International

Review of
Administrative
Sciences

Article

The evolving EU accountability

landscape: moving to an ever
denser union

International Review of
Administrative Sciences
0(0) 123
! The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0020852315589697
ras.sagepub.com

Anchrit Wille
Institute of Public Administration, Leiden University, The Netherlands

Abstract
This article aims to bring the accountability of the EU executive out of the shadows by
tracing the development of the current accountability landscape around the main EUs
executive actors. It looks at the development and the diversification of accountability
forums (and mechanisms) in the EU: what forums and arrangements have come into
being for holding the EU executive powers accountable? Instead of focusing on single
individual accountability branches, this article examines the development of accountability in the EU by treating it as a complex landscape. And rather than assuming equilibrium, a starting point is the evolving nature of this landscape. On the basis of this
exploration, the article seeks to understand the way in which the EUs institutional
accountability framework has evolved through a patchwork of arrangements, and how
this contributes to the emergence of a complex, multilayered governance landscape in
order to fit within todays presumptions about how power should be controlled and
accountability achieved.
Points for practitioners
The landscape of accountability institutions in the EU is slowly becoming denser. The
shift from national, state-based policy-making to the EU level and the continuous expansion of the executive sphere in the EU is accompanied by a growing concern about how
to organize democratic accountability in the complex multi-level web of European
governance. The establishment of new watchdog institutions (such as an ombudsman,
an anti-corruption office, ethical committees, auditors, a whistleblower protection act)
and strengthened scrutiny points to the increased relevance of accountability and
control over the EU executive.

Corresponding author:
Anchrit Wille, Institute of Public Administration, Campus The Hague, Leiden University, Schouwburgstraat 2,
2511 VA Den Haag, The Netherlands; PO Box 13228, 2501 EE Den Haag, The Netherlands.
Email: a.c.wille@cdh.LeidenUniv.nl

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

Keywords
accountability, administration and democracy, administrative organization and structures, audit, international administration, international organizations (IGOs), multi-level
government

The expansion and proliferation of accountability

in the EU system
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. This passage
from the Schuman Declaration in 1950 indicated the start of an ambitious but
limited venture. Over time though, its institutional structure has grown more
mature and dense, evolving into what is todays EU. A continuous expansion
and fragmentation of the executive sphere resulted in a vast multi-level governance
structure with the capacity to formulate and implement policies at the EU and
national level (Curtin, 2009; Curtin and Egeberg, 2008).
With the rise of these new governance structures, questions about how
European governance should and could be democratically organized, and how it
is accounted for, has become increasingly a topic, both in the literature and in the
discussion on EU governance (Bovens et al., 2010: 5). Accountability has, along
with the concepts of legitimacy, representation and responsiveness, come to be
considered as a hallmark of democratic governance (Bovens, 2007).
The EU, while pursuing closer integration has, through Treaties since the Single
European Act 1986, pursued an agenda of strengthening accountability and democratization. Following the Treaty of Lisbon 2007, the role of the directly elected
European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments was expanded to secure
improved accountability within the ordinary legislative process. In parallel with
this political aspiration for organizing democratic accountability, there was a
marked concern for improved administrative and nancial accountability. The
establishment of an ombudsman, complaint-handling mechanisms, a whistleblower
protection act, rating agencies, inquiry committees and a host of auditors are
indicators of a distinct proliferation of accountability in the EU system.
Together it has produced a list of procedures, mechanisms, and forums that
have been devised to hold the EU executive to account that has become longer
and equally varied.
This article explores how the accountability landscape in the EU has evolved
over time. It examines the rise of accountability provisions and focuses on the
accountability forums that play a role in holding EU executive actors to account.
Rather than assuming equilibrium, this article takes the uidity, ambiguities,
inconsistencies and the evolving nature of accountability as a starting point (see
Olsen, 2013: 449). Whereas previous work has often concentrated on a single institutional arena in isolation, this article will explore accountability in the EU from an
integrated systemic view that emphasizes linkages across all of the major forums
that hold the executive to account. Instead of focusing on one institution, the

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Wille

article shows how dierent accountability forums are related, how they interact
and adapt to one another over time. The aim is an exploration of the web of
accountability arrangements that has been woven around the EU executive: what
pivotal watchdog institutions, accountability forums and arrangements have come
into being for holding the EU executive powers accountable?
To sketch a tentative portrait of the EU accountability landscape, this exploration draws on the insights from existing (case) studies. In addition, annual reports
of several EU institutions are used to document the development of oversight and
accountability practices. The article aims to enhance understanding of the way in
which the EUs institutional accountability framework has evolved and ts within
todays presumptions about how power should be controlled and accountability
achieved. The picture presented is one of a dynamic, dierentiated and complex
accountability landscape that provides the groundwork for overseeing the
European executive.

The EU accountability landscape: a dynamic

institutional order
A central element of good governance is the question of how power is allocated,
legitimated, applied and, above all, how it is subject to checks and balances. As the
scale of European legislative and executive power grew, the demand for more
accountability grew with it.

What is accountability?
The concept of holding to account obliges ocials to disclose information, to
explain and justify the exercise of authority, and to submit to sanctions if necessary
(Bovens, 2007: 450). Three stages are key to an accountability relationship in this
denition. First, the provision of information and reporting, and exploring whether
accountees have met the standards expected of them. Second, the debate, in which
accountees are questioned and required to defend and explain themselves. Third,
passing judgement in which actors are sanctioned for falling below the standards
expected of them, or rewarded for achieving or exceeding them.
Most accountability sequences do not include all these stages, or not all stages
are performed by the same forum. In an accountability landscape dierent forums
can play a dierent role in the accountability process. Some institutions specialize
in checking and investigation, and others focus on probing questions, debate and
the nal deliberation (Curtin, 2009: 270).
The capacity to hold to account relies, thus, on a combination of structures,
mechanisms and procedures that is concerned with ex post oversight. The opportunity for holding executive power to account is essential for democratic systems,
and can take dierent forms political, administrative, professional, legal or social
(Bovens, 2007: 454457) depending on the forum of accountability. These dierent forums make inquiries about policies that are or have been in eect; they

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

scrutinize past executive actions, and call executive ocers to account for their
actions. Next to the courts and parliaments there is a wide range of quasi-legal
forums of auditors, inspectors, and controllers, supreme audit institutions
(SAIs), anti-corruption agencies and ombudsman oces that are exercising independent and external political, administrative and nancial supervision in modern
democracies. Together these dierent institutions provide for an accountability
landscape.

Accountability: an evolving landscape

The accountability landscape should not be treated as a static structure, but rather
as dynamic evolving practices (Bovens et al., 2010: 192). Building the EU into a
polity that appeals to democratic standards of legitimacy implies the institutionalization of a variety of established systems, procedures and mechanisms prescribing
who is accountable to whom for what (Olsen, 2013: 450). Alongside the allocation
of more powers and their own nancial resources in the EU, and the transfer of
functions from national to supranational institutions, the political debate about
democracy and legitimacy in the EU grows more intense in the late 1990s raising
questions about the accountability of the EUs executive bodies. The development
of the institutional landscape of accountability is, thus, part of a struggle for good
government at the EU level and a process of legitimization through accountability
(see Laan, 2003: 77). It is likely to be a controversial, politicized and dynamic
process in which EU actors cope with the tensions between multiple, contested and
dynamic conceptions and standards of accountability (Olsen, 2010, 2013).
The development of the accountability landscape manifests itself along several
dimensions. To start with, it becomes evident in a system of delineated obligations
of the (new) executive bodies that they give account to (new) accountability forums.
These basics give institutional shape to the who is accountable to whom question.
Many of the obligations arise out of constitutions or treaties, or are imposed by
laws or rules. The creation of these new obligations and forums leads, in its turn, to
the rise of new accountability relationships, and a process of integration of the
information, debating and sanctioning function.
The rise of accountability practices follows the rise of these new accountability
provisions. Actors bargain with each other over how those in power are held
publicly responsible for their decisions and how accountability provisions (for
example, new powers agreed on in the treaties) should be interpreted, and which
one of the several procedures for holding to account should be chosen. Existing
forums renegotiate their powers and generally try to broaden the scope of their
control and of their powers of investigation, debate and sanctioning (Bovens et al.,
2010: 192).
Negotiation of a stronger use of new accountability provisions and the emergence of new accountability networks (Harlow and Rawlings, 2007) together with
the maturation of new standards for accountable behaviour are signs of an evolving accountability landscape. Modications in the norms that guide the behaviour

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Wille

of institutional actors and a rearrangement of systems of accountability is part of a

wider process of institution building both in organizational terms and in terms of
establishing and upholding a normative framework.
The literature on accountability generally focuses on accountability as a
dyadic relationship. Accountability is handled as a model of one actor accounting
to one forum. In practice, accountability in the EU involves a complex cast
of actors operating at the European, national and subnational levels, in
which accounting takes place in a range of ways to a whole cast of accountability
forums (Bovens et al., 2010: 192). This article perceives, based on previous work
on institutions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Olsen, 2010, 2013; Thelen, 2004),
the accountability landscape as an integrated system in which various
arenas cohere in important ways, characterized as they are by institutional
complementarities.
Moreover, mapping the accountability landscape means that we need to move
beyond the static single institutional analysis. It requires embedding institutions
into their broader historical and evolutionary context to see how these institutions
are adapting to the new international political and administrative context in which
they operate. Institutional dynamics occur as forums, constrained by the weight of
inherited practice, innovate in pursuit of their goals (Thelen, 2012). New expectations become entrenched, and create coordination costs and provide incentives for
further changes.
The remainder of this article addresses the emergence of the EU accountability
landscape. It rst describes the expansion and diversication of accountability in
the EU along six dimensions. An exploration of its emerging contours can expose
the rudiments of accountability surrounding the new executive powers in the
EU. Then, based on this stocktaking, the article reects on the outcomes of this
transformation of EU governance.

The emergence of the EU accountability landscape

The mapping of the evolving accountability landscape focuses on six separate
dimensions. These are (1) the emergence of new accountability obligations; (2)
the rise of new forums and watchdog institutions; (3) the multiplication of accountability relationships; (4) the maturation of new standards for accountable behaviour (5) the rise of accountability practices, and (6) the emergence of accountability
networks.

Accumulation of accountability obligations

A key development underlying the accountability landscape is the accumulation of
formal (and informal) responsibilities and obligations of the (new) EU executive
bodies to provide information (and justication) on their actions. Not only have
treaties become the spearhead for constituting and reforming the accountability
obligations in EU governance, the rise of ethical frameworks, whistle-blower acts,

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

transparency initiatives, auditing requirements, and performance contracts, have

all contributed to form the basis of the EU accountability landscape. Together they
have added new rules and procedures on top or instead of the old ones; in many
cases it concerns a sharpening of the provisions about who is responsible for what,
and expanded stipulations to inform and report to (new) political and administrative forums. A long series of revisions of the Treaties have changed the framework
of accountability in which the core EU institutions operate (Bovens et al., 2010;
Curtin, 2009; Wille, 2013). These core executive bodies, like the European
Commission and the European Council, have become, in their accountability obligations, more distinctly linked to the democratic arenas. But also the large number
of European agencies established since the mid-1990s (Busuioc, 2010; Koop, 2011)
has been tied to new (often contested) reporting requirements and obligations to
other supervisory and accountability forums.

Emerging forums and powers of oversight

What bodies are there for holding the EU executive to account? Owing to the
growing complexity of the expanding EU political-administrative system we witness the expansion and proliferation of formal accountability forums and mechanisms, as displayed in Figure 1.
One of the pillars in the EU accountability landscape, present from the very
start, is embodied in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), materializing legal
accountability, which is the most unambiguous type of accountability. The ECJ
has responsibility for ensuring that the rules laid down under the Union Treaties
are observed, together with the national courts of the member states. The ECJ not
only guarantees respect for Community law but also ensures the mutual limitation
of the powers of its actors European institutions, national governments and
individuals.
Another pillar in the EU landscape is political accountability which has evolved
through the institutional design and development of parliaments at both the
European and the member state level. Launched in 1952, the Common Assembly
of the European Coal and Steel Community, as the EP was then known, amounted
to little more, in the words of the English political scientist David Farrell, than a
multi-lingual talking shop. The Assembly had no legislative powers and only 78
members, drawn from the national parliaments of the member states. Yet, over the
years, the Assembly, renamed the European Parliament in 1962, slowly increased
its powers and legitimacy. In 1979, for the rst time, its members were directly
elected instead of being appointed by governments, which gave a major boost to
the EUs claim to democratic representation of voters across the continent.
Subsequent enlargements, however, have raised the number of members to a
total of 751 today. Having rst acquired limited budgetary powers in 1970, the
European Parliament has since continued to expand its remit and responsibilities.
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) marked the beginning of Parliaments metamorphosis into the role of co-legislator. At the same time, the Parliament also

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Wille

Figure 1. Development of accountability forums in the EU (19552012).

progressively acquired oversight powers over the Commission, establishing and

reinforcing political accountability at the supranational level of the EU (Hix and
Hyland, 2013; Wille, 2013).
Until the late 1980s, it was sucient to increase the EPs powers to make up the
democratic decit in the EU (Dehousse, 1998). But the need for political accountability forums at the national level has led to a trend from national parliaments to
reinforce their own powers vis-a-vis their own national executives for the performance of the role of representing their national interests at the EU level (Bovens
et al., 2010: 194). The need to involve national parliaments in EU aairs stems
from the idea that parliamentarization at the EU level does not suce to legitimize
European integration and should be accompanied by strong national parliaments
who are controlling national governments and their activities at the EU level
(Cooper, 2012; De Ruiter, 2013; Winzen, 2012). According to the prevailing concept of dual legitimacy, national parliaments constitute an important source of
democratic legitimacy in the EU. Strengthening parliamentary scrutiny and participation rights at the domestic level is thus seen as an eective measure to address
the perceived democratic decit in EU decision-making the reason for aording
the strengthening of their oversight role a prominent place in the Lisbon Treaty.
The importance of improved nancial accountability faced the EU with a
change in the nancing of the EU budget as a result of the 1970 and 1975
budget treaties. This created political pressure for the establishment of a stronger

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

external auditing capacity in the EU. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) was
established in 1977, but assumed the status of a full institution of the Union
when the Treaty on European Union came into operation in 1993 (Laan, 2003:
764765). As the EUs external auditor, also called the guardians of EUs
nances, it is to carry out the audit of the EU nances and expected to contribute
to improving EU nancial management and report on the use of public funds.
When actors in the European supranational institutions became aware that
fraud and corruption were of direct concern when the Community institutions
were granted their own resources independent from member states in the
1970s (Pujas, 2003) an anti-corruption agency was designed. The EUs AntiFraud Oce (OLAF) was set up on 1 June 1999 and its aim is to ght against
fraud, corruption and other irregularities identied in the Community budget
(Cini, 2007: 165). (OLAF is the acronym of its title in French, Oce europeen de
lutte antifraud.) Fraud and irregularities, which became visible in the reports of the
newly installed ECA, were then presented as a problem which ought logically to be
addressed by the European Community (EC), and no longer by member states
alone.

The proliferation of accountability relationships

The substantial growth in the number of executive actors there are currently 12
executive bodies and 40 agencies operating at the EU level that need to be held to
account, combined with the evolving number of forums that watch over these
executive institutions and bodies, provides for a proliferating of accountability
relationships. A selection of these accountability relationships between the main
accountability actors and the main forums is displayed in Table 1.
This collection of accountability relationships is represented in matrix form and
it shows what types of accountability have become key in the EU landscape. The
accountability relationships are not only qualied in terms of type, but also in
terms of vigour based on an assessment by Curtin (2009: 274). The table indicates
that in the web of relationships, legal accountability is fairly crystallized out; and
that in the eld of political and administrative accountability, new relationships are
evolving or have the potential to develop further.
Although this article will not analyse further the details of these accountability
relationships, it is clear that with the empowerment of EP and national parliaments, and the establishment of the ECA and the European Ombudsman political
and administrative accountability have become more germane in the EU polity and
that it are these relationships that have the potential to be built up.

Evolving standards: the institutionalization of accountability doctrines

As an unsettled polity, the EU had no shared vision of how accountability was to
be organized and legitimized (Olsen, 2013). But holding to account means that
there must exist a set of criteria for measuring accountable behaviour. If there

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Wille

Table 1. The accountability matrix: accountability forums in relation to executive actors

EU watchdogs: Accountability types and forums
Legal

Political

Political

Financial

Administrative

Executive actors

Court of
Justice

EP

National
Parliaments

Court of
Auditors

Ombudsman

European Commission
European Council
Council of Ministers
Agencies
Comitology commitees
ECB

strong
medium
strong
medium
medium
medium

strong
weak
weak
medium
medium
medium

weak
weak medium
medium
none
none
none

medium
none
medium
medium
none
medium

medium
none
medium
medium
medium
medium

Source: Curtin (2009: 274), adapted by author.

are no standards or expectations there can be no accountability. The drive for

accountability is, therefore, closely linked with the emergence of new standards
of accountability, and making intangible normative meanings palpable.
The new watchdog institutions allowed for new practices and ideas to be introduced into EU governance. Once established, these new institutions worked to
build on their mandate. It was part of the building of institutional identities and
winning acceptance for the oce (Olsen, 2013: 466). Using the mission statements
of the pivotal accountability forums in the Union as an indicator of the main
standards they are pursuing (displayed in Table 2) we see the crystallization of a
normative accountability framework. By spelling out these principles as the main
purpose of the institution, the accountability forum contributes to a constitutionalization of this normative framework in the Union. Through its reports and
assessment of the EU practices in terms of these standards, forums not only helped
to hold the executive to account, they also acted to enhance the normative framework of accountability in the Union (Cini, 2007).
The European Court of Justice (ECJ), for instance, has played, from the start,
an indispensible role in the EUs accountability landscape putting forward the rule
of law (Curtin, 2009). The Court of Auditors was part of a wider advocacy coalition for improved nancial management in the EU (Laan, 2003). The rst
Ombudsman, Jacob Soderman, gained a reputation for promoting norms for openness in the EU (Erkkila, 2012: 65; Magnette, 2003). The EP eshed out norms of
political accountability and responsibility of the Commission. All institutions acted
as advocates for improved accountability in relation to the policies and nances of
the Union. The growing salience of these watchdogs can be perceived as part of a
wider attempt to expand and solidify the ethical framework of the democratic
fabric of the European Union, which consists in subjecting all of the Unions
institutions to standard sets of rules and procedures, or scrutiny by agents who
are dedicated to a single task but responsible for applying it across the entire EU

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Integrity
. . . protects the financial
interests of the
European Union by
investigating fraud, corruption and any other
illegal activities

. . . promotes transparency and an administrative culture of service,

and fosters the highest
standards of behaviour
in the EUs institutions

. . . contributes to improving EU financial management, promotes

accountability and
transparency and acts
as the independent
guardian of the financial
interests of the citizens
of the Union

. . . has a range of supervisory and control

powers. These allow it
to exercise oversight
over other institutions,
to monitor the proper
use of the EU budget
and to ensure the correct implementation of
EU law

. . . its mission has been

to ensure that the law
is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties

European Anti-Fraud
Office (OLAF)

Principles of good
administration

European Ombudsman
(EO)

Sound financial
management

European Court of
Auditors (ECA)

Political scrutiny and

responsibility

European Parliament (EP)

and national parliaments

Rule of law

Court of Justice (ECJ)

Table 2. The EU accountability standards (based on mission statements of institutions).

10
International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Wille

11

institutional system (Peterson and Shackleton, 2012: 401). Within a very limited
time frame the EU has developed its own legal, political and administrative order
(Curtin, 2009: 203; Curtin and Egeberg, 2008).

Evolving accountability practices

In the accountability landscape dierent forums can play a dierent role in the
accountability process. Some of the institutions specialize in the checking and
investigation stage, others focus on probing questions, debate and nal deliberation (Curtin, 2009: 270). The ECJ and the EP, in particular, have been able to
develop certain strong-arm tactics to enable the actor in question to suer some
consequences as a result of having being held to account (Curtin, 2009: 272). To
assess the development of accountability practices in the EU, the output of the
dierent accountability forums is taken as a proxy indicator of changes in accountholding activity.
Let us start with the development of legal accountability as displayed in Figure
2. In recent decades the volume of the judicial activity of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) has increased slightly, as we can see in Figure 2, displaying a small
rise in court cases in recent years. Any member state or private individual can ask
the ECJ to make a judgment over the legality of acts adopted by the Community,
and even to contest some of the decisions made by its institutions. When the Court
takes up an issue, it operates not only to resolve disputes, but also as an accountability forum.
The ECJ may have greater legal authority than the EP, but over the years, the
EP has also become a much more powerful actor and its oversight function has
gained ground steadily during the past decade. The EP ensures democratic control
over the Commission, which regularly submits reports to Parliament including an
annual report on EU activities and on the implementation of the budget. One of
the most popular and visible methods to ensure executive accountability, posing
questions, increased in the 15 years between 1999 and 2014 from 3187 to 10,632 as
Figure 3 shows. Several factors account for the greater incidence of accountability
practices. Among them are the growing number of MEPs, the increased sta
resources, the committee structure with 22 committees, but indications of fraud
and mismanagement and the resignation of the Santer Commission have had a
profound eect on the emphasis that is placed on accountability.
In addition, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) has worked to expand its
own role. The ECA as an external auditing body exercises its role by providing
information about the management of the Unions nances to the Unions executive and parliamentary bodies at EU and national levels. It has no judicial functions and does not impose sanctions on individual ocials or institutions. Hence
the basis of its contribution rests on the outcome of its audits as expressed in
reports. Accountability is promoted through the publication and dissemination
of information about the systems and practices of nancial management in the
EU (Laan, 2003). The ECA carries out three additional types of audits. The Court

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

Figure 2. The development in judicial activity of the Court of Justice (200614) (Source: Annual Report ECJ compilation).

12

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Wille

13

Figure 3. The development in number of parliamentary questions of the European

Parliament (19992014) (Source: EP and General Reports compilation).

is a prolic producer of reports as is displayed in Figure 4. This is its primary means

of giving an account of the conduct and results of its audits. Its output in terms of
the number of audit reports and opinions is much increased in recent years.
The emergence of accountability practices in the EU has also evolved through the
role of the European Ombudsman and OLAF. The Ombudsman had a record
number of inquiries opened and closed in 2012 as Figure 5 shows. The 465 inquiries
opened constitute an 18 percent increase compared with 2011. The number of inquiries closed increased by 23 percent compared with 2011 and reached a new peak of
390. Not displayed in the gure, most inquiries that the Ombudsman opened in 2012
concerned the European Commission (245 inquiries or 53 percent of the total). The
key to its success, following Magnette (2003: 678), is the hybrid nature of the
Ombudsman: The powers of the Ombudsman, limited as they are, give him the
opportunity to combine the instruments of parliamentary scrutiny and judicial control in an original way. On the one hand, acting like a court, it addresses individual
complainants and it denes and applies general principles to solve the cases submitted to it (and in its interpretation building a doctrine of good administration). On
the other hand, acting as a parliamentary organ, and with the strong support of the
EP, the Ombudsman uses his powers of inquiry and proposition to suggest wideranging reforms of European governance (and in doing so, promoting the principles
of transparency, participation and explanation).
OLAF, investigating cases of fraud, and assisting EU bodies and national
authorities in their ght against fraud, has an increasing caseload. In
2013, OLAF received more information of investigative interest than ever
before, as Figure 6 shows. In that year, OLAF opened the high number of 253
investigations, and issued the highest number of recommendations in the last
ve years (not shown in the gure), with 353 recommendations for judicial, nancial, administrative or disciplinary action to be taken by institutions and member
states.

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Figure 4. Development in the number of reports of the European Court of Auditors (200414) (Source: Annual Report ECA compilation).

14
International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Figure 5. Development in the number of inquiries of the European Ombudsman (200313) (Source: Ombudsman Annual Report
compilation).

Wille
15

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

(right axis)

Figure 6. Development in the amount of incoming information (right axis) and investigations opened by OLAF (200413) (Source: OLAF
Annual Report).

(le axis)

16
International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Wille

17

Table 3. The development of accountability practices in the EU (index).

Forums

Output

ECJ

new cases
completed cases
pending cases
parliamentary questions
specific annual reports
special reports
opinions
inquiries opened
inquiries closed
incoming information
cases opened

EP
ECA

Ombudsman
OLAF

2006 (abs)

2013 (abs)

2006 100%

537
546
731
6075
23
11
8
267
250
822
148

622
719
787
10,632
51
24
14
350
461
1294
253

116%
132%
108%
175%
222%
218%
175%
131%
184%
157%
171%

To summarize the development of EU accountability, the practices in the dierent

institutional domains are displayed in Table 3. The index in this table measures the
changes in the output and performance of the dierent watchdogs. The index is calculated by comparing the performances (or output) of the institutions in the observation
period (2013) in relation to those of the reference period (in which the index is given a
value of 100 in 2006). Comparing index numbers indicates that the largest relative
increase in accountability activity has taken place within the domains of political and
administrative accountability; that is, in parliamentary questioning, the number of
ombudsman inquiries opened, and the number of special reports from the ECA.

An evolving multi-level accountability network

Although single forums are important loci of accountability, in practice eective
and ecient accountability is realized through the cooperation of dierent forums
or watchdogs. When accountability is achieved because a group of autonomous
forums work together to achieve it, we are dealing with an accountability network.
Harlow and Rawlings (2007: 13) reserve the term for a network of agencies specialising in a specic method of accountability. The search for enhanced accountability in the EU has contributed to the emergence of links and forms of social
organization between dierent forums in the EU accountability landscape. These
networks are emerging horizontally between the political and administrative
forums at the supranational level; and vertically between forums cutting across
the dierent levels of governance.
The development and strengthening of accountability arrangements at the
supranational level (as OLAF and ECA), and the empowerment of the EP and
the Ombudsman, were indicative of a shift from the national to the supranational
in the European accountability landscape. National accountability structures on

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

18

International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

their own were insucient given the development of the EU budget. Adequate
political and nancial accountability required institutions at the EU level and
this justied the empowerment of the EP and the establishment of a Court of
Auditors. However, with the gradual Europeanization of public policy-making
the need for vertical multi-level cooperation and coordination became apparent.
The development of vertical networks promoting accountability in all main
areas political, administrative, judicial is discernible and is displayed in
Table 4. The primary purpose of these vertical networks is institutional cohesion
and the eective functioning of accountability in a multi-level context.
The vertical, multi-level character of the accountability networks is also observable in parliamentary oversight. The Treaty of Lisbon bestowed more powers on
both the EP and national parliaments. From 2009, national parliaments and the EP
have worked on a series of proposals for improving inter-parliamentary relations,
dialogue and cooperation even further. The main objectives of this cooperation
between the EP and the national parliaments are: (a) to promote the exchange of
information and best practices between the national parliaments of the European
Parliament with a view to reinforcing parliamentary control, inuence and scrutiny
at all levels; and (b) to ensure eective exercise of parliamentary competences in the
EU. An example of a joint parliamentary meeting is the European Parliamentary
Week (EPW) that brings together parliamentarians from all over the European
Union to discuss economic, budgetary and social matters. Moreover, the European
Parliament committees regularly invite members of the national parliaments to
their meetings to discuss new Commission legislative proposals.
Also in terms of holding the EU executive to account, we nd new initiatives in
cooperation. National parliaments want to have a stronger control and inuence
over EU decision-making. The EP wants to have a better oversight of the functioning of the national systems when it comes to the eective implementation of the
EU budget (Cipriani, 2010: 4748, 254), and introduced the multi-level internal
control framework of the single audit.
A comparable multi-level accountability network emerged to ensure legal
accountability. The ECJ is often portrayed as existing in splendid isolation in
Luxembourg, given its formal independence enshrined in the Treaties. But the
Court is actually surrounded by specialized and often very circumscribed legal
communities. The ECJ and lower national courts have developed a mostly
cooperative relationship: national courts receive guidance on European
Community (EC) law from the Court, and the ECJ relies on national courts to
refer cases and apply EC law (most EU law is applied by national courts). The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has played, from the start, an indispensible role in
the EUs accountability landscape putting forward the rule of law (Kelemen and
Schmidt, 2012). This relationship has been symbiotic with both the ECJ and lower
national courts beneting. The ECJs relationship with national courts has been
fundamental to its development as a supranational institution.

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Parliament network

The Court in co-operation Conference of European

Affairs Committees
with the courts and
(COSAC): representatribunals of the member
tives from EP and
states ensures a uniform
national parliaments
application and interpreInter-parliamentary EU
tation of EU law
Information Exchange
(IPEX) facilitating the
information flow
Parliamentary Week connecting parliamentarians
from the EU

Judicial network

Table 4. An evolving multi-level accountability network

Ombudsmen network

Anti-fraud network

Supreme Audit Institutions The European Network of The OLAF Anti-Fraud

Ombudsman: the EO and Communicators
(SAIs) of the European
Network (OAFCN): the
the national and regional
Union and the European
information and commuCourt of Auditors (ECA) ombudsmen, and similar
nication link for the
bodies of the EU
cooperation within the
national investigative sermember states
framework of the
vices, with which OLAF
Contact Committee
co-operates in the
structure
member states

Auditors network

Wille
19

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

20

International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

Moving to an ever-denser accountability landscape

The European Community was, from the start, set up as a hybrid institutional
system based on the intertwining of sometimes competing logics and objectives.
The EU, in the words of Olsen (2010: 81), is a conceptual battleground and an
institutional building site. The continuous expansion and fragmentation of the
executive sphere in the EU in recent decades, whereby core institutions tend to
delegate an increasing proportion of their tasks to bodies which are either under
their direct control or are granted some form of independence in the decisionmaking process, have made the governance structure more varied and dense
(Curtin, 2009: 106, 135; Flinders, 2004).
The shift from national, state-based policy-making to transnational and multilevel European governance was accompanied by a growing concern about how to
organize democratic accountability in the complex multi-level web of European
governance (Bovens et al., 2010: 5). The development of new watchdogs and their
strengthened scrutiny in recent decades points to the increased relevance of
accountability and control over the EU executive. So far, the EUs complex
multi-level network governance structures cutting across decisional levels has
been a melange or mixture of overlapping or competing or complementary
powers and responsibilities and a diversied set of accountability relationships
that lead to a mixture of accountability mechanisms operating at European,
national and sub-national levels (see Bovens et al., 2010; Papadopoulos, 2010).
This mixed order of multiple horizontal and vertical accountability regimes,
arrangements and practices at distinct levels in the EU demonstrates an everdenser institutional landscape.
It is clear that this accountability landscape was not created in a single big bang
or followed a clear and single logic. Individual components were forged at dierent
historical junctures, brought into being by dierent political actors and coalitions
(see Thelen, 2004: 285). It lumps dierent genres or types of accountability together
political, administrative, nancial and judicial. The emergence of these arrangements over the previous decades, occupied with the political task of solving the
accountability decit in the EU, was part of a dynamic, fragmented and often ad
hoc reform process, full of inconsistencies and tensions of continuous transformation. Each EU enlargement has given the new member states the opportunity to
bring in their conception of accountability and to try to integrate some of the
founding principles of their national constitutional cultures in the Treaties (Costa
et al., 2003: 668): It is no surprise that strengthened control by Parliament ranked
high on the European agenda after the United Kingdom and Denmark joined the
EU. Likewise, the establishment of the principle of transparency and of extrajudicial control mechanisms coincided with the membership of Sweden and
Finland. The development of an accountability landscape is a continuous adaptive
process. As the world around accountability forums changes, their successful operation depends on their active ongoing adaptation in the social, political context in
which they are embedded (Heritier, 2007; Olsen, 2010, 2013).

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Wille

21

Nonetheless, two dierent broader dynamics of change can be distinguished,

profoundly shaping the trajectory of accountability in the EU and forming the
contours in this evolving landscape. First, the parliamentarization of the EU,
through the empowerment of the EP and the tentative commitments of national
parliaments, has developed since the Single European Act with the Treaties of
Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, and has resulted in the emergence of
mechanisms with the aim of ensuring democratic accountability in the EU, from
both a supranational and intergovernmental perspective. With the Lisbon Treaty
2007, the debate surrounding the role of national parliaments remains one of
securing improved accountability within the ordinary legislative process. After
Lisbon, accountability can be pursued either through parliamentary scrutiny of
the minister or through the subsidiarity monitoring. This development is part of
a broader trajectory in the direction of more democratization and politicization
(see Olsen, 2010: 93; Wille, 2013).
A second and related development driving the contours of the accountability
landscape is the concern with rationalization and functionality (see Olsen, 2010:
92). The multiplication of accountability mechanisms in the EU is part and parcel
of a general trend towards greater control of public authorities and more accountability from decision-making authorities in the Western world over the past 30
years (Costa et al., 2003). New control bodies have been set up everywhere with
the task of checking that governments abide by their budget obligations, and of
preventing and sanctioning instances of fraud and corruption (Rosanvallon, 2008).
The growth and the complexity of the EU administration, increased budget
resources and the multi-level character of the EU governance systems made the
establishment of an eective accountability landscape progressively critical.
The diusion of professional ideas about good governance, enhanced administrative
performance and institutional transparency (Erkkila, 2012) elicited the emergence
of auditors, ombudsmen, and audit bodies. These non-majoritarian guardian
type institutions play a major role in democratic governance in all political systems.
The key to their legitimacy lies in their independence. These regulatory control
mechanisms progressively gained their new position and tasks as they were
regarded as being needed in the EU institutional structure. The need for reliable
information and procedures increase as parliaments progress from rubber-stamping to informed institutions (see Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2013: 66). In calling for
these new watchdogs to control and assess the EU executive, the EP itself has
shown the importance in the EU of these new non-parliamentary control procedures as complementary to the classical parliamentary oversight tools.
The description of the shifts in accountability, as well as the sources of institutional change, and the processes of institutionalization, remain sketchy at best at
this moment. These issues are a topic for future research. Understanding the
accountability landscape requires that the evolving and contested nature of the
question who is accountable to whom for what and how, is taken as a point of
departure rather than assuming its equilibrium. And instead of focusing on single
individual accountability branches, accountability is treated as a complex

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

22

International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

landscape system. When patterns of accountability change, these accountability

arrangements become an object of political contention. Functional pressures trigger new search processes for alternative arrangements or for adaption of the existing institutional accountability order. For this reason an analysis of the evolving
accountability landscape should take the long view to come up with meaningful
generalizations.
Acknowledgment
I am grateful to Mark Bovens, Johan Olsen, Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid and two
anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

References
Bovens M (2007) Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework.
European Law Journal 13: 447468.
Bovens M, Curtin D and t Hart P (eds) (2010) The Real World of EU Accountability: What
Deficit? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Busuioc EM (2010) The accountability of European agencies: Legal provisions and ongoing
practices. Dissertation, Utrecht University.
Cini M (2007) From Integration to Integrity: Administrative Ethics and Reform in the
European Commission. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Cipriani G (2010) The EU Budget: Responsibility without Accountability? Brussels: CEPS
Paperbacks.
Cooper I (2012) A virtual third chamber for the European Union? National parliaments
after the Treaty of Lisbon. West European Politics 35: 441465.
Costa O, Jabko N, Lequesne C and Magnette P (2003) Introduction: Diffuse control mechanisms in the European Union: Towards a new democracy? Journal of European Public
Policy 10: 666676.
Curtin D (2009) Executive Power of the European Union: Laws, Practices and the Living
Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Curtin D and Egeberg M (2008) Tradition and innovation: Europes accumulated executive
order. West European Politics 31: 639661.
Dehousse R (1998) European institutional architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary
system or regulatory structure? Common Market Law Review 35: 595627.
De Ruiter R (2013) Under the radar? National parliaments and the ordinary legislative
procedure in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 20: 11961212.
Erkkila T (2012) Government Transparency: Impacts and Unintended Consequences.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Flinders M (2004) Distributed public governance in the European Union. Journal of
European Public Policy 11(3): 520544.
Harlow C and Rawlings R (2007) Promoting accountability in multilevel governance: A
network approach. European Law Journal 13(4): 542562.
Heritier A (2007) Explaining Institutional Change in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hix S and Hyland B (2013) Empowerment of the European Parliament. Annual Review of
Political Science 16: 171189.
Kelemen RD and Schmidt SK (2012) Introduction the European Court of Justice and legal
integration: Perpetual momentum? Journal of European Public Policy 19: 17.

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016

Wille

23

Koop C (2011) Explaining the accountability of independent agencies: The importance of

political salience. Journal of Public Policy 31(02): 209234.
Laffan B (2003) Auditing and accountability in the European Union. Journal of European
Public Policy 10: 762777.
Magnette P (2003) Between parliamentary control and the rule of law: The political role
of the Ombudsman in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 10:
677694.
Mahoney J and Thelen K (eds) (2010) Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency,
and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olsen JP (2010) Governing through Institution Building: Institutional Theory and Recent
European Experiments in Democratic Organization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Olsen JP (2013) The institutional basis of democratic accountability. West European Politics
36(3): 447473.
Papadopoulos Y (2010) Accountability and multilevel governance: More accountability, less
democracy? West European Politics 33: 10301049.
Pelizzo R and Stapenhurst F (2013) Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight.
London: Routledge.
Peterson J and Shackleton M (2012) The Institutions of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Pujas V (2003) The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): A European policy to fight
against economic and financial fraud? Journal of European Public Policy 10: 778797.
Rosanvallon P (2008) Counter-democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Thelen K (2004) How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany,
Britain, the United States and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thelen K (2012) Varieties of capitalism: Trajectories of liberalization and the new politics of
social solidarity. Annual Review of Political Science 15: 137159.
Wille A (2013) The Normalization of the European Commission: Politics and Bureaucracy in
the EU Executive. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Winzen T (2012) National parliamentary control of European Union affairs: A crossnational and longitudinal comparison. West European Politics 35(3): 657672.

Anchrit Wille teaches at Leiden Universitys Institute of Public Administration.

Her most recent book is The Normalization of the European Commission: Politics
and Bureaucracy in the EU Executive (Oxford University Press, 2013), an in-depth
case study of the development of politicaladministrative relationships in the most
important EUs institutions. She has published on such topics as executive politics,
accountability in the EUs multi-level governance context, politicaladministrative
relationships, institutional dynamics, citizen participation, political inequality and
democratic governance.

Downloaded from ras.sagepub.com at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 4, 2016