UNIVERITY OF SAN JOSE- RECOLETOS

School of Law

Compilation of Civil Law

Questions and Suggested
Answers
Book 2: Property

Submitted by:
CIVIL LAW CLASSES
Regular and executive
A.Y. 2016-2017

Submitted to:
ATTY. JENNOH TEQUILLO
Civil Law Review Professor

June 2016

Property

P R
NAME:

O P

E R

ANGIE R. ARONG (EXECUTIVE)

CASE:

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. JAMES NG AND

ANTHONY NG, GR NO. 187556, MAY 5, 2010

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

TOPIC:

POSSESSION

Question:
A and B, siblings herein, respondent obtained loans from CDE Bank petitioner
amounting to Twenty Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00) to secure they
mortgaged two parcels of land situated in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City. A and B failed to settle their loan obligation, hence, CDE Bank instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage before Notary Public. Notice of
Auction Sale was posted and the same way it was published in the
newspaper of general circulation and the bank was declared as the highest
bidder. For failure of the respondent to redeem the property within 1year
reglementary period, petitioner filed an ex-parte petition of issuance of writ
of possession in the trial court, hence denied the petition, since petitioner
was unable to prove that it complied with Sections 3 and 4 of Act 3135. Is the
dismissal meritorious?

Suggested Answer:

No.
It is settled that questions regarding the validity of a mortgage or its
foreclosure as well as the sale of the property covered by the mortgage
cannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance of a writ of possession.
Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary
period, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and
the issuance thereof is merely a ministerial function. The judge to whom an
application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of
the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Until the foreclosure sale is
2

Property

annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial. More so when,

as in the present case, the redemption period has expired and ownership is
vested in the purchaser.

Property

NAME:

MICHELLE MAE MABANO (EXECUTIVE)

CASE:
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR vs EBIO GR No.
1784211, June 23, 2010
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY - Ownership

Question:
Mario derives his title over an accreted portion of a creek from his father-inlaw who has been in continuous and exclusive possession of such land since
1930. The City of Paraaque passed a resolution to construct an access road
along the creek. The City of Paraaque claims ownership of the lands
adjoining the creek and the accreted portion thereof by way of donation by
GH, Inc. in 1966. Mario sought for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
construction of the access road which will affect the subject lot which
belongs to them. The court ruled in favor of Mario. The city of Paraaque
appealed and argued that since the creek is a tributary of the river, it is
classified as part of public domain and any land that may have formed along
its banks through time should also be considered part of the public domain.
Rule on the city governments appeal.

Suggested Answer:
The accreted portion of the creek belongs to Mario.
Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by
law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under
the Torrens System; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In this case, neither GH, Inc. nor the city of paraaque in its corporate
capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Hence, respondents are
deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through
prescription.
4

Property

Property

NAME:
CASE:
LANTUD

COLLEEN ROSE GUANTERO (EXECUTIVE)

DATU KIRAM SAMPACO VS. HADJI SERAD MINGCA
G.R. No. 163551

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

TOPIC:

LAND TITLES

Question:
X Owns a parcel of land covered by an OCT, Y alleged that the OCT was
secured in violation of laws and through fraud, deception and
misrepresentation, considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential
lot and the title issued is a free patent.
X and his predecessors-in-interest had never taken actual possession or
occupied the land under litigation. On the contrary, Y has all the evidence of
actual possession and ownership of permanent improvements and other
plants on the land in dispute.
Y now contest the validity of the X OCT. Was the OCT of X secured in violation
of laws and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation, considering that
the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and the title issued is a free
patent? Who has a better title of the property?
Suggested Answer:
NO. The OCT was not secured in violation of laws.
In the case of Sampaco vs Lantud, the Court held: It should be pointed out
that the allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was made
only by respondent, but the true classification of the disputed land as
residential was not shown to have been made by the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
pursuant to Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as
The Public Land Act. Hence, the trial court erred in concluding that there was
fraud in the issuance of respondents free patent title on the ground that it
covered residential land based only on the Complaint which stated that the
property was residential land when it was not shown that it was the President
who classified the disputed property as residential, and OCT itself stated that
the free patent title covered agricultural land. It has been stated that at
present, not only agricultural lands, but also residential lands, have been
6

Property

made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any

natural born Filipino citizen. Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case, the
free patent title was granted over agricultural land as stated in OCT.
X has a better title over Y.
In the case of Sampaco vs Lantud, the court held: The Torrens title is
conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein, and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land
registration proceedings. Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail
over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. An
original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an
administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued
under judicial proceedings. However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility
of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.

Property

NAME:
CASE:

KEISHA ROJAS (EXECUTIVE)

MORES VS. YU-GO G.R. NO. 172292; JULY 23, 2010

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Question:
A asked B to allow him to use his land for the meantime while he has still no
home. B agreed without asking for any rental but subject only to the
condition that the said stay would last until anyone of his family would need
the subject property. Consequently, B demanded A to return the subject
property but the latter pleaded for an extension of time to which B agreed.
However, instead of heeding such demand, appellees hired some laborers
and started demolishing the improvements on the subject property. B then
filed an injunction suit and prayed for the reimbursement of the value of the
residential building illegally demolished. A argued he was the one who
caused its renovation consisting of a 3-bedroom annex, a covered veranda
and a concrete hollow block fence, at his own expense, and with appellants
consent, which renovation was made without altering the form and
substance of the subject property and that what they removed was merely
the improvements made on the subject property, which removal had not
caused any substantial damage thereto as, in fact, it remained intact. The
trial court ruled in favor of A for being a possessor in good faith. The
appellate court disagreed believing that the relationship between the B and
A is one between a lessor and a lessee, making Article 1678 of the Civil Code
applicable to the present case. The options given by Article 1678, the right of
appropriating the useful improvements after reimbursing 50% of its value or
the right of removal of the useful improvements, are given by law to the
lessor B. Did the Appellate Court appropriately ruled in this case? Decide
with reasons.
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the Appellate Court is correct.
The good faith referred to by A was about the building of the improvements
on the leased subject property. However, tenants like the A cannot be said to
be builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be owners of the
property. Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of
the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
8

Property

thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a
rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to
"improve" his landlord out of his property.
The appellate court is correct in ruling that Article 1678 of the Civil Code
should apply in the present case. Article 1678 reads:
If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to
the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or
substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the
lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that
time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon
the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to the ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to
any reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no
damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to
retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
Hence, the Court of Appeals is correct in applying Article 1678 of the Civil
Code.

NAME:

SHEENA LLEVA (EXECUTIVE)

CASE:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. AVELINO DELA PAZ,
ARSENIO DELA
PAZ, JOSE DELA PAZ AND GLICERIO
DELA PAZ,
REPRESENTED BY
JOSE R. DELA PAZ GR
NO. 171631
NOVEMBER 15, 2010
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY

Question:
Respondents filed for an application for registration of a parcel of land with
an area of 25, 825 square meters. To prove ownership thereof, they
submitted in evidence several tax declarations issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest. Respondents maintain that such evidence serve as
sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain. The State opposed that tax declarations and tax
payments receipts if any, do not constitute competent evidence of bona fide
acquisition of the land applied for and that they failed to show open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for a period of not less than 30 years. Rule on the petition.
Suggested Answer:
Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by
any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration
or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership.
They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

10

NAME:
CASE:
16, 2010

ISHA B. CORBETA (EXECUTIVE)

LAGAZO VS. SORIANO G.R. NO. 170864 FEBRUARY

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY- EFFECTS OF POSSESSION

Question:
X and Y purchased from their grandfather, Z a parcel of land covered by OCT
No. P-12345, Lot No. 678 with an area of 9,000 square meters located at
Poblacion, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. In addition thereto, X and Y cultivated the
land as early as 1970s and left undisturbed until early 2000 when Mr. W,
unlawfully entered in the said area claiming to be the rightful owner thereof
contending that he is the legal heir of Mr. T, the registered owner thereof. Mr.
W further alleged that the land in dispute was not sold to Mr. Z by Mr. T but
only a subject to their mortgage agreement during mid 60s.
Base on the aforementioned facts, X and Y filed a complaint for forcible entry
with application for TRO and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Mr. W.
If you are the Honorable Presiding Judge, how will you decide the case?
Suggested Answer:
If I were the Honorable presiding Judge, I will rule in favor of X and Y. The law
clearly elucidates that in ejectment cases, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. Consequently,
it must be noted that ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings
intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be
resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
premises or possession de facto, (Sudaria vs Quiambao).
In fine, X and Y was in peaceable quite possession of the property and
cultivated the same for a long period of time. Applying the law, the claim of
Mr. W being the rightful owner cannot be given any merit because the only
issue to be resolved in this case is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the premises or possession de facto.
Therefore, it is undeniable that possession of the lot in question must remain
to both X and Y.

11

NAME:

JOAN RISEL B. ABANGAN (EXECUTIVE)

CASE:
SPOUSES PATRICIO AND MYRNA BERNALES VS HEIRS
OF
JULIAN SAMBAAN, G.R NO. 163271,
JANUARY 15, 2010
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

FORGED DEED OF SALE OF PROPERTY; EFFECT

Question:

Vic, married to Dina Bonevic, was the registered owner of a property. The lot
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14202.
The respondents herein and the petitioner Danica are the children of Vic and
Dina. Danica, who is the eldest of the siblings, is the present owner and
possessor of the property in question.
Before his death, Vic requested his children to redeem the subject property
which was mortgaged to Danica and her husband Marc Pingris. Thus, in
1982, respondent Oyo Sotto, one of Vic's children, offered to redeem the
property but the petitioners refused because they were allegedly using the
property as tethering place for their cattle.
In January 1991, respondents received information that the property was
already transferred to petitioners name. Whereupon, they secured a copy of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970 which bore the
signatures of their parents and had it examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation. The result of the examination revealed that the signatures of
their parents, Vic and Danica, were forged.
Respondents, together with their mother Vic, filed a Complaint for Annulment
of Deed of Absolute Sale and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
against herein petitioners. Rule on the petition.

Suggested Answer:
A forged deed of absolute sale cannot convey any title. The petitioners
cannot take refuge in the protection accorded by the Torrens system on titled
lands.
The presentation of the forged deed, even if accompanied by the owners
duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner did not thereby lose his
title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or
title to the said property.
12

13

NAME:

ANNE VERNADICE AREA(EXECUTIVE)

CASE:
SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL AND VICTORIA
SORDEVILLA VS.
MARIA COPRADA, G.R. NO.
152423, DECEMBER 15, 2010
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

LAND TITLES- CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

Question:
Lita is the registered owner of lot 1234 situated in M.H. Del Pilar St.,
Majayjay, Laguna. In 1960, Maria was able to persuade Lita to allow her and
her family to use and occupy the land for their residence, under the condition
that they will vacate the premises should petitioners need to use the same.
Respondent and her family were allowed to construct their residential house.
Respondent's present circumstances have completely improved, because of
this, petitioners verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land,
but the latter refused. Respondent alleged that sometime in the early 1960's,
petitioner Lita offered the said lot for sale for P2,000.00 to respondent, who
readily agreed. The purchase price was paid in installments and was fully
paid in 1962. Due to their close relationship, the agreement was never
reduced to writing. Respondents argued that petitioners are no longer the
owners of a portion of the subject land because of the sale in her favor.
Decide on the respondents argument.
Suggested Answer:
Respondents argument is without merit.
A collateral attack on the title of the petitioner is not allowed.
Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled,
except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The
issue of the validity of the title of the petitioners can only be assailed in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the respondent
has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of
the trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
Hence, in the case at bar the argument of the respondent arguing that
petitioners are no longer the owners of a portion of the subject land because
of the sale in her favor is a collateral attack on the title of the petitioners,
14

which is not allowed. Thus, such argument is not tenable.

15

NAME:
CASE:
166973;

NILGIE C. VILLAGANAS (EXECUTIVE)

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS CO; G.R. NO.
FEBRUARY 10, 2009

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY, EASEMENT JUST COMPENSATION

Question::
Petitioner filed a complaint for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way
over three (3) lots belonging to respondent in connection with the
construction of its transmission lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line
Project (Lahar Project).
What should be the basis of just compensation in this case? Full fair market
value of the property or a mere easement fee?
Suggested Answer:
When petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is
liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the
courts.
This Court is mindful of the fact that the construction of the transmission
lines will definitely have limitations and will indefinitely deprive the owners
of the land of their normal use.

16

NAME:

AIRENE EDAO (EXECUTIVE)

CASE:
PROPERTIES,
2010

G.G. SPORTSWEAR MFG. CORP. vs. WORLD CLASS

INC., G.R. NO. 182720, MARCH 2,

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY,

Question:
Mr. A offered to buy a unit of condominium from a developer Johndorf. After
Mr. A paid the full reservation fee amounting to Php 1M, the developer
executed a contract to sell stating the corresponding monthly instalments. In
the contract to sell it was indicated that the condominium unit will be
completely done after two years reckoned from the full payment of the
reservation fee. When Mr. A already paid 50% of the total contract price or
two years after he has paid the full reservation fee, still the developer could
not give Mr. A a specific date for the total completion of the unit. Because of
this, Mr. A stopped paying the monthly instalments and notified the
developer. Can Johndorf forfeit the payments made by Mr. A?
Suggested answer:
No, Johndorf cannot forfeit the payments made by Mr. A
Section 23 of P.D. No. 957 provides that no installment payment made by a
buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he
contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when
the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further
payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans
and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer
may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including
amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest
thereon at the legal rate.
In the case presented, the developer has not yet finished the complete
delivery of the condominium unit to Mr. A although two years has already
lapsed after he has paid the full reservation fee of the unit. It was the time
limit committed by Johndorf as indicated in the contract to sell it executed.
Hence, the buyer Mr. A has legal basis in stopping his monthly installments
payments to Johndorf for it has not complied its commitment of full delivery
of the condominium. Therefore, in accordance with Section 23 of P.D. No.
957, Johndorf cannot forfeit the payments of Mr. A when the latter stopped
17

paying the further monthly installments due.

18

NAME:

KAREN ABEGAIL S. MONTERON (EXECUTIVE)

CASE:

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. DELFINA C. CASIBANG,

ET.AL., G.R. NO. 192268, JANUARY 27, 2016

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY- LACHES

Question:
Jose Sanchez owned a parcel of land with an area of 7,532 square meters.
Sometime in 1965, the Mayor Cesar Cananan requested Jose Sanchez to
allow the construction and operation of a school in the western portion of his
property to which Jose Sanchez granted.
The school was known as Baybayon North Central School which was under
the supervision of the DepEd. When Jose Sanchez died, his heirs still tolerate
the use and possession of the property by the school.
However, when the heirs of Jose Sanchez used some portion of the said
property, the teachers of the school demanded from them to vacate the
property.
Subsequently, Jose Sanchez heirs filed an action for Recovery of Possession
and/or Sum of Money against the Deped.
The DepEd argued that they have use and possessed the land adversely,
peacefully and continuously for 40 years and the right of the heirs of Jose
Sanchez is already barred by laches.
Is the contention of the Deped that the right of the heirs of Jose Sanchez over
the subject property barred already barred by laches meritorious?
Suggested Answer:
NO.
Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

19

Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere

allegations in the pleadings. The following elements, as prescribed in the

case of Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., must be present to constitute

laches:
x x x (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having
been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the respondents have a right to
eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is
imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the
petitioner's occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
Thus, the right of the heirs of Jose Sanchez is imprescriptible and cannot be
barred by laches.

20

NAME:
CASE:
188213,

RIZA MAE G. OMEGA (EXECUTIVE)

CRUZ VS. PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB,

G.R. NO.

JANUARY 11, 2016

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY- NUISANCE

QUESTION:
A Punong Barangay (or Chairperson of Barangay) gave an order to the
Barangay Tanod to destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a
hacksaw which latter promptly complied with, thus, rendering the said
basketball court unusable. The acts of barangay officials prompted the filing
of a Complaint (for Malicious Mischief, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority) before the
Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Ombudsman by the group that
claims to be the basketball court's owners. The court owners contended that
the two barangay officials performed an abatement of what they thought
was a public nuisance but did the same without following the proper legal
procedure, thus making them liable for said acts and they further added that
a Punong Barangay has no power to declare a thing a nuisance unless it is a
nuisance per se. On the other hand, Punong Barangay asserts that he merely
abated a public nuisance which he claimed was within his power as barangay
chief executive to perform and was part of her duty to maintain peace and
order. Is the contention of Punong Barangay tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The contention of Punong brangay is not tenable.
Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it
may not be summarily abated. A nuisance may also be classified as to
whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which case, it
may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of
persons and property, which may be summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity; or, (b) a nuisance per accidens, which "depends upon
certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of
fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a
nuisance;" it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose
21

and may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention.

A basketball ring cannot be considered as nuisance per se that is susceptible
to a summary abatement, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per
accidens, for it does not pose an immediate effect upon the safety of persons
and property, the definition of a nuisance per se. A basketball ring, by itself,
poses no immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object of
recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of property, of health
or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a
nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing.
In addition, under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one
without judicial proceedings, of a public nuisance is the responsibility of the
district health officer. Under Article 702 of the Code, the district health officer
is also the official who shall determine whether or not abatement, without
judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against & public nuisance. The two
articles do not mention that the chief executive of the local government, like
the Punong Barangay, is authorized as the official who can determine the
propriety of a summary abatement.
Therefore, the act of the Punong Barangay in ordering the destruction of the
basketball ring is illegal.

22

NAME:

FAITH CULTURA (EXECUTIVE)

CASE:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDREA TAN
(G.R. No. 199537,
10 February 2016)
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY- ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; PATRIMONIAL

PROPERTY OF STATE

Question:
On October 2, 2002, Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No.
4080, Cad. 545-D (new) situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu (the subject
lot). She alleged that:
1) the property was declared alienable and disposable on
September 1, 1965; and
2) she had been in open continuous, public, and notorious
possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty
(30) years.
If you were the judge, will you grant the application?
Suggested Answer:
NO. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable
of acquisition by prescription.
It remains outside the commerce of man and the respondents physical
possession and occupation thereof do not produce any legal effect. In
the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired legal
possession of the property and her physical possession thereof, no
matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.

23

NAME:

LORELIE BELLEZA

CASE:
NO. 177790

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VEGA ET AL GR.

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

LAND TITLES

Question:
Heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed an application for registration of title of a
parcel of land in Cebu City. They alleged that the subject land is alienable
and disposable; and they have been in possession of the land since time
immemorial. During the trial, petitioners presented several exhibits in
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to
prove their ownership, occupation and possession and the report and
testimony of the Special Investigator of CENRO Laguna that the subject land
is within the alienable and disposable zone.
The Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General opposed to the said application arguing that respondents failed to
prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable. Decide.
Suggested Answer:
The application for registration of title must be denied. Sec. 14 of
PD1529 provides that, applicants for registration of title must prove that (1)
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; and (2) that they have been and their predecessors in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable public land, the general rule is: all applications for original
registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a
CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original
classification made by the DENR Secretary. As an exception, however, the
courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented
on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground
of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of
government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of
effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to
applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to
this Decision (Janury 17, 2011) and shall be inapplicable to all future
applications
24

25

NAME:
CASE:

ALBERT BITANGHOL
PACIFICO VALIO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Question:
X files a petition with the RTC for application for registration of a piece of
land allegedly acquired by him through his uncle upon the latters death on
1947. His uncle bought a land from Y on May, 1916. The said lot was not a
part of public domain and have not yet reclassified as disposable and
alienable. His only evidence is that it was allegedly owned by his uncle
before June 12, 1945. As a judge of the RTC, would you grant the petition?
Explain.
Suggested Answer:
No.
In order that a land of public domain may be registered, the petitioner must
prove two things.
That the property/land was classified as part of the disposable and alienable
land of public domain by a positive act of the government such as
Presidential proclamation or an Executive order; and
That they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The property was not classified as disposable and alienable, thus it would still
remain as a land owned by the State. Thus it cannot be owned by a private
individual.

26

NAME:
CASE:

KIRBY BRAGAT
DICHOSO VS MARCOS GR NO 180282

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

Question:
A filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against B. A is the owner of
Lot No. 21553; while B is the owner of Lot No. 1. As A had no access to a
public road to and from their property, he claimed to have used a portion of
Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. B, however, blocked the
passageway with piles of sand. Though A have been granted another
passageway by the spouses C and D the owners of another adjacent lot
which is longer and circuitous, designated as Lot No. 21559-B, A still
instituted the complaint before the RTC.
IS A ENTITLED TO A GRANT OF LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
THROUGH THE PROPERTY OF B IN GOING TO AND FROM THEIR PROPERTY TO
THE PUBLIC STREET AND WHERE THEY USED TO PASS?
Suggested Answer:
NO
1. To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites
should be met:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his
claim for easement of right of way may be granted. A failed in this regard.
Admittedly, A had been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot
owned by the Spouses C and D. In fact, other lot owners use the said outlet
in going to and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there is an existing
27

outlet to and from the public road.

28

NAME:
CASE:
2011
SUBJECT:
TOPIC:

JIGO DACUA
LEOVERAS vs. VALDEZ G.R. No. 169985 June 15,
CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY

Question:
Leoveras and Valdez acquired a property by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
They share the property equally. The parties took possession of their
respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their name for
taxation purposes. Valdez, upon registration, learned that Leoveras already
registered a part of its land and that the latter already possessed such
portion the reason he filed a complaint for Annulment of Title and
Reconveyance seeking to reconvey the disputed property.
Leoveras contended that he should be declared as the real owner as he
already registered it in his name and that he agreed with Valdez that the
extent of their ownership would be based on their actual possession.
1. Did the registration of property vest Leoveras of its title over Valdez?
2. Is Leoveras correct with his contention?
Suggested Answer:
No. By fraudulently causing the transfer of the registration of title over
the disputed property in his name, the petitioner holds the title to this
disputed property in trust for the benefit of the respondent as the true
owner; registration does not vest title but merely confirms or records title
already existing and vested. The Torrens system of registration cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at the
expense of others.
No.Non-possession does not negate ownership, neither does
possession automatically prove ownership,4 especially in the face of an
unambiguous document executed by the parties themselves.
Contrary to the petitioners claim that his actual possession determines the
extent of his ownership, it is the parties Agreement that defines the extent
of their ownership in the subject property. One of the legal effects of
partition, whether by agreement among the co-owners or by judicial
proceeding, is to terminate the co-ownership and, consequently, to make the
29

previous co-owners the absolute and exclusive owner of the share allotted to
him.

30

NAME:

STEPHEN ESPARAGOZA

CASE:

HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO

G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

Question:
A and B, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later,
B, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath
that it was his father X, Sr.(Married to Y) who purchased the said property.
Subsequently, J together with his son K sold a portion of the property to
herein respondent Z. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return
of the property, but Z refused to heed their demand; hence this case for the
annulment of sale of the property. The contention of the petitioner was that
following B, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and
that the sale of the property to Z without the prior liquidation of the
community property between X, Sr. and Y was null and void pursuant to
Article 130 of the Family Code. Z and J countered that Article 130 of the
Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the
sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent
of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that
the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs,
considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of
the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs. Is the sale valid?
Suggested Answer:
No, the sale will continue to be valid with respect to the share of the coowner.
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership
A co-owner could sell his undivided share and he has the right to freely sell
and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.

31

NAME:

COLLEEN ROSE GUANTERO

CASE:

DATU KIRAM SAMPACO VS. HADJI SERAD MINGCA LANTUD

G.R. No. 163551

TOPIC:

LAND TITLES

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW

Question:
X Owns a parcel of land covered by an OCT, Y alleged that the OCT was
secured in violation of laws and through fraud, deception and
misrepresentation, considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential
lot and the title issued is a free patent.
X and his predecessors-in-interest had never taken actual possession or
occupied the land under litigation. On the contrary, Y has all the evidence of
actual possession and ownership of permanent improvements and other
plants on the land in dispute.
Y now contest the validity of the X OCT. Was the OCT of X secured in violation
of laws and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation, considering that
the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and the title issued is a free
patent? Who has a better title of the property?
Suggested Answer:
NO. The OCT was not secured in violation of laws.
In the case of Sampaco vs Lantud, the Court held: It should be pointed out
that the allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was made
only by respondent, but the true classification of the disputed land as
residential was not shown to have been made by the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
pursuant to Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as
The Public Land Act. Hence, the trial court erred in concluding that there was
fraud in the issuance of respondents free patent title on the ground that it
covered residential land based only on the Complaint which stated that the
property was residential land when it was not shown that it was the President
who classified the disputed property as residential, and OCT itself stated that
the free patent title covered agricultural land. It has been stated that at
present, not only agricultural lands, but also residential lands, have been
made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any
natural born Filipino citizen. Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case, the
free patent title was granted over agricultural land as stated in OCT. X has a
32

better title over Y.

In the case of Sampaco vs Lantud, the court held: The Torrens title is
conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein, and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land
registration proceedings. Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail
over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. An
original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an
administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued
under judicial proceedings. However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility
of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.

33

NAME :

DARYL ANDREW C. MONTECLAR

CASE:

MARGARITA F. CASTRO (PETITIONER) VS NAPOLEON

MONSOD (RESPONDENT) G.R. NO. 183719, FEBRUARY 2,
2011

SUBJECT : CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Question:
Jigo is a registered owner of a 500 sq. m lot adjoining the lot of Jimbo which
has an area of 500 sq. m. There is a concrete fence, more or less two (2)
meters high, dividing their respective lots.
Jigo caused the annotation of an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m.
of the property of Jimbo. The adverse claim was filed without any claim of
ownership over the property. When Jimbo commence excavating the
disputed area for his dream house, Jigo objected. Jigo showed to Jimbo his
adverse claim for easement as annotated in the title.
Grounding on the abovementioned annotation alone, the lower court ruled in
favor of Jigo.
On appeal, Jimbo contends that the adverse claim of Jigo was non-registrable
considering that the basis of his claim was an easement and not an interest
adverse to the registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of
petitioner.
Moreover, Jimbo avers that when he bought the property there was no
annotation or existence of any easement over the property. Jigo neither
asked permission nor talked to him with regard to the use of 65 sq.m. of her
property as easement. Therefore, there is no easement to speak of in line
with Art. 613 of the New Civil Code which recognizes two kinds of easement
only: Legal and Voluntary. The courts cannot impose or constitute any
servitude where none existed. They can only declare its existence if in reality
it exists by law or by the will of the owners. There are therefore no judicial
easements.
Do the arguments of Jimbo hold water?
Suggested Answer:
NO, the arguments of Jimbo do not hold water.
34

Admittedly, the New Civil Code provides that an easement is established

either by law or by will of the owners (Article 619, NCC) and, therefore, the
courts cannot impose or constitute any servitude where none existed. They
can only declare its existence if in reality it exists by law or by the will of the
owners.
However, it is a crystal clear the legal prohibition under Article 684 of the
New Civil Code that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land
as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support. This constitutes legal easement as contemplated in Article 619 of
the New Civil Code.
In reality, what Jigo is claiming is a judicial recognition of the existence of the
easement of subjacent and lateral support over the 65 sq. m. portion of
petitioners property covering the land support/embankment area. The legal
easement exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of
property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and
the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every
adjoining landowner would come to court or have the easement of subjacent
and lateral support registered in order for it to be recognized and respected.

35

NAME:

CEFERINO ONG

CASE:

ABALOS V. HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO G.R. NO. 175444

DECEMBER 14, 2011

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY LAW

Question:
Vincente owned a piece of land. In the year 2000, he allowed Jaime to stay in
his land and build his house which Jaime acknowledged and his son Felix
knew. In 2006, Jaime died and he transferred ownership of the land to Felix.
In 2015, Vincente wanted to use the land which Felix is currently staying.
However Felix disputed the claim stating that he owned the land given to him
by his father and that he had already acquired the land through acquisitive
prescription. If you were the judge, rule on the case.
Suggested Answer:
The land is still owned by Vincente. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. Possession in
good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the
thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership
It is clear that during their possession of the property in question, Felix knew
that his father did not own the said land. Thus, having knowledge that he nor
his predecessor-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, Felixs
possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as to enable
them to acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription. Acts of possessory
character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are
inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession, to constitute
the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be adverse, if not, such
possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period
of prescription.

36

NAME:
CASE:

ROCHE O. TORREJOS
BEATINGO V. GASIS GR 179641, FEBRUARY 9, 2011

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY ( DOUBLE SALE )

Question:
On May 19, 1998, Clara bought a piece of land from Natoy which was under
the name of Natoys predecessor in interest. The sale was evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. On October 18, 1999, Clara r went to the
Register of Deeds to have the sale registered. She, however, failed to obtain
registration as she could not produce the owners duplicate certificate of title.
She filed a petition for the issuance of the owners duplicate certificate of
title. The petition was opposed by Irene, claiming that she was in possession
of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) as she purchased the subject
property from Natoy on January 27, 1999, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
This prompted petitioner to file the Complaint, insisting that she is the
rightful owner of the subject property.
On the contrary, respondent claimed that she purchased the subject property
from Natoy without knowledge of the prior sale of the same subject property
to petitioner, which makes her an innocent purchaser for value. Respondent
declared that, upon payment of the purchase price, she immediately occupied
the subject property and enjoyed its produce. Who has a better right to the
property between Clara and Irene if both failed to register the conveyance in
the Registry of Deeds.
Suggested Answer:
Irene has a better right to the property. The case is one of double sale. In
resolving the issues raised by the parties, the rules laid down in Article 1544
of the Civil Code apply:
x x x Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who
in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

37

NAME:

CACHO, KLENZENE O.

CASE:

RUBEN C. CORPUZ, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

WENIFREDA C. AGULLANA, VS. SPS. HILARION AGUSTIN
AND JUSTA AGUSTIN (G.R. NO. 183822, JANUARY 18, 2012)

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY LAW, TORRENS TITLE

Question:
A filed a complaint for ejectment B on the allegation that he is the registered
owner of a land which was formerly owned by C in whose name an Original
Certificate of Title was issued. C sold said properties to D, father of A. D
allowed B to occupy said land because they are relatives.
Despite demand to vacate, B refused to leave the premises.
A alleged that he has the better right to possess subject property having
acquired the same from D through a Deed of Quitclaim.
B interposed the defense that D disposed of subject property by executing a
Deed of Absolute Sale in his favour for a consideration 300,000.00. B do not
dispute the existence of the TCT registered in the name of A. B alleged
though that the land title issued to A was an "act of fraud" on his part.
a) Who has better possession to the property?
b) Is Bs allegation of fraud with respect to the TCT correct?
Suggested Answer:
a) B has the right to possess the property.
Under the law, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between
the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of
38

the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership
is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.
In this case, A has instituted an unlawful detainer case against B. A cannot
simply oust B from possession through the summary procedure of an
ejectment proceeding.
b) Bs allegation with respect to the invalidity of the TCT was not correct.
Under the law, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the
attributes
of
property
ownership,
which
necessarily
includes
possession. However, a certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral
attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law.
In this case, the allegation of B with respect to the invalidity of As TCT is
based on fraud which is equivalent to a collateral attack. Such collateral
attack is not allowed in unlawful detainer case.

39

NAME:

SUAL, JECAR

CASE:
DURAWOOD
179884, 01/25/16

CONSTRUCTION

VS.

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY LAW [LAND REGISTRATION]

BONA,

GR

NO.

Question:
A owns Lot 1 which he sold to B. The Deed of sale was entered on Primary
Entry Book by the Register of Deeds on May 31, 2016 without however
paying the required fees. C, on the other hand, because of a collection case
he filed against A, was able to secure a Notice of Levy on Attachment on Lot
1 and the same was annotated in its title on June 1, 2016
As the Honorable Judge, who has the better right over Lot 1?
Suggested Answer:
C has the better right over the property. For the entry in the Primary Entry
Book to be considered to have the effect of registration, there is still a need
to comply with all that is required for entry and registration, including the
payment of the prescribed fees. In this case, there was no payment of the
required fees. Thus, the entry of the Deed of Sale could not be considered as
registration for purposes of binding other persons. The annotation in the title
in favor of C therefore affords better right.

40

NAME:

DENILA, JUN MARLON M.

CASE:

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. ERNESTO P.

PAGAYATAN, G.R. NO. 182572, JUNE 18, 2012

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Question:
X is the assignee of Z over certain parcels of agricultural land. A portion of
the said property was placed under the land reform program. The land was
thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries by DAR and LBP
which fixed the value of the land at P 5,056,833.54. On the other hand, Y
inherited from Z a parcel of agricultural land which was placed under the
coverage of the same program and valued by LBP at P1,512,575.05. X and Y
rejected the valuation of their properties, hence PARAD conducted summary
administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation. PARAD
fixed the preliminary just compensation at P 51,800,286.43 for X
and P 21,608,215.28 for Y. X and Y filed separate motions to Deposit the
Preliminary Valuation praying that LBP deposit the preliminary compensation
determined by the PARAD. The RTC ordered LBP to turn over the said cash
deposits and bonds to the Clerk of Court. LBP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, that there was no need to physically turn over the deposit
to the clerk of court, since it was made in the name of the Clerk of Court
anyway. RTC denied the motion. Is the RTC correct?
Suggested Answer:
YES.
The law provides that for property to be in custodia legis, it must have been
lawfully seized and taken by legal process and authority, and placed in the
possession of a public officer such as a sheriff, or of an officer of the court
empowered to hold it such as a receiver.
In this case, there is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit
41

considering that the DAR already took possession of the properties and
distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries. Therefore, it was only a natural
consequence for respondent judge to order the physical turnover of the
deposits, which had already been placed under the name of the Clerk of
Court.

42

NAME:

CLAROS, STEPHANIE M.

CASE:

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV V. HEIRS OF HOMER L.

BARQUE,
REPRESENTED BY
TERESITA
BARQUE
HERNANDEZ,

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:
LAND

PROPERTY, LAND REGISTRATION, FRIAR LANDS PROPERTY,

REGISTRATION, FRIAR LANDS

Question:
Manotoks title to the Piedad Friar Land Estate was cancelled and reverted to
the government for lack of a certificate of sale signed and approved by the
Secretary of Natural Resources.
But Manotok had a Deed of Conveyance which was issued after full payment
of the purchase price by the
Director of Lands. The DENR issued a memorandum which declared that all
Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary are
deemed signed or otherwise ratified by the said memorandum.
Manotok also heard that Congress passed a law exempting from the
requirement of the Secretarys signature already titled lands in another
estate, the Banilad Friar Lands.
May the memorandum and the law cure Manotoks claim to title?
Suggested Answer:
NO
The issuance of a valid certificate of sale is a condition sine qua non for
acquisition of ownership under the Friar Lands Act. Otherwise, DENR
Memorandum Order No. 16-05 would serve as administrative imprimatur to
holders of deeds of conveyance whose acquisition may have been obtained
through irregularity or fraud.
43

The enactment of the law signifies the legislatures recognition that in the
absence of signature and/or approval of the Secretary of Interior/Natural
Resources in the Certificates of Sale on file with the CENRO, the sale is not
valid and the purchaser has not acquired ownership of the friar land.
But to invoke said law, the existence and due issuance of a title or duly
executed certificate of sale on file with the DENR regional office must be
established by the evidence on record. In the absence of the required
evidence, there is nothing to confirm and validate through the application of
the law.

44

NAME:

AUGUSTO, MEL JASON T.

CASE:

REMEDIOS ANTONINO VS. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF

MAKATI CITY AND TAN TIAN SU, G.R.
NO. 185663, JUNE 20, 2012
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP

Question:
A had been leasing a residential property located at Makati City and owned
by B. Under the governing lease contract, A was accorded with the right of
first refusal in the event B would decide to sell the subject property.
Thereafter, the parties executed a document denominated as Undertaking
Agreement where Bagreed to sell to A the subject property
for P39,500,000.00.However, in view of a disagreement as to who between
them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not
proceed as intended.
A
filed a complaint against Su with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, for the reimbursement of the cost of repairs on the subject
property and payment of damages.
If you are the Honorable Presiding Judge, how will you rule the case?
Suggested Answer:
If I am the Presiding Judge, I will rule to dismiss the complaint.
Well-settled is the rule that a private document supposedly evidencing the
alleged sale does not confer to Antonino title to the subject
property. Ownership is transferred when there is actual or constructive
delivery and the thing is considered delivered when it is placed in the control
or possession of the buyer or when the sale is made through a public
instrument and the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred. In
other words, As complaint is not in the nature of a real action as ownership
45

of the subject property is not at issue.

Therefore, the complaint should fail for lack of merit.

46

NAME:

APRIL JAY E. TANO

CASE:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. V. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN,

INC. (RBK), JANUARY 25, 2012

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY LAW OWNERSHIP

Question:
The National Irrigation Authority (NIA) needed some parcels of land for the
purpose of constructing the CARCAR Irrigation Project. Consequently, it filed
with a RTC a Complaint for the Expropriation of a portion of 3 parcels of land.
Among the affected parcels of land was Lot No. 23 covered by TCT No. T10007 and registered under the Rural Bank of Barili (RBB). In its Answer, RBB
alleged that it no longer owned Lot No. 23. Subsequently thereafter, in
response to the expropriation complaint, Peanut Bitter and Sweet Corn filed
their Answer-in-Intervention, pointing out that they were the new owners of
Lot No. 23, which they acquired from RBB. The court granted the complaint
and ordered NIA, among others, to forward the payments intended for RBB to
Peanut Bitter and Sweet Corn. The court based its conclusion on the nonparticipation of RBB in the expropriation proceedings and the latters
manifestation that it no longer owned Lot No. 23. Is the court correct in its
conclusion?
Suggested Answer:
NO. The court cannot rely on mere inference.
In order for the reconveyance of real property to be valid, the conveyance
must be embodied in a public document and registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds where the property is situated.
In the case at bar, the TCT is still registered in the name of the RBK. Thus, it
was imprudent for the CA to rely on RBBs mere declaration of nonownership and non-participation in the expropriation proceeding to validate
intervenors claim of entitlement to that payment. The court should have had
47

required the intervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining to the

conveyance of the subject lot. The court cannot rely on mere inference,
considering that the payment of just compensation is intended to be
awarded solely to the owner based on the latters proof of ownership.

48

NAME:

CABUENAS, MARIA CLEA B.

CASE:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEIRS OF MONTOYA,

G.R. NO. 195137, JUNE 13, 2012

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Question:
X filed with the MTCC an Application for land registration. X alleged that he
and his predecessors-in-interest were in possession and occupation of the
property sought to be registered since 1940. On the other hand, Y claims
that X cannot register property because he failed to prove that he and his
predecessors-in-interest possessed the property openly, continuously and
exclusively under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
What must X prove so he may rightfully claim ownership and title over the
property?
Suggested Answer:
For X to rightfully claim that they have acquired an imperfect title worthy of
judicial confirmation under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, it is incumbent
upon them to prove that: (a) the land is alienable and (b) their possession
and occupation must be in the manner and for the period prescribed by law.
The respondents must prove by means of clear and convincing evidence that
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, they and their predecessors-in-interest
performed acts of dominion as anyone would naturally do over his property.

49

NAME:

DESCALLAR, ROWELLA L.

CASE:

JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO LOILO

ESPINEDA AND DAISY ALIADO MANAOIS, REPRESENTED IN
THIS ACT BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MA. WILHELMINA
E. TOBIAS, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT (G.R. NO. 193443 ,APRIL 16,
2012)

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY, LAND REGISTRATION

Question:
In 2001, Jean, Carlo and Daisy filed with the RTC of Cavite, an application for
land registration covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Indang,
Cavite alleging that they acquired the subject property from Mr. Rody Rama
pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996; and they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than
30 years. As proof of possession, they presented the testimony of their
caretaker testifying that they have been in possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years, Tax Declarations, Resolution which
approved the reclassification of several lots, including the subject property,
from agricultural to residential/commercial, DARCO Conversion Order which
converted several parcels of land, including the subject property, from
agricultural to residential/commercial and Certification issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Did Jean, Carlo and Daisy
prove themselves that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession and occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Suggested Answer:
No.
Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when
no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
50

patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.

51

NAME:

MARCELO, CORNELIO C.

CASE:

HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, VS. SALOME

E. GABRIEL, G.R. NO. 175763 , APRIL 11, 2012

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:
PROPERTY,
OWNERSHIP;

LAND

REGISTRATION;
RECONVEYANCE;
PRESCRIPTION; CIVIL INTERRUPTION

Question:
Involved in this case are two (2) parcels of land, both in the name of the
respondents during the pendency of the case.
Petitioner Bran traces his title to Lot 1 from his father Eddard who bought the
property from Jon, the brother of Robb. Robb on the other hand is the father
of Meera.
In 1969, Bran was able to secure a Tax Declaration for Lot No. 1 which
cancelled the tax declaration in the name of the Respondent Meera.
Thereafter, Bran started building several piggeries and planted vegetables.
Sometime in 1979, Meera was able secured a tax declaration on Lot No. 1
and Lot No. 2 and by 1998, an OCT was issued in his name covering both
Lots. Bran argues that Meera employed fraud in securing the OCT when the
latter borrowed the titles covering Lot 1 from Brans mother Caitlyn. He
further stated that although Meera was able to secure a title, she never
exercised her ownership over Lot 1 because she never stepped foot on it.
Thus on 2000, Bran filed a case for reconveyance of title alleging fraud, and
also to declare him owner through acquisitive prescription.
Rule on the contention of Bran
Suggested Answer:
Reconveyance
No.
52

Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or
vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of
title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. Thus, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens
title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered
property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance
does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of
Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected
as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or
its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
persons name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right.
The totality of the evidence on record established that it was petitioners who
are in actual possession of the subject property; respondents merely
insinuated at occasional visits to the land. However, for an action for
reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, this Court has held that the party
seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title
to the property and the fact of fraud.
Prescription
No.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor
through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership,
possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken
and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor
can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must
prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
On the matter of prescription, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
53

ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith
and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith.
Petitioners adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the issuance of
TD No. 1145 It is settled that tax receipts and declarations are prima
facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes
have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property,
they may become the basis of a claim for ownership. Petitioners caretaker
has since lived in a nipa hut, planted vegetables and tended a piggery on the
land.
It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over the
property by securing a tax declaration in the name of Meera albeit over a
bigger area than that originally declared. In 1998, they finally obtained an
original certificate of title covering the entire 1,763 square meters which
included Lot 1. But these facts did not amount to interruption of possession.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Raon this Court citing
Article 1123 of the Civil Code 45held that civil interruption takes place with the
service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a mere
Notice of Adverse Claim.
Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by
judicial summons to the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of
judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as to when such summons
shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to
interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if
the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings
to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial
character of civil interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the
54

possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in the case at
bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is
nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt
respondents possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil
interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in
1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because
there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial
validity. What existed was merely a notice. There was no compliance with
Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact,
filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial
summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of
Appeals in its affirmance of the RTCs ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim
cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil
interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were
not able to interrupt respondents adverse possession since 1962. The period
of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents favor
despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.

55

NAME:

ANNA BEATRICE QUIJANO

CASE:
NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION VS. GALABO
GR NO. 174191;
JAN. 30, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC:

POSSESSION; OWNERSHIP; UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Bar Question:
7D Corporation (7D) filed a case complaint for forcible entry against David on
Lot No. 515. 7D claimed ownership over the land because it purchased the
same from Boy Nabua evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. According to
7D, Nabua acquired the land from David sometime in July 10, 1970 as shown
in the Deed of Transfer of rights. On the contrary David contended that he is
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession over the land since
1948. 7D contended that it has the rightful possession of the property
because it validly acquired ownership over Lot No. 515 when it purchased it
from Nabua, entitling it to the right, among others, to possess the property
as ancillary to such ownership. The court ruled in favor of 7D stating that the
right of 7D was anchored on the Deed of Absolute Sale. Is the decision of the
court correct?
Suggested Answer:
No.
In a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of is possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person
with a better right lawfully ejects him. The possession contemplated by the
concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a
forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession
de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of
ownership; these are different legal concepts for which the law provides
different remedies for recovery of possession. The word possession in
forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or
possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue.
In the case at bar, 7D merely anchored its claim to possession over said
property on its alleged ownership. It did not prove its prior physical
possession. On the other hand, Davids allegation of prior physical
possession had not been refuted. Since in an unlawful detainer case, physical
56

possession is the issue not ownership. The ground relied upon by 7D to claim
right of possession is misplaced.

57

NAME:

ANNA DANESSA VALDEZ

CASE:
STAR TWO
CORPORATION OF THE
MARCH 6, 2013

(SPV-AMC), INC., VS PAPER CITY

PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 169211,

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Problem:
Paper City applied for and was granted four loans and credit
accommodations by RCBC, secured by four (4) Deeds of Continuing Chattel
Mortgages on its machineries and equipments found inside its paper plants.
RCBC eventually executed a unilateral Cancellation of Deed of Continuing
Chattel Mortgage. Thereafter, RCBC together with Metrobank and Union
Bank, entered into a Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI), with Paper City. In the
MTI, Paper City acquired additional loans secured by five (5) Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage, plus real and personal properties in an annex to the MTI,
which covered its machineries and equipment.The parties subsequently
executed amendments and supplements to the MTI but still including as part
of the mortgaged properties the various machineries and equipments
located in and bolted to and/or forming part of buildings and with an
additional security composed of a newly constructed two-storey building and
other improvements, machineries and equipments located in the existing
plant site.
Paper City defaulted in its obligations prompting RCBC to file a Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure. It filed a Complaint against the creditor banks
alleging that the said extra-judicial sale was null and void. It contends that
the machineries and equipments should not form part of the real estate
mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure sale as these are considered as
personal properties. Rule on the contention.
Suggested answer:
Paper City's contention is not correct. In the case of Bischoff v. Pomar and
Cia. General de Tabacos, the Court ruled that even if the machinery in
question was not included in the mortgage expressly, Article 111 of the old
Mortgage Law provides that chattels permanently located in a building,
either useful or ornamental, or for the service of some industry even though
they were placed there after the creation of the mortgage shall be
considered as mortgaged with the estate, provided they belong to the owner
of said estate. The provision of the old Civil Code was cited. Thus:
58

Article 1877 provides that a mortgage includes the natural accessions,

improvements, growing fruits, and rents not collected when the obligation is
due, and the amount of the indemnities granted or due the owner by the
underwriters of the property mortgaged or by virtue of the exercise of
eminent domain by reason of public utility, with the declarations,
amplifications, and limitations established by law, in case the estate
continues in the possession of the person who mortgaged it, as well as when
it passes into the hands of a third person.
Considering that the Indenture which is the instrument of the mortgage that
was foreclosed exactly states through the Deed of Amendment that the
machineries and equipments listed in Annexes "A" and "B" form part of the
improvements listed and located on the parcels of land subject of the
mortgage, such machineries and equipments are surely part of the
foreclosure of the "real estate properties, including all improvements
thereon".
The real estate mortgage over the machineries and equipments is even in
full accord with the classification of such properties by the Civil Code of the
Philippines as immovable property. Thus:
Article 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works;

59

NAME:

MICHELLE JOSEPHINE EDEN M. SILVA

CASE:
RIVERA-CALINGASAN V. RIVERA; G.R. NO. 171555.
APRIL 17, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC:

PROPERTY EJECTMENT

Bar Question Type

Wilfredo filed a case for forcible entry against Evangeline. He claimed that he
lawfully possessed and occupied the two parcels of land with a building used
for his furniture business. That in taking advantage of his absence due to his
hospital confinement, Evangeline took possession and caused the renovation
of the building on the property. He further said that he has been residing in
that address ever since. The court ruled in favor of Wilfredo, that he is
entitled to the land since he has been in possession of such, residing in the
same address. On appeal Evangeline said that the court erred in equating
possession with residence since possession in forcible entry cases means
physical possession without qualification as to the nature of possession, i.e.,
whether residing or not in a particular place. Is Evangeline correct? Decide.
Suggested Answer:
No.
Ejectment cases forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary
proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled
to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de
facto and not to the possession de jure. Indeed, possession in ejectment
cases means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. In a forcible entry case,
prior physical possession is the primary consideration.
The Court did not err in equating residence with physical possession since
residence is a manifestation of possession and occupation. Wilfredo has been
residing in the same address, while Evangeline has been using a different
address as residence. Evangeline was not able to prove her physical
possession.

60

NAME:

ROUNALD SITOY

CASE:
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EDUARDO M.
CACAYURAN
G.R. NO. 191667, APRIL 17, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC:

PROPERTY

BAR QUESTION:
The Sanguniang Bayan of Municipality of A, issued a resolution leasing a part
of the municipal plaza. It was opposed by the citizens of the municipality.
Can the public plaza be subject to contract of lease?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.
Under the Civil Code, Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be
devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They
are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased
by the municipality to private parties.

61

NAME:
CASE:
CAMACHO

MELISSA S. GUILLEMER-COTONER
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDWARD M.
G.R. NO. 185604 JUNE 13, 2013

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:
OF TITLE

PROPERTY RECONSTITUTION OF ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE

Problem:
Edward M. Camacho filed a petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title of
O.C.T. No. (not legible due to wear and tear) .
The RTC held that while the number of the OCT is not legible, it is an
authentic OCT per the findings of the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
The corresponding Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale, the tax
declaration for the year 2003, and the Register of Deeds Certification all
indicated that the number of the OCT is not legible. LRA report did not at all
establish the existence and previous issuance of the OCT sought to be
reconstituted.
Has the RTC properly acquired and was invested with jurisdiction to hear and
decide the petition for reconstitution?
Suggested Answer:
No.
Section 9 R.A. No. 26 on the publication, posting and the contents of the
notice of the Petition for Reconstitution provides thus:
SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition xxx
shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the
name of the registered owner, the names of the interested parties appearing
in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the
date on which all persons having an interest in the property must appear and
file such claim as they may have. x x x
Section 9 thereof mandatorily requires that the notice shall specify,
among other things, the number of the certificate of title and the
names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted
certificate of title.

62

In the instant case, the corresponding Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with

Absolute Sale, the tax declaration for the year 2003, and the Register of
Deeds Certification all indicated that the number of the OCT is not legible.
LRA report did not at all establish the existence and previous issuance of the
OCT sought to be reconstituted.
The LRA did not state the number of the original certificate of title, which is
not sufficient evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution. The deed
of extrajudicial declaration of heirs with sale did not also mention the
number of the original certificate of title.
There is a insufficiency in the publication when the missing title was merely
identified as "OCT No. (not legible)" which is non-compliant with Section 9
hereof.
Thus, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction to proceed with the case since the
mandatory manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by R.A.
No. 26 had not been strictly followed, thereby rendering the proceedings
utterly null and void.

63

NAME:

REYNOLD JOHN F. GIME

CASE:
RECIO VS HEIRS OF SPOUSES AGUENDO; GR NO
182349, JULY 24, 2013
SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW
TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Problem:
A, B, C, D (refered to as the Z's)owned a parcel of land with irovements as
co-heirs. X leased the parcel of land. The Z's offered to sell the parcel of land
to X for P500,000 the deal was cancelled upon the fault of the Z's. Later G
the son of X renewed the offer. A claiming to be the repesentative of the Z's
negotiated with G and later both parties agrees that the parcel of land will be
sold. G paid partial payments of P110,000 and P50,000 to A. G wanted to pay
the full balance of P340,000. But A kept avoiding G, as a result G filed a case
of specific performance to transfer the land in his name. Prior to the trial G
found out that the parcel of land was sold to spouses H which G impleaded in
his case. A also represented the Z's in majority of transaction and documents
on selling the lands including the sale to spouses H.
Can A sell the parcel of land without the written consent of the Z's?
Answer:
No.
Art. 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an
agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall
be void.
In Woodchild Holdings, Inc. v. Roxas Electric and Construction Company, Inc.
the Court stated that persons dealing with an assumed agency, whether the
assumed agency be a general or special one, are bound at their peril, if they
would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of agency but
also the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted,
the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.In other words, when the
petitioner relied only on the words of respondent Alejandro without securing
a copy of the SPA in favor of the latter, the petitioner is bound by the risk
accompanying such trust on the mere assurance of Alejandro.

64

NAME:

JESON PAGAPONG

CASE:
GUIDO-ENRIQUEZ, V.
SEPTEMBER 30, 2013

VICTORINO

G.R.

NO.

180427

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Problem:
Antonia and herpredecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupation of a parcel of
land for 30 years. One day she decided to register the land but only to find
out that it is covered by a title owned by Guido.
On opposition, Guido argued that the land registration court, cannot
entertain Antonias application for registration of title because the lot is
entirely within the boundaries of a larger tract of land which is already
covered by his TCT. Guido further contends that his TCT has become
indefeasible. Is Guido correct?
Answer:
No.
The Court ruled that while prescription is unavailing against the owners of
the land on the ground that they are holders of a valid certificate of title, the
equitable presumption of laches may be applied against them for failure to
assert their ownership for such an unreasonable length of time.
In the case, the failure of Guido to assert his right over the open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupation" of said land by
Antonia for more than 30 years amounts to a waiver of his right over the
property.

65

NAME:

LORENZ MARTIN M. LERIN

CASE:
REPUBLIC VS. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R.
199310, FEBRUARY 19, 2014
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Question:
Your client goes to you and inquires you on the following matter:
(a) What is the Regalian Doctrine and
(b) If I present certification issued by the PENRO and CENRO, will it be
enough to classify my land as alienable and disposable?
Suggested Answer:
(a) All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
(b) No.
In the case of Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc., it was ruled that it is
not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

66

NAME:

ROSLYN D. CORTES

CASE:

SPOUSES
BERNADETTE
AND
RODULFO
VILBAR,
PETITIONERS, V. ANGELITO L. OPINION, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 176043. JANUARY 15, 2014

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY; LAND TITLES; MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH.

Question:
On July 10, 1979, Juan entered a Contract to Sell involving 2 lots with ABC
Realty. He bought Lot 20 wherein ABC Realty executed a duly notarized Deed
of Absolute Sale in his favor after full payment. Juan was not able to register
because ABC Realty allegedly failed to have the lot formally subdivided. In
1981, Juan bought Lot 21 which ABC Realty executed a Contract to Sell. He
had been in actual, open and peaceful possession of the said lots.
Pedro claimed that he acquired the subject lots through Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage. On January 12, 1995, Mario borrowed money from
Pedro. Mario executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lots 20 and 21
but he defaulted in payment so the said Lots were sold at a public auction
where Pedro was the highest bidder.
Pedro filed a complaint of Accion Reivindicatoria against Juan, so thar Pedro
will be declared the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lots. During
the trial, Juan presented the Absolute Deed of Sale for Lot 20 and the
Contract to Sell for Lot 21. While Pedro justified the legality of his claim over
the properties by tracking his rights on the rights passed on to him by Mario.
Mario was the former chairman of the BOD and CEO of ABC Realty. He was
offered with substantial benefits by ABC Realty as compensation. However,
ABC was not able to give his compensation so he filed a complaint for Sum of
Money against ABC Realty on May 12, 1981. Real properties of ABC Realty
were levied on October 31, 1984 including lots 20 and 21. The disputed
properties were eventually sold at a public auction where Mario was the
highest bidder.
Who has the Better Title over the subject lots? Is it Juan or Pedro?
Suggested Answer:
Pedro has a better title over the subject Lots 20 and 21.
Levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior
unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the
67

properties involved were duly covered by the Torrens system which works
under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which
gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. It is settled that
a party dealing with a registered land does not have to inquire beyond the
Certificate of Title in determining the true owner thereof, and in guarding or
protecting his interest, for all that he has to look into and rely on are the
entries in the Certificate of Title.
It is evident that ABC Realty, the former owner of the subject Lots,
contracted with the Juan. The said sale took place before Mario filed a
complaint for Sum of Money and prior to the levy of the said properties.
However, the sale of Lot 20 was NOT annotated on the original title in the
name of ABC Realty, while ONLY a Contract to Sell was executed between
ABC Realty and Juan as regards to Lot 21. The levy in favor of Mario takes
preference over a prior sale made between Juan and ABC Realty which was
even not registered and annotated. There is no reason to doubt that the
predecessors-in-interest of the Pedro with respect to the said properties
acquired the same through lawful means. Pedro acted in good faith in
dealing with the registered owners of the properties. He relied on the titles
presented to him, which were issued in accordance with the law, and without
any liens or encumbrances.

68

NAME:

RALPH KEVIN H. SANTILLAN

CASE:

PEBLIA ALFARO AND THE HEIRS OF PROSPEROUS ALFARO

V. SPOUSES EDITHO AND HERA DUMALAGAN

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY; MULTIPLE SALES; OWNERSHIP

Question:
X sold a parcel of land to spouses YY through a deed of absolute sale and
immediately caused the transfer of the titles to the latters name. This lot
upon purchase already contained structures and some occupants, moreover
the title of X to the property contained an annotated adverse claims.
Spouses UU on the other hand intervened and filed a case against spouses
YY and to nullify their title contending that they are the real owners of the
said lot. They presented as evidence certificates of completion and
occupancy and some electric bills. Spouses YY argued that they are
purchasers in good faith; that the same was ineffective and it was not in the
name of spouses UU. Who has the better right?
Suggested Answer:
Spouses UU has the better right.
Under the law, particularly on Article 1544 of the New Civil Code regarding
the multiple sales, the same applies only when all the purchasers are in good
faith. In detail, Art. 1544 requires that before the second buyer can obtain
priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout.
In the case at bar, spouses YY cannot claim good faith since there was no
showing that the supposed ineffectivity of the annotated adverse claims
have not been cancelled at the time of purchase. Further, upon the sale to
spouses YY, the fact that there were already structures and some occupants
in the said lot wouldve alerted them to look beyond Xs title and make
further inquiries about the extent of the latters right and authority over the
subject lot.

69

NAME:

GLEN MARVIN Y. TIU

CASE:
REPUBLIC
CORTEZ, 715 SCRA 416

OF

THE

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY, REGISTRATION

PHILIPPINES

VS.

EMMANUEL

Question:
C filed with RTC an application for judicial confirmation over a parcel of land
in Manila. He submitted tax declarations from 1966 to 2005, survey plan of
the property with the annotation that it is alienable and disposable and other
documents. A testimony of a witness was also presented by C. the RTC
granted the application but the SolGen appealed and the CA affirmed the
RTC decision. What must be proven in order for a land to be registered under
the Torrens Title?
Suggested Answer:
In Republic v. Rizalvo, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling
in Malabanan, viz:
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for
registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject
property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear
that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. x x x. (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that are considered
patrimonial may be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529, before acquisitive prescription could commence, the property sought
to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable; it
must also be declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public
use, public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, absent
an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of
public dominion

70

NAME:

RAMON MIKHAIL DUYONGCO

CASE:

SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA VS.

HEIRS OF ABALON G.R. NO. 183448

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:
FORGED INSTRUMENT AS THE ROOT OF A VALID TITLE IN
RELATION TO
AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE.
Question:
Who is an an innocent purchaser for value?
Answer:
An Innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest therein and
who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before
receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property.

71

NAME:
CASE:

ELERLENNE LIM
VILLASI VS. GARCIA, 713 SCRA 629

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP

Question:
Due to favorable judgment by the Court of Appeals in favor of X, a Writ of
Execution was issued commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective
the Decision of the Court of Appeals. To satisfy the judgment the sheriff
levied on a building located in Quezon City. While the said building was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Y, the lots in which it was
erected were registered in the names of the Z. To forestall the sale on
execution, Z filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside
Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of the
property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff.
a. Does Z has a right to file the third-party claim?
b. Is the tax declarations or realty payment of property a conclusive
evidence of ownership?
c. Is the accessory follows the principal doctrine applicable in this case?
Suggested Answer:
a. No. The right of a thirdparty claimant to file a terceria is founded on his
title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its
supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and
the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first
unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In this
case, Z failed to prove that they have bona fide title to the building. Worthy
to note is the fact that the building in litigation was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Y and not with Z. While it is true that tax receipts
and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute credible proof of claim of title over the property.
b. No. Tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in
the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
72

interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to

the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.
c. No. While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal,
that is, the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to
everything, which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially, such rule is not without exception. In
cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the
principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or
entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall
be upheld. In a number of cases, we recognized the separate ownership of
the land from the building and brushed aside the rule that accessory follows
the principal.
The rule on accession is not an ironclad dictum. On instances where this
Court was confronted with cases requiring judicial determination of the
ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated to
disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are
factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on
which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated
separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may be, can be made
liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.

73

NAME:

CHRISTIAN FERNANDEZ

CASE:
IMELDA, LEONARDO, FIDELINO, AZUCENA, JOSEFINA,
ANITA AND SISA,
ALL
SURNAMED
SYJUCO
VS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR. NO.
148748
JANUARY 14, 2015
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY; QUIETING OF TITLE

Question:
The petitioners are the registered co-owners of the subject land under a TCT
issued by the RD on March 26, 1984. Petitioners have been in open,
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, by themselves
or through their predeccessors-in-interest since 1926.
Sometime in 1994, however, petitioners learned that a broker named
Exequiel, offered for sale the subject land to a certain Lusi. Petitioners found
out that the purported owner of the subject land, respondent Bonifacio, was
the sublessee of Kalayaan Development Corporation, which, in turn, was the
sublessee of Manufacturers Bank, which was the direct lessee of petitioners.
Petitioners also learned that respondent Bonifacio was able to register the
subject land in her name.
Petitioner lodged a petition before the RTC praying for the declaration of
nullity and cancellation of respondent Bonifactios TCT. Since respondent
Bonifacio already sold the subject land to VSD Realty, the latter was
impleaded in the civil case. The RTC dismissed the petition.
Petitioners contend that their TCT and respondents TCT pertains to the same
land and that the latter titles have been fraudulently obtained. Petitioners
also aver that their undisturbed possession of the subject property gives
them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court to ascertain and determine
the nature and effect of respondents adverse claim on the subject. Has the
action of the petitioners to quiet title prescribed?
Suggested Answer:
No. It is an established doctrine in land ownership disputes that the filing of
an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed real property is in the
possession of the plaintiff. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land
claiming to be an owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or
his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. In this case,
petitioners have duly established during the trial that they and/or their
74

predecessors-in-interest have been in uninterrupted possession of the

subject land since 1926 and it was only in 1994 when they found out that
respondent Bonifacio was able to register the said property in her name in
another title. Moreover, the rule in the incontrovertibility or indefeasibility of
title has no application in this case given the fact that the contending parties
claim ownership over the subject land based on their respective certificates
of title thereon which originated from different sources.

75

NAME:

IMEE HIYAS

CASE:

SPOUSES SALVADOR P. NORBERTE, JR. AND ELIZABETH S.

NORBERTE V. SPOUSES FELICISIMO G. MEJIA AND ELVIRA
C. MEJIA AND/OR THEIR HEIRS, REPRESENTED BY ALEXIS
MEJIA-QUERUBIN
GR. NO. 182886
MARCH
19,
2015

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Question:
The subject lot was owned by Sps. Mapagbigay who allowed that the same
be possessed by X. This lot was subsequently sold to Sps. Mapera who
successfully registered the same in their names. Hence, they filed an
ejectment suit against X.
On 1998, Sps. Mapera sold the subject lot to Sps. Kawawa under a
Conditional Sale stipulating the payment by installment of the said lot. While
theere was still no full payment, on 2000 the subject lot was again sold by
Sps. Mapera to X which resulted to the execution of the compromise
agreement between Sps. Mapera and X.
Later on 2003, Sps. Mapera died, and their heirs executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Sps. Kawawa. The latter filed in the same year an
ejectment suit against X before the MeTC. The latter dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction contending that action has already prescribed.
RULE ON THE MATTER.
Suggested Answer:
The MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
The ownership of the subject property passed to the Spouses
Kawawa by constructive delivery upon the execution on 1998 of the
contract of conditional sale between them and the Sps Mapera. Although
denominated as conditional, a deed of sale is absolute in nature in the
absence of any stipulation reserving title to the seller until full payment of
the purchase price. In such case, ownership of the thing sold passes to the
buyer upon actual or constructive delivery. 7 In a contract of sale, the title to
the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. In a
contract to sell, on the other hand, the ownership is, by agreement, retained
by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the
76

purchase price.8 Here, there was already a perfected contract. The condition
imposed was only on the performance of the obligations of the parties. 9
There is nothing in the Deed of Conditional Sale which expressly provides for
the retention of title or ownership of the property by the sellers until full
payment of the purchase price.10 There is clearly no express reservation of
title made by the Sps Mapera over the property, or any provision which
would impose payment of the price as a condition for the contract's entering
into force. The absence of such stipulation indicates that what the parties
have actually contemplated was a contract of absolute sale.
Therefore, the Spouses Kawawa were deemed to have been unlawfully
deprived of the lawful possession of the property by X upon the execution of
the contract of conditional sale on 1998. Unfortunately, they filed their
complaint for ejectment only on 2003, way beyond the prescribed period of
one (1) year within which the action should be commenced.

77

NAME:

BARRY RAZA

CASE:
ALICIA
B.
FRANCISCO S. VALENTIN
194488, FEBRUARY 11,2015
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

REYES,
PETITIONER,
VS.SPOUSES
AND ANATALIA RAMOS, GR NO.

Question:
X is an owner of a lot surrounded by other estates, one of which belonged to
Y, and a 4 meter wide irrigation canal that limited access to the public road.
For the purpose of having an easy access to the public highway X wants to
establish an easement of right of way on the lot of Y. Should the easement of
right of way be granted?
Suggested Answer:
No. The following requisites need to be established before a person becomes
entitled to demand the compulsory easement of right of way:58 1. An
immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons,
and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; 2. Payment of proper
indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable; 3. The isolation of the
immovable is not due to its owners acts; and 4. The proposed easement of
right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In the case at bar, There is an adequate exit to a public highway. The
convenience of the dominant estates owner is not the basis for granting an
easement of right of way, especially if the owners needs may be satisfied
without imposing the easement. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is
not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without
imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.

78

NAME:
CASE:
2015

FAITH CHAREEN D. ROLLAN

SUPAPO VS. DE JESUS, G.R. NO. 198356, APRIL 20,

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Question:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against
respondents before the MeTC. The court favored the spouses but on appeal
with the RTC, by the respondents, the court reversed the decision on the
ground of prescription of cause of action. It ruled that the action having been
filed beyond the ten (l0)-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the
Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the actual demand to vacate was
made, the RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which the ejectment suit
should have been filed is counted from the time the certificate to file action
was issued. The certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992,
while the complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or
more than ten (10) years thereafter. Is the RTC correct?
Suggested Answer:
No.
Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states that registered land not subject to
prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
In Bishop v. CA, we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the
Torrens Title were aware of the other persons' occupation of the
property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners
have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as
the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
In this case, the spouses Supapo is the registered owner of the disputed land
as such their right is imprescriptible and indefeasible. Their complaint for
accion publiciana has not prescribed. Thus, the RTC is incorrect.

79

NAME:

FERNANDEZ, MAE CLAIRE C.

CASE:

MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ V. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO AND

HIS WIFE REMEDIOS HERMANO G.R. NO. 160914, MARCH
25, 2015

SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

PROPERTY

Question:
Antonio and Remedios are the registered owners of a house and lot covered
by TCT, which they used as their rest house/vacation place.
Marcela occupied and possessed the property sometime on September 1,
2001 pursuant to the alleged Memorandum of Agreement between her and a
certain Benitez, without the authority and consent of Antonio. She admitted
the existence of TCT, but she contended that the true and actual owner of
the property was Benitez. She alleged that Antonio and his wife had already
sold the property to Benitez; the latter, in turn, sold it to petitioner by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale, which they executed on March 1, 2001. She
claimed that Antonio knew about the sale and her immediate occupation.
Antonio through counsel sent a formal demand letter to Marcela for the latter
to vacate and turn over the possession of the property and to pay the rental.
His demands unheeded, Antonio then sued Marcela before the MTCC. Proofs
of his claim are the TCT, tax declaration and tax payments.
Has Antonio has adequately pleaded and proved a case of forcible entry?
Suggested Answer:
No.
The proofs submitted by respondents (TCT, tax declarations, realty tax
payments) only established possession flowing from ownership.
Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the possession
contemplated is not exactly the same as that which is in issue in a forcible
entry case. Possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to possession de
facto, or actual or material possession, and not one flowing out of ownership.
These are different legal concepts under which the law provides different
remedies for recovery of possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party
who can prove prior possession can recover the possession even against the
owner. Whatever may be the character of the possession, the present
occupant of the property has the security to remain on that property if the
occupant has the advantage of precedence in time and until a person with a
80

better right lawfully causes eviction.

81

NAME:

REALINO, FRANCES MAY C.

CASE:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CECILIA GRACE L.
ROASA, married to
GREG AMBROSE ROASA, G.R. No.
176022. February 2, 2015
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:

LAND REGISTRATION

Question:
Roasa filed an application for registration of title over a parcel of land. The
OSG opposed on the ground that there was failure to comply with the
required 30-year adverse possession since the subject land was declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain only on march 15, 198,
and the application was filed only on december 12, 2000. Any period of
possession prior to the date when the subject land was classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the 30-year period of possession. Is the OSG correct?
Suggested Answer:
NO.
What is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has
already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application
for registration. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the computation of the
period may include the period of adverse possession prior to the declaration
that land is alienable and disposable.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the subject lot has been
declared alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982. This is more than
eighteen (18) years before respondent's application for registration, which
was filed on December 15, 2000. Moreover, the unchallenged testimonies of
two of respondent's witnesses established that the latter and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in adverse, open, continuous, and
notorious possession in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945.

82

NAME:

YVONNE NICOLE C. GARBANZOS

CASE:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPS. CASTUERA
(GR NO. 203384;
JANUARY 14, 2015)
SUBJECT:

CIVIL LAW

TOPIC:
PROPERTY CLASSIFICATION; ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
PROPERTY
Question:
Andres Valiente owned a 3,135-square meter land in Barangay Siminublan,
San Narciso, Zambales which he sold Jose and Perla Castuera (Spouses
Castuera). On 21 May 2003, the Spouses Castuera filed with the RTC an
application for original registration of title over the property. They presented
three witnesses to support their application who testified that the Spouses
Castuera owned the property and presented documentary evidence to
support their application which included tax receipts and an advance plan.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed an opposition to the application for original registration. The
RTC granted the application for original registration of title over the property.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. The Spouses
Castuera attached to their appellees brief a certification from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) certifying
that the land is alienable and disposable. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Petitioner assailed the decision of the CA contending that the advance plan
and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and
disposable character of the property
Is the contention of the petitioner correct?
Suggested Answer:
YES.
It is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared
83

by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the

DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation must be
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such official record. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

84