WHITE v.

ROUGHTON
February 27, 1976 | Per Curiam | Appeal | Non-delegation Doctrine
SUMMARY: Roughton, without written notice and explanation, terminated the
general assistance received by White and Walker, and denied the application for the
same by Silagy without informing her of the reasons for the denial of her application.
They filed a complaint against Roughton, alleging that the latter determines
eligibility arbitrarily, without any established written standards and regulations. The
Court held that the lack of established standards and regulations for the
determination of ones eligibility for the general assistance is violative of due
process. Moreover, Roughton failed to give plaintiffs adequate notice and an
evidentiary hearing before their benefits were terminated, as well as state the reason
for the denial of the application.
DOCTRINE: Due process requires that welfare assistance be administered to ensure
fairness and freedom from arbitrary decision-making as to eligibility. Fair and
consistent application of eligibility requirements, requires established written
standards and regulations.
FACTS:
1. C. Vaughn Roughton, as the supervisor of the town of the City of Champaign
Township, administers the general township assistance program which provides
locally collected taxes for distribution as welfare to needy township residents.
He terminated the assistance being received by Leon White and Elester Walker
and denied the application for assistance of Beatrice Silagy.
2. White: received general assistance in the form of food orders for 5 periods of
1 week each in 1974. His last allotment was given on Oct. 8, 1974, and was
subsequently terminated thereafter without any written notice or explanation as
to the reason for the termination. He was also not informed of his right to
appeal or how to institute such appeal.
3. Walker: was provided food assistance for $14 on Aug 23, 1974, and rent
assistance for $65 from Oct 1-Nov 1, 1974. Subsequently, his assistance was
terminated without written notice and without informing him of his right to
appeal.
4. Silagy: applied for township general assistance on at least 3 occasions in 1974,
but was denied of assistance without being informed of the reasons for the
rejection of her application nor of her right to appeal.
5. Plaintiffs claim that Roughton: (1) operates the general assistance welfare
program without published standards for eligibility or the amount of aid given;
(2) terminates general assistance without giving the recipient notice and a
hearing prior to that termination; (3) denies applications for general assistance
welfare without giving the applicant notice and a hearing after the denial of the

application; (4) fails adequately to inform recipients and applicants of their

right to appeal.
ISSUE/S: WoN plaintiffs right to due process has been violated. YES.
HELD/RULING: REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
RATIO:
1. Procedural due process requires that welfare recipients must be provided with
adequate notice and an evidentiary hearing before benefits may be discounted
(Goldberg v. Kelly).
2. Moreover, due process requires that welfare assistance be administered to
ensure fairness and freedom from arbitrary decision-making as to eligibility.
Federally subsidized public assistance is governed by statute and extensive
regulations. The Illinois Public Aid Department maintains specific regulations
governing procedures and standards to determine eligibility. Defendant
Roughton is apparently not bound by the regulations of the Illinois Public Aid
Department. Certain basic eligibility requirements, however, are provided in the
General Assistance statute itself.
3. Defendant Roughton as administrator of the general assistance program has the
responsibility to the program to ensure the fair and consistent application of
eligibility requirements. Fair and consistent application of such requirements
requires that Roughton establish written standards and regulations.
4. At the hearing in the district court on the preliminary injunction, defendant
Roughton admitted that he and his staff determine eligibility based upon their
own unwritten personal standards. Such a procedure, vesting virtually
unfettered discretion in Roughton and his staff, is clearly violative of due
process.
5. The district court erred by failing to consider the relevant evidence presented at
the hearing on the preliminary injunction. At issue was whether plaintiffs
procedural due process rights were violated by the method by which they were
denied general assistance, not whether they were entitled to the same.
6. Defendants contention that the hearing in the district court provided plaintiffs
sufficient due process cannot be sustained. The requirements of due process
include a determination of the issues according to articulated standards. The
lack of such standards in this case deprives any hearing, whether before an
agency or a court, of its meaning and value as an opportunity for the plaintiffs
to prove their qualifications for assistance.