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CAMPUS-RUEDA
FACTS: The parties were legally married in the city
of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle
San Marcelino. Gotia filed a complaint against the
respondent for support outside the conjugal home.
It was alleged that her husband demanded her to
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs. Gotia refused to perform any act other than
legal and valid cohabitation. Which just refusals of
the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce
him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict
injuries upon her. She was obliged to leave the
conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents. The trial court ruled in favor of the
respondent and stated Gotia could not claim for
support from her husband. Gotia filed a motion for
review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gotia can claim for support
from her husband.
HELD: Yes. The law provides that the husband is
obliged to support his wife but this law is not
absolute. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to
leave due to the maltreatment of her husband.
Thus, she can claim for support from her husband.
_______
ARROYO v. VASQUEZ
FACTS: Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C.
Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of
wedlock by marriage in 1910. They lived together
as man and wife in the city of Iloilo but on July 4,
1920, Dolores went away from their common home
with the intention of living separate from Mariano.
An action was initiated by Mariano for the
resumption of martial relations compelling
defendant to return to their marital home and live
with him as a dutiful wife. However, defendant
claimed that she left without consent due to the
cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in
turn prayed for (1) a decree of separation, (2) a
liquidation of the conjugal partnership and (3) an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent
separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon
consideration of the evidence before him, reached
the conclusion that the husband was more to blame
than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of
her furnished sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with
him.
10
11
13
32
33
streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco
died, he executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed
of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who
accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq
m. was left under his name. This was made in
consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of
the petitioner. AttyLacaya notarized the deed and
was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot
received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105
and assessed value of P28,550. The decedents
nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate
succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law
wife
of
Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter
vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was
valid.
HELD: The court in this case considered a
sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based
on the testimony of Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of CirilaComille
such as application for business permit, sanitary
permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also,
the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver
employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old
and may no longer be interested in sex at the very
least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men
and women holding themselves out to the public as
such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor
of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
_________
BA FINANCE CORP v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the
petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as
evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his
own behalf and as a representative of A&L
Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special
power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo,
who managed the business and under whose name
the said business was registered, purportedly
authorized the husband to procure the loan and
sign the promissory note. 2months prior the
procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their
v.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
Held:
Issue:
1.
Whether or not the decision made by the
RTC is erroneous since Milagros De Guzman was
not mentioned as a party-plaintiff.
2.
Whether or not the liability of the spouses
Carandang on joint and solidary.
1.
No. Quirino and Milagros De Guzman were
married before the effectivity of the Family Cod but
it is assumed that the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains govern their property relations.
And all the properties they had acquired during
their marriage it is presumed it is as well conjugal
unless the contrary was provided; as stated in the
Family Code, Articles 116. In this case it is
presumed that the checks issued by Milagros are
considered as a conjugal party of her and Quirino
despite her not being mentioned as a party-plaintiff
in the case.
2.
Yes. Just like Quirino and Milagros the
spouses Carandang were married before the
effectivity of the Family Code and their property
regime is conjugal partnership under the Civil
Code. The obligations they entered as husband
and wife is chargeable against their conjugal
partnership and not as an independent debtors.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the decision
rendered by the RTC and CA earlier against the
spouses Carandang.
_________
CASTILLO v. PASCO
FACTS: On December 22, 1932, Gabriel and
Purificacion Gonzales, as co-owners of the litigated
fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said
property to the spouses Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and
Macaria Pasco for the sum of P6,000.00, payable
in three installments.
The initial payment of P1,000 for the fishpond was
made up of P600, that one of the vendors (Gabriel
Gonzales) owed to appellee Pasco, and P400 in
cash, which the latter paid out of the proceeds of
LACSON v. DIAZ
FACTS: The final decision rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental in civil case no.
5790 ordering defendant to pay plaintiff a sum of
P97,532.92 with legal interest until fully paid plus a
sum, and attorneys fees, then court issued a writ of
execution. On August 7, 1961 provincial sheriff of
Negros sent to the manager of Talisay-Silay Milling
Company, where defendant worked, notice to
garnish one-third of his monthly salary, and any
other personal properties to cover the total amount
P132,718.30. Defendant filed a motion to quash the
writ of execution and to lift the notice of
garnishment of his salary, arguing that it is not
enforceable as the money judgment arose from a
contract entered by him in his first marriage, that
the judgment cannot be enforced against his
salaries which form part of the conjugal properties
of the second marriage.
ISSUE: W/N the defendants salary may be used to
pay the debt contracted before the second
marriage.
HELD: Article 163 of the civil code states that:
ART. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities
imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before the marriage, and that
of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may
be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have
been covered, if the spouse who is bound should
have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Yes, such obligations incurred before the marriage
may be enforced the conjugal assets if the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the new
Civil Code have already been covered, and that the
obligor has no exclusive property or the same is
insufficient. However, it has not yet been
established that the defendant does not have
properties of his owner that the same are not
enough to satisfy the appellant claim. Also, there is
no showing that the responsibilities named in Article
161 of the new Civil Code have already been
covered in order that the personal obligation of the
husband may be made chargeable against the