6. MITCHELL BROTHERS FILM GROUP and Jartech, Inc. v.

CINEMA ADULT THEATER, a/k/a Cinema 69, et al.

604 F.2d 852
Oct. 16, 1979.
TOPIC: Unprotected Works
PONENTE: GODBOLD, Circuit Judge
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Obscenity does not prevent a work from being copyrightable.

AUTHOR: Tan
NOTES:

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Cinema Adult Theater made and distributed unauthorized copies of a pornographic film produced by Mitchell Brothers. While
Cinema Adult conceded copying, it argued that the movie was not copyrightable because of its obscenity. After reviewing the
legislative history of the Copyright Act, the court concluded that the Act did not prohibit the copyrighting of obscene works.
Further, the court noted that deciding the question of obscenity would require courts to engage in difficult line-drawing with
regard to societal standards of decency.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellants owned a properly registered copyright on a motion picture titled "Behind the Green Door."
Two groups of defendants, each group consisting of a theater and several individuals, obtained copies of the movie without
plaintiffs' permission and infringed the copyright by exhibiting the film at the theaters.
Plaintiffs-appellants commenced a copyright infringement suit.
The Lido Art Theater group did not appear for trial, default judgment was entered against it and a statutory penalty awarded
to plaintiffs.
The Cinema Adult Theater group appeared for trial, and after a bench trial the court found in its favor. On appeal, the
Cinema Adult group has not appeared.
The infringers asserted as an affirmative defense that the copyrighted material, a movie, was obscene, and that, therefore,
under the equitable rubric of "unclean hands", plaintiffs were barred from relief.
After viewing the film, the court found it obscene, adopted the unclean hands rationale, and denied relief to the copyright
owners.
Review of this holding requires the court to consider the constitutional limits upon the power granted to Congress to issue
copyrights, the manner in which Congress has chosen to exercise that power, and the applicability of the unclean hands
doctrine.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the Copyright Statute allows the copyright of obscene materials.
2. Whether the Copyright Act, in allowing copyright of obscene material, was constitutional.
3. Whether the courts should take it upon themselves to permit the defense of obscenity in copyright infringement cases.
HELD: YES. YES. NO.
RATIO:
1. The copyright statute contains no explicit or implicit bar to copyrighting obscene materials and provides for a

copyright of all creative works, obscene or nonobscene, that otherwise meet requirements of Copyright Act.
The statutory provision that controls in this case reads:
The works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author.
Motion pictures are unquestionably "writings" under the Copyright Act.
The district court did not base its decision on standards found within the Act, which it described as "silent as to works which
are subject to registration and copyright."
The Act is not "silent." Rather, the statutory language "all the writings of an author" is facially all-inclusive, within itself
admitting of no exceptions. There is no other statutory language from which it can be inferred that Congress intended that
obscene materials could not be copyrighted.
Further, Congress in not enacting an obscenity exception to copyrightability avoids substantial practical difficulties and
delicate First Amendment issues. Since what is obscene in one local community may be non-obscene protected speech in
another, and the copyright statute does not in other respects vary in its applicability from locality to locality, Congress in
enacting an obscenity exception would create the dilemma of choosing between using community standards that would
fragment the uniform national standards of the copyright system and venturing into the uncharted waters of a national
obscenity standard. We can only conclude that we must read the facially all-inclusive 1909 copyright statute as containing
no explicit or implicit bar to the copyrighting of obscene materials, and as therefore providing for the copyright of all creative
works, obscene or non-obscene, that otherwise meet the requirements of the Copyright Act.

2. The protection of all writings, without regard to their content, is a constitutionally permissible means of
promoting science and useful arts under Congress' copyright power.
The Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution provides that
"The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . ."
The district court construed this clause to limit the congressional power to grant copyrights solely to works that promote the
sciences and useful arts.
In our view the district court's reading of the Copyright and Patent Clause is unduly restrictive of Congress' power and is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's broad view of the congressional powers granted by this Clause. As one commentator
has pointed out, the words of the copyright clause of the constitution do not require that Writings shall promote science or
useful arts: they require that Congress shall promote those ends.
Congress has authority to make any law that is "necessary and proper" for the execution of its enumerated Article I powers,
including its copyright power, and the courts role in judging whether Congress has exceeded its Article I powers is limited.
The courts will not find that Congress has exceeded its power so long as the means adopted by Congress for achieving a
constitutional end are "appropriate" and "plainly adapted" to achieving that end.
Although Congress could require that each copyrighted work be shown to promote the useful arts (as it has with patents), it
need not do so. Congress could reasonably conclude that the best way to promote creativity is not to impose any
governmental restrictions on the subject matter of copyrightable works. By making this choice Congress removes the chilling
effect of governmental judgments on potential authors and avoids the strong possibility that governmental officials (including
judges) will err in separating the useful from the non-useful. Moreover, unlike patents, the grant of a copyright to a nonuseful work impedes the progress of the sciences and the useful arts only very slightly, if at all, for the possessor of a
copyright does not have any right to block further dissemination or use of the ideas contained in his works.

3. Obscenity is not an appropriate defense in an infringement action, whether piggybacked on an "unclean

hands" rubric or introduced in some other manner.
Some courts have denied legal redress in infringement suits to holders of copyrights on immoral or obscene works by
applying judicially-created doctrines.
One is the equitable doctrine of unclean hands which was invoked by the infringers and adopted by the District Court.
Assuming that the said equitable doctrine applies in this case, it should not be used as a conduit for asserting obscenity as a
limit upon copyright protection. Creating a defense of obscenity in the name of unclean hands or through any other vehicle
adds a defense not authorized by Congress that may, as discussed above, actually frustrate the congressional purpose
underlying an all-inclusive copyright statute. It will discourage creativity by freighting it with a requirement of judicial
approval. Requiring authors of controversial, unpopular, or new material to go through judicial proceedings to validate the
content of their writings is antithetical to the aim of copyrights. If the copyright holder cannot obtain financial protection for
his work because of actual or possible judicial objections to the subject matter, the pro-creativity purpose of the copyright
laws will be undercut.
The Supreme Court and this court have held that equitable doctrines should not be applied where their application will defeat
the purpose of a statute. Because the private suit of the plaintiff in a copyright infringement action furthers the congressional
goal of promoting creativity, the courts should not concern themselves with the moral worth of the plaintiff.