISSUE: Whether the offer of plea bargain of the petitioner is meritorious
HELD:Yes.Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and
2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial

24

conference. But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already
presented several witnesses.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be
made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, 10 and that the plea of
guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however
use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of
guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining
or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its
discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of
discretion.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and
the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public.
The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of
the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties
they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the
economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in
committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and
corruption in government."171avvphi1
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However,
subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be
accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction.
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner
liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead
guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that
petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the
Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while
the Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless,
absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render account was in violation of a law or
regulation that requires him to render such an accounting within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his
duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government
funds,29 not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this case.
Unlike Estradawhich involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, 30 and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a discriminatory
dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.

25

*An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may
be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.

Rule 117
Panaguiton v. DOJ, Tongson, Cawili
FACTS: Cawili borrowed money from petitioner. As payment for the loan, Cawili and Tongson jointly issued
three checks in favor of petitioner. The checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by closure
of the account. Petitioner filed a complaint for violation of BP 22. The prosecutor found probable cause only
with respect to Cawili as Tongsons defense that his signatures on the checks had been falsified. Petitioner
then filed a partial appeal before the DOJ even while the case against Cawili was already filed in court. The
Chief State Prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation and to refer the falsified
document to the NBI. After reinvestigation, still only probable cause with respect to Cawili was sustained. In
the city prosecutors resolution, it was held that the case with respect to Tongson had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4)
years. n this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January
1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995
did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already
elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22
imputed to him had already prescribed. Ultimately, the DOJ held that the action on the crime has prescribed.
In justifying its resolution, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do
not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not
provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90
of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
ISSUE: Is the running of the prescriptive period tolled upon the filing of the information in court or upon the
filing of the complaint with the prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
HELD: Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own
prescriptive periods. Act 3326 provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once
a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense
is halted. the term proceedings should now be understood either executive or judicial in
character (citing SEC v. Interport Resources). To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control (citing People v. Olarte).

26

Cerezo vs People, GR 185230, June 1, 2011

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for libel against respondents. Finding probable cause, the Prosecutor filed
the corresponding Information against them, but reversed its earlier finding and recommended the
withdrawal of the Information.
Relying on the recommendation o f the prosecutor, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed on the
ground that it is a settled rule that the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the
Public Prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. Being vested
with such power, he can reconsider his own resolution if he finds that there is reasonable ground to do so.
However, upon petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC granted the same and reinstated the case
after the DOJ Secretary reversed the resolution of the prosecutor.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC judge necessarily has to make an independent evaluation or assessment of
the merits of the case.
Held: Yes. Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on
the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information,
the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of
Justice. It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment
must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor
or the ruling of the DOJ Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the
trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said
Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainants right to due process.
They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever
Rule 118
Rule 119
MANGUERRA v RISOS
Facts:
Respondents were charged with EstafaThrough Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of
Cebu City. The case arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by
respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as
the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.
Earlier, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly
confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in
Manila for further treatment.The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He
explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age,
which limited her freedom of mobility.
RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court
of Makati City. The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on November 3,
2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency
of the situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age. Concepcions deposition was finally taken at
her residence.

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Respondents assailed the RTC orders in a special civil action for certiorari.
CA rendered a Decisionfavorable to the respondents,the CA resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that
the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: WON Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies to the deposition of Concepcion.
Held: No.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the
judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It
also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and
necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the
judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt her from the application of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once
the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states
that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or
2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus,
when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion
would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been
compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the
conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending.
Pimentel v Pimentel
Facts:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito R. Pimentel in RTC Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC Antipolo for the pre-trial and
trial for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
RTC ruled that this is a prejudicial question.
CA also dismissed the petition
Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

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Held:
No.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure [6] provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this
case, clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide.
The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent.There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

PEOPLE vs JOSE GO 08/06/2014

FACTS: On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued Resolution
ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the
receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory receiver of OCBC,
effectively took charge of OCBCs assets and liabilities.
While all the aforementioned events were transpiring, PDIC began collecting on OCBCs past due loans
receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers for the immediate settlement of their outstanding
loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of OCBC are Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared
to have obtained a loan of [P]10 Million each. Both denied being granted any loan by OCBC. Timmys, Inc.
insisted that the signatures on the loan documents were falsified. Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having
applied a loan by OCBC.
The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the
names of Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of managers checks allegedly
deposited to the savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were
automatically transferred to his current account in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.
Hence, PDIC filed a complaint4 for 2 counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila against the private respondents in relation to the purported loans
of Timmys, Inc., and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. After finding probable cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
the City of Manila filed Informations against the private respondents in the RTC in Manila.
The private respondents pleaded not guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A pretrial was
conducted. Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. After the
presentation of all of the prosecutions evidence, the private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. The presiding judge granted the private
respondents Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and ordered the case to be re-raffled to another branch. The
case was subsequently re-raffled to the branch of the respondent RTC judge.

29

In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent RTC judge granted the private respondents Motion
for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. On January 17, 2007, the private respondents filed their Demurrer to
Evidence7 praying for the dismissal of the criminal cases instituted against them due to the failure of the
prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RTC judge found the private respondents
Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious dismissed the Criminal Cases and acquitted all of the accused.
Private prosecutor in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 moved for reconsideration but was
denied. OSG moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE IN GRANTING THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (YES); And WON THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY
WHEN IT WAS NOT CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER (NO)
HELD: As a general rule, an order granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal.
There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the
accuseds demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an
accuseds demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal
order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is
annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the
accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
when it granted the accuseds demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent order of acquittal void
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish
that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense
justice."
In the exercise of the Courts "superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. So it is that the writ will be
granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice." 47
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declares that the CA grossly erred in affirming the trial
courts July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondents demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury
to the banking industry and public interest. The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent
evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents,
and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court
effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecutions evidence against the respondents, which it was
duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC
depositors money not to mention that the banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial
court should have conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the
issues.
Salvanera v. People

30

State witness
FACTS: In an information, petitioner Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and
Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane.
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin,
the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime; while
Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All the accused have been arrested and detained, except
Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large.
The prosecution moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as
state witnesses.
Trial Court: denied the prosecutions motion for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix. The
prosecution moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state
witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of the two accused are absolutely necessary to establish that
petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane.
CA:The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo
Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in reversing the Trial Courts decision in discharging the accused Abutin and
Tampelix as State witness.

Held. No!
A. Requirements/conditions to be considered in allowing one to be a state witness.In the
discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be present,
namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness
at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

31

d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,

e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
B. Salvaneras Argument: (accused/petitioner)According to petitioner, the testimony of an accused
sought to be discharged to become a state witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused
likewise sought to be discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in the same
criminal case. Petitioner justifies this theory on the general principles of justice and sound logic. He contends
that it is a notorious fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on
others, if by doing so, he will be freed from any criminal responsibility. Thus, in the instant case, petitioner
supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix will naturally seize the opportunity to be absolved of any liability by
putting the blame on one of their co-accused. Petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and
Salazar, who are not accused, do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
conspiracy. Thus, they could not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that petitioner
is the mastermind or the principal by induction.
C. Courts explanation. We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To
require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the
exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness."
The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will
be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by
the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator
are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity.Even if the confirmatory
testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other
respects."

It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the
case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are
corroborated on important points by each others testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes
manifest."
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a
crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only
they have knowledge of the crime.The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime,
as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of
the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission
of the crime.
D. Rationale for declaring an accused as a State Witness. The decision to grant immunity from
prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego
prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the
right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in
the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will
probably elude the long arm of the law.
People vs Lacson
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS
PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M.

32

JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M.
LACSON, respondent.
Provisional Dismissal
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The
provisional dismissal of offenses punishable imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

Conditions for the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117:

1. The prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or the latters counsel moves for a
provisional dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution or accused move for a provisional dismissal
of the case
2.

The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case

3.

The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally

4.

The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case

BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., petitioner, vs. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, respondent.

In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only
be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.This Court leans toward
Resallys contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before the
CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf
of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
FACTS: In 1973, Benjamin married Azucena with whom he had three children. In 1979, Benjamin developed
a romantic relationship with Sally who was a customer in the business owned by Benjamins family. After
Azucena left for the United States of America, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sallys
father was against the relationship hence, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office
in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital
status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their
cohabitation, they acquired several real properties.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with
her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using
their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage.

33

The trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. 1) the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and
the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage with
Azucena; 2) that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous; and 3) that the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes,
particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were sufficient to deny the
demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally;
(2) the letters and love notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his
marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.s admission that he and Resally were in some kind
of a relationship.The CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty
of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he was already married
to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his
marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge.
ISSUE: Whether the Double Jeopardy has set in?
HELD: YES.
This Court leans toward Resallys contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari
before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the
State.
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal.
However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged
that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case,
the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or
action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action
in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.
[Emphases Supplied]
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the trial courts
order granting petitioners demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the criminal case.
Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is apparent that her
only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners. Because bigamy is a
criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to prosecute the case on appeal. Thus, Sally Go did not have
the requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.
Rule 120
HIPOS SR. VS BAY

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FACTS:
On 15 December 2003, two informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others
before the RTC of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay.
On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking
Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Information had been filed
against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the
cases. On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged. On 10
August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the
Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused.
The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City
Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano. On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating
the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the
Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied
the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date. Said order states: WHEREFORE, finding no
probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes and acts of lasciviousness, the motion to
withdraw informations is DENIED. Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order,
petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus, to compel the trial court to accept the Prosecutors
Motion to Withdraw information.
ISSUE:
WON the Hon. Supreme Court can compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus by
virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor of QC finding no probable cause against the
accused and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information
HELD:
NO. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer
where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond
the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when
refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. While a judge
refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same,
he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at
bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by
denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore.

The Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial court, seeking
to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutors Office. The

35

prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr., 437 SCRA 504
(2004), we reiterated the doctrine we established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462
(1987), that once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the
case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the
trial court.
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed
to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the
rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment
of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law. When the trial court
grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the
Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so
not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its
judicial prerogative.
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we
do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion. The
decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the
President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and
absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion that
will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call
for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.

GR No. 173089 August 25, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO, respondents
Facts:
In 2002, Jaime Abordo was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by Kennard Majait,
JoenilCalvez and Jose Montes. An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while
Calvez hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt. Abordo was charged with two (2)
counts of attempted murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder before the RTC of Biliran Province Branch
16. The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its decision, the RTC held Abordo
liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to
Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo. With respect to the
complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted. All three complainants moved for reconsideration regarding the
civil aspect. They filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez without the conformity of
the Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the criminal aspects. For said reason,
Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration while Calvez motion to withdraw was
granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed Calvez appeal for not bearing the conformity of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. ZunosIndorsement of the letter of
Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari
under rule 65. The CA dismissed the petition outright. Not in conformity, the OSG comes to this court via this
petition for review under Rule 45.

36

Issues:

1. Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not appeal, is the remedy to question a
verdict of acquittal.
2. Whether the case need be remanded to the CA for appropriate proceedings.

Ruling:
1. Yes, in line with the finality-of-acquittal doctrine.
2. No, as a remand will only prolong the proceedings.
RATIO:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at
the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that
is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several
cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the
dismissal of, criminal cases.
Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordos constitutional guaranteed right against double
jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 6 before the
appellate court.
The rule is that while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
Rule 121
Rule 122 to Rule 125
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Appellant616 SCRA
223 | G.R. No. 172873 | March 19, 2010
FACTS:
Roldan Morales y Midarasa was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and
sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Upon arraignment, Morales, assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to both charges read in Filipino, a language known and understood by him. On motion of the City
Prosecutor, the cases were consolidated for joint trial. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. In 2004, the trial
court rendered a Decision finding Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. Appellant elevated the case
to this Court via Notice of Appeal. In the Supreme Court Resolution, the Court resolved to accept the case
and required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs simultaneously, if they so desire,
within 30 days from notice. Both parties adopted their respective appellants and appellees briefs, instead
of filing supplemental briefs.
ISSUE:Whether the appeal opens the whole case, including facts, for review.
RATIO:
Yes. This is the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case.
RULING:
At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal throws the

37

whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such review, we find the
present appeal meritorious.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule
admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material
bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due
consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold
that this case falls under the exception.
MERCEDITA T. GUASCH vs ARNALDO DELA CRUZ
DOCTRINE: However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving
of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure.
[24]
Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby
FACTS: On November 10, 2000, respondent Arnaldo dela Cruz (respondent) filed a Complaint-Affidavit[4]
against petitioner Mercedita T. Guasch (petitioner) with the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent alleged
that petitioner was his neighbor and kumadre. On several occasions, petitioner transacted business with him
by exchanging cash for checks of small amount without interest xxx petitioner returned the next day and
was able to convince him to give her P3,300,000.00 in cash in exchange for her Insular Savings Bank Check
xxx On the date of maturity and upon presentment, however, the check was dishonored for the reason that
the account against which it was drawn was already closed.
On March 2, 2001, the City Prosecutor of Manila issued a Resolution recommending that an information for
estafa be filed against petitioner. On February 7, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information for
estafa against petitioner.
After petitioner entered her plea of not guilty and after the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a
Motion With Leave To Admit Demurrer to Evidence.
The trial court issued an Order[9] dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the
case. The trial court found that respondents assertion of misrepresentation by petitioner that her check will
be fully funded on the maturity date was not supported by the evidence on record. Accordingly, her guilt not
having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner was acquitted.
respondent filed a Manifestation[10] with attached Motion to Amend Order dated June 16, 2005[11] (Motion
to Amend) to include a finding of civil liability of petitioner. In the Manifestation, respondents counsel
justified his failure to file the motion within the reglementary period of 15 days because all postal offices in
Metro Manila were allegedly ordered closed in the afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue.
The trial court denied respondents Motion to Amend xxx finding that counsel for respondent was inexcusably
negligent; hence, the Order dated June 16, 2005 has become final and executory. Respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[14] but the same was denied by the trial court
On the issue of whether the issuance of the Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence
was made with grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals ruled in the negative as it found that the trial
court did not anchor the acquittal of petitioner on evidence other than that presented by the prosecution as
contended by petitioner. On the issue of whether the denial of respondents Motion to Amend was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative.

38

ISSUE: The lone issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondents Motion to Amend.
HELD: Yes, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondents
Motion to Amend.
As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the
reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly
enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay
in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business,
and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not
hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.[23]
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course
to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure.[24] Certain
elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.[25]
Several of these elements obtain in the case at bar.
First, there is ostensible merit to respondents cause. The records show that petitioner admits her civil
obligation to respondent. In her Kontra-Salaysay,[26] petitioner alleged that she owed respondent a total of
P3,300,000.00 as a result of their joint lending business whereby petitioner borrows money from respondent
with interest and petitioner, in turn, lends the money to her clients. Respondent did not waive, reserve, nor
institute a civil action for the recovery of civil liability. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
respondents actual and active participation in the criminal proceedings through a private prosecutor leaves
no doubt with respect to his intentions to press a claim for the unpaid obligation of petitioner in the same
action. Hence, since the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, the trial court was dutybound to determine the civil liability of petitioner pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure which provides:
SECTION 2. Contents of the judgment.
xxx
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed
to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
(2a)
Second, it cannot be said that petitioner will be unduly prejudiced if respondents Motion to Amend for the
sole purpose of including the civil liability of petitioner in the order of acquittal shall be allowed. Foremost,
petitioner admits her civil obligation to respondent. Respondent concededly has an available remedy even if
his Motion to Amend was denied, which is to institute a separate civil action to recover petitioners civil
liability. However, to require him to pursue this remedy at this stage will only prolong the litigation between
the parties which negates the avowed purpose of the strict enforcement of reglementary periods to appeal,
that is, to put an end to judicial controversies. Not only will that course of action be a waste of time, but also
a waste of the resources of both parties and the court as well.
ROSIE QUIDET vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 170289 April 8, 2010

39

Doctrine:Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself for
it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold. In case of
reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance tips in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as what
is at stake is the accuseds liberty.

FACTS: Petitioner Rosie Quidet, Feliciano Taban, Jr. (Taban), and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were charged with
homicide for the death of Jimmy Tagarda (Jimmy).
On even date, the aforesaid accused were also charged with frustrated homicide for the stab wounds
sustained by Jimmys cousin, Andrew Tagarda (Andrew), arising from the same incident.
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in frustrated homicide. Meanwhile, in
homicide, Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and Tubo maintained their innocence.
Accordingly, thereafter, the trial court rendered a partial judgmentsentencing Taban to imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Jimmy P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and Tubo guilty of homicide and all three accused
(petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty of frustrated homicide. The trial court found that the stabbing of Jimmy
and Andrew was previously planned by the accused. The active participation of all three accused proved
conspiracy in the commission of the crimes. Furthermore, the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses cannot be offset by the defense of plain denial.
From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA the RTC with some modifications, lowering the frustrated homicide to attempted homicide
only. According to the CA, the accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter
successfully deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have healed within five to
seven days even without medical treatment. The crime committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide.
The CA also deleted the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew because the same was not
fully substantiated.
Petitioner insists that it cannot be said that he had the same criminal purpose and design as Taban
and Tubo. His participation was not necessary to the completion of the criminal acts because by the time he
boxed Andrew and Jimmy, the stabbing had already taken place. The evidence further established that the
stabbing incident was purely accidental and that the accused had no grudge against the victims. Also,
petitioner was unarmed negating his intent to kill.

ISSUE:

40

1. Whether the Decision of the CA finding petitioner to have acted in conspiracy with the other
accused (Taban and Tubo) in the commission of the offenses charged is in accordance with
law and/or jurisprudence;
2. Whether the CA correctly modified the crime from frustrated to attempted homicide;
3. Whether the CA erred in deleting the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew on the
ground that the same was not fully substantiated.

HELD:
1. Yes. The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner
is criminally liable only for his individual acts.Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution
does not meet the test of moral certainty in order to establish that petitioner conspired with
Taban and Tubo to commit the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide. We agree with
petitioner that this case is similar to People v. Vistido and the ruling there applies with equal
force here.
By and large, the evidence for the prosecution failed to show the existence of conspiracy which,
according to the settled rule, must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In the
absence of conspiracy, the liability of the defendants is separate and individual, each is liable for his own
acts, the damage caused thereby, and the consequences thereof. While the evidence shows that the
appellant boxed the deceased, it is, however, silent as to the extent of the injuries, in which case, the
appellant should be held liable only for slight physical injuries.
We reach the same conclusion here. For failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt, petitioners liability is separate and individual. Considering that it was duly established
that petitioner boxed Jimmy and Andrew and absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by the latter
from these acts, petitioner should only be made liable for two counts of slight physical injuries. In addition,
he should pay P5,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Jimmy and another P5,000.00 as moral damages
to Andrew. Actual damages arising from said acts cannot, however, be awarded for failure to prove the
same.

2. Yes.Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, in Criminal Case No. 92-080 (frustrated
homicide), the CA correctly modified the same. The crime committed was attempted
homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were
not life-threatening. Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the
appellate courts judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of
their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.

41

3. Yes.Anent the award of damages for which Taban and Tubo should be made solidarily liable,
in Criminal Case No. 92-079, the trial court properly awarded civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jimmy. Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of
the deceased victim without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission
of the crime.In addition, the trial court should have awarded moral damages in the sum
of P50,000.00 in consonance with current jurisprudence. As to actual damages, the
prosecution was able to prove burial-related expenses with supporting receipt only to the
extent of P5,000.00. In People v. Villanueva, we held that when actual damages proven by
receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate damages
for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. We explained that it
was anomalous and unfair thatthe heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in proving
actual damages amounting to less than P25,000.00 would be in a worse situation than those
who might have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate
damages. Accordingly, an award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages is proper under the premises. As to loss of earning capacity, the same cannot be
awarded due to lack of proof other than the self-serving testimony of Jimmys mother. In
Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA correctly ruled that Andrew is not entitled to an award of
actual damages for failure to substantiate the same. However, he is entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the pain, trauma and suffering arising from the
stabbing incident. It may be noted that the afore-discussed higher indemnities are not
favorable to Taban and Tubo who did not appeal, but in line with our ruling in People v.
Pacaa, they shall be held solidarily liable therefor since these amounts are not in the form
of a penalty.

PEOPLE V TARUC
G.R. No. 185202
FACTS:Accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was charged with the crime of murder in connection with the
death of Emelito Sualog. Upon arraignment on 25 April 2005, accused, duly assisted by a lawyer from the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO), pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial on the merits, the RTC on 29 June 2005 rendered a Decision convicting the accused, The case was
brought to the Court of Appeals for automatic review pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC .
On 13 January 2006, accused-appellant, through the PAO, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellants Brief.
The Court of Appeals directed accused-appellants counsel to furnish it with the present and complete
address of his client within five days from notice. In compliance, the PAO lawyer concerned informed the
Court of Appeals that accused-appellant escaped from prison on 23 August 2002.Said PAO lawyer claimed
that he had no means of knowing the current whereabouts of the accused-appellant. Thereupon, the PAO
lawyer asked the Court of Appeals to direct the Warden of the Provincial Jail in Balanga, Bataan, to file a
certification as to the accused-appellants escape.
ISSUE: Whether he has lost his right to appeal

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HELD: Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of the same Rules allows the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of the accused-appellant who eludes the jurisdiction of the
courts over his person, viz:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The Court of Appeals may, upon motion
of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio.

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency
of the appeal.
In allowing the dismissal of the appeal of the accused-appellant under the circumstances identified by the
foregoing rule, the Court, in People v. Mapalao,[16]explained that:

Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court
Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the
Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SECTION 1. Uniform procedure. - Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the procedure in
the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.
SC By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal In People v. Ang Gioc,
Court enunciated that:

the

There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of
appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or
not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case
has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the
judgment rendered against him x x x.
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he
cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from
prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction,
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the
Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Notwithstanding, the
escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction,
considering that what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not
only a power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases. (People vs. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034,
August 20, 1996). By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal.

Rule 126
Rule 127

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44