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BOYER-ROXAS v CA
ORDER
When these cases were called for
continuation of trial, Atty. Benito P. Fabie
appeared before this Court, however, the
defendants and their lawyer despite receipt of
the Order setting the case for hearing today
failed to appear. On Motion of Atty. Fabie,
further cross examination of witness Victoria
Vallarta is hereby considered as having been
waived.
The plaintiff is hereby given twenty (20) days
from today within which to submit formal offer
of evidence and defendants are also given ten
(10) days from receipt of such formal offer of
evidence to file their objection thereto.
In the meantime, hearing in these cases is set
to September 29, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning. (Original Records, p. 286)
Copies of the Order were sent and received by the
petitioners and their counsel on the following dates
Rebecca Boyer-Roxas on August 20, 1986, Guillermo Roxas
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner is the Decision[1] dated January 21, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No 74667, which affirmed the
Order[2] dated September 24, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan, in Civil Case No. 548-ML,
denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
The Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), predecessor
of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), is the
owner of the Bataan Hilltop Hotel and Country Club, located
at
the
Bataan
Export
Processing
Zone,
Mariveles, Bataan. Dante M. Quindoza is the Zone
Administrator of the Bataan Economic Zone.
In
this
case,
respondent
Coalbrine
is
a
corporation. However, when respondent Neri filed the
complaint in the RTC, there was no proof that she was
authorized to sign the verification and the certification
against non-forum shopping.
The Court has consistently held that the requirement
regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not
jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with
which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective.[12] Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct, and not the product of the imagination or a matter
of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.
The court may order the correction of the pleading if
verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is
not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[13]
On the other hand, the lack of certification against
non-forum shopping is generally not curable by mere
amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice. [14] The same rule
applies to certifications against non-forum shopping signed
by a person on behalf of a corporation which are
unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to
file the complaint on behalf of the corporation. [15]
In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (FASAP),[16] we ruled that only
individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution
may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of
a corporation. We also required that proof of such authority
must be attached. Failure to provide a certificate of nonforum shopping is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition.
Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification
was submitted unaccompanied by proof of signatory's
authority.
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor
Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. [4] The Ordinance is
reproduced in full, hereunder:
guilty party
cancelled.
shall
automatically
be
the
Mayor
for review
petition was
a resolution
petition as a
to the Court
including
affected
unless
those
rights
are
considered in a suit involving those who
have this kind of confidential relation to
them."[36]
Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.[40] ErmitaMalate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill
up a prescribed form stating personal information such as
name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation
before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging
house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals.
A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City
of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and
similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However,
the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was
sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and
the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities
covered under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public
morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but
the services offered by these establishments have been
severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the
lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line
of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.[41]
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct
business practices, namely wash rate admissions and
recognition
to
the
right
to
privacy
independently of its identification with liberty;
in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life
of the citizen.[70]
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which
the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for
more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose
pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is
momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who
wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate
purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed
any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable
private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other
than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look
to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a
wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners
of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the
means
must
be reasonably
necessary for
the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights.[71] It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will
not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. [72]
SO ORDERED.
CHING VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
57169 dismissing the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus filed by petitioner Alfredo Ching, and its
Resolution2 dated June 28, 2004 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
T/R
Nos
.
Date
Grante
d
Maturit
y Date
Principal
Description of
Goods
204
2
01-3081
04-3081
184
5
12-0580
03-0581
180
1
11-2180
02-1981
P2,001,715 Synthetic
.17
Graphite
Electrode
[with] tapered
pitch filed
nipples
185
3
12-0880
03-0681
185
7
12-0980
03-0981
182
4
11-2880
02-2681
189
5
12-1780
03-1781
179
8
11-2180
02-1981
191
1
12-2280
03-2081
180
8
11-2180
02-1981
204
1
01-3081
04-3081
209
9
02-1081
05-1181
210
0
02-1081
05-1281
for the offense under P.D. No. 115, via criminal prosecution.
Moreover, P.D. No. 115 explicitly allows the prosecution of
corporate officers "without prejudice to the civil liabilities
arising from the criminal offense." Thus, according to the
Justice Secretary, following Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation, the civil liability imposed is clearly separate
and distinct from the criminal liability of the accused under
P.D. No. 115.
Conformably with the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice,
the City Prosecutor filed 13 Informations against petitioner
for violation of P.D. No. 115 before the RTC of Manila. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 99-178596 to
99-178608 and consolidated for trial before Branch 52 of
said court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Secretary of Justice denied in a Resolution 18 dated
January 17, 2000.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with the CA, assailing the resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice on the following grounds:
1. THE RESPONDENTS ARE ACTING WITH AN UNEVEN
HAND AND IN FACT, ARE ACTING OPPRESSIVELY
AGAINST ALFREDO CHING WHEN THEY ALLOWED HIS
PROSECUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO EVIDENCE
HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO PROVE HIS PARTICIPATION
IN THE ALLEGED TRANSACTIONS.
2. THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
COMMITTED AN ACT IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION
WHEN THEY CONTINUED PROSECUTION OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE THE LENGTH OF TIME
INCURRED IN THE TERMINATION OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION THAT SHOULD JUSTIFY
THE DISMISSAL OF THE INSTANT CASE.
C.
THE PRESENT SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS IS NOT
THE PROPER MODE OF REVIEW FROM THE
RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. THE
PRESENT PETITION MUST THEREFORE BE
DISMISSED.21
On April 22, 2004, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the
petition for lack of merit, and on procedural grounds. On the
procedural issue, it ruled that (a) the certification of nonforum shopping executed by petitioner and incorporated in
the petition was defective for failure to comply with the first
two of the three-fold undertakings prescribed in Rule 7,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; and (b) the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was not
the proper remedy of the petitioner.
On the merits of the petition, the CA ruled that the assailed
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were correctly issued
for the following reasons: (a) petitioner, being the Senior
Vice-President of PBMI and the signatory to the trust
receipts, is criminally liable for violation of P.D. No. 115; (b)
the issue raised by the petitioner, on whether he violated
P.D. No. 115 by his actuations, had already been resolved
and laid to rest in Allied Bank Corporation v. Ordoez; 22 and
(c) petitioner was estopped from raising the
City Prosecutors delay in the final disposition of the
preliminary investigation because he failed to do so in the
DOJ.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, alleging that:
I