Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
METAPHILOSOPHY
Vol. 36, Nos. 1/2, January 2005
0026-1068
Abstract: This essay attempts to develop a new theoretical model for business
ethics distinct from the two canonical business-ethics theories, the stakeholder
theory and the shareholder value theory. Milton Friedman argued that because
managers are agents of the companys owners, their sole moral responsibility is to
maximize owner returns. Thomas Pogge has recently suggested that such a view
involves a kind of moral incoherence and that we should reject the efcacy
of social arrangements like the principal-agent relationship in altering
moral obligations. Both views fail to give proper account of the dispersal of
moral responsibilities in business contexts. We must distinguish minimal moral
obligations (stemming from justice and rights) from maximal moral obligations (stemming from all other moral considerations, including duties of aid,
benecence, and the virtues). Minimal obligations apply to all persons, but
maximal obligations can be effected by social arrangements like the ownermanager relationship. There may be moral obligations incumbent on owners that
do not apply to managers. Understanding this distribution of responsibilities
enables us to develop a new and attractive model of business ethicsthe
ownership modelwhich places greater emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of the owners of business than has been traditional in business ethics.
Keywords: business ethics, corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory,
shareholder value theory, Milton Friedman, Thomas Pogge, corporate governance, ethical investment, benecence, rights, justice, virtue, responsibility, charity.
164
DAVID RODIN
industry devoted to corporate social responsibility has been established, as well as high-prole international initiatives, such as Ko
Annans Global Compact.
This emerging consensus, however, is fundamentally challenged by an
argument expressed in its most pungent form by the Nobel Prizewinning
economist Milton Friedman (Friedman 1999). According to Friedman
the moral obligation of managers to stakeholder groups other than
shareholders is extremely limited. He believes that it is generally not
permissible for managers to forgo legally acquired prots for moral
reasons. His argument is simple: managers are employed as agents of the
owners of the corporation. Their legal and moral obligation is to manage
the assets of the shareholders so as to maximize shareholder returns. If
they manage assets so as to fulll social responsibilities and thereby fail
to maximize returns, they are wrongfully appropriating resources that do
not belong to them. As Friedman says, managers can do goodbut only
at their own expense (1999, 252).1
What is striking about this argument is that it suggests that the
institutional relationship between managers and owners profoundly
affects the nature and distribution of ordinary moral obligations. Managers are not required to doFindeed, they are required not to do
certain things that would be morally obligatory if they were acting outside
the institutional structure, or managing their own assets.
In an intriguing chapter of his book World Poverty and Human Rights,
Thomas Pogge presents an argument that (although not presented in this
context) can be read as a response to Friedmans challenge (see Pogge
2002, ch. 3). His aim is to question the moral efcacy of social arrangements, such as the manager-owner relationship and the institution of
nation- states, in altering the pattern of our moral obligations. Managers,
suggests Pogge, cannot escape the normal claims morality makes on us by
reference to the fact they are acting on behalf of the assets owners. Nor
can owners escape such claims by appointing managerial agents.
In contrast to Pogge, I will argue that social arrangements like the
owner-manager relationship can appropriately alter the distribution of
moral obligations and responsibilities in business. But in contrast to
Friedman, I will argue that these relationships do not alter the distribution of moral obligations in such a way as to make ethical obligations
irrelevant to corporations. On the contrary, I will sketch what I take to be
a promising new model for grounding an account of corporate ethics
the ownership model of business ethics. This model develops a middle
1
Elaine Sternberg puts the point even more strongly, claiming that managing for social
responsibility is tantamount to theft: Managers who employ business funds for anything
other than the legitimate business objective are simply embezzling: in using other peoples
money for their own purposes, they are depriving owners of their property as surely as if they
had dipped their hands into the till (2000, 41).
165
way between the two canonical theories of business ethics, the stakeholder
and shareholder value theories, and it has important advantages compared with these two theories.
Pogges argument is rooted in a form of structural critique of moral
codes. He claims that a moral code can be shown to be incoherent and in
prima facie need of revision if it contains a counterproductive loophole.
By this he means roughly that the code provides incentives for an ideal
adherent (one who is fully informed and committed to complying with the
code) to act in ways that defeat the overall purpose of the code. If a code
incentivizes behavior that is regrettable, all things considered, by the
lights of the code itself, then other things being equal the code ought to be
revised.
One of the examples Pogge uses to illustrate this claim is the agency
model of business management. He asks us to imagine that our father
owns an apartment block inhabited by elderly tenants who have lived
there for many decades and enjoy a strong sense of community. An
opportunity arises to increase nancial returns on the building by evicting
the tenants and converting the apartments into luxury ats. Pogge
supposes that the prevalent ethical code endorses the following judgments: (1) it is impermissible for the father acting on his own behalf to
undertake the conversion; (2) it is permissible for a lawyer appointed by
the father to maximize returns on the building to undertake the conversion; and (3) it is permissible for the father to appoint the lawyer on these
terms.2
But Pogge argues that a code endorsing this set of judgments is
incoherent in that it contains an inherently regrettable loophole. For
the father is able to avoid an important moral obligation by effecting
what amounts to a merely cosmetic change in social arrangements
having the lawyer administer the conversion rather than doing it
himself. Pogge supposes the conversion to be intrinsically regrettable
by the codes own lights, yet the code provides an ideal incentive to
effect this outcome by providing means to do so without color of
wrongdoing. Broadening the argument, Pogge concludes: We should
avoid inherently regrettable ideal incentives toward creating or
joining social arrangements by denying altogether the moral signicance
of social arrangements in matters of common decency and basic justice
(2002, 87).
2
In fact Pogge stipulates that this is true of the hypothetical code he presupposes in his
example. But it is clear that he takes this code to be substantially coextensive with the ethical
code that is actually prevalent in society, for as he says later in the chapter, he believes his
argument has the effect of upsetting received moral convictions (2002, 89). I therefore read
the argument as engaging with the prevalent ethical code as it actually exists in our society. It
should also be noted that ethical code here refers to a set of generally accepted ethical
norms, but these need not be codied in any formal way.
166
DAVID RODIN
Against this I will argue that the prevalent moral code governing
business activities is a good deal more resilient than this. It does not
contain inherently regrettable loopholes in the sense Pogge suggests.
There is a coherent code of business ethics that does recognize the
signicance of social arrangements in apportioning moral responsibility,
though spelling out what this amounts to will require a careful analysis of
interacting moral responsibilities and will also require a call for some
reform of corporate institutional arrangements.
Pogge considers what he sees as a weak spot in my entire approach,
because, quite generally, the claim to have found a loophole can always be
countered by claiming that the relevant ideal incentive is not in fact
regrettable on the whole (2002, 79). In other words, though it may be
regrettable in some respects that there exists an ideal incentive to hire the
lawyer to evict the tenants, there may be some countervailing value
embodied in the code that means it is not regrettable, all things
considered, for the code to provide this incentive. He notes, rightly,
that the key question about such an objection is its plausibility in light of
the rationale of the code as a whole. He considers and rejects out of hand
a proposal that the code is not regrettable, all things considered, because
of the moral importance of hiring lawyers.
But Pogge fails to consider a much more plausible rationale, one that
does in fact underlie many aspects of the moral code of private business.
This is the moral importance of the benets that accrue to society as a
whole from the practice of managing assets so as to maximize returns.
Such a practice helps to achieve the most economically efcient distribution of resources, which benets society as a whole. For example, in the
case of the apartment block, maximizing returns by converting the
building releases underlying capital value that may then be used for
further investment. This in turn generates additional employment and tax
revenue that may be used for health care, education, and other public
goods. It is this societal benet that is the rationale underlying the
permission for the lawyer to undertake the conversion, and it provides
a strong prima facie reason for believing that the incentive within the code
to appoint a lawyer to evict the tenants is not regrettable, all things
considered.
I take this observation to be part of a broader account, consequentialist in spirit, that underlies the moral rationale for the institution of
competitive capitalism as a whole. Of course it could be that such a
rationale is based on faulty economic analysis. Alternatively, it may be
that the societal benets in this particular case are not sufcient to
outweigh the aggregate harm to evicted tenants, or that tenants have
rights against being harmed in certain ways. If this were the case, then
the terms of the prevalent code of business would require alteration. But
the reasons for the alteration would be internal to the justicatory
dynamic of the code itself and would not stem from the existence of
r Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005
167
168
DAVID RODIN
you but a minimal obligation for me, if I have made a promise or entered
into a contract to assist, or if I am a close family member. On the other
hand, human rights, such as the right not to be attacked or unjustiably
deprived of my property, impose minimal obligations on all people.
The distinction between minimal and maximal moral obligations will
obviously require a good deal of further clarication and explanation
before it can function in a full-edged moral theory. For example, might
it not be the case that some duties of aid are also obligations of justice
for example, those that arise in situations of extreme need or rescue?3
My intention here is not to provide such a full analytical clarication
but rather to investigate how institutional arrangements affect the
distribution and structure of these two classes of moral obligation,
intuitively and indicatively understood. Such an investigation has the
potential to be valuable however one chooses fully and nally to specify
the distinction between minimal and maximal obligations, and it may
even provide useful constraints that will assist in the process of drawing
the distinction itself.
It is of the greatest importance for the proper interpretation of business
ethics cases, such as that of the apartment block, to determine whether we
are dealing with minimal or maximal moral obligations. Pogge supposes
that the obligation not to evict the tenants is a minimal moral obligation.
The tenants, he writes, are morally entitled to the preservation of their
community (2002, 86). But this interpretation is doubtful. It is hard to
see how the tenants could have a claim right against the owner not to evict
them. What could the source of such a claim be? It is true that the tenants
would be harmed by the eviction. But the question, so far as minimal
moral obligations are concerned, is not whether the tenants are harmed
but whether they are unjustiably harmed, in other words wronged, by
the eviction (consider how local tradesmen and shopkeepers who stand to
gain from the conversion would be harmed by the abandonment of the
conversion plans). The harm inicted on the tenants might be unjustied
if it violates an explicit or implicit contract, or if it violates an accepted
norm (for example, one that judges the eviction of tenants to be unjustly
disproportionate to the social benets achieved from allowing owners to
maximize returns on their properties). But there is no reason to suppose
that such factors are at work in this case, because if they were then it
would be equally impermissible for both the lawyer and the owner to
undertake the conversion.
Generalizing this point, it would seem that Pogges claim that the
ethical code permits the lawyer to evict the tenants is only plausible on the
assumption that the obligation to not evict is construed as a maximal, not
a minimal moral obligation. Consider how, according to the prevalent
moral code, lawyers and managers are not entitled to promote their
3
169
170
DAVID RODIN
171
172
DAVID RODIN
173
the owner could evade his maximal moral obligations without color of
wrongdoing by simply appointing the lawyer. It would seem that this
involves a regrettable loss of moral responsibility, especially given the
moral importance of the maximal obligations concerned.
In reality, however, there is no loss of moral responsibility. To think
otherwise is to misunderstand the nature of the relationship between
owners and managers, or more generally the nature of the principal-agent
relationship. The mistake is to think that because it is permissible for the
lawyer to evict the tenants, it follows that it is permissible for the owner to
appoint the lawyer on such terms that he would be permitted or obligated
to do so.
On the contrary, the principal is responsible for setting morally
appropriate terms under which an agent will manage his affairs. Thus if
an owner is subject to a moral obligation pertaining to his asset, then he
has a further obligation to ensure that any agent managing this asset does
so in a way that is consistent with that moral obligation. Moreover, the
principal will typically retain ultimate supervisory and executive control
over the agents decisions and actions. Thus we often say of the agency
relationship that the agent acts on behalf of the principal and the principal
acts through the agent. Maximal obligations are therefore not lost in the
principal-agent relationship, because they are fully retained by the
principal.9
The appropriate image for understanding the nature of a principals
responsibility is ownership of a machine. Owning a commercial asset,
such as a business, is like owning a special kind of machine whose
function is to generate outputs of greater value that its inputs. Like any
machine, a business brings with it a collection of rights and responsibilities for the owner. Rights clearly include rst call on the prots
generated. But responsibilities come with those rights, and they include
the obligation to ensure that the business machine does not cause
unjustied harm to others, and that its products are utilized in accord
with the requirements of both the moral minimum and the moral
maximum. To take a simple example, owning a car brings with it the
right to keep the prots generated by its commercial use, but it may also
bring with it important obligations and responsibilities. These will include
the obligation not to use the car in a way that endangers others, and to
9
This retention of responsibility on the part of the principal is exceptionally robust. It
may even exist when the agent performs acts without specic instruction by the principal.
Thus, if I have a troublesome colleague in the department and I hire a thug known to have
committed contract killings in the past and tell him to just deal with the problem, then I
will be guilty in both law and morality if he proceeds to kill the colleague. There are,
obviously, limits to the responsibility of principals. If an agent acts in bad faith and without
instruction, and moreover the principal has taken sufciently stringent measures to oversee
and supervise the agents activities, then the principal may have no responsibility at all for
the actions of the agent.
174
DAVID RODIN
Minimal
full
full
obligations
Maximal
full
limited
Owners
Managers
obligations
175
176
DAVID RODIN
177
178
DAVID RODIN
179
How might this be achieved? There are two broad mechanisms through
which shareholders can affect the policies of corporations. The rst is
through their election of the board of directors; the second is through the
buying and selling of shares, which determines market capitalization and
indirectly the cost of equity capital, two critical determinants of corporate
success. Both mechanisms need to be strengthened and reformed if the
moral vision of the ownership model is to be given effect.
There is a vast literature on both topics, and I can only make some very
indicative comments here. It is interesting to note, however, that reform
of corporate governance is already high on the agenda of shareholders,
managers, and government regulators. So the ownership model of
business ethics provides further normative motivation for a movement
that is already substantially under way. Since the birth of the shareholder
activism movement in the 1990s and the corporate scandals of the early
years of the new century, numerous corporate governance initiatives have
been proposed to protect the interests of shareholders by increasing their
control over management behavior. Many of these same reforms may
simultaneously be used to empower shareholders to communicate their
moral preferences to management and oversee their implementation. But
in general the moral dimension of corporate-governance reform needs to
be more explicitly recognized. There need to be explicit mechanisms for
moral policies to be debated by the board of governors and proposed and
voted on by shareholders. Shareholders themselves must become more
aware of the moral responsibilities of ownership and be more prepared to
become proactively involved in corporate-governance activities. Already
many NGOs lobby shareholders directly in an attempt to change a
corporations policy.
But given the nature of modern shareholding, active and effective
participation in corporate-governance activities will never be a realistic
possibility for most small investors. For this reason the various ethicalinvestment initiatives are of the greatest importance. The ethical-investment industry is still in its infancy; it is small and highly fragmented, and
many of its products and indices are ethically crude. But it is also the
fastest-growing segment of the mutual-fund industry in many markets. If
the ethical-investment movement were ever to reach sufcient scale and
appropriate structure, it would have the potential to be a powerful
mechanism for shareholders to affect the moral activities of corporations
by raising the cost of capital for corporations that do not conduct
themselves in accordance with the moral preferences of shareholders.
The chief requirement for this to occur (beyond the support of the
share buying public) is the existence of accessible, standardized, and
impartial data on the ethical aspects of corporate activity. At the moment
numerous different ethical standards, investment criteria, and indices
compete for investor attention. Most of these are based on a particular
conception of what constitutes ethical behavior on the part of corporar Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005
180
DAVID RODIN
tions. Yet it is unlikely that any of these particular standards will ever
gain universal acceptance among investors because people differ in their
moral commitments and, as we have already seen, certain differences in
the conception of the maximal moral obligations are entirely appropriate.
What seems to be required is the existence of a third-party rating agency
that can assess the performance of corporations along a number of different
ethical criteria. It could measure such factors as support of the disadvantaged, treatment of employees, the manufacture of dangerous products, and
so forth. The criteria themselves could be specied at a very ne-grained
level involving hundreds of criteria and subcriteria. The data pertaining to
these criteria would need to have the following features. First, the data
would need to be produced in such a way that shareholders are able to
weight the different criteria according to their own moral preferences and
commitments to generate a personalized moral prole for their investment
activities. For example, one investor may be morally opposed to the
manufacture of weapons but less concerned about greenhouse-gas emissions, whereas another investor may have the opposite concerns. Second,
the data must be capable of being aggregated across a portfolio of shares or
a managed fund, so that the portfolio or fund as a whole can be assessed
according to an investors personal moral prole. Finally, the data must be
standardized and easy to use, and the providers must be universally
recognized as legitimate and trustworthy. In other words, what is needed
is an analogue in the arena of ethical assessment to the standard providers
of credit-risk assessment, Moodys and Standard & Poors.
None of these ethical reforms will be quickly or easily achieved, and
their ultimate effectiveness is not guaranteed. But what is clear is that
appropriate reform will not be achieved without the right theoretical
account of the distribution of responsibilities in business ethicsin what
ways managers and owners ought to respond to maximal and minimal
moral considerations. On the argument of this essay, it would appear that
the ownership model of business ethics is a strong contender for providing
such an account.
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics
CPO Box 8260
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 2601
Australia
david.rodin@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk
References
Evan, William, and Edward Freeman. 1999. A Stakeholder Theory of
the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism. In An Introduction to
r Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005
181