Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Issue
Ruling
WON, under
the Doctrine of
Incorporation,
International
Law prevails
over Municipal
Law
Whether treaty
can modify
regulations
governing
admission to
the phil. bar.
Facts
3. Sison vs Board of Accountancy 85 Philippines Report 276
Ferguson is a British subject admitted in the practice of
accountancy in the Philippines without examination because
there exists a reciprocity between the Philippines and the
United Kingdom regarding the practice of accountancy.
Subsequently, the Board of Accountancy, upon the
examination of the case of those British accountants without
examination, came to the conclusion that , there being no
law which regulates the practice of accountancy in England,
and that the practice of accountancy in England, and that
the practice of accountancy in said country being limited
only to the members of incorporated private accountant's
societies, the certificates issued by the Institutes of
chartered accountants and other similar societies in
England and Wales cannot be considered on a par with the
public accountant's certificates issued by the Philippine
Board of Accountancy, which is government entity. In view
thereof, the respondent Board of Accountancy "resolved to
suspend, . . . the validity of the C.P.A. certificates of the
above-mentioned candidates pending the final revocation
thereof should they fail to prove to the satisfaction of the
Board within sixty days' notice that : (a) Filipinos are
allowed to take the professional accountant examination
given by the British government, if any, and (b) Filipino
certified public accountants can, upon application, be
registered as chartered accountants or granted similar
degrees by the British Government.
Such action of the Board of Accountancy was based on an
opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice, on October 1,
1946 (Annex A), to the Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales does not meet the requirement of section 41 of
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court and that the negative
statement therein, as quoted above, does not establish the
existence of reciprocity, which induced the board to hold
that the registration, without examination, of those British
subjects as certified public accountants, is in accordance
with the provision of section 122 of Act No. 3105 as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342.
However, the Secretary of justice, answering a query from
the Secretary of Finance, in an opinion rendered on
February 10, 1947 "on the legality of the suspension or
revocation " of the certificates issued to those British
subjects as contemplated in resolution No. 5, series of 1946
of the Board of Accountancy, was of the opinion that "the
board may not suspend or revoke the certificates previously
granted to the ten British accountants herein involved,
including respondent Robert Orr Ferguson, because such
action is in contravention of section 13 of Act No. 3105 as
amended which explicitly provides that the suspension or
revocation of the certificate issued under the said Act may
be done by the board for unprofessional conduct of the
holder or other sufficient cause.
Issue
Ruling
While the profession of certified public accountant is not
controlled or regulated by the Government of Great Britain, the
country of origin of respondent Robert Orr Ferguson, according
to the record, said respondent had been admitted in this
country to the practice of his profession as certified public
accountant on the strength of his membership of the Institute of
Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow (England), incorporated
by the Royal Charter of 1855. The question of his entitlement
to admission to the practice of his profession in this jurisdiction,
does not therefore, come under reciprocity, as this principle is
known in International Law, but it is included in the meaning of
comity, as expressed in the alternative condition of the proviso
of the above-quoted section 12 which says: such country or
state does not restrict the right of Filipino certified public
accountants to practice therein.
International Law is founded largely upon mutuality, reciprocity,
and the principle of comity of nations. Comity, in this
connection, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will on the other; it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
acts of foreign governments and tribunals, having due regard
both to the international duty and convenience and the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws. The fact of reciprocity does not
necessarily influence the application of the doctrine of comity,
although it may do so and has been given consideration in
some instances.
The Philippine and the United Kingdom, are bound by a treaty
of friendship and commerce, and each nation is represented in
the other by corresponding diplomatic envoy. There is no
reason whatsoever to doubt the statement and assurance
made by the diplomatic representative of the British
Government in the Philippines, regarding the practice of the
accountancy profession in the United Kingdom and the fact
that Filipino certified public accountant will be admitted to
practice their profession in the United Kingdom should they
choose to do so.
Facts
4. Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 131
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the
proceedings in a civil case which were initiated during the
Japanese military occupation on the ground that the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts
have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue
judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct
Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling
law granting such authority.
Issue
Ruling
1. Whether or
not under the
rules of
international
law the judicial
acts and
proceedings of
the courts
during a de
facto
government
are good and
valid.
Facts
Issue
pending in
said courts at
the time the
Philippines
were
reoccupied
and liberated
by the United
States and
Filipino forces,
and the
Commonwealt
h of the
Philippines
were reestablished in
the Islands.
Ruling
nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws
and institution so far as military necessity will permit.
Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the
ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be
unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is
essentially provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands
prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had
become re-established and conceived of as having in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of
the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts,
without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon
them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points
out in speaking of said principles a state or other
governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. Such political resurrection is the
result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies
to regain their original shape upon removal of the external
force, and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.
Whether or not
the
sovereignty
can be
subjected to
restrictions
and limitations
by a treaty?
Facts
7. The Holy See vs Rosario 238 SCRA 524
Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot
5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to
Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the
Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which
represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over
the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.
Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who
assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc.
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute
arose between the two parties because both were unsure
whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said
lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists
that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says
that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest
money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.
The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation.
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment
of the sale, specific performance and damages against
Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos
moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based
on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on
ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign
immunity by entering into a business contract. The
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to
the Supreme Court.
Issue
Ruling
Whether or not
Holy See can
invoke
sovereign
immunity.
Facts
Issue
Ruling
the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view,
it is the Holy See that is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the
status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its
Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic
representations with the Philippine government since 1957
(Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.
Whether or not
article 256 of
the Spanish
Penal Code
was abrogated
with the
change from
Spanish to
American
sovereignty
Whether or not
the change of
the
sovereignty
extinguishes
the previous
liability of the
City of Manila
to its creditor?
Whether or not
a law may
invalidate or
supersede
treaties or
generally
accepted
principles.
Facts
11. US vs Look Chaw 18 Phil 573
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port
of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its
cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The
defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought
these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention of
selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that
as his hold had already been searched several times for
opium he ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All
the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.
Issue
Ruling
Whether or not
courts of local
state can
exercise its
jurisdiction
over foreign
vessels
stationed in its
port.
Whether or not
the Philippine
courts have
jurisdiction
over the crime
committed
aboard
merchant
vessels
anchored in
our
jurisdictional
waters.
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal
waters thus the Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction
over the said offense. The Court said that having the opium
smoked within our territorial waters even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it
causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our
territory.
Whether or not
Asaalis
contention is
correct.
Facts
the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign
sovereign without its consent.
Issue
Ruling
Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. This point was
made clear [in the petition] in these words: 'Assuming, for
purposes of argument, that the Philippine Government, through
the Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue a
Timber License to cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases
Agreement subjects the exercise of rights under a timber
license issued by the Philippine Government to the exercise by
the United States of its rights, power and authority of control
within the bases; and the findings of the Mutual Defense
Board, an agency of both the Philippine and United States
Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr. Gener
within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be
consistent with the security and operation of the Base," is
conclusive upon the respondent Judge. ...
The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which
would result in a pecuniary charge against the, sovereign or
would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of
a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly
and immediately to the most important public function of any
government - defense of the state is - equally as untenable as
requiring it to do an affirmative act.
The insuperable obstacle to the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge is that a foreign sovereign without its consent is haled
into court in connection with acts performed by it pursuant to
treaty provisions and thus impressed with a governmental
character.
Facts
Issue
Ruling
legal interest over the subject matter of this controversy.
Apparently, the lower court, perhaps taken in by the contention
of appellee, could not see its way clear to applying the
Philippine Property Act of 1946 enacted by the United States
Congress as it was a foreign statute not susceptible to judicial
notice. Again, if it were cognizant of the leaning of the above
Brownell decision, it would have realized how erroneous such
a view is. For, as was made clear in the above decision, there
was "conformity to the enactment of the Philippine Property Act
of 1946 of the United States [as] announced by President
Manuel Roxas in a joint statement signed by him and by
Commissioner McNutt Ambassador Romulo also formally
expressed the conformity of the Philippine Government to the
approval of said act to the American Senate prior to its
approval."
16. Guerreros Transport Services vs Blaylock Transportation Services Employees Association 71 SCRA 621
In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a Whether or not YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor
public bidding for a 5-year contract for the right to operate
the said
Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent w/
and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval
members of
military requirements, to provide security for employment, and,
base. This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, ownerthe Union
in the event certain services are contracted out, the US Armed
operator of Guerreros Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero),
were entitled
Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to give
over Concepcion Blayblock, the then incumbent
to be
priority consideration to affected employees for employment.
concessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock reinstated by
Transport Services Blayblock. Blayblocks 395 employees
Guerrero.
A treaty has 2 aspects as an international agreement
are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).
between states, and as municipal law for the people of each
state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid
When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to
provision of the treaty enters into and forms part of the contract
employ the members of the Union. Thus, the Union filed a
between Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities. In view
complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to
of said stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore,
employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US
bound to give priority to the employment of the qualified
Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC
employees of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously
upon Guerreros MTD on jurisdictional grounds, there being
in recognition of such obligation that Guerrero entered into the
no employer-employee relationship between the parties.
aforementioned Compromise Agreement.
Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded the case to the
NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to
Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to
absorb all complainants who filed their applications on or
submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who of the
before the deadline set by Guerrero, except those who may
members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by
have derogatory records w/ the US Naval Authorities in
Guerrero, and that such determination shall be considered as
Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.
final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC,
through Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to implement the
Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision
absorption of the 175 members into Guerreros Transport
of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC Resolution, & that
Services, subject to the following conditions:
any non-compliance was attributable to the individual
complainants who failed to submit themselves for
a) that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock
processing & examination. The Labor Arbiter ordered the
Transport Service at the time its concession expired; and
reinstatement of 129 individuals. The Union filed a Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order wasnt appealed
b) that they should pass final screening and approval by the
so it was declared final & executory
appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base concerned.
Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise
Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of
Labor the determination of members of the Union who shall
be reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final.
The agreement is deemed to have superseded the
Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered the
absorption of 175 members of the Union subject to 2
conditions.
Facts
Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for
a mission. On her trip, she bought a discounted ticket which
provided that she could bring someone with her so she
brought with her her adopted daughter. Some of her coworkers complained because they thought that Santos used
government fund to finance her daughters fare. It was later
found out that the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less
than the amount that was given to Santos to be used for her
expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her refusal
to appear before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty
of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office of the
President and after review, then president Corazon Aquino
issued Administrative Order No. 122 which declared Santos
guilty of dishonesty. She was then removed from her post
and was replaced.
Issue
Whether or not
Santos should
reinstated to
her office.
Ruling
No. Even though the Supreme Court found evidence which
showed that Santos was not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty
as in fact what she did of securing a ticket which was 50% the
cost of what was allotted for her travel expense for tickets and
thus was beneficial to the government (for she helped save
and lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to
reverse the recall done to Santos. She cannot be reinstated by
the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is
solely her prerogative. Further, the position held by Santos is
primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of
the president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is
not actually removed from her position or office but rather her
term merely expires. Also, her position involves foreign
relations which is vested solely in the executive. The SC
cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the exercise of
such prerogative. Thus, the assignment to and recall from
posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her
to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the
interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.
"Considering that the conduct of foreign relations is primarily
an executive prerogative, courts may not inquire into the
wisdom or unwisdom in the exercise thereof. This is a principle
laid down by the courts from time immemorial. The power to
conduct foreign policy and its necessary element of assigning
the countrys representatives abroad is best addressed to the
wisdom of the executive branch and not to be unduly interfered
with by the judiciary
"The head of State, as the States Chief organ and
representative in the totality of its international intercourse, with
the consequence that all his legally relevant international acts
are considered acts of his state. Such acts comprises chiefly
the reception and sending of diplomatic agents and consuls,
conclusion of treaties, and recognition of states.
The conduct of the external affairs of the State is an executive
prerogative. As head of the State, the President deals with
foreign states and governments with respect to matters relating
to entering into treaties, maintaining diplomatic relations,
extending or withholding recognition. Chief Justice Marshall
described the President of the United States as the `sole organ
of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative
with foreign nations. This apt description likewise applies to the
President of the Philippines.
Whether or not
a treaty may
supersede
provisions of
the
Constitution.
Facts
Issue
Ruling
dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit
insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover,
respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from
any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes.
Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its
invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in
view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be
applicable, that question the confronts this Court.
Whether or not
a complaint for
damages be
dismissed in
the sole basis
of a statement
complained in
a Diplomatic
Note.
WON private
respondents
are immune
from suit being
officers of the
US Armed
Forces
Facts
for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and
sex.
Issue
Ruling
manner that invades or violates the personal & property rights
of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit
will not be a suit against the state. The doctrine of immunity
from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in
his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered
for the position even if she was previously employed as a
Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted
an interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for
that position and that person kept the position despite orders
from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal.
Extension of Abalateos services is another proof. She was not
appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for the
position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service
Commission, Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of Air
Force). Shauf has proven that discrimination did occur whereas
respondents merely denied allegations.
Whether the
US naval base
in bidding for
said contracts
exercise
governmental
functions to be
able to invoke
state immunity.
Whether the
defendants
were also
immune from
suit under the
RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts
done by them
in the
performance
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is
one of the generally accepted principles of international law
that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even
without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the
generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by
the majority of the states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition
and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
Facts
In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and
Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in Baguio
City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from
the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove
had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club
manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to
a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective
bargaining agreement between the center and
its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and
recommended his dismissal. Genoves reaction was to file
his complaint against the individual petitioners.
Issue
of their official
duties.
Ruling
over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable
to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has
not been formally impleaded
Whether the
Holy See is
immune from
suit insofar as
its business
relations
regarding
selling a lot to
a private entity
Facts
land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties
was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties
and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
Issue
Ruling
of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament
enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in
Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as
any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course
of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial
character."
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the
host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has
created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions
in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in
characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a
private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.
whether
Facts
surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three
apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as
the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and
Michel Apartments.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed
three lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments,
in favor of the United States of America at a monthly rental
of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments, P1,890 for the
South Syquia Apartment, and P3,335 for the Michel
Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to
be for the duration of the war and six months thereafter,
unless sooner terminated by the United States of America.
The apartment buildings were used for billeting and
quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the
Manila area.
In March 1947, when these court proceedings were
commenced, George F. Moore was the Commanding
General, United States Army, Philippine Ryukus Command,
Manila, and as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in
the Manila Theatre, was said to control the occupancy of the
said apartment houses and had authority in the name of the
United States Government to assign officers of the U. S.
Army to said apartments or to order said officers to vacate
the same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate
Division, Office of the District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila,
who, under the command of defendant Moore was in direct
charge and control of the lease and occupancy of said three
apartment buildings. Defendant Moore and Tillman
themselves did not occupy any part of the premises in
question.
Under the theory that said leases terminated six months
after September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs
sometime in March, 1946, approached the predecessors in
office of defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the
return of the apartment buildings to them, but were advised
that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the
premises. On May 11, 1946, said plaintiffs requested the
predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to renegotiate
said leases, execute lease contract for a period of three
years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those
payable under the old contracts. The predecessors in office
of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to execute
new leases but advised that it is contemplated that the
United States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1
February 1947. Not being in conformity with the
continuance of the old leases because of the alleged
comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder, plaintiffs
formally requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and
to release the apartment buildings on June 28, 1946.
Tillman refused to comply with the request. Because of the
alleged representation and assurance that the U.S.
Government would vacate the premises before February 1,
1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure
possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly
rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore and
Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to
cancellation upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure
to comply with the alleged representation and assurance
that the three apartment buildings will be vacated prior to
February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947, served
formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and 64
other army officers or members of the United States Armed
Issue
respondents
are not
individually
responsible for
the payments
of rentals or
damages in
relation to the
occupancy of
the houses in
question;
whether this is
a suit against
the USA
without its
consent
Ruling
is the United States of America. The lessee in each of the three
lease agreements was the United States of America and the
lease agreement themselves were executed in her name by
her officials acting as her agents. The considerations or rentals
was always paid by the U. S. Government. The original action
in the municipal court was brought on the basis of these three
lease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of the Supreme
Court that any back rentals or increased rentals will have to be
paid by the U. S. Government not only because, as already
stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by such
Government but also because the premises were used by
officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately
after the terminations of hostilities.
The defendants and respondents Moore and Tillman cannot be
held individually responsible for the payments of rentals or
damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment houses
in question. Both of these army officials had no intervention
whatsoever in the execution of the lease agreements nor in the
initial occupancy of the premises both of which were effected
thru the intervention of and at the instance of their
predecessors in office. The original request made by the
petitioners for the return of the apartment buildings after the
supposed termination of the leases, was made to, and denied
not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in office.
The notice and decision that the U. S. Army wanted and in fact
continued to occupy the premises was made not by Moore and
Tillman but by predecessors in office. The refusal to
renegotiate the leases as requested by the petitioners was
made not by Moore but by his predecessors in office according
to the very complaint filed in the municipal court. The
assurance that the U. S. Army will vacate the premises prior to
February 29, 1947, was also made by the predecessors in
office of Moore.
As to the defendant Tillman, according to the complaint he was
Chief, Real State Division, Office of the District Engineer, U. S.
Army, and was in direct charge and control of the leases and
occupancy of the apartment buildings, but he was under the
command of defendant Moore, his superior officer. We cannot
see how said defendant Tillman in assigning new officers to
occupy apartments in the three buildings, in obedience to order
or direction from his superior, defendant Moore, could be held
personally liable for the payment of rentals or increase thereof,
or damages said to have been suffered by the plaintiffs.
With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed
his command in Manila, these lease agreements had already
been negotiated and executed and were in actual operation.
The three apartment buildings were occupied by army officers
assigned thereto by his predecessors in office. All that he must
have done was to assign or billet incoming army officers to
apartments as they were vacated by outgoing officers due to
changes in station. He found these apartment buildings
occupied by his government and devoted to the use and
occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his
command, and he had reasons to believe that he could
continue holding and using the premises theretofore assigned
for that purpose and under contracts previously entered into by
his government, as long as and until orders to the contrary
were received by him. It is even to be presumed that when
demand was made by the plaintiffs for the payment of
increased rentals or for vacating the three apartment buildings,
defendant Moore, not a lawyer by profession but a soldier,
must have consulted and sought the advise of his legal
Facts
Forces who were then occupying apartments in said three
buildings, demanding (a) cancellation of said leases; (b)
increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment
effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of new leases
for the three or any one or two of the said apartment
buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release of said
apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the
event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands.
The thirty-day period having expired without any of the
defendants having complied with plaintiffs demands, the
plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Municipal
Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful detainer
(desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons
occupying apartments in the three buildings for the purpose
of having them vacate the apartments, each occupants to
pay P300 a month for his particular apartment from January
1, 1947 until each of said particular defendant had vacated
said apartment; to permit plaintiffs access to said apartment
buildings for the purpose of appraising the damages
sustained as the result of the occupancy by defendants; that
defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs whatever damages
may have been actually caused on said property; and that in
the event said occupants are unable to pay said P300 a
month and/or the damages sustained by said property, the
defendants Moore and Tillman jointly and severally be made
to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per month per
apartment from January 1, 1947 to March 19, 1947,
inclusive, and/or the damages sustained by said
apartments, and that defendants Moore and Tillman be
permanently enjoined against ordering any additional parties
in the future from entering and occupying said premises.
Issue
Ruling
department, and that his action in declining to pay the
increased rentals or to eject all his army officers from the three
buildings must have been in pursuance to the advice and
counsel of his legal division. At least, he was not in a position
to pay increased rentals above those set and stipulated in the
lease agreements, without the approval of his government,
unless he personally assumed financial responsibility therefor.
Under these circumstances, neither do we believe nor find that
defendant Moore can be held personally liable for the payment
of back or increased rentals and alleged damages.
As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments
involved, there is less reason for holding them personally liable
for rentals and supposed damages as sought by the plaintiffs.
It must be remembered that these army officers when coming
to their station in Manila were not given the choice of their
dwellings. They were merely assigned quarters in the
apartment buildings in question. Said assignments or billets
may well be regarded as orders, and all that those officers did
was to obey them, and, accordingly, occupied the rooms
assigned to them.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it can be
concluded that the real party defendant in interest is the
Government of the United States of America; that any
judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to
be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 codefendants but by the said U. S. Government. The U. S.
Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit
which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover,
this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latters consent but it is of citizen filing
an action against a foreign government without said
governments consent.
Whether the
petitioners
were
performing
their official
duties when
they did the
acts for which
they have
been sued for
damages.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which
the petitioners are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as
director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the
private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work
assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It
is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply
to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
information regarding the case of the private respondents.
Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was
within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticismin
effect a direct attack against him-that Special Services was
practicing "an autocratic form of supervision.
There should be no question by now that such complaint
cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held
ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have
ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we
upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to
our own government but also to foreign states sought to be
subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is
that "there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of
foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the
sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par
in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude
Facts
Issue
Ruling
would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this
precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our
Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that
the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be
sued as such without the previous consent of the state. To be
sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is
clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him
to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds
refuses to record a deed of sale; or to restrain a Cabinet
member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be
unconstitutional; or to compel the national treasurer to pay
damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; or the
commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments
from a fund already available for the purpose; or, in general, to
secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by
himself without the government itself having to do a positive act
to assist him. We have also held that where the government
itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may
directly implead the government even without first filing his
claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as
the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice."
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as
Festejo v. Fernando, where the Court held that a bureau
director could be sued for damages on a personal tort
committed by him when he acted without or in excess of
authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just
compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public
irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous
consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a
party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's
unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under
any of the recognized exceptions. The government of the
United States has not given its consent to be sued for the
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment
that may be rendered against them. As it is the American
government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of
appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Whether or not
personal effect
of Verstuyft
can be
exempted from
search and
seizure under
the diplomatic
immunity.
Facts
respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting
diplomatic immunity.
Issue
Ruling
Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his
discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by
seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the
executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering
the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of
the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.
W/N the CA
Facts
with respondent. The maintenance agreement includes the
following specific equipments: air conditioning units,
generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water
motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.
The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's
work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with
the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent
terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter
claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as
a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot
be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.
29. Liang vs People GR 125865
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong
City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was
arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After
fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody
of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an office of protocol from the DFA stating
that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process
under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the
MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the
criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the
MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case
to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered
by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal case.
30. Callado vs IRRI 244 SCRA 211
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the
IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip
to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary
investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource
Development Department Manager. In view of the findings,
he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under
the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to
supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a
problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges
against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination
to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity
pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Issue
erred in
sustaining the
trial court's
decision that
petitioners
have waived
their immunity
from suit by
using as its
basis the
provision in
the
Maintenance
Agreement.
Ruling
private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of
whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act
is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the
establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The
state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain
the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The
Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity
when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The
maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of
Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It
cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Whether or not
the petitioners
case is
covered with
immunity from
legal process
with regard to
Section 45 of
the Agreement
between the
ADB and the
Philippine
Govt.
No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy
immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings,
except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by
the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law.
There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the Executive
Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities
accorded to international organizations, which determination
has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the
Courts in order not to embarass a political department of
Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
Facts
Issue
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute
enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having
waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor
Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute
to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent
IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the
defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving
the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and,
finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the
aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
complaint dismissed.
Ruling
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or
other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of
unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an
express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which
it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may
waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary
on its part.
Facts
Agreement between the Government and ICMC.
This case has also resolved another petition of the same
nature, the International Rice Institute. This is why in the
ruling of this case, mention of the IRRI case may be made
from time to time.
Issue
Ruling
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI
is clearly necessitated by their international character and
respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of
partiality and interference by the host country in their internal
workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of
Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of
immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from
political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice
of member States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there
are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall
make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private
character to which the specialized agency is a party."
Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of
Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government,
whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the
Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities
accorded. Thus:
Art. IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities. 1. The
Commission shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate
authorities of the Government to ensure the observance of
Philippine laws, rules and regulations, facilitate the proper
administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any
abuse of the privileges and immunities granted its officials and
alien employees in Article III of this Agreement to the
Commission.
2.In the event that the Government determines that there has
been an abuse of the privileges and immunities granted under
this Agreement, consultations shall be held between the
Government and the Commission to determine whether any
such abuse has occurred and, if so, the Government shall
withdraw the privileges and immunities granted the
Commission and its officials.
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of
dispute with management as, in fact, there had been organized
a forum for better management-employee relationship as
evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees
and Management (CIEM) wherein "both management and
employees were and still are represented for purposes of
maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI
and its employees." The existence of this Union factually and
tellingly belies the argument that Pres. Decree No. 1620, which
grants to IRRI the status, privileges and immunities of an
international organization, deprives its employees of the right to
self-organization.
The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process
except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly
waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a
certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for
the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification
election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated
process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective
bargaining process together with related incidents and/or
concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the
"legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and
Facts
Issue
33. Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center vs NLRC 206 SCRA 283
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture W/N NLRC
Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is a department of an
has jurisdiction
international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries
over the case?
Development Center, organized through an agreement
entered into in Bangkok, Thailand. Juvenal Lazaga was
employed as a Research Associate. Lacanilao in his
capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of
termination to private respondent informing him that due to
the financial constraints being experienced by the
department, his services shall be terminated. SEAFDECAQD's failure to pay Lazaga his separation pay forced him
to file a case with the NLRC. The LA and NLRC ruled in
favor of Lazaga. SEAFDEC-AQD claimed that the NLRC
has no jurisdiction over the case.
34. DFA vs NLRC GR 113191
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an
illegal dismissal case against Asian Development Bank. Two
summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and
the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB
and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB,
as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an
immunity from legal process except for borrowings,
guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1)
and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5
and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and
The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's
Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
1. Whether or
not ADB is
immune from
suit
Ruling
administrative proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation
is neither remote and from which international organizations
are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of
their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to
be standard provisions in the constitutions of international
Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization
concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally applicable to
proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem."
No. Southeast Asian Fisheries Development CenterAquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international
agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including
its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and
freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located.
2. Whether or
not by entering
into service
contracts with
different
private
companies,
ADB has
descended to
the level of an
ordinary party
to a
commercial
transaction
Facts
Issue
giving rise to a
waiver of its
immunity from
suit
Ruling
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have
not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official
acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.
3. Whether or
not the DFA
has the legal
standing to file
the present
petition
Facts
Issue
Ruling
allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support
of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was
submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents
through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign
states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the
facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the
acts and transactions involved."