Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G.R.

118978
Facts:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and
defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That
employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really
motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her
employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she
was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being
outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage is valid?
Held: Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination,
afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all
phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. Acknowledged as
paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and
security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance
of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through
substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of
such employee, ones labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. The
government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by
petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
In the case at bar, it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by
the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, that youre fully aware that the
company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.
Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent
was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her
concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the
companys policy against marriage (and even told you that married women employees are not

applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.

Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on
the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with
her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to
deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in
the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a
contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient,
the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioners policy against
legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.
Duncan Asso. Of Detailman-PTGWO vs Glaxo Wellcome Phils., (2004) G.R. 162994
Facts:
Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo as medical representative, after
Tecson had undergone training and orientation. Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of
employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing
company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity
or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the
company. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is
expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra, a competitor of Glaxo. She was Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay and
supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared
marketing strategies for Astra in that area. The two married even with the several reminders
given by the District Manager to Tecson. In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that
his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that
he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told
him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was performing his job well.
This situation eventually led to his constructive dismissal.
Issue: WON Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of a competitor
company is valid?
Held: Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.

Tecsons contract of employment with Glaxo being questioned, stipulates that Tescon agrees to
abide by the existing company rules of Glaxo, and to study and become acquainted with such
policies. In this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its employees of its
rules regarding conflict of interest. No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals
when it ruled that Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo has a
right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the
assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo possesses the
right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws
endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it
does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also
recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of fair play.
Star Paper Corp., vs Simbol (2006) G.R. 164774
Facts:
Simbol was employed by the company on Oct 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of
the company, whom he married. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should
they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy to which
Simbol complied.
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd
degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed
a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married,
one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.
Issue: WON the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid
exercise of management prerogative?

Held: Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two or more of its
employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame.
Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of her marriage.
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify
as a valid exercise of management prerogative. It is significant to note that in the case at bar,
respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting
Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be
detrimental to its business operations. e. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without
valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a
perceived danger at the expense of an employees right to security of tenure.
The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a
disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial
scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate,
effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination
based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
Rivera vs Solidbank (2006) G.R. 163269
Facts:
Rivera had been working for the Solidbank since 1977. In Dec 1994, deciding to devote his time
and attention to his poultry business in Cavite, Rivera applied for retirement. Subsequently,
Solidbank required Rivera to sign an undated Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, Rivera
acknowledged receipt of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and
promised that "[he] would not, at any time, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly
engage in any unlawful activity prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or
subsidiary companies, their stockholders, officers, directors, agents or employees, and their
successors-in-interest and will not disclose any information concerning the business of
Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plans, processes, or data of any kind."

On May 1995, the Equitable employed Rivera as Manager of its Credit Investigation and
Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group. Upon discovering this, Solidbank First
Vice-President for HRD Celia Villarosa wrote a letter informing Rivera that he had violated the
Undertaking. She likewise demanded the return of all the monetary benefits he received in
consideration of the SRP within five (5) days from receipt; otherwise, appropriate legal action
would be taken against him, when Rivera refused, Solidbank filed complaint.
Issue: WON the one year employment ban imposed by Solidbank upon Rivera is null and void
for being unreasonable and oppressive and for constituting restraint of trade?
Held: A post-retirement competitive employment restriction is designed to protect the employer
against competition by former employees who may retire and obtain retirement or pension
benefits and, at the same time, engage in competitive employment.[66]
We have reviewed the Undertaking which respondent impelled petitioner to sign, and find that in
case of failure to comply with the promise not to accept competitive employment within one year
from February 28, 1995, respondent will have a cause of action against petitioner for protection
in the courts of law. The words cause of action for protection in the courts of law are so broad
and comprehensive, that they may also include a cause of action for prohibitory and mandatory
injunction against petitioner, specific performance plus damages, or a damage suit (for actual,
moral and/or exemplary damages), all inclusive of the restitution of the P963,619.28 which
petitioner received from respondent. The Undertaking and the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
do not provide for the automatic forfeiture of the benefits petitioner received under the SRP
upon his breach of said deeds. Thus, the post-retirement competitive employment ban
incorporated in the Undertaking of respondent does not, on its face, appear to be of the same
class or genre as that contemplated in Rochester.
It is settled that actual damages or compensatory damages may be awarded for breach of
contracts. Actual damages are primarily intended to simply make good or replace the loss
covered by said breach.[67] They cannot be presumed. Even if petitioner had admitted to
having breached the Undertaking, respondent must still prove that it suffered damages and the
amount thereof.[68] In determining the amount of actual damages, the Court cannot rely on
mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of losses.[69] The benefit to
be derived from a contract which one of the parties has absolutely failed to perform is of
necessity to some extent a matter of speculation of the injured party.
On the assumption that the competitive employment ban in the Undertaking is valid, petitioner is
not automatically entitled to return the P963,619.28 he received from respondent. To reiterate,
the terms of the Undertaking clearly state that any breach by petitioner of his promise would
entitle respondent to a cause of action for protection in the courts of law; as such, restitution of
the P963,619.28 will not follow as a matter of course. Respondent is still burdened to prove its
entitlement to the aforesaid amount by producing the best evidence of which its case is

susceptible.[70]
Yrasuegui vs Philippine Airlines (2008) G.R. 168081
Facts:
Petitioner Yrasuegui, an international flight steward of Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL) was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
In consequence thereof, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL before the
Labor Arbiter (LA). Te Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. It also
issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of the petitioner without loss of seniority
and other benefits, and also the payment of backwages. Respondent PAL appealed to the
NLRC which affirmed the LAs decision. Respondent PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA
reversed the NLRC case.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the petitioner valid.
Held: The Court upheld the legality of the petitioners dismissal.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice
or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not serious misconduct. Neither is it
reflective of his moral character.
The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an
analogous cause under Article 282 (e) of the Labor ode. His obesity may not be unintended, but
is nonetheless voluntary. Voluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable
to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element
runs through all just causes under Art. 282, whether they be in nature of a wrongful action or
omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although
it lacks the element of intent found in Art. 282 (a), (c), and (d).
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or
national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job
discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise
unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the
normal operation of a business or enterprise.