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Mistake of Fact, Good Faith, acted without culpable negligence are valid defenses, even if it turns out that
the person was innocent. (People vs. Ancheta)
No legal ground, without intent to deliver to judicial authorities. (Arbitrary Detention)
No Legal ground, with intent to turn over to judicial authorities (Unlawful Arrest)
Legal Ground with intent to deliver to judicial authorities but unreasonably delays (Undue Delay under 125)
No intent to detain, but unlawfully prevented for an appreciable length of time from free movement
(Coercion)
Victim is a woman and detained with lewd designs from the outset (abduction)
Offenses cannot be complexed.
Psychological and not only physical restraint is sufficient for the crime of arbitrary detention, as when
victim was permitted to take meals outside of detention but was too terrorized not to return. (People vs.
Oliva)
ARTICLE 125. DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL
AUTHORITIES.
Provision applies to arrests without warrant and it is lawful.
Delivery refers to filing of complaint; Judicial Authority refers to courts of justice not the public prosecutor
(Sayo et al. vs. Chief of Police)
Failure to deliver the arrestee does not make detention illegal, it just makes the arresting officer criminally
liable (People vs. Mabong)
Article applies to special laws. (..or their equivalent, referring to penalty categories)
The hours during which the courts are closed and no deliver can be made are not to be counted (People
vs. Acasio)
Arrested person may be detained beyond stated periods if he demands preliminary investigation (Sec. 7
Rule 112 Rev. Rules Crim. Pro.)
Art. 125 made applicable to security guards employed by a company who arrested and delayed the
turnover of public officers whom they held in custody (People vs. Sali)
ARTICLE 126. DELAYING RELEASE.
Order of release may be given verbally. (People vs. Misa)
ARTILCE 127. EXPULSION.
Only Chief Executive can order deportation.
ARTICLE 128. VIOLATION OF DOMICILE.
Implied objection, where entry was effected through an opening not intended for that purpose. (first mode
liable)
If Offender is a private individual, trespass to dwelling is committed
A public officer entering anothers dwelling to prevent some serious harm to himself or the dwellings
occupants or a third person or entry into taverns and other public houses absolves a person from criminal
liability.
ARTICLE 129. SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED AND ABUSE IN THE SERVICE OF
THOSE LEGALLY OBTAINED.
Perjury and others crime separate.
If a private individual conspired he is liable under this article. (US vs. Ponte)
ARTICLE 130. SEARCHING DOMICILE WITHOUT WITNESSES.
Applicable in searches with a warrant or valid warrantless searches; also where there is consent of owner,
or incidental to a lawful arrest.
ARTICLE 131. PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION AND DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS.
Public Officers vs. 153- Private Individuals
This cannot be committed by a person who is a participant in the meeting (People vs. Calera)- <Unjust
Vexation, proper crime here>
ARTICLE 132. INTERRUPTION OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
Public Officers vs. 153- Private Individuals
Customarily observed and authorized by authorities of a religion.
There must actually be a religious ceremony. If the offense was committed only in a meeting or a rally of a
sect it would be punishable under Art. 131 (People vs. Reyes)
ARTICLE 133. OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS.
Public Officer/Private Individuals
A public rally by itself conducted by a religious group is not religious ceremony. (People vs. Mandoriao,
Jr.)
If acts committed in a place devoted to religious worship, unnecessary that a religious ceremony is
conducted.
ARTICLE 134. REBELLION OR INSURRECTION.
ARTICLE 134-A. COUP DETAT.
Both crimes can be committed in peace or war time
An armed public uprising by a substantial number of rebels is generally required.
Rebellion cannot be complexed with but absorbs acts committed in the furtherance of the rebellious
movement. (People vs. Hernandez; Enrile vs. Salazar)
Offenses committed for personal reasons or other motives are punished separately even if committed
simultaneously with the rebellious acts (People vs. Oliva)
Illegal Possession of firearm in furtherance of rebellion under PD 1866 is distinct from the crime of
rebellion under the RPC. Therefore violation of PD 1866 being malum prohibitum, invalidates the
defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent. (People vs. de Gracia)
A crime under the RPC cannot be absorbed by a statutory offense, therefore charging one of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion is proper. (People vs. Tiozon).
No crime of misprision of rebellion (US vs. Ravidas) *Misprision is only to treason!
Concealment by the offender of the rebellious activities may make him an accessory.
ARTICLE 137. DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES.
No Crime under this article if principal crime is treason.
ARTICLE 139. SEDITION.
Arms not necessary as long as there is tumultuous public uprising.
Sedition does not absorb murder committed by reason or in furtherance of the seditious activities.
(People vs. Cabrera)
MAJOR CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER.
1. Treason: Conspiracy and proposal (Art. 115), Misprision of Treason (Art. 116) <No Crime of Inciting to
Treason>
2. Rebellion: Conspiracy and Proposal (Art. 136), Disloyalty of Public Officers (Art. 137), inciting (Art. 138)
3. Coup detat: Conspiracy and proposal (Art. 136)
4. Sedition: Conspiracy (Art. 141), Inciting (Art. 142)
BASIC RULE: Conspiracy, proposal and inciting are punishable only if major crimes are NOT
COMMITTED. Otherwise they are absorbed and offenders will be principal by inducement.
Acts or words of incitement must have been premeditated, otherwise if they were only spontaneous the
crime will be tumultuous disturbance as an outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition (Art.153)
The assemblage of persons present must not have been called for the purpose of listening to such
incitement, otherwise the crime will be illegal assembly (Art. 146).
Misprision of Treason and disloyalty of public officers can be prosecuted independently.
In re: Sedition, Knowingly conceal such evil practices <Art. 142> principal not accessory!
ARTICLE 143. ACTS TENDING TO PREVENT THE MEETING OF THE CONGRESS AND SIMILAR
BODIES.
ARTICLE 144. DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS.
No public uprising involved.
Force producing physical injuries, or Fraud involving falsification. Said offenses are complexed as
necessary means employed.
ARTICLE 146. ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES.
Assembly was for the purpose of committing offenses other than treason, rebellion, sedition or assault.
Presumption is that there are persons armed otherwise it will be covered by Public Disorder (Art. 153) or
unlawful utterances (Art. 154[2])
ARTICLE 148. DIRECT ASSAULT.
FIRST FORM: (Force/Intimidation + Objectives of Rebellion/Sedition Public Uprising
To constitute direct assault against an agent of a person in authority the violence, intimidation or
resistance employed by the offender must be serious. (US vs. Tabiana)
If the victim is a person in authority the degree of force employed against him is immaterial as the mere
laying of hands on him is sufficient (US vs. Gumban)
In all forms of assault, resistance or disobedience, it is required that (a) the accused knew the identity of
the victim and (b) the victim was then acting in the due and lawful performance of his duties, or the reason
for the attack against him was his performance of such official duties. (People vs. Rellin)
If both are accused and victim are public officers, NO DIRECT ASSAULT, because it presupposes that the
accused was not discharging his official duties during the attack. Offense may be coercion or physical
injuries <II Viada 246>
Attack was on the occasion of the performance by victim of his official duties, motive is immaterial. (US
vs. Garcia)
If the cause of the direct assault was the past performance by the victim of his official duties which the
accused resented, the accused is guilty of direct assault even if he attacked the victim while both were
going out to fight (Justo vs. CA)
Direct assault is committed even if several days had transpired between the victims performance of his
official duty and the assault, as where the judge was attacked by the offender by reason of a contempt
order he issued for the incarceration of the latter several days before the offense (People vs. Torrecarion)
If motive will not be established, as when a judge was boxed out while it is standing on a railway station,
crime will be physical injuries (People vs. Saiel)
If a school teacher was slapped by the accused not while she was performing her school functions nor by
reason thereof, but in the presence of her pupils, the crime was held to be slander by deed (People vs.
Gamo)
If direct assault was committed with slight physical injuries and the victim is a person in authority, they will
be separate crimes; but if the victim is an agent of a person in authority, the slight physical injuries will be
absorbed in the direct assault (People vs. Acierto)
If the public officer was acting with abuse of his official functions, he is deemed to be acting in a private
capacity and if he is attacked, there would be no crime of direct assault. Thus, where two councillors
fought in the session hall, there could be no direct assault if the cause of the fight was a private matter.
(People vs. Yosoya)
No such legal obligation in the preparation of the formation papers of a corporation to state the truth, so
there is no falsification (People vs. Quasha)
There was no legal obligation to disclose the fact of a previous conviction in the personal data form
submitted by the offender to the police department since that form was not an official document, hence no
falsification was committed.(People vs. Poserio)
There is a legal obligation to disclose the truth in entries made in a residence certificate, hence the
accused was liable for falsification. (People vs. Po Giok To)
NBI personal data sheet is an official document (People vs. Uy)
Where force was employed to compel another to execute a contract, the offender is not liable for
falsification as such compulsion does not make it a false instrument, but only a voidable one. (US vs.
Milla)
Falsification can be committed by imprudence, either by a private individual (People vs. Baas) or by a
public officer (People vs. Castillo)
The person in possession of a falsified document is presumed to have falsified the same, especially so if
he had the opportunity and the motive to do so. (People vs. Manansala)
What is required to be true is an assertion of fact by the accused; hence where the declarant stated that
she was eligible for the public position, an inaccuracy therein could not hold her liable for falsification as
she was actually expressing only an opinion. (People vs. Yanza) Similar to the case of claimant of land
(People vs. San Jose).
Making alterations or corrections in a document to make it speak the truth, even if unilaterally done,
cannot be falsification as the essence of this offense is to make the document tell a lie. (US vs. San
Mateo)