Calalang v.

Williams
G.R. No. 47800, 2 December1940
Facts: Commonwealth Act No.548 was passed by the National Assembly,by
virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit uponand avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest
and convenience of the public.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on,
roads and streets designated as nationalroads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the
Director ofPublic Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, shall promulgate thenecessary rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads
and streets. Suchrules and regulations, with the approval of the
President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating
theconstruction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable
distance from along the national roads. Suchroads may be temporarily
closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and
his dulyauthorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic thereon makes such actionnecessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of
theSecretary of Public Works and Communications.
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved
torecommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawnvehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de laBarca to Dasmarias Street,
from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. and along
RizalAvenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga
Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from aperiod of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
On August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works andCommunicationsapproved
therecommendation that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawnvehicles,between the points and during the hours as above indicated,
for a period of one year from the date of theopening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila haveenforced

and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted, As a

consequence of suchenforcement, all animal-drawnvehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places abovementionedto the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:Does Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 548grant authority to
promulgate rules andregulations for the regulation and control of the use of and
traffic on national roads and streets and is an undue delegation of legislative power.
Held: No.
Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer legislative power
upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretaryof Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what
public policy demands butmerely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safetransit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to
close them temporarily to any or allcases of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable inthe public
convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of whatthe law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which
the application of saidlaw is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations
on the use of national roads and to determinewhen and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the trafficthereon
and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot bedirectly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other governmentofficial to whom is confided the
duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law.But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.

PASEI v. Torres, et al.

G.R. No. 101279, 6 August 6, 1992
Facts: On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses
suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben
D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending
the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going
to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of
deploying such HongKong-boundworkers.
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No.
30, Series of 1991, datedJuly 10, 1991, providing guidelines on the Government
processing and deployment of Filipino domestichelpers to Hong Kong and the
accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipinodomestic
helpers.
On 2 September 1991, petitioner, a national organization of private employment
and recruitment agencies, filed a prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE
and POEA circulars and to prohibit implementation for the reason that, among
others, the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.
Issue: Did respondents act with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their
rule-making authority in issuing said circulars?
Held: No.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and
regulate recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand, the scope of the
regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by E.O. No. 797, to take over
the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National
Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of
Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging, such as, among others, to
establish and to maintain a registration and/or licensing system to private sector
participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas and
to recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers,
on a government togovernment arrangement and in such other sectors as policy
may dictate.

The vesture of quasi-legislativeand quasi-judicialpowers in administrative bodies is

not unconstitutional,unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the
growing complexity of the modern society". More and more administrative bodies
are necessary to help in the regulation of societys ramified activities.
The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the
recruitment anddeployment of Filipino land-based workers for overseas
employment. A careful reading of the challengedadministrative issuances discloses
that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly orby
necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents. The power to"restrict and
regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police
power .To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas
thepower to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and
control with due regard for theinterests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons".
The said DOLE Administrative Order No. 16 merely restricted the scope or area of
petitioners business operations by excluding therefrom from recruitment and
deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong until after the establishment of the
mechanisms that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to
Hong Kong. Other than that, petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino
workers either for Hong Kong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino
workers for other countries.
Thus, the questioned circulars are valid exercise of the police power as delegated
to the executive branch of Government.
(Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack
of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative
Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in
question may not be enforced and implemented.)

JMM Promotion, et al. v. CA

G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996
Facts: Former President Corazon C.Aquino ordered a total ban against the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreigndestinations. The ban
was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment
industrypromised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in
the system of deployment. Inits place, the government, through the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, subsequently issuedDepartment Order No. 28, creating
the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which wastasked with issuing
guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing
artistsabroad.
On January 6, 1994, issuedDepartment Order No. 3 establishing various
procedures and requirements for screening performingartists under a new system
of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Those who pass
were to be issued anArtist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to
processing of any contract of employment bythe POEA. Thereafter, the Department
of Labor issued a series of orders.
Issue: Are the said orders valid?
Held: Yes.
Between 1987-1991, most of Filipinas, a large number employed as domestic
helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical
and personal abuse. Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant
number of Filipina performing artistsended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom
were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution),and following the deaths of a
number of these women, the government began instituting measuresaimed at
deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them
aslegitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a number of
our countrymen havenonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters.
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in theissuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute
ban against the deployment ofperforming artists to "high risk" destinations, a
measure which would only drive recruitment furtherunderground, the new scheme
at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performingartists by requiring
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to

onlythose individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of

employment as artists abroad.
The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self-protection and is not
inaptly termed the law of overruling necessity. It may be said that inherent and
plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society.' Carried onward bythe current of legislature,
the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative
discretion,provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles
that mean security for the public welfareor do not arbitrarily interfere with the right
of the individual.
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lexembodies the character of the entire
spectrum ofpublic laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under
the State's police power. Asan inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually
"extends to all public needs, this "least limitable"of governmental powers grants a
wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriaegives effect
to a host of its regulatory powers.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates
government toextend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic
constitutional statement on labor provides that The State affirms labor as a primary
social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare. More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987
Constitution in its firstparagraph states that, The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized andpromote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Further, licensing or accreditation requirements is within the police power of
regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. These
requirements are not unwarranted deprivation of a property under the due process
clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory
standards, no such deprivation exists.

Adasa vs. Abalos

February 19, 2007
Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints and affidavits that
petitioner Bernadette Adasa was encashed two checks issued in the name of the
respondent through deceit without knowledge of respondent Abalos. Adasa failed to
pay to the proceeds of the checks despite demands of Abalos. Adasa filed a
counter-affidavit admitting that she received and encashed the checks and alleged
further in a supplemental affidavit that Bebie Correa instead received the 2 checks
and that she left the country. The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Iligan City
issued a resolution finding probable cause against Adasa and ordered for filing of
two separate informations for Estafa through falsification of commercial document
by a private individual. This petition only concerns one of the two (Criminal Case
#8782) criminal cases (8781 & 8782) that were docketed. Petitioner Adasa filed a
motion upon the trial court in order for the OCP to conduct a reinvestigation, in
which the OCP has reaffirmed its finding of probable cause. Adasa has entered a
not guilty plea during her arrangement on October 1, 2001 and later filed a petition
for review before the DOJ where it reversed and set aside the resolution of the
OCP and ordering it to withdraw the information for estafa.
Respondent Abalos filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the DOJ should
have dismissed the petition for review outright contending that Sec 7 of DOJ
Circular no 70 mandates that If an information has been filed in court pursuant to
the appealed resolution the petition shall not be given due course if the accused
had already been arraigned the aggrieved party cannot file a petition for review as
the secretary of Justice shall deny it outright.
The trial court has granted the petitioners motion to withdraw information and
dismissed the criminal case, on February 2003. Respondent filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA on the DOJ resolution and it reversed the sad resolution.
The appellate court emphasized that DOJ Circular 70 Sec 7 used the phrase shall
not.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari contending that section 12 of the same
DOJ Circular used the word may that would give discretion to the Secretary of
Justice to entertain an appeal, thus this petition.
Issue: WON the overall language and the intent of DOJ Circular no 70 is directory
that it would give discretion to the Secretary of Justice to entertain an appeal even
if the accused has been arraigned.
Held: No. the court held that CA is correct, the DOJ cannot give an appeal/petition
for review due course and must dismiss such actions if the accused has already
been arraigned. Therefore in Sec 12 if the ground for the dismissal is the
arraignment of the accused, it must go back and act upon through Section 7. If Sec
12 is given a directory application it would render earlier mandatory provisions

invalid/negligible and would undermine the main objectives of the said circular
which is for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice.

Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, et al.

G.R. No. 128509, 22 August 2006
Facts: Petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service operator,
authorized by the Philippine PortsAuthority (PPA)to provide and render arrastre and
stevedoringservices at the Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte, and on all vessels
berthed thereat, from September 1992 to September 1993.
In December 1993, pending final consideration ofpetitioners application for renewal
with the PPA Office, Manila, the PPA through its Port ManagerSalvador L. Reyna of
the Tacloban Port Management Office issued a 90-day holdoverauthority
topetitioner. Stated therein was the proviso that notwithstanding the 90dayperiod
aforementioned,the authority shall be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier
permit/contract for cargo handling services is granted or sooner withdrawn or
cancelled for cause pursuant to PPA AdministrativeOrder No. 1081. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed with respondent mayor an application for the renewal of its business
permits, which, in turn, was denied. Petitioner thus filed for a petition for mandamus
with preliminary injunction, and enjoined respondent mayor to issue the business
license sought.
On the other hand, the respondent mayor averred that the remedy of mandamus
does not lie as the issuance of the permit sought is not a ministerial function, but
one that requires sound judgment and discretion. In denying petitioners application,
respondent mayorinvoked Municipal Resolution No. 9327, passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos,Leyte which prohibits any party which likewise
operates shipping lines plyingthe route of Cebu to Hilongos and vice versa, from
engaging in arrastre and stevedoring services atthe port of Hilongos.
Issue: Is respondent mayors issuance of the permit a discretionary duty?
Held: Yes.
It can be deduced from Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code that
the limits in the exercise of the power of a municipal mayor to issue licenses and
permits, and suspend or revoke the same can be contained in a law or ordinance
The said section is pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general
welfare clause, which encapsulates the delegated police power to local government
units. Thus, under the LGC, the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses
and permits and suspend or revoke the same forany violation of the conditions
upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant tolaw or ordinance.

The pursuit of its duty under the police power necessarily entails exercise ofofficial
discretion in order for any local officials to ascertain which will better serve
theirconstituents who elected them into office. Full discretion must necessarily be
granted them toperform their functions and it will not be sound logic to simply make
them perform purelyministerial functions. And when the discharge of an official duty
requires the exercise of officialdiscretion or judgment, it is never a ministerial one.
Furthermore, where the only power given to a municipal corporation or official is to
issuelicense, as in Section 444 of the Local Government Code, it is clearly
regulatory in nature ratherthan a revenue raising one. Conclusively, regulation
being the object of the power to issue licenseand permits the exercise of discretion
by the issuing authority becomes an inescapable prerogative.This could be the very
same reason why business permits and licenses are renewed almost annuallyin
order that the licensing officials in carrying out their functions could examine and
evaluateavailing circumstances and conditions and with the exercise of discretion
determine whether togrant or deny the application or, to revoke a license or permit
already issued. It should also beunderstood that a municipal license is not a
property such that it is revocable when public interest so requires.
However, the fact that there only was the Resolution No. 93-27, and no
ordinance nor law, petitioners cause still cannot prosper because the proper
action is certiorari to determine whether grave of abuse of discretion had
been committed, and not mandamus.

Republic of the Phils. v. Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.

G.R. No. L-26862, 30 March 1970
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant sought the invalidation of the payment by defendantappelle for the registration of its 3 motor vehicles in the form of negotiable backpay
certificate of indebtedness, alleging that that the defendant was a mere assignee of
such negotiable instrument and not the backpay holder itself. Thus, the complaint
filed sought the payment with surcharges plus the legal interest from the filing
thereof.
The registration fee which defendant-appelleehad to pay was imposed by Section 8
of the Revised MotorVehicle Law.The conclusion is difficult to resist therefore that
the Motor Vehicle Act requires thepayment not of a tax but of a registration fee
under the police power. Hence the inapplicability of the sectionrelied upon by
defendant-appelleeunder the Back Pay Law. It is not held liable for a tax but for a
registrationfee. It therefore cannot make use of a backpay certificate to meet such
an obligation.
However, in August 1958, the National Treasurer, upon whom devolves the function
of administering the Back Pay Law had approved the acceptance ofnegotiable
certificates of indebtedness in payment of registration fees of motor vehicles with
the view that suchcertificates should be accorded with the same confidence by
other governmental instrumentalities as otherevidences of public debt, such as
bonds and treasury certificates.
The then Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office ofBaguio City and Casiano
Catbagan, the Cashier of the Bureau of Public Highways in the same city,
defendantbus firm has undisputedly shown that, after the said certificates of
indebtedness were properly indorsed in favorof the Motor Vehicles Office of Baguio
City and accepted by the Bureau of Public Highways on May 29, 1959, itwas duly
and properly issued official receipts acknowledging full payment of its registration
fees for thesecond installment of 1959 of its 238 vehicles, and that the Bureau of
Public Highways, thru its collecting anddisbursing officer, was validly and regularly
authorized to receive such payment
Issue: Isthe acceptance ofpayment valid and binding on plaintiffRepublic?
Held: No.

The government is not bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived by the national
treasurer and the auditor general. The Government is never estopped by mistake
or error on the part of its agents. While the question here is one of the collection of
a regulatory fee underthe police power, there is nothing to stand in the way of the
collection of the registration fees from defendant-appelle.

People, et al.v. Maceren

G.R. No. L-32166, 18 October1977
Facts: On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin
Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary
investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with havingviolated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 841. The five accused in the morning of March
1, 1969 allegedly resorted to electro fishingin the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte,
Sta. Cruz by using their own motor banca, equipped with motor with attachments
and usages causing destruction to aquatic animals.
The said law prohibits the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing.
However, the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish "electro fishing."
Notwithstanding the silenceof the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissionerof Fisheries,
promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, prohibiting electro fishing in all
Philippine waters.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of theFisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 841,amending section 2 of AdministrativeOrder No. 84, by restricting the
ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries. Thus, the phrase "in any portion
of the Philippine waters", found in Section 2, was changed by the amendatoryorder
to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes,
swamps, dams,irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water.
Issue: Did the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing such orders?
Held. Yes.
The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is
not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries arepowerless to penalize it.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in
fishing (2) unlawful fishingin deep-sea fisheries (3) unlawful taking of marine
mollusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges (5) failure of licensedfishermen to report the
kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.Nowhere in that law is
electro fishing specifically punished.

Further, Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electrofishing, does not

contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of "other violations"
because, asalready shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower
to the penalty for fishing with the use ofobnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed
in Section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "otherviolations" of the law and
regulations fixed in Section 83 of the Fisheries Law. Thus, Administrative Order No.
84 only originally punished electro fishing in all waters, there was a ban against
electro fishing was imposed to fresh water fisheries by the subsequent orders.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare
what acts should constitute acriminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for inthe law itself.While an
administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulationsto carry into effect
a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact
a criminalstatute.
Administrative agencies are clothed with rulemakingpowers because the
lawmaking body finds itimpracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for
the multifarious and complex situations that maybe encountered in enforcing the
law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objectsand
purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law
prescribes. The law itself cannot be extended.

SMART Communications, Inc., et al. v. National Telecommunications

Commission (NTC)
G.R. No. 151908, 12 August 2003
Facts: Petitioners filed against the NationalTelecommunications Commission,
Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and
DeputyCommissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 1362000(the Billing Circular)and the NTC Memorandum
dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporaryrestraining order. Petitioners alleged that the NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippinesthat the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property
withoutdue process of law that the Circular will result in the impairment of the
viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging thevalidity and
expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and callbalance announcement are
unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and
void ab initio.
Issue: Does NTC have quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power?
Held. Yes.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislativeor rule-makingpowers and quasijudicialor administrative adjudicatory powers.Quasi-legislativeor rulemakingpower
is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within theconfines of the granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegabilityand separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the
product of a delegated legislative power to createnew and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by thelegislature to the administrative agency. It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be notin
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must
conform to and be consistent with theprovisions of the enabling statute in order for
such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control
withrespect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative

body, as well as with respect to what fields are subjectto regulation by it. It may not
make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute,particularly the statute it is administering or which created
it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case
ofconflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislativeor rulemakingpower of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicialor administrativeadjudicatory power. This
is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy
is to apply and to decide inaccordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
bodyexercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrativenature, where the power to act
in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive oradministrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasijudicialfunctions, the administrative officers or bodies are required toinvestigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for theirofficial action and exercise of discretion in a
judicial nature.
The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 1362000and its
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000was pursuant to its quasi-legislativeor
rulemakingpower.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaustadministrative remedies before
going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned wasperformed pursuant to its quasi-judicialfunction, and not
when the assailed act pertained to its rulemakingor quasi-legislativepower.

Compania General De Tabacos v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners

G.R. No. 11216, 6 March 1916
Facts: Respondent ordered petitioner to present annually a detailed report of
the latters finances and operations of its vessels are operated by it as a common
carrier within the Philippine Islands. Petitioner refused compliance on the ground
that the provisions of Act No. 2307 relied on by the board was invalid as
constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative
power to the board. The petitioner also answered that the proposed report were
cumbersome, unnecessary and entails an immense amount of work.
The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
relies for its authority, so faras pertinent to the case at hand provides that, the
Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require
every publicutility as herein defined (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of
finances and operations, in such form and containing such mattersas the Board
may from time to time by order prescribe.
Issue:Is such authority given to the board aninvalid delegation of legislative power?
Held: Yes.
It is clear that such statute which authorizes the board commissioners to require
detailed reports from public utilities,leaving the nature of the report, the contents
thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle uponwhich it shall
proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the
board, is notexpressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public
utilities to which it refers. Such aprovision does not declare, or set out, or indicate
what information the State requires, what is valuable to it,what it needs in order to
impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the
Statemust have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to
require them to deal justly andequitably with the State. The Legislature seems to
have authorized the Board of Public UtilityCommissioners to require what
information the board wants.
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and inpursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done, to the latter no valid objection can be made.

In the present case, the provisions complained of does not lay down the general
rules of action under which the commission shall proceed, nor does it itself
prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practicallyeverything is left to
the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which
isunrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what
extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.

People of the Phils., et al. v. Vera, et al.

G.R. No. 45685, 16 November 1937
Facts:
The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking C
orporation (HSBC), arerespectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano
Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminalcase entitled "The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge
adinterim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard
the application of Cu Unjiengfor probation in the aforesaid criminal case. HSBC
questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings and assailed the
constitutionalityof the Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of laws
and gives unlawful andimproper delegation to provincial boards.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 is section 11 which reads as follows:
"This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the saleof a probation officer at rates
not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation
officersshall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
Issue: Is Act No. 4221 an invalid delegation of legislative power?
Held: Yes.
In testing whether a statuteconstitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or
not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute wascomplete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to
thejudgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. The general rule,
however, is limited by another rulethat to a certain extent matters of detail may be
left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted orpromulgated by
executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incompleteand hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative board may beguided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it.
The Probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon theprovincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted is a "rovingcommission" which enables the

provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act,

thelegislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but inreality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine. If a provincial board does not wishto have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for thesalary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative
power to the provincial boards.
The legislature has not madethe operation of the Probation Act contingent upon
specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by theprovincial board. It leaves the
entire operation or nonoperationof the law upon the provincial boards.
Thediscretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial
board need not investigateconditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any
specified contingency. It is bound by no rule limitedby no principle of expediency
announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts
orconditions and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all.
It need not give any reason orhave any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to
appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer.
The statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the
operation of the Probation Actin particular provinces but, considering that, in being
vested with the authority to appropriate or not thenecessary funds for the salaries
of probation officers they thereby are given absolute discretion to determinewhether
or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the
provincial boards are inreality empowered by the legislature to suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, theAct to be held in abeyance
until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the
necessaryfunds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done, but by
what may be done under its provisions.
Moreover, Section 11 of the Probation Act (No. 4221) is inseparably linked with the
otherportions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is
the bare idealism of the system,devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of
people who may be deserving of the intended beneficialresults of that system. The
clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the
wholecontext, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the
affirmative action of the differentprovincial boards. If not one of the provinces
and this is the actual situation now appropriates thenecessary fund for the salary
of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There canbe

no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer

without a probation system
(Probation and pardon are not coterminous nor are they the same. They are
actually distinct and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In
probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a freeman He is
not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire
punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationers
case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The
probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody
subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court, he may be
rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when
rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally
imposed upon him. Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve
and from commutation of the sentence.
Further, the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their
probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law
had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and
thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.)

Ynot v. IAC, et al.

G.R. No. 74457, 20 March 1987
Facts:

E.O. No. 626-A, reads, in part:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that
henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shallbe transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation
andforfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and othersimilar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission mayay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and
to deserving farmers through dispersal as theDirector of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
on January 13,1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure.They werereturned to
the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and givena
supersedeasbond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce thecarabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined
the prohibition, convicted thepetitioner and immediately imposed punishment,
which was carried out forthright.
Issue: Is the said order an invalid delegation of legislative power?
Held: Yes.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree,promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law. It was issued by PresidentMarcos not for the purpose of taking care
that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise ofhis legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in hisjudgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever
thelegislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his
judgment requiredimmediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue
decrees, orders or letters ofinstruction that were to have the force and effect of law.
As there is no showing of any exigency tojustify the exercise of that extraordinary

power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to questionthe validity of the
executive order.
The questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscatedproperty as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the
seizedproperty shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairmanof the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay see
fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deservingfarmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase "may
see fit"is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, ifcondition it is. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or
better still, thelimitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Theiroptions are apparently boundless. Who shall be
the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and bywhat criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and theyalone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Therefore, where the officers mentioned are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of theproperties arbitrarily taken, there was then an invalid delegation of
legislativepowers.