Fulltext of Cases Human Rights (Sat 1-3pm)

G.R. No.
100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as
an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and
received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said
notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises
of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their
stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a
letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23
July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the
CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection,
and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and
again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation
for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
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3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the
demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this
Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North
Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain
business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a
permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21
September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
1|P a g e F u l l t e x t o f C a s e s f o r
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On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be
understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated
in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had
meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss
was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed
by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The
motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to
investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly
and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of
women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to
man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of
18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing
CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the
petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The
latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with
the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring
such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in
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the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the
Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court.
In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has
observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment,"
but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the
extent of CHR's investigative power.
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It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried,
could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the
University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?"
The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the
world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of
religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to
elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social
rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because
they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right,
innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to
include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and
inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific
provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the
country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others,
comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of
Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights
expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on
21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest
upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until
ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances
became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to
censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to
submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were
practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26 August
1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and
also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation.
Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its
effectivity would also be curtailed.
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So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the
Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political
right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right
to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are
considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political
rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished
this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other violations
of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
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MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under
the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which
cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments
regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This
particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at
the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as
human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of
that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
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MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime,
everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they
had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to
confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
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MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political
detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5)
salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
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The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed
Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and
jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made
without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this
was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which
we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in
that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our
concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the
convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments,
could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights,
not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission
as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example,
there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be
considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned
initially by this provision freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as
well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related
crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up
to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the
concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
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MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those that
pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different
rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has
specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
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SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much
we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not
pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate
torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and the persons who are allegedly guilty are
people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must
be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little
individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political
violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any
response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on
Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are
not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general
sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and
seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the
religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
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priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that
"Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking
into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-saristores and carinderia, as well
as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than
that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to
have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order
for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in
its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be
understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with
the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never
derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf
of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending
[within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection
of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate
agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standion the part of the petitioners to
question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially
consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case
before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act
already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580.
The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
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SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division)[1] dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended
Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the
alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete
the presentation of its evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the
PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry
out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose
of this order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board)
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. [2]
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported
unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is
also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by
elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command
Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the
amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Hu man
Righ ts Class
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los
Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the
alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and
kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4)
attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent
for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986
without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth
Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence
of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military
Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been
known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Boards consultant. Although
the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth
of P104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the
amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.[3]
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) [4] against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also
impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano (Dimaano) as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other
hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas
from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue
advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.[5]
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that
respondents have violated RA No. 1379.[6] The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties,
funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In
his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued
at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu
City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas
from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
10 | P a g e F u l l t e x t o f C a s e s f o r
Hu man R ig h ts Class
After termination of the pre-trial,[7] the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence of
witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to charge the delinquent properties with
being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.[8]
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners presentation of evidence on the
ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The
Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing
complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner should proceed to
present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the
absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to
conform to the evidence already presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or
properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its many postponements.
Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The
Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more
chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May
1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take
under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to
present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate
pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG
does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are
subordinates of former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The
counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture
cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its
Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT
MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY,
COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN
RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189
SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to
this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived
by respondents with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was
allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS
SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED
AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE. [12]
The Courts Ruling
First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[13] and Republic v.
Migrino.[14]
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture
petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the
active service or retired.[15] The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government
agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings. [16] The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power
under Section 3 of EO No. 1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this
order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover
and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to time.
x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall
under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten
wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close
associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; [17] or (2) AFP personnel involved in other
cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.[18]
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under
the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was
undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army.Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making
him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the term subordinate. The
Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos,
their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws,
2ndEd., 203].
[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his
wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate,
dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration of former
President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General [19] does not suffice to make
him a subordinate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima
facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies,
agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with
former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos acquiescence
in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino,
the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of
investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former President. However, the
same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following
recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.[20]
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a
finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to
EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and
necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly
owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the
properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income
without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in
fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close
association with former President Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find
a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation
with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft
Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the
above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;[21] (Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a
subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the
urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
2,
[24]
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1,
14,[25] 14-A:[26]
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows
what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No.
1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships;
and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated
under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require
a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of
Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and
the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO
No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.[27] The
Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986. [28]
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that
Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for
lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply
to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and
1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of
Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may
be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the
powers granted to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their
respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot
exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional
assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies.[29]Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their
Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990,
which explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the
parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. [30] Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this
case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action. [31]
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor
General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan. [32] The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No.
1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.[33]
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners
evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for noncompletion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed
it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had
almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its
evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. [34] The motion sought to charge the delinquent
properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by
defendant Dimaano alone x x x.
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since petitioner did not state when it
would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29
September and 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner
manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the
matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has been ready for trial for over a
year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for
trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of
evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such
as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a
situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate
action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic. [35]
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of
private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379. [36] The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on
the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted.
Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of
what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x. [37] Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its evidence.
Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint.[38] The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already
pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the presentation of its evidence.
The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked
petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only
prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the
PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal
basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners
evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized
and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of
petitioners evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private
respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team
seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized
these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications
equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five
days after the successful EDSA revolution. [39] Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and by the will of the
Filipino people.[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution
which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the
date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its
embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use
the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25
March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.[41] The resulting government was
indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the
protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution
limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution,
there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a
person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:[42]
A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with
violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs
whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself.
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the people power revolution that
the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the
Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers,
change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal
and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said
that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish,
to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in
violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner
in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little
resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the
departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in
effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all
sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance
without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one
could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as
contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[43] petitioner Baseco, while
conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon
adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom
Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and
takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have
received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the
power and duty of the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed
by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing
of assets or accounts. And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the
authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders would
clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the validity of the
sequestration orders. The following discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all
of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal.
This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that
argument. On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the
legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The answer is
clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection, for
exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos
remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate
and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization.
Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one
breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at
the heart of constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due
process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is backsliding. It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we
get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report asks for extraordinary
exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is asking for is that we
should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a
vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of
consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When
it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch
Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the
PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be
sold. Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your
private safe.
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will
release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in
the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for
sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it
would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee
report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it
can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale
of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not
sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another Christian replied
when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my
nations safety sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section
8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite
the
impassioned
plea
by
Commissioner
Bernas
against
the
amendment
excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section
26,[44] Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration
orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional
provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the
interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the States good faith
compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights [45] recognized in the present
Covenant.Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration,
the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.[46] Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights [47] of individuals under
the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not
the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as
human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government
did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional
Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. [48] The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by
the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were
valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders
should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned
the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified
the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the
raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the weapons,
were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know
the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they also brought
the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained
in attach cases and cartons with markings Sony Trinitron, and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing
that the attach cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find
out that they contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this money instead
of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also the money
because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be
suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor. [49]
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the Municipal Trial
Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and
five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or contraband which
could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the communications equipment
and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search warrant considering that we have not
established concrete evidence about that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in the house of
Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.[50]
xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office who charged Elizabeth
Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the name of
Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did
you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries and other
items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really
know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because they might get lost if
they will just leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be contained in attach
cases. These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the
course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also decided to take this
considering that they believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer
Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.[51]
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding
team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items
could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. [52] Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,[53] and they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these
items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We
thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November
1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as
the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC,
TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL
RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in
this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution
and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her
ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of
Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and
the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a
Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from
afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the
victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however,
stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February
Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of
lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the military establishment that thraetened
civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious
military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There
are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos,
to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively control while the
separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power from
the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating
chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos
and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to
show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained
elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty
years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class
by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding
(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?
(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision,
including the grounds upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may
controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear
and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and his
family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do
so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be
legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which is nonjusticiable. According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without
reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the
President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves merely a
determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its
nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still a
justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the
Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not
decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum
for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite
Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national
security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua,
Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and
Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their
governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32;
Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this
issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow
confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v.
Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof,
respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and
abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The
Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the
"right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country,
including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order,
public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of
abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty
of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it
is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to
travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action
and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American
jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the
absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of
the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution,
to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the
Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of
Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he
executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a
separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and
judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626
(1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a
grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power
which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power
which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec.
1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws,
the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into
treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 1423].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the
President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive
power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est
exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency
after which ours is legally patterned.**
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle
everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers
ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from Washington to the
early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at
any particular moment depends in important measure on who is President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of government
subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most agencies of
government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each President's distinctive
temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions,
phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a
chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on
the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood
it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and
to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the
constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the
development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and
limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly
broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary
type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the
point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government
and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of
government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as
well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds
it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants
the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus,
in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the
Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the
National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General
to do so, said:
...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are not
charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties
devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not
legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of
either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among which the
powers of government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it
would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the
Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific
of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or
that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people"
and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social
contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the
Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution
reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his
family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to
be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred
freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of
equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty
of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty
to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a
power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the
President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the
view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American
Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of
law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said
to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of the
Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the
President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as
irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws."
[House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit
to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this
wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of
the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the
Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain
issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people
themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government,
no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to
us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute
brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did
not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits
the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear
that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the
courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481
that:]
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of
government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under
which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the
function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was
in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has
acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents
were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with
impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the
Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it
could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the
proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily
and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that
would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress
or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats
to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of
the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The
President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that
responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder
of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a
position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the
enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden
imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is
one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common
knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved
during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state
of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., concurring:

"The threats to national security and public order are real the mounting Communist insurgency, a simmering separatist movement, a
restive studentry, widespread labor disputes, militant farmer groups. . . . Each of these threats is an explosive ingredient in a steaming
cauldron which could blow up if not handled properly." 1
These are not my words. They belong to my distinguished colleague in the Court, Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. But they express
eloquently the basis of my full concurrence to the exhaustive and well-written ponencia of Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes.
Presidential powers and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not derived solely from a particular constitutional clause or
article or from an express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to the
Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied to these
powers: "residual," "inherent," 44 moral," "implied," "aggregate," "emergency." whatever they may be called, the fact is that these
powers exist, as they must if the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently. It is in this
context that the power of the President to allow or disallow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines should be viewed. By reason of its
impact on national peace and order in these admittedly critical times, said question cannot be withdrawn from the competence of the
Executive Branch to decide.
And indeed, the return of the deposed President, his wife and children cannot but pose a clear and present danger to public order and
safety. One needs only to recall the series of destabilizing actions attempted by the so-called Marcos loyalists as well as the ultra-rightist
groups during the EDSA Revolution's aftermath to realize this. The most publicized of these offensives is the Manila Hotel incident
which occurred barely five (5) months after the People's Power Revolution. Around 10,000 Marcos supporters, backed by 300 loyalist
soldiers led by Brigadier General Jose Zumel and Lt. Col. Reynaldo Cabauatan converged at the Manila Hotel to witness the oathtaking of Arturo Tolentino as acting president of the Philippines. The public disorder and peril to life and limb of the citizens
engendered by this event subsided only upon the eventual surrender of the loyalist soldiers to the authorities.
Then followed the Channel 7, Sangley, Villamor, Horseshoe Drive and Camp Aguinaldo incidents. Military rebels waged simultaneous
offensives in different parts of Metro Manila and Sangley Point in Cavite. A hundred rebel soldiers took over Channel 7 and its radio
station DZBB. About 74 soldier rebels attacked Villamor Air Base, while another group struck at Sangley Point in Cavite and held the
15th Air Force Strike wing commander and his deputy hostage. Troops on board several vehicles attempted to enter Gate I of Camp
Aguinaldo even as another batch of 200 soldiers encamped at Horseshoe Village.
Another destabilization plot was carried out in April, 1987 by enlisted personnel who forced their way through Gate 1 of Fort Bonifacio.
They stormed into the army stockade but having failed to convince their incarcerated members to unite in their cause, had to give up
nine (9) hours later.
And who can forget the August 28, 1987 coup attempt which almost toppled the Aquino Government? Launched not by Marcos
loyalists, but by another ultra-rightist group in the military led by Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan who remains at large to date, this
most serious attempt to wrest control of the government resulted in the death of many civilians.
Members of the so-called Black Forest Commando were able to cart away high-powered firearms and ammunition from the Camp
Crame Armory during a raid conducted in June 1988. Most of the group members were, however, captured in Antipolo, Rizal. The
same group was involved in an unsuccessful plot known as Oplan Balik Saya which sought the return of Marcos to the country.
A more recent threat to public order, peace and safety was the attempt of a group named CEDECOR to mobilize civilians from nearby
provinces to act as blockading forces at different Metro Manila areas for the projected link-up of Marcos military loyalist troops with
the group of Honasan. The pseudo "people power" movement was neutralized thru checkpoints set up by the authorities along major
road arteries where the members were arrested or forced to turn back.
While not all of these disruptive incidents may be traced directly to the Marcoses, their occurrence militates heavily against the wisdom
of allowing the Marcoses' return. Not only will the Marcoses' presence embolden their followers toward similar actions, but any such
action would be seized upon as an opportunity by other enemies of the State, such as the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
NPA'S, the Muslim secessionists and extreme rightists of the RAM, to wage an offensive against the government. Certainly, the state
through its executive branch has the power, nay, the responsibility and obligation, to prevent a grave and serious threat to its safety
from arising.
Apparently lost amidst the debate on whether or not to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is one factor, which albeit, at
first blush appears to be extra legal, constitutes a valid justification for disallowing the requested return. I refer to the public pulse. It
must be remembered that the ouster of the Marcoses from the Philippines came about as an unexpected, but certainly welcomed, result
of the unprecedented peoples power" revolution. Millions of our people braved military tanks and firepower, kept vigil, prayed, and in
countless manner and ways contributed time, effort and money to put an end to an evidently untenable claim to power of a dictator.
The removal of the Marcoses from the Philippines was a moral victory for the Filipino people; and the installation of the present
administration, a realization of and obedience to the people's Will.
Failing in legal arguments for the allowance of the Marcoses' return, appeal is being made to sympathy, compassion and even Filipino
tradition. The political and economic gains we have achieved during the past three years are however too valuable and precious to
gamble away on purely compassionate considerations. Neither could public peace, order and safety be sacrificed for an individual's
wish to die in his own country. Verily in the balancing of interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential prerogative, which we do not
find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily exercised, to ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
"The Constitution ... is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2;
18 L. Ed. 281 [1866])
Since our days as law students, we have proclaimed the stirring words of Ex Parte Milliganas self-evident truth. But faced with a hard
and delicate case, we now hesitate to qive substance to their meaning. The Court has permitted a basic freedom enshrined in the Bill of
Rights to be taken away by Government.
There is only one Bill of Rights with the same interpretation of liberty and the same guarantee of freedom for both unloved and
despised persons on one hand and the rest who are not so stigmatized on the other.
I am, therefore, disturbed by the majority ruling which declares that it should not be a precedent. We are interpreting the Constitution
for only one person and constituting him into a class by himself. The Constitution is a law for all classes of men at all times. To have a
person as one class by himself smacks of unequal protection of the laws.
With all due respect for the majority in the Court, I believe that the issue before us is one of rights and not of power. Mr. Marcos is
insensate and would not live if separated from the machines which have taken over the functions of his kidneys and other organs. To
treat him at this point as one with full panoply of power against whom the forces of Government should be marshalled is totally
unrealistic. The Government has the power to arrest and punish him. But does it have the power to deny him his right to come home
and die among familiar surroundings?
Hence, this dissent.
The Bill of Rights provides:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied, Section 6, Art. 111, Constitution)
To have the petition dismissed, the Solicitor General repeats a ritual invocation of national security and public safety which is
hauntingly familiar because it was pleaded so often by petitioner Ferdinand E. Marcos to justify his acts under martial law. There is,
however, no showing of the existence of a law prescribing the limits of the power to impair and the occasions for its exercise. And
except for citing breaches of law and order, the more serious of which were totally unrelated to Mr. Marcos and which the military was
able to readily quell, the respondents have not pointed to any grave exigency which permits the use of untrammeled Governmental
power in this case and the indefinite suspension of the constitutional right to travel.
The respondents' basic argument is that the issue before us is a political question beyond our jurisdiction to consider. They contend that
the decision to ban former President Marcos, and his family on grounds of national security and public safety is vested by the
Constitution in the President alone. The determination should not be questioned before this Court. The President's finding of danger to
the nation should be conclusive on the Court.
What is a political question?
In Vera v. Avelino (77 Phil. 192, 223 [1946], the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
It is a well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent
that power to deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions. It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to determine what matters fall
within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that he outside the scope of the judicial power. More
properly, however, it means those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.
We defined a political question in Taniada v. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051, 1066 [1957]), as follows:
In short, the term 'Political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language ofCorpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
The most often quoted definition of political question was made by Justice William J. Brennan Jr., who penned the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr (369 US 186,82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962]). The ingredients of a political question as
formulated in Baker v. Carr are:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may
describe a political question, which identifies it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on
the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.
For a political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or Congress, the exercise
of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary or inherent power against a civil right which claim is not found
in a specific provision is dangerous. Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public officials to strike where they
please and to override everything which to them represents evil. The entire Government is bound by the rule of law.
The respondents have not pointed to any provision of the Constitution which commits or vests the determination of the question raised
to us solely in the President.
The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist because no law has been enacted specifying the
circumstances when the right may be impaired in the interest of national security or public safety. The power is in Congress, not the
Executive.
The closest resort to a textile demonstrable constitutional commitment of power may be found in the commander-in-chief clause which
allows the President to call out the armed forces in case of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law in the event of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
There is, however, no showing, not even a claim that the followers of former President Marcos are engaging in rebellion or that he is in
a position to lead them. Neither is it claimed that there is a need to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim
martial law because of the arrival of Mr. Marcos and his family. To be sure, there may be disturbances but not of a magnitude as would
compel this Court to resort to a doctrine of non- justiceability and to ignore a plea for the enforcement of an express Bill of Rights
guarantee.
The respondents themselves are hard-pressed to state who or what constitutes a Marcos "loyalist." The constant insinuations that the
"loyalist" group is heavily funded by Mr. Marcos and his cronies and that the "loyalists" engaging in rallies and demonstrations have to
be paid individual allowances to do so constitute the strongest indication that the hard core "loyalists" who would follow Marcos right
or wrong are so few in number that they could not possibly destabilize the government, much less mount a serious attempt to
overthrow it.
Not every person who would allow Mr. Marcos to come home can be tagged a "loyalist." It is in the best of Filipino customs and
traditions to allow a dying person to return to his home and breath his last in his native surroundings. Out of the 103 Congressmen
who passed the House resolution urging permission for his return, there are those who dislike Mr. Marcos intensely or who suffered
under his regime. There are also many Filipinos who believe that in the spirit of national unity and reconciliation Mr. Marcos and his
family should be permitted to return to the Philippines and that such a return would deprive his fanatic followers of any further reason
to engage in rallies and demonstrations.
The Court, however, should view the return of Mr. Marcos and his family solely in the light of the constitutional guarantee of liberty of
abode and the citizen's right to travel as against the respondents' contention that national security and public safety would be
endangered by a grant of the petition.
Apart from the absence of any text in the Constitution committing the issue exclusively to the President, there is likewise no dearth of
decisional data, no unmanageable standards which stand in the way of a judicial determination.
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
may be impaired only upon a lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Section 6 further provides
that the right to travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
There is no law setting the limits on a citizen's right to move from one part of the country to another or from the Philippines to a foreign
country or from a foreign country to the Philippines. The laws cited by the Solicitor General immigration, health, quarantine, passports,
motor vehicle, destierro probation, and parole are all inapplicable insofar as the return of Mr. Marcos and family is concerned. There is
absolutely no showing how any of these statutes and regulations could serve as a basis to bar their coming home.
There is also no disrespect for a Presidential determination if we grant the petition. We would simply be applying the Constitution, in
the preservation and defense of which all of us in Government, the President and Congress included, are sworn to participate.
Significantly, the President herself has stated that the Court has the last word when it comes to constitutional liberties and that she
would abide by our decision.
As early as 1983, it was noted that this Court has not been very receptive to the invocation of the political question doctrine by
government lawyers. (See Morales, Jr. .v Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983]).
Many of those now occupying the highest positions in the executive departments, Congress, and the judiciary criticized this Court for
using what they felt was a doctrine of convenience, expediency, utility or subservience. Every major challenge to the acts of petitioner
Ferdinand E. Marcos under his authoritarian regime the proclamation of martial law, the ratification of a new constitution, the arrest
and detention of "enemies of the State" without charges being filed against them, the dissolution of Congress and the exercise by the
President of legislative powers, the trial of civilians for civil offenses by military tribunals, the seizure of some of the country's biggest
corporations, the taking over or closure of newspaper offices, radio and television stations and other forms of media, the proposals to
amend the Constitution, etc. was invariably met by an invocation that the petition involved a political question. It is indeed poetic
justice that the political question doctrine so often invoked by then President Marcos to justify his acts is now being used against him
and his family. Unfortunately, the Court should not and is not allowed to indulge in such a persiflage. We are bound by the
Constitution.
The dim view of the doctrine's use was such that when the present Constitution was drafted, a broad definition of judicial power was
added to the vesting in the Supreme Court and statutory courts of said power.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This new provision was enacted to preclude this Court from using the political question doctrine as a means to avoid having to make
decisions simply because they are too controversial, displeasing to the President or Congress, inordinately unpopular, or which may be
ignored and not enforced.
The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years
to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear that it was
extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power.
Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their counsel were among the most vigorous critics of Mr. Marcos (the main
petitioner) and his use of the political question doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its
mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the question doctrine. We are compelled to
decide what would have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.
This is not to state that there can be no more political questions which we may refuse to resolve. There are still some political
questions which only the President, Congress, or a plebiscite may decide. Definitely, the issue before us is not one of them.
The Constitution requires the Court "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction."
How do we determine a grave abuse of discretion?
The tested procedure is to require the parties to present evidence. Unfortunately, considerations of national security do not readily lend
themselves to the presentation of proof before a court of justice. The vital information essential to an objective determination is usually
highly classified and it cannot be rebutted by those who seek to overthrow the government. As early as Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87, 93
[19051), the Court was faced with a similar situation. It posed a rhetorical question. If after investigating conditions in the Archipelago
or any part thereof, the President finds that public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, can the
judicial department investigate the same facts and declare that no such conditions exist?
In the effort to follow the "grave abuse of discretion" formula in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the
court granted the Solicitor General's offer that the military give us a closed door factual briefing with a lawyer for the petitioners and a
lawyer for the respondents present.
The results of the briefing call to mind the concurrence of Justice Vicente Abad Santos inMorales, Jr. v. Enrile, (121 SCRA 538, 592
[19831):
How can this Court determine the factual basis in order that it can ascertain whether or not the president acted
arbitrarily in suspending the writ when, in the truth words of Montenegro, with its very limited machinery fit]
cannot be in better position [than the Executive Branch] to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the
Archipelago? (At p. 887). The answer is obvious. It must rely on the Executive Branch which has the appropriate civil
and military machinery for the facts. This was the method which had to be used in Lansang. This Court relied heavily
on classified information supplied by the military. Accordingly, an incongruous situation obtained. For this Court,
relied on the very branch of the government whose act was in question to obtain the facts. And as should be expected
the Executive Branch supplied information to support its position and this Court was in no situation to disprove
them. It was a case of the defendant judging the suit. After all is said and done, the attempt by its Court to determine
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ was a useless and futile exercise.
There is still another reason why this Court should maintain a detached attitude and refrain from giving the seal of
approval to the act of the Executive Branch. For it is possible that the suspension of the writ lacks popular support
because of one reason or another. But when this Court declares that the suspension is not arbitrary (because it cannot
do otherwise upon the facts given to it by the Executive Branch) it in effect participates in the decision-making
process. It assumes a task which it is not equipped to handle; it lends its prestige and credibility to an unpopular act.
The other method is to avail of judicial notice. In this particular case, judicial notice would be the only basis for determining the clear and
present danger to national security and public safety. The majority of the Court has taken judicial notice of the Communist rebellion,
the separatist movement, the rightist conspiracies, and urban terrorism. But is it fair to blame the present day Marcos for these
incidents? All these problems are totally unrelated to the Marcos of today and, in fact, are led by people who have always opposed him.
If we use the problems of Government as excuses for denying a person's right to come home, we will never run out of justifying
reasons. These problems or others like them will always be with us.
Significantly, we do not have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not the
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of the implications of a Marcos
return to his home to buttress a conclusion.
In the first place, there has never been a pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national security and public
safety will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the Philippines. It was only after the present petition was filed
that the alleged danger to national security and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents' pleadings. Secondly, President
Aquino herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to (1) national welfare and interest and (2) the continuing need to
preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability. (See page 7, respondents' Comment at page 73 of Rollo). Neither ground
satisfies the criteria of national security and public safety. The President has been quoted as stating that the vast majority of Filipinos
support her position. (The Journal, front page, January 24,1989) We cannot validate their stance simply because it is a popular one.
Supreme Court decisions do not have to be popular as long as they follow the Constitution and the law. The President's original
position "that it is not in the interest of the nation that Marcos be allowed to return at this time" has not changed. (Manila Times, front
page, February 7, 1989). On February 11, 1989, the President is reported to have stated that "considerations of the highest national good
dictate that we preserve the substantial economic and political gains of the past three years" in justifying her firm refusal to allow the
return of Mr. Marcos despite his failing health. (Daily Globe, front page, February 15, 1989). "Interest of the nation national good," and
"preserving economic and political gains," cannot be equated with national security or public order. They are too generic and sweeping
to serve as grounds for the denial of a constitutional right. The Bill of Rights commands that the right to travel may not be impaired
except on the stated grounds ofnational security, public safety, or public health and with the added requirement that such impairment must
be "as provided by law." The constitutional command cannot be negated by mere generalizations.
There is an actual rebellion not by Marcos followers but by the New Peoples' Army. Feeding as it does on injustice, ignorance, poverty,
and other aspects at under-development, the Communist rebellion is the clearest and most present danger to national security and
constitutional freedoms. Nobody has suggested that one way to quell it would be to catch and exile its leaders, Mr. Marcos himself was
forced to flee the country because of "peoples' power." Yet, there is no move to arrest and exile the leaders of student groups, teachers'
organizations, pea ant and labor federations, transport workers, and government unions whose threatened mass actions would
definitely endanger national security and the stability of government. We fail to see how Mr. Marcos could be a greater danger.
The fear that Communist rebels, Bangsa Moro secessionists, the Honasan ex-soldiers, the hard core loyalists, and other dissatisfied
elements would suddenly unite to overthrow the Republic should a dying Marcos come home is too speculative and unsubstantial a
ground for denying a constitutional right. It is not shown how extremists from the right and the left who loathe each other could find a
rallying point in the coming of Mr. Marcos.
The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor General or what the majority calls "catalytic effect," which alone sustains the claim of danger to
national security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult problem or any troublesome person can be substituted for the
Marcos threat as the catalysing factor. The alleged confluence of NPAs, secessionists, radical elements, renegade soldiers, etc., would
still be present. Challenged by any critic or any serious problem, the Government can state that the situation threatens a confluence of
rebel forces and proceed to ride roughshod over civil liberties in the name of national security. Today, a passport is denied. Tomorrow,
a newspaper may be closed. Public assemblies may be prohibited. Human rights may be violated. Yesterday, the right to travel of
Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Jovito Salonga was curtailed. Today, it is the right of Mr. Marcos and family. Who will be tomorrow's
pariahs I deeply regret that the Court's decision to use the political question doctrine in a situation where it does not apply raises all
kinds of disturbing possibilities.
I must emphasize that General Renato de Villa, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, has personally assured the Court that a rebellion
of the above combined groups will not succeed and that the military is on top of the situation. Where then is the clear danger to
national security? The Court has taken judicial notice of something which even the military denies. There would be severe strains on
military capabilities according to General de Villa. There would be set-backs in the expected eradication of the Communist threat.
There would be other serious problems but all can be successfully contained by the military. I must stress that no reference was made
to a clear and present danger to national security as would allow an overriding of the Bill of Rights.
The Solicitor General's argument that the failure of Congress to enact a statute defining the parameters of the right to travel and to
freely choose one's abode has constrained the President to fill in the vacuum, is too reminiscent of Amendment No. 6 of the martial law
Constitution to warrant serious consideration. Amendment No. 6 allowed Marcos to issue decrees whenever the Batasang Pambansa
failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment required immediate action. When the Bill of
Rights provides that a right may not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health and further
requires that a law must provide when such specifically defined interests are prejudiced or require protection, the inaction of Congress
does not give reason for the respondents to assume the grounds for its impairment.
The fact that the Marcoses have been indicted before American federal courts does not obstruct us from ruling against an
unconstitutional assertion of power by Philippine officials. Let the United States apply its laws. We have to be true to our own.
Mr. Marcos may be too ill to withstand the rigors of a transpacific flight. The agony of traveling while hooked up to machines which
have taken over the functions of his heart, lungs, and kidneys may hasten his death. The physical condition of Mr. Marcos does not
justify our ignoring or refusing to act on his claim to a basic right which is legally demandable and enforceable. For his own good, it
might be preferable to stay where he is. But he invokes a constitutional right. We have no power to deny it to him.
The issuance of a passport may be discretionary but it should not be withheld if to do so would run counter to a constitutional
guarantee. Besides, the petitioners are not asking for passports and nothing else. Any travel documents or any formal lifting of the
Marcos ban as would allow international airlines to sell them tickets would suffice.
With all due respect for the majority opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the right to travel. I do not think we should differentiate the
right to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must be more
preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel. It was precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators
Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate period
which led the framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this right. Media often asks,
"what else is new?" I submit that we now have a freedom loving and humane regime. I regret that the Court's decision in this case sets
back the gains that our country has achieved in terms of human rights, especially human rights for those whom we do not like or those
who are against us.
The respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Raul S. Manglapus has disclosed a list of former dictators who were barred by their
successors from returning to their respective countries. There is no showing that the countries involved have constitutions which
guarantee the liberty of abode and the freedom to travel and that despite such constitutional protections, the courts have validated the
"ban a return" policy. Neither is it shown that the successors of the listed dictators are as deeply committed to democratic principles
and as observant of constitutional protections as President Aquino.
It is indeed regrettable that some followers of the former President are conducting a campaign to sow discord and to divide the nation.
Opposition to the government no matter how odious or disgusting is, however, insufficient ground to ignore a constitutional
guarantee.
During the protracted deliberations on this case, the question was asked is the Government helpless to defend itself against a threat to
national security? Does the President have to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law? Can she not
take less drastic measures?
Of course, the Government can act. It can have Mr. Marcos arrested and tried in court. The Government has more than ample powers
under eixisting law to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public safety. But the denial of travel papers is not
one of those powers because the Bill of Rights says so. There is no law prescribing exile in a foreign land as the penalty for hurting the
Nation.
Considering all the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to return to and live and die in his own country. I say
this with a heavy heart but say it nonetheless. That conviction is not diminished one whit simply because many believe Marcos to be
beneath contempt and undeserving of the very liberties he flounted when he was the absolute ruler of this land.
The right of the United States government to detain him is not the question before us, nor can we resolve it. The question we must
answer is whether or not, assuming that Marcos is permitted to leave Hawaii (which may depend on the action we take today), the
respondents have acted with grave abuse of discretion in barring him from his own country.
My reluctant conclusion is that they have, absent the proof they said they were prepared to offer, but could not, that the petitioner's
return would prejudice the security of the State.
I was the one who, in the open hearing held on June 27,1989, asked the Solicitor General if the government was prepared to prove the
justification for opposing the herein petition, i.e. that it had not acted arbitrarily. He said it was. Accordingly, the Court, appreciating
the classified nature of the information expected, scheduled a closed-door hearing on July 25,1988. The Solicitor General and three
representatives from the military appeared for the respondents, together with former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, representing the
petitioners.
In about two hours of briefing, the government failed dismally to show that the return of Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat to
the national security as it had alleged. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political and
economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions.
Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist "factual bases for the President's decision" to bar Marcos's
return. That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court after that hearing.
In holding that the President of the Philippines has residual powers in addition to the specific powers granted by the Constitution, the
Court is taking a great leap backward and reinstating the discredited doctrine announced in Planas v. Gil (67 Phil. 62). This does not
square with the announced policy of the Constitutional Commission, which was precisely to limit rather than expand presidential
powers, as a reaction to the excesses of the past dictatorship.
I can only repeat Justice Black's wry observation in the Steel Seizure Case (343 U.S. 579) that if it was true that the President had been
granted the totality of executive power, "it is difficult to see why our forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some
trifling ones, . . . I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but regard it as an
allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated."
I have no illusion that the stand I am taking will be met with paeans of praise, considering that Marcos is perhaps the most detested
man in the entire history of our country. But we are not concerned here with popularity and personalities. As a judge, I am not swayed
by what Justice Cardozo called the "hooting throng" that may make us see things through the prisms of prejudice. I bear in mind that
when I sit in judgment as a member of this Court, I must cast all personal feelings aside.
The issue before us must be resolved with total objectivity, on the basis only of the established facts and the applicable law and not of
wounds that still fester and scars that have not healed. And not even of fear, for fear is a phantom. That phantom did not rise when the
people stood fast at EDSA against the threat of total massacre in defense at last of their freedom.
I cannot turn back on the lessons of liberty that I taught for more than three decades as a professor of Constitutional Law. These
principles have not changed simply because I am now on the Court or a new administration is in power and the shoe is on the other
foot.
Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to come back to the Philippines against the prohibitions of the government then,
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and the liberty of abode that his adversary invoked. These rights are guaranteed by the
Constitution to all individuals, including the patriot and the homesick and the prodigal son returning, and tyrants and charlatans and
scoundrels of every stripe.
I vote to grant the petition.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Already, some people refer to us as a nation without discipline. Are we ready to be also called a society without compassion?
The issue as to whether or not former President Ferdinand E. Marcos should be allowed to return to the Philippines may be resolved by
answering two simple questions: Does he have the right to return to his own country and should national safety and security deny him
this right?
There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen and both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, he has the right to return to his own country except only if prevented by the demands of
national safety and national security.
Our Armed Forces have failed to prove this danger. They are bereft of hard evidence, and all they can rely on is sheer speculation.
True, there is some danger but there is no showing as to the extent.
It is incredible that one man alone together with his family, who had been ousted from this country by popular will, can arouse an
entire country to rise in morbid sympathy for the cause he once espoused.
It is therefore clear to me, all other opinions to the contrary notwithstanding, that the former President should be allowed to return to
our country under the conditions that he and the members of his family be under house arrest in his hometown in Ilocos Norte, and
should President Marcos or any member of his family die, the body should not be taken out of the municipality of confinement and
should be buried within ten (10) days from date.
If we do this, our country shall have maintained its regard for fundamental human rights, for national discipline, and for human
compassion.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I dissent. As I see it, the core issue in this case is, which right will prevail in the conflict between the right of a Filipino, Ferdinand E.
Marcos, to return to the Philippines, and the right of the Philippine Government to bar such return in the interest of national security
and public safety. In this context, the issue is clearly justiciable involving, as it does, colliding assertions of individual right and
governmental power. Issues of this nature more than explain why the 1986 Constitutional Commission, led by the illustrious former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, the new provision on the power of Judicial Review, viz:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Article
VIII, Section 1, par. 2; (Emphasis supplied)
Mr. Marcos invokes in his favor the specific and precise constitutional right of every Filipinoto travel which, in the language of the
Constitution, shall not be impaired "except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law" (Art. III, Sec. 6). That the right to travel comprises the right to travel within the country, to travel out of the country and to return
to the country (Philippines), is hardly disputable. Short of all such components, the right to travel is meaningless. The real question
arises in the interpretation of the qualifications attached by the Constitution to such right to travel.
Petitioners contend that, in the absence of restricting legislation, the right to travel is absolute. I do not agree. It is my view that, with or
without restricting legislation, the interest of national security, public safety or public health can justify and even require restrictions on
the right to travel, and that the clause "as may be provided by law" contained in Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution merely
declares a constitutional leave or permission for Congress to enact laws that may restrict the right to travel in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health. I do not, therefore, accept the petitioners' submission that, in the absence of enabling legislation,
the Philippine Government is powerless to restrict travel even when such restriction is demanded by national security, public safety or
public health, The power of the State, in particular cases, to restrict travel of its citizens finds abundant support in the police power of
the state wich may be exercised to preserve and maintain government as well as promote the general welfare of the greatest number of
people.
And yet, the power of the State, acting through a government in authority at any given time, to restrict travel, even if founded on police
power, cannot be absolute and unlimited under all circumstances, much less, can it be arbitrary and irrational.
Mr. Marcos, I repeat, comes before the Court as a Filipino, invoking a specific constitutional right, i.e., the right to return to the
country. 1 Have the respondents presented sufficient evidence to offset or override the exercise of this right invoked by Mr. Marcos?
Stated differently, have the respondents shown to the Court sufficient factual bases and data which would justify their reliance on
national security and public safety in negating the right to return invoked by Mr. Marcos?
I have given these questions a searching examination. I have carefully weighed and assessed the "briefing" given the Court by the
highest military authorities of the land last 28 July 1989. 1 have searched, but in vain, for convincing evidence that would defeat and
overcome the right of Mr. Marcos as a Filipino to return to this country. It appears to me that the apprehensions entertained and
expressed by the respondents, including those conveyed through the military, do not, with all due respect, escalate to proportions of
national security or public safety. They appear to be more speculative than real, obsessive rather than factual. Moreover, such
apprehensions even if translated into realities, would be "under control," as admitted to the Court by said military authorities, given the
resources and facilities at the command of government. But, above all, the Filipino people themselves, in my opinion, will know how to
handle any situation brought about by a political recognition of Mr. Marcos' right to return, and his actual return, to this country. The
Court, in short, should not accept respondents' general apprehensions, concerns and perceptions at face value, in the light of a
countervailing and even irresistible, specific, clear, demandable, and enforceable right asserted by a Filipino.
Deteriorating political, social, economic or exceptional conditions, if any, are not to be used as a pretext to justify derogation of human
rights. 2
As a member of the United Nations, the Philippines has obligations under its charter. By adopting the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, (Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution), the Philippine government cannot just pay lip service
to Art. 13, par. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides that everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country. This guarantee is reiterated in Art. XII, par. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which states that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country." (Emphasis supplied) "Arbitrary"
or "arbitrarily" was specifically chosen by the drafters of the Covenant 3 hoping to protect an individual against unexpected,
irresponsible or excessive encroachment on his rights by the state based on national traditions or a particular sense of justice which falls
short of international law or standards. 4
The Solicitor General maintains that because the respondents, as alter egos of the President, have raised the argument of "national
security" and "public safety," it is the duty of this Court to unquestioningly yield thereto, thus casting the controversy to the realm of a
political question. I do not agree. I believe that it is one case where the human and constitutional light invoked by one party is so
specific, substantial and clear that it cannot be overshadowed, much less, nullified by simplistic generalities; worse, the Court neglects
its duty under the Constitution when it allows the theory of political question to serve as a convenient, and yet, lame excuse for
evading what, to me, is its clearly pressing and demandable duty to the Constitution.
During the oral arguments in this case, I asked the Solicitor General how one could validly defend the right of former Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr., a Filipino, to return to the Philippines in 1983 and, at the same time, credibly deny the right of Mr. Marcos, also a Filipino, to
return to the Philippines in 1989. I still have not found a satisfactory answer to that question. Instead, it has become clearer by the day
that the drama today is the same drama in 1983 with the only difference that the actors are in opposite roles, which really makes one
hope, in the national interest, that the mistake in 1983 should not be made to persist in 1989.
To one who owes Mr. Marcos, his wife and followers absolutely nothing, personal, political or otherwise, the following are the cogent
and decisive propositions in this case
1. Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to die and be buried in this country;
2. respondents have not shown any "hard evidence" or convincing proof why his right as a Filipino to return should be
denied him. All we have are general conclusions of "national security" and "public safety" in avoidance of a specific
demandable and enforceable constitutional and basic human right to return;
3. the issue of Marcos' return to the Philippines, perhaps more than any issue today, requires of all members of the
Court, in what appears to be an extended political contest, the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." It is only thus
that we fortify the independence of this Court, with fidelity, not to any person, party or group but to the Constitution
and only to the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I vote to grant the petition.
The only issue that saddles the Court is simply: "whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines." 1 I therefore take exception to allusions 2 anent "the capacity of
the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar." 3 I have legitimate reason to fear that my brethren, in passing judgment on the Marcoses
(insofar as their "capacity to stir trouble" is concerned), have overstepped the bounds of judicial restraint, or even worse, convicted
them without trial.
I also find quite strained what the majority would have as the "real issues" facing the Court: "The right to return to one's country,"
pitted against "the right of travel and freedom of abode", and their supposed distinctions under international law, as if such
distinctions, under international law in truth and in fact exist. There is only one right involved here, whether under municipal or
international law: the light of travel, whether within one's own country, or to another, and the right to return thereto. The Constitution
itself makes no distinctions; let then, no one make a distinction. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemus.
As the majority would indeed have it, the issue is one of power: Does the Executive have the power to deny a citizen his right to travel
(back to the country or to another)? It is a question that, in essence, involves the application, and no more, of the provisions of the 1987
Constitution:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. 4
The majority says, with ample help from American precedents, that the President is possessed of the power, thus:
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. 5
So also:
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind
that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government
exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution
reminds everyone that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II,
Sec. 1 . ] 6
And finally:
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of
rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of
the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it
is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demanded [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to
preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed [See Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that an
allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President]. 7
I am not persuaded.
I
First: While the Chief Executive exercises powers not found expressly in the Charter, but has them by constitutional implication* the
latter must yield to the paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando: "A regime of constitutionalism is thus unthinkable
without an assurance of the primacy of a big of rights. Precisely a constitution exists to assure that in the discharge of the governmental
functions, the dignity that is the birthright of every human being is duly safeguarded. To be true to its primordial aim a constitution
must lay down the boundaries beyond which he's forbidden territory for state action" 8
My brethren have not demonstrated, to my satisfaction, how the President may override the direct mandate of the fundamental law. It
will not suffice, so I submit, to say that the President's plenitude of powers, as provided in the Constitution, or by sheer constitutional
implication, prevail over express constitutional commands. "Clearly," so I borrow J.B.L. Reyes, in his own right, a titan in the field of
public law, "this argument ... rests ... not upon the text of the (Constitution] ... but upon a mere inference therefrom." 9 For if it were,
indeed, the intent of the Charter to create an exception, that is, by Presidential action, to the right of travel or liberty of abode and of
changing the same other than what it explicitly says already ("limits prescribed by law" 10 or "upon lawful order of the court" 11 the
Charter could have specifically declared so. As it is, the lone deterrents to the right in question are: (1) decree of statute, or (2) lawful
judicial mandate. Had the Constitution intended a third exception, that is, by Presidential initiative, it could have so averred. It would
also have made the Constitution, as far as limits to the said right are concerned, come full circle: Limits by legislative, judicial, and
executive processes.
Obviously, none of the twin legal bars exist. There is no law banning the Marcoses from the country; neither is there any court decree
banishing him from Philippine territory.
It is to be noted that under the 1973 Constitution, the right to travel is worded as follows:
Sec. 5. The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health. 12
Under this provision, the right may be abated: (1) upon a lawful court order, or (2) "when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health. 13 Arguably, the provision enabled the Chief Executive (Marcos) to moderate movement of citizens,
which, Bernas says, justified such practices as "hamletting", forced relocations, or the establishment of free-fire zones. 14
The new Constitution, however, so it clearly appears, has divested the Executive's implied power. And, as it so appears, the right may
be impaired only "within the limits provided by law . 15 The President is out of the picture.
Admittedly, the Chief Executive is the "sole" judge of all matters affecting national security 16and foreign affairs; 17 the Bill of Rights
precisely, a form of check against excesses of officialdom is, in this case, a formidable barrier against Presidential action. (Even on
matters of State security, this Constitution prescribes limits to Executive's powers as Commander-in-Chief.)
Second: Assuming, ex hypothesis that the President may legally act, the question that emerges is: Has it been proved that Marcos, or his
return, will, in fact, interpose a threat to the national security , public safety, or public health?" What appears in the records are
vehement insistences that Marcos does pose a threat to the national good and yet, at the same time, we have persistent claims, made by
the military top brass during the lengthy closed-door hearing on July 25, 1989, that "this Government will not fall" should the former
first family in exile step on Philippine soil. which is which?
At any rate, it is my opinion that we can not leave that determination solely to the Chief Executive. The Court itself must be content
that the threat is not only clear, but more so, present. 18
That the President "has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people ... " 19 is an obligation open to no doubt. But the
question, and so I ask again and again, is: From whom? If we say "from Marcos," we unravel chinks in our political armor. It also flies
in the face of claims, so confidently asserted, that "this Government will not fall" even if we allowed Marcos to return.
It flies, finally, in the face of the fact that a good number of the henchmen trusted allies, implementors of martial law, and pathetic
parasites of the ex-first couple are, in fact, in the Government, in the comfort of its offices, and or at the helm of its key agencies. Let us
not, therefore, joke ourselves of moral factors warranting the continued banishment of Marcos. Morality is the last refuge of the selfrighteous.
Third: The problem is not of balancing the general welfare against the exercise of individual liberties. 20 As I indicated, not one shred of
evidence, let alone solid evidence, other than surmises of possibilities, has been shown to justify the 'balancing act" referred to. Worse,
these conjectures contradict contentions that as far as Philippine society is concerned, Marcos is "history".
The power of the President, so my brethren declaim, "calls for the exercise of the President's power as protector of peace.
21
This is the self-same falsehood Marcos foisted on the Filipino people to justify the authoritarian rule. It also means that we are no better
than he has.
That "[t]he power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence" 22 is a bigger fantasy: It not only summons the
martial law decisions of pre-"EDSA" (especially with respect to the detestable Amendment No. 6), it is inconsistent with the express
provisions of the commander-in-chief clause of the 1987 Charter, a Charter that has perceptibly reduced the Executive's powers vis-avis its 1973 counterpart. 23
II.
The undersigned would be lacking in candor to conceal his dislike, to say the least, for Marcos. Because of Marcos, the writer of it's
dissent lost a son His son's only "offense" was that he openly and unabatedly criticized the dictator, his associates, and his military
machinery. He would pay dearly for it; he was arrested and detained, without judicial warrant or decision, for seven months and seven
days. He was held incommunicado a greater part of the time, in the military stockade of Camp Crame. In his last week in detention, he
was, grudgingly, hospitalized (prison hospital) and confined for chronic asthma. The deplorable conditions of his imprisonment
exacerbated his delicate health beyond cure. He died, on November 11, 1977, a martyr on the altar of the martial law apparatus.
The undersigned also counts himself as one of the victims of Marcos' ruthless apparatchiki. On August 14, 1979, he was, along with
former President Diosdado Macapagal, and Congressmen Rogaciano Mercado and Manuel Concordia, charged, "ASSOed"and placed
under house arrest, for "inciting to sedition" and "rumor mongering " 24 in the midst of the distribution of Ang Demokrasya Sa Pilipinas
(Democracy In the Philippines), a book extremely critical of martial rule, published by him and former Congressman Concordia, authored
by President Macapagal and translated into Tagalog by Congressman Rogaciano Mercado. In addition, they were also all accused of
libel in more than two dozens of criminal complaints filed by the several military officers named in the "condemned" book as having
violated the human rights of dissenters, and for other crimes, in the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. It had to take the events at
"EDSA" to set them free from house arrest and these political offenses. I am for Marcos' return not because I have a score to settle with
him. Ditto's death or my arrest are scores that can not be settled.
I feel the ex-President's death abroad (presented in the dailies as 'imminent") would leave him 'unpunished for his crimes to country
and countrymen. If punishment is due, let this leadership inflict it. But let him stand trial and accord him due process.
Modesty aside, I have staunchly and consistently advocated the human right of travel and movement and the liberty of abode. 25 We
would have betrayed our own Ideals if we denied Marcos his rights. It is his constitutional right, a right that can not be abridged by
personal hatred, fear, founded or unfounded, and by speculations of the "man's "capacity" "to stir trouble" Now that the shoe is on the
other foot, let no more of human rights violations be repeated against any one, friend or foe. In a democratic framework, there is no this
as getting even.
The majority started this inquiry on the question of power. I hold that the President, under the present Constitution and existing laws,
does not have it. Mandamus, I submit, lies.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Grio- Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in
his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule 19 1 of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos
Norte.5Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent
Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch,
both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an
Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country."7 The body, which was later on referred
to as the Zearosa Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to
eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. 9Upon the conclusion of its
investigation, the Zearosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey
Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies Report to the President" (the Report). 10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations
against her and her aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. 12Purportedly without the benefit of data verification,
PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission, 13 thereby causing her inclusion in the
Reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the Philippines. 15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed group
(PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring
by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the
prominent personalities with whom these groups are associated. 17 The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the
Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa. 18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacaang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the
Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups
validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86)
firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but that the more significant fact from
his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due
to the existence of the Commission which has continued communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbao stressed that the
Commissions efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body
monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that
the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has been considerably
weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied
with the Commissions recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In
the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the
PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized. 20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the
politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. 21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus,
she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte
gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the
enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people
identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July
2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her
Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b)
withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering
respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports. 26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010
after finding the Petition meritorious on its face. 27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit all information and reports
forwarded to and used by the Zearosa Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed
respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zearosa Commission, or to any other
government entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to
make a written return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July
2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation
and surveillance of Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was
implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a
Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple
attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following requisites under the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the
right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location
of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information.31 They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa. 32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition. 33 The trial court categorically ruled that the
inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy,
to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboas right to privacy
indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that
comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security
that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation
and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboas
activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the
Zearosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx
xxx
xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused respondents, who are public officials, of
having gathered and provided information that made the Zearosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this
gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x. 34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through
substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zearosa
Commission without the benefit of prior verification. 35 The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official
positions, information on her may have already been acquired. 36 Finally, it held that the Zearosa Commission, as the body tasked to
gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a
compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38 raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant to [sic]
the Zearosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zearosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is
an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present substantial evidence to show that her
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she
had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a
PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should
be done in accordance with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered
unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from
respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack
the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to
informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis--vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v.
Mutuc,43thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections
raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the
constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean
more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The
right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice
Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose
claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court, stated: "Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the
right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx
xxx
xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty;
in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual,
in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern
society has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow
the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health
as may be provided by law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a
person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial
secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of
certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. x x x.46(Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute
right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the
legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In
Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over
the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is
an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no
infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to
ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative
investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In
these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state
interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It
seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American
habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data
protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden, 52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their
private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen,
worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security
zone.53 He was refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of
information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was
prevented access.54 He claimed, among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights55on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his classification in the
register as a security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the
refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private life.57 However,
the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim,
which was the protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the
scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities. 59 The following
statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22,
55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend
not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference involved. In the
instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of
the interference with the applicants right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for the Contracting States to have laws
granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not accessible to the public information on
persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for
national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leanders legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his
possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not as
such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, 34-35), and, apart
from those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the respondent State in assessing the pressing
social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security,
was a wide one.
xxx
xxx
xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the
conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security", as it is the very absence
of such communication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the abovementioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of
Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the person concerned, as
contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see
paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system
meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the
respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual
interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to
have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding
legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary
remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the
relevant state interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis the interest of the state to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted
authority.60 It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled
and administered by a national police commission. 61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the
power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes
to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to
assist the commission in the performance of its functions. 63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection
of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and
prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zearosa
Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities.65One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came
from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa
Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose
of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the
police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission
without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a
violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation.1wphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update
information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. 66 Thus, safeguards
were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further determination as to the propriety of
sharing information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative
bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court
nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality.
Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent
to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature.1wphi1 That it was leaked to
third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that
respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the
purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private
life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful
mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,
- versus -
RAYMOND MANALO
MANALO,
Respondents.
and
REYNALDO
G.R. No. 180906

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 7, 2008
x- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the
constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar
involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 [1] of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense,
the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents.
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[2] filed before this Court by
herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and
agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective
Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article
VIII, Section 5(5)[3] of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we
(1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or
persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their
Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or
depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1[4] of the 1987 Constitution.[5]
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein
petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits,
and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under
Sec. 26[6] of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period
provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule
and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as
required in Sec. 18[7] of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.[8]
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further
resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of
Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to
the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the
petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.[9]
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the
dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1.
To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file
herein;
2.
To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.
3.
To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from
notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his
duly authorized deputy, the latters authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance
with this directive.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers
and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were
not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by
the barangay hall.[11]
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed
soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but
his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in
the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip,
ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers
stopped her and told her to stay.[12]
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz,
and Pula de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly
taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed
men.[13]
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the
soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias
Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him
was Ganata. He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was George who was tall, thin, white-skinned
and about 30 years old.[14]
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were
beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldos. The van stopped several times until
they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open,
Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their
guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymonds) room and it was his (Raymonds) turn to be beaten
up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit
with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA
members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.[15]
In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them
sir, and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived
and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One
of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew
much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents abduction. [16] While these officials
interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk,
they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.[17]
On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with
urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and
burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they
stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they
would come back the next day and kill him. [18]
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him
to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped
through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his
chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who
were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.[19] He reached the
highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him
to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his
back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond
before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.[20]
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed,
the torture resumed, particularly when respondents guards got drunk. [21]
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in
that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and
sleeping. He counted that eighteen people[22] had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.[23]
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms
and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers
marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the DTU. [24]
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked
them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt
other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines,
including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents urine test and advised them to
drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the
master of the DTU, Master Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he
met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. [25]
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue
suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey
house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilarios men. [26]
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big
unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to
them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was
already waiting, seated. He was about two arms length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to
which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond
if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that
Gen. Palparan was an evil man.[27]
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?
Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, bastat sundin nyo ang lahat ng
sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa magulang mo huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right
dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na
kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno. [28]
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning,
Hilario, Efren and the formers men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents house. Raymond was shown
to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers,
Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymonds parents acceded. Hilario threatened
Raymonds parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were
then brought back to Sapang.[29]
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four masters who were
there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.[30] When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white
vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine
he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that
they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance. [31] During his
testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. [32]
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named Alive, was green and
yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if
they were getting their dose of the medicine. The Alive made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up. [33]
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in
Sapang, he should introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again
Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians. [34]
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three
unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold
was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks. [35]
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in
a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the
barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of
the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was
crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the
laundry.[36]
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel
Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with Allan whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called
master or commander by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times,
Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back
on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed. [37]
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive
and should continue along their renewed life. Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents
to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back
to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the
name Oscar and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names
and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.[38]
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24 th Infantry Battalion
in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed
with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their
guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising
livestock.[39]
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to
take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an
old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA
members in his house.[40] Another time, in another Operation Lubog, Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA
men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right
before Raymonds eyes.[41]
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and
some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to
do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.[42]
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to
detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril,
at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang
nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa
kanyang katawan at itoy sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at
dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon
nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan,
ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya
tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak,
dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang
ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa
Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen.
Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na
galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na
kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi
ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi
pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na
kami kinakadena.[43]
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald
(Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They
were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were
instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.[44]
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for
which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked
a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was
pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other
three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents house did not have electricity. They used a
lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking
session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond
and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound
for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.[45]
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymonds affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed
together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he
was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond
attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA
because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer
bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and
brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed
to use the name Rodel and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along
Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while
Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of Alive in different houses. In these trips,
Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once
outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board,
Welcome to Camp Tecson.[46]
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic
medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly
cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their
escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne
by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August
15, 2007, two days after respondents escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the
scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. [47]
Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of
the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held
incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas
corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely:
Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The
respondents therein submitted a return of the writ On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party
respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on
September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army,
stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish
their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007, it exonerated
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the
disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the
Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. [48]
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense,
which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers alleged abduction. He also
claimed that:
7.
The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he
undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP
operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic
policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8.
In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the
Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to
submit report of such compliance Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have
issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of
action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the
petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.[49]
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he
received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued
directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and
the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or
direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message
on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA
and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX 3 of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative
to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought
for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme
Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding
circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military
personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of
justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process. [50]
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No.
179994, another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I
immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any
detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police,
Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good
office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba,
Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were
detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used
by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino. [51]
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt.
Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of
the Return and would be subsequently submitted.[52]
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7 th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers
Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. [53] The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the
7th Infantry Division.[54]
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palaran,[55] through his Assistant Chief of Staff,[56] to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under
his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy
Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the
veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any. [57] Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint
as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the
television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction. [58]
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and conducting an
investigation on May 29, 2006.[59] The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.[60] The
investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no
other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated[61] as
according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons.[62]
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. [63] The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first
time to meet them.[64] During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall,
Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons. [65]
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the
next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two
signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.[66] When the Sworn
Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30,
2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.[67] He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel. [68]
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenezs Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially
quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken
from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified
armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for
Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula
Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit B) states that he was at Sitio
Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his
residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy.
Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation
that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they
claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently
denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit C) states that he is a
resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato
Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an
NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for
accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the
concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the
incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA
vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a
member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit O) states that he is a resident of
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That
being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as
active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother KUMANDER BESTRE TN:
Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San
Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their
place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a
criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his
father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit E) states that he is a resident of Brgy.
Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate
when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed
only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by
alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there
are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their
brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA
BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit F) states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He
claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an
NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged
abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio
mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are
his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit G) states that he is a resident of
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based
at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that
they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE
is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in
the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction
of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him
about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the
abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the
government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged
abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that
incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy
and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the
ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming
that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the
first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGUs, they
ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village,
they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the
CPP/NPA is concerned.
V.
CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above
named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any
administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI.
RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians
Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.[69]
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate courts assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the
December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED,
REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN
PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH
THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE
PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD
CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS,
RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND
MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL
PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL
AUGUST 12, 2007.[70]
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17,
2007. The Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,[71] hence representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice
system[72] participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances.[73] It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our peoples
constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial
law regime.[74] As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances,
its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.[75] On the other hand, enforced disappearances are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.[76]
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means protection in Spanish.[77] In 1837, de Tocquevilles Democracy in
America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to
many Mexican jurists.[78] One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,[79] which
granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into
the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights
granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and
Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case
in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation. [80]
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. [81] If, after hearing, the judge determines
that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the officials superiors, to cease the violation and to
take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles
of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails
in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using
this power to make law for the entire nation. [82]
The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the
particular needs of each country. [83] It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexicos
self-attributed task of conveying to the worlds legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful
history conceived.[84] What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later
evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo
contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality
and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the
protection of peasants rights derived from the agrarian reform process. [85]
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses
especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the
whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.[86] Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain,
however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights. [87]
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of the above amparo protections
are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause,
provides for the judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Clause accords a similar general protection to human
rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy
of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution. [88] The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of
judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.[89]
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,[90] these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ
of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under theAmparo Rule, this
hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights
abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid
judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.[91]
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long
run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order [92] to stop
petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23,
2007,[93] prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of
the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they
moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo
brothers enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible
uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein
respondent Raymond Manalo.[94]
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners cause of action, to determine
whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
(emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[95]
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from
their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until
they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent
Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents harrowing
experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the
following: Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel. [96] (N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na
galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. [97] May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang
hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.[98] Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang
bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena.[99] Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto
kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar. [100]
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz:
the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents)
to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house
through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU
auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the
CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also
CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were
Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long
captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or
sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando,
the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The
investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU
auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the
participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly
exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated
Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners
captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no
controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and
told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal role in
the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long
captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that
unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without
probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; SantiagoLagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish
that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilarios involvement could not,
indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the
petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas
proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought
away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents
during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a
Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a
week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to
Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they
were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face
with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners
parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join
anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join
any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master
Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when
Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other
occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was
established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was
similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for,
indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming. [101]
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not corroborated by other independent and
credible pieces of evidence.[102] Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo
Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical
injuries inflicted on respondents,[103] also corroborate respondents accounts of the torture they endured while in detention.Respondent
Raymond Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt.
Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit, [104] firms up respondents story that they were detained for some time in said military
facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar
evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan
government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commissions findings of fact were
mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. [106]These
statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military
installation where she was detained.[107] She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular
second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered
while in detention.[108]
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that
much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will
depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other
evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no
surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced
disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and
surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not free in
every sense of the word[109] as their movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial
Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people
are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents rights to life, liberty
and security.[110] (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even
killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.[111]
Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point out that this right is often associated with liberty; it is also
seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment. Conceding that there is no
right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights to be kept free from torture
and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places [112] fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person
under the writ of Amparo. They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view
of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents
cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile[113] that the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by
the State on the exercise of that liberty[114] such as a requirement to report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a
deprivation of liberty[115] or being put under monitoring and surveillance. [116]
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their
right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to
security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and
effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the states power over a persons home and possessions, but more
importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. [117] The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court
in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: [118]
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting
under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity
and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional
inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute
as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any
interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons. [119] (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1[120] guarantees essentially the right to be alive[121] - upon which the enjoyment
of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which
each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful
ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his
person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans
existence.[122] In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual. [123]
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom
from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. [124] It is the right to security of
person as the word security itself means freedom from fear.[125] Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126] (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the
threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned
in the earlier part of the provision.[127]
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II
of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant.[128] Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because
they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. [129]
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the
victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as
the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically
proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily
integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of freedom from threat as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an
offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these
degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.[130] In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the
state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ... (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other
hand, provides that (n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Although the
application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in
holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could
reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances
in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3
to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.[131] (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily
integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental
freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the
meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These
rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.[132]
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of the
writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect
for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. [133] As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the
importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,[134] viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government. [135]
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee[136] in not a few cases involving Article 9[137] of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person
appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of
person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,[138] a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school
in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one
could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux
prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other
provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right
to liberty and the right to security of the person.These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the
Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article
9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of
formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined
in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of
persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties
are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9
which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its
jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.[139] (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,[140] which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who
continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the
ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,[141] involving discrimination, intimidation and
persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,[142] involving the abduction of the complainants
husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,[143] involving the murder of the complainants partner and
the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,[144] involving an
assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the right to security not only as prohibiting the State from
arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. [145] The ECHR
interpreted the right to security of person under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on
disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.[146] In this case, the claimants son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been
seen since. The familys requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested
that this was a violation of her sons right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect
the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to
account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take
effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation
into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.[147] (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a
continuing violation of respondents right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In
Raymonds narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain Mam, who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are
now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to
be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan,
respondents captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo
attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na
kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi. [148]
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this
continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only
in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat
to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.[149] Precisely
because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt
acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of
respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will
again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide
protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an
effective investigation of respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt.
Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn
Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was
present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question
to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six
implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a
policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of amparo is issued
by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved
party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of
the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in
the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court. [150] Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also
submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting
on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.[151] To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of
National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek
through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty
and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective
investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their
case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any
treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the
characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior
to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and
(4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce.[152] In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague
allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be
produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the
documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction
has not been shown.
Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant
for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people
from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as
respondents.
Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody or control
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,[153] the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces
tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company
questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the
argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Constitution
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and
unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the
exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal
injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom
respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of
respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be
served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents rights. The list of
medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical
interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret
walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203335
February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO,
JR.,Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203299
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203306
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI "TOTO"
CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID, TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA, CIRILO P. SABARRE, JR., DERVIN
CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203359
SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203378
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL R.
BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICEDEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203391

HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA.
KATHERINE ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, LEILA DE
LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203407
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist BIENVENIDO L.
LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG, Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno,
CRISTINA E. PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan, FERDINAND R. GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B.
MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, LANA R. LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Women's Party,
ADOLFO ARES P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE LIMA, Secretary of the Department of Justice, LOUIS
NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office, NONNATUS
CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief of the
Philippine National Police, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203440
MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT V.
SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN (all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center), Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as
Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, The CHIEF of the Philippine National Police, The DIRECTOR of the National Bureau of Investigation (all of the
Executive Department of Government), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203453
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI), CENTER FOR
MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN, MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH
ALWYN ALBURO, ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-tora10175/,Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CYBERCRIME
INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT
AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203454

PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES,Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THE HON. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203469
ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C. RIMORIN; JULIUS
D. ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD
A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A. HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S.
REMENTILLA; MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S. YU; CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC.
PRESIDENT RUBEN B. LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, INC. COORDINATOR PEDRO E.
RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS
NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; HON.
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and P/DGEN. NICANOR A.
BARTOLOME, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203501
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Information and
Communications Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his official capacity as Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine
National Police,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203509
BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES,Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203515
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as President and
in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE
HANDS IN THE PASSAGE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203518
PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN HEROISM,
represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S. Melencio, FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO,
MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIO, NOEMI LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA ORALES,
JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M. RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR.,
LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E.
OSORIO, ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO,Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE DOJ OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME
INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER,Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the
internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study, amusement,
upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special audiences like
associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit
card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of
the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But
all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology
for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully
the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for
committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false
representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children
who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and
punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of
indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They
accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and
memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of
their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace
activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day
temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from
implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
The Issues Presented
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and
impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators.
These provisions are:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
The Rulings of the Court
Section 4(a)(1)
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental
rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct,1 useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. 2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.3
In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no
fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. 4
Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools and techniques
used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target
systems security and report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be
remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records. 5
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be
used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the "get out of jail free card." 6 Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior
permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
xxxx
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the
area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by
means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not
encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, 8 the act of willfully destroying without
right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no
connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and private documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect 9 or the fear of possible
prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the
State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing
socially harmful conduct.10 Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil
that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of ones constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of circumstances will Section
4(a)(3) be valid.11 Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
xxxx
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and
deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at the
time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will
cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any
other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law
would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another
who registers the name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between
the two, the law should recognize the difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is
the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain
name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:

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b) Computer-related Offenses:
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(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the
penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and
transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.13 But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v.
Mutuc,14 it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of
constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter
of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon" 15 the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused
by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches 16 and seizures, which is the
basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. 17 In assessing the challenge that the
State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. 18
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his
place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.19 The law punishes those who acquire or use
such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb
computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific conducts
proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition,
use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the
unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of
identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate
purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and it may be
presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the
part of the perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a
special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(1) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
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(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. 21 They express fear that private
communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal
code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious
kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously." 22 This
meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the
bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act give a proper
perspective on the issue. These deliberations show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x between and among two private
persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some." 23 The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that
the element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber
prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography,
i.e., by webcam.25
The subject of Section 4(c)(1)lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activityis not novel. Article 201 of the RPC punishes
"obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain
or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography."26 The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or design
involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other
consideration.27
The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that serve no other purpose than satisfy the
market for violence, lust, or pornography.29 The Court weighed the property rights of individuals against the public welfare. Private
property, if containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through
internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the
exploitation of women.
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity.30 The Court will not
declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of
maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of
a computer system as Congress has intended.
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(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree
higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in
cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since
the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty.32 The potential for
uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture or create any
form of child pornography"33 clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to
punish.34Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally
liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his
ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.
The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below. For now the Court
must hold that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.
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(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer
system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its
existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject
receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in
early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a
"spam." The term referred to a Monty Pythons Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam"
when reading options from a menu.35
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a nuisance
that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and
interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the
person sending out spams enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys
less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers." Secondly,
people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been
outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or
reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given
to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. 36 The State cannot rob him of this
right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which
may be brought by the offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel.
Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
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(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the
requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as
a basis for conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article
354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise good
jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People39 even where the offended
parties happened to be public figures.
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c)
identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact 41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.42 The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.43
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required to establish
guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a
public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National
Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private
persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement
where the offended party is a public figure. Societys interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs.44
Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of actual malice or
malice in fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who were public figures. Actually, the
Court found the presence of malice in fact in that case. Thus:
It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus,
petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there
malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants
during the electoral campaign. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given to utterances against public figures in the above case, cinema and
television personalities, when it modified the penalty of imprisonment to just a fine of P6,000.00.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly
presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. 45 For his defense, the accused must
show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true. 46
Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the countrys obligations under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines, 47 the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that penal defamation laws should include the
defense of truth.
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it
happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition that the accused has been prompted in making the statement
by good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears
that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the
defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have
been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that
defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of expression. 48 Indeed, the ICCPR states that although
everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute.
It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be provided by law.49
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to
Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
"similar means" for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel
brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet
media is distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style.50 In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of
quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the
networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users. Whether
these reactions to defamatory statement posted on the internet constitute aiding and abetting libel, acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime
law punishes, is another matter that the Court will deal with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of
the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on protected expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects
the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing
laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor
General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the
law.51 The legislature is not required to define every single word contained in the laws they craft.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets another in
destroying a forest,52 smuggling merchandise into the country,53 or interfering in the peaceful picketing of laborers,54 his action is
essentially physical and so is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character. These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves
to the tests of common sense and human experience.
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea of "aiding or
abetting" wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use.
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33% of Filipinos have accessed the internet within a year, translating to
about 31 million users.55 Based on a recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most engaged countries for social
networking.56 Social networking sites build social relations among people who, for example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or
real-life connections.57
Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared interests use Facebook
to get in touch.58 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and
exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile.59 A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video
on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the users privacy settings.
If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to his friends, anyone on Facebook can react to the
posting, clicking any of several buttons of preferences on the programs screen such as "Like," "Comment," or "Share." "Like" signifies
that the reader likes the posting while "Comment" enables him to post online his feelings or views about the same, such as "This is
great!" When a Facebook user "Shares" a posting, the original "posting" will appear on his own Facebook profile, consequently making
it visible to his down-line Facebook Friends.
Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to send and read short textbased messages of up to 140 characters. These are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is the practice of posting small pieces of digital
contentwhich could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short videos, or other mediaon the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter
user has "Followers," those who subscribe to this particular users posts, enabling them to read the same, and "Following," those whom
this particular user is subscribed to, enabling him to read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter user can make his tweets available only
to his Followers, or to the general public. If a post is available to the public, any Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting. Retweeting
is just reposting or republishing another persons tweet without the need of copying and pasting it.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo;
c) the internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet caf that may have provided the computer used for
posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site.60Now,
suppose Maria (a blogger) maintains a blog on WordPress.com (blog service provider). She needs the internet to access her blog so she
subscribes to Sun Broadband (Internet Service Provider).
One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married public official has an illicit affair with a movie star.
Linda, one of Marias friends who sees this post, comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are so immoral." Marias original post is
then multiplied by her friends and the latters friends, and down the line to friends of friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a
stranger to both Maria and Linda, comes across this blog, finds it interesting and so shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog
on her Twitter account. Nenas "Followers" then "Retweet" the link to that blog site.
Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random persons "Retweet" of Nenas original tweet and posts this on her Facebook account.
Immediately, Pamelas Facebook Friends start Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting. A lot of them even press the
Share button, resulting in the further spread of the original posting into tens, hundreds, thousands, and greater postings.
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it with others,
to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that
says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not
be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No,
for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting
libel in the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social networking site. Would a reader and his Friends or Followers,
availing themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the complex
world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the
crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk
sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or
abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the
criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a round hole when applied to cyberspace libel.
Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a
chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to
freedom of expression.
The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 61 a case involving the
constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The law prohibited (1) the knowing transmission, by means of a
telecommunications device, of
"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18 years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an interactive computer
service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age or to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of
age communications that, in context, depict or describe, in terms "patently offensive" as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.
Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First Amendments guarantee of freedom of speech for being overbroad.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled:
The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. 223, is a matter of special concern for two reasons.
First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special U.S. Const. amend. I concerns
because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of
a criminal conviction, the CDA threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The
severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas,
and images. As a practical matter, this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of vague
regulations, poses greater U.S. Const. amend. I concerns than those implicated by certain civil regulations.
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The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. 223, presents a great threat of censoring speech that, in fact, falls
outside the statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose
messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further reason for insisting that the statute not be overly
broad. The CDAs burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. (Emphasis
ours)
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and
travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim,
his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of
this cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will
unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. 62
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise
robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 63 The terms "aiding or
abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments,
and other messages.64 Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is
acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,65 "we must view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount facial challenges to penal
statutes not involving free speech."
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground
absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the
statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing.66
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he
claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness
of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A
person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.67
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any government threat
of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of
the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers
such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens are not given
"fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain
whether or not one netizens comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did not?
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory story against
Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then that should be considered an original posting published on the internet. Both the
penal code and the cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations that
society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy relationships and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity
and tension between social or economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.
In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google procures, stores, and indexes child pornography and facilitates the
completion of transactions involving the dissemination of child pornography," does this make Google and its users aiders and abettors
in the commission of child pornography crimes?68 Byars highlights a feature in the American law on child pornography that the
Cybercrimes law lacksthe exemption of a provider or notably a plain user of interactive computer service from civil liability for child
pornography as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider and cannot be held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene...whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.69
When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he effectively republishes it whether wittingly or unwittingly. Does
this make him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? When a user downloads the Facebook mobile application,
the user may give consent to Facebook to access his contact details. In this way, certain information is forwarded to third parties and
unsolicited commercial communication could be disseminated on the basis of this information. 70 As the source of this information, is
the user aiding the distribution of this communication? The legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve users of annoying fear of
possible criminal prosecution.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its
obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the
cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless
consummated.71 In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section
4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on
Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section
4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on
Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses
borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker may for instance
have done all that is necessary to illegally access another partys computer system but the security employed by the systems lawful
owner could frustrate his effort. Another hacker may have gained access to usernames and passwords of others but fail to use these
because the system supervisor is alerted.72 If Section 5 that punishes any person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense
is not upheld, the owner of the username and password could not file a complaint against him for attempted hacking. But this is not
right. The hacker should not be freed from liability simply because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.
Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the innocent. 73 While this may be true with respect to
cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section
4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6), Section 4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1)
as well as the actors aiding and abetting the commission of such acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty through adroit
tracking of their works. Absent concrete proof of the same, the innocent will of course be spared.
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with
the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the
penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws,
as the case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points
out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology
and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is
able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be prosecuted and
penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two different laws define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other. 74 With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child
pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online
or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one
and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished
under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.75 Charging the offender
under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.76
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPAs scope so as to include identical
activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPAs definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would
likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum
amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of
not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five
hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of
prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00)
or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as
enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be
one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto
mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or
both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree
lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not
exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability of Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices; when the crime
punishable under 4(a) is committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a
measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be
punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act
or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been connected with another crime. 77 Judges and magistrates can
only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.78
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by
technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer
system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not
content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated
information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or
to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail
civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind
they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected.
Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or
information that they send to one another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may require the disclosure of matters
normally considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law, 79that
there is a compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. 80 In assessing regulations affecting
privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees.81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the tremendous
activities in cyberspace for public good. 82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor
traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law enforcement
authorities with the power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a
state business. Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to
adopt legislative measures to empower state authorities to collect or record "traffic data, in real time, associated with specified
communications."83 And this is precisely what Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to collect or
record such data.
But is not evidence of yesterdays traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it has been committed, adequate for fighting cybercrimes
and, therefore, real-time data is superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who commit the crimes of accessing a
computer system without right,84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;86and producing child pornography87 could easily evade detection and prosecution by simply moving the physical
location of their computers or laptops from day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere:
from internet cafs, from kindred places that provide free internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors.
Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can
neither be located nor identified. There are many ways the cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child
pornography could use relays of computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is
only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-issued search and seizure warrant that can
succeed in ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not provide ample safeguards against crossing
legal boundaries and invading the peoples right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in Morfe v.
Mutuc88that certain constitutional guarantees work together to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude,
and that there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all
freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional
privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions, while
informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to informational
privacythat those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without
surveillance and intrusion.91 In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two98 | P a g e F u l l t e x t o f C a s e s f o r
fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a
certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable.92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a particular person or group, petitioners
challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the
population who use all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be
measured from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his communication through a service provider, must of necessity
disclose to the latter, a third person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT user. For example, an ICT user who
writes a text message intended for another ICT user must furnish his service provider with his cellphone number and the cellphone
number of his recipient, accompanying the message sent. It is this information that creates the traffic data. Transmitting
communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it through the postal
service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no one will read the information appearing outside the envelope.
Computer datamessages of all kindstravel across the internet in packets and in a way that may be likened to parcels of letters or
things that are sent through the posts. When data is sent from any one source, the content is broken up into packets and around each of
these packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data: information that tells computers where the packet
originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where
the packet is going, and how the packet fits together with other packets. 93 The difference is that traffic data sent through the internet at
times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their
coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from one computer system to another where their contents are pieced back
together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the
sender and the recipient.
For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the service providers communications system will put his
voice message into packets and send them to the other persons cellphone where they are refitted together and heard. The latters
spoken reply is sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected by the service provider, the sender reveals his cellphone number to
the service provider when he puts his call through. He also reveals the cellphone number to the person he calls. The other ways of
communicating electronically follow the same basic pattern.
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that telephone users in the 70s must
realize that they necessarily convey phone numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a call. That Court ruled that even if
there is an expectation that phone numbers one dials should remain private, such expectation is not one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another over cyberspace except
through some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed for a successful cyberspace
communication. The conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making the expectation to privacy in regard to them
an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk,
pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to create profiles of the persons under
surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a persons close associations, religious views, political
affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls
within matters protected by the right to privacy. But has the procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly
enough to protect individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in
real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence and that whether there is due
cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define
the meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel
situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General suggests that "due cause" should mean
"just reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even
bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a
general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement agencies use the traffic
data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an identified suspect? Can the data be
used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data
collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law
enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data
contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these
agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications." But this supposed
limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The
power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of traffic data "in real time" because it is not possible to get
a court warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But warrantless search is associated with a police
officers determination of probable cause that a crime has been committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that
unless the search is immediately carried out, the thing to be searched stands to be removed. These preconditions are not provided in
Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal protection to internet users and that the procedure
envisioned by the law could be better served by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare assurance that law enforcement
authorities will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The grant of the power to track cyberspace
communications in real time and determine their sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.95
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth
doctrine. These doctrines however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply only to free speech cases. But Section 12 on its
own neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions to monitor individuals and place
them under surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or even impossible. "All the forces of a technological age x x x
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking
to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the
Constitution guarantees.
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services
provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content
data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its
preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer data preserved,
transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal
document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.
Hu man Righ ts Class
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data
preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture
proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to be considered
private communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass
its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and
subscriber information relating to communication services for at least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to
content data for at least six months from receipt of the order for their preservation.
Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. The service provider has
never assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement
authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly
hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring
any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or
control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for
investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners objection is that the issuance of
subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive
agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers. 98
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of
law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an
unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after
judicial intervention.
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law
enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications
network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer
system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to
enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer data storage medium
and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure procedures. On its face, however,
Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use
of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on
the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but
merely supplements them.
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law
enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and
examination.
Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of preservation or examination, destroyed or deleted upon the lapse of the
prescribed period. The Solicitor General justifies this as necessary to clear up the service providers storage systems and prevent
overload. It would also ensure that investigations are quickly concluded.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination violates the users right
against deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to
require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved,
he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a
copy before it is deleted.
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the
Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.
Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or
video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer
data, produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service providers systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in ones papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer
data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of
expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare
certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial
warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and
executioner all rolled into one.100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine
the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the
dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. 101 Section 19, however, merely
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into
consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three
tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression
and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement
authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum
period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by
law enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a
legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,102 Section 20 necessarily incorporates
elements of the offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it
would not have had to make reference to any other statue or provision.
P.D. 1829 states:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
x x x.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial
determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised.
Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this
Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement
of the national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses through
a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.103
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan.
Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition
of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and
technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and users assets.104 This definition serves as the
parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses
by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing
arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation."105 This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which
has been considered as sufficient standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected
Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to the
prejudice of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are
committed with the use of information and communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;

i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve traffic data and
subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration of the
prescribed holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICCs Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and
CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3)
on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but
VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1wphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of
the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175
and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in
respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44
September 13, 1945
LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.
Guillermo B. Guevarra for petitioners.
J.A. Wolfson for respondents.
HILADO, J.:
Alleging in their petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated August 30, 1945, that they have been and are being "confined, restrained and
deprived" of their liberty in the Correctional Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link
Infante, pray that the officers therein named, to wit, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the CIC, U.S. Army, "or whoever
acts in her place or stead," be directed to appear before this Court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show cause why
petitioners should not forthwith be set at liberty.
Respondent Lt. Col., Bradford, having been served with this Court's order to show cause dated August 31, 1945, made return thereto
dated September 5, 1945, to which are attached as parts thereof certain commitment orders marked Schedules A, A-1 and A-2, the first
and last emanating from the Headquarters of the Sixth Army, 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the second from that
of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.
Respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, WAC, having been served with this Court's order to show cause dated September 7, 1945,
made return thereto dated on the same day, incorporating therein by reference Schedules A, A-1 and A-2 of her co-respondents' return
above mentioned.
It appears from these returns, as well as from the arguments of counsel, that by virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the
Army MacArthur on December 29, 1944, petitioner Lily Raquiza was on March 13, 1945, arrested by the 306th Counter Intelligence
Corps Detachment of the U.S. Sixth Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 385 (Schedule A), wherein she was
charged as follows:
Commitment Order. The person named and described above is deemed a risk to the security of the U.S. Forces for the
reasons set forth above. The commanding officer of any military stockade, jail, or comparable installation in which this person
may be confined is authorized and directed to detain him in custody until released by competent military authority.
In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or charge against petitioner Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity
for Japanese."
As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, it appears that by virtue of the aforesaid proclamation she, on February 25, 1945, was arrested by
the same 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 286 (Schedule A-2)
wherein the Commitment Order is in exactly the same terms as in Schedule A. The specific complaint or charge against petitioner Tee
Han Kee in Schedule A-2 is "Active collaboration with the enemy."
With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, it appears that by virtue of the same proclamation she, on April 10, 1945, was arrested by
the 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, and detained under Commitment of
that date (Schedule A-1), wherein she was charged with "Active collaboration with the Japanese." Her previous association with the
enemy constitutes a present security risk to the United States Armed Forces.
The said proclamation reads:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
PROCLAMATION
PROVIDING FOR MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN UPON THE APPREHENSION OF CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES WHO VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID, COMFORT AND SUSTENANCE TO THE ENEMY.
WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to
the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief Southwest
Pacific Area, hereby do publish and declare it to be my purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any
position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war;
whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases.
Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this twenty-ninth day of December, 1944.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General of the Army
United States Army
Commander-in-Chief
Of course, the power of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army to issue the foregoing proclamation cannot be seriously
questioned. It has not been questioned in this case. Where opinions are divided as to its interpretation and effects.
General of the Army MacArthur therein published and declared it to be his purpose, among other things, to hold in restraint the
persons referred to, when apprehended, "for the duration of the war; whereafter, I shall release them to the Philippine Government for
its judgment upon their respective cases." He premised his proclamation upon two grave reasons, to wit, (1) that evidence was before
him "that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance
due the Government of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;" and (2) that "military necessity requires that such
persons be removed from any opportunity to threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our military operations."
In the very nature of things, the Commander in Chief of the Army of liberation at the time of issuing that proclamation had to act upon
the evidence then before him. The exigencies of the mighty military operations that he had then but recently begun for the destruction
or defeat of the powerful enemy who was at that time occupying the Islands, did not permit of any other procedure. And to deny him
the exclusive power and competency to determine the strength and sufficiency of such evidence would have been destructive of that
military efficieny with which, in the interest of all the citizens of the Philippines themselves, not excluding the herein petitioners, the
operations for their liberation had to be conducted. And once having apprehended the persons to whom the proclamation referred, the
same exigencies required that the said Commander in Chief be invested with the exclusive power and authority to decide when he
should deliver them to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Has the war terminated within the meaning of that part of his proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief declared his purpose to
hold such persons in restraint "for the duration of the war"? We are of opinion that it has not.
In the case of United States vs. Tubig (3 Phil., 244, 254), this Court said:
From that day the fighting continued, and the insurrection did not end officially until the President proclaimed it an end, July
4, 1902. It is necessary to refer to a public act of the Executive Department to fix the date of the closing of the war.
(Freebornvs. The Protector, 79 U.S., 700.)
If it be alleged that, notwithstanding the insurrection, there were no actual hostilities in Nueva Ecija at the times above
mentioned, the answer is that the condition of hostility remained impressed on the whole island until it was removed by the
proclamation of the President. . . .
War, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminates at the time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority
competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political department, and not of the judicial department, of government to
determine when war is at an end. . . . (67 C.J., 429, sec. 195.)
And even if the war had terminated, we are of opinion that under the aforesaid proclamation the petitioners, who are held in restraint
thereunder, would continue legally under custody of the proper military authorities of General of the Army MacArthur's or his
successors' command, for a reasonable time after termination of the war.
If General of the Army MacArthur had, in express terms, declared in his aforesaid proclamation that after termination of the war he
will release the persons therein named to the Philippine Government within a reasonable time, we think that he could have done so
within his legitimate powers as Commander in Chief of the United States Army; and not only this, but that for obvious reasons he
should be the best and, therefore, the only judge of how long or how short that time should be under the circumstances. And in order
to give his proclamation a reasonable construction, we are of opinion that this should be implied from the context. Otherwise, we
would be giving to this solemn document the irrational interpretation that said Commander in Chief thereby announced a purpose
which would be physically impossible for him to carry out; namely, to make delivery to the Philippine Government immediately upon
termination of the war of persons under restraint whose number he could not then foresee but which he could reasonably expect to be
more or less considerable, with their respective charges and pertinent evidence, papers, and the like. It was not a matter of delivering a
certain quantity or amount of personal property but human beings who although under custody, had to be properly housed,
maintained and otherwise treated as becoming the "dignity of the human person," which is one of the cardinal principles of democracy
for which the United Nations have fought in this war.
The fact that, as this Court can take judicial notice of, delivery of certain persons under custody of the United States Army pursuant to
the said proclamation has already begun does not mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, which it clearly has
not. Such delivery is undoubtedly within the power of the proper military authorities to make even before the termination of the war.
The existence of the military necessity to which General of the Army MacArthur refers in his proclamation, as well as its continuance, is
a question exclusively for the military authorities to determine, as regards each and every person under detention. For obvious reasons,
the civil courts should not here interfere, and it is to be presumed that in the judgment of said military authorities that necessity no
longer requires the detention by them of the persons whom they have already delivered to the Philippine Government.
In the case of Coleman vs. Tennessee (97 U.S., 509), the Supreme Court of the United States, among other things, said:
It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its
government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and the criminal jurisdiction of the place. The sovereign is understood, said this
court in the celebrated case of The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 139, to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction when he allows the
troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions: "In such case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction
over the army to which this right of passage has been granted, it would certainly be considered as violating his faith. By
exercising it, the purpose for which the free passage was granted would be defeated, and a portion of the military force of a
foreign independent nation would be diverted from those national objects and duties to which it was applicable, and would
be withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose power and whose safety might greatly depend on retaining the
exclusive command and disposition of this force. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction
over the troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those punishments
which the government of this army may require." (Emphasis ours.)
In the case of the United States Army of liberation, not only has the Commonwealth Government asked, and the United States
Government agreed, that it come and be stationed in the Philippines, but it is here for the very realization of the overruling and
vehement desire and dream of the Filipino to be freed from the shackles of Japanese tyranny, and to see this was brought to a victorious
end. If a foreign army permitted to be stationed in a friendly country, "by permission of its government or sovereign," is exempt from
the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place, with much more reason should the Army of the United States which is not only
permitted by the Commonwealth Government to be stationed here but has come to the islands and stayed in them for the express
purpose of liberating them, and further prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion, be exempt from the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of this place, at least for the time covered by said agreement of the two Governments. By analogy, an attempt of our civil
courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period expires, would be considered as a violation of this
country's faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold. By exercising it, paraphrasing the foregoing quotation, the
purpose for which the stationing of the army in the islands was requested or agreed upon may be hampered or prejudiced, and a
portion of said military force would be withdrawn from the control of the sovereign to whom they belong. And, again, by analogy, the
agreement, for the stationing of the United States Army or a part of its forces in the Philippines implies as a waiver of all jurisdiction
over their troops during the time covered by such agreement, and permits the allied general or commander in chief to retain that
exclusive control and discipline which the government of his army may require.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Schooner Exchange (7 Cranch, 139), gave the reasons underlying the doctrine of mutual waiver
of jurisdiction between nations in the following paragraphs:
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is
promoted by intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants
require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that
absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers.
xxx
xxx
xxx
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual
intercourse, and interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is
understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the
attribute of every nation.
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the present petitioners, while under the custody of the United States military forces, may be
considered as prisoners of war. In volume II, Hydee International Law, page 345, section 676, we read:
. . . It should be borne in mind that an army in the field, in the course of any operation in any locality . . . may also avail itself,
of the right to make civilians prisoners of war.
The author cites from the Rules of Land Warfare which contain an enumeration of civilians who may be made prisoners of war. This
enumeration includes:
(c) Persons whose services are of a particular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, such as the higher civil officials,
diplomatic agents, couriers, guides, etc. . . . (Emphasis ours.)
We think that the petitioners would prima facie come within this classification under the charges of "Espionage activity for Japanese,"
"Active collaboration with the Japanese," and "Active collaboration with the enemy."
We are not unmindful of the fact that the detention of the petitioners may have subjected them to hardships, but this situation is one of
those born of all wars where hardships of all description are visited upon even the most innocent people. At any rate, we do not think
that the petitioners are totally without remedy. We think they may have recourse to the proper military authorities by making due
representation to them.
These military authorities, we can safely presume, will not deny to the petitioners any remedy which may be available under the
military laws and under the prevailing circumstances. The United States army forces which have come to the Philippines for the
express purpose of liberating the Filipinos and to restore them the blessings of liberty under a democratic government, just as fast as
the military situation would permit, would not be we can justly assume the very ones to take from them any of those liberties
without legal reason or justification. But the present state of the world is such that military exigencies or military necessity may, under
certain circumstances, still require some limitation on the restoration or enjoyment of those liberties. The present case is, in our opinion,
one such situation.
Whether the doctrine here laid down would be applicable to cases arising in time of peace, we do not decide.
In conclusion, we hold that the petition should be dismissed. No special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya and Pablo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 182498
June 22, 2010
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief,
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police AntiCrime and Emergency Response; and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
In our Decision of December 3, 2009, we referred the present case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate proceedings directed at
the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and validation of their results with respect to the enforced
disappearance of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. In the same Decision, we also required: (1) the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to present to the CA
a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the CA for consideration and action, and (2) the CA to
submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs, as
petitioners ,and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of the Decision.
On February 16, 2010, we issued a Resolution, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing that the case be
remanded to the CA for further proceedings as directed in our Decision of December 3, 2009.1avvphi1
On March 17, 2010, our December 3, 2009 Decision became final, and an entry of judgment was accordingly made on May 28, 2010.
Considering the foregoing, the Court resolves to DIRECT the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court, within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Resolution, its 1st quarterly report and recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs,
and the respondent, as directed in our Decision of December 3, 2009. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG are likewise reminded to faithfully
and promptly comply with the directives in our Decision of December 3, 2009.
SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO
RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers
and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the
following stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM)
workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning
of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and
section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente,
(5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed
upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason,
the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969)
shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de
Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize
the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon
reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacaang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50
A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and
third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the
mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the
first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act
No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the
joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed,
dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their
constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated
September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as
directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as
employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29,
1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on
the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant
to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners
received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969,
within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should
be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for
the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion
for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en bancdismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for beingpro
forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners
received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of
the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal
from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76,
rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the
ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake
committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said
president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on
November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as
the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest
possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the
happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not
its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the
sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we
cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to
listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless
the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as
in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by
the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield
against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between
the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of
human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated
by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices
Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to
our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-ofinterests test. 16Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that
by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence
violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by
foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of
assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the
police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they
believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and
its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of,
and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence
perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also
intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own
employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more
emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of
local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the
weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality
abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to
individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the
human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the
scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our
duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can
generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial
Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of
Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses
during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an
injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or
strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a
strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage
work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to
the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will
be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete
unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for
the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the
issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by
one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the
more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any
rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in
this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which
request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass
demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request
of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for
dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all
its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section
3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees
the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for
their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the
employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the
part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under
pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in
giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the
appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to
come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union
activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their
interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the
company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution,"
nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company"
and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees
from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to
them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to
them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a
laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the
superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged
abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of
the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss
actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not
present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were
exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by
the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were
damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages
for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for
unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances
of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being
absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of
Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State
shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to
give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial
Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the
exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social
and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental
agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as
ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may
be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to
obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional
right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without
due process of law, 26even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both
failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted
itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms
are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of
which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate
legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no
time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one
article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient
whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the
Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which
to pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days
from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such
motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial
Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated
September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or
more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule
governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation,
prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the
foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with
the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but
also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case
does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying
the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere
legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have
the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15)
days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56,
Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969
was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to
be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of
ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex
"G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73,
rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such
motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision
subject of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or
answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be
raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a
decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can
be made.30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant
case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights
invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the
said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny
application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30creiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do
not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day
in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when
all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of
the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the
contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an
appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the
admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which
cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or
not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or
excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even
if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the
unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal.
(Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning
adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to
survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case,
especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a
Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific
guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial
Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it
subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the
record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also authorized
by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case
of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly
discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion
is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of
Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a
court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this
provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not
even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang
Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these
reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or
not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical
meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578).
(emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor
workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the
fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969,
instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late
considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of
which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous
Court inPalma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was
cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104
Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it
deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in
Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view them in their entirety,
'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as
means conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in
altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of
Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of
the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point
promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA
272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the
same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the
Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers
were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief;
Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the
demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge
(p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969
and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their
vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union
leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal
blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our system of
Government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that
what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is that preservation of liberties
does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The
only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the
Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a group that is
important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor
and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of
its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its
income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police
officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for
having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of
immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru
Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their
individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been
aptly stated,the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is
a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue
publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic
Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine
Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does
not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed
solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the
employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action,and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an
unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the
complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free
assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass
demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969;
and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service
until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from
the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
G.R. No. 187495
April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide her with
the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x
x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong." 1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which
affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos.
99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their four (4)
children6as they put up several businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m.
of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution, 8 finding probable cause for grave
threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the
accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal
Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in an Order13dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was
arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15 averring that the name of the private
complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated
November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby
modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18, 2000. 17 Accordingly, the
criminal informations were amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial of the two
cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent
physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They got married after a year of
courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they engaged in
several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was
under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill
business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods. 22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the daughters observed the
disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the
businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective. 25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. 26 Three of the
children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She
shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City
most of the days of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then
returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and
fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.30 However, in 1997, he started to be
brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of
lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission. 31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was
preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay
in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the
children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where
the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro
City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly routine. The family store in their
residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the
mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then
prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the
third floor of the house. KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant
and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the
c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed." 36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her
reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall
on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her
lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them
down so forcefully they tore on the sides. 39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him
away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom, 43 KKK's pleas were audible
in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who
prodded her to go to their parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom
and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the
door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. 47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry,
MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened
the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK
crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?"
before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]" 49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom.
KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered herself with a blanket. 50However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To
prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK
to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but
she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way
out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an
animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the
children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After
resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night
in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the children. 54 He
then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his
comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room. 55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and
attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he
grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. 57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front
of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your
mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and
went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no
heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do
[sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once
gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly
uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled
out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and
OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you
crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense

The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK
because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while she
was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and efforts,
the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the
accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He
left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to
Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of
the truck and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According to him, on October
16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck.
On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the truck. They finished
loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former
attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic,
left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de
Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other
truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where
they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged
truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and
management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked
to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance
ofP3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly P9,894.88.66Her
failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape allegations. 67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior. While in
Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when
his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same
when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not
her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went
out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters purportedly addressed to
Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody
from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other
priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted
her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly
to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player. She
got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation
between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted
out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the
accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant.
However, the separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal
separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999. 75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and
credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and
genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime
such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs
and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent
testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on
October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of
rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as
moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the
amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative declarations of
MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the commission of the crime because a
medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to
sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK
such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for
rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's
accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she only found out that a wife
may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her
about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at
his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place
where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so desire, they may
file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through
counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and
the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on
October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate
and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a woman
through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of obtaining the
heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity. 85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using his
property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until she marries to become the
property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner;
buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied her political power and status
under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family. 90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her
husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal property or write a will. 91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory that would
later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract. 92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a
man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife. 93 In those
jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other
courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife
but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for being violative of married
women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule in cases where the husband
and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment
or written agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York declared the same
unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The
decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have
been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to
marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New
York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in
support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual
act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and
frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd.
Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on
demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels
"aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in
"violent or forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her
husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these
doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is
a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole
human being x x x."102(Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act without
exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally
or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old provisions
of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation,
the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse. 105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major
instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender
equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns.107 The country also committed, among others, to
condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation
if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this
principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination
against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and
practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women. 108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of gender equality in the 1987
Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international law such as the
CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype
concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes
against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2
thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is
void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353
penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's
progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative
Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general
definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point

of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it
says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the legal profession,
Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband
from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband.
That is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam
Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go
against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this
jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is the
belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must
provide for something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband
forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under
Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers
to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all
denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual
assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee report are all now
denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is
marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who forces the wife even
to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x
x.110(Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x
x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that
because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until
she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband.
But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital
rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the]
husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you
cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal knowledge by force[,]
threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or
putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the same
definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It
implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of evidence is now
transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is
inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his
wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ,
don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women and they
would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are just
defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does not negate. 111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is where to place it. Let
us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any
of the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated does not come into the
picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then
that is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the
meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against
the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any
need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the
definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that she was really brow
beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed
against her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr.
Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x. 113

The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,114 which regards rape within
marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch
obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal violence are the most common type of
spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical
violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence. 115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA,
he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual,
obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and that the
standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual
right and obligation between husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already been superseded by
modem global principles on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for human dignity established in various
international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the
traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of such measures is R.A. No 8353
insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his
wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of
gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, nonspousal violence and violence related to exploitation; 119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without
her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not
merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords
himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent.
Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital
activities121 that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as
expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual
intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual
communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship.124 When it
is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the
Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels
aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation. 125 But he cannot and should not
demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in
the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws 126 ordains that
similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person
or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault;
and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime
shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law
affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape victims
because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by herein
accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A
married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman. 128 She can give or withhold her consent to a
sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their
sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. 129 Women do not divest themselves
of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable. 130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for different definition or elements
for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and
unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases
as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital
rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the
aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases
should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal principles and evidentiary policies in
the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accusedappellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must
examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified.
Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the
complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect.
This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially
during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and
value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal. 132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial proceedings and the
transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six
separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She remained
consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to
convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially
ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his
temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and
headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant
forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him
to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his
own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted. 133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the
conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings,
the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted
to stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant
further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate
his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He
forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen
and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed
his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying
himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the absence of the victim's
consent to the sexual congress.136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or
grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force and intimidation both of which
were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap which means that he wanted to
have sex."
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.
xx xx
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Q So after that what else did he do?

A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than
me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held your two hands?
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxxx
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
xxxx
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
xxxx
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything. 137
(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he normally do that if he have sex with
you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.

xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with me. 139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and then resting
his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the actual moment of
the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay
with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's
bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to
mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was
customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there
were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the
same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point
when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that
point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual
intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was resisting his sexual
onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much
more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she seriously did not
assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she
repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result.
What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind 141 or is of such
a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission. 142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical certificate do not
negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a
medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do not pertain to the elements that
produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. 145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which are, however,
disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was
controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied based on the position of her
hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an
indication of consent.147Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the actual rape is
bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can
testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on
whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the
circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie,
dont do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their
conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated
to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke
MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief
struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK
narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged inside the children's bedroom.
The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging
that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the
staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of force and
intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear manifestations
of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her
conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom
episodes - all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report the rape incidents to the police
authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not
necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape.
In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told
her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence
it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear
of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is
more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to
submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as
simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have befallen
KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the
failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and positive
testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments
of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court. 152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes generated by
incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was
the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31,
1996 in the amount ofP3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the
accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately P3 Million was spent for the construction of their
house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited
in the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the lettersender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs
herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do
so, to present the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting
witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to
confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on
the witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely made up those
malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary
weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present
sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape
charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-appellant has essentially admitted the
facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi
and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive
to testify falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the
crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility
refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed
when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with
Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less
by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time. 156 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at
the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony of the victim, and her two
daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the
accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward,
credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her
consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as
believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based
thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of
October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in accord with
Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which
states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount ofP50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims without need
of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.1wphi1 Considering that the crime
committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount
is P50,000.00159 and notP75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human being. It
respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in
the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be
her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from
their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his wife's body
by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and
thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to
engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts
that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of
procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool to
harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and
scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made
answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further
ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity,P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

100150 January 5, 1994

[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

Petitioner raises the following issues:

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

FERNAN, C.J., concurring:

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

G.R. No. 180906

xxx xxx xxx

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

February 11, 2014

G.R. No. 203391

G.R. No. 203454

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

Section 4(b)(3) provides:

Section 4(c)(1) provides:

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h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;

September 13, 1945

LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,

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June 22, 2010

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Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

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G.R. No. 187495

April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

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Version of the defense

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MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point

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PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x. 113