Kristoffer Smemo's 2014 Masters Thesis "The Politics of Labor Militancy in Minneapolis, 1934-1938".

University of Massachusetts - Amherst
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Masters Theses 1896 - February 2014
Dissertations and Theses
2011
The Politics of Labor Militancy in Minneapolis,

1934-1938
Kristoffer Smemo
ksmemo@umail.ucsb.edu
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Smemo, Kristoffer, "The Politics of Labor Militancy in Minneapolis, 1934-1938" (). Masters Theses
1896 - February 2014. Paper 719.
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/719
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THEPOLITICSOFLABORMILITANCYINMINNEAPOLIS,19341938
AThesisPresented
by
KRISTOFFERO.SMEMO
SubmittedtotheGraduateSchoolofthe
UniversityofMassachusettsAmherstinpartialfulfillment
oftherequirementsforthedegreeof
MASTEROFARTS
September2011
UniversityofMassachusetts/FiveCollegeGraduatePrograminHistory
CopyrightbyKristofferO.Smemo2011
AllRightsReserved
THEPOLITICSOFLABORMILITANCYINMINNEAPOLIS,19341938
AThesisPresented
by
KRISTOFFERO.SMEMO
Approvedastostyleandcontentby:
____________________________________________________
ChristianG.Appy,Chair
____________________________________________________
GeraldFriedman,Member
____________________________________________________
FrancisG.Couvares,Member
________________________________________________
JoyeL.Bowman,Chair
HistoryDepartment
DEDICATION
Formyparents.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Simplyput,thisthesiswouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheguidance,
expertise,andsupportofanincrediblygenerouscommunityofscholars.ChrisAppy
directedthisthesiswithpatienceandakeeneyetowardsrefiningbothmy
argumentsandwriting.TheinsightfulcommentsandcritiquesJerryFriedman
offeredateverystageofthewritingandresearchprocesswereinvaluable.Frank
CouvareswasalwayshappytolistenasIworkedoutnewideasandalsoclearedup
pointsofconfusion.PeterRachleff,andDaveRiehlereadilyansweredmyquestions
aboutMinneapolislaborhistoryandpointedmetowardsahostofimportant
archivalresources.IoweatremendousintellectualdebttoBruceLaurie.Heurged
meearlyintheearlystagesofthisprojecttorethinkthesignificanceofthe1938
midtermelectionsintandemwiththeproblemsoflaborfactionalism.SincethenI
havebenefitedenormouslyfromhisincisivecriticismsofmyworkandourmany
discussionsaboutthepoliticsoftheNewDeal.FellowgraduatestudentsRichard
AndersonandGinaTalleyalsograciouslyreadthroughmanydense(andpainfully
long)roughdraftsofindividualchapters.IalsowanttothanktheUniversityof
MassachusettsHistoryDepartmentGraduateStudiesCommitteeforfundingthis
research.ThestaffsattheStateHistoricalSocietyofWisconsinandatthe
MinnesotaHistoricalSocietywerebothexceedinglyhelpfulhandlingmyrequests
andansweringmyquestions.ThanksalsotoCarolStrongoftheMinneapolis
ElectionsOfficeandDebBohleroftheHennepinCountyElectionsforcompilingand
scanningelectiondata.Finally,averyspecialthanksgoestoAlannaMikiforallof
herloveandsupport.
v

ABSTRACT
THEPOLITICSOFLABORMILITANCYINMINNEAPOLS,19341938
SEPTEMBER2011
KRISTOFFERO.SMEMO,B.A.,HAMLINEUNIVERSITY
M.A.,UNIVERSITYOFMASSACHUSETTSAMHERST
Directedby:ProfessorChristianAppy
Themilitancythathelpedpromptfederallaborreformandtheelectoral
incorporationofindustrialworkersexposedseriouspoliticalfaultlineswithinthe
socalledNewDealcoalition.Inparticular,militancyandfactionalisminthelabor
movementcompromisedtheearlyelectoralvictoriesoftherulingFarmerLabor
PartyinMinnesotaandNewDealDemocratsnationally.Yetthelandslidevictoryof
Republicancandidatesin1938inMinnesota,aswellasacrosstheindustrialNorth,
wasnotarepudiationoftheNewDealorthelabormovement.TheseRepublicans
refashionedtheirpartyplatformtoaccommodatekeypartsoftheNewDeal,
includingrecognizingthelegitimacyofcollectivebargaining.LiberalRepublicans
harnessedpopularsupportNewDealsocialpolicy,butunlikeDemocratstheywere
freetocriticizethesupposedexcessesoftheNewDealnamelyamilitantand
politicizedlabormovement.Minneapolisprovidesonecasestudytoreconsiderthe
impactoflabormilitancyonthedevelopmentofNewDealliberalism.
vi
TABLEOFCONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................................. v
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................................vi
CHAPTER
1.LABORMILITANCYINMINNEAPOLIS .........................................................................................1
2.CLASSSTRUGGLEINMINNESOTA ................................................................................................6
Introduction...................................................................................................................................6
ThePoliticalEconomyofTransportationinMinneapolis .........................................6
RadicalFarmers,OrganizedWorkers.............................................................................. 10
RootsofanInsurgency........................................................................................................... 16
Confrontation ............................................................................................................................. 23
Aftermath ..................................................................................................................................... 40
3.THEPOLITICSOFMAKINGMINNEAPOLISAUNIONTOWN,19351936................. 44
Introduction................................................................................................................................ 44
Local574inExile...................................................................................................................... 45
TheFarmerLaborPartyandthePopularFront......................................................... 68
TheApogeeofFarmerLaborism....................................................................................... 77
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 89
4.THECONTESTEDTERRAINOFLIBERALISM ........................................................................ 90
FindingLaborsPlaceintheSecondNewDeal ............................................................ 90
FarmerLaborismDivided .................................................................................................... 94
LaborFactionalisminMinneapolis................................................................................ 101
TheContestedTerrainofLiberalism ............................................................................ 109
FarmerLaborisminCrisis................................................................................................. 118
Backlash..................................................................................................................................... 133
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 137
5.EPILOGUE ........................................................................................................................................... 140

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 145
vii

CHAPTER1
LABORMILITANCYINMINNEAPOLIS
Minneapolisisntlikeanothercity.NotlikeNewYork.Itsnotcosmopolitan.
Noritislike,sayDetroit.Detroitislikeabigcompanytownhelddownto
thebeltandthesalestalk.Minneapolisisfarmorevariedandmore
headstrong.NorisitlikePittsburgh,whichiscrowdedandsmokyandtough
likethesteelitmakes.NothinglikeKansasCity,whichhastriedtobelike
Boston.NorlikeBostonSt.PaulisproverbiallytheBostonoftheMidwest.
Minneapolisislikenoneofthem.Andyet,itsharestheAmericancommon
denominatorwitheachofthem.1
DuringtheGreatDepressionadeepcurrentofsocialconflictcoursedthrough
everymajorUScityandwas,accordingtojournalistCharlesWalker,theAmerican
commondenominator.Minneapoliswasnodifferent.Wavesofstrikesand
proteststhroughoutthe1930swrackedthecityasunemploymentskyrocketedand
employersslashedwages.In1934,Minneapolisbecameoneoftheflashpointsofa
resurgentAmericanlabormovement.Alltoooften,historianstreatthebloody
Minneapolistruckingstrikesofthatyeareitherasanisolatedeventorpartofan
undifferentiatednationaltrendofworkerdiscontent.Whattheseaccountstypically
ignorearethepoliticsoflabormilitancy.Thereisadeeperandmorecomplicated
storybeneaththetruckingstrikesthatilluminateshowsignificantlyclassstruggle
duringtheDepressionreshapedthecontoursofmidtwentiethcenturyAmerican
politics.
TheimmediatepoliticalramificationsoflabormilitancyinMinneapoliswere
multifold.ThesurgeinlabormilitancyspurredbySection7(a)oftheNational
1CharlesRumfordWalker,AmericanCity:ARankandFileHistory(NewYork:Farrar
andRinehart,1937),1.

RecoveryIndustrialActof1933galvanizedworkersasaclassinadiversityof
workplaces.InMinneapolis,workingclassprotesttookplaceinauniquepolitical
context.Mostnotably,asocialdemocraticFarmerLaborPartygovernedthestate
andacadreofrevolutionarysocialistTrotskyistsledtheresurgentMinneapolis
labormovement.The1934truckingstrikeswerethereforeatensemomentwhen
competingideasabouthowtochallengethepowerofcapitalismcollided.Inthe
wakeofthetruckingstrikes,theTrotskyistshopedtotranslatetheirnewfound
organizationalstrengthintopoliticalpowerwithintheFarmerLaborParty.
However,theTrotskyistsvisionoftransformingtheFarmerLaborPartyintoan
outrightlaborpartyclashedwiththeFarmerLaborleadershipseffortstobuilda
strongcrossclasselectoralcoalition.Themilitancyofthe1934strikesalsopitted
insurgentlaborradicalsagainsttheentrenchedcraftunionleadersoftheMinnesota
StateFederationofLabor.Whatdividedthetwofactionswasadeepseatedconflict
overthepoliticalroleoforganizedlaborinmodernindustrialsociety.Organized
laborclashedwiththeFarmerLaborPartyaswellovertherepresentationofthe
tradeunionsinpartydecisionmaking,aconflictmadeallthemoreproblematicalby
theFarmerLaboralliancewiththeCommunistParty.
TheinternalconflictwithinthelabormovementandtheFarmerLaborParty
overtheclasscharacterofelectoralpoliticsexposedthedeeperandmore
complicatedpoliticalloyaltiesofMinneapolisvoters.Despiteemergingpolitical
fractureswithintheFarmerLaborPartyandthelabormovement,acoalitionof
workers,farmers,andmiddleclassprofessionalsbroughtFarmerLaboritesinto
officebyhugenumbersinthe1936elections.Insurgent,rankandfilemilitancy

forgedthedisparatestrandsofworkerprotestintoasocialmovementbehindthe
policyinitiativesoftheNewDeal.LabormilitancyinMinneapolisandacrossthe
industrialNorthforcedpartiesandthestatetotakethepoliticaldemandsof
workersseriously.Manyofthosedemandsforeconomicregulationandexpanded
socialwelfareprovisionsresonatedwithmembersofothersocialclasses.However,
thispowerfulnewelectoralcoalitioncenteredonorganizedlaborwasafragile
creature.Throughout1937and1938,laborfactionalismdividedworkersand
alienatedcrucialcrossclassallies.Thesedivisionsforeclosedthesocialdemocratic
possibilitiesoftheNewDeal,butnotthelongtermviabilityofliberalreform.
In1938,onlytwoyearsafterthegreattriumphofliberalism,alandslide
victoryofRepublicancandidatesdroveFarmerLaboritesandprogressiveNewDeal
DemocratsfromofficeintheindustrialNorth.Divided,dispirited,andreelingfrom
arenewedboutofeconomiccrisis,neithertheFarmerLaborPartynortheNew
DealDemocratscouldreignitetheurgencyofthe1936campaigns.Thesedefeats,
though,didnotnecessarilysignalarepudiationofNewDealreform.Thevictorious
Republicanswerenotrabidreactionariescommittedtoevisceratingtheliberal,
interventioniststate.Onthecontrary,theyrefashionedtheirplatformsto
accommodatekeyelementsofNewDealreform,includingrecognizingthe
legitimacyoftradeunionsandcollectivebargaining.MinnesotasRepublican
gubernatorialcandidateHaroldStassendefinedhiscampaignasastruggleagainst
thetwinforcesofreactionandradicalism,therebyredefininghispartyasaliberal
party.NewDealizedRepublicanslikeStassenacknowledgedthatthepolitical
landscapehadchangeddramaticallysince1933.Theyalignedthemselveswiththe

popularsupportforNewDealsocialpolicy,buttheyremainedfreetocriticizethe
excessesoftheNewDeal,namelyamilitantandpoliticizedlabormovement.
Forthesakeofspaceandscope,thisstudyomitsanumberoffactors
otherwisecentraltoahistoryofMinnesotaduringtheheightoftheDepression.For
one,thisisspecificallyanurbanstudy,andthusthepoliticalmobilizationandclass
interestsoffarmersaredealtwithonlytangentially.Closelyexaminingthebasic
antagonismsandconflictsofinterestbetweenfarmersandworkerscouldnotbe
accommodatedasthecentralarcofthisstudyfollowsthelargelyurbanissuesthat
dividedtheMinneapolislabormovementandFarmerLaborParty.Second,the
historyofMinneapolistwincitySt.Paulisalsolargelyignoredfortworeasons.For
one,despitebeingthestatecapital,St.Paulwasnotasimportanteconomicallyand
politicallyasMinneapolis.Second,St.Paulinthe1930slookeddramatically
differentfromMinneapolis.Payingsufficientattentiontothosedifferenceswould
takeadditionalchapters.
ByfocusingonMinneapolis,thisthesisendeavorstoprovideamicrocosmic
exampletounderstandthefactorscontributingbothtotheremarkableexpansion
andswiftcontractionofworkingclasspoliticsinthe1930s.Theorganizationaland
politicalpoweroflaborwascriticaltoanenduringliberalrealignmentofAmerican
politics.Labormilitancyputclassantagonismsatthecenterofapowerfulelectoral
coalitionthatwascapableoffundamentallyredefiningNewDealliberalism.
However,factionalismcrippledthelabormovementsabilitytopressthestatefor
moresweepingandevensocialdemocraticchangeatthenationalandstatelevel
from1938onward.Thiscriticaldefeatofworkingclasspoliticsforeclosedthelabor

movementsabilitytoactasanengineofprotosocialdemocracy,butitalso
reaffirmedacommitmenttothebasictenetsofNewDealliberalismamongboth
DemocratsandkeysegmentsoftheRepublicanParty.Yet,aslaborspolitical
strugglesinMinneapolisillustrated,anotherworldwaspossible.

CHAPTER2
CLASSSTRUGGLEINMINNESOTA
Introduction
TheviolentoutburstsoflabormilitancythatshookMinneapolisinthe
summerof1934didnotexplodespontaneously.Norweretheymerelytheresultof
theeconomiccrisisoftheDepression.TheuniquepoliticaleconomyofMinneapolis,
themetropolitancenterofMinnesotaandmuchoftheupperMidwest,shapeda
powerfulformofsocialdemocraticpoliticsthatunitedagrarianprotestwithurban
tradeunionism.Beginninginthe1920s,Minnesotafarmerlaborismrailedagainst
themerchantsandbankerswhoruledMinneapolisandlaidapoliticalfoundation
forthelaborinsurgencyofthe1930s.Thispoliticalcontextwascomplicatedbythe
emergenceofacommittedcorpsofTrotskyistmilitantsamongthecitys
transportationworkers.Thus,the1934truckingstrikeswereatensemoment
whencompetingideasabouthowtochallengetheuncheckedpowerofcapitalism
collided.UnderstandingthestrikesandtheirimpactonMinneapolismeansparsing
outthecomplicatedpoliticsoflabormilitancy.
ThePoliticalEconomyofTransportationinMinneapolis
StraddlingtheMississippinearitsheadwatersalongsideSaintPaul,
MinneapolisbecametheupperMidwestsmajorcommercialandtransportationhub
westofChicago.Firstbyrailandthenbyhighway,Minneapolisbecamethegateway
formovingpeopleandmanufacturedgoodsacrosstheGreatPlains.Itwasalsothe

distributioncenterfortheagriculturalproducts,timber,andmineralwealthofthe
west.TransportationmadeMinneapolisanimportantmarketplaceandfinancial
center.Thiswasespeciallytrueforagriculture,andtheMinneapolisgrainexchange
becameknown(bothaffectionatelyanddisdainfully)astheWallStreetofthe
Northwest.
Inthisdevelopingworldofcorporateagribusiness,abustlingcraft
economyofurbancommerceemergedclusteredaroundthewarehousesand
wholesalersdowntownwherethousandsworkedloadingandhaulinggoods
throughoutthecityandtheregion.2EvenbeforetheDepression,thetruckalready
displacedboththehorseteamandtherailroadasthemostefficientwaytomove
productsin,around,andoutofMinneapolis.3AsjournalistCharlesWalkerwrote:
Minneapolisisatbottomacityofcommerceandtransportation,infactas
wellasinspirit.Notonlydoesthecitadelofwarehousestellyouthat,but
youbreatheitintheatmosphereofherstreetsandhermarketplace:those
rowsofsemitrailersbackeduptoeightfreightdepots,thetrucksonmeat
rowandfishrow,andthefleetsoftrucksloadingatthecitys991
wholesalers,ormovingoutofthecitywitheverythingfromsafetypinsto
cultivatorstothevillagesandfarmsoftheNorthwest.4
Thecorporateconsolidationoftransportationanddistribution,coupledwiththe
mechanizationoftheteamsterscraft,reinforcedthedriversdesiretoretainasense
ofdignityandindependenceasindependentproprietorshipgavewaytowagelabor.
InMinneapolisaselsewhere,theylookedtotheInternationalBrotherhoodof
Teamsters(IBT)tohelpthemreassertcontrolovertheworkprocessandtheterms
2Foraninsightfuldescriptionofcraftbasedeconomies,seeAndrewWenderCohen,
TheRacketeersProgress:ChicagoandtheStrugglefortheModernAmericanEconomy
(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),310,1518,passim.
3ShaneHamilton,TruckingCountry:TheRoadtoAmericasWalMartEconomy
(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2008),7.
4Walker,AmericanCity,23.

oftheirlabor.TheIBTconsidereddriversskilledworkersonparwithmachinistsor
carpentersandorganizedthemalongstrictcraftlinesdependingonwhatkindof
goodsadriverhandled.UndertheleadershipofDanielTobin,theIBTwasa
conservative,exclusive,andoftenxenophobicorganization.5Theunionsemphasis
onstrictlymaintainingitsdistinctionasaskilledcraftoftencutdriversofffrom
othertransportationworkersliketheinsidemenwholoadedandunloadedthe
trucks.
WhilecitieslikeChicagodevelopedadensenetworkofpowerfulcraftunions,
organizedlaborenduredastunteddevelopmentinMinneapolis.Althoughdrivers
playedacrucialroleinthecityseconomy,theorganizationalstructureand
attitudesoftheIBTlimitedthedriversabilitytochallengetheauthorityof
increasinglysophisticatedemployers.ConfrontingthedriverswastheCitizens
Alliance(CA),anassociationthatrepresentedabroadcrosssectionofMinneapolis
employerstocoordinatecapitalsresistancetoorganizedlabor.Formedin1903,
theCAwasheadedbythecitysbusinesseliteandespousedastridentopenshop
philosophyfoundedonadefenseofpropertyandadefenseofliberty
synonymouswiththedefenseofthenation.6TheCAseconomiccloutdirectly
influencedeverybranchofstategovernment.In1916and1917,theCA
orchestratedthesuccessfulrepressionofageneralstrikecalledbythecitysdrivers
5DavidWitwer,CorruptionandReformintheTeamstersUnion(Urbana,IL:
UniversityofIllinoisPress,2003),61.
6WilliamMillikan,AUnionAgainstUnions:TheMinneapolisCitizensAllianceandits
FightAgainstOrganizedLabor,19031947(St.Paul,MN:MinnesotaHistorical
SocietyPress,2001),15.

andwarehouseworkersandanothercalledbythestreetcarworkersunion.7Once
theUnitedStatesenteredWorldWarI,employersundertheguiseoftheMinnesota
CommissionforPublicSafetywereabletoassumenearlydictatorialpowerunder
thepretenseofwartimeemergency.8ThroughitsparamilitaryarmtheCivilian
AuxiliaryandwiththeaidoftheEspionageandSeditionActs,thecommission
effectivelydroveMinneapolisonlySocialistmayorfrompowerin1918.9Through
thelegislatureandthecourtsthepoweroflaborwasformallyrestricted;through
thepolice,theNationalGuard,andPinkertonagents,laborwasforciblybeatenback.
TheworkersofMinneapoliscoulddrawtwocompeting,butnotmutually
exclusivelessons,fromthisformativeperiodofworkingclassactivismandlabor
repression.First,theovertclassruleoftheCitizensAllianceandtheweaknessof
thecraftunionsconvincedmanyworkersoftheneedforindependentpolitical
actiontoadvancelaborscause.TheelectionofaSocialistmayorindicatedan
emergingworkingclassconsciousnessamongthecitysworkers.Yettheweakness
oftheSocialistselectoralcoalitiontowithstandanassaultfromcapitalalso
highlightedthelimitsofclasspoliticstowinpopularsupport.Moreover,thecity
andstatespoliticalinstitutionsprovedextremelysusceptibletobeingseizedor
outflankedbycapital.Second,workersrealizedtheyalsoneededpowerfulunions
toactasautonomousorganizationstodefendthemselvesandtheirspecificinterests
7OneThousandTeamstersareDeniedRights,CityCouncilHearsLaborsSideof
Story,MinneapolisLaborReview,June16,1916,1;ThugsandGunmenInvadethe
CityatMastersCall,MinneapolisLaborReview,June30,1916,1.
8PaulL.Murphy,WorldWarIandtheOriginofCivilLibertiesintheUnitedStates
(NewYork:Norton,1979),8889.
9CarolJenson,LoyaltyasaPoliticalWeapon:The1918CampaigninMinnesota,
MinnesotaHistory43(2)1972:4357.

againstemployersandthestate.Theintertwinedpowerofcapitalandthestate
provedtoworkersthatwinningevenmoderateconcessionsfromemployerswould
requireabitteranddeterminedstruggle.Yettoomilitantanaction(likeageneral
strike)couldalsoprovokethefullforceofstaterepression.Theprecedingsketchof
theMinneapolispoliticaleconomyillustrateshowthecitysworkersfaceda
problemendemictotheAmericanlabormovement:howtoreconcileclassbased
electoralpoliticswithpureandsimpleunionism.Thisproblemwouldfinda
uniqueresolutionintherevivedsurgeofagrarianprotestreshapingMinnesotas
politicalculture.
RadicalFarmers,OrganizedWorkers
EventhoughmenwithnameslikePillsbury,Crosby,Washburn,and
Weyerhauserwerestillbankers,orrailroaddirectors,ortheownersoftheflour
mills,bythemid1930sMinnesotapoliticswasdominatedbypeoplewithnames
likeOlson,Peterson,andAnderson.10Themovementthatsuccessfullychallenged
thepoliticalhegemonyofMinneapolisNewEnglandcapitaliststookshapeinthe
1920sasurbanworkersjoinedforceswithfarmers.DavidBrodyarguesthatthe
riseoffarmerlaborpoliticswasaspecificresponsetoasteepdeclineincropprices
andthewidespreadpostwarrepressionoforganizedlabor.Crisisconvincedboth
groupstorenouncevoluntarism,reconcile(oratleastignore)theirintrinsicclass
differences,andseekaredressfortheirgrievancesthroughthestate.However,
oncethefederalgovernmentrespondedwithlimitedfarmsubsidiesandsome
10

protectionfortherailwaybrotherhoodsin1923and1924,boththeAFLandits
agrariancounterparttheFarmBureaubackedawayfromthirdpartypoliticsand
radicalismingeneral.11Whilethisisaconvincingaccountfromaneliteperspective,
Brodysanalysisfailstoaddresswhyfarmerlaborismenduredinplaceslike
Minnesota,Wisconsin,andWashingtonintothe1930s.Farmerlaborismwasable
toremainrelevantbeyondthemid1920swhereveritcouldmovebeyondnarrow
economicinterestsandembraceamoreexpansiveandmalleablesocialdemocratic
platform.Afluiddefinitionofclasspoliticsunitedotherwiseantagonisticsocial
groupingtogetherasproducersagainstaparasiticelitetodefendcoreAmerican
valuesagainstanexploitiveandtyrannicalstatusquo.12Farmers,workers,aswell
astheprofessionalandintellectualfractionsofthemiddleclassralliedbehinda
programthatallowedthemtoconfronttheagentsoftheirexploitationandelect
someoftheirowntohighoffice.
FarmerlaborisminMinnesotaemergedintheformofamasssocial
democraticpartyandwonastoundingearlyvictories.In1918,thestatebranchof
theNorthDakotabasedfarmersassociationtheNonPartisanLeague(NPL)andthe
WorkingPeoplesNonpartisanPoliticalLeague(WPNPL),thepoliticalarmofthe
MinnesotaStateFederationofLabor,cobbledtogetherathirdpartyoutofadiffuse
collectionofgroupsthatincludeddisaffectedprogressiveRepublicans,socialists,
prohibitionists,andisolationistsundertheFarmerLaborParty(FLP)banner.The
FLPadvocatedforstatecontroloverbanks,mills,andgrainelevatorstocheckthe
11DavidBrody,OntheFailureofU.S.RadicalPolitics:AFarmerLaborAnalysis,
IndustrialRelations22(2)1983,15253.
12MichaelKazin,ThePopulistPersuasion:AnAmericanHistory(Ithaca,NY:Cornell
UniversityPress,1998),16.
11

powerofcommercialandcorporateagriculturalinterestsbasedinMinneapolisand
pledgedtoprotectlaborsrighttoorganize.TheFLPrelieduponademocraticand
decentralizedpartystructureofmembershipbranches.Thebasicunitsofthe
FarmerLaborFederation(renamedtheFarmerLaborAssociationin1925)were
localFarmerLaborclubsandaffiliatedeconomicorganizations,chieflylaborunions.
TheFLPwasorganizedasabottomupinstitutionoffarmersandworkersthat
providedspaceforthedivergentconcernsofbothgroups.13Followingfouryearsof
partybuildingandorganizing,theFLPwentintothe1922electionsasaconfident
andinsurgentparty,winningbothofMinnesotasUSSenateseats,aCongressional
race,andonlynarrowlylosingthecontestforgovernor.
Fromtheonset,theFarmerLaborPartywascommittedforemostto
achievingelectoralsuccessandtheleadershipwasfullypreparedtocompromiseon
itspoliciesandpoliticsinordertobuildthekindofbroadbasedcoalitionneededto
winelections.14AccordingtoitsDeclarationofPrinciples:TheFarmerLabor
movementseekstouniteintoapoliticalorganizationallpersonsengagedin
agricultureandotherusefulindustryandthoseinsympathywiththeirinterests,for
thepurposeofsecuringlegislationthatwillprotectandpromotetheeconomic
welfareofthewealthproducers.15Nevertheless,theFLPsprinciplesandthe
13HowtheFarmerLaborAssociationWorks,(St.Paul,MN:EducationBureauof
theFarmerLaborAssociation,1936),5,box1,folderAmericanCityFarmerLabor
Party(Chapter5),Conventions,1934and1936,CharlesRumfordWalkerPapersat
theMinnesotaHistoricalSociety,St.Paul.
14MillardGieske,MinnesotaFarmerLaborism:TheThirdPartyAlternative
(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1979),32.
15DeclarationofPrinciples,March20,1925,box3,folderEducationalBureau
CorrespondenceandMiscellaneousPapers,undated,19251939,FarmerLabor
AssociationofMinnesotaPapersattheMinnesotaHistoricalSociety,St.Paul.
12

partysverynamedifferentiatedtheinterestsoffarmersandworkersfromthoseof
commercialandcorporateconcerns.TheFLPdirectedfarmerandlabordiscontent
againstspecificcapitalistinstitutions,suchasmills,packinghouses,andthe
MinneapolisChamberofCommerce,ratherthancapitalismitself.Atitsmost
effective,theFLPsAmericanconceptofsocialismstruckadifficultbalance
betweentheneedsoffarmersandworkers.16BoththeFLPandthecraftunion
leadersoftheStateFederationofLaborfullyagreedwithSeligPerlmans
pronouncementthatlaborneedsthesupportofpublicopinion,meaningthemiddle
class,bothruralandurban.17FarmerLaboriteseffectivelyprefiguredthecentral
tenetsofKeynesianismandadvocatedsubsidiesandpricecontrolstoaidfarmers
andcollectivebargainingtoincreasethepurchasingpowerofworkers.Inasociety
wrackedbyeconomicinequalityandcrisis,afluid(orilldefined)conceptionof
classconflictallowedtheFLPtoadaptitsradicalismtosuitthedemandsofshifting
politicalrealitiestowinelectionsintoughtimes.
Thestockmarketcrashof1929andtheensuingDepressiononlyaddedto
thehardtimesofMinnesotasfarmersandworkersandexpandedtheappealof
farmerlaborism.ThedynamicandcharismaticFarmerLaboriteFloydB.Olsonwas
electedgovernorin1930.Twoyearslater,Olsonwasreelectedandalongwithhim
werefiveUSCongressionalrepresentativesandaworkingFarmerLabormajorityin
thestatehouseofrepresentatives.Spurredbythedeepeningeffectsofthe
DepressionandcontinuedpublicdiscontentwiththeRepublicanParty,Olson
16ArthurNaftalin,AHistoryoftheFarmerLaborPartyofMinnesota(unpublished
Ph.D.dissertation,UniversityofMinnesota,1948),73.
17SeligPerlman,ATheoryoftheLaborMovement(NewYork:Macmillan,1928),
16061.
13

pushedtheFLPfurtherleft.AmemberoftheIWWwhileworkingoddjobsinthe
PacificNorthwestinhisyouth,heremadehimselfasamoderateliberal,firstasa
DemocratandthenastheFarmerLaborattorneyofHennepinCounty.Asthe
Depressionworeonherevivedhisradicalreputationwithfieryandvaguelyanti
capitalistrhetoric.InacampaignspeechassailingtheRepublicansin1932,Olson
avowed:
Weareonthethresholdofimportantchangesinthesocialandeconomic
structureandthefoeisdesperate.Thereisanewdealcomingtothefarmer,
theworker,themassesgenerallywhohavebeendowntroddenthroughout
theages.Thereisnothingthatcanpreventitscomingnoteventhe
RepublicanParty.Thegodsthatthispartyhasworshippedarebeginningto
failthem.Thatpartyhasfailedandisbankruptbecauseithasnovisionofa
newandfairersociety.18
AtthestateconventionoftheFarmerLaborAssociationinMarchof1934,Olson
famouslydeclared:Iamnotaliberal,IamwhatIwanttobearadical.19Under
OlsontheFarmerLaborPartyadvancedtheideaofacooperativecommonwealth
underwhichthestateandfederalgovernmentwouldownandoperatepublic
utilitiesandkeyindustriesalongwithproducerandconsumercooperative
managementoftheremaininglargescaleenterprises.20Nevertheless,Olsons
reformsfellratherneatlyinlinewiththoseofFranklinRooseveltandhisNewDeal,
namelyastatesocialsecurityprogram,apartialmoratoriumonfarmmortgages,
andaprogressiveincometax.EventhoughtheFLPspoliticssteeredclearof
18ThirdPartyFootprints:AnAnthologyfromWritingsandSpeechesofMidwest
Radicals,JamesM.Youngdale,ed.(Minneapolis:Ross&Haines,Inc.,1966),250.
19QuotedinGieske,MinnesotaFarmerLaborism,188.
20SpeechbyVincentDay,nodate(ca.1934),box2,folderSpeechesbyVincentA.
Day,undated,VincentAlpheusDayPapersattheMinnesotaHistoricalSociety,St.
Paul.
14

revolution,thedistinctlyradicalcomponentsoffarmerlaborrhetoricstuckout
conspicuouslyduringthefirstyearsoftheDepression.
Inthiscontext,theprecisepoliticalroleofthelabormovementwasstillan
openquestionintheearlyyearsofOlsonsadministration.Bytheearly1930s,The
FarmerLaborPartyhadsuccessfullymobilizedbothfarmersandurbanvoters,but
itnowneededthecriticalsupportoforganizedworkerstocementitspolitical
presenceinMinnesota.Unionscouldprovidecandidateswithcampaignfunding
andvolunteers,andespeciallythecrucialelectoralmobilizationofworkers.
Organizedlabor,too,requiredtheassistanceofasympatheticstatetoovercomethe
immenseresourcesandconcertedresistanceoforganizedcapital.Therevitalization
oforganizedlaborstillposedanumberofinterrelatedproblemsforfarmerlabor
politics.IftheFLPfoughttooaggressivelytorebuildtheunions,thepartycouldbe
perceivedasprivileginglaborsinterestsoverthoseoffarmers.Ifthepartyfailedto
assistintheestablishmentofsuccessfulunions,thenurbanworkerswouldhave
littlematerialincentivetocontinuetoalignwiththeFLP.WhiletheFarmerLabor
leadershipinitiallylookedtothemoribundAFLunionstorebuildthelabor
movement,anewcultureofworkingclassactivismwasbeginningtoassertitselfin
oppositiontoconservativeandexclusivecraftuniontradition.Undertheaegisof
thecitysteamstersunion,aninsurgentlabormovementinMinneapolistestedthe
FarmerLaborPartyscommitmenttoradicalismaswellasitsabilitytoactasan
impartialarbiterofsocialconflict.
15

RootsofanInsurgency
WhiletheFarmerLaborPartywasconsolidatingitspoliticalstrength,the
tradeunionsstruggledtorebuild.Intheaftermathofthe1916teamstersstrike,the
GeneralDriversandHelpersLocal574settledintoobscurityasasmallunionofonly
100oddmembers.Althoughtheunionneverwonasinglestrikeuntil1934,union
membershipdidentitleadrivertoslightlybetterwagesworkingforoneofthefew
unionizedhaulingfirmsinthecity.21However,Minneapolisstrictopenshop
economymadetheunionsbargainingpositionprecariousandtheleadershipof
boththelocalandinternationalloathetocallstrikeseveninthefaceofdrasticpay
cuts.22WilliamBrown,thelocalslongtimepresident,describedthedismalearly
yearsofLocal574in1937:
IjoinedtheDriversUnionin1919.Wehadourregularmeetingsandthe
fellerswouldbeefuntiltwointhemorning.Ionceproposedanorganization
campaign,butacoupleofmembersgotinanargumentastowhodmoved
theheaviestpianothatday.Thatendedthediscussion.Finallyforsome
reasonorother,theTeamsters[Joint]Council[32]gavemethejobof
InternationalOrganizerin1933.SoIdecidedtoworkwithafewguyswho
knewhowtoorganize.Wehaddwindleddowntoninetymembers.Afterthe
coalownershadrefusedusrecognition,IproposedtotheTeamstersCouncil
thatwestrike.Isaid,Ifwelosewerenoworseoffthanweare,thisisno
unionwevegotanyway.Theworkerswanttoorganizeiftheycanget
confidenceinus.Ifwewinthecoalstrikewecanorganizethewhole
truckingindustry.23
21FarrellDobbs,TeamsterRebellion(NewYork:MonadPress,1972),38.
22LetterfromDanielJ.TobintoCliffordHall,April23,1930,Mss848,box15,folder
3,FarrellDobbsPapersattheWisconsinStateHistoricalSociety,Madison.
23Walker,AMilitantTradeUnion,Minneapolis:MunicipalProfile,SurveyGraphic,
January1937,29,box1,folder,Newspaperclippingsandmagazinearticles,Local
574strike1934,WalkerPapers.Brownsclaimthattherewere90membersfalls
betweentheestimatesgivenbyTeamstermilitantsJackMaloneyandFarrellDobbs,
whoputthetotalmembershipataround175and75,respectively,before1933.
Maloney,itshouldbenoted,actedasDobbsfactcheckerforhisbooksonthe
Minneapolisteamsters.JackMaloneyinterview,April2125,1988,Twentieth
16
AmongthosefewguyswhoknewhowtoorganizewereCarlSkoglundand
VincentRaymondDunne.SkoglundemigratedfromSwedentoMinnesotain1911
andshortlythereafterjoinedtheSocialistPartyandtheIWWwhileworkingasan
itinerantlaborer.InMinneapolis,Skoglund,whoconsideredhimselffirstand
foremostarevolutionaryinternationalist,wasinspiredbytheBolshevikRevolution
andhelpedfoundthestatebranchoftheCommunistParty(CP)in1919.Vincent
DunnewasalsoaWobblieandaSocialistfromthenorthwoodsofMinnesotaand
joinedSkoglundintheCP.BothSkoglundandDunnewereactiveinthelabor
movementandtheFarmerLaborAssociationbeforebeingexpelledin1926from
thetwoorganizationsforbeingCommunists.24TheCPprovidedaplatformfortheir
radicalactivismandDunneranasthepartyscandidatefortheUSSenatein1928.
Laterthatsameyear,however,Skoglund,Dunne,histwoyoungerbrothersGrant
andMiles,andfifteenothercomradesweredrivenfromthepartyforsupportingthe
LeftOppositionofLeonTrotskyagainstJosephStalin.
The Dunne brothers and Skoglund joined the Left Oppositions US wing, the
Communist League of America (CLA), led by James P. Cannon, Max Shachtman, and
Martin Abern. The Dunnes and Skoglund were particularly close with Cannon, a
Midwesterner and former IWW organizer on the Iron Range, whom they met in 1924
when he was still a ranking member of the CP.25 Trotskyism, Cannon explained, was the
CenturyRadicalisminMinnesotaOralHistoryProject,MinnesotaHistoricalSociety,
OralHistoryDivision,38;Dobbs,TeamsterRebellion,65.
24Dobbs,TeamsterRebellion,32.
25BryanD.Palmer,JamesP.CannonandtheOriginsoftheAmericanRevolutionary
Left,18901928(Urbana,IL:UniversityofIllinoisPress,2007),248.Cannonwas
alsoresponsibleforhelpingtosmuggleTrotskysTheDraftProgramofthe
17

restoration, the revival, of genuine Marxism as it was expounded and practiced in the
Russian revolution.26 Trotsky argued that revolution was a struggle of working-class
self-emancipation, both inside and outside Russia, whereas Stalins parochial and
regressive idea of socialism in one state relied on authoritarian party bureaucracy to
suffocate proletarian activism.27 The Stalinists fought ferocious battles with their rivals
on the left, as the Communists and Social Democrats did in Germany, rather than unite to
defeat their enemies on the right. Horrified by these developments, Trotsky argued that
the workers must lead the party, not visa versa. Under Stalin, he argued, the party was
disconnected from the real struggles of the proletariat and concerned only with the
consolidation of its own power. The American Trotskyists organized the Communist
League as a vanguard party, composed of the most class-conscious elements of the
proletariat, to guide the masses though the process of raising class consciousness,
recasting defeats and ideological missteps as the formative experiences leading
eventually to genuine proletarian revolution.
Trotskysinterpretationofrevolutionarysocialismwasfundamentaltothe
organizingstrategyoftheMinneapolismilitants.Trotskyadvancedtheconceptof
permanentrevolution:Arevolutionwhichmakesnocompromisewithanysingle
formofclassrule,whichdoesnotstopatthedemocraticstage,whichgoesoverto
socialistmeasuresandtowaragainstreactionfromwithout.28Trotskysemphasis
CommunistInternational:ACriticismofFundamentalsoutofRussiaaftertheSixth
WorldCongressoftheCominternin1928.
26JamesP.Cannon,TheHistoryofAmericanTrotskyism(NewYork:PathfinderPress,
1972),1.
27LeonTrotsky,TheRevolutionBetrayed:WhatistheSovietUnionandWhereisit
Going?(NewYork:PathfinderPress,1991).
28Trotsky,ThePermanentRevolution(NewYork:ProgressPublishers,1931),22.
18

onmilitancyasthekeytoraisingworkingclassconsciousnessresonatedmost
deeplywiththeTeamstermilitants.TheessentialtaskoftheAmericanCommunist
Left,TrotskycounseledhisUSfollowersin1929,consistsofdirectactionuponthe
revolutionaryelementsofthe[working]class.29WhiletheCommunistsdenounced
organizingwithintheAFLastradeunionfetishism,theTrotskyistsoptedtowork
withinthemainstreamlabormovement.CannonconsideredtheCPsbrandofdual
unionismtobewhollycounterproductivebecauseitisolatedtherevolutionary
militantinartificialandidealunionsoftheirown.Insteadtherevolutionary
neededtoplungeintothelabormovementasitexistedandtrytoinfluenceitfrom
within.30Thisrelationshiptothelabormovementunderpinnedtheideaof
entryism,burrowingwithinaninstitutiontotransformitintoanorganof
revolutionaryactivity,asacoreprincipleoftheTrotskyistmovement.Thetrade
unionorganizingunitedworkersandrevolutionariestogetherinagenuinemass
workingclassorganization.Fortherevolutionaryinthetradeunionthenextstep
waspreparingtheworkersforamilitantconfrontationwithcapital.
TheTrotskyistsmadeMinneapolisabaseforthesmallbreakaway
communistsectandsettoworkbuildingafollowingamongthecitysdrivers.31
SkoglundandtheDunneschosetoorganizethetruckingindustrybecauseofits
extensivereachintonearlyallaspectsofthecityseconomyandbecause
Minneapoliswasthecentraltransithubforgoodsbeingmovedacrosstheupper
Midwest.Decliningwagesandlongerhoursalsoafflictedtruckingandhauling;for
29Trotsky,GreetingsSenttotheWeekly,TheMilitant,December14,1929.
30Cannon,AmericanTrotskyism,121.
31Palmer,JamesP.Cannon,34749.
19

example,driversandwarehouseworkersputinfiftyfourtoninetyhourweeksjust
toearntwelvetoeighteendollars.32Thefactthatleadingmembersofthe
CommunistLeaguealreadyworkedasdriversmadetruckinganobviousentry
point.Skoglund,blacklistedfrommostjobs,foundworkinthecoalyardshauling
heatingfuelthroughoutMinneapolisduringthecitysbrutalwintersasan
independenttrucker.Dunneworkedintheyardsasaweighmasteratasmallcoal
firmownedbyafamilyofsympatheticsocialists.Organizingthecoalyarddrivers,
theTrotskyistssurmised,wouldrequiremilitantdirectactiontobreakthrough
employersrigiddefenseoftheopenshop.
TheTrotskyistsorganizingwasbothaidedandcompromisedbythelabor
reformsenactedbytheNewDeal.Negotiatingtheroleofstateinterventionposed
theoreticalandpracticalproblemsfortheTrotskyistmilitants.EarlyNewDeal
laborreformacknowledgedtherightsoforganizedlabor,butdidlittletoensureits
enforcement.TheNationalRecoveryAdministration(NRA)establishedbyNIRA
wasdesignedtoreducedestructivecompetitionbyhavingindustriescreate
codesoffaircompetitionthatwouldregulatepricesandwagesinorderto
stimulateeconomicgrowth.Federallegislation,especiallySection7(a)of1933s
NationalIndustrialRecoveryAct(NIRA),providedanimportantcatalystforthe
shopfloorinsurgencyexperiencedthroughouttheUSintheearly1930s.33Labor
unionswereconsideredacriticalmechanismtokeepfirmsinlinewiththecodes
andtoincreasethepurchasingpowerofworkers.Section7(a)relieduponthe
33MichaelGoldfield,WorkerInsurgency,RadicalOrganization,andNewDealLabor
Legislation,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview83(4)1989:125782.
20

voluntarycomplianceofemployerstorecognizeunions,forcingunionistsacrossthe
countrytowageprolongedandoftenviolentrecognitionstrikesagainstthe
determinedresistanceofbusiness.Thesestrikesweredirectedalmostequally
againstthegovernmentforitsfailuretoupholdthelaborprovisionsoftheNRA.34
TheTrotskyistswereinitiallywillingtoutilizethemachineryoffederallabor
lawbecauseitofferedasenseoflegitimacytounionactivities.Local574announced
inJulyof1933thatitwouldwaiveinitiationfeesfornewmemberstotake
advantageofSection7(a)sprovisionsprovidingtherightofworkerstoformand
joinlabororganizationsoftheirownchoosing.Thelocalalsopreparedtosubmita
codeofwageratesfordriverstothedistrictNRAcommissioner.35Asmuchasthey
deeplydistrustedbourgeoisreformism,thepromisedreformsoftheNewDeal
providedaconvenientavenuetobeginchannelingrankandfileangerand
frustrationintotheunion.Theobviousproblemforrevolutionarymilitantswas
howtoutilizereformistmeasuresliketheNRAtoadvancetheworkingclass
strugglewithoutbecomingsubsumedbyreformism.Theyrationalizedthatinacity
asviciouslyantiunionasMinneapolisfederalreformalonecouldnotwin
organizingdrives.TheTrotskyistsgirdedtheunionforaprolongedandbitter
struggletowinrecognition.
InfluencedbyMarxistdialecticalmaterialism,asenseofhistoryguidedthe
Trotskyistmilitantsof574.AsstaunchMarxistLeninists,theTrotskyistsperceived
theDepressionasmomentofcapitalistcrisisthatcouldonlyproducemass
34ColinGordon,NewDeals:Business,Labor,andPoliticsinAmerica,19201935(New
York:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994),213.
35FreeInitiationforTruckDrivers,MinneapolisLaborReviewJuly14,1933,1.
21

revolutionaryconsciousnessthroughtheleadershipofadisciplinedvanguard.The
CommunistLeaguecadrescouldfulfillthisroleinthetruckingindustryifthey
couldlinkthemselveswiththemilitantworkersthroughthetradeunion
movement.36Howtomaketheconnectionbetweentradeunionworkand
revolutionaryclassstruggletangibleforworkerswasamatterofmakingMarxist
theoryrelatabletotheirdailyexperiences.However,simplyappealingtothe
driversandconvincingthemoftheneednotonlyforaunion,buttofightforone,
wasthemilitantsprimarymission.JournalistCharlesRumfordWalkersketched
thepoliticalattitudesrepresentativeofthetruckdriversheinterviewedin1933and
1934inpreparationforhisrankandfilehistoryofMinneapolis,AmericanCity.
WalkerfoundthetypicalMinneapolistruckerbeforethestrikestobenonunionand
generallyignorantoforuninterestedinpoliticsorsocialconcerns.Yet,healso
foundtheworkingclassofMinnesotatobemorepoliticallysensitivegiventhe
presenceoftheoldSocialistmovement,thelonghistoryofPopulism,andrevolt
fromtheNonPartisanLeaguetotheFarmerLaborParty.37Walkersenseda
nascentradicalismwithintheconsciousnessofthecitysworkersunderpinnedby
thepoliticalstrugglesthatcontributedtotheriseoftheFarmerLaborParty.The
abysmalconditionsinthecoalyards,aswellasacrossMinneapolisandtheentire
country,providedthespaceforareawakeningofradicalprotest.
37CharlesRumfordWalker,NotesforLifeStoryofaTruckDriver,nodate(ca.
1934),2,box1,folderAmericanCityPreliminaryProspectusandGeneralNotes,
WalkerPapers.
22

Confrontation
1934borewitnessto1,856strikesthatinvolvedalmost1.5millionworkers,
thegreatestdemonstrationoflabormilitancysincetheendoftheFirstWorldWar.
TheseriesoftruckingstrikesinMinneapolishelmedbyLocal574boreclose
resemblancetosimilarlaboruprisingsintheautopartsplantsofToledoandtheon
docksofSanFranciscothatsameyear.Thesethreeconflictsinvolvedelementsof
leftistleadership,massrankandfileparticipation,andviolent,confrontational
tacticstowinstrikedemands.38Moreover,allthreestrikesinvolvedasignificant
measureoflocalresistancetotheconservatismoftheparentAFLunionand
altercationswithstateandlocalgovernments.The1934strikewavewasan
illustrationofhowideasaboutclassstruggletookconcreteform.Whilethe
outbreakoflaborinsurgencyinMinneapoliswasinfluencedbythesamenational
trendsthatspurredstrikesinToledoandSanFrancisco,thepoliticalcharacterof
thetruckingstrikeswasdefinedbyuniquelocalcircumstances.TheTrotskyists
applicationofMarxisttheorytothecomplexdailystrugglesofworkersdirectly
confrontedthepoliticalcontextshapedbythegoverningFarmerLaborPartyand
employersorganizedintheCitizensAlliance.Sincethetruckingstrikesthemselves
havebeenextensivelyscrutinizedinotherworks,thepointofthisbriefsummaryis
toexaminetheirpoliticalramifications.39Specifically,thisanalysiswillexamine
38HowardKimeldorf,RedsorRackets?TheMakingofRadicalandConservative
UnionsontheWaterfront(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1988),100.
39Cf.Dobbs,TeamsterRebellion,andWalker,AmericanCity,fortheauthoritative
accountsofthe1934strikes.IrvingBernsteinsTheTurbulentYears:AHistoryofthe
AmericanWorker,19331941(Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1970)remainstheclassic
accountofthesurgeinlabormilitancythroughoutthe1930s.Amorerecentwork,
PhilipKorthsMinneapolisTeamstersStrikeof1934(EastLansing,MI:Michigan
23

howthestrikesshapedandreshapedthepoliticsofworkingclassculturein
Minneapolis.
Atthebeginningof1934,574sleadershippreparedforactionagainstthe
coalyardoperatorsinthemidstofacharacteristicallybrutalMinnesotawinter.
DanielTobinandtheIBTwereadamantlyopposedtoanystrikeactivitythatwould
jeopardizethepeacefulrelationsthelocalhadcarvedoutforthehandfulofdrivers
coveredbycontractsinthecityscrafteconomy.Inalettertolocalpresident
WilliamBrown,Tobinbluntlywrotethatwithoutofficialsanctionfromthe
Internationalthelocalwouldnotreceiveanystrikefundsandwouldrisklosingits
unioncharter.40Thatsameday,Tobinwroteanopenlettertothemembership
warningofthedifficultiesofwagingastrikeandominouslyremindedthemofthe
bitterexperienceswhichorganizedlaborhastoencounterfromtheemployersas
wellasfromtheprejudicedcourtsandthepoliceforce.41Hewasalsobecoming
increasinglyfrustratedbythelocalsradicalsandreachedouttotheMinneapolis
AFLestablishmentforassistance.AlifelongDemocratandstridentanticommunist
Tobinwas,touseBruceLauriesterm,aclassicSamuelGompersstyleprudential
unionistwhoexplicitlyrejectedmilitancyandradicalismtoavertstate
repression.42HeurgedthecitysCentralLaborUnion(CLU)toputgreaterpressure
StateUniversityPress,1995),containsahostofinterviewswithparticipantson
bothsidesofthepicketline.
40LetterfromDanielJ.TobintoWilliamS.Brown,January6,1934,Minneapolis
TeamstersStrike,1934:SelectedDocuments,19281941attheMinnesotaHistorical
Society,ManuscriptCollectionMicrofilmCall#M494,St.Paul,referredtohereafter
as574Papers.
41LetterfromDanielJ.TobintoLocal574,January6,1934,574Papers.
42BruceLaurie,ArtisansintoWorkers:LaborinNineteenthCenturyAmerica(Urbana,
IL:UniversityofIllinoisPress,1989),176209.
24

thelocalleadersandmaketherequestthatallindividualswhosympathizewiththe
CommunistmovementbeeliminatedfromLocalNo.574.Thereisadistinct
difference,Tobincontinued,betweenaSocialistoftheoldtradeuniontypeand
thenewtypeofCommunists,whosetheoriesanddoctrinesarefoundedonthe
revolutionoftheworkers.43ForaprudentialunionistlikeTobin,talkofrevolution
onlyinvitedlaborrepression.
TobinsadmonishmentsandpleasforhelpintheCLUdidlittletoquellthe
driversmilitancy.Theteamsterpresident,though,seriouslymisunderstoodthe
moodoftheworkers.TheyreasonedthatpreservingLocal574asanexclusivecraft
organizationcouldnolongerprotectdriversastheeconomybottomedout.Inalast
ditchefforttopreservepeace,Tobindeniedthelocalstrikeassistanceonthe
technicalitythatnotallmembershadbeenwiththeorganizationfortherequisite
sixmonths.44ButonFebruary7,600membersofLocal574votedtostrikeandthe
nextdaydriverspicketedeverycoalyardinthecity.45Inanimpressivedisplayof
disciplinedmilitancy,thedriverseffectivelyshutdownthecityscoalindustry.After
twodaystheSt.PaulMinneapolisRegionalLaborBoardoftheNRAissueda
proposalguaranteeingacertificationelectiontoendthestrike.46Theaggressive
andwellorganizedconductofthestrikepressuredtheboardtomovethe
certificationelectionaheadofscheduleinthehopesofstemminganyfurtherwork
43LetterfromDanielJ.TobintoRoyWeir,January4,1934,574Papers.
44LetterfromJohnGillespietoLocal574,nodate(ca.January1934),574Papers.
45DriversVotetoStrike,MinneapolisTribuneclipping,February7,1934,Mss848,
box15,folder4,DobbsPapers.
46St.PaulMinneapolisLaborBoardRuling,nodate(ca.February9,1934),Mss848,
25

stoppages.47Theemployers,though,refusedtorecognizetheunionandcited
GeneralHughS.JohnsonandDonaldRichbergsofficialinterpretationofSection
7(a)thatneitheremployersoremployeesarerequiredbylaw,toagreetoany
particularcontract,whetherproposedasanindividualorcollectiveagreement.48
Thefinalagreementreachedbytheboardsecuredasmallwageincreaseforthe
drivers,buttheemployersrefusedtorecognizetheunion.49
AlthoughtheFebruarycoalstrikewonrelativelylittleforMinneapolis
drivers,Local574developedanewfoundorganizationalcohesionthatwouldprove
essentialintakingonthecitystransportationindustry.ByMarchthevoluntary
organizingcommitteegrewtoincludeahostofnewCommunistLeaguemembers
includingayoungtruckerfromnorthMinneapolisnamedFarrellDobbs,inaddition
totheDunnes,andSkoglund.Themilitantsconsideredthestructureandideology
ofthepartytobecrucialtobuildingtheunionaswellasworkingclassradicalism.
JamesCannonconcludedthatthecoalyardstrikesucceededbecausethestrike
leadersworkedsocloselywiththeCommunistLeague.50TheTrotskyistsdidnot
hidetheirpoliticalaffiliations.Whenaskedabouttheirpoliticsatmembership
meetingsDunneandSkoglundrespondedopenly.Theywereveryfrank,one
unionmemberrecalled.Theymadenobonesaboutitthattheyweremembers[of
47NeilM.CronintoLocal574,February10,1934,Mss848,box15,folder4,Dobbs
Papers.
48CitizensAllianceBulletin,February2,1934;Truckingcompanyformletterto
employes[sic],February,13,1934,Mss848,box15,folder4,DobbsPapers.
49St.PaulMinneapolisRegionalLaborBoardUniformWageScaleStatement,
February26,1934,Mss848,box15,folder4,DobbsPapers.
50Cannon,AmericanTrotskyism,135.
26

theCommunistLeague].51DunneandSkoglundusedtheRussianRevolutionquite
abittogetworkerstounderstandhowtowinfightsandwhattheyneed,thatthey
needtooverthrowthecapitalistsystem.52TheTrotskyiststradeunionwork
embracedbreadandbutterbargainingasaninitialstepinforgingrevolutionary
classconsciousness.CentraltothisworkwasthereinventionofLocal574asa
massunionrepresentingworkersacrossthetransportationindustry.Thelocals
organizingcommitteemadeliberaluseofthelocalchartersgeneraldesignationto
organizeallworkersassociatedwithtrucking(e.g.platform,shippingroom,drivers
helpers,packers,andyardworkers)intoasingleunion.Intothismodernized
machineryofclasswarfare,CharlesWalkercommented,organizedtruckdrivers
coulddramaticallyreshapethepowerdynamicsofthecityspoliticaleconomy.The
individualdriver,heremarked,waslikeasergeantinthestrikearmycapableof
notonlyshuttingdowncommerceandindustry,butalsocoordinatingtheindustrial
actionsofotherworkersonthestreets.53Fightingforincreasedwagesand
improvedworkingconditionswasnotreformistortradeunionfetishism,butan
objectlessoninthepowerofworkersunitedasaclasstoresistoppressionand
exploitation.
AtfirstglancetheFLPseemedtobealogicalallyfor574.Asthelocal
preparedtoconfrontthetruckingcompanies,theTrotskyistsreachedouttotheFLP
forsupport.Olsonwasanearlyandvocaladvocateoftheteamstersorganizing
campaigns,buthealsowaswaryofbeingtoocloselylinkedtotheTrotskyistswho
51Maloneyinterview,89.
52HarryDeBoerinterview,March24,June22,1988,TwentiethCenturyRadicalism
inMinnesotaOralHistoryProject,4.
53Walker,NotesforLifeStoryofaTrucker,3,WalkerPapers.
27

weresteadilybecomingthemostprominentfiguresintheunion.Local574stageda
massmeetinginAprilentitledtheTheRighttoOrganizethatwastofeatureOlson
asthekeynotespeaker.Thegovernorbalkedatsuchanoutrightassociationwith
thelocalandsenthispersonalsecretaryVincentDaytoreadamessageonhis
behalf.Inthemessage,thegovernorurgedworkerstofollowthesensiblecourse
andbandtogetherforyourownprotectionandwelfare.54Olsonspledgeof
solidaritywithorganizedlaborandLocal574gavethecampaignagreatdealof
prestigeandhelpedattractthousandsofdriversandwarehouseworkerstothe
union.55Thegovernor,though,remainedhamstrungbySection7(a),leavingthe
stategovernmentandtheRegionalLaborBoardwithouttheleveragetocompel
employersunitedbytheCitizensAlliancetorecognizetheunion.Inaddition,the
TrotskyistsrelationtotheFarmerLaborgovernmentwasweightedbyprosand
cons.Ontheonehand,theyreasonedthatsinceOlsonreliedonunionsupport,he
wouldhavetosupporttheorganizingdriveandnotbendtoemployerdemandsto
breakthestrike.Ontheother,theyfearedthatOlsonandtheFLPstiestotheState
FederationofLaborwouldmeanthatintheeventofalargerstrike,thegovernor
wouldintervenetotryandwrestcontroloftheunionfromradicalsandhandthe
organizationovertoAFLbureaucrats.56
TheTrotskyistsof574appreciatedtheroleoflaborreforminprovoking
workermilitancyandinvokedreformprovisionswhenadvantageous,butthey
dismissedonprincipletheliberalreformsoftheNewDeal.Section7(a)wasasop
54LetterfromFloydB.OlsontoWilliamS.Brown,April13,1934,574Papers.
55BothDobbsandWalkerclaimedthatmembershipclimbedto3,000followingthe
RighttoOrganizemeeting.TeamsterRebellion,65;Walker,AmericanCity,91.
28

tothelaborstatesmenoftheAFLanddidnothingmorethancementanelite,
bureaucraticpartnershipbetweenthestateandlaborleaderslikeTobinatthe
expenseofworkers.Theresolutionofthecoalyardstrikedemonstratedthelabor
mediationboardsinherentweakness.Citingcodeviolations,employer
discriminationagainstunionists,andtheoverallinabilityoftheNRAtoassist
organizingdrives,theTrotskyistsconcluded:Onlywherelaborhasbeen
powerfullyorganizedandhasstruckwithdeterminationhavelaborsrightsbeen
respected.57Amilitantmassmovementwasnecessarytochallengeorganized
laborsofficialcomplacencytodemandtheenforcementofthelanguageofSection
7(a).
ThatspringLocal574enteredintonegotiationswiththeMinneapolis
truckingfirmsthroughtheRegionalLaborBoard.Meetingsbetweentheunionand
theemployersgroup,theGeneralAdvisoryCommittee(GAC),producedlittle
worthwhilediscussionsincetheGACcontinuedtorefusetoacknowledgethe
legitimacyoftheLocal574.OnMay7,theGACclaimedthat574didnottruly
representthedriversandbrokeoffdialoguealtogether.58Althoughtheunionwas
abletoproveitselfasthedriversrightfulbargainingagent,subsequenttalks
collapsedsincetheLaborBoardwaspowerlesstogettheGACtoseriouslyconsider
theunionsdemands.Tocomplicatematters,Tobinagaindeniedstrike
authorizationandassertedthatlocaldidnothavejurisdictionoverinsideworkers.59
ThecombinationofthemilitantFebruarystrike,theopenaffiliationofthestrike
57LaborandtheNewDeal,TheMilitant,May5,1934,3.
58LetterfromGeneralAdvisoryCommitteetoW.W.Hughes,May7,1934,Mss848,
59Korth,MinneapolisTeamsterStrike,88.
29

leaderswiththeCommunistLeague,andtheTrotskyistssharpcriticismoftheNRA,
causedTobinandthestateAFL,aswellasOlson,tobewaryofthegrowingpowerof
theteamsters.ThetensioninMinneapoliswaspalpableasLocal574preparedfor
anevenlargerstrikeactionthatspring.
OnMay16,5,000teamsterswentonstrike,focusingtheirattentiononthe
centralcommercialmarketdistrictindowntownMinneapolis.Thelocalorganizeda
strikeheadquarters,repletewithagarage,infirmary,andmesshall,tocoordinate
thedispersalofitsmotorizedflyingsquadsofpicketstointerceptnonunion
trucks.Asinpreviousstrikes,deputizedmembersoftheCAsarmedformations
assaultedpicketlinesandprotectedconvoysofnonuniontrucksandbolsteredthe
citypoliceforce.Inresponsetotheviolenceunleashedagainststrikers,thelocal
informedOlsonthatunlessthepoliceanddeputieswerereinedintheunionwould
withdrawfromnegotiationsandthrowoutageneralcallforeveryworkerin
Minneapolisandvicinitytoassistusinprotectingourrightsandourlives.60Over
twodays,May21and22,strikersinmilitaryformationroutedthepoliceandCA
forcesinthemarketdistrictandtookcontroloverthecitysstreets,winningtheso
calledBattleofDeputiesRun.ForthefirsttimeinMinneapolis,openclasswarfare
turnedintheworkersfavor.Picketlinesheldfirmandstrikingdriversfamously
directedtraffic.Thedriverswerejoinedbysome35,000workersfromthebuilding,
iron,electrical,garment,andaslewofothertradesonpicketlinesacrossthecityin
amassivewaveofsympathystrikes.61Olson,whohadalreadymobilizedthe
60LetterfromLocal574toFloydB.Olson,May19,1934,Mss848,box15,folder5,
DobbsPapers.
61MinneapolisShowsTheWay,May26,Militant,1934,1.
30

NationalGuard,movedtroopsintothemarketdistricttorestorestatecontroland
onMay23thelocalagreedtoatruceoutlinedbyOlson.62
FurthernegotiationshelmedbyOlsonwiththeaidoffederallabormediators
broughtthestriketoanendonMay25.Olsonslabortreatyprovidedforunion
recognitionandareaffirmationtotheprinciplesofSection7(a)onthepartofthe
employers.Sincetheagreementdidnotprovideforaclosedshoporevenany
signedagreement,thelocalwouldhavetonegotiatewitheachfirm(atotalof166)
individually.Withoutindustrywidebargainingtherewasnohopeofrecognition.
OlsonsoriginalagreementstipulatedthatLocal574wasentitledtorepresentthe
contentiousinsideworkers,butheultimatelyrelentedtopressurefromtheCAand
theIBTanddecidedthemattershouldbelefttoarbitrationacrucialpointthat
Olsonneglectedtoannouncepriortotheagreement.Intheendtheboardagreed
withTobinthatinsideworkerswerenotunderLocal574sjurisdiction,
underminingtheunionsposition.
Theendofthestrikeproducedaflurryofresponsesasvariousfactions
attemptedtoturntheoutcomeofthecitysmostviolentlabordisputetotheirown
advantage.Theleadersofthestrikeadmittedtotheworkersthattheagreement
wasacompromisewiththebosses,butonethatatleastlaidthegroundworkfor
eventualunionrecognition.63TheCommunistPartycastigatedtheteamster
leadershipforagainwinningonlymeagerconcessionsfromthetruckingfirms.
NoneotherthanWilliamDunne,theeldestoftheDunnesandastaunchStalinist,
62LetterfromTradeUnionCommittee,Local574toFloydB.Olson,May23,1934,
Mss848,box15,folder5,DobbsPapers.
31

blastedhisbrothersandtheircomradesforsquanderingamomentofreal
revolutionarypotential.64TheCommunistsdeclaredthattheunalloyedworking
classmilitancyoftheMaystrikehadcrystallizedbytheBattleofDeputiesRuninto
revolutionaryconsciousness.Theveryactoftakingcontrolofthestreetsshould
havebeenthemomentwhentheworkersturnedamerelaborstruggleintoa
politicalstruggleagainstcapital.Insharpcontrast,thejubilantStateFederationof
LaborheraldedthedefeatoftheCitizensAllianceanddivertedattentionfromthe
TrotskyistsbycelebratingOlsonastherealheroofthestrike.Thecraftunions
emphasizedthepeaceableresolutionhammeredoutbyOlsonastherealobject
lessonofthestrike,notitsmilitancyandviolence.TheMinneapolisLaborReview
proclaimedthestrikeavictoryforthegovernorasmuchasfortheteamsters.
Tellingly,thesameissuethatannouncedthestrikesresolutionalsoprominently
advertisedtheopeningstagesoftheFLPscampaignfortheNovemberelection.65
TheFarmerLaborPartywantednothingmorethantodisassociateitself
fromtheviolenceofthestrike.LaborpeacewasessentialtotheFarmerLabor
campaigninordertodownplaytheradicalimagepresentedbyOlsonandtodeflect
characterizationsoftheFLPasapartystokingtheflamesofclasshatred.Olsons
settlementwaspresentedasevidenceoftheFarmerLaborgovernmentscool,
deliberate,andevenhandedabilitytoresolvetensesocialconflict.Onecampaign
leaflet,forexample,boastedofthecongratulatorytelegramssentbySen.Robert
64 William F. Dunne and Morris Childs, Permanent Counter-Revolution: The Role of the
Trotzkyites in the Minneapolis Strikes (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1934).
65GeneralDriversSmashLinesofCitizensAlliance,GovernorisPeacemakerIn
DriverStrike,HeadquartersOpenForFLCampaign,MinneapolisLaborReview,
June1,1934,1.
32

WagnertoFarmerLaborSen.HenrikShipstead,thefederalmediators,andOlsonfor
findinganamicableresolutiontothestrike.66NosuchtelegramwassenttoTobin,
whoWagnercontactedattheheightofthestreetfightingdemandingtoknowwhat
theteamsterpresidentwasdoingtoendthestrike.AnundoubtedlymortifiedTobin
couldonlyrespondthatthesituationwasbeyondhiscontrol:thetruckershad
organizedthemselvesandweremakingtheirownbattle.67Theapparent
powerlessnessofthelabormovementoveritsownunionsincreasedthepolitical
pressureontheFLPtostepintothebreachandbridleinsurgentworkers.TheFLP
neededarevivedlabormovementtoserveitsideologicalandelectoralends,butan
aggressivemovementwasaliabilitytotheFLPspoliticalcampaign.
However,theweaksettlementprofferedbyOlsonservedonlytoexacerbate
themilitancyoftheteamstersandunderminethelegitimacyoftheNRA.As
historianThomasDorrancepointsout,labororganizingundertheNRAprovidesan
excellentavenuetoexaminethosepointsofcontactwhereindividualsdirectly
experiencedthegrowthofafederaladministrativestate.68Firstandforemost,the
workersrecognizedthesuperiorpowerofdirectactionandagitationoverthatof
governmentagencieswithlimitedcapacitytoresolveimmediategrievances.The
membersofLocal574complainedbitterlyaboutthegovernorsarbitrated
agreement.AtaJuly6membershipmeetinglocalleadersregisteredtheirdisgust
66FarmerLaborcampaignflyer,nodate(ca.May1934),Mss848,box15,folder5,
DobbsPapers.
67WashingtonSizedUpTruckDriverStrike,MinneapolisLaborReview,June29,
1934,2.
68ThomasF.Dorrance,RemakinganOlderDeal:ChicagoEmploymentPolicies,
19321936,Labor:StudiesinWorkingClassHistoryoftheAmericas7(1)2010,89.
33

withtheinadequacyoflaborreform.EmeryNelson,aunionrepresentativetothe
RegionalLaborBoardfromtheMilkDriversunion,statedinunequivocalterms:
FrommyexperiencewiththeBoardyouaregoingtohavetobemore
militantthanyouwere.Youaregoingtohavebiggerorganizations;allthe
strengthyoucangathertogether;justsomuchbetterwillyougoon.Iwant
tosaytheemployersarefightingmorebitterlythaneverbefore.Theyhave
strongerorganizations.Theyaretryingtocalmthatarticle7aofthe
NationalRecoveryAct.Thelabormovementmustlikewisefightharder.
RoyWeiroftheCLUagreedthatSection7(a)wasworthlesstolaboras
implementedbythegovernment,butreminded574smembersofthegovernorsin
CaliforniaandKentuckywhoatthemomentwerebreakingtheLongshoremens
[and]coalminersstrike[s].IjustwantedtosaythatwehaveaGovernorinthe
StateofMinnesotawhodidnotcallouthismilitiatokillpeopleandputfearin
them.69
ThelocalsproblemswiththeIBTmountedalongwithrankandfile
discontenttowardsthestateandfederalgovernments.BusinessagentCliffordHall
relayedtotheIBTthelocalsdissatisfactionwiththeresultsoftheMaystrikeand
appealedforassistanceasthelocalpreparedtoresumethestrike.70Thomas
Hughes,theIBTsSecretaryTreasurer,deniedtherequestbecauseofoutstanding
initiationfeesowedtotheInternational.71Thecitingofsuchtechnicalitiescouldnot
masktheIBTsexasperationwiththelocalscontinuedmilitancy.Tobins
embarrassmentoverhisinabilitytorestraintheTrotskyists,coupledwithhisown
virulentanticommunism,fueledhistiradesagainstthelocal.AccordingtoTobin,
69Membershipmeetingminutes,TeamstersLocal574,July6,1934,Mss848,box
15,folder6,DobbsPapers.
70LetterfromCliffordHalltoThomasL.Hughes,June21,1934,574Papers.
71LetterfromThomasL.HughestoCliffordHall,June25,1934,574Papers.
34

communistsweredoingmoretohelpplaceonthestatutebooksadverselegislation
againstlaborthanalltheenemiesoflaborcombined.72Inaneditorialintheofficial
IBTjournal,widelyreprintedbytheCA,TobindescribedtheTrotskyiststrike
leadershipaswolvesinsheepsclothingandurgedloyalunionofficerstostiflesuch
radicals,becausetheydonotbelonginourunion73
ThesecondmajortruckingstrikeinthreemonthsbeganonJuly16withthe
employersstillstaunchlyopposedtobargainingwiththeunionandtheLaborBoard
unabletoenforceitsownrulings.TheBattleofDeputiesRunandtheoutpouringof
solidaristicactionbyfellowworkerswereaheadymanifestationofindependent
workingclasspower.Suchrankandfilemilitancyhelpedtheleadershipof574
securethesupportoftheCLUandthebusinessagentsofthebuildingtradesunions
forthestrike.TheresultwastherepudiationofTobinsconservativeunionismas
wellasOlsonsattemptsatconciliation.Thestrikebeganpeaceablyandonceagain
notrucksmovedthroughthemarketdistrict.Aftertwodaysthetruckingfirms
beganmovinggoodsunderpoliceescort.Neithertheemployersnorthepolice
wantedarepriseofMaystreetfighting.MinneapolisChiefofPoliceMichael
Johannesreportedlyinformedhisofficers:Weregoingtostartmovinggoods.
Donttakeabeating.Youhaveshotgunsandknowhowtousethem.74Onthe
afternoonofFriday,July20,aheavilyarmedpolicecontingentguardedthefirst
truckmovedintothemarketdistrictaslineofpicketslookedonhelplessly.Asthe
72QuotedinBertCochran,LaborandCommunism:TheConflictthatShapedAmerican
Unions(PrincetonUniversityPress,1977),163.
73DanielJ.Tobin,OfficialMagazineoftheI.B.T.,C.,S.,andH.ofA.,July1934,13,14,
574Papers.
35

truckpulledaway,asecondtruckfromtheunionsflyingsquadronattemptedto
blockthepoliceconvoy.Thepoliceofficersrespondedbylayingdownawithering
lineoffireonthecruisingpicketsinthebedoftheuniontruckaswellasthose
massedonthestreet.Inamatterofminutes,thepolicekilledtwoandwounded
sixtysevenunarmedpickets,turningthedayintoBloodyFriday.Theviolence
unleashedbythecitypolicereinforcedthelocalmilitantsskepticismoflabor
reformlegislationandOlsonsclaimtobeafriendoftheworker,whilereaffirming
theneedtomaintainamilitantline.InaspeechhonoringHenryNess,oneofthe
workerskilledbythepolice,WilliamBrownlamented:HebelievedintheNRAand
theNewDealandintherightofpeacefulpicketing,buttothedismayanddisgustof
allthepeopleofMinneapolishewasshotdown.75Thefortythousandworkerswho
marchedinNessfuneralprocessionwereavividillustrationoftherankandfile
solidarity.
Afterdaysoftumultuousandultimatelyfruitlessnegotiationsfollowingthe
shooting,federallabormediatorsE.H.DunniganandFatherFrancisHassconvinced
Olsontothreatenbothsideswithamartiallawdecreeifthetwocouldnotagreetoa
finalcompromise.TheHassDunniganplanmetseveralkeyuniondemandsand
calledforcertificationelectionsatall166truckingfirms,thereinstatementof
strikingworkers,anddefinedtheestablishmentofuniformwagescaleasa
legitimatebargainingissue.76Theunionmembershipvotedalmostunanimouslyto
accepttheplan,whiletheCAsEmployersAdvisoryCommitteerebelledonceagain
75SpeechbyWilliamS.Brown,nodate(ca.July24,1934),box1,folderAmerican
Citynotes:Local574andstrike,WalkerPapers.
76MemofromFatherFrancisHaasandE.H.DunnigantoEACandLocal574July25,
1934,Mss848,box15,folder6,DobbsPapers.
36

onthegroundsthat574wasnottherightfulbargainingagentoftheworkersand
thatitsleadershipwasCommunistic,leavingOlsontotaketheinitiativeand
declaredmartiallawonJuly26.77TheStrikeCommitteeof100,thelocalsrank
andfilesteeringcommittee,demandedthatOlsonwithdrawtheNationalGuardand
allowforpeacefulpicketing.78Thestrikeleaderscalledamassmeetingofpicketsat
strikeheadquartersscheduledfor4a.m.onWednesday,August1,toorganizea
protestindefianceofthemartiallaworder.79Butjustmomentsbefore4a.m.,800
troopsdescendeduponstrikeheadquartersandarrested53unionists,including
WilliamBrownandMilesandVincentDunne.80Forthefirsttimeindecades,574s
strikenewspapertheOrganizerseethed,
atradeunionheadquartershasbeenoccupiedbymilitaryforcesandtrade
unionleadersimprisonedinamilitarystockade.NoteveninToledo,where
troopswerecalledoutbyaDemocraticGovernor,norinSanFrancisco,
wheretheywerecalledoutbyaRepublicanGovernor,hassuchamonstrous
violationoftherightsofworkingmenbeenperpetrated.81
ManyinLocal574feltOlsonbetrayedtheFLPsclaimtobeaworkingclasspartyby
sendingintroopstoprotecttheemployerspropertyinsteadofthedriverspicket
lines.AlettertotheeditoroftheOrganizernoted:IwishtheTruckDriverswould
77LetterfromWilliamS.BrowntoFatherFrancisHaasandE.H.Dunnigan,July26,
1934,Mss848,box15,folder6,DobbsPapers;Millikan,AUnionAgainstUnions280
81.
78LetterfromStrikeCommitteeof100toFloydB.Olson,July28,1934,Mss848,box
15,folder6,DobbsPapers.
79PicketsWillMobilizeforAutoPatrols,MinneapolisTribuneclippingAugust1,
1934,1,box1,folderNewspaperclippings:Local574Strike,June1934,Minneapolis
Tribune,WalkerPapers.
80700ofMilitiaSentBacktoFairGrounds,MinneapolisTribuneclippingAugust2,
1934,1,box1,folderNewspaperclippings:Local574Strike,June1934,Minneapolis
Tribune,WalkerPapers.
81Local574IssuesCallforaProtestGeneralStrike,Militant,August4,1934,1.
37

havereceivedsuchcooperationofthisfamousFarmerLaborGovernorasthe
bossesdo.82
Indefendingthearrestsandseizureofstrikeheadquarters,Olsonclaimed
theguardhadnoalternativeandthatclampingdownonunlawfulpicketswasthe
onlyresponse.83Fearingpublicbacklashandthealienationofhisbaseinthelabor
movement,heissuedastatementdefendingthecrackdownonthestrikersasaway
toprotectthestrikeandthegeneralpublic.84Tocompensatefortheseizureof
strikeheadquarters,OlsonorderedtheNationalGuardtoraidtheCitizensAlliance
headquartersandconfiscateintelligenceaboutemployersantistriketactics,butit
producedlittleinformationthankstoCAinformantswithintheNationalGuard.The
symbolicuseoftroopsagainstemployerswaslargelyanattempttorestoreOlsons
credibilityasanimpartialarbiterintheeyesofthegeneralpublic.
Olsoncloselywatchedthepublicsreactiontothestrikedevelopmentsashe
preparedforreelectioninNovember.InamemotoOlson,hispersonalsecretary
VincentDayexplainedthatmostpeoplewereverymuchinsupportofthestrikers
andagreedwiththeirdemands.However,Thepublicisagainstthestrikeweapon.
Itannoys,irritates,andfrightenstheconsumers,butthatistheextentoftheir
opposition.Thestrikeasaremedyforlabordifficultiesissenseless,stupid.
PrefiguringtheimpetusfortheWagnerAct,DaycontinuedthattheFLPneededto
pushfortheinstitutionofastronglaborcodecontainingarealguaranteeofthe
82I.HobermanLettertotheEditor(Organizer),August21,1934,Mss848,box15,
folder7,DobbsPapers.
83TroopsArrestPickets,MinneapolisTribuneclippingnodate(ca.August2,1934),
box1,folderLocal574Strike,WalkerPapers.
84TroopsWillNotBeUsedBreakStrike,MinneapolisLaborReview,August3,
1934.
38

rightofcollectivebargaininginordertoensurelaborpeace.85Laborpeacewas
centraltofarmerlaborismselectoralstrategyaswellasitsideologicalmakeup.
LikethefirstBritishLabourgovernment,theFarmerLaborPartyhadnohostility
tostrikers,onlystrikes.86Towinthecontinuedsupportofcrossclassallies,
politicalscientistAdamPrzeworskiargues,asocialdemocraticpartymustremain
committedtothelegaldemocraticprocessandnotbetemptedtosubstitutemass
actionforalegislativemandate.Thesocialdemocratschoicetowieldthepolitical
weaponmeantthattheymustforgoextraparliamentarytacticslikestrikesto
achievepoliticalresults.87TheFLPwaseagertodispelanypublicperceptionthat
thepartywasaidingandabettingtheteamstersindustrialactionagainstthe
capitalistclassofMinneapolis.However,Olsoncouldnotabandonhiscoreurban
constituency,particularlysincetheirdemandshadnonethelessgeneratedpopular
support.
OverthenextthreeweeksawarofattritionwaswagedasOlson,thestrike
leadersof574,andtheCAhashedoutaseriesofproposalsandcounterproposals.88
OnceagainestablishinglaborpeacewascrucialfortheFLPaselectionseasondrew
nearer,butthistimeOlsonwascommittedtonegotiatingasettlementthatwould
placatethemilitantdrivers.TheviolenceofBloodyFriday,thepoliticalfalloutof
themartiallawdecreeandthearrestofthestrikeleadership,andtheunbridled
85MemofromVincentA.DaytoFloydB.Olson,nodate(ca.August6,1934),box2,
folderMemorandatoGov.Olson,1934,DayPapers.
86RalphMiliband,ParliamentarySocialism:AStudyinthePoliticsofLabour(London:
MerlinPress,1972),10910.
87AdamPrzeworski,CapitalismandSocialDemocracy(NewYork:Cambridge
39

militancyofthemembership,compelledOlsontofinallytakeahardlineagainstthe
employers.Inasharprebuke,OlsonwrotetotheCA:Theagenciesofgovernment
donotbelongtoyou.TheybelongtoallthepeopleandIproposetousethe
governmentalagenciesundermyjurisdiction,includingthenationalguard,forthe
protectionofallthepeopleofthecityofMinneapolis.89FinallyonAugust21,after
OlsonrequestedthepersonalintercessionofRoosevelt,thetruckingfirmsagreedto
theprovisionsoftheoriginalHassDunniganplan,securingfor574official
recognition,auniformminimumwage,andtherighttorepresentallofitsmembers.
Aftermath
ForthemembersofLocal574,thestrikesprovidedanobjectlessoninthe
powerofmilitantandradicalunionismtoeffectrealchange.AsHowardKimeldrof
arguesinhisstudyofSanFranciscodockworkersduringtheDepression,
revolutionarylanguageintandemwithsocialactioncouldforgeamilitantrankand
fileclassconsciousness.90Yettheprocessofradicalizationproduceditsownunique
setoftensionsthatanimatedthestruggleforunionrecognition.Thebloodystrikes
wagedbyLocal574throughout1934tointroduceorganizedlabortoMinneapolis
succeededbecauseofworkingclassmilitancy.Thestrikesrepresentedamoment
wherelaborrepressionwasovercomebyunitedlaboraction.Crucialtothisvictory
weretheTrotskyistteamsters,labormilitantswhowereneitheroutsideagitators
noractorswilledintobeingbytheuniquehistoricalphenomenonoftheDepression
alone.ThevictoryoftheteamstersinMinneapolissentshockwavesthroughtheIBT
89QuotedinWalker,AmericanCity,178.
90Kimeldorf,RedsorRackets?.
40

andthecitysbusinesscommunity.TheCitizensAlliancecontinuedtohammer
awayatthelocal,butitsagitationyieldedfewresultsasemployerslineduptosign
unioncontractswiththeirworkers.ByMayof1935theentiretruckingindustryin
Minneapolisoperatedunderaclosedshopagreement.Themilitancyofthestrikes
andtheradicalismofLocal574sleadershipdeeplyunnervedTobinand
conservativebusinessunionistsintheAFL.Thus,intheensuingyearsmanyof
Local574smostbitterbattleswouldnotbewagedemployers,butconservative
opponentsinthelabormovement.
Olsonmanagedtonavigatehiswaythroughthestrikeswithmostofhis
politicalcredibilityintactbuttheFLPwouldpayapriceforitsinvolvementinthe
driverslabordispute.VincentDayremindedOlsonthedaybeforetheelectionthat
therealissueinMinneapolisisthetruckstrikeandthatthegovernorneededto
carefullyexplainhishandlingofthesituationtothevoters.91Campaignliterature
pointedoutthatthegovernormaintainedlawandorderwhilealsosupportingthe
strikers.
GovernorOlsonisthefirstgovernorinAmericatocalloutthemilitiaduringa
strikeforthepurposeofprotectingallthepeopleandnottheasanagencyto
breakupastrikebyshootingunarmedworkersfightingforanAmerican
standardofliving.Hehandledamajorstrikebyplacingacityundermartial
lawwithoutthesheddingofblood.92
TheFLPslatewonthe1934elections,butthefaultlinesinthepartyscoalitionwere
startingtoappear.Olsonwonreelection,buthebeathisRepublicanchallengerby
91MemofromVincentA.DaytoFloydB.Olson,November1,1934,box2,folder
MemorandatoGov.Olson,1934,DayPapers.
92BreadorStraw:TheIssuesoftheCampaign,OlsonforGovernorAllParty
VolunteerCommittee,nodate(ca.1934),box1,folderCorrespondenceandOther
Papers,undated1930s;19301935,SusieW.StagebergPapersattheMinnesota
HistoricalSociety.
41

only70,000votescomparedtothealmost200,000votedifferenceheenjoyedtwo
yearsearlier.93ThestrikescrippledtheFLPssupportinruralcommunities.For
instance,in1932Olsonhandilywon46ofthestates84ruralcounties,butin1934
helost95percentofthosesamecounties.94Giventhisreversaloffortune,thefact
thathewasstillabletowinisquiteastounding.OlsonandtheFLPconsolidatedits
strengthinurbanareasandcountedarejuvenatedlabormovementasanimportant
votingbloc.Nonetheless,the1934truckingstrikesconvincedOlsonthatparty
couldnotaffordtobecomeentangledinanotherlabordisputeofsuchmagnitude.
ThefutureofFarmerLaborpoliticswoulddependonitsabilitytoharnessthe
politicalresourcesofthetradeunionswhilemaintainingasafedistancefromits
disputes.
Theradicalismofthestrikeandtherepressionmetedoutagainstthestrikers
markedadecisivemomentinshapingworkingclassconsciousnessinMinneapolis.
CharlesWalkernotedinhiscompositedescriptionofaMinneapolistruckerthat
certaincommunistideasaboutclassexploitationresonatedwithMinneapolis
workersafterthestrikes.Forinstance,theideaofthestateasaninstrumentof
classdominationgibedquiteperfectlywithhisownexperiencewhentheStateof
Minnesotacalledin[the]militiatobreakthedriversstrike,sothathebelievesthat
principlepassionately,andtalksonthatpointlikeaCommunist.Yet,thetypical
driverstillvotesforOlson,deniesbeingaCommunist,andhasevenbeatenupa
93BruceM.White,etal.,MinnesotaVotes:ElectionReturnsbyCountyforPresidents,
Senators,Congressmen,andGovernors,18571977(St.Paul,MN:Minnesota
HistoricalSocietyPress,1977),192195.
94RichardM.Valelly,RadicalismintheStates:TheAmericanPoliticalEconomyand
theMinnesotaFarmerLaborParty(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1989),117.
42

fewinhisday.95TheTrotskyistsprovedtheirworthasorganizersthroughout
1934andtappedintoastrongundercurrentofworkingclassradicalismamongst
Minneapolisworkers.Thestrikeshelpedtoawakenthistraditionandradicalize
workersthroughsolidaristicaction,evenifthedemandsmadebythestrikerswere
themselvesnotinherentlyradical.ThenextmajorchallengefortheTrotskyist
teamsterswastofindawaytotranslatetheirnewfoundorganizationalpowerinto
politicalpower.Thisprocesswoulddividethecityslabormovement,strainitsties
totheFarmerLaborParty,anddramaticallyreshapethepoliticallandscapeof
Minneapolis.
95Walker,NotesforLifeStoryofaTrucker,23,WalkerPapers.
43

CHAPTER3
THEPOLITICSOFMAKINGMINNEAPOLISAUNIONTOWN,19351936
Introduction
Thenearinsurrectionarytruckingstrikesof1934gaveorganizedlaborits
firstrealfootholdinthepoliticaleconomyofMinneapolis.Bythetimeanother
waveofviolentstrikesrolledthroughthecityinthesummerof1935General
DriversandHelpersLocal574wasthelargestandmostinfluentialunioninthe
state,winningconcessionsfromemployersintheworkplaceandpressuring
politicalpartiesandthestatetotakethedemandsofworkersseriously.Labor
militancyalsoexposedseriousdivisionsbetweenconservativeunionleadersand
radicalrankandfileactivists.Local574sclasheswiththeInternational
BrotherhoodofTeamstersandtheAFLthreatenedtosplittheurbanlaborvote
crucialtotheelectoralsuccessofMinnesotasgoverningFarmerLaborParty.The
newfoundpowerofLocal574madetheTrotskyistsinfluentialfiguresinFarmer
Laborpolitics.LiketheirCommunistPartyadversaries,theytoooptedtoembrace
electoralpoliticsanddownplaytherhetoricofrevolutioninordertoexpandthe
appealofsocialism.In1935,theTrotskyistsspearheadedamilitantmobilizationof
workingclassforcesandsimultaneouslyalignedthemselveswithreformist
electoralpartypolitics.Similarly,theFarmerLaborParty,muchliketheNewDeal
Democrats,attemptedtosolidifytheloyaltyofworkersandintegratethepolitical
demandsofthelabormovementwithoutalienatingsympatheticclassfractionsfrom
theparty.Despiteemergingpoliticalfractures,acoalitionofworkers,farmers,and
44

middleclassprofessionalsreturnedtheFarmerLaborPartybyhugenumbersinthe
1936elections.Understandinghowtheespeciallyvolatilelabormovement
emergedasacohesiveblocby1936meansexploringthepoliticalcontextand
politicalchoicesmadebylabormilitantsliketheTrotskyistteamstersin
Minneapolis.
Local574inExile
Thestrikesof1934fortheAFL,accordingtopoliticalscientistMichael
Goldfield,signifiedtheexistenceofanemergingmassbasedlabormovementled
byradicals,completelyoutsidetheircontrol.96Themilitancyoftheearly1930s
swelledlaborsdepletedranks,butmilitancybroughtanewbodyofradicalleaders
intopositionsofunionleadershipwhochallengedthecautiousconservatismofthe
AFL.97Whateverthehopesforacooperativerelationshipbetween574andthe
internationalunion,theywereshatteredbythelocalspersistentdefianceofIBT
presidentDanielTobinsordersthroughoutthetumultofthe1934truckingstrikes.
ThesubsequentelectionandappointmentofTrotskyistactivistsFarrellDobbs,Carl
Skoglund,andVincent,Grant,andMilesDunnetokeyunionpostsbroughttensions
withtheIBTtoaheadinmidAprilof1935.InalettertoIBTSecretaryTreasurer
ThomasHughes,anapoplecticTobindeclaredtheMinneapolislocalpurelyand
96Goldfield,WorkerInsurgency,1273.
97Cf.RosemaryFeurer,RadicalUnionismintheMidwest,19001950(Urbana,IL:
UniversityofIllinoisPress,2006);PhilipKorthandMargaretBeegle,IRemember
LikeToday:TheAutoLiteStrikeof1934(EastLansing,MI:MichiganStateUniversity
Press,1988);CharlesP.Larrowe,HarryBridges:TheRiseandFallofaRadicalLabor
Leader(Chicago:LawrenceHillandCo.,1977).
45

withoutquestioncontrolledbyCommunists.98Tobin,hesitanttopredicatehis
assaultonthelocalsTrotskyistleadershipentirelyonpoliticalgrounds,forceda
confrontationbycitingthelocalsfailuretopayoutstandingpercapitataxeson
membershipduesowedtotheinternationalaswellasahostofunspecified
violationsofthe[IBT]Constitution.99Tostrengthenhisposition,Tobindemanded
theMinneapolisCentralLaborUnionseveritstiesto574orelsehewouldinstruct
theAFLtorevokeitscharteraswell.100Foritspart,thelocalpleadedpovertyinthe
wakeofthe1934strikesandfeltentitledtoareprievebecauseitreceivednostrike
supportfromtheIBT.Moreover,theleadershipsawthatthedemandforoverdue
taxeswaslittlemorethanaploytotoppleitsmilitantleadership.101Tobinroundly
rejectedanypleasforclemencyandcastigatedthelocalsleadersfortheir
recklessnessanddisobedience.InalettertoDobbs,Tobinwrote:
WhatwedoknowisthatyoupracticallydefiednotonlyourInternational
UnionbuttheentireLaborMovement,byrefusing,inthefirstplace,to
requestthesanctionoftheInternationalforyourstrike;bygoingoutand
attemptingtocallaGeneralStrike,bysolicitingmoneyinournamewhenthe
strikewasunauthorizedandnotapprovedandinmanyotherwaysviolating
thecontractyourlocalenteredintowiththeInternationalUnionwhenthe
charterwasissued,which,insubstance,isthatyourlocalunionwouldbe
subjecttoallthelawsoftheInternationalandwouldabidebyitsrulingsand
itsdecisions.102
98LetterfromDanielJ.TobintoThomasL.Hughes,April12,1935,series1,box35,
folder2,StaffCorrespondenceHughes,ThomasL.,19301940,International
BrotherhoodofTeamsters,Chauffeurs,Warehousemen,andHelpersofAmerica
PapersattheStateHistoricalSocietyofWisconsin.
99LetterfromThomasL.HughestoFarrellDobbs,April15,1935,574Papers.
100 LetterfromDanielJ.TobintoEmeryC.Nelson,April15,1935,Mss848,box15,
101 LetterfromLocal574toThomasL.Hughes,April20,1935,Mss848,box5,folder
1,DobbsPapers.
102 LetterfromDanielJ.TobintoFerrellDobbs,April22,1935,574Papers.
46
Tobinsownprudentialunionismandpersonalambitioninformedhisview
oforganizedlaborasastabilizingforceinAmericansocietyduringtimesof
economicturmoil.Tobinsownanimustowardsstrikesdatedfromhisparticipation
inafailedandviolent1896Bostonstreetcarworkersstrike.103Militancyand
radicalism,Tobinargued,wouldonlystrengthenemployersopposition,turnpublic
opinionagainstunions,and,ashappenedaftertheFirstWorldWar,bringoutthe
repressiveapparatusesofthestateagainstlabor.Hehopedthatelectoralpolitics
couldrehabilitateorganizedlaborsflaggingpostwarfortunes,shiftinghissupport
fromtheAmericanLaborPartyin1919totheindependentcandidacyofRobertM.
LaFollettein1924,beforebecominginvolvedintheDemocraticPartywiththe
candidacyofAlSmithin1928.104TheIBTpresidentsmalleablepartisan
attachmentsandcontingentalliancewiththeDemocraticPartywerecharacteristic
ofwhathistorianJulieGreenecallsthepureandsimplepoliticsoftheAFL.105 As
thedevastationoftheDepressionbolsteredthepartyspoliticalfortunes,Tobin
movedsolidlyintotheDemocraticcamp.Hedevelopedacloserelationshipwith
Rooseveltduringthe1932electionswhileservingaschairmanoftheDemocratic
NationalCommitteesLaborBureau(aposthewouldholduntil1944).Tobinwas
oneoftheonlymajorlaborleaderstoactivelycampaignonbehalfofRooseveltthat
year,buthisemphasisonelitelobbyingandnegotiationwithtoppartyleaders
103 TranscriptfromNBCradioprogramImanAmerican!,September14,1941,
series1,box44,folder5,StaffCorrespondenceTobin,DanielJ.,19171945,IBT
Papers.
104 PhilipTaft,TheA.F.ofL.IntheTimeofGompers(NewYork:HarperandBrothers,
1957),478;PhilipS.Foner,HistoryoftheLaborMovementintheUnitedStates,Vol.8:
PostwarStruggles,19181920(NewYork:InternationalPublishers,1988),25674.
105 JulieGreene,PureandSimplePolitics:TheAmericanFederationofLaborand
PoliticalActivism,18811917(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),285.
47

meanthiseffortsprobablycontributedlittletothestrongshowingofDemocrats
amongworkingclassvoters.Ifanything,Tobinscampaignworkwasarather
nakedattempttosecurethepostofSecretaryofLabor,ajobheneverthelesslostto
FrancesPerkins.106
Tobindesperatelywantedtocompensateforhisinabilitytoreininthe
TrotskyistsduringthetruckingstrikesandprotecthisreputationinWashingtonas
aguardianoflaborpeacebytakingahardstanceagainstthelocal.Toreassert
authorityinMinneapolis,hesentinadelegationofIBTofficialstocharterLocal500
astheofficialbargainingagentforthecitysdrivers.Hehopedthatdisaffiliation
wouldpromptemployerstotearuptheircontractswiththeradicalsofLocal574
andsignonwiththeresponsiblebusinessunionismofLocal500.Tobinfailedto
recognizethatitwasmilitantdirectaction,notbusinessunionism,whichensured
unionrecognitionandtheenforcementofsignedagreementsinthetrucking
industry.Fearingarepriseofthepreviousyearsstrikes,fewcompaniesdared
renegeontheircontractswith574.Thoseemployersthatdidattempttotake
advantageoftheinternalteamsterdisputetogobackonornotrenewcontracts
weresubjectedtoshowpiecejobactionsthatdemonstratedtheunionsnewfound
controlovertrucking.107Thus,duringMarchandApril,when574appearedtobeat
itsweakest,nomajortruckingfirmbroke,orfailedtoresign,acontractwiththe
local.
106 IrvingBernstein,TheLeanYears:AHistoryoftheAmericanWorker,19201933
(Baltimore:PenguinBooks,1966),511;Taft,TheA.F.ofL.FromtheDeathof
GomperstotheMerger(NewYork:OctagonBooks,1970),453.
107 Maloneyinterview,104.
48
Therevocationof574scharterexiledthelocalteamstersfromtheIBTand
theAFLsHouseofLabor,butthelocalenjoyedanoutpouringofsupportin
Minneapolis.FarrellDobbswasnotboastingwhenheinformedIBTVicePresident
JohnGeary,Whenyouleaveherewithourcharterunderyourarm,yourest
assuredyouhavegotthecharter,butwehavegotthemen.108 Dobbslater
estimatedthatofLocal574sroughly5,000members,only50joinedtherival
local.109Local574continuedtoannounceitsallegiancetotheAFLandreiteratedits
eagernesstorejointhelaborfederation,whilethelocalremainedsteadfastinits
condemnationoftheIBTspoliticalattackonmilitantunions.Tobin,theTrotskyist
leadershipcharged,wasasplitterforundertakingapoliticallymotivatedattackon
thehardwonlaborsolidarityoftheMinneapolislabormovement.110The
effectivenessoftheTrotskyistsdirectactiontacticsandtheireagernesstoassist
otherunionsassuredLocal574theallegianceofthelocallabormovement.Despite
beingbarredfromparticipatinginanyAFLorganization,theCLUvigorouslybacked
574.111DelegatesfromtheCLU,theIAM,andtheBuildingTradesCouncil
unsuccessfullyfoughttogettheMinnesotaStateFederationofLaborconventionto
urgeTobintoreturnthelocalscharterortogivethefloortorepresentativesfrom
108 Maloneyinterview,104.
109 Dobbs,TeamsterPower(NewYork:MonadPress,1973),76.
110 AFalseRumor,NorthwestOrganizer,May8,1935,2.
111 Mpls.CentralLaborUnionSupportsDriversLocal574,NorthwestOrganizer,
April16,1935,1;CentralLaborUnionVotesUnanimouslytoBack
RecommendationofSpecialCommitteetoRestore574sCharter,Northwest
OrganizerMay8,1935,1;CitizensAllianceofMinneapolisSpecialWeeklyBulletin,
May14,1935,Mss848,box15,folder9,DobbsPapers.
49

574.112TheSaintPaulTradesandLaborAssemblyandahostoflocalunions
likewiseadoptedresolutionscallingforthereinstatementof574intotheIBTand
theAFL.113PrefiguringtheabandonmentofthepartysultrarevolutionaryThird
Period,theMinnesotasectionoftheCommunistPartyevenwentsofarastocommit
itscadrestoassistingthelocalsreturntotheAFLforthesakeofrestoringlabor
unity.114
Whythelocalfoughttoremainwithinthefoldofthesetwoconservative
labororganizationsandinthefaceofsuchhostilityonthesurfaceappearsatodds
withthelocalleadershipsradicalism.Thispositionwasconsonantwiththe
emergingTrotskyiststrategyofentryism,burrowingwithinareformistinstitution
totransformitintoanorganofrevolutionaryactivity.AnarticleintheTrotskyist
newspapertheNewMilitantapplaudedLocal574forattemptingcorrectlytoexist
withintheframeworkofthegenerallabormovementrepresentedbytheAFofL.115
Trotskyorderedhisfollowerstoenterexisting,organicworkingclassorganizations
inordertoclarifytheunfocusedmilitancyofworkersintorevolutionaryaction.116
112 ProceedingsoftheFiftythirdConventionoftheMinnesotaStateFederationof
Labor,RedWing,Minn.,August1921,1935,42,6263.
113 TradesandLaborAssemblyminutes,May8,1935,Mss848,box15,folder9,
DobbsPapers;letterfromI.A.MLocal382toDanielJ.Tobin,June10,1935,Mss848,
box15,folder9,DobbsPapers;letterfromHillardSmithtotheSecretariesofAll
LocalUnionsoftheA.F.ofL.andallRailroadBrotherhoods,August8,1935,Mss
848,box15,folder9,DobbsPapers;letterfromJ.M.DropoktoHillardSmith,August
17,1935,Mss848,box15,folder9,DobbsPapers;minutesofTradeUnion
ConferenceCalledtoDemandRestorationofLocal574Charter,September30,1935,
114 ToMembersofLocal574,nodate(ca.May1935),Mss848,box15,folder16,
DobbsPapers.
115 Local574UnderFireAgain,NewMilitant,May4,1935,4.
116 Trotsky,TheCrisisoftheFrenchSection,19351936(NewYork:PathfinderPress,
1977),58.
50

Themostimportantofallprerequisitesforthedevelopmentofamilitantlabor
movement,JamesCannoncounseled,istheleavenofprincipledcommunists.117
Despitebeingabulwarkofconservativecraftunionism,remainingacharteredlocal
oftheIBTconnectedtheTrotskyiststooneofthenationsmostpowerfulunions.
FromwithintheIBTTrotskyistactivistshopedtocultivaterankandfileprotestand
overtimeputpressureonTobintoadoptamoremilitantstanceorevenseize
controloftheentireunion.Ratherthanretreattoinsulardualrevolutionaryunions
liketheCommunists,theTrotskyiststheorizedthatcarvingoutaplaceinagenuine
massorganizationliketheIBTwasessentialtofacilitatingtherevolutionary
developmentoftheworkingclass.
TheTrotskyistsattemptedtobuildupontheorganizationalstructureof
Local574toconstructaworkingclasspoliticalbaseledbyaLeninistvanguard
partyandindependentof,butnotantagonisticto,theFLP.Thealarmingofvictory
offascisminGermanyconvincedTrotskythataunitedfrontbetween
revolutionaryandreformistpartieswasnecessarytodefendworkingclass
organizationsandadvancerevolutionarypolitics.Theunitedfrontwasbasedona
conditionalalliancewithbourgeoisandreformistpartiestoconfrontthemenaceof
fascism,butitssuccessdependedontherevolutionaryleadershipoftheworkers
overothersocialclasses.Thepetitbourgeoisieandthepeasantry,Trotskyargued,
canhavenopolicyofitsownbecauseitseconomicsituationwouldbedefined
eitherbytheproletariatorthebourgeoisie.118 Trotskyoutlinedapolicyofcritical
supporttopreventthesubordinationoftheworkersrevolutionaryinitiativetothe
117 LearnfromMinneapolis!NewMilitant,May26,1934,1.
118 Trotsky,TheCrisisoftheFrenchSection,36.
51

parliamentarypolitics.Theunitedfront,Trotskywrote,doesnotrenounce
parliamentarystruggle,bututilizesparliamentabovealltounmaskits
impotence.119Electoralpoliticswerenottobedismissed,buttheymeantlittle
withoutapowerfulmassmovementofworkers.
TheMinneapolisTrotskyistsattemptedtoconsolidatethelocalspolitical
autonomybyrecruitingmilitantrankandfileunionmembersintotheCommunist
LeagueofAmerica.HistorianConstanceMyersarguesthattherigidchainof
commandinthevanguardpartyalienatedworkerswhofoughtagainstindustrial
hierarchiesandbureaucratismonthejob.Moreover,thepartysdogmatism
silencedinternalcriticismandproducedalessintense,lesscreativerebellion
againstandcritiqueofcapitalistvalues.120Evenaftertheupheavalsof1934few
workerssignedupwiththeCLA.Themajorityofthe100oddmembersinthe
CommunistLeaguesMinneapolisbranchwerealmostexclusivelycommittedto
tradeunionwork,andrarely,ifever,attendedgeneralpartymeetings.121TheCLAs
fewpartyworkersfocusedonthepartyapparatus.122ThecreationoftheWorkers
Party(WP)outofamergeroftheCommunistLeaguewithAJMustesAmerican
119 Trotsky,CrisisoftheFrenchSection,59.
120 ConstanceMyers,TheAmericanTrotskyists,19281941(unpublishedPh.D.
dissertation,UniversityofSouthCarolina,1974),ivv.
121 GraceHolmesCarlsoninterview,July9and14,1987,TwentiethCentury
RadicalisminMinnesotaOralHistoryProject,14,3840;Maloneyinterview,92.
TrotskyistactivistGraceHolmesCarlson,apsychologyprofessorattheUniversityof
Minnesotaandforatimethewifeofthelocalslawyer,recalled:Alotofthese
peopledidntreallyhaveatrulybasicinterestinMarxism;theirinterestwaswhat
theMarxistscould,sotospeak,dofortheminthetradeunionmovement.Perhaps
thetwomostnotabledelinquentsfrompartyworkwerenoneotherthanGrantand
MilesDunne,theyoungerbrothersofthelocalschiefideologueVincentDunne.
122 Carlsoninterview,1617.
52

WorkersParty(AWP)didlittletoexpandtheappealofTrotskyismamongthecitys
workers.
TheTrotskyistsinitiatedapolicyofcriticalsupportfortheFLP,backingthe
partyscandidateswhilesharplycriticizingthedangerousillusionsofFarmer
Laborism.123Workers,Trotskyargued,votedreluctantlyforreformistcandidates
andthusitwasthetaskoftherevolutionarytoprovidealternativeleadership.124
AlthoughtheTrotskyistsadmittedthattheFLPwasanorganicmanifestationof
workingclassstruggle,itsheavilypetitbourgeoissocialbaseposedserious
problemsforlabor.Withoutaneffectivenetworkofpartyworkersthelocals
Trotskyistleadersleanedmoreheavilyontheunionitselftoinfluencethepoliticsof
theFarmerLaborParty.ThroughLocal574theTrotskyistsadvancedaformof
whathistorianRosemaryFeureridentifiesascivicunionism,connecting
workplaceconflictswiththosefacingtheworkingclasscommunities.125They
intendedtousethelocalssheersize,organizationalwherewithal,andprestigeto
mobilizeworkersbehindprolaborcandidatesandtopressuretheFLPtoexpand
reliefbenefits,payunionscaleonallstateWPAprojects,andtoappropriateidle
factoriesasstaterunenterprises.Moreover,withoutanucleusofpartyactivists
workingoutsidethelabormovement,theTrotskyistsbrandofcivicunionism
almostexclusivelystressedissuesofspecificconcerntotradeunions.Critical
supportfortheFLPwasgearedtoprotectandadvancetheinterestsoforganized
laborratherthanpushthepartyfurtherleft.
123 Dobbs,TeamsterPolitics(NewYork:MonadPress,1975),64;W.P.Supports
ElectionBattleAgainstMpls.Reactionaries,NewMilitant,May18,1935,1.
124 Trotsky,Fascism,Stalinism,andtheUnitedFront(London:Bookmarks,1989),45.
125 Feurer,RadicalUnionism,xvii,xviii,5758,67,74,9092,passim.
53
InitsfirstmajorforayintoFLPpolitics,thelocalsupportedthecandidacyof
laborattorneyandformerSocialistThomasLatimerformayorofMinneapolisin
Juneof1935.TheincumbentRepublicanmayor,A.G.Bainbridge,formerlya
prominentofficialintheStateFederationofLabor,waswidelydespisedbythecitys
workersforthepoliceviolenceunleashedagainstpicketsduringtheJuly1934
truckingstrike.126AvictoryforLatimerwouldbeanopportunityfororganized
labortohavesomerealinfluencewithinthecorridorsofCityHallforthefirsttime
sincetheSocialistadministrationofThomasVanLearalmostfifteenyearprior.Ata
membershipmeetingofLocal574inApril,Latimerwasgivenastandingovation
withthunderousapplausefromthe1,000driverswhocametohearhimspeak.127
ThelocalpressedwhatfewresourcesitstillhadavailabletoassisttheLatimer
campaign,butmoreimportantlyLocal574putitsreputationamongthecitys
workersbehindtheFarmerLaborcandidate.HeadlinesintheNorthwestOrganizer,
Local574sweeklynewspaper,exhortedworkerstoRememberBloodyFridayand
demandedBainbridgeandBloody[ChiefofPolice]MikeJohannesmustgo!128The
localimploredworkerstovoteastraightFLPticket,andwarnedinnouncertain
terms:Theimmediatefutureofthelabormovementisatstake!129Latimer
defeatedhisRepublicanchallengerwithsolidworkingclasssupport,butnotin
significantenoughnumberstoleavehimpoliticallybeholdentothelabor
movement.
126 Cf.petitiontotheCityCouncilofMinneapolistoremoveMayorA.G.Bainbridge
fromoffice,nodate(ca.September1934),Mss848,box15,folder6,DobbsPapers.
127 FLCommitteeAsksUnionsRepresented,MinneapolisLaborReview,April14,
1935,1.
128 SupporttheFarmerLaborCandidates,NorthwestOrganizer,May1,1935,1.
129 DefeattheCitizensAllianceCandidates,NorthwestOrganizer,May25,1935,1.
54
Latimerwasdeeplyuncomfortablewiththeteamsterleadershipsradicalism
andworriedthatfrictionbetweenthemilitantnewdirectionofthelabormovement
andthehardlineantiunionismoffirmsorganizedbytheCitizensAlliancewould
sparkanotherroundofviolentstrikes.Nationaldevelopmentsinlaborlawgavethe
newmayorreasontobeconcerned.InMay,theSupremeCourtsdecisionin
SchechterPoultryCorp.v.UnitedStatesruledtheNRAunconstitutional.The
torturedcareeroftheNRAhadalreadyconvincedanumberofNewDealersto
rethinktheroleofunionsasagentsofeconomicrecoveryempoweredbyfederal
laborlaw.130PassedthreedaysaftertheSchechterdecisionandpromptedbythe
ongoingmilitancyofthelabormovement,theNationalLaborRelationsAct(NLRA),
betterknownastheWagnerAct,establishedaformallegalprocedureforthe
recognitionoftradeunions.131Rooseveltsownbelatedinterestingivinglaborthe
righttocollectivelybargainwasintendedtoclampdownontheindustrial
disturbancesburdeningorobstructingcommerce.132Althoughlaborsrightto
organizewasenshrinedinlaw,employerscontinuedtofiercelyresistNewDeal
laborlawundertheassumptionthatWagnertoowouldberuledunconstitutional.
InMinneapolis,theCitizensAllianceurgeditsmemberstoresistWagnersincursion
130 Gordon,NewDeals,200.
131 TheargumentthatmasslaborprotestpromptedthepassageoftheWagnerAct
hasprovencontroversial.ForabreakdownofthedebateseeThedaSkocpol,
KennethFinegold,andMichaelGoldfield,ExplainingNewDealLaborPolicy,
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview84(4)1990:12971315.
132 WilliamE.Leuchtenburg,FranklinRooseveltandtheNewDeal,19321940(New
York:HarperColophonBooks1963)150151,336;quotedinDavidM.Kennedy,
FreedomFromFear:TheAmericanPeopleinDepressionandWar,19291945(New
York:OxfordUniversityPress,1999),298.
55

intotheaffairsofbusiness.133Nationally,workersorganizedthemselvestoconfront
employersandinthemassproductionindustriesralliedaroundthenewlyformed
CommitteeforIndustrialOrganization(CIO).134Inthissamespirit,574beganan
organizingdrivetobringtheclosedshoptoallMinneapolistruckingfirmswhile
alsoassistingtherecognitiondrivesofunionsinotherindustries.135Inthisheated
atmosphere,Latimerauthorizedthepurchaseofmachineguns,teargas,andsix
armoredcars,ostensiblytothwartbankrobberies,butVincentDunneprotestedthe
policedepartmentsnewacquisitionsbypointingouttheycanbeusedtobreak
strikestoo.136
Inthesummerof1935anotherstrikewaveshookMinneapolis.InmidJuly,
IAMLocal1313stucktheFlourCityOrnamentalIronWorks,aidedbysecondary
boycottsandsympathystrikescoordinatedby574.137JustastheOlson
administrationproudlyannouncedtheestablishmentofapublicallyownedand
cooperativelymanagedruralelectrificationprogram,thenewFarmerLabormayor
ofMinneapolisdeployedpoliceagainststrikingworkers.138Then,onthemorningof
July26,Latimerpersonallyledadetachmentof68policeofficersandsome30
133 CitizensAllianceofMinneapolisSpecialWeeklyBulletin,May14,1935,Mss
848,box15,folder9,DobbsPapers.
134 RobertZieger,TheCIO,19351955(ChapelHill,NC:UniversityofNorthCarolina
Press,1995),2939.
135 OrganizationDriveOnAllFrontsBegunByLocal574,NorthwestOrganizer,
May15,1935,1.
136 Dobbs,TeamsterPower(NewYorkMonadPress,1973),89;Maloneyinterview,
117.
137 LocalNo.1313FightsInjunction,NorthwestOrganizerJuly24,1935,1;Letter
fromRobertHapptoVincentDay,September17,1935,box1,folderMisc.
correspondence:RobertHapp,19351936,DayPapers.
138 FLLaunchesVastRuralElectricPlanonCooperative,PublicOwnershipBasis,
MinnesotaLeader,July20,1935,1.
56

strikebreakersacrossunionpicketlinesandintotheFlourCityworks.139Rightly
appalledbyLatimersbrazendisregardforlaborsolidarity,theNorthwestOrganizer
demandedthatthemayormakeapartialrestitutiontoorganizedlaborbyshutting
downthefactoryasamenacetothepublicpeace.140LatimerignoredLocal574
andpolicecontinuedtoprotectstrikebreakersfromincreasinglyhostilestrikers
incensedbythemayorsactions.Violenceonthepicketlinespeakedwhenpolice
firedintoacrowdofworkersgatheredtoprotestthecompanyshousingof
replacementworkersintheplant,killingtwobystanders.141AlongsideFlourCity,a
strikeragedamongthehosieryworkersattheStrutwearKnittingMills.142The
StrutwearfirmwasevenmoredeterminedthanFlourCitysmanagementtoprevent
unionization,and,attheurgingoftheCitizensAlliance,lockedouttheworkersand
shutdowntheplant.143Heretoo,Local574playedacrucialroleinprovidingtactical
assistanceandstrikesupportforthepicketingworkers.144TheStrutwearstrike
wasnearlyasviolentasFlourCityand,mostinfamously,VincentDunnewaspulled
bypolicefromtheknitterspicketlineandsavagelybeaten.145
LatimershostilitytowardsmilitantlaborshockedandenragedLocal574,
butthemayorstoodcommittedtorestoringlaborpeacethroughforceandwiththe
139 MetalWorkersStrikeIsSolid,NorthwestOrganizer,July31,1935,12.
140 ClosethePlant,MayorLatimer,NorthwestOrganizer,July31,1935,2.
141 TwoMassacredWhenPoliceProtectLawlessFlourCityCo.,MinneapolisLabor
Review,September13,1935,1.
142 StrikeRanksGrowingFastAtStrutwear,NorthwestOrganizerAugust21,1935,
1;UnionStrutwearKnittersStopProduction,MinneapolisLaborReviewAugust23,
1935,1.
143 Millikan,AUnionAgainstUnions,29495;Mayer,FloydB.Olson,276.
144 LoisQuamandPeterJ.Rachleff,KeepingMinneapolisanOpenShopTown:The
Citizens'Allianceinthe1930s,MinnesotaHistory50(3)1986,11017.
145 StrikeRanksGrowingFast,1.
57

assistanceofconservativelaborleaders.Inacloseddoorconferenceinthemayors
receptionroomwithofficialsfromtheMinnesotaStateFederation,Latimeragreed
tobackLocal500anddeclaredthatpolicewouldbeusedagainststrikingworkers
notrepresentedbyAFLunions.146Latimeralsoannouncedthecreationofacity
EmployerEmployeeBoardtosupplementthefederallaborbureaucracy.The
board,composedofrepresentativesoflaborandemployersappointedbythe
mayor,wasauthorizedtoarbitrateindustrialdisputesanddeclareanywork
stoppageillegal.147 574sexecutiveboardemphaticallyrejectedLatimersofferto
haveoneofitsofficerssitontheboard,claimingthisartificialagencywas
usurpingthelegalrightsofunionorganizations.148Thelocalinturnconfronted
theFLPoverLatimerseffortstorepressmilitantlabor.Isthisthefutureaccepted
policyoftheFarmerLaborParty?Wasthispartoftheplatformhewaselectedon?
askedaneditorialintheNorthwestOrganizer.Thelocalpointedtothe10,000
workerscriticaltoLatimerselectionwhowereorganizedintounionsindependent
oftheAFL.
WedemandthattheFarmerLaborPartyclarifyitspositioninregardtoso
calledoutlawunions.Iftheydonotwantthesupportofworkersinthese
unionsthenletthemsaysoplainly.Ourfuturepoliticalcoursewillbelargely
guidedbytheiractions.149
146 TobinAgentsMeetLatimer;PlanBetrayalofStrikers,NorthwestOrganizer,
August21,1935,12.
147 MayorLatimerAttemptstoIntroduceCompulsoryArbitrationinLocalLabor
DisputesReactionaryUnionLeadersAid,NorthwestOrganizer,September11,
1935,12.
148 LetterfromExecutiveBoardGeneralDriversUnionLocal574totheHennepin
CountyCentralCommitteeoftheFarmerLaborParty,theMinneapolisGeneral
LaborUnion,AllTradeUnionsandRailroadBrotherhoods,September20,1935,Mss
149 AQuestiontotheFarmerLaborParty,NorthwestOrganizer,August21,1935,2.
58

ThelocalgarneredthesupportofkeyFLPwardclubsinMinneapolis.Aresolution
presentedbytheFifthWardClubtotheHennepinCountyCentralCommittee
assertedthattheFLPwasdependentuponthesupportofallbonafide[sic]labor
organizationsregardlessofwhetherornottheyareaffiliatedtotheAmerican
FederationofLabor.150
Tocomplicatemattersinbothstrikes,agroupofinfluentialCommunist
activistsintheMinneapolisIAMlocalsandamongtheunemployedchallengedthe
Trotskyistspreeminentpositionamongmilitantworkers.TheMinnesotaCPs
returntoorganizinginthemainstreamlabormovementwasatacitadmissionofthe
failureoftheThirdPeriodshardleftsectarianism.Nonetheless,thisrevived
activityintheAFLunionsonlyfurtherstrainedsolidarityasviolentresistancefrom
employersandthecitygovernmentintensified.151Anticipatingtheinternational
Communistmovementsofficialturntoreformism,theStalinistsreachedmuchthe
sameconclusionsastheirTrotskyistadversaries:revolutionarypoliticsneededto
betemperedtoattractwidersupportforsocialism.152TheCPcalledonthe
MinneapolisFLPadministrationtoupholditscampaignpledgestoprotecttheright
ofworkerstopicketwithoutpoliceinterference,increasereliefbenefits,ensurea
150 ResolutionoftheFifthWardFarmerLaborClubofMinneapolis,nodate(ca.
September1935),Mss848,box15,folder16,DobbsPapers.
151 Local574LeadersTryToStopUnity,UnitedAction,August1,1935,1;Dobbs,
TeamsterPolitics,186.
152 TheMinnesotaCPwasnotaloneindiscardingthepurityrevolutionary
isolationpriortotheformaladoptionofthePopularFront,buttheMinnesota
sectionmadethisshiftlaterthanmanyoftheirMidwestcomradeswhoengagedin
genuinecoalitionbuildingasearlyas19311932.Feurer,RadicalUnionism,4142;
SteveNelson,JamesR.Barrett,RobRuck,SteveNelson:AmericanRadical
(Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress,1981)7576;LizabethCohen,Makinga
NewDeal:IndustrialWorkersinChicago,19191939(NewYork:Cambridge
UniversityPress,1990),26364
59

unionpayscalesonallpublicworksprojects,andinvestigatelaborendorsed
aldermenwhosupportedLatimersstrikebreakingpolicies.153 TheCPalso
proposedtoleadtheFLPrankandfileandthetradeunionsbehindaUnitedLabor
bannertoforcetheFarmerLaborleadershiptoadoptaclassstruggleprogram.154
Inlatesummerof1935theCommunistscriticalapproachtotheFLPwasalmost
identicaltothatoftheTrotskyists.Politically,thetwounionswereatoddsoverthe
appropriaterelationshipofarevolutionarypartytotheFarmerLaborParty.Ata
publicdebatebetweentheTrotskyistsandtheCommunists,CPstalwartHarry
MayvilleofthemachinistscontendedthattheFarmerLaborPartycouldbe
transformedintoapartyofclassstruggle.VincentDunneoftheteamstersretorted
thatpoliticalrelianceonFarmerLaborismwithoutalabormovementcommittedto
militantdirectactionwouldbearetreatintoreformism.155Anychanceofa
partnership,though,wasoutofthequestionasbothgroupsviedtobecomethe
vanguardofMinneapolismassesandtoilers.
UnderpressurefromthelabormovementandtheMinneapolisFLP
establishment,Latimerworkedtonegotiateapeacefulsettlementtothestrike
wave.ThroughtheEmployerEmployeeBoardthemayororderedtheFlourCity
plantshuttered.FlourCitymanagementwasforcedtorecognizetheunionand
agreedtodemandsforwageincreasesandovertimepay,endinganearlythree
153 WhatMinneapolisWorkersExpectofFLAdministration,UnitedAction,August
1,1935,3.
154 RumblingsAreHeardinFLPartyRanksOverBetrayals,UnitedAction,August
1,1935,3,7.WalterFrank,WhyIWasACandidateForAldermanofthe11thWard,
UnitedAction,August1,1935,12.
155 DunneBlastsC.P.inDebate,NewMilitant,June15,1935,2.
60

monthlongstrike.Olsonsroleintheresolutionofthestrikeremainsunclear.156If
hepersonallypressuredLatimertoclosetheplantitseemslikelythathewould
havestressedthepoliticalimportanceofrecastingtheFLPsroleinresolvingthe
strike.TheFLPwaseagertorehabilitateitsreputationamongitsworkingclass
basewhilealsoreassuringitsruralandpetitbourgeoisadherentsthatthepartywas
evenhandedinitsmediationofsocialconflict.Yet,inasurveyofthecitysworking
classwardstheFLPestimatedthatonly30percentofworkervoterswereclass
consciousandforthestrikers.157Whilenotaninsignificantdegreeofsupport,the
limitedsalienceofthestrikeamongthemassofworkingclassvotersnodoubt
reassuredFLPleadersanxioustoavoidthrustingthepartyintothemiddleofalabor
dispute.Asaresult,neitherthegovernornortheFLPpublicallyrepudiatedthe
mayor.Instead,Latimerwaschastisedforhislackofstatesmanshipandforbeing
soeasilymanipulatedintoviolentconfrontationbytheintransigenceoftheCAand
radicalstrikeleaders.158Meanwhile,thestrikeatStrutweardraggedonuntilApril
1936.LatimersrequestforOlsontosendintheNationalGuardtoclosethefactory
ledStrutwearmanagementtobringsuitinfederalcourtclaimingthegovernor
exceededhisauthority.BythetimeOlsonremovedthetroopsfromMinneapolis,
156 GeorgeH.Mayer,ThePoliticalCareerofFloydB.Olson(Minneapolis:Universityof
MinnesotaPress,1951),275.Olson,nodoubtstillreelingfrombeingtarreda
strikebreakerduringthe1934truckingstrikes,wasleeryaboutbeingtooclosely
associatedwithamayoractivelyinvolvedinbreakingastrike.
157 LetterfromRobertHapptoVincentDay,August23,1935,box1,folderMisc.
158 StrikeDeathsRouseDemandtoOustLatimer,MinnesotaLeader,September21,
1935,1.
61

theworkersandmanagementreachedasettlementthatrecognizedtheknitters
union.159
SurprisinglyenoughAFLPresidentWilliamGreeninterpretedOlsons
actionsasanendorsementofmilitantandradicallabor.Inresponse,Greentook
advantageoftheinternaldisputewithintheIBTtobeginanalloutcampaign
againstmilitancyandradicalismwithintheAFL.Theupsurgeinlabormilitancy
throughouttheAFLoverprevioustwoyears,promptedGreentowrite,[wemust]
preventcontrolofourmovementlodginginthehandsofCommunists.160ToGreen,
themlewithintheIBToverLocal574wasemblematicofalargerproblemwith
radicalismfacedbytheentireAFL.ThesecretaryoftheStateFederationofLabor
appearedinOctoberbeforetheAFLExecutiveCommitteetoprovidethefederation
withinformationregardingtheextensivenetworkofCommunistsactiveinthe
Minneapolislabormovement,inparticular574andIAMLocals382and1313.161
GreenthendispatchedhislieutenantMeyerLewistocoordinateasocalledRed
drivetorootradicalsoutoftheMinnesotalabormovement.162Lewismissionto
exposeundercoverradicalswashighlyunpopularinMinneapolis,leadingmany
otherwisemoderateandconservativeunioniststoresenttheAFLsintrusioninto
159 Mayer,FloydB.Olson,27677;StrutwearPlantReopens,NorthwestOrganizer,
April8,1936,1;DetailsStrutwearSettlement,MinneapolisLaborReview,April
10,1936,1.
160 LetterfromWilliamGreentoPaulJ.Smith,October4,1935,Mss848,box15
161 MinutesofAmericanFederationofLaborExecutiveCouncilMeeting,October
1935,Mss848,box15,folder9,DobbsPapers
162 LetterfromWilliamGreentoMeyerLewis,October28,1935,Mss848,box15,
62

localaffairsandsidewithLocal574.163Greensdecisiontotargetradicalswasnot
evenunanimouslysupportedintheAFL,especiallynotamongstindustrialunion
leadersintheCIOwhowerecomingtorelyheavilyuponradicalorganizers.David
DubinskyoftheInternationalLadies'GarmentWorkers'UniondescribedLewis
handlingoftheReddriveasfutileandselfdestructiveinatelegramtoGreen:
Methodshepursueswillnotridthemovementofcommunists,ifthereareany,but
willdestroythe[organized]labormovement.164Dubinskyfearedthatawitchhunt
inMinneapoliswouldonlyunderminelaborsolidarityandfuelemployersantiunion
polemics.
Theongoingcrisisinthelabormovementbetweenconservativeunion
leadersandmilitantrankandfileinsurgentsthreatenedtodestroytheviable
politicalcoalitionsmadepossiblebylaborunity.Infall1935,reportstoOlsons
officedescribedthepoliticallydisastrousfalloutofacontinuedriftbetween574and
theIBTandtheAFL.Tobin,oneFarmerLaboradvisorreasoned,couldonlydefeat
574withLatimershelp.IftheIBTpresidentcontinuedtoantagonizethelocaland
iftheFLPremainedneutral,theTrotskyistswouldruntheirownticketinthe1936
electionsandcutintotheFLPvoteinMinneapolisworkingclasswards.165Robley
Cramer,theeditoroftheMinneapolisLaborReview,telegrammedFarmerLaborUS
163 LetterfromMeyerLewistoWilliamGreen,nodate(ca.October1935),Mss848,
box15,folder9,DobbsPapers;MeyerLewisspeechattheUniversityofMinnesota,
November12,1935,MinneapolisTeamstersStrikeDocuments;FloreShows
GrowthInternationalUnion,MinneapolisLaborReview,November15,1935,1.
LewisRoutedinAssembly,Local574GoestoCollege;LewisGetsItontheChin,
NorthwestOrganizer,November20,1935,12,1,3.
164 TelegramfromDavidDubinskytoWilliamGreen,November13,1935,Mss848,
165 LetterfromRobertHapptoVincentDay,September1,1935,box1,folderMisc.
63

SenatorHenrikShipsteadinWashingtontoexplainthegravityofthesituation:a
splitinlabormovementwillmean[a]splitin[the]politicalmovementanddisaster
allalongtheline.166USCongressmanDeweyJohnsonandseveralFLPwardclubs
andcommitteesdemandedanendtotheReddriveinordertorestorelabors
politicalunity.167TheHennepinCountyFarmerLaborCentralCommitteefollowed
suitandadoptedaresolutioninsupportof574sreinstatementintotheAFLeven
thoughonlytwomonthsearlierthecommitteehadrefusedtocensureorinanyway
officiallycondemnLatimerforhisroleintheFlourCitystrikeshootings.168
WiththegrassrootsFarmerLaborunitsinsupportoftheTrotskyist
teamstersandthestatepartystillsilentontheissue,theFLPslongstanding
relationshipwiththeMinnesotaStateFederationofLaborseemedonthevergeof
deteriorating.GeorgeLawsonoftheStateFederationofLaborblamedlabors
factionalstrifeonunionistswhodeviatedfromstrictlyeconomicissuesinfavorof
plansandisms.169LawsonalsourgedShipsteadtoaccepttheAFLspositionthat
communistshadnolegitimateplaceinthetradeunionsandpushtheFLPtocome
outmoreforciblyagainstmilitantlabor.170AsidefromLatimer(theonlyFarmer
Laboritetoaddressthe1935statelaborconvention),thecraftfederationleaders
166 TelegramfromRobleyCramertoHenrikShipstead,November12,1935,Mss
167 WarnsofFLDrifttoRight,NorthwestOrganizer,October30,1935,1;Third
WardFLClubOpposesMeyerLewis,JuniorFarmerLaborClubCondemnsLewis,
NorthwestOrganizer,November13,1935,2.
168 Henn.F.L.P.GroupHitsatRedPurge,NorthwestOrganizer,December11,
1935,1;AnotherReformistBetrayal,NorthwestOrganizerOctober23,1935,2.
169 ProceedingsoftheFiftythirdConventionoftheMinnesotaStateFederationof
Labor,16.
170 LetterfromGeorgeW.LawsontoHenrikShipstead,November15,1935,Mss
64

foundmostoftheFLPtobetoosoftoncommunismandconsidereditsleftofcenter
politicstooradical.ThebureaucratsoftheA.F.ofL.sInternationalsareasmuch
opposedtoaFarmerLaborPartyastheyaretotheCommunists,wroteanFLP
advisortoOlsonssecretaryVincentDay.171LawsonlashedoutattheFarmerLabor
newspapertheMinnesotaLeaderforcriticizingtheReddriveandrebukedtheFLP
forinterferinginlaborsaffairs.172Olsonwasleftonshakygroundasthe
MinneapolisFLPstoodsolidlybehindtheTrotskyistteamsterswhiletheAFLwas
leaningonthestatepartytotakedecisiveactionagainstlaborradicals.
ThecontinuingcrisisinthelabormovementforcedtheTrotskyistteamsters
toreevaluatetheirconnectiontotheFLP.InSeptember,WilliamBrown,thelocals
president,hadpublicallydismissedtheFLPasdeadandthreatenedtocreatea
realproducerspartyifOlsoncontinuedtotolerateLatimerscollusionwith
Tobin.173TheWorkersPartyevenwentsofarastodeclarethatworkersshould
withdrawenmassefromthatFLP.174 Suchthreatsranghollow,andthelocal
demandedtoknowwhytheFLPsimplystoodbyasoneofthekeycomponentsofits
coalitionwasbeingtornapartbytheinterferenceoftheAFL.TheReddrive,the
localconcluded,waspoisedtoevisceratetheveryunionsresponsibleforsomuchof
theFLPsurbansupport.TheFLP,theNorthwestOrganizerpointedout,hasits
baseintheunions.
171 LetterfromRobertHapptoVincentDay,September17,1935,box1,folderMisc.
172 Geo.LawsonHitsOutAtFLPPaper,NorthwestOrganizer,November27,1935,
1,3.
173 LetterfromHapptoDay,September17,1935,DayPapers.
174 MPLS.W.P.ShowsTrueRoleofFLParty,NewMilitant,November9,1935,1,4.
65
Mostofitssupportcomesfromtheunions.TheGreendrivewilllopoffthe
FarmerLaboriteunionistsjustasquicklyasitattacksothergroups.If[the
FLP]standsaside,theGreenMachinewillcutittopieces.Itmusttakeafirm
standagainstthetacticsofMeyerLewisandaidtheprogressiveunionsin
defeatinghim.175
ThelocalarguedthattheFLPwasatitscorealaborparty,withamandatetofollow
thedirectionofthetradeunions.FortheTrotskyists,alaborpartywasaconcrete
expressionofwhatRosaLuxemburgreferredtoastheinseparabilityoftradeunion
andparliamentarystruggleinthedevelopmentofrevolutionaryconsciousness.176
Moreover,thelaborpartyideaseemedthebestpossiblecompromiseto
accommodatethenecessityofbackslidingintoclasscollaborationistpolitics.
WithoutsupportfromeitherthelocallabormovementorfromtheFLP,the
AFLsReddrivecollapsed.SotoodidtheIBTseffortstoforceout574sTrotskyist
leadership.Withthesupportofitsrankandfile,theMinneapolislabormovement,
andinfluentialfiguresandinstitutionsintheFLP,noemployerwaspreparedto
provoke574bysigningnewagreementswith500.AlthoughLocal574was
committedtoadvancingindustrialunionism,itsrealprioritywastoreaffiliatewith
theIBTandtheAFL.177TheTrotskyistleadershipwasadamantlyopposedto
fomentinganyfurtherdivisionwithinthelabormovementbyattemptingtomove
intothenewlyformedCIO.Pleasforlaborunitydidnotkeeplocalleadersfrom
meetinginearly1936withCIOorganizationaldirectorJohnBrophy.Brophy
175 WhatAbouttheFarmerLaborParty?NorthwestOrganizer,November6,1935,
2.
176 RosaLuxemburg,SelectedPoliticalWritings,DickHoward,ed.(NewYork:
MonthlyReviewPress,1971),263,269.
177 DemandIndustrialUnion,January29,NorthwestOrganizer1936,1;CLU
resolutioninfavorofindustrialunionism,nodate(ca.September1936),Mss848,
66

advisedagainstseekingaCIOcharterforfearofexacerbatingtensionswiththeAFL
andthelocalsleadersagreedwithhisadvice.JoiningthefledglingCIOwouldhave
decimatedthelocalssolebaseofconsistentsupportamongthelocalAFLunionsin
theMinneapolisCLU.178
InJulyof1936,anemissaryfromTobincontactedthelocalaboutbeginning
reconciliationtalks.AfterthreeweeksofnegotiationsbetweentheIBTpresident
andthelocalleadershipLocals574and500weremergedtogetherasLocal544.179
Theresultwasanuneasytrucebetweenthenewlyminted544andtheIBTwhereby
officialsfromLocal500wouldbeintegratedintothelocalleadershipasmemberson
theexecutiveboardandasvicepresidentandsecretarytreasurer.180Despitethe
presenceofTobinsalliesinafewunionleadershipposts,themergeritselfwasa
majorconcessiononthepartofTobinandtheAFL.Ineffect,thecreationof544
legitimizedalocalorganizedandledbyacadreofradicals.
Organizedlaborwasfacedwithanumberofcrucialchoicesby1936,but
abstainingfrominvolvementinthepoliticalprocesswasnolongerone.Twoyears
ofmilitantstrugglewerebeginningtomaketheunionshopandcollective
bargainingconcreterealitiesforthousandsofMinneapolisworkers,butmaintaining
thisnewsystemofindustrialrelationshingeduponactivegovernmentsupportof
organizedlabor.Theinitialproblemswithensuringcompliancewithlaborlaw,
coupledwithorganizedlaborslingeringdiscomfortwithrelyingonstate
intervention,meantthatlaborneededtocontinuetakinganaggressivestance
178 Dobbs,TeamsterPower,113.
179 Unionof574500ThrillsWorkers,MinneapolisLaborReview,July17,1936,1.
180 Dobbs,TeamsterPower,12325.
67

againstemployers.Labormilitancyhadprovedpracticalonthepicketlineandit
forcedthestatetotakeseriouslyboththeshopfloorandpoliticalgrievancesof
workers.Inthiscontext,theappealofvoluntarismandstrictnonpartisanshipwas
beginningtowane.HavingbeatenTobinandsurvivedGreensReddrive,thelocal
didnotabandonFarmerLaborpolitics.Rather,theincreasedpoliticalprofileof
militantlaborreinforcedtheTrotskyistsvisionofincreasingthepoweroftrade
unionsovertheFLP.Atthesametime,theturmoilwithintheMinnesotalabor
movementledtheFLPtobeginacriticalrevaluationofitspoliticalrelationshipwith
organizedlabor.Fearfuloffuturefragmentationinthelabormovement,notto
mentiontheestrangementofruralandmiddleclassvotersfromtheFarmerLabor
banner,theFLPsleadershipattemptedtolimitthepoliticalinterventionof
organizedlabor.
TheFarmerLaborPartyandthePopularFront
Throughout1935,theinternationalCommunistmovementwasinamoment
oftransition.InMinnesotaandelsewhere,partymembersslowlyshedthe
stricturesoftheThirdPeriodwithareturntocollaboratingwithliberal,reform
orientedworkingclassorganizations.InresponsetothefailureoftheCPsultra
revolutionaryapproachtoattractworkingclasssupport,thePopularFrontwas
officiallyinauguratedattheSeventhWorldCongressoftheCommunist
Internationalinthesummerof1935tobuildbroadcrossclassallianceswith
socialistandliberalbourgeoispartiesandtradeunionsincommoncauseagainstthe
68

riseoffascism.181 UnderthePopularFronttheCPsoughttoenterthemainstreamof
AmericanpoliticsastheleftwingoftheNewDealcoalition.TheCP,General
SecretaryEarlBrowderproudlydeclared,becamethemostsinglemindedpractical
reformistpartythatAmericaeverproduced.182InternallytheCPremaineda
rigidlyhierarchicalvanguardpartydrivenbyideologicaldogmatism,replacingthe
fetishizationofrevolutionwiththefetishizationofliberalreform.Thepolitical
turnofthePopularFrontembracedelectoralpoliticsandthegradualreformof
capitalism,relinquishinganypretenseaboutbeingarevolutionaryparty.The
planksofthePopularFrontsprogramwasessentiallyaleftleaningvariationof
whattheNewDealultimatelyachieved,e.g.publicworksprojects,reliefforfarmers,
andcollectivebargaining.183CommunistcadresreturnedtotheAFLunionsand
mostsignificantlysurgedintoCIOorganizingcampaignsinthemassproduction
industries.Initially,PopularFrontCommunistswereopposedtotheDemocratic
Partyandeagerlysoughtentryintostatelevelthirdpartypolitics.184Progressive,
labor,andfarmerlaborpartiesinWisconsin,NewYork,andMinnesota,theCP
181 ThetermPopularFrontrefersspecificallytoLeonBlumscoalitiongovernment
ofsocialistsandCommunistsinFrancefrom19361937,butthetermhascometo
betheblankethistoricaltermforthisperiodininternationalCommunism.TheCP
intheUSfirstdubbedthisnewspiritofcooperationtheUnitedFrontandalso
usedsloganslikethePeoplesFrontandtheDemocraticFrontbeforethesigning
oftheMolotovRibbentropPactin1939.Cf.TimReesandAndrewThorpe,eds.,
InternationalCommunismandtheCommunistInternational,191943(Manchester:
ManchesterUniversityPress,1998)andJaneDegras,ed.,TheCommunist
International19191943:Documents(London:Routledge,1971).
182 QuotedinBryanD.Palmer,RethinkingtheHistoriographyofUnitedStates
Communism,AmericanCommunistHistory2(2)2003,152.
183 Cf.EarlBrowder,WhatIsCommunism?(NewYork:VanguardPress,1936),115
117.
184 KennethWalzer,ThePartyandthePollingPlace:AmericanCommunismandan
AmericanLaborPartyinthe1930s,RadicalHistoryReview,Spring1980:10429.
69

reasoned,weretheidealplatformstolaunchanationalandmoreauthentically
workingclassalternativetotheDemocrats.185
PriortotheofficialshiftininternationalCommuniststrategy,theMinnesota
CPhadalreadybegunmovingintotheFLP.Inaresolutionpassedbythe
CommunistPartyCentralCommitteeinAugust1935,thepartyleadersclaimeda
sharpclassdifferentiationwasemerginginMinnesotabetweentheleftward
movingworkersandsmallfarmersandtheofficialleaders,tradeunionreformists,
andthebourgeoispoliticiansoftheFLP.Whiletheresolutionnotedthatworkers
andfarmerswerenotyetreadytoaccepttheCommunistPartyoutright,thenew
platformorderedpartymemberstoworkwithintheFLPtoisolateitsreactionary
leadershipaswellasdemagoguesliketheTrotskyists.186BySeptember
CommunistswerejoiningtheFLPandfromwithintheorganizationdenounced
LatimerandOlson.187ThegrowinginfluenceoftheCPtroubledtheFarmerLabor
leadership.AtameetingorganizedbytheCPtoprotestthepolicekillingsduring
theFlourCitystrike,anFLPadvisorestimatedthatoverhalfofthemorethan400
peopleinattendancewereactiverankandfilemembersofourownparty.188The
nextmonth,OlsonmetwithEarlBrowderandthegovernoragreedtosecretlyallow
CPmembersbackintotheFLP.189TheCPceaseditsattacksonOlsonandstopped
185 JohnEarlHaynes,DubiousAlliance:TheMakingofMinnesotasDFLParty
(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1984),15.
186 TheTasksofthePartyInCarryingThroughtheCCResolutionontheLabor
PartyinMinn.andNorthwest,UnitedAction,August15,1935,5.
187 LetterRobertHapptoVincentDay,September21,1935,box1,folderMisc.
correspondence:RobertHapp,19351936,DayPapers;GovernorOlsons
LeadershipOftheFarmerLaborParty,UnitedAction,September16,1935,2.
188 LetterfromHapptoDay,September21,1935,DayPapers.
189 HarveyKlehr,TheHeydayofAmericanCommunism:TheDepressionDecade(New
70

runningitsowncandidatesforofficeinMinnesota.AlthoughtheCPwasverysmall
inMinnesotaoneestimateputmembershipatonly1,000inthe1930sthese
cadresbecamesomeofthemostdiligentanddedicatedmembersoftheFLP.190The
influxofdisciplinedandhardworkingCPcadresloyaltoOlsonhelpedthegovernor
strengthenhispositionagainsttheFLPscompetingfactions.191
TheCommunistsreenteredFarmerLaborpoliticsjustasOlsonwas
strugglingtokeeplaborfactionalismfromdullingthepartyselectoraledge.As
muchastherevivalofthelabormovementinMinneapolismobilizedworkers
behindtheFLP,themovementsmilitancyappearedtoundermineFarmer
Laborismsclaimtobeadvocatingpeacefulandorderlychange.192Olsonwasmost
concernedwithhowtomakeleftofcenterpoliticsappealingtoadiversityofclass
fractionsandnotstrictlyworkers.However,theFLPs1934lossesinruralcounties
andslippingnumbersinkeyurbanwardsmadekeepingthepartysbasein
organizedlaborintactanurgentmatterforthepartyasawhole.Asthelabor
movementwassplinteringover574sfeudwithintheIBT,theAFLsReddrive,and
Latimershandlingofthe1935strikewave,Olsonrealizedthatthecoordinating
bodyoftheFLPsstatewideparty,theFarmerLaborAssociation,neededtobe
insulatedfromlaborfactionalism.Thiswasproblematicbecausetradeunionists
York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1984),259.OlsonsaccordwithBrowderproved
wrongTrotskys1932predictionthat,giventheCPsfailuretoweditselftothe
embryonicfarmerlabormovementintheearly1920s,itwouldhaveless
possibilityinthenewphaseofananalogousmovement.Trotsky,OntheLabor
PartyQuestioninAmerica,ClassStruggle,August1932.
190 Haynes,DubiousAlliance,16.
191 Naftalin,AHistoryoftheFarmerLaborParty,238;Gieske,MinnesotaFarmer
Laborism,216.
192 Gieske,MinnesotaFarmerLaborism,19495.
71

comprisedthebulkoftheassociationsmembership.Before1933,6,000to8,000
tradeunionistswereduespayingmembersoftheFarmerLaborAssociationwhen
totalmembershipwasonlyabout10,000.Evenwhenmembershipgrewto20,000
in1934andthenumberofunionmembersintheFarmerLaborAssociation
remainedstatic,theunionswerestilltheassociationsmostorganizedgrouping.193
TheCPsrelativeisolationfromthecontroversiesinthelocallabor
movementmadetheCommunistsanevenmoreattractivepartnerforOlson.The
tremendousgrowthoftheCPnationallyandinMinnesotathroughthe1930swas
accompaniedbyasteadydeproletarianizationasmiddleclassprofessionals
progressivelybegantooutnumberindustrialworkers.194Despiteparty
pronouncements(echoingthoseoftheTrotskyists)callingforthetransformationof
theFLPintorealclassstrugglepartyledbythemilitanttradeunions,the
MinnesotaCPhadnoformalauthorityoveranymajorMinneapolistradeunion.195
Thepartyshistoricinabilitytoconstructaleadershipnetworkontheshopfloorno
doubtinfluencedthePopularFrontsturntowardsreformistelectoralpolitics.196
193 PaulS.Holbo,TheFarmerLaborAssociation:MinnesotasPartyWithinaParty,
MinnesotaHistory,38(7)1963,303.
194 NathanGlazer,SocialBasisofAmericanCommunism(Westport,CT:Glenwood
Press,1974),114,147,149,159.TheCPsworkingclassbaseinthe1920swasin
theimmigrantforeignlanguagesections,groupsthatthepartyleadership
nonethelessdisparagedinfavorofappealingtonativebornworkers.After1934
andwiththeadventofthePopularFront,theCPturnedagainsttheforeignlanguage
groupsandembracedsympatheticfractionsfromthemiddleclass.Bymiddle
classtheCPreferredtopetitbourgeoisprofessionals(e.g.teachers,clerks,and
lawyers).Forexample,see,SymposiumonRoleofProfessional,Intellectual,
UnitedAction,October1,1935,2.
195 BuildtheFarmerLaborParty!UnitedAction,December13,1935,8.
196 NelsonLichtenstein,TheCommunistExperienceintheTradeUnions,Industrial
Relations19(2)1980,129;Palmer,RethinkingtheHistoriographyofUnitedStates
Communism,152.
72

ThelackofamassbasemadethepartyentirelydependentonanFLPleadership
thatdidnotwanttopublicizetheirconnectionstotheCP.ThealliancewiththeFLP,
oneCommunistorganizergrumbled,wasmoreorlessarelationshipwiththetop,
verysecretivenotonlytothemassesatlarge,buteventoourmembershipand
sympathizers.197TheCPsdisciplinedandefficientorganizationaffordedtheparty
privilegedaccesstotheFLPandevenremadesomepartymembersintoFarmer
Laborelites.Despitesuchinfluence,theCPwasinnopositiontostakeoutan
independentpoliticalcourse.TheCPslongstandingpracticeofdemocratic
centralismindecisionmakingandthePopularFrontsideologicalfealtyto
reformismmeantthattheCommunistsgenerallydeferredtoFLPpolicy.
Furthermore,sincetheCommunistsreliedalmostexclusivelyonsympathetic
FarmerLaboritesforsupportandprotection,theycouldnoteasilydefytheir
patrons.
WiththeapprovalofOlson,Communistsmovedintothewardclubsand
countyanddistrictcommitteesoftheFarmerLaborAssociationthathadbeen
neglectedbythepureandsimpleAFLtradeunionistsandtheTrotskyists.198
ThesesmallandoftenunderstaffedorgansofferedtheCommunistsandtheirliberal
alliesaperfectentrypointtoassumecontroloverpowerfulFarmerLabor
AssociationstructuresliketheHennepinCountyCentralCommittee.199Olsonwas
willing,ifnoteager,tointegratetheCPintotheFLPbecauseasadisciplinedcoreof
197 QuotedinHaynes,DubiousAlliance,19.
198 AlthoughneithertheCLAnortheWPbannedmembershipintheFLPoutright,
theemphasisontruepartyworkmeantthatnoTrotskyistactivistsweremembers
ofFarmerLaborAssociationwardclubsinMinneapolis.Carlsoninterview,1617.
199 Klehr,TheHeydayofAmericanCommunism,258.
73

operativesCommunistcadrescouldhelpadvancethegovernorspolicieswithinthe
FarmerLabormovementattheallimportantdistrictandstateconventions.In
effect,OlsonsrecruitmentoftheCPwasanefforttotransformtheFLPorganization
fromamassbasedpartyintoaconstituentpartyneitherstructurednorwidely
perceivedasacohesivepolicylinkbetweenvotersandofficials.200Althoughunion
memberswerestillasizeablegroupintheFarmerLaborAssociation,accordingto
ArticleIVoftheassociationsconstitutionthemaximumnumberofdelegatesatrade
unionorotheraffiliatedgroupcouldsendtopartyconventionswaspeggedatthree
inordertopreventanyonegroupfromcommandeeringtheproceedings.201
CommunistsandPopularFrontliberalsinturnremadestandingassociationsinto
frontgroupsandcreatedwholenewpaperorganizations,suchastheBulgarian
MacedonianWorkersClubandtheRosaLuxemburgLeague,tooutflanktradeunion
opposition.Local544,withitsthreedelegatesfor5,000members,was,tosaythe
least,seriouslyunderrepresentedatFarmerLaborconventions.
OlsonsalliancewiththeCommunistPartyhighlightedtheproblemoflabor
factionalism.WhileOlsoncouldhavelookedtofarmgroupstohelpminimizeunion
power,thatwouldhaveonlyexacerbateddivisionsintheFarmerLabormovement
betweenruralandurbanvoters.WarrenCreel,SecretaryoftheFarmerLabor
AssociationsEducationalBureau,claimedthatCommunistcadreswereinaunique
positiontodrivetheunionsoutoftheFarmerLaborAssociationwhilecementing
theloyaltyofunionvotersforFLPcandidates.Speakingfromtheclubsand
200 WalterDeanBurham,CriticalElectionsandtheMainspringofAmericanPolitics
(NewYork:W.W.NortonandCompany,1970),9.
201 ConstitutionoftheFarmerLaborAssociationofMinnesotaadoptedMarch20,
1925.
74

committeesoftheFarmerLaborAssociation,CommunistsandPopularFront
liberalsurgedunionworkerstodemandthedisaffiliationoftheirtradeunionsfrom
theFarmerLaborAssociationasaprotestagainstpetitbourgeoisandantilabor
politicianslikeLatimer.TheCPsalternativewasforthetradeunionstocreate
separatepoliticalcommitteestoendorseprogressiveFarmerLaborcandidatesand
mobilizeunionmembersonelectiondays.202Suchproposalscarriedlittleweight
amongtherankandfileandorganizedlabordidnotdeserttheFarmerLabor
Associationenmasseuntilafterthedefeatsof1938.TheintegrationoftheCP
spelledouttheFarmerLaborleadershipsrevisedattitudetowardsorganizedlabor:
thefunctionoftheunionswassimplytogetworkerstothepolls,nottodictate
policyandriskthebalkanizationoftheFLP.Withoutatradeunionbase,the
CommunistsimplicitlysecondedOlsonsstancethatthepoliticalroleofworkers
wasattheballotbox,votingforprogressiveFarmerLaborcandidates.
Inthelastmonthsof1935andthroughoutmostof1936theCPwasstill
quietlyestablishingitselfwithintheFLP,buttheTrotskyistsunderstoodtheFLPs
tentativemoveintoaPopularFrontcoalitionasathreattotheirownpolitical
influence.TheTrotskyistsagreedinpartwithCPthatthewideninggapbetween
organizedworkersandthecareermindedpetitbourgeoisFLPpoliticianswasthe
partysrealproblem.203InsteadofengagingdirectlyinFLPpoliticslikethe
Stalinists,theTrotskyistsattemptedtoshoreuptheirpositionofleadershipwithin
202 WarrenCreel,TheMinnesotaFarmerLaborParty,FourthInternational,March
1946,7(3),7781.
203 LawandOrder,NorthwestOrganizer,September3,1936,4.
75

thelabormovementbyforminganorganizedleftblocintheCLU.204TheTrotskyists
alsoreturnedtobuildingapoliticalbaseoutsidetheFLPasJamesCannon
negotiatedthemassentranceofWorkersPartymembersintothedecayingSocialist
Party.205TheTrotskyistsexpectationthatarejuvenatedandradicalizedSPcould
pressuretheFLPfurtherleft,buthopesforthisplanwerequicklydashed.Thestate
SPchapterforcefullyresistedtheassimilationoftheWP,cripplingtheTrotskyists
abilitytoappropriateandrevivethedormantSocialistorganization.206Onceagain,
theTrotskyistswerelefttorelyalmostsolelyonthelocaluniontoinfluence
FarmerLaborpolitics.
ThefundamentaldifferencebetweenthepoliticsoftheTrotskyistsandthe
Communistswasnotideological,butoverhowtogainaccesstoinstitutionsof
power.TheCP,withOlsonsblessing,rosethroughtheFLPsgrassroots
organizationalnetworkstowieldinfluenceoverpartypolicywhiletheTrotskyists
focusedonthetradeunionaffiliatestotheFarmerLaborAssociation.Forthetime
being,thisdifferenceinpoliticalspheresofoperationcontainedtheconflict
betweentheCPandtheTrotskyists.ThedefeatoftheAFLsantiradicalpurges
solidifiedthepoliticalpositionoftheCommunistsandtheTrotskyistswhilealso
makingbothgroupsawareoftheneedtocloseranksbehindtheFLPtostaveoff
conservativecounterattacks.Politicalunityfororganizedlaborappearedtobeat
hand.
204 TheLeftWing,NorthwestOrganizer,June3,1936,4.
205 Cannon,HistoryofAmericanTrotskyism,236.
206 PositionoftheMajorityGroupMinneapolisSocialistLocal.RE:Admission
WorkersPartyMembers,March7,1936;O.F.HawkinstotheN.E.C.oftheSocialist
PartyofAmerica,March10,1936,box5,folderCorrespondenceandOtherPapers,
JanuaryApril,1936,OscarHawkinsPapers.
76
TheApogeeofFarmerLaborism
ThedivisionswithintheFarmerLabormovementwereclear:craftand
industrialunionists,NewDealDemocrats,Republicans,Communists,Socialists,a
slewofotherradicalsandmilitants,andagrowingrankandfilelargelynewto
electoralpolitics.207Inafewyearstimetheseelementswouldcarvethelabor
movementupintocompetingfactions.However,in1936theextentoflabors
successesontheshopfloor,instatehouses,andinWashingtonwasstillsonewand
shockingthatexistingtensionsweredwarfedbytheextraordinarypolitical
possibilitiesbeforeorganizedlabor.Rumblingsforanationalfarmerlabororlabor
partytochallengetheDemocratswerequietedin1936asthevariousagentsof
workingclasspoliticsjoinedtogethertosupportRooseveltsbidforreelection.The
possibilityofaretrenchmentofliberalprogress,animatedbyfearsofhomegrown
populismandfascism,unitedthesegroupsbehindtheNewDealDemocratsand
theirthirdpartyalliesatthestatelevel.InMinnesota,themultifacetedstruggleto
solidifycollectivebargaininginMinneapolisexposedtheinternalandexternal
forcesthatcouldlaywastetothelabormovementandtheFLP.The1936campaign
wasamomentwhenthekeyactorsinlaborandontheleftunitedbehindadriveto
stemaconservativebacklashagainsttheNewDeal.
207 Cf.SamuelLubell,TheFutureofAmericanPolitics(NewYork:HarperColophon
Books,1965);Cohen,MakingaNewDeal,25189;GaryGerstle,WorkingClass
American:ThePoliticsofLaborinaTextileCity(NewYork:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1989),15395;KristiAndersen,TheCreationofaDemocraticMajority,1928
1936(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1979).
77
Theelectioncampaignbeganwiththefanfaretypicalofpreviouselection
seasons,butthiscampaignwasaboutprotectingtheliberalreformofthepastfour
yearsfromarearguardassault.208Olsondescribedthecontemporarypolitical
climateasacontestbetweenliberalsandreactionaries.Inpolitics,hewrote,the
liberallogicallybelongswithpartiesseekingtheestablishmentofanewsocial
order.Thereactionary,ontheotherhand,refusestoadmitthatconditionshave
undergonearadicalchangeandinsistsuponreestablishinganoutmodedsocial
order.Realliberalchange,Olsondeclared,couldonlybeachievedbyradicalism,
confrontingtheproblemsofsocietyattheirroots(theradix)inordertocreatea
morejustandequitableworld.209Reactionarieswerenothingmorethanharbingers
offascismbecausetheirpoliticsreinforcedthehierarchiesoftheoldsocietywhile
repressingthesocialforcesstrainingtocreateanewsociety.Olsonsleftleaning
interpretationofliberalismwasdistinctfromMarxistinterpretationsofclass
struggle.InaninterviewwithjournalistCharlesWalker,Olsoncomplainedthatthe
leftfailedtograsptheessentialconservatismofAmericanpoliticalculture.The
problemwiththeseleftistsandritualiststheywanttorideonawhitehorsewitha
pennantflyinghellbentforthebarricades.Mymethodisadifferentone.Boring
fromwithin,whichIlearnedfromtheoldWobblies.210Farmerlaborism,Olson
contended,wastheidealcombinationofprogressiveliberalism,acknowledgingthe
208 FLPartyLaunchesStateCampaign,MinnesotaLeader,February1,1936,1.
209 LetterfromFloydB.OlsontoJ.A.Blomgren,May21,1936,box2,folder
MemorandatoGov.Olson,1934,DayPapers.
210 Walker,TheFarmerLaborPartyofMinnesota,PartII:GovernorOlsonsLast
Interview,TheNationMarch20,1937,319,box1,folderMagazinearticles,Farmer
LaborPartyandFloydB.Olson,1933,1937,WalkerPapers.
78

needforradicalchangewhilemoderatingdemandsforsocialupheavaltofitwithin
thepoliticalinstitutionsofcapitalistdemocracy.
OlsonannouncedinJanuaryof1936hisdecisiontorunfortheUSSenate.
ThebattlefortheFLPsgubernatorialnominationwassetbetweenurbanPopular
Frontliberalsandruralagrarians.ElmerBenson,theformerstateCommissionerof
SecuritieswhoOlsonappointedtoserveouttheremainingtermofanopensenate
seat,wasthefavoriteofthepartysprogressiveandPopularFrontfactions.Benson,
arelativeunknownwhohadneverheldanelectedoffice,wasacloseallyofthe
governor,enjoyedthesupportoftheFLPsweeklynewspapertheMinnesotaLeader,
andenthusiasticallywelcomedapartnershipwiththeCP.211Hisopponentwas
HjalmarPetersen,acountrynewspapereditorwhorosethroughtheFLPranksto
becomelieutenantgovernortoprovidearuralbalancetoOlsonsticket.Although
PetersenrepresentedtheFLPsmoreconservativeruralwingsuspiciousofmilitant
urbanlabor,heneverthelesswentalongwithOlsonsdecisiontoaligntheFLPwith
theCP.212Thenominatingconventionwasexpectedtobehighlycontentioussince
Olson,sufferingfromstomachcancer,wouldnotbeinattendancetomoderatethe
proceedings.
Blaminganoverlyambitioussocialdemocraticagendaforthesetbacksofthe
1934elections,the1936stateconventionguttedthemuchofthepartysradical
platformwhileneverthelessgivingradicalsavoiceinthedeliberations.Despite
grumblingsbymanyFarmerLaborites,fortyCPdelegates,complimentedby
212 StevenJ.Keillor,HjalmarPetersenofMinnesota:ThePoliticsofProvincial
Independence(St.Paul:MinnesotaHistoricalSocietyPress,1987),149.
79

anotherhundredPopularFrontliberals,wereseatedandconstitutedasizeablebloc
inaconventionof667delegates.Invain,alividThomasLaitmerbemoanedthe
replacementofoldtimeFarmerLaboritesbycommunistagents.213Thetrades
andlaborassembliesofDuluthandSt.PaulsharedLatimersfrustrationand
demandedthat574stwodelegatesnotbeseatedattheupcomingstateFLP
conventionbecausethelocalwasnotapartoftheAFLandfortheleadershipsties
toCommunism.214Intheend574sdelegateswereseatedwithlittleprotest,but
proposalsputforthbyTrotskyistdelegatescallingforanFLPendorsementofaWPA
workersorganizingdriveandaplanforthestatetoappropriateidlefactoriesfor
unemployedworkerswerebothroundlyrejected.215StandardFLPsupportforthe
publicownershipofindustryandnaturalresourceswasexcisedandreplacedbyan
intentionallyvagueschemeknownasPlannedPlentytodownplaytheFLPs
socialistroots.216Theconventionsidesteppedthecontentiousissueofcreatinga
nationalfarmerlaborpartytochallengeRoosevelt,acoreCommunistissue,by
refusingtotakeastandonewayoranotheronthematter.217Thestateconventions
revisionsofpartycertainlyfrustratedtheFLPsleftwing,butitalsodemonstrated
theextentoftheTrotskyistsandStalinistscommitmenttoacceptingthe
213 Gieske,MinnesotaFarmerLaborism,216,218.
214 FLPStateBodyMovesAgainst574,NorthwestOrganizer,March18,1936,3.
215 TheFLPRedScare,NorthwestOrganizer,March25,1936,4.
217 TheComingFLStateConvention,UnitedAction,February14,1936,special
supplement;Giekse,MinnesotaFarmerLaborism,21819.
80

compromisesinherenttoparliamentarypolitics.Bothgroupslefttheconvention
preparedtofullysupporttheFLPplatformandcandidates.218
Arelativeunknownwhenheenteredtheconvention,Bensonprovedpopular
amongthedelegatesthankstoOlsonsendorsementandmanagedtowinthe
nominationforgovernor.219Bensonscampaigntoneddowntheradicalrhetoric
previouscampaignsandactivelyconnectedtheFLPandtheNewDealafterOlson
publicallyendorsedRoosevelt.220Bensonremindedworkingclassvotersofthe
needforincreasedstateinterventionineconomicandsocialpolicytotacklethe
Depression.Ourworkers,heavowed,wanttoknowwhetherthegovernmentwill
solveforthemandfortheirchildrenthenightmareofeconomicinsecurity,withits
threatofhunger,want,anddegradation.221BensonapplaudedNewDealreforms,
especiallythosewonfororganizedlabor,buthewarnedworkers:Ifwelosethis
Election,thenourcausewillbelostformanyyears.222TheFLPplatformattacked
Republicanplanstoinstituteastatesalestaxanddenouncedtheincursionofchain
storesintothestateeconomy.Thespecteroffascismwaseverpresentinthe
218 Olson,BensonEndorsed,NorthwestOrganizer,April1,1936,1;Haynes,
DubiousAlliance,18.
219 Keillor,HjalmarPetersen,130.
220 Mayer,FloydB.Olson,29598.Formoreonthenationalthirdpartyquestion,cf.
EricLeifDavin,TheVeryLastHurrah?TheDefeatoftheLaborPartyIdea,1934
1936,WeAreAllLeaders:TheAlternativeUnionismoftheEarly1930s,Staughton
Lynd,ed.(Urbana,IL:UniversityofIllinoisPress,1996),11771;Zieger,CIO,3941;
Gieske,MinnesotaFarmerLaborism,20608;Ottanelli,TheCommunistPartyofthe
UnitedStates,95105;DavidBrody,WorkersinIndustrialAmerica:Essayson
TwentiethCenturyStruggle(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),22021.
221 ElmerBenson,radioaddresstranscript,October23,1936,box3,folder
CorrespondenceandMiscellaneousPapers,Oct.Dec.,1936,ElmerBensonPapersat
theMinnesotaHistoricalSociety,St.Paul.
222 AnAppealtoUnionMen,Bensoncampaignletter,October28,1936,box3,
folderCorrespondenceandMiscellaneousPapers,Oct.Dec.,1936,BensonPapers.
81

Bensoncampaigntounderscoretheseriousnessoftheelection.Itisbutastep
fromthereactionaryphilosophyoftheRepublicanParty,Bensonwarned,to
reactionarydictatorship.223AmericanfascistgroupsliketheBlackLegionandthe
SilverShirts,theFLPalleged,wereexpandingtheirranksandevenpreparingfora
putschagainstavictoriousliberaladministration.224Thestakesin1936were
higherthanever,BensonandtheFLPclaimed,becausetheoppositionfully
understoodthestrengthofprogressiveliberalismandwouldstopatnothingtosee
suchapowerfulcoalitioncrushed.
ThedeathofFloydOlsonfromcancerinAugustdidnotderailthemomentum
oftheFLPcampaign;ifanythingitonlycontributedtoitsforwardsurge.Over
150,000MinnesotanscameouttomournthelategovernorashelayinstateinSt.
Paul.225IndeathOlsonwaspracticallycanonizedasthepatronsaintoftheFLP,
transformingacomplicatedandambitiouspoliticianintoapopular(andpliable)
iconfortheleft.Toworkers,OlsonwastheFarmerLaborParty,andevenharsh
criticsliketheTrotskyistsmadethetactfulandpoliticallyjudiciousdecisionto
honorthelategovernor.TheNorthwestOrganizersobituaryforOlsonmadeno
mentionofthe1934strikes,andinsteadpraisedhimasanunswervingchampion
223 ElmerBensonspeech,nodate(ca.August20,1936),box3,folder
CorrespondenceandMiscellaneousPapers,Oct.Dec.,1936,BensonPapers.
224 GunGangAttackonFLPartyIsUrgedbyFascists,MinnesotaLeader,March7,
1936,1,6;RevealBlackLegionDriveinMinnesota,MinnesotaLeader,May30,
1936,1;SilvershirtsPlotArmedFascistRevoltinAutumn,ChieftainReveals,
MinnesotaLeader,June27,1936,1.
225 150,000PeoplePayTributetoGovernorOlsonAtLastRites,MinnesotaLeader,
August29,1936,1.
82

oftheunderprivilegedandexploited.226Olsonsdeathfurtheraccentuatedthe
Trotskyistteamsterssteadymoveawayfromoutspokenrevolutionarypolitics
towardsagreateraccordwiththeFLP.TheTrotskyistleadershipofthelocal
warnedagainstanyunprincipledstruggleforthecrownofthedeadleaderto
preventtheRepublicansortheDemocratsfromtakingadvantageofparty
dissension.227Theneedforlaborandpoliticalsolidaritywasnotlostonthe
Trotskyists,whoonceagainswallowedtheirrevolutionaryprinciplesandaccepted
FarmerLaborismoutofpoliticalnecessity.
StilltheNorthwestOrganizerissuedahighlyqualifiedendorsementofthe
FLPinSeptemberof1936.InMinnesotatheabstractquestionofhowworkers
shouldvoteisasimpleone.Thepoliticaldutyofworkerswastosupport
whateverpoliticalmovementmostcloselyrepresentshiseconomicneedsandin
turnmolditintoaweapontofightintheinterestsoftheexploited.228The
editorialurgedthereadership,whonodoubtrangefromCommuniststo
Republicans,tovoteastraightFLPticket.EveniftheFLPlackedthecredentialsof
agenuineworkingclassparty,attheveryleastitwasapoliticalpartytowhich
laborunionsaredirectlyaffiliated.229Stillsmartingfromthebetrayalsofthe
Latimeradministration,theTrotskyistsurgedworkerstovoteFarmerLaborwhile
pointedlyremindingthepartythatworkingclasssupportdependeduponthe
actionsofitselectedrepresentatives.TheTrotskyistshopedthatintheelectionthe
226 WholeStateMournsAsFloydB.OlsonPasses,NorthwestOrganizer,August26,
1936,1,3.
227 OlsonandtheParty,NorthwestOrganizer,August26,1936,4.
228 TheWorkerVoter,NorthwestOrganizer,September17,1936,4.
229 TheLaborVote,NorthwestOrganizer,October15,1936,4.
83

tradesunionscouldbringenoughvoterstothepollstopressuretheFarmer
Laboritetoliveuptoitscampaignpromisesandinturnincreaseunionpower
withintheFLP.
TheFLPunderBensonasunderOlsonwasalsowaryofthepolitical
interventionoforganizedlabor.Bensonandthepartysothercandidateswere
sensitivetoRepublicanchargesthattheFLPwasaradicallaborpartyresponsible
forthestrikesandindustrialturmoilthatshookthestateovertheprecedingtwo
years.TheanswerthattheFarmerLaborPartyshouldmaketothisdastardly
conniving,theNorthwestOrganizerdeclared,istocomeoutwholesaleinsupport
ofstrikingworkersandanswertheslanderofthereactionarypoliticiansbysaying
openlythattheFarmerLaborPartyDOESsupporttheeconomicorganizationofthe
workers.230But,asin1934,theFLPadamantlyresistedaccusationsthatitwasa
frontfororganizedlabor.ItscandidatesparaphrasedthepreambletotheWagner
Actbystatingthatonlylegallysanctionedcollectivebargainingcouldendpresent
stateofindustrialwar.231Itwasthecontinuedoppositionofemployersandthe
GOPtocollectivebargainingthatwastherootcauseoflabordisputes,forcing
workerstoassumeamoremilitantstancetowintheirlegalrighttounion
representation.232Instancesoflaborviolenceweretheresultofcapitalssenseless
resistancetounions;itwasemployerswhoprovokedlaborriotsbyusinghired
230 LaborandElections,NorthwestOrganizer,October8,1936,4.
231 Gov.PetersenTakesLeadInEffortForStrikeSettlement,MinnesotaLeader
October3,1936,3;LundeenDemandsAdequateSocialSecurityLegislation,
MinnesotaLeaderOctober17,1936,2,
232 BensonAttacksNelsonRefusaltoRevealHisTaxPlan,MinnesotaLeader,
September26,1936,2.
84

thugsand,ifpossible,thepolicetodisruptpeacefulpickets.233Labormilitancywas
theinevitableoutcomeofreactionarypolitics,andtheonlyoptionforpeacewasto
accepttherealityofclassconflictandmediateitthroughthestateinstitutions.
InanattempttoconvinceconservativeFarmerLaboritesandmoderate
DemocratstovoteRepublican,MinnesotaRepublicansdescribedthemselvesasthe
onlyliberalpartyinthestate,blastingtheNewDealandpaintingunionsasthe
incubatorsofcommunistrevolution.234TheFLPretortedthatRepublicanswere
merelyclassicalliberalsinterestedonlyinadvancingtheinterestsofthecapitalist
class.235TheissueinMinnesotaisnotcommunism,norisitsocialism,the
MinnesotaLeaderexplained.TherealissueoftheelectionwastheRepublican
PartyseagernesstocompensateforthefailuresofHooverbyadoptingthe
trappingsoffascism.236RepublicanRedbaitingfailedtogaintractioninlargepart
becausethebaseoftheFLPaswellasitsleadingfigureswereunitedbehindthe
partyscandidateforgovernor.InthiscontextRepublicanattacksranghollow
becausetheydidnotresonatewithseriousdivisionslingeringwithintheFLPs
ranksoramongliberalvoters.OrganizedlaborstoodunitedbehindtheAFLandthe
StateFederationLaborconventioninSeptemberpassedresolutionsendorsingthe
entireFLPslateandRoosevelt.237InexchangefortheFLPssupportofRoosevelt,
thestatesDemocraticcandidatesforgovernor,thesenate,andcongressbowedout
233 LaborRioting,MinnesotaLeaderOctober3,19364.
234 G.O.P.PlaysItsLastCard,theRedScare,MinnesotaLeaderOctober24,1936,1,
5.
235 RepublicansasLiberals,MinnesotaLeaderFebruary27,1936,4.
236 TheIssueIsRepublicanism,MinnesotaLeaderOctober24,1936,4;Benson
RepudiatesCommunism;BlamesG.O.P.,MinnesotaLeaderOctober31,1936,1,5.
237 ProceedingsoftheFiftyfourthConventionoftheMinnesotaStateFederationof
Labor,Cloquet,Minn.,September2123,1936,6667.
85

oftheelectiontopreventsplittingtheliberalvote.238TheCPreverseditsopposition
toRooseveltandgaveuponathirdpartycampaign,butavoidedexplicitly
endorsingthepresidentandinsteadthepartydirecteditsinvectiveagainstthe
RepublicanParty.239Therefore,theunityoforganizedlabor,thesurrenderofthe
statesDemocrats,thecollapseofanationalfarmerlaborpartyforeclosedthemajor
potentialriftsintheurbanFarmerLaborcoalition.
TheDemocraticlandslideacrossthecountryreelectedRooseveltbymore
thanelevenmillionvotes.Thepresidentwasaccompaniedbackintoofficebya
solidcontingentofNewDealersintheHouseandSenateaswellasgovernorsinkey
industrialstateslikeMichiganandPennsylvania.Tradeunionsbecamemorethan
simplyeconomicorganizationsaslaborprotesthelpedtomobilizepoliticalaction
behindlatentworkingclasssentiments.240Democraticpoliticslinkedworking
classinterestswiththoseofotherclassfractions,minimizingtheeffectofclass
polarizationontheDemocraticvote,butissuesmostrelevanttolaboroccupied
muchofthecampaignagenda.241Heightenedlabormilitancygreatlyincreasedthe
politicalprofileofindustrialworkersandconvincedRoosevelttoreachouttothe
burgeoningCIOandthenearlyfourmillionworkersitwasorganizingintoindustrial
238 CurtisandDelaneyQuitRaceinOrdertoUniteLiberals,MinnesotaLeader
October10,1936,6;Valelly,RadicalismintheStates,170.
239 Ottanelli,TheCommunistPartyoftheUnitedStates,9798.
240 RichardOestreicher,UrbanandWorkingClassPoliticalBehaviorandTheories
ofAmericanElectoralPolitics,18701940,JournalofAmericanHistory741988,
1282.
241 DavidPlotke,BuildingADemocraticPoliticalOrder,ReshapingAmerican
Liberalisminthe1930sand1940s(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),
13234.
86

unionsleadinguptothe1936elections.242Thecreationin1936oftheCIOs
politicalarm,LaborsNonPartisanLeague(LNPL),mobilizedmillionsofworkers
behindtheDemocrats,inmanycasesfortheveryfirsttime.WilliamLeuchtenberg
arguesthattheLNPLwasessentialtobringingOhio,Illinois,Indiana,and
PennsylvaniaoutforRooseveltandtheDemocrats.243NewDealDemocratswere
thelogicalalliesofindustrialmassproductionworkersbecauseafterthepassageof
theWagnerActtheRooseveltadministrationappearedwillingtoatleastnominally
incorporateworkingclassorganizationsinthepoliticalprojectofrevivingthe
economy.244 Thelaborupheavalsoftheearly1930sprovedtoworkersandlabor
leadersalikethatunionscouldbeconstructedfrombelow,butnotsustained
withoutsomekindofassistancefromthestate.245
AlongwiththeresoundingreelectionofRoosevelt,theNovemberelections
broughttheFLPitsmostsweepingvictoriesthanksalsotoorganizedlabor.Inthe
governorsraceBensontrouncedhisRepublicanopponentby250,000votes,atthat
timethelargestmarginofvictoryforanygovernorinMinnesotahistory.Benson
wonbigintheTwinCitiescountiesofHennepinandRamseyandontheIronRange,
buthealsopickedupasignificantnumberofvotesinruralareasthathadrejected
242 MikeDavis,TheBarrenMarriageofAmericanLabourandtheDemocratic
Party,NewLeftReview124(1980),53.
243 Leuchtenburg,RooseveltandtheNewDeal,189.
244 SteveFraser,TheLaborQuestion,TheRiseandFalloftheNewDealOrder,
19301980,SteveFraserandGaryGerstle,eds.(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1989),56.
245 Cf.StevenFraser,LaborWillRule:SidneyHillmanandtheRiseofAmericanLabor
(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress1993),332.
87

Olsonin1934.246ForthefirsttimetheFLPwondecisivecontrolofthestatehouse
ofrepresentatives,andbothUSsenatorsandfiveofthestatesnineUS
representativeswereFarmerLaborites,withasixthmissingbyonly300odd
votes.247FortheFLP,theelectionresultssignifiedarevolutionachievedin
Americathroughtheballotabloodlessrevolutioncarriedoutinthetruestand
noblesttraditionsofthiscountry.248TheprogressiveturninNewDeallegislation,
coupledwiththefearofrightwingbacklashagainstRoosevelt,ledtheFLPto
downplayitssocialisticplanks,renounceitsnationalthirdpartyaspirations,and
uniteorganizedlabor.TheonceapprehensiveStateFederationofLabor
enthusiasticallyendorsedRooseveltandtheentireFLPslateatitsannual
convention.249 TheTrotskyistteamstersurgedvoterstoKeepfaithwithFloydand
stagedmassralliesonbehalfofFarmerLaborcandidates.Aftertheelections,
though,theycounseledworkerstoremainwatchfuloftheFLPandremainsteadfast
inadheringtoamilitanttradeunionpolicy.250 Attheendofday,though,thelocal
andindeedthelabormovementasawhole,wasleftwithnochoicebuttocontinue
toendorsetheFLP.
246 White,etal.,MinnesotaVotes,19396;FarmerLaborPartyWinsByLandslide,
MinnesotaLeaderNovember7,1936,1.
248 TheMeaningofItAll,MinnesotaLeader,November7,1936,4.
249 ProceedingsoftheFiftyfourthConventionoftheMinnesotaStateFederationof
Labor,Cloquet,Minn.,September2123,1936.
250 OfficialF.L.P.StateTicket,NorthwestOrganizer,October22,1936,1;FLPMass
RallyInUnionHallOnOctober29,NorthwestOrganizer,October22,1936,3;The
NewRegime,NorthwestOrganizer,November19,1936,4.
88

Conclusion
1935wasayearofvictoriesfortheTrotskyistteamstersandtheMinneapolis
labormovement.Insurgent,rankandfilemilitancygalvanizedthedisparate
strandsofworkerprotestintoasocialmovement,butthisnewmovementwasalso
exposedtoarrayofnewpoliticalpressures.TheTrotskyists,isolatedfromthe
mainstreamlabormovementandfrustratedbytheirlackofsuccessincreatinga
politicalalternativetotheFLP,werereluctantlycompelledtorelyonsympathetic
FarmerLaboritesinthefaceofoverthostilityfromtheIBT,theAFL,andMayor
Latimer.Fearfuloffuturefragmentationinthelabormovement,nottomentionthe
estrangementofothersocialgroupsandclassfractionsfromtheFarmerLabor
banner,theFLPsleadershipsoughttolimitthepoliticalinterventionoforganized
labor.However,from1935to1936theFarmerLaborParty,liketheNewDeal
Democrats,successfullymanagedtokeepschismsinthelabormovementfrom
compromisingthepartyswinningelectoralcoalition.TwoyearslatertheFLPand
theDemocratswouldfindthemselvesbothovercomebyanunravelingofthevery
forcesresponsibleforsuchspectacularwins.ThefallofthePopularFrontaligned
FLPwasprecipitatedbytheoutbreakofacivilwarbetweentheAFLandCIO,
exacerbatedbyintensifyinginternalpartyconflictsbetweentheTrotskyistsandthe
Communists.IntothebreachsteppedanewvarietyofliberalRepublicanswillingto
accommodatekeyaspectsofNewDealsocialpolicy,includinglegalprotectionsfor
collectivebargaining,whilerallyingvotersagainstthemilitantandpoliticizedlabor
movementresponsibleformuchoftheNewDealcoalitionsearlyelectoralsuccess.
89

CHAPTER4
THECONTESTEDTERRAINOFLIBERALISM
FindingLaborsPlaceintheSecondNewDeal
ThetwoyearsfollowingthelandslidereelectionofRooseveltandthesuccess
ofNewDealDemocratsandtheiralliesintheMinnesotaFLPdefinedthelongterm
meaningoftheNewDeal.Atstakein1937and1938wastheverynatureofNew
Dealreform.After1936aneworderinAmericanpoliticswasemerging,torn
somewherebetweenliberalandsocialdemocraticpolitics.BuildingaDemocratic
politicalorder,accordingtopoliticalscientistDavidPlotke,requiredamajor
mobilizationofdiversesocialgroupingsandorganizationsunitedbyadurable
configurationofinstitutionsanddiscourses.251TheearlyfluidityofNewDeal
politicsopenedaspaceforradicalsandliberalstointermingle,allowingthelatterto
freelycriticizethecapitalistsocialorderandtheformertopursuesocialreform.252
TheexperimentalnatureofNewDealreformsgavetheDemocratsaflexible
platformfromwhichtoappealtothevotesofaacrossclasscoalitionof
ideologicallycontradictoryelements.253Theelectionsof1932and1936cemented
arealignmentofAmericanpoliticsinfavoroftheDemocrats,butwhatremained
disputedwasexactlyhowtheNewDealcoalitionwouldreshapenationalpolitics.
AlthoughthekeylegislationofthesecondNewDeal(theWagnerAct,SocialSecurity
Act,etc.)waspassedpriortoNovember1936,themobilizationofsocialforcesfor
251 Plotke,ADemocraticPoliticalOrder,45,4748.
252 DougRossinow,VisionsofProgress:TheLeftLiberalTraditioninAmerica
(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2008),104.
253 Oestreicher,UrbanandWorkingClassPoliticalBehavior,1285.
90

andagainstliberalreformmustbegivencloserscrutinyintheaftermathofthe
generalelection.254Itwasthepoliticalconflictbetweenlaborandcapital(andtheir
respectiveintraclassconflicts)intheindustrialnorthin1937and1938that
determinedeachsideslongtermabilitytoaltertheDemocraticpoliticalorderfor
thenext30years
ThecrisisoftheDepressionopenedthespaceforinnovativenewpolitical
strategiestoputworkingclasspoliticsatthecenteroftheNewDeal.Organized
laborsentryintomasspolitics,especiallythroughtheCIO,representedaninsurgent
socialmovementofnorthernindustrialworkerscompetingagainstotherorganized
socialforcesforstatelevelinfluence,specificallycorporateindustrialcapitalists.255
Yetthelabormovementwasatoddswithitselfoverhowtowielditsnewfound
politicalinfluence.TheexpulsionoftheCIOunionsfromtheAFLin1936
underscoredtherivalideologicalfoundationsofcraftandindustrialunionisminthe
midstoftheNewDeal.AshistorianChristopherTomlinsnotes,thedecisiverolein
constructingtheUnitedStatesmodernindustrialrelationsregimebelongedtothe
liberalbureaucraticadministrativestate.256TheAFLsenduringcommitmentto
craftdistinctions,antistatism,andadecentralizedorganizationalstructure,
ensuredthefederationsunwillingnesstoabandonnonpartisanshipbyestablishing
254 Fraser,TheLaborQuestion,68.
255 Cf.MartinJ.Sklar,TheCorporateReconstructionofAmericanCapitalism,1890
1916:TheMarket,theLaw,andPolitics(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1989),1314.
256 ChristopherTomlins,TheStateandtheUnions:LaborRelations,Lawandthe
OrganizedLaborMovementinAmerica,18801960(NewYork:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1985),102.
91

institutionaltieswiththerulingNewDealDemocraticParty.257TheCIOembraced
thesocialKeynesianswhoadvocatedanationallaborrelationsregimetofoster
unionismandincreasethepurchasingpowerofworkersandinthebroadercontext
ofawelfarestate.Nevertheless,despitetheorganicrelationshipbetweentheCIO
andthesecondNewDeal,therelativeweaknessofthenewindustrialunionsmeant
thattheCIOneededRooseveltandtheDemocraticPartyfarmorethaneither
neededtheCIO.258Thelabormovementwassplitatpreciselythemomentwhenit
couldhaveexertedthemostpressureonaNewDealstatestillintheprocessof
findingitsbearings.OrganizedlaborspivotalplaceintheNewDealcoalitionwas
dividedintotwocompetinginterestswithconflictingorganizationalneedsand
ideologicalunderpinnings.
Thistensionwasexpressedmostclearlyatthestatelevelintheindustrial
northwherelaborprotestandpoliticalorganizationinitiatedanewreformoriented
politicalorder.TriumphantNewDealstategovernmentstriedhardtokeep
togetherthevitalworkingclassvotingblocatthecoreofthenewrealignment,but
theseeffortstoreconcilelaborfactionalismoftenappearedtoprivilegeinsular,
oftenjurisdictionalstrugglesbetweencompetingfactionsofthelabormovement.
TheresultstrainedtheNewDealsrelationshipwiththeothersocialclassesand
classfractionsthatmadethevictoriesof1936possible.Althoughtheindustrial
heartlandcontinuedtovoteinlargenumbersforRooseveltin1940and1944,the
crossclasscoalitionthatelectedtheMinnesotaFarmerLaborParty,theProgressive
PartyinWisconsin,andNewDealDemocratsinMichigan,Ohio,andPennsylvania
257 Greene,PureandSimplePolitics,273;Phelan,WilliamGreen,169.
258 Fraser,TheLaborQuestion,68,70.
92

splinteredandpavedthewayforRepublicanvictoriesin1938.259Nevertheless,by
thelate1930stheworkingclasspoliticsattheheartoftheNewDealachieveda
socialsaliencebeyondindustrialworkers.Thediscordrendingthelabormovement
andtheNewDealDemocratsandtheirthirdpartyalliesdidnotshatterthe
widespreadsupportfortheNewDeal.TheRepublicanPartyreversedalmosta
decadesworthofpoliticaldefeatsintheindustrialnorthbyaccommodatingthe
statismoftheNewDealandmarginalizinghardlineantiNewDealers.Accepting
aspectsoftheNewDealgaveRepublicansentreintoDemocraticindustrial
strongholdsbyappealingtourbanvoterswhofavoredarestrainedformofNew
Dealstyledstateintervention.ThismoderateliberalismalsogavetheGOPthe
abilitytocriticizethesupposedexcessesoftheNewDeal,principallyitsstrong
connectionwithaninsurgent,politicizedlabormovement.Inthisneworder,
though,liberalRepublicansmadeastoundingideologicalconcessions,like
acknowledgingthelegitimacyoforganizedlabor,whichsustainedthebasicthrustof
NewDealliberalism.Themidtermelections1938becameacriticalmomentto
definetheNewDealasaprogramandanidea.Afruitfulwaytounpackthis
complexprocessisbylookingatthepoliticalcontextofindividualindustrialstates.
WitharulingleftofcenterFarmerLaborPartyandapoliticizedlabormovement
withstrongradicalleadership,Minnesotaoffersanextreme,butnolessrevealing,
exampleofhoworganizedlaborsinternalandexternalconflictsshapedthecourse
ofNewDealliberalismatthecrucialjunctureof1937and1938.
259 TwoexceptionsarethevictoriesofWendellWilkieinMichiganin1940and
ThomasDeweyinWisconsinin1944.
93
FarmerLaborismDivided
InMinnesotanewlyelectedGovernorElmerBensoninterpretedthe
landslideof1936asanopportunitytomovestatepoliticsinamoreradical
direction.Bensonsambitiouslegislativegoalsincludedthecreationofstateowned
cooperatives,astateplanningboard,abanontheuseofstrikebreakers,repealof
theWorldWarOneeracriminalsyndicalismlaw,andasharplyincreased
progressiveincometaxtosoaktherich.260ItwasclearthatBensonsradical
convictionswereconsiderablymoresincerethanthoseheldbyhispredecessor.
FloydOlsonusedtosaythesethings,exasperatedMinneapolisindustrialistJohnS.
Pillsburyallegedlyfumed,butthissonofabitchbelievesthem.261Nevertheless,like
Olsonbeforehim,BensonremainednervousthatthemajorityofMinnesotavoters
wouldsupportalegislativeagendafurthertotheleftoftheNewDeal.Thegovernor
andhisadvisorsreasonedtheFLPsleftwingneededtoneutralizeconservative
oppositionandensuregreaterpartydisciplineinordertomakeacompellingcase
foranexplicitlysocialdemocraticprogram.Significantly,Bensonnotonly
continuedbutalsoexpandedtheFLPsalliancewiththeCommunistParty,
effectivelyremakinghisadministrationintoaPopularFrontgovernment.262Hewas
deeplyimpressedbothbytheprogramofthePopularFrontandthecadreofyoung,
welleducated,andhardworkingCPmemberswhoimmersedthemselvesinthe
dailyworkoftheFLP.HeappointedCommuniststopostsinnumerousstate
262 Klehr,TheHeydayofAmericanCommunism,261.
94

agencies,givingthenewgovernoraloyalandenergeticcadreandtheCommunists
realbureaucraticpower.263AtCommunistPartyGeneralSecretaryEarlBrowders
insistence,CommunistFarmerLaboriteswereinstructednottoactasan
independentblocbutstrictlyasaloyal,proBensoncaucuswithintheFLP.264The
Communistsexercisedtheirnewfoundpoweraspartisansfirstandforemostagainst
thegovernorscriticsintheparty,particularlythoseinthetradeunionswherethe
CPstilllackedagenuinebase.
Animatedbyleftsectarianism,intenseinternalpartyconflicteruptedasthe
tradeunionsandPopularFrontFarmerLaboritesattemptedtoasserttheir
authorityovertheFLPspowerfulHennepinCountyCentralCommittee.Inearly
March1937,theCentralCommitteeorganizedanominatingconventiontofinda
candidatetoreplacetheunpopularincumbentThomasLatimerintheupcoming
Minneapolismayoralelection.MayorLatimerthoroughlypolarizedtheMinneapolis
FLPwithhiseffortstorepressthe1935summerstrikewave,afactnotloston
representativesfromthe96tradeunionsandrailroadbrotherhoodsinattendance
attheconvention.265Eventhoughthemajorityoftheassembleddelegateswere
solidlyopposedtoLatimer,therecentelectionofaPopularFrontbloctothecounty
organizationsexecutivecommitteegalvanizedaminorityfactionaroundthe
embattledincumbentagainstthemarginalizationoflaborbyCommunist
263 Valelly,RadicalismintheStates,14041.
265 Delegatelist,nodate(ca.March1937),box3,folderFarmerLaborParty
ConventionandCampaign,1937,VioletJohnsonandAllenSolliePapersatthe
MinnesotaHistoricalSociety,St.Paul.
95

infiltrators.266Forcedtochoosebetweenparticipatinginaconventionrunby
PopularFrontersorlinkarmswithLatimer,theTrotskyistsoptedtobackLatimer.
TheLatimerfactionannouncedtheformationofrumpconventionattheCentral
LaborUnionhall,bringingtogethertheTrotskyistswiththeirerstwhileenemiesin
theStateFederationofLaborandtherightwingoftheFLPattheheadof400mostly
labordelegates.267AcommitteesenttotheCLUhallatBensonsbehestwasmet
withacausticrebukefromTrotskyistMilesDunnewhostatedthattherump
conventionwouldnotcompromisewiththereactionarypoliciesofpolitical
adventurers.DunnewentontodenouncethegovernorssecretaryRogerRutchick,
aswellasthechairandvicechairoftheCLUandthecochairstheHennepinCentral
Committee,asCommuniststooges.Therumpconventionunanimouslynominated
LatimerandpassedamotiontowithdrawalldelegatesfromtheCentralCommittee
untilthebodycouldbereorganizedonabasisoftruerepresentation.268
TheTrotskyistsaboutfaceonLatimerhelpedsmoothoveradeeprift
betweenmilitantsandconservativesinthecitylabormovement,butthechallenge
washowtojustifytheprotestagainsttheMinneapolisFLPtotherankandfileof
thelabormovement.Theobviousproblemwashowtoconvinceworkersthat
backingaknownstrikebreakerlikeLatimerandpromptingafissureintheFLPwas
266 ReportoftheEducationCommittee,HennepinCountyFarmerLaborAssociation,
June30,1937,1,box1,folderCorrespondenceandOtherPapers,AprilJuly,1937,
StagebergPapers.
267 ReportoftheEducationCommittee,1,StagebergPapers;.Valelly,Radicalismin
theStates,143.NodoubtinanakedattempttocementthesupportofLocal544,
LatimerevenwentsofarastojointheCommitteefortheDefenseofLeonTrotsky.
Haynes,DubiousAlliance,24.
268 FarmerLaborPartySplitAsTradeUnionistsShakeOffGripofAdventurers,
NorthwestOrganizer,March18,1937,12.
96

intheirbestinterest.Toavoidbeingforcedtodeepentheirpublicconnectionto
LatimerorsurrendertotheHennepinCentralCommittee,Local544sidesteppedthe
issuebyendorsingVincentDunnesrunformayorontheSocialistPartyticket.269
EventhoughtheTrotskyistshadralliedthetradeunionsagainsttheCentral
CommitteearoundtheissueofincreasinglaborsvoiceintheFLP,theynowurged
organizedlabortoassumeanonpartisanpositioninordertoavoidworseningthe
fracasintheCentralCommittee.TheturningoftheCentralLaborUnionintoa
debatingsocietyfortheFarmerLaborparty,aneditorialintheNorthwest
Organizerintoned,isarealcrimeagainstthelabormovement.270 TheTrotskyists
newpoliticalpositionlaidthebasisforanunlikelyallianceoftheStateFederationof
Labor,rightwingFarmerLaborites,andtheantiStalinistleft.Howexactlythis
ratherclumsypolitickingcouldcompeltheFLPtoguaranteegreaterpoliticalpower
forthetradeunionsremainedunclear.
TherevoltofthetradeunionswasanembarrassmentforBensonwhofound
himselfunabletorestorepartyunity.Stillstingingfromtherumpconventions
accusationsofCommunistpenetrationintotheHennepinCentralCommittee,the
FLPneededtofindacandidateformayorwhowasinnowaytiedtoeither
faction.271Bensonreachedouttotheheadofthestatespensionboardandformer
AllAmericanfootballplayerKennethHaycraft.Atthereconvenedregular
conventiontheCentralCommitteepledgeditsfullsupporttotheHaycraftcampaign
269 V.R.DunneFilesForCityMayor,NorthwestOrganizer,April22,1937,3.The
Trotskyistswereatthispointstillpursuingapolicyofentryismintheranksofthe
SPtotryandaffectaleftwardshiftinthepartyofNormanThomas.
270 TheCentralLaborUnion,NorthwestOrganizer,April1,1938,4.
271 Millikan,TheRedBaitingofKennethC.Haycraft:AMinnesotaAllAmerican,
MinnesotaHistoryWinter1994,180.
97

andreprimandedtheoutlawconventionsendorsementofLatimer.272Thebattle
betweentherivalmayoralcandidatesnowspreadintothewardclubs,effectively
paralyzingtheabilityoftheMinneapolisFLPsgrassrootscampaignnetworkto
promoteacandidate.273Intheprimaryeachcandidatereceivedroughly25,000
votes,withHaycraftedgingoutLatimerbyonly236votesinthefinaltally.
However,incomparisontothe50,000voteswonbyRepublicannomineeGeorge
Leach,theFLPwasinaseriouslyfracturedstategoingintothegeneralelection.274
RatherthanattempttoappeasetheLatimerfaction,Haycraftscampaigndefiantly
calledthesittingmayorthecrownprinceofreaction.275Latimerandthetrade
unionsbegrudginglyendorsedHaycraft,butthemayorandhisalliesinthelabor
movementwaiteduntilalmosttheeveoftheelectiontopublicallyurgeworkersto
performtheirdutyatthepolls.276
Haycraftlosttheelectionbyalmost18,000voteswhilestillcarryingsevenof
Minneapolis13wardsinaracewhereoverallvoterturnoutroseby6percent.277
DespitetheviciousinternalfeudingtheFLPmanagedtoretainitsmajorityonthe
272 MinneapolisFLsOpenOfficesforHaycraftDrive,MinnesotaLeader,April3,
1937,8.
273 ExecutiveCommitteeofHennepinCo.CentralCommitteeoftheFarmerLabor
Assn.ofMinnesotavs.ThomasLatimer,summonsinHennepinCo.DistrictCourt,
Apr.26,1937,5,box1,folderCorrespondenceandOtherPapers,AprilJuly,1937,
StagebergPapers.
274 ReportoftheEducationCommittee,2,StagebergPapers.
275 HaycraftSoundsKeynote;StatesLaborPosition,MinnesotaLeader,April10,
1937,5;HarmonySeenAtDinnerforFLNominees,MinnesotaLeader,May22,
1937,3;Haycraftcampaignflyer,nodate(ca.June,1937),box3,folderFarmer
LaborPartyConventionandCampaign,1937,JohnsonandSolliePapers.
276 VotetheFarmerLaborBallot;ElectHaycraft;DownReaction,Northwest
Organizer,June10,1937,1;LatimerUrgesHaycraftsElection,MinneapolisLabor
Review,June4,1937,1.
277 ThefinalelectionfiguresputLeachat89,809votestoHaycrafts71,904.General
cityelectionsrecapitulation,June14,1937,MinneapolisElectionsOffice.
98

citycouncil,buttheactualnumberofworkerswhovotedFarmerLabordwindled.
BourgeoisvoterssolidifiedtheiroppositiontotheFLPandanincreasingnumberof
thelowermiddleandworkingclassesalsoturnedoutfortheRepublicans.Leachs
chiefbastionofsupportcamefromthecitysaffluentEighthandThirteenthWards,
thesocalledsilkstockingdistricts,wherehedrewalmost19,000votesalone.278
Politically,Leachwasanoutrightconservative,buthiscampaignslogan
Independent,NonPartisan,Progressive,soughttoplacehimabovethedivisive
partyconflictsandclasspoliticsthatmarredtheFLPcampaign.279Leachcertainly
benefitedfromtheinterpartystrifeandtheGOPmaderealadvancesinFLP
strongholds.InthecitysworkingclassThirdWard,forinstance,Haycraftout
polledLeachbyonly1,200votes,whiletwoyearsearlierLatimer(withthe
enthusiasticendorsementoftheunions)beathisRepublicanchallengerbyover
5,000votes.280Thisperformancemarkedaseriousreversaloffortunewhen
comparedtotheNovembergubernatorialelectioninwhichBensonbeathis
Republicanchallengerbyover10,000votesinthesameward.281Inthemore
socioeconomicallymixedwardsthatHaycraftwon,hedidsobymuchnarrower
marginsthanthoseachievedbyLatimerin1935andnowhereclosetothoseof
Bensonsin1936.282
280 Toprovidefurthercontext,intheThirdWards1935aldermanicrace,teamster
presidentWilliamBrownfellonly1,108votesshyofaseatonthecitycouncil.City
generalelectionsrecapitulation,June14,1937,June10,1935.
281 Countygeneralelectionsrecapitulation,November3,1936,HennepinCounty
ElectionsOffice.
282 YetanotherstarkexamplewasintheTenthWardwhichLatimershandilywon
bynearly6,000votesandBensonbynearly8,000,comparedtoHaycraftsmere
99
WhiletheprimaryfeudnodoubthelpedtodentHaycraftsnumbers,the
laborpoliticsatthecoreofthedisputedemonstratedtheclasspolarizationevident
intheelectionresults.Thebroadappealofworkingclasspoliticsmarshaledso
effectivelybytheFLPin1936wassignificantlynarrowedtoreflectthespecific
politicalinterestsoftradeunionleadershipduringthebattleovercontrolofthe
HennepinCountyCentralCommittee.Inapostelectionreport,thePopularFront
alignedandCommunistchairedHennepinCountyEducationalCommitteeargued
thattheurbanpetitbourgeoisievotedRepublicanbecausethesplitorganizedbythe
reactionaryLatimerforcesfatallyundercuttheabilityoftheprogressive
HennepinFarmerLaboritestoleadaneffectivecrossclasscoalition.283 Although
conservativeFarmerLaboriteslikeLatimerandhissupportersinthecraftunion
leadershipstoodinstarkideologicaloppositiontotheTrotskyists,theirunlikely
coalitionwasnonethelessbasedonanappealtoworkersasaclass.TheTrotskyist
andLatimerforcesstructuredtheiroppositiontothePopularFrontblocasan
aggressivemaneuvertoasserttheprimacyoforganizedlaborspoliticsinthe
MinneapolisFarmerLaborParty.Theresultingelectoraldefeatwasanillustration
ofwhatAdamPrzeworskiidentifiesasthepermanenttensionbetweenthenarrow
interestsofunionsandthebroaderinterestsofparties.284Historicallylabor
politicsarenotintrinsicallyexclusionary,butpartiesandunionsmustarticulate
1,000votemargin.Citygeneralelectionrecapitulation,June10,1935andJune14,
1937;countygeneralelectionrecapitulation,November3,1936.
284 Przeworski,CapitalismandSocialDemocracy,14.
100

thosepoliticstobeofimmediateinteresttoothersocialclassesinordertowin
electoralsupport.285
Inthepublicimagination,therevoltofthetradeunionsagainsttheCentral
CommitteeeffectivelybrandedtheFLPaseitheraworkerspartyinthenarrowest
senseorahiveofCommunismsubversion.Thetradeunionistsfailedtoconvince
votersthattheirstrugglewiththeFLPwasmorethanafightoverpartyinfluence,
butinfactaworthwhilebattleoverpreservingthevoiceofworkingpeopleinparty
affairs.TheRepublicancampaigneagerlycapitalizedontheviciousinfightinginthe
HennepinCountyCentralCommitteeandLeachcourtedvotersuneasywiththe
radicalismoftheFLPbyhighlightingtheclassantagonismthatanimatedtheinner
partyturmoil.Tocomplicatemattersfurther,thedisputesfracturingoftheFLPs
1936coalitionspilledoverdirectlyintoapoliticallymotivatedjurisdictionaldispute
betweentheAFLandthenascentMinnesotaCIO.
LaborFactionalisminMinneapolis
ThedebacleofthemayoralelectionmadeBensonincreasinglyexcitedbythe
politicalopportunitiesofallyingwiththeCIOtocombatoppositionfromtheAFL
andtheTrotskyists.HehopedthattheexplosivenationalgrowthoftheCIOwould
carryoverintoMinnesotatosupplanttheAFLandinfusethestatelabormovement
witharenewedcommitmenttoprogressivepoliticalactiononhisterms.The
governorenthusiasticallysupportedtheCIOsorganizingcampaignsinthemines
andloggingcampsofnorthernMinnesota,meatpackinginSaintPaulandsmallrural
285 GstaEspingAndersen,PoliticsAgainstMarkets:TheSocialDemocraticRoadto
Power(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1985),8.
101

communities,atFordsTwinCitiesAssemblyPlant,andintheMinneapolistextile,
machineassembly,andelectricalshops.286Foritspart,CIOreachedouttoasizeable
swathofworkers,mostofwhomlivedandworkedoutsidethestatesmetropolitan
center,unrepresentedbytheStateFederationofLabor,tobuildthebasisforarival
labororganization.IdeologicallytheCIOssocialdemocratictendenciesgelled
neatlywiththoseheldbytheFLPsleftwingandBensonalsosawthegreatpotential
ofharnessingtheCIOspoliticalmachinerytotheFLP.Thegovernorpledged
himselftotheindustrialunionmovementandshapedhislaborlegislationagenda
arounditsneeds.Thecenterpiecewasaproposalforthecreationofastatelevel
WagnerActtoaugmentfederalprovisionsprotectingtherightofworkersto
organizeandbargainthatwasidenticaltolegislationendorsedbytheCIOacrossthe
industrialnorth.287
BensonssympathiesfortheCIOandcloseworkingrelationshipwiththeCP
reintroducedthecorrosiveelementoflaborfactionalismtotheMinneapolislabor
movement.AtfirsttheCIOsmovementintoMinnesotawasoflittleconsequence
becausenoneofitsorganizingdrives,ofteninindustriesviolentlyopposedto
unionslikeminingandtimber,wonanysignificantvictories.Nonetheless,the
statescraftunionleadersdefendedtheAFLshardlinestanceagainsttheCIO.
GeorgeLawsonoftheStateFederationofLaborclaimedthatthesuspensionofthe
CIOwasnotarepudiationofindustrialunionism,butacensureoftheCommittees
organizationalmethods,specificallythetargetingofworkersalreadyorganized
287 StateWagnerActToRemoveStrifeUrgedByBenson,MinnesotaLeader,July3,
1937,5.
102

intocraftunions.288ToassuagetheAFL,theCIOstatedthatitseffortsinMinnesota
weresolelytoorganizetheunorganizedandnottoraidcraftunions.289
Nevertheless,Minnesotalaborleadersin1937compliedwiththenational
leadershipoftheAFLandbarredtheCIOfromtheStateFederationofLaborand
fromtheMinneapolisCLU.290
Althoughtheindustrialunionupsurgewasanidealentrypointforthe
CommunistsalreadyensconcedintheFLPtobuildagenuinebaseintheunions,
partyactivityonlyfurtheraggravatedideologicaltensionsinthelabormovement.
InAugustof1937,thestatecommitteeoftheMinnesotaCommunistPartyopenly
[declared]itsfullsupporttothehistoricworkoftheCIO,andpledgeditsmembers
andresourcestostrengthenorganizingdrivesacrossthestate.291 AlthoughJohnL.
LewiscouldcynicallyclaimtheCommunistsherecruitedtoorganizeCIOunions
weresimplyhisfunctionaries,suchinsoucianceneglectsthewiderimpactofthe
tumultuousideologicalstrugglesspawnedbythepresenceofCommunist
unionists.292TheCPsmoveintotheCIOdirectlyantagonizedtheAFLunionsthat
onlymonthsearlierrevoltedagainstBensonsPopularFrontalliesincontrolofthe
HennepinCountyFLP.Bensonawkwardlywadedintothisopenendedconflictby
announcinghimselfasalaborgovernorunwillingtobedraggedintothequagmire
288 LawsonSaysAFLDoesNotCondemnIndustrialUnions,MinnesotaLeader,May
1,1937,1.
289 NoFightAgainstCrafts,SaysCIO,MinnesotaLeader,May22,1937,5.
290 C.L.U.toAppealDisassociationCIO,MinneapolisLaborReview,August20,1937,
4.
291 DraftResolutionoftheStateCommittee:BuildingtheCommunistParryforTrade
UnionUnityandanAllInclusiveFarmerLaborParty,August1938,2,call
#HX544.D73folio,MinnesotaHistoricalSociety.
292 AsLewisinfamouslyasked:Whogetsthebird?Thedogorthehunter?Quoted
inZieger,TheCIO,83.
103

oftheAFLCIOcontroversy.293TheTrotskyistsandtheStateFederationofLabor
interpretedCommunistledCIOorganizingdrivesasanintrusionintotheirrightful
jurisdictionsandanattempttosaptheirpoliticalclout.
LaborfactionalismflaredintoopenconflictinSeptember1937when
CommunistunionistsinthreeMinneapolisIAMlocalsled5,000machinistsintotwo
newlyestablishedlocalsoftheUnitedElectrical,Radio,andMachineWorkers(UE).
LiketheTrotskyistsinLocal544,theCPcadresinthemachinistlocalseschewed
hardlinerevolutionaryrhetoricinfavorofmilitantindustrialunionismandclashed
repeatedlywiththeconservativenationalIAMleadershipwhileearningtherespect
oftherankandfile.MovingthemachinistsintotheCIOandtheCommunistledUE
gavetheMinnesotaCPitsfirstgenuinefootholdintheMinneapolislabormovement.
TheMinneapolismachineshopsbecamethecenterofthenewstatewideIndustrial
UnionCouncil,linkingtheSteelWorkersOrganizingCommittee(SWOC)campaign
ontheMesabiIronRangewithnewlyformedlocalsrepresentingmeatpacking
workersinsouthernMinnesota.294Ledbyexecutiveofficerswhowereall
CommunistsoratleastsympathetictothePopularFront,theMinnesotaCIO
effectivelybecameanorganoftheCP.295ThedefectiontotheUEalsomoveda
numberofCommunistmachinistsintoinfluentialpositionsintheHennepinCounty
FarmerLaborapparatuses.Thecaptureofthemachinistsprovidedtheleftwing
HennepinFarmerLaboriteswithatradeunionbasetocountertheTrotskyistState
FederationofLaborallianceininterpartyclashes.Nevertheless,thestateCIOwas
293 BensonforLaborUnity,MinneapolisLaborReview,July16,1937,4.
294 Haynes,CommunistsandAntiCommunistsintheNorthernMinnesotaCIO,
19361949,UpperMidwestHistory1(1)1981:5573.
104

onlyafractionofthesizeoftheStateFederationofLaborinMinneapolisandacross
thestate.GiventheforwardmomentumofCIOunionsacrossthecountry,theFLPs
PopularFrontblocwasconfidentthattheIndustrialUnionCouncilcouldeasilyout
organizetheStateFederationofLabor.
AtthehelmofthemostpowerfulunioninMinneapolis,ifnotthestate,the
TrotskyistteamstersfearedthatanyStalinistinroadsintothelabormovementvia
theCIOwouldcurtailthepoliticalpoweroftheAFLintheFLP.Theirresponseto
theIAMlocalsdefectionwasemblematicofadeepeningalliancewiththeState
FederationofLabor.Predictably,theTrotskyistslashedoutattheirresponsible
leadershipoftheStalinistforunderminingthelaborunitythatmadethegrowthof
theIAMlocalspossible.296 Theyconsideredtheraidonthemachinistlocalslittle
morethananakedgrabforpoliticalpowerbytheCommunistParty.297Werepeat,
theleadersofLocal544announced,theMinneapoliscrisisisnotaCIOquestion,
notanindustrialunionquestion.Thisisthequestion:IstheMinneapolislabor
movementtobesplitupandclubbedintothedirt,allforthepurposeoffeedingthe
appetitesoftheselfseekingStalinistclique?298TheCLUcameoutinsupportofthe
fewhundredmachinistswhoremainedinAFLlocalsandcondemnedthetrickery
oftheCommunistsforblatantlyraidingestablishedlocals.299TheTrotskyistsput
296 Dobbs,TeamsterPolitics,1012;TheMachinistsLocalsGoCIO,WhatFor?
NorthwestOrganizerSeptember2,1937,1,3.
297 Dobbs,TeamsterPolitics,100.
298 CLUEndorsesAFofLMachinists,NorthwestOrganizer,September30,1937,1.
299 C.L.U.SupportsA.F.L.Machinists,MinneapolisLaborReview,October1,1937,1
2.
105

thepointmorebluntlyinsayingtheMinnesotaCIOdeclaredwarontherestofthe
unionmovement.300
Asthecompetingfactionsinthelabormovementgrewmoreintransigent,
Bensonfounderedasapeacemaker.Delegatestothe1937StateFederationof
LaborConventioninSeptemberputforward13resolutionscallingforlaborunity,
butcontinuedAFLhostilitytotheCIOalsoevidentontheconventionfloor.Ina
pointedreferencetotheCIOsrelianceonNLRBelectionstowinunionrecognition,
StateFederationPresidentT.E.CunninghamreassertedtheAFLsantistatismand
snidelyremarked,Therightoforganizationofworkingmenisnotgrantedbylegal
action.301OntheconventionfloorFarrellDobbsspokeinfavorofindustrial
unionismwhiledenouncingtheCIOstiestoStalinismandpenchantforlabor
splitting.302Inhisspeechtotheconvention,Bensonimploredthelabormovement
toresolveitsinternalcontroversiesandtorestorelaborunityinordertoavoidthe
fatesthatbefelltheGermanandItalianlabormovements.303Althoughthe
governorsaddresswasgreetedwithapplause,RepresentativeJohnBernard,the
FarmerLaborcongressmanwhorepresentedtheIronRange,waspreventedfrom
speakingbecauseofhisworkasanorganizerforSWOC.304Aftertheconvention
Bensonstruggledtorepairtheriftinlaborsranksandforhiseffortswonfresh
300 WhoIsAidedbyUnionSplit,NorthwestOrganizer,October1,1937,1.
301 ProceedingsoftheFiftyfifthConventionoftheMinnesotaStateFederationof
Labor,Hibbing,Minn.,September2022,1937,6973,20.
302 StateFederationConventionPassesCIOAFLResolution,NorthwestOrganizer,
September30,19373.
303 StateFederationAppealsforUnitedLaborMovement,MinnesotaLeader,
September25,1937,1,3.
304 BensonGivenGreatOvationatConvention,BernardSaysTopicWastoBe
Unity,MinneapolisLaborReview,September24,1937,1.
106

scornfromthelabormovement.Hepersonallymetwith75businessagentsand
laborofficialsfromtheAFLinthestatesenatechamberswhodismissedoutrightthe
governorspleastoenterpeacenegotiationswiththeCIO.305
ThetenseatmosphereintheMinneapolislabormovementwasonly
exacerbatedbytheassassinationofTeamstersJointCouncilchairPatrickCorcoran
outsidehishomeonthenightofNovember17.Corcoransdeathbecamea
flashpointintheAFLCIOcrisisasbothsidesconcoctedstoriesinvolvingtheSoviet
secretpoliceandgangsterstosmeartheiropposition.Corcoransownfuneral
nearlydevolvedintoabloodyshowdownbeforeanarmedmanandallegedCIO
representativewasremoved.306TheviolentdeathofaleadingAFLunionofficialin
themidstofacontentiousjurisdictionaldisputeshouldhaveconvincedBensonto
acttheimpartialarbiter,butagainheprovedunwillingorunabletotranscendhis
proCIOsympathies.InalettertoTobin,Dobbsnoted,Thereseemstobe
considerablehesitancyonthepartoftheadministrativeforcestoreallydelveinto
thiscaseonanenergeticbasis.307Withnoarrestsorstrongleadstheinvestigation
groundtohaltandwildaccusationsswirled,stokinganimositybetweentheState
FederationofLaborandtheCIOandtheirFarmerLaborallies.Publically,thelabor
movementwastaintedwithanunsavoryconnectiontomurder,withtheimplication
ofgangsterismandcorruptionasthepresumedmotive.Similarly,Bensonandthe
FLPappearedeitherasaccomplicesinacoveruporradicalprovocateursunableto
305 BusinessAgentsTellBensonofMachinistSplit,NorthwestOrganizer,October1,
1937,1.
306 LetterfromJohnS.PicagotoThomasHughes,November29,1937,Mss,9/1,
series1,box43,folder5,ONeil,Mary,19161940,IBTPapers.
307 LetterfromFarrellDobbstoDanielJ.Tobin,December2,1937,Mss848,box5,
107

maintainlawandorder.308
Minnesotaslaborgovernorwasactivelycontributingtothefactionalism
eatingawayathispartyasnationaleconomiccrisisstruckatthegainsmadeby
organizedlabor.Inthisworseningatmosphere,Bensonreiteratedthedangersof
discordinthelabormovementfortheFLP.Ouropponents,Bensonexplainedto
theRamseyCountyFarmerLaborAssociationconvention,seekbyeverymeans
theycangrasptobreakupourmovement,tomakeitsmall,narrow,divided,
sectarian,exclusiveandineffective.309Butthegovernorsownbehavior
exacerbatedthesharporganizationalandideologicaldivisionspittingorganized
laboragainstitself.HisunyieldingloyaltytotheCommunistblocintheFLPsparked
onenearlycatastrophicrevoltduringtheLatimerHaycraftprimaryandhis
preferentialtreatmentoftheCIOwassettoigniteanother.Tomakemattersworse,
thesepoliticalriftsinthelabormovementcoincidedwiththecripplingoutbreakof
aneconomicrecession.Workersfoughtdesperatelytoprotecttheirgainsinthe
workplace,butfromthespringof1937untiltheoutbreakofWorldWarTwothe
labormovementweresquarelyonthedefensive.3101937wasamilitantyearasthe
numberofstrikesmorethandoublednationallyasemployersseizedanopportunity
tofloutnationallaborlawandviolentlyresistthegainswonbyunions.311The
recessionhittheindustrialunionsespeciallyhardandthemilitantmarchoftheCIO
309 TextofBensonSpeechAtRamseyCountyFLConference,MinnesotaLeader,
December4,1937,5.
310 MelvynDubofsky,TheStateandLaborinModernAmerica(ChapelHill,NC:
UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1994),13738.
311 FlorencePeterson,ReviewofStrikesintheUnitedStates,MonthlyLabor
Review,46(5)1938,1066.
108

groundtoahalt.Asadividedorganizedlabormovementduginforaprotracted
fightwithcapital,aconservativecoalitionwastakingshapeinCongressagainstan
embattledRooseveltadministration.InMinnesota,aselsewhereintheindustrial
North,laborfactionalismunderminedthepoliticaleffectivenessoforganizedlabor
aswellasthebroadappealofworkingclasspolitics.
TheContestedTerrainofLiberalism
DespitethemultifaceteddivisionsintheFarmerLaborPartyinthelabor
movement,thisperiodmarkedanascendanceofworkingclasspolitics.Militant
laborcoalescedaroundabroadbasedFarmerLabormovementtosubstantively
reshapethepoliticalenvironmentofMinnesota.Thisprocesstookplacealongside
similartransformationsacrosstheindustrialnorthwiththeNewDealDemocrats.
Althoughthelabormovementwasdivided,tradeunionsandworkingclasspolitics
wereresponsibleforthemomentouspoliticalrealignmentbehindNewDeal
liberalism.Theleftwarddriftofnationalpoliticsin1936wasbynomeans
uncontested,butscholarshavealmostexclusivelyframedoppositiontotheNew
Dealinstarklyreactionaryterms.Regularlyoverlookedisthehistoryofinfluential
segmentsoftheRepublicanPartyinnorthernindustrialstatesthatacceptedthe
NewDealasthebedrockofanewpoliticalrealityintheUnitedStates.Theprewar
resurgenceofaliberalGOPwasnonethelessfoundedonasharpcritiqueoftheNew
Dealsincipientsocialdemocratictendenciesandacleardesiretocurbthestrides
madebyurbanindustrialworkersandtheirpoliticallymobilizedtradeunions.In
short,theintertwinedinsurgencyoforganizedlaborandthetriumphofNewDeal
109

classpoliticsbeliedasubtle,yetdeeplysignificant,conflictovertheshapeand
directionofmidtwentiethcenturyliberalism.
RecentscholarshiphighlightsthelimitsofNewDealliberalismastheresult
ofinternalstrugglewithintheDemocraticPartyandthedifficultiesforAmerican
politicalinstitutionsandculturetoembracemoredynamicreformregimes.
ReactionarySouthernDemocratsareroutinelycitedastheprimaryimpedimentto
thevaguelysocialdemocraticaspirationsoftheNewDeal.TheSouth,Sean
FarhangandIraKatznelsonargue,possessedastructuralvetooverallNewDeal
andFairDeallegislationatatimewhenRepublicansalonecouldnotsustainan
effectiveopposition.312TheSouthernvetoofSouthernDemocratstolegislation
promotinglabororganizationandnationaleconomicplanningdelimitedorganized
laborspoliticalintegrationintothestate,therebyforestallingatransitionfrom
liberalismtosocialdemocracy.313Inadditiontoplacatingtheracistandreactionary
Bourbonsoftheparty,NewDealreformersrelentedinthefaceofmounting
businessopposition.Followingthe1937recessionandespeciallyduringtheSecond
WorldWar,NewDealelites,AlanBrinkleyargues,underwentaconfusedand
contentiousprocessofadjustmenttoreachanaccordwithcorporatebusiness
autonomy.314DavidPlotkeislessconvincedthatreformerssurrenderedtocapital
totheextentthatBrinkelycontends,butmaintainsthattheNewDealorderitself
312 SeanFarhangandIraKatznelson,TheSouthernImposition:CongressandLabor
intheNewDealandFairDeal.StudiesinAmericanPoliticalDevelopment19(1)
2005,1.
313 IraKatznelson,KimGeiger,andDanielKryder,LimitingLiberalism:The
SouthernVetoinCongress,19331950,PoliticalScienceQuarterly108(2)1993,
3012.
314 AlanBrinkley,TheEndofReform:NewDealLiberalisminRecessionandWar
(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1995),7.
110

lackedtheideologicalandinstitutionalcapacitiestobecomeasocialdemocratic
politicalorder.315NickSalvatoreandJeffersonCowiegoevenfurtheranddismiss
theNewDealasahistoricalaberrationthatcouldnotovercomeAmericasdiverse
anddivisiveracial,ethnic,andreligiousbackgroundnorreconcileitselfwiththe
individualismatthecenterofAmericanpoliticalculture.316
ThebasicinsightofthesevaryinginterpretationsisthattheNewDealwasa
compositepoliticalorderofcompetingsocialelements.Althoughbasicallycorrect,
thissummationreliesonthreeassumptions:thattheNewDealwasincapableof
socialdemocracy,thatthedefiningmomentofconflictwasthe1940s,andthat
Republicanoppositionbythelate1930swasresolutelyantiNewDeal.However,a
closerandmorenuancedlookattheindustrialNorthrequirestwocorrectivesto
theseassumptions.OneemphasizesthetenuousnatureoftheNewDealselectoral
coalition.TheotherfollowsBrinkleystimetablebutmovesthecriticalperiodof
conflictto19371938,inparticularthedefeatofNewDealersduringthemidterm
electionseason.AsAlanWarepointsout,eventhoughtheDemocratsappearedto
bethenationalmajoritycoalition,thepartyneveractuallyestablishedastable
majority.Marginalnorthernurbanvoters,includingmanyerstwhileRepublicans,
wereconsistentlyluredbytheinitiativesoftheNewDealintheeconomiccrisis,but
neverpermanentlyembracedit.317ThedislocationsoftheDepressionallowedthe
Democratstotakeadvantageofthecrisistopasslegislationfarbeyondwhata
315 Plotke,BuildingaDemocraticOrder,4748.
316 NickSalvatoreandJeffersonCowie,TheLongException:RethinkingthePlaceof
theNewDealinAmericanHistory,InternationalLaborandWorkingClassHistory
74(Fall2008),56.
317 AlanWare,TheDemocraticPartyHeadsNorth,18771962(NewYorkCambridge
111

nationalmajoritymightotherwisehaveconsentedto.318Yet,thepowerfulnew
coalitionthatemergedin1936was,astheRooseveltadministrationsoon
discovered,difficulttocontrolandunify.319TheDepressiondidnothandAmerican
politicsovertotheDemocrats,butitdiddramaticallyreshapethepoliticalterrainof
theindustrialNorthandmadeNewDealliberalismabroadlyappealingidea.Given
thestrengthandfragilityoftheDemocraticmajorityinthenorth,itisessentialto
consideralsotheshapeofoppositiontoNewDealliberalism.
TobetterunderstandtheoppositiontotheNewDealrequiresreevaluating
theresurgenceoftheRepublicanPartyinthelate1930s.Scholarshavestruggledto
situateconservatisminaperiodofsocalledliberalconsensusinlargepartbecause
thegeneralthrustoftheseaccountsemphasizestheriseofanexplicitlyantiNew
Dealrightwing.320Thismeansbroadeningurbanpolitics,therevoltofthecityin
the1930sdescribedbySamuelLubell,toincludeamorediversearrayof
oppositionalvoices.321ThestandardhistorycontendsthattheRepublicanParty
soughttoconserveanAmericawhichtheybelievedexistedbefore1933.Their
oppositiontotheNewDeal,historianJamesPattersonclaims,initiallytookplaceon
318 KennethFinegoldandThedaSkocopl,StateandPartyinAmericasNewDeal
(Madison,WI:UniversityofWisconsinPress,1995),72.
319 JamesT.Patterson,CongressionalConservatismandtheNewDeal:TheGrowthof
theConservativeCoalitioninCongress,19331939(Lexington,KY:Universityof
KentuckyPress,1967),257.
320 Cf.GeorgeWolfskill,TheRevoltoftheConservatives:AHistoryoftheAmerican
LibertyLeague,19341940(Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1962);GeorgeH.Nash,The
ConservativeIntellectualMovementinAmerica:Since1945(NewYork:,1976);
RobertF.Burk,TheCorporateStateandtheBrokerState:TheDuPontsandAmerican
NationalPolitics,19251940(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1990);Kim
PhillipsFein,InvisibleHands:TheMakingoftheConservativeMovementfromthe
NewDealtoReagan(NewYork:W.W.Norton,2009).
321 SamuelLubell,TheFutureofAmericanPolitics(NewYork:HarperandRow,
1955),6.
112

awidespectrumextendingfromtheverymoderatetothereactionarybeforethe
RepublicansbecamearesolutelyantiNewDealminoritypartyinresponseto
Rooseveltsleftwardturnin1936.322Thisnewfoundcoherencewasachieved,
historianClydeWeedargues,becausethepartyseasternelitesuccessfullydrove
outanymoderateorliberaldissentingvoices.323ThepartyslingeringProgressive
winginthewesteithersidedwiththeDemocratsorhardenedintovocalopponents
oftheNewDealbecauseoftheirprofounddistrustofcentralizedstatepowerand
interestgroupbartering.324ThisanalysisofthereconciliationofaneastwestGOP
schismunderconservativecolorsgravelyignoresurbanRepublicansineasternand
westernstateslikeMinnesota,Michigan,Pennsylvania,andWisconsinwhoblended
adesireforliberalreformwithaconservativecritiqueofNewDealclasspolitics.
SuchurbanRepublicansfoundanaturalconstituencyinthosemarginalvoterswho
supportedtheNewDeal,butremainedskepticalofanincreasinglypowerfulNew
Dealstateunderpinnedbyapoliticizedlabormovement.By1938,thetenetsof
liberalRepublicanismappearedverypersuasivetoawiderangeofurbanvoters.
AcrossthecountryanembattledRooseveltadministrationandadivided
labormovementlefttheDemocratsweakandvulnerableintheverynorthernurban
industrialcentersthathadbecometheirkeybastionsofsupport.Attheapexofits
powertheprogressive,evenradical,baseoftheNewDealinthelabormovement
wasfrayingjustaselitereformerswerebeginningtoseriouslydoubttheefficacyof
322 Patterson,CongressionalConservatism,viiviii.
323 ClydeP.Weed,TheNemesisofReform:TheRepublicanPartyDuringtheNewDeal
(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1994),73.
324 JamesL.Sundquist,DynamicsofthePartySystem:AlignmentandRealignmentof
PoliticalPartiesintheUnitedStates(Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitute,1983),
240268.
113

socialKeynesianpolicy.Theoutbreakofwhatquicklybecameknownasthe
RooseveltRecessionmadeclearthattheNewDealhadnotendedtheDepression
andthrewintoquestiontheunderpinningsofsocialKeynesianeconomictheory.
RooseveltsproposedreorganizationoftheSupremeCourtinearly1937enraged
hisopponentsandunnervedmanysupporterswhosawanexecutiveoverreaching
hisconstitutionalauthority.Inaddition,resurgentlabormilitancy,sparkedbythe
sitdownstrikesintherubberandautoplantsandthecountervailingbruntof
violentemployerrepressionespeciallyamongtheLittleSteelfirms,posedtwo
interrelatedproblemsforNewDealers.IftheNewDeallaborrelationsregimecould
notsecureindustrialpeace,thengovernmentsanctionedcollectivebargainingwas
doomed.Similarly,attemptsbyworkerstomeetrepressionwithmoreaggressive
strikeactivityunderscoredthepowerlessnessoftheNewDealstate.Laborstrife
exposedtheveryusefulnessandlegitimacyofNewDealpoliticstocloseand
unflatteringscrutiny.By19371938,theRepublicanshadachoicetoeitherleada
frontalassaultontheNewDealorcolonizeitbycooptingitsmostpopular
components.
Remarkably,theMinnesotaRepublicanPartysresponsetotheflagging
fortunesoftheFLPandtheNewDealwastocooptmuchofitsreformagendaand
jettisonitsownstridentconservatism.Thiswasbynomeansagradualevolutionin
partythinking,buttheoutcomeofapowerstrugglebetweenthepartys
archconservativeoldguardandanewgenerationofactivists.FollowingLeachs
electioninthesummerof1937,theMinnesotaLeaderexcitedlyreporteda
developingfissureinthestateGOP.Ononesidewasacaucusofhardline
114

conservatives,unswervingintheiroppositiontotheFLPandtheNewDeal,who
calledthemselvestheCommitteeforRepublicanAction.Ontheother,theYoung
RepublicanLeagueofHennepinCountywarnedthatthepartywasfallingintothe
handsofacliqueofFascists.325Ledbyanambitiousandhardworkingyoung
countyattorneynamedHaroldStassen,theYoungRepublicanswantedtoshedthe
partysunpopularimageasagentsofreactionandbigbusiness.In1934,asviolent
classconflictragedonthestreetsofMinneapolis,Stassenwaselectedchairmanof
theYoungRepublicansanddeclared,wefavorthebeginningofapoliticalparty
fromwhichwillbeexcludedthoseselfishinterestswhichseektousewealthof
extensivecorporateholdingsasthekeytoimproperinfluence;apartywhichwill
presentanaggressive,intelligentandfairmindedoppositiontothosenowin
office.326TheliberalmovementledbyStassen,politicalscientistIvanHinderaker
wrote,wastobearevitalizingforceintheRepublicanPartythatrecognizedthe
newsetofeconomic,social,andpoliticalfactorsreshapingdailylife.Stassenandhis
followersconsciouslywantedtobuilduponthereformsbegunbytheFLPandNew
DealDemocratswhiletemperingtheirradicalimplications.327
TheuniquepoliticalbackgroundofhisSt.Paulupbringingdeeplyinformed
Stassensbrandofliberalism.GrowingupaRepublicaninIrishCatholicSt.Paul,the
DemocraticPartysloneMinnesotastronghold,impresseduponStassenthevalueof
325 WarringGroupsinGOPThreatentoSplitParty,MinnesotaLeader,June26,
1937,1.
326 QuotedinH.HenrySouthworth,HaroldStassenandtheRebirthofthe
RepublicanParty,unpublishedtermpaper,1963,box1,folderHaroldStassenand
theRebirthoftheRepublicanParty,H.HenrySouthworth,1963,HaroldStassen
Papers,MinnesotaHistoricalSociety,ArchivesandManuscriptsDivision,St.Paul.
327 IvanHinderaker,HaroldStassenandDevelopmentsintheRepublicanPartyin
Minnesota,19371943,Ph.D.dissertation,UniversityofMinnesota,1949,iii.
115

honinganeclecticpoliticalplatformtoappealtoadiverseelectorate.Hisclose
friendandlawpartner,conservativeDemocratElmerRyan,abuddingpolitician
whowaselectedtotheUSCongressin1934,helpedguideStassensearlyforaysinto
St.Paulpolitics.HislinkstotheDemocratsalsoreflectedhisownideological
sympathyforlabor.Stassentoutedhisworkingclassbackgroundinthecitys
stockyardneighborhoodsandproudlyannouncedhistwobrothersasmembersof
AFLunions.TheriseoftheFLPandthecrisisoftheDepressionfurtherinfluenced
StassensliberalRepublicanismasDakotaCountyDistrictAttorney,aposition
formerlyheldbyFloydOlson.In1933heingratiatedhimselftoboththeOlson
administrationbyprosecutingtheSouthSt.PaulArmourpackinghousefor
blacklistingstrikingworkersandtheAFLbyhelpingtodiscreditthestrikes
Communistleadership.328Inaddition,Stassenmadeanameforhimselfduringthe
packinghousestrikeandtheexperiencewasdecisiveinshapinghiscritical
liberalism.Latercampaignliteratureoutlinedhow[h]econferreddailywiththe
strikeleadersandconvincedthestrikerstorepudiatetheoutsidecommunists
[who]attemptedtoinciteviolenceandpreventarbitration.329Hewasa
RepublicanwhopraisedtheAmericanFederationofLabor,butherejected
voluntarisminfavorofstrictlegislationtoresolvelabordisputesanddrastically
328 Asoneformerlyblacklistedmeatpackerwrote,WeworkersknowthatStassenis
ourfriend.Anonymoushandwrittendeposition,box1,folder,Notesand
CorrespondenceRelatingtoArmourPackingHouseStrike,1933,StassenPapers.
329 HisLaborRecord,Stassencampaignpamphlet,nodate(ca.1938),box1,folder
NotesandCorrespondenceRelatingtoArmourPackingHouseStrike,1933,Stassen
Papers.
116

limittheabilityofworkerstostrike.330Despiteacceptingthelegitimateroleof
tradeunionsinamoderneconomy,Stassenssolidcommitmenttousingthestateto
curtailtheabilityofunionstoactasautonomousagentsofworkingclasspower
definedtheauthenticityofhisRepublicancredentials.
Inlate1937andearly1938,theGOPstruggledtofindanomineetochallenge
BensonforthegovernorshiptwoyearsaftertheFLPlandslide.Stassensname
cameupasapotentialsacrificiallambforthepartyeventhoughmanyinthe
Republicanestablishmentfoundhimfartooliberal.Hesurgedaheadinacrowded
fieldofestablishedconservativecandidates(includingMayorLeach)andwonthe
nominationinaprimaryelectionthatwitnessedthenumberofRepublicanvotes
increaseby25percent.331Stassendefinedhiscampaignasastruggleagainstthe
twinforcesofreactionandradicalism,therebyredefiningtheMinnesotaGOPasa
liberalparty.TheGOPsgubernatorialcandidatedescribedthepartysnewliberal
directioninanannouncementtocampaignvolunteers:Youareenrolledina
crusadetodriveracketeering,radicalism,masqueradingunderaliberallabel,outof
ourstateCapitol,andtoreplaceitwithatrulyliberal,constructive
administration.332StassenputforwardathoroughlyNewDealinfluencedplatform
thatincludedsupportforthe1935SocialSecurityActandtheneedtoincreasethe
purchasingpowerofworkers.KeytothisliberalreinventionoftheRepublican
Partywashisavowedsupportfortherightsoforganizedlabor.Weshallnever
330 Southworth,HaroldStassenandtheRebirthoftheRepublicanParty,14,
StassenPapers.
331 Southworth,HaroldStassenandtheRebirthoftheRepublicanParty,78,
StassenPapers;Gieske,MinnesotaFarmerLaborism,265.
332 CalltoAllStassenforGovernorVolunteers,1938,box4,folder1938
GubernatorialCampaignMisc.CorrespondenceandRelatedPapers,StassenPapers.
117

permittheNationalGuardsmensbayonetstobeusedasanemployersweaponto
crushthosewholabor,Stassenannounced.Neithershallwegivetothe
irresponsibleleftwingofthelaborthesupportofthestategovernmentinits
attempttounderminethesoundlabormovement.333Hispositionwasdesignedto
resonatewiththeconservative,pureandsimplepoliticsoftheAFLwhile
denouncingmilitantandpoliticallyactiveunionslikeLocal544andthoseintheCIO.
StassensemphasisonlaborpoliticswasacalculatedefforttobreakaparttheFLPs
increasinglyunstableurbancoalitionbyhighlightingthesourceofintraparty
tensionintheFLP.
FarmerLaborisminCrisis
TheriseofaliberalfactioninthestateGOPacutelyexacerbatedthegrowing
conflictintheFLP.WiththefeudovertheMinneapolismayoralnominationfreshin
mind,thepartysleftandrightwingsduginforabitterprimarycampaignas
conservativeFarmerLaboriteHjalmarPetersenonceagainchallengedBensonfor
thegovernorship.Petersenwasencouragedtorunbythepartysrightwingwho
wereappalledbyBensonsPopularFrontadministration.Healsodrew
considerablesupportfrominfluentialRepublicansandbusinessleadersconvinced
thatamoderateFarmerLaboritestoodabetterchanceofbeingelectedthana
memberoftheirownparty.334AmongBensonsupportersPetersenwasexcoriated
asaclosetreactionary,buttheleftwingwasnonethelessimpatienttostifleany
333 QuotedinHineraker,HaroldStassenandDevelopmentsintheRepublicanParty
inMinnesota,236.
118

impressionthatthepartywastearingitselfapart.335SelmaSeestrom,thePopular
FrontliberalcochairoftheHennepinCountyCentralCommittee,arguedthatthere
wasnodivisionintheFarmerLabormovementbetweenaleftandrightwing,onlya
strugglebetweentherankandfileandasmallcliquewhowantcontrolofthe
[FarmerLabor]Association.336
ThatcliqueincludedtheTrotskyists,Latimer,andtheStateFederationof
LaborwhoweretentativelyrallyingbehindPetersenasawaytoincreasethetrade
unionspoliticalinfluenceintheFLP.InadiscussionwithTrotskyinMexicoCityin
April1938,JamesCannonlaidoutthepoliticalsituationfacingthetradeunions:
TheStalinistswhohavebeendrivenoutofthetradeunionshavepenetrated
deeplyintotheFarmerLaborAssociationthisconstitutesaweaponagainst
usintheunions.ThepolicytherenowisthepolicyofablocoftheTrotskyist
unionswithwhattheycalltherealfarmerlaborites,thatis,reformistswho
believeintheFLPanddontwishtheStaliniststocontrolit.Howfarcanwe
carrysuchablochowfarcanwefightforjustorganizationalcontrol?Butif
ourpeoplestandaside,theStalinistsgetcontrol.Ontheotherhand,ifwe
fightreallyenergetically,aswedointheunions,webecomechampionsof
theFLP.Itisnotasimplequestionitsveryeasyforpeopletogetlostin
thereformistpolicy.337
TrotskyurgedtheMinneapolisfactionnottoabandontheFLP,buttocontinue
workingtotransformitintoanoutrightlaborparty.338However,theTrotskyists
attempttotranslatesupportforPetersenintoamovetowardsconvertingtheFLP
intoalaborpartyonlygeneratedabacklashamongtheunionrankandfile.339A
335 WhereisHjalmarGettingHisSupport?,MinnesotaLeader,January29,1938,3
336 DraftresolutionoftheHennepinCountyCentralCommittee,nodate(ca.1938),
box1,folderCorrespondenceandOtherPapers,undated1938,StagebergPapers.
337 Trotsky,LeonTrotskyontheLaborPartyintheUnitedStates(NewYork:Merit
Publishers,1969),29.
338 Trotsky,LeonTrotskyontheLaborPartyintheUnitedStates,46.
339 TheMinnesotaLeaderonPetersen,NorthwestOrganizer,January27,1938,4;
A.I.HarrisonPetersonAgain,NorthwestOrganizer,February3,1938,4.
119

groupcalledtheOrganizedTeamsterFarmerLaborCommitteecirculateda
pamphletthroughoutLocal544condemningtheTrotskyistleadershipfor
supportingreactionarieslikeLatimerandPetersen.WedriversareFarmer
Laborites,thecommitteessecretaryDouglasRazewrote,Wedemandthat[the
Trotskyists],asrepresentativesofouruniongivefullsupporttotheFarmerLabor
administration.340Inaddition,theTrotskyistledunitycommitteefailedtosecure
thevotesneededtodislodgethePopularFrontblocfromtheleadershipofthe
HennepinCentralCommittee.341Underpressurefromtheunionrankandfileand
stymiedinitseffortstowincontroloverthemachineryoftheMinneapolisFarmer
Laborestablishment,theTrotskyistsandtheStateFederationofLaborcoulddo
littletochartanindependentpoliticalpathandreluctantlymovedtobackBenson
againstPetersen.342
Dispiritedbythecraftunionsdecision,PetersenoptednottoattendtheFLP
stateconventioninMarch.Theconventionproceedings,heldintheCIOstronghold
ofDuluth(noless),veryquicklydisillusionedthefewAFLunionsthatdidsend
delegationstotheFarmerLaborconclave.Eagertoneutralizeaconservative
uprising,Bensonpresentedamuchmoremoderateplatformtotheassembled
delegates.Gonewerethepartysexhortationsofproductionforuseaswellas
plankscallingforsocializedmedicineandpublicownershipofutilitiesandnatural
340 OrganizedTeamstersFarmerLaborCommitteepamphlet,February3,1938,2,4,
341 HennepinFLUnitySlateAbandoned,NorthwestOrganizer,February3,1938,
1.
342 VoteforGovernorBensonDefeattheReactionaries!,NorthwestOrganizer,
June16,1938,4.
120

resources.343InresponsetoayearofdebilitatinginfightingBensonattemptedto
placatebothfactionsbyparingbacktheFLPssocialdemocraticaspirationsuntilthe
partysreformagendalookedalmostidenticaltothatoftheNewDeal.TheFLP
pledgedtoprotecttherightoflabortoorganizeandbargaincollectively,toadopta
statefundworkmenscompensationlaw,astatewageandhourbill,andastate
laborrelationsactpatternedontheNLRA.Nonetheless,abannerprominently
displayedatthefrontoftheconventionhallreadingBUILDAFARMERLABOR
BULWARKAGAINSTFASCSIMwasapointedreminderofBensonsPopularFront
orientation.344
FortheTrotskyistsandothertradeunionists,thestateconventionproveda
dismalreminderoftheFLPsslackcommitmenttolaborandworkingclasspolitics.
FrankTigheoftheHennepinCountydelegationnoted,LookontheplatformandI
dontthinkyouwillfinditisovercrowdedwithtradeunionists.Dontforget,
Tigheadmonishedtheconvention,thatthefoundationoftheFLPartyrests
neverthelessupontheeconomicorganizationofthetradeunionsaswellasthefarm
organizations.345Organizedlaborfeltitselfignoredandmarginalizedasnearlyall
ofitsdemandswerestruckdownwhilearaftofCommunistfrontgroupsandpaper
organizationsseizedcontroloftheconventiontoadvanceBensonsmoderatenew
program.LedbydelegatesfromtheMinneapolisBuildingTradesCouncil,theState
FederationofLaboreventhreatenedtowithdrawfromtheconvention.Militant
343 Giekse,MinnesotaFarmerLaborism,260.
345 ProceedingsoftheFarmerLaborConvention,Duluth,MNMarch2527,1938,48,
box3,folderProceedingsoftheFarmerLaborConvention,FarmerLabor
AssociationPapers.
121

Minnesotalabor,theleadersofLocal544sighed,seemedonlytoholdanysway
withtheFLPwhenitthreatenedtowalkawayfromtheconventionwithits
membersintow.346
Asanattempttorestorepartyunitytheconventionprovedadismalfailure.
Inthesummerof1938boththeleftandrightwingspreparedforafierce
gubernatorialprimary.PetersenfocusedhiscampaignonrootingouttheReds
whohadseizedcontroloftheBensonadministration.347Otherwisesympathetic
partyofficialsandaffiliatedorganizationswereembarrassedbyhisincessant
emphasisonCommunistinfiltration.TheyreluctantlysidedwithBensoninhopesof
puttinganendtopartyinfightingthatwasfocusingunwantedpublicattentionon
theveryrealpresenceofCommunistsintheFLP.AninfuriatedPetersentookthese
defectionsasproofofCommunistdominationandhisattacksonBensonandhis
innercircle,dubbedtheMexicanGenerals,increasinglycombinedredbaitingwith
antiSemiticattacksonthegovernorssupporters.348AsPetersenlostsupport
amongtheFLPestablishment,heappealedtoRepublicansbycallingforareturnto
theFLPsliberalrootsandawayfromthepalepinkliberalismofthePopular
Front.349UnsureofStassenselectability,RepublicansinundatedtheFarmerLabor
primarytonominatePetersenandensurethatthegeneralelectionwouldbea
346 FLStateConventionMarkedByConservatism,NorthwestOrganizer,March31,
1938,2.
348 Gieske,MinnesotaFarmerLaborism,253,263.
349 Keillor,HjalmarPetersen,148;Southworth,HaroldStassenandtheRebirthof
theRepublicanParty,13,StassenPapers.
122

contestbetweenmoderateconservatives.350Bensononlynarrowlydefeated
Peterseninahighlycompetitiveprimaryelection,butthegovernorspaltry16,000
votepluralityfellfarshortofanexpectedmarginof50,000.351Bensonswinwas
purelyapyrrhicvictory.HisstrongestshowingwasontheIronRangewhereSWOC
wasorganizingironoreminers,buttheoutspokensupportoftheCIOundermined
theFLPsconsciousefforttodownplayitsimageasthepartyofmilitantindustrial
workers.Incontrast,Petersensdissidentcampaigngalvanizedagrowing
conservativecoalitionagainstBensonthatnowshifteditssupportStassen.
Bensonscampaignforreelectionclamoredtoreignitethesamesenseof
urgencythatanimatedthe1936electionbyrepeatedlyconnectingtheFLPtothe
NewDeal.Asonepieceofcampaignliteratureloudlyexclaimed:MINNESOTA
UNDERGOVERNORBENSONISTODAYTHENO.1NEWDEALSTATEOFTHE
UNION.352By1938,theNewDealhadlostmuchofitslusteranditscoalitionwas
unraveling,buttheFLPcontinuedtoidentifyitselfwiththeDemocrats.TheBenson
campaignfocusedonrepairingtheFLPscrumblingrelationshipwithorganized
laborwhilearticulatingthebroadsocialbenefitsofastronglabormovement.The
campaigndeliberatelyunderscoredhowmuchhadchangedfororganizedlabor
sincethetruckingstrikesof1934bysharplyremindingworkersofthevitalrole
playedbythestateinmediatingindustrialdisputes.Doyoucontroltheabsolute
righttoandpowertoorganizeandbargaincollectively?askedonecampaign
350 Hineraker,HaroldStassenandDevelopmentsintheRepublicanPartyin
Minnesota,151.
352 CampaignIssueistheNewDeal,campaignpamphlet,1938,box4,folder
FarmerLaborliterature,StassenPapers.
123

pamphlet.TheLaborMovementofourstateandnationhasakeeninterestin
government[b]ecausegovernmentplayssuchanimportantpartinourliveswe
mustofnecessitybeinterestedinthosewhoadministergovernmentalfunctions.353
TheBensoncampaignwascarefultodescribetheNewDeallaborrelationsregime
asbeneficialforallsegmentsofsociety,notstrictlyorganizedworkers.In
Minnesota,theFarmerLaborplatformdeclared,therewerethousandsof
organizedandunorganizedworkers,whosebuyingpowermustbeprotectedifthe
restofourcitizensaretothrive.Increasingthepurchasingpowerofworkersby
supportingunionizationwasaboonforeveryoneproducersandconsumers,
workersandcapitalistsinthestores,shops,andfactories.354Protectinglabors
righttoorganizeandcollectivelybargainwasessentialtorevivingtheeconomyand
restoringsocialstabilityinastatethathadbecomesynonymouswithlaborstrife.
Stassenscampaignalsoemphasizedlaborpolicy,evenashisplatform
expoundedthevirtuesofanenlightenedcapitalismthatreliedonthestateto
restrainworkingclasspower.InspeechtotheYoungRepublicanLeagueof
Minnesota,apartyactivistremarked:Whilelaborhasmadegreatstridesduring
thepastdecade,itnowfacesaserioussituationinMinnesota,becauseofthe
mannerinwhichthepresentadministrationhasbecomeinoculatedwithultra
radicalismandcommunistictendencies.355ThroughoutthecampaignStassen
353 GovernorElmerA.Benson:LaborsProvenFriendcampaignpamphlet,nodate
(ca.1938),box4,folderFarmerLaborliterature,StassenPapers.
354 FarmerLaborPlatformfor1938campaignpamphlet,box4,folderFarmer
Laborliterature,StassenPapers.
355 KennethL.DawsonspeechtotheYoungRepublicanLeagueofMinnesota,no
date(ca.1938),box4,folderGubernatorialCampaignMisc.Correspondenceand
RelatedPapers,StassenPapers.
124

developedalaborpolicythatadvocatedincreasedstateinterventiontocontrol
militantlaborandunscrupulouscapital.Inatypicalcampaignspeech,Stassen
excitedlydescribedthethreatofuncheckedclassconflict:
Theflamesofindustrialwarfareconstituteoneofthemostseriousthreatsto
futureprogress,tosocialsecurity,tothemaintenanceofourdemocratic
government.Thegraspingreactionariesandtheviciousradicalsarethetwin
stokerswhofeedthesedestructiveflames.Theone,thereactionary,refuses
torecognizetherightsofworkerstoorganizeashechooses.Theydestroy
muchoftheeffortsofthegreatmajorityofemployerswhodorecognizetheir
dutytosocietyandtotheiremployeesandwhodopromotetheindustrial
peace.Theother,theradical,fostersandpromotesprematurestrikes,
encouragesunnecessaryviolenceandlawviolations,developsadisrespect
forpublicauthority,usesthelabormovementasascreenforcommunistic
activities,ruthlesslysplitsasunderthegreatlabormovementofthenation
andunderminesanddestroysmuchthathasbeenaccomplishedbythe
sincere,constructiveleadersofthelabormovement.356
ThefatalflawoftheWagnerAct,Stassencomplained,wasthatitmadeno
provisionsforthesettlementofdisputeswhencollectivebargainingfailed.357 He
calledforaprogressivelaborrelationsactto[do]awaywiththecavemantactics
ofprematurestrikes,lockouts,andviolencebylegislatingstrictguidelinesfor
labororganizingandprotest.358Hisproposedlaborpolicyhingedontheassumption
thatlabor,notcapital,wasatfaultforcreatingsocialdiscord.Ifthestatecould
restrainworkermilitancy,thenemployerswouldbepersuadedtobargainingood
faithwithorganizationsoftheirworkerschoosing.Thispolicywasgroundedina
fundamentalhostilitytotheprocessofpoliticizedcollectivebargainingusheredin
bytheWagnerAct.Stassenconcededthatworkershadarighttoformunions,but
356 Stassenspeechnotes,nodate(ca.1938),box5,folder1938Gubernatorial
CampaignSpeechMaterial,StassenPapers.
357 Hinderaker,HaroldStassenandDevelopmentsintheRepublicanPartyin
Minnesota,90.
358 Stassenspeechnotes,StassenPapers.
125

heradicallyreinterpretedthespiritoftheNewDeallaborrelationsregimeto
reassertthestateasacheckonworkingclasspower.
Stassenridiculedthepoliticalempowermentoforganizedlaborengendered
bytheNewDeal.Heeagerlyplayedupthesplitinthelabormovement,andlike
RepublicansacrossthecountryheattackedtheCIOsmilitancyandpolitical
aspirations;heevenwentsofarastoinstructcampaignvolunteerstopublicizean
allegedremarkbyBensonthatMinnesotaisaCIOstate.359ButinMinnesotathe
CIOremainedweak.ItwasunionslikeLocal544inMinneapolisthatwerethereal
targetsofStassenslaborpolicy.360InhiskeynoteaddresstotheRepublicanstate
conventionhestated,Ouradministrationwillrespectthetradeunionmovementas
aneconomicmovementandwillnotseektomakeofitapoliticalvehicle.361
StassenconjuredupthenonpartisanshipoftheAFLbyarguingthattheonly
acceptableplacefororganizedlaborinademocraticsocietywasasabargaining
agentforjobconsciousworkers.HeshrewdlyquotedamemberofanIAMlocal
guttedbytheraidingoftheUEinacampaignlettertounderscorethefailureofNew
Deallaborpolicytorevivetheeconomy.Hesforalaborrelationslawthatwill
preventmostofthelockoutsandwalkoutswhicharecostingusmoreandmorein
359 Stassencampaignmemo,nodate(ca.1938),box4,folderGubernatorial
CampaignMisc.CorrespondenceandRelatedPapers,StassenPapers.
360 Curiously,StassenrefrainedfromexplicitlysinglingouttheTrotskyistsin
campaignspeechesandliterature.Perhapshedidnotunderstandtheirsectarian
riftwiththeStalinists,butmorelikelyhedidnotwanttooffendtheStateFederation
ofLaborbyremindingthemoftheirinabilitytopurgetheradicalleadersof
Minneapolismostpowerfulunion.
361 HaroldStassen,KeynoteSpeechattheRepublicanStateConvention,September
2,1938,box4,folder1938GubernatorialCampaignMisc.Correspondenceand
126

losttimeandputtingmoreandmoreofusonthereliefandWPArolls.362 The
insurgentRepublicanismportrayedstrikesasanimpedimenttoeconomicrecovery
foremployers,employees,andthestate,ratherthanalegitimateinstrumentfor
workingpeopletoredresstheirgrievances.Stassencontendedthatwhatworkers
wantedfromtheirunionswasindustrialpeace,notpoliticalactivismpropagatedby
communisticelements.Healsopointedlydredgedupthememoryofanasty
jurisdictionalfighttoremindworkersaffiliatedwiththeStateFederationofLabor
whereBensonsrealsympathieslay.
Stassensstudiedefforttocultivatealiberalimagewassupplementedbyan
archconservativeshadowcampaigntodemonizetheFLPthroughextensivered
baitingintertwinedwithvitriolicoutburstsofantiSemitism.Asaresulttherewere
twoRepublicancampaignsforgovernor:onewasfilledwithadmirationfortheNew
Deal,andtheotherwasshotthroughwithfascisticandxenophobiclanguageand
imagery.363RepublicanspickedupthethreadofantiSemitismleftoverfrom
PetersensprimarycampaigntoassailBenson.DespiteStassensliberalpretensions
andclaimsthathedidnotendorsesuchtactics,thetenoroftheRepublicanattacks
ontheFLPcanbestbesummedupinoneStassencampaignsong:
Hiho,hiho
WejointheCIO
Wepayourdues
TothegoddamnJews
Hiho,ho.364
362 Stassencampaignletter,nodate(ca.1938),box4,folderGubernatorial
CampaignMisc.CorrespondenceandRelatedPapers,StassenPapers.
363 HymanBerman,PoliticalAntiSemitisminMinnesotaduringtheGreat
Depression,JewishSocialStudies38(3)1976.26061.
364 JohnGunther,InsideU.SA.(NewYork:HarperandBrothers,1947),301.
127

RepublicanpoliticianandfascistsympathizerRayP.Chasepopularizedthese
sentimentsinhiswidelydistributedantiFLPscreedAreTheyCommunistsor
Catspaws?SubtitledaRedBaitingArticle,thescurrilouspamphletreachedsome
13,000homesandwasdisseminatedtoleadingLutheranandCatholicfiguresacross
thestate.365InittheFLPwaspaintedasafacadefortheinsidiousforcesof
internationalCommunismandJewry.366Chasespamphletfeaturedcrude,Nazi
inspiredantiSemiticcaricaturesoffourofBensonsadvisorsascommissarsof
Bolsheviktyranny.ReferredtoastheMexicangeneralsbyPetersenduringthe
primarybattle,theepithetstuckandconjuredupanimageofacliqueofforeign
revolutionariesconspiringagainstthesupposedlyforgottenmenofMinnesota
(i.e.,gentileScandinaviansandGermans).367WhileStassenneverstoopedtoanti
Semitism,neitherdidhebridlesupporterslikeChasewhoseconflationofred
baitingandantiSemitismprovedhighlyeffective.368Thenetresultmadethe1938
Minnesotagubernatorialelection,inhistorianJeffreyGurocksestimation,themost
successfuluseofpoliticalantiSemitismintheUnitedStates.369
AlthoughtheFLPagainattemptedtorallyvotersagainstafascisticassaulton
progressivereform,thisyearthemomentumwasonthesideoftheRepublicans.
A.I.Harris,oneofthegovernorsadvisorssingledoutinChaseshateliterature,
366 RayP.Chase,AreTheyCommunistsorCatspaws?ARedbaitingArticle(Anoka,
MN:n.p.,1938).
367 F.L.PartyBetrayedbyMexicanGenerals.MinnesotaLiberalCounselor,nodate
(ca.1938)box4,folder1938GubernatorialCampaignMisc.Correspondenceand
368 Berman,PoliticalAntiSemitisminMinnesota,262.
369 JeffreyS.Gurock,AmericanJewishHistory,Volume6,Part1(NewYork:
Routledge,1998),262.
128

comparedthefakeliberalismoftheGOPtoNationalSocialismssubversive
appropriationofworkingclasspolitics.370Redbaitingandphonyliberalismwere
symptomaticoftheideologicalbankruptcyoftheRepublicancampaign,butalsothe
dangerofreactionmaskingitstrueintentionswithprogressiveplatitudes.371
HomegrownfascismandtheGOPwereconspiringtogether,theFLPreported,
becausetheleaderoftheMinnesotabranchoftheSilverShirtsannouncedhewas
backingStassen.372InresponsetounceasingredbaitingBensondistancedhimself
fromthePopularFrontandurgedhisCommunistalliestokeepquietduringthe
election.HedeclaredhimselfandtheFLPtheonlytrueliberalsintherace.The
aimofliberalgovernment,hestatedinacampaignspeech,[isto]aidpeoplein
todayseffortstoliberatethemselvesfromwantandinsecurity.Today,anypolitical
leaderwhofailstorecognizethedangerofthisnewindustrialandcommercial
feudalismcannotqualifyforliberalleadership.373Bensondefendedhisprolabor
recordandcomparedhimselftoMichiganGovernorFrankMurphywhorefusedto
usetroopsagainstthesitdownstrikersatGMsFlintplants.374Yethislabor
platformwaslimitedtopleasforincreasedwagesandshorterhours,andasidefrom
aCIObackedproposalforastatelevelWagnerAct,thegovernorofferednospecific
policiesforaddressingtheeconomiccrisis.Despiteadoptingacarboncopyofthe
NewDeal,BensonenjoyedlittlesupportfromDemocraticleaders.Stillreelingfrom
370 FakeLiberalismForerunnerofFascism,MinnesotaLeader,April23,1938,4.
371 RepublicanSmokeScreenFails,MinnesotaLeader,October22,1938,1,7.
372 BackingStassen,SilverShirtChiefTellsLeaderReporter,October22,1938,8
373 Youngdale,ed.,ThirdPartyFootprints,32829.
374 F.P.Ryan,InMichiganItsMurphy,InMinnesotaItsBensoncampaignleaflet,
nodate(ca.November1938),box14,folderCorrespondenceandMiscellaneous
Papers,Nov.78,BensonPapers.
129

thefailureofhissocalledpurgeofantiNewDealDemocrats,Rooseveltdidnot
activelycampaignforBensonandkeptsilentthroughalmosttheentirecampaign.
ThepresidentdidnotevenendorseBensonuntilaweekbeforetheelection,offering
onlygenericpraiseforthegovernorseffortstodevelopliberalgovernmental
policies.375Unlikein1936,theDemocraticPartywasindisarrayanditspopularity
wasflagging.YetBensonandtheFLPcontinuedtoidentifytheircampaignwiththat
oftheDemocrats.
Astheelectiondrewnearer,theFLPnervouslytriedtomitigatetheimpactof
continuedlaborfactionalism.Ahandfuloflocalelectionsacrossthecountry
foreshadowedpoliticalfalloutofasplitinlaborsranks.InSeattletheWashington
CommonwealthFederation,anonpartisanfarmerlaborgroupworkingwithinthe
stateDemocraticParty,wastornapartbytheduelingAFLandCIOunions.TheCIO
unionsbackedtheCommonwealthFederationsliberalmayoralcandidate,whilethe
craftunionsoptedtobackaconservativeDemocrat.376Closertohome,St.Paulfell
totheRepublicansdespitetheFLPsdecisiontosupportthecitysDemocratic
machineandnotrunanycandidatesinthemunicipalelections.377Inaletterto
Benson,VincentDunneexplained:ThepresentprogramoftheFLPisonewhichcan
scarcelyinspiretheworkersandfarmerstocloseranksandconductthestubborn
fightwhichisnecessaryforvictory.ThedefeatsinSt.Paul,Dunnewarned,
presagedtroubleforthegeneralelectionbecausetherewaslittledifferenceinthe
375 BensonNamedLiberalChoicebyRoosevelt,MinnesotaLeader,November5,
1938,1,3.
376 AFLCIOWarfareDefeatsLaborinSeattleMayoraltyCampaign,Minnesota
Leader,April9,1938,4.
377 Gieske,MInneostaFarmerLaborism,262.
130

classcharacterofeithercandidatesortheirprograms.378TheTrotskyistsremained
ambivalentabouttheFLPandhostiletoBensonsNewDealorientedPopularFront
administrationbecause,theyargued,FarmerLaborismwasforfeitingworkers
interestsinordertowinovertheurbanmiddleclasses.Inapleaforlaborunity,the
MinnesotaLeaderrananeditorialoutliningthesteepcostsoffactionalism.Thereis
thethreatthatthe[labor]movementmaybebrokenupintodisunifiedfragments,
withsomeofthosefragmentsevenlisteningtolaborsenemiesfromtheranksof
privatemonopoly.ThereisalsothesirenvoiceofthenewRepublicanism,which
hopestowinbackthegoodwilloftheworkingmenwhomitbetrayed,bycovering
theclawsofreactionwiththesoftphrasesofRepublicanyes,butliberalism.379US
CongressmanJohnBernardlaidoutthepoliticalrepercussionsoftherupturein
laborsranksinbluntterms.InelectionswheretheAFLandtheCIOdividetheir
supportamongcompetingcandidates,thousandsofmiddleclassandprofessional
people,thelogicalsupportersofprogress,becomedistrustfulofbothlabor
candidatesandthrowtheirvotestothereactionarywhomeverybodyhasforgotten
toexpose.TheA.F.ofL.manisdefeated,theC.I.O.manisdefeated,andacompany
stoogewinshandsdown.380
Classpolitics,notlaborunity,wastherealproblem.Eventhoughthelabor
movementwasofficiallyunitedbehindBensonandtheFLP,rankandfileworkers
didnotturnoutinfullforceduringeithertheSt.Paulorgubernatorialprimary
378 LetterfromVincentDunnetoElmerBenson,nodate(ca.October1938),Mss
379 LaborDay1938,MinnesotaLeader,September3,1938,4.
380 BernardUpholdsNewDealLaws,MinnesotaLeader,April2,1938,6.
131

elections.381Local544announceditssupportoftheentireFLPslate,butadvocated
analternative,yetvague,militantprogramtotheofficialpartyprogram.382As
partisansintheinternalstrugglesdividingtheFLP,theTrotskyistsfailedtotake
seriouslythepoliticalramificationsoflaborfactionalism.Local544andtheother
AFLunionsinMinneapolisconsistentlyrefusedtoreintegratetheCIOintothe
institutionsofthecitylabormovement.WhenSelmaSeestromputforwarda
proposalthattheMinnesotaIndustrialUnionCounciljointlydecideuponcandidate
endorsementwiththeCLUandtheHennepinCountyCentralCommittee,the
proposalwasquicklyshotdownforgivingthemuchsmallerCIOunionsequal
representationwiththeAFLrivals.383JoeVanNordstrand,organizationaldirector
oftheIndustrialUnionCouncil,accusedtheleadershipofLocal544ofstaging
politicalstrikesatstatecooperativecreameriestofomentsentimentagainst
BensonandtheCIO.384AlthoughbothfactionsofficiallysupportedBenson,the
ceaselessmaneuveringandjockeyingforpowerintheHennepinCountyCentral
CommitteeandCLUprovedselfdefeatingattheballotbox.Therankandfilewas
fatiguedbymonthsofsenselessinfightingandfactionalism.Astheelectionneared,
thetradeunions,theFLPsvitalbaseofurbansupport,wereindisarrayand
disillusioned.
381 LetterfromDunnetoBenson,DobbsPapers.
382 MilitantFLPResolutionPassed,NorthwestOrganizer,November3,1938,1.
383 CLU,FLCommitteesToMeet,NorthwestOrganizer,August4,1938,4.
384 RecommendationoftheMinnesotaStateIndustrialUnionCouncilonMethodsof
CooperationwiththeWorkingFarmers,nodate(ca.1939),Mss848,box15,folder
13,DobbsPapers.
132

Backlash
TheFLPwasdefeatedasspectacularlyasitwasbroughtintoofficetwoyears
earlier.Bensonwasburiedinalandslidebynearly300,000votes.Inoutstaterural
countiesthegovernorwashandilybeaten,butthebiggestreversalwasinHennepin
CountywhereStassenwonbycloseto50,000votes.385InMinneapolisthe
polarizationofthecitysvotersdemonstratedinthe1937wasrepeatedinthe
generationalrace.Bensonwonamere6,500votesoutofalmost40,000totalvotes
castinthebourgeoisEighthandThirteenthWards.MostdistressingfortheFLP,
though,wasthecontinueddeclineofFarmerLaborsupportinworkingclasswards.
In1936BensontrouncedhisRepublicanchallengerinthelaboringThird,Sixth,and
NinthWards.Twoyearslater,hebarelywonthesesolidworkingclassdistrictsas
overallvoterturnoutinfellbyfully15percent.386Thegovernorsracewasthe
centerpieceofthestatewidecollapseoftheFLP.IntheTwinCities,ontheIron
Range,andinthesmalltownsandfarms,aresurgentRepublicanPartydrovealmost
theentireFarmerLaborticketfromoffice.
InaneditorialforumforTheNationentitledWhyWeLostfeaturingPhilip
LaFolletteandFrankMurphy,Bensonconcludedthatthedefeatstemmedfroma
numberoffactorsincludingredbaiting,antiSemitism,anddivisionsinthe
organizedlabormovement.Thecumulativeeffectwastoproduceconfusioninthe
mindsoffarmersandwhitecollarsectionsofourcitypopulationastowhatthe
sharpeninglaborissueswereallaboutaftertwoyearsworthofconservative
385 White,etal.,MinnesotaVotes,19697.
386 Countygeneralelectionrecapitulation,November10,1938,HennepinCounty
ElectionsOffice.
133

propagandaupbraidingFarmerLaboritesandNewDealersforwagingaclasswar
inCongressandstatelegislatures.387TheRepublicanvictoryledmanytoask,Did
thepeoplevoteagainsttheNewDeal?No,Bensonsurmised,becausethevictorious
RepublicansinMinnesota,Michigan,andWisconsinallvowedtocontinuetoprotect
thebasicreformsoftheNewDeal(i.e.,legalprotectionforcollectivebargaining,
socialsecuritylegislation,unemploymentinsurance,andfarmsubsidies).The
peopledidnotvotedowntheNewDeal,theyvotedinapartythatpromisedtofulfill
theNewDealbetter,butthispromisewasatoddswiththeRepublicanPartyscore
interests.TodaysstreamlinedconservativesandNewDealizedRepublicanshave
promisedtwothings:(1)Torebuildourcrumbingeconomicfoundations;(2)todo
sowithoutdislodgingthefinancialandindustrialoligarchywhichnowstands
betweenthepeopleandtheirfulluseoftheeconomic,social,andpolitical
institutionsoftheircountry.Thetwopromisescontradicteachother.Bensontook
solaceinthiscontradictionandpredictedthatthepeoplewouldreturnto
progressivepoliticsearlierthanmanyofusexpect.388
TheRepublicanvictory,though,wasmuchbroaderthanBensonrealized.
GOProdetovictoryacrosstheindustrialNorthandMidwest,unseatingNewDeal
andthirdpartypoliticiansbyembracingaliberalizedplatform.InMichigan,Ohio,
andPennsylvania,theworkshopofAmerica,Republicanswereelectedover
staunchlyprolaborNewDealcandidates.TheGOPelected17newgovernors,12
previouslyheldbyDemocratsand2bythirdparties.IntheUSSenateandHouseof
387 PhilipF.LaFollette,ElmerA.Benson,andFrankMurphy,WhyWeLost,The
Nation,December3,1938,587.
388 LaFollette,Benson,andMurphy,WhyWeLost,58889.
134

Representatives,theRepublicanspickedup23and81seatsrespectively.According
toClydeWeed,theRepublicanselectedin1938acceptedthebroadoutlinesofNew
Deal,butremainedstaunchlyconservativeandcommittedtoblockinganyfurther
leftwarddriftinsocialandeconomicpolicy.389Thisexplanation,asBensons
editorialargues,obscuresthesignificantideologicalconcessionsmadeby
RepublicanstoaccommodateeventhebroadoutlinesoftheNewDeal.Thedefeatof
progressiveNewDealerssympathetictosomekindofsocialdemocraticreform
steeredtheDemocratsinamoreconservativedirection.Thismove,though,was
heavilyinfluencedbyliberalRepublicansembraceofthebasicthrustoftheNew
Deal.NewDealizedRepublicanshelpedtothepioneerthefiscalKeynesianismthat
shapedthepoliticaleconomyoftheNewDealorderfromthe1940sonward.This
peculiarlyAmericanbrandofKeynesianeconomics,aspoliticalscientistsKaren
OrrenandStephenSkowronekdescribe,representedadistillationoftheterms
underwhichliberalismsnewsocialprioritiescouldaccommodatesouthern,
corporate,andlaborpower.390Theelectionsof1938didnotsignifytheendof
liberalism.Onthecontrary,theelectionsestablishedtheenduringtermsand
boundariesoftheNewDealorder.TheRepublicanresurgencein1938convinced
theDemocraticPartyperhapsonceandforalltodelimititscommitmenttoclass
politicsandretrenchitssocialpolicyinitiatives.
Thesplitinthelabormovementthatfullyemergedin1938fatally
underminedtheverysocialmovementmostcapableofmusteringacampaignfor
389 Weed,TheNemesisofReform,201.
390 KarenOrrenandStephenSkowronek,RegimeBuildinginAmerican
Government:AReviewofLiteratureonthe1940s,PoliticalScienceQuarterly,113
(4)199899,701.
135

moreextensivesocialandeconomicreform.ThecaseoftheMinneapolislabor
movementunderscoredhowpoliticaldivisionsbegatorganizationaldivisionsthat
preventedorganizedlaborfromconsolidatingtheimpressivegainswoninthe1936
elections.ThepoliticaldifferencesbetweentheCIOandAFLwerenotuniquetothe
midtolate1930s.Theongoingdebateovertheworthofvoluntarismandnon
partisanshipweredeepseated,reinforcingaparochialandnarrowminded
approachtopoliticsthatbecameallthemoreselfdefeatingasthelabormovement
emergedasanationalsocialmovement.YetthecrisisoftheDepressionandthe
experimentalnatureoftheNewDealopenedthespacefororganizedlaborto
mobilizenotonlyitsgreatlyexpandedconstituency,butalsoothersocialclasses
behindapoliticalagendathataddressedthestructuraldeficienciesofcapitalism.
Evenduringthetenuousperiodofunityin1935and1936,thelabormovementwas
abletopushtheDemocraticPartytoidentifyitselfandtheNewDealwithworking
classpolitics.Somethingresemblingsocialdemocraticreformwaswithinorganized
laborsgraspbefore1938,butnotafter,becausebothDemocratsandRepublicans
reachedatacitcompromisetoreininamovementthatthelatterconsideredtoo
radicalandtheformertoodivisive.
DespitethesetbackofaRepublicanvictory,boththeFLPandtheTrotskyists
interpretedthedefeatsof1938asconcreteevidenceofasubstantiveshiftatthe
baseofthenationalpoliticalculture.Notcontenttoacceptthelimitationsofthe
NewDealstatusquo,votersturnedtotheRepublicans,nowpreachingaliberal
sermon,becausetherewasnorealpoliticalalternative.Thepeoplewantedchange,
theFLPreasoned,butremainedconfusedaboutwhatkindsofchangeswouldbe
136

necessarytoendtheeconomiccrisisoftheDepression.391TheTrotskyistsargued
thattheelectionwenttotheRepublicansbecauseoftheNewDealsinabilityto
articulateanewmessagethatexplicitlyacknowledgedthecontradictionsof
capitalistsociety.ThroughoutthenorthernstripofstatestheNewDealerswere
ruthlesslyrejectedandexpelledfromofficebecausevoterscouldfindnoreal
differencesintheDemocratsortheirthirdpartyalliesliketheFLP.392Nonetheless,
aliberalconsensushadbeenwonbythestrugglesofeconomicallyandpolitically
organizedworkingpeople.Thesestrugglesimbuedworkingpeoplewiththe
confidencetodemandbettertreatmentatworkandagovernmentmoreresponsive
totheirneeds.TowinagaininAmericasworkshop,theFLPandtheTrotskyists
agreed,theRepublicanPartywouldneedtoproveitsliberalcredentials.
Historically,though,theresultwasliberalretrenchment.
Conclusion
The1938midtermelectionsbecameacriticalmomenttotestthedurability
oftheNewDealorder,itscoalition,anditsideologicallimits.Onanationallevel,the
caseoftheMinneapolisteamsterswasemblematicofawidespreadbacklashagainst
theNewDealandthepoliticizedlabormovementthatenergizeditsleftleaning
tendencies.ThedefeatofNewDealersintheindustrialNorthwasaccompaniedby
themortalwoundingoftheirthirdpartyalliesliketheFLP.Laborwonaccessto
politicalpowerbecauseofitsmilitancyandmilitancyinturnhelpedtoundermine
391 BeyondtheNewDeal,MinnesotaLeader,November12,1938,3.
392 WhyWorkersandFarmersVotedRepublican,NorthwestOrganizer,November
17,1938,2.
137

itsgreatstridesbytheendofthe1930s.Laborspoliticalcloutwasnotweakened
becauseofmilitancyinandofitself.Labormilitancywasnotaninfantileoutburst,
asRooseveltsuggestedaftertheFlintsitdownstrikes.Norwasitawhollyself
defeatingelectoralstancethatisolatedworkersasaclassfromothersocialclasses.
Labormilitancyprovidedthebasisforanationalmovementtocoherearoundlocal
andregionalexperiencesofclassconflictthatlinkedshopfloorstruggleswith
politicalactivismandrealgainsinpublicpolicy.WhattheTrotskyistteamstersand
othersinthelabormovementfailedtoarticulatewasamessagethatconsistently
connectedthestruggleofworkerswiththoseofothersocialclasses.Theruinous
effectoffactionalismonlyamplifiedorganizedlaborspoliticalisolation.
Theelectionsalsowitnessedtheriseofanew,redefinedGOP.Themoderate
andliberalRepublicanswhoassumedpowerin1938recognizedthatthepolitical
landscapeoftheNorthwasmarkedlydifferentfromtheonetheyconfronteda
decadeearlier.ThebasicthrustofNewDealreformtheneedforsomedegreeof
stateinterventionintheeconomy,somesocialwelfarelegislation,andthe
legitimacyoforganizedlaborsrightsprovedpopular.TheseRepublicans
recognizedthechangingpoliticaltenorofthetimesandadaptedbyconcedingan
importantideologicalpointbyrecognizingthelegalityofunions.However,these
Republicansretainedamarkedhostilitytoanychallengetothesupremacyofcapital
andcontinuedtofollowthepathchartedbyconservativeDemocrats.
TheNewDealssocialdemocraticpotential,embodiedinthemoral
preeminenceofthelaborquestionandtheorganizationalupheavalofmilitant
138

organizedlabor,wasblunteddecisivelyin1938.393Thedefeatsofthe1938
electionscrystallizedtheschismsthatstymiedorganizedlaborsveryabilityto
mobilizepoliticallyforsweepingsocialchange.Organizedlaborheldavaunted
positionintermsofprestigeandpoliticalrelevanceasamass,classconscious
movementinthe1930sandeffectivelyreshapedthepoliticalorderfornextseveral
decades.Yetthismovementwashighlyunstableandcomposedofpowerfulbut
combustibleelementsthatquicklyfracturedtheemergingnationallabormovement
bythemid1930s.
393 Fraser,TheLaborQuestion,57.
139

CHAPTER5
EPILOGUE
ThedebacleoftheNovemberelectionslefttheFarmerLaborPartyreeling
andmonthslaterstillbitterlydividedoverwhoorwhatwasresponsibleforsucha
disaster.AtaMarch1939meetingoftheHennepinCountyFarmerLabor
Association,thepartysleftandrightfactionsangrilyconductedanelectoral
postmortem.Therightwing,comprisedmainlyoftradeunionists,blamedthe
CommunistsinBensonsPopularFrontadministrationforignoringtheinterestsand
demandsoforganizedlabor.Bensonscampaign,onedelegateargued,madeno
efforttoreachouttotheunionsforpolicyinputinordertogetanylocalslinedup
behindthegovernor.Theunionsdontgiveadamnwhoisincontrolpolitically,
anotherlaborrepresentativedeclared,buttheydowanttodoeverythingtheycan
tobettertheconditionsoftheunions.ThePopularFrontleftwingretortedthatit
waslaborsnarrowfocusontheinterestsoftheunionsthatdroveawaycrucial
middleclassandruralvotersandcosttheFLPtheelection.ItwastheTrotskyists,
theyclaimed,whowerefomentingdivisioninthecountyorganizationtodestroythe
FarmerLaborPartyonceandforall.394BothfactionscouldagreethatFarmer
Laborismandliberalreformingeneralwasatacrossroads,butneitherquite
understoodjusthowsharplythefutureofreformhadcontracted.
Ontheonehand,thisdebateovertheroleofclassinelectoralpolitics
394 MinutesoftheHennepinCountyFarmerLaborAssociation,March22,1939,box
2,folderMinutesoftheHennepinCountyFarmerLaborAssociation,March22,
1939,StagebergPapers.
140

underscoredjusthowmuchMinnesotaandnationalpoliticshadchangedoverthe
lastdecade.ThecrisisoftheDepressioncertainlycontributedtotherapid
ascendanceoftheFarmerLaborPartyin1930,butitwastheorganizationofurban
workersthatensuredthepartyscontinuedelectoralsuccess.Thetruckingstrikes
of1934madecollectivebargainingarealityforworkersinthecitysbustling
transportationanddistributioneconomyandthefollowingtwoyearsextendedthe
reachofunionsintootherMinneapolisindustries.Labormilitancyrevitalizedthe
labormovementandremadeitintoasocialmovementofworkingpeoplecapableof
reshapingcityandstatepolitics.Therefore,inMinnesotaandelsewhere,the
politicalachievementsoftheNewDealwerenotsolelytheproductofRooseveltand
theexecutivebranch.AsDavidBrodywrites,Thepublicmenwhocarriedlabors
fightoccupiedstatehouses,mayorsofficesandcongressionalseats,andwhatthey
didonbehalfoflabortheydidindependentlyoftheNewDealadministration.395At
thelocalandstatelevel,theFLPlikeNewDealDemocratsrespondedtothe
upsurgeinlabormilitancyandthedislocationsoftheDepressionbyplacing
workingclassdemandsforgreatereconomicregulationandsocialwelfarepolicies
atthecenterofalargenewreformcoalition.Theelectionsof1936representedthe
apogeeoflaborcentricreformpolitics,butthisnewcoalitionsdurabilitywas
strainedbytheclasspoliticsatitscore.
AlthoughorganizedlaborsubstantiallyredefinedthecontoursofNewDeal
liberalism,laborsclasspoliticsalsocontributedtothesharpcontractionoftheNew
Dealssocialdemocraticpotential.Buildingabroadcrossclasscoalitionwasthe
395 Brody,WorkersinIndustrialAmerica,126.
141

highestpriorityofNewDealersandFarmerLaborites.Examiningthe1938election
returnsconvincedevenprolaborNewDealersthatwhateverelectoraledgethe
unionsprovidedcandidatescouldalsoinduceabacklashagainstthespecificclass
interestsoforganizedworkers.Laborfactionalismcontributeddecisivelytothis
perceptionascompetingunionsfocusedtheirpoliticalinfluenceonsecuring
jurisdictionalauthorityoverparticularcraftsandindustries.InMinnesotathe
divisionswithinthelabormovementwerecomplicatedbysectariantensions
betweentheTrotskyistteamstersandPopularFrontCommunistsasbothgroups
struggledtowininfluenceintheFarmerLaborParty.BoththeTrotskyistsandthe
Communistsbelievedinreformistelectoralpolitics;thepointofcontentionwas
whethertheFLPshouldadvanceitssocialdemocraticplatformasaprogressive
crossclassentityoranoutrightlaborparty.Asthemidtermelectionsneared,the
variousfactionsinthelabormovementandtheFLPcouldfindlittlecommonground
onwhichtorallypopularsupport,muchlesspushformoresweepingreform.
Thevauntedcoalitionof1936wasintatters,buttheappealofNewDeal
liberalismwasnotsoeasilydiminished.TheliberalismofStassenandotherNew
DealizedRepublicanssimplyembracedtheessentialconservatismoftheNew
Deal.396TheeclecticandexperimentalreformsoftheNewDealwereintendedonly
torationalizecapitalismsmostglaringdeficienciesandinequalities.397Itwasthe
politicizationofthelabormovementthatpressuredNewDealDemocratsto
undertakemoresubstantivereform,butasthemovementfragmentedsotoodidthe
396 Brody,WorkersinIndustrialAmerica,107.
397 Skocpol,PoliticalResponsestoCapitalistCrisis:NeoMarxistTheoriesofthe
StateandtheCaseoftheNewDealinPoliticsandSociety10(2)1980,156.
142

Democrats.AsamasssocialdemocraticpartytheFLPwasevenmoresusceptibleto
thedebilitatingeffectsoflaborfactionalism.Intothebreachsteppedanew
generationofRepublicanswhounderstoodtheneedforreform,butcouldnotabide
bytheclasspoliticsofamilitantlabormovement.Theymadecommoncausewith
liberalreform,butbalkedatthesocialdemocracyadvancedbycertainsegmentsof
thelabormovement.TheliberalRepublicanonslaughtof1938convincedthe
Democratstodelimittheirreformagenda.Divided,theprogressivewingofthe
labormovementcoulddolittletoinfluencetheDemocratspartypolicy.Theunions
oftheCIOaswellasthoseoftheAFLentrenchedthemselvesascompetinginterest
groupsinthewiderconstellationofDemocraticpolitics.
Thedefeatsof1938destroyedtheFLPalongwithotherthirdpartiesthat
presentedamoreradicalalternativetotheNewDeal.In1944,thepartysremnants
mergedwiththeDemocratstocreatetheDemocraticFarmerLaborParty(DFL).398
ForthenextdecadethisamalgamofDemocratsandFarmerLaboritesfounderedat
thepolls.Duringthistime,thestateRepublicansunderStassenandhissuccessors
continuedtoembraceliberalismwhileconsciouslyworkingtoexpungetheradical
heritageofFarmerLaborismandthemilitancyoftheTrotskyists.In1939,thestate
legislaturepassedtheMinnesotaLaborRelationsActthatseverelycurtailed
workersabilitytostrikeitwouldbecomethemodelfortheTaftHartleyActof
1947.TheninJuneof1941,onlymonthsbeforetheUSenteredtheSecondWorld
War,theStassenadministration,inconjunctionwiththeFBIandDanielTobinofthe
IBT,helpedtoorchestratethearrestofLocal544sTrotskyistleadershiponcharges
398 Cf.JenniferDelton,MakingMinnesotaLiberal:CivilRightsandtheTransformation
oftheDemocraticParty(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,2002),1219.
143

ofseditionandtheunionwasputintoreceivership.InMinnesota,theforcesof
liberalismoutflankedandrepressedradicalism.
From1934to1938,theveryshapeofliberalreformwasactivelycontested
andworkersandtheirinterestsstoodatthecenterofthisdebate.Itwasworking
classpolitics,usheredinbyinsurgentmilitancyandthengalvanizedintoarobust,if
fractious,coalitionatthepolls.Whatdrovethisnascentcoalitionwasadynamic
impulseforsocialreformthatsubstantivelychangedpeopleslives.Workerswon
higherwagesandbetterconditionsonthejob,buttheyalsodiscoveredtheir
collectivepowertoreshapepoliticsandtoconnecttheirstruggleswiththoseof
othersocialclasses.Attheapogeeofitspower,organizedlaborsquanderedits
newfoundcloutinfruitlessfactionalbattlesandalienatedcrucialcrossclassallies.
Throughoutthewarandpostwaryears,organizedlaborremainedacritical,but
subordinate,componentoftheliberalcoalition.399Theelectoraldefeatsof1938
broughttoaclosethemomentwhenorganizedlaborcouldrightfullyclaimtobethe
lynchpinofAmericanreformpolitics.Itwasthelocalstrugglesincitieslike
MinneapolisthatdefinedthelongtermdirectionoftheNewDealorder.
399 Cf.KevinBoyle,TheUAWandtheHeydayofAmericanLiberalism,19451968
(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1995).
144

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