G.R. No.

92163 June 5, 1990

(c) denied his right to bail; and

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE

ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR
DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL
PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs.
Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would reexamine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening
period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of
success-but none, it would Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively
conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen;
none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to
bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant
had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R.
Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning,
February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given
over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo
Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpusherein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on
March 6, 1990. 5On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the
respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but
separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall
within the Hernandezruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information
in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for
the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.charged murder
and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated
otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo")
arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in
the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling,
and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with
which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses
provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds
of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The
Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the
matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the
legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to
Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator
Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of
Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes,
and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;

(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two
(2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the
ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent
challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others,
Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to
the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this
Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon
which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious
offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11In thus acting, the
President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of
law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or
should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the
complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were
not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what
appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made
clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace

referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente
en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana,
p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then
in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que
un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea
medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas
grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de las
que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los
delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to
the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts
charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code
does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act
constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment
graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that
the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period,
Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the
aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this
benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the
result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits
said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more
serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate
penalties for each offense. 12

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with
the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of
Rodriguez Navarro:

This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling
merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's
complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does
in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple
rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition
for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating
its denial?

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against
defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed
by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot
exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in
conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a
similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke
that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason
of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial
court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without
first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed
as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the
strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently
irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different
from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during
the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or
affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the
judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established
procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty
minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively
brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or
could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandezas applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information
charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more
than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal
action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in
dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said
Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond
the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be
demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such
complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from
deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is
the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner:
the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It
makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail,
though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing
where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom
no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to
proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other
parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of
the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such
pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming
directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but
also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the

delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so
doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered
and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached
this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the
Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short
shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with
the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has
thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses
(G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is
therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have
uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner
Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim
in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the
strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law,
that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have
become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is
allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the
rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in
the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but
by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing
rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded
streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public
peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to
restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and
delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The
Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any
given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the
need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence
said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's
earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted
by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135,
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO
TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO
MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the
information on the following grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed
meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the
"complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator
of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having
committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarias Village, Makati, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully
and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt.
Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance
of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to
dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge
Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was)
probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the
Information on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against
Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting
on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the
Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration
for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for
all the component acts of rebellion;
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by
patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this
Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law
while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil.
515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case
gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the
component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure
reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion.
(Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex
crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for

two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in
furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c)
which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine
ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of
the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing
penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo
Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or
concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a
component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of
rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us
that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People
v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28
SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot
therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138
[1948]) is instructive:

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated
Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col.
Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits
executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive
Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday
party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information
(Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about
100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby
concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully
armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December
coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or
include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree
No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one
crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101
separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other
armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed
to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be,
and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even
so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the
latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of
coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of
opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so
may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction
with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of
treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is
punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code;
hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is
specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains
the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime
of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part
and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery,
kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the
instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must
not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel
Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for
practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of
conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and
must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion
punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor
the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed
with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v.
Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD
1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER
IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court
in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD
1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The
prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone
or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and
also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in
Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under
PD 1829 can not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is
not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the
latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act
is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be
deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and
convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms. The Court ruled:

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to
his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass
upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the
accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the
crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a
separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is
QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors
in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in
the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further
now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where
the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner
Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD
1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on
the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The
Court, however, clarified, to wit:

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN NUEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI;
ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING
ANDRINO @ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE; RUBEN DOE @ KA
RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ; ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND
CARLITO MAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused, RODRIGO DASIG, accused-appellant.

accused-appellant Nues because of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he
noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him together with his companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a
suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon
reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to escape. The team
of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines
and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at
his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber
revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him.

NOCON, J p:
Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his conviction by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.
He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others who are still at large, in an information
which reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue, of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with
intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and use of motor
vehicle, all armed with unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital
portion which caused his death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a
policeman who was then in the performance of his official duties."
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the
prosecution had presented its first witness, accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to
"guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said
accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing,
Nuez died on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto
Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to
assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon
controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted
as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he
identified as Edwin Nuez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two
of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being
followed, they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a
gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and
thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own
life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons
take Pfc. Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead while the rest of the
group including Nues acted as back up. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle
and fled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can identify

Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nues was turned over to the
Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the
PC Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army
Hospital in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of
the Creer Law Office, who was requested by the military to represent appellant who did not have
a lawyer. Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked appellant whether he was
willing to avail of his services, to which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his
constitutional rights. The interrogation was conducted in Cebuano upon appellant's request.
Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise
admitted that he and Nues were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were
"Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as Exhibit
"J" 2 was signed by him on every page thereof with the first page containing a certification
likewise signed by him, which states: "I hereby certify that the herein statement is free and
voluntary, and that I am assisted by my counsel in the course of this investigation" followed by
the signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial confession was subscribed and sworn
to before Cebu City Asst. Fiscal Salvador Solima.
In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession
was taken was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends
that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of
simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and
consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious
offense. That even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence as said counsel did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect, his
presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings and not to protect
appellant against possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the sincerity of
Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering that the latter is a known anti-Communist
advocate and that the law firm to which he belongs has represented high ranking officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.
We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated
that he had personally examined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's statement
was free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the same in his presence and swore under
oath as to the veracity of everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he

assisted the affiant from the start of the investigation up to its termination. Atty. Parawan testified
thus:

Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?

A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.

"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?

Q Was that reduced to writing?
A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced
myself as a lawyer. So they informed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced
myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a
confrontation with Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his lawyer in
that investigation. Then he told me yes.
Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?
A No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in connection with that investigation
which was about to be made?
A Yes.
Q Who are the persons present at that time?
A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira,
myself and Dasig.
Q What happened after that?
A The CIS started the investigation.
Q You mean this Ariston Ira?
A Yes.
Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig informed of his constitutional rights
to remain silent, to counsel and if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement of his
will be used against or in his favor in the court of justice?
A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.
Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired next?
A The investigation started.

A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were the answers of the accused,
Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions propounded by the investigator voluntary?
A Yes, they voluntary.
Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?
A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00, we proceeded to the office of
the City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema
(sic) and then it was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema (sic).
Q Were you present during the proceeding?
A I was also present."
We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court that the
extra-judicial confession of the appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:
"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his investigation was
properly informed and appraised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that time he did
not signify his intention to retain a lawyer of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in
the person of Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at that time, to
assist him during the custodial investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed
at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was confined after being hit on
his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein accused after the
latter has answered in the affirmative to his question as to whether he would be amenable to be
assisted by him as his counsel of his own choice.
"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato Parawan after consenting to be his
counsel was with him when his extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed and
sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office
who, before accused has actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his extrajudicial confession, has informed him (accused) of his constitutional rights and has explained the
contents of his extra-judicial confession.

"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City
Fiscal's Office, clearly shows that accused in executing the same has done so voluntarily and
after having understood the contents thereof which is in the visayan language, a language
known to him, found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B."
"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the sworn statement of
his co-accused Edwin Nues dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to before
City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of Cebu City."
The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused
successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of
reward or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four square to the
case at bar. In Parojinog this court had this to say:
"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.'
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show
that no objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the
investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda
V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained for the
first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. Thus it was too late."
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective
and hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal
liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer
who stood by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record is
the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's sworn
declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial
confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which
query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been
substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As has been pointed out, such
allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of
guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.
Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is guilty, what he committed
was a political crime of simple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted of murder with
direct assault.

The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as manifested in the
People's brief, which We quote:
"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously convicted him of Murder
with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of Rebellion.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means. (Article
135, Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership
with the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad
while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial
notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective
of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the
killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of
the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct
assault upon a person in authority."
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing
too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or
an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.
Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where the accused who was
charged with murder admitted his membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC
informer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135
of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons
convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General.
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However,
in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime
committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person
giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an
unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of
Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession
was legally obtained. However, appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the
liquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly constituted
government, the crime committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion
beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight

(8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga,
Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his
waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three
other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the
ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year
old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who
fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y
Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim
from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face,
the chest, and other parts of the body. 2 On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the
cause of death as hypovolemic shock.3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992
filed an Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931
before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present
unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police
Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused
ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy
with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to
pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline
Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil

indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of
Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing
actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on
the part of the said accused.
With costs against the accused.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision
finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as
supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In
his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New
People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends," 4 (said killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime
of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not
fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he
should have been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion
under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been
meted only the penalty of prison mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor
General avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the
defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman
was for "political and subversive ends." 5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if
appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial court had found appellant guilty
merely of being a participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as
appellant contends, but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by
Republic
Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty imposable for
individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is
committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially, of
any of their powers or prerogatives. 6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. 7 By
its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action,
which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. 8 One aspect noteworthy in the
commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in

the crime itself because they acquire a political character. This peculiarity was underscored in
the case of People v. Hernandez, 9 thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the
Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then it becomes
stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime
of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a
different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than
the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes
imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political
end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a
state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People
v. Gempes, 10 this court stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since
moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to
state, which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the
deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are
duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of
these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases
where the act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the
rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without
any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a
common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion. 11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime
alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit from the
law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case
of Enrile
v.
Amin, 12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D.
No. 1829, 13 for allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of
the senator's knowledge that Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against
the prosecution's contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D 1829 could be tried
separately 14 (on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829
is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being charged, though punishable under
a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts
for which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on
June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of
P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already been
filed and in fact decided, the Court said:

The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but
also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political
offense. 15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile vs. Amin further
underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with
rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is
a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the
act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then
it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished
separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the
act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would
not, by and of itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr., 16 to the instant case
is striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the accused
Ompad, alias "Commander Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other
members of the NPA in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel
infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely charged with and
convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political
motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information. 17 It must be
established by clear and satisfactory evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or
defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The lone
uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being an
informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate to
establish that the motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant's
obvious interest in testifying to that effect. 18
Similarly, in People v. Buco, 19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to establish
that the reason for the killing of their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence
adduced by the defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by
Tomas Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the
evidence likewise showed that Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the
killing on account of private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court
attributed no political motive for the killing, though committed by known members of the
Hukbalahap movement. 20

People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held
that "the act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion."
In Dasig the Court however noted that the accused, who was charged with murder, not only
admitted his membership with the NPA but also executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect
that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his
brief therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this Court favorably
quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective
of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He
states that accused-appellant's belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only
insubstantial but also self serving 23an averment to which, given a thorough review of the
circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly overcame
the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for the
killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the PC.
The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning
to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar where the
evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not
substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of victim SPO3
Jesus Lucilo. 24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession
to having participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:

Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you used the road near the bakery
where did you proceed?
A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at more less 4:30
P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI
AN TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead
of a small store, my three (3) companions continue walking towards poblacion, later on a
policeman sporting white T-shirt and a khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said
policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the small store,
when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN took the service firearm of the said
policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2) companions commanded a
tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel
took the handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)

Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?

A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is JESUS
LUCILO. (sic)

Q What is your participation in the group?

A Look-out sir.

Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)
A No more sir. 25

Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?

A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a
certain alias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me and told me
to go with them, so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a
passenger jeepney and told me board on said jeepney. (sic)

Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we
walk towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we
continue walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)

It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention
that he was a member of the New People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals
nothing which would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a
political purpose. Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements,
did not contain any mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3
Lucilo. 26 Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn
statement of October 19, 1992. 27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership in the NPA surfaced
almost merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed
through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew
appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta
admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member. 28 The logical result, of
course, was that the trial court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial
court, after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony while
upholding the rest of it. 29 While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's testimony on appellant's
alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration

about how the crime was committed. 30 Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent
portions, except as to the identity of the gun wielder, by the testimony of the appellant himself.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993,
sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.

In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime
being a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He
testified that, upon the prodding of aliasAlwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of
the
organization's
goals. 31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our
organization," 32 without, however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he
had been a member of the NPA for five months before the shooting incident. 33

SO ORDERED.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched in terms so
general and non-specific 34 that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would
have made towards the achievement of the NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere
policeman, was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have
offended the NPA. Against appellant's attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a
political color, the evidence on record leaves the impression that appellant's bare allegations of
membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It
is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed
to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating
the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by
common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or
irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled.
Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate,
unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts that the Government
authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the
right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need
for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid. 35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of
SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime
of murder. 36 It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is
settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to
convict. 37 Against appellant's claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one
witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to
convict the accused. 38Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the
appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction, there
being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of
the felony. 39 In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution's case was furthermore
bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in open court that he and the eyewitness, his own
uncle, bore no grudges against each other.40
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant
was sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery,
the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law.

G.R. No. 17748

March 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the Philippine Constabulary to
inflict revenge upon the police of the city of Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the participants in the public disturbance. Convicted in
the trial court of a violation of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to
the maximum penalty or a near approach to the maximum penalty provided by the punitive
provisions of that law, all of the defendants have perfected an appeal to this court. A statement
of the case and of the facts, an opinion on the pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no reversible
error be found, regarding the appropriate penalty, will be taken up in the order named.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS
On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a member
of the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The
arrest of the woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage
committed by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila
police department and member of the Philippine Constabulary.
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on
Calle Real, in the District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter with various
Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary.
Private Macasinag was seriously, and as afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.
The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and private
Macasinag and other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a
Constabulary soldier endangered a deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at
Santa Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon converted into a desire for revenge against the
police force of the city of Manila. The officers of the Constabulary appear to have been aware of
the state of excitement among the soldiers the shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the
commanding officer of the Barracks, increased the number of guards, and confined all the
soldiers in the Barracks.

to saw out the window bars of the quarters, in his charge, and to allow soldiers to escape
through the window with rifles and ammunition under the command of their sergeants and
corporals. When outside of the quarters, these soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the
city police force.
One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real,
Intramuros, fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an
American policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was taking with a friend named Jacumin,
a field clerk in the United States Army. These two men were shot and died soon afterwards. To
the credit of policeman Driskill be it said, that although in a dying condition and in the face of
overwhelming odds, her valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was killed
notwithstanding that in response to the command of Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated
both arms.
A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without
considering that the passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad
fired a volley into the car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor de Torres and gravely
wounding three other civilian passengers, Gregorio Cailes, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes.
Father Jose Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila, proved himself a hero on this occasion
for, against the command of the Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease firing
and advanced in order that he might administer spiritual aid to those who had been wounded.
The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes later, Captain William E.
Wichman, assistant chief of police of the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by
policeman Saplala, arrived at the corner of Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a
volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain
Wichman and the death shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala.
About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic police station. When it was on Calle
Real near Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had stationed
themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of
patrolmen Trogue and Sison.

During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in
Santa Lucia Barracks to the effect that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the
streets of Intramuros and that private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot he
received the night before. This rumor contributed in no small degree in precipitating a movement
for reprisal by the Constabulary soldiers against the policemen.

Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in number, had in the meantime,
arranged themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gradens on the east side of Calle General
Luna opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired upon the
motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio who with
companions were passing along Calle General Luna in front of the Aquarium going in the
direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros. As a result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle,
policeman Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired
several volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service
of the city of Manila across Calles General Luna and Padre Burgos, but fortunately no one was
injured.

At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the
Fourth Company approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of quarters,
and asked him to let the soldiers out through the window of the quarters of the Fourth Company.
Private Torio was easily persuaded to permit private Francisco Garcia of the Second Company

General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and Captain Page, commanding officer of the
Santa Lucia Barracks, and other soldiers in the streets of Manila, and other soldiers one after
another returned to the Barracks where they were disarmed. No list of the names of these
soldiers was, however, made.

In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920, Colonel, Lucien R. Sweet of the
Constabulary officers, and later by the fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced an investigation
of the events of the night before. He first ordered that all the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks at
that time, numbering some one hundred and eighty, be assembled on the parade ground and
when this was done, the soldiers were separated into their respective companies. Then Colonel
Sweet, speaking in English with the assistance of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who interpreted his
remarks into Tagalog, made to all of the soldiers two statements.
What occurred on the occasion above described can best be told in the exact language of
Colonel Sweet: "I assembled all four companies in Santa Lucia Barracks and asked them to tell
me which ones had been out the night before and which ones had participated in the shooting,
which they did, and to tell me the names of those who were with them and who were not then
present, which they did. I think there were seventy-two (seventy-three) present and they named
five (four) others." Again the witness said: "At first I asked all those who went out on the previous
night for any purpose whatever to signify the fact by stepping forward and gave them five
minutes to think it over before doing so. To those who stepped forward that had gone out for any
purpose whatever I asked those who took part in the shooting the night before that in justice to
themselves and to the other men who had not taken part in it, and for the good of all concerned,
that they step forward and they did." The names of the four who took part (not five as stated by
Colonel Sweet), but ho were taken to present, were noted by Captain Gallardo.
The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken in writing during the afternoon of the
same day, December 16. The questionnaire prepared by the fiscal of the city of Manila was in
English or Spanish. The questions and answers were, however, when requested by the soldiers,
translated not their dialects. Each statement was signed by the soldier making it in the presence
of either two or three witnesses.

policemen and then abused by the same; and not content with having abused her,
they gave this woman to an American; after this incident, they arrested two soldiers of
the Constabulary, falsely accusing them of keeping women of bad reputation; after this
incident, came the shooting of Macasinag, a shooting not justified, because we have
come to know that Macasinag did nothing and the policemen could have arrested him
if they desired. Moreover, the rumor spread among us that the police department of
Manila had given orders to the policemen to fire upon any Constabulary soldier they
found in the streets, and we believe that the rumor was not without foundation since
we noticed that after the Macasinag affair, the policemen of Manila, Contrary to the
usual practice, were armed with carbines or shotguns. For this reason we believe that
if we did not put an end to these abuses of the policemen and secret service men,
they would continue abusing the constabulary. And as an act of vengeance we did
what we had done last night.
6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last night? I saw that
almost all the soldiers were jumping through the window and I was to be left alone in
the barracks and so I followed.
7. Who asked you to join it? Nobody.
8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was shot by the Manila police
the night before last on Calle Real? Yes, Sir, I know him because he was our
comrade.
9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of said soldier?
Indeed, yes, not only was I offended, but my companions also were.

Although the answers to the questions contained these statements vary in phraseology, in
substance they are the same. One of them, the first in numerical order, that of Sergeant
Graciano L. Cabrera, taken in Spanish and interpreted into Tagalog, may be selected into
Tagalog, may be selected as typical of the rest, and is here literally transcribed:

10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during the riot last night. I cannot tell
precisely the number of shots I fired because I was somewhat obfuscated; all I can
assure you is that I fired more than once.

1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and residence. Graciano I. Cabrera,
254 years of age, single, sergeant of the first company of the General Service of the
Constabulary, residing in Santa Lucia Barracks.

11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any other person?-If so state whether the
victim was a policeman or a civilian. I cannot tell whether I hit any policeman or any
civilian.

2. To what company of the Philippine Constabulary do you belong? First Company,

General Service of the Constabulary.]

12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. I cannot given an exact
account of the streets where I fired my gun. I had full possession of my faculties until I
reached Calle Victoria; afterwards, I became aware that I was bathed with perspiration
only upon reaching the barracks.

3. Where were you garrisoned

1920? In the Santa Lucia Barracks.

yesterday

afternoon

December

15,

4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday evening? Yes, sir.

13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or how many cartidge
did you use? I Carried a carbine; I cannot tell precisely the number of cartridges I
used; however, I placed in my pocket the twenty cartridges belonging to me and I
must have lost.

5. For what reason, and where did you go? We went in search of the policemen
and secret service men of Manila. It has been sometime now since we have been
having standing grudge against now since we have been having a standing grudge
against the police of Manila. The wife of one of our comrades was first arrested by the

14. How did you manage to leave the barracks? By the window of the quarter of the
Fourth Company, through the grating which I found cut off.

15. Are the above statements made by you, voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously
given? Yes, sir.
16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of immunity is made to
you? Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.
(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.
Witnesses:
S. GALLARDO.
LAURO C. MARQUEZ.
The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the
crimes of murder and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before
different judges of first instance.
All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E.
Vallado., Dionisio Verdadero, and Paciano Caa, first pleased guilty to the charge of sedition,
but later, after the first witness for the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded
guilty were permitted, with the consent of the court, to substitute therefor the plea of not guilty.
the prosecution, in making out it case, presented the seventy-seven confession of the
defendants, introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76, conclusive, and with the exception of
those made by Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and Venancio Mira, all were identified by the
respective Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who intervened in taking them. The
prosecution further relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the uprising.
The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses. The first defense was in favor of all the
defendants and was based on the contention that the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were
not freely and voluntarily made by them. The second defense was in favor of the defendants
Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Roberto Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz,
Roque Ebol, Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla, Paciano Caa, Juan Abarques, Genaro
Elayda, Hilario Hibabar, P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Nemesio
Decea, Venancio Mira, Baldomero Rodriguez, Juan Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel,
and was to the effect these men did not take part in the riot.
The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the accused had been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum
imprisonment of ten years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292. The court, however,
distinguished fines from that of a defendants Francisco Garcia, a private and the eight corporals
E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan
Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was
imposed, and of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio
Eugenio, upon each of whom a fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs were divided
proportionately among the defendants.

For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just been made, we are indebted in large
measure to the conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the Honorable George R. Harvey
who presided in the sedition case and of the Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the
murder case. As stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the defendants, the proof is
substantially the same in both cases.
In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as made by the trial court in this case.
The rule is again applied that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of the trial
court in passing upon the credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstances of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil.,
295; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar, no such fact or
circumstance appears.
OPINION
An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the defendants and appellants. Two the
assignment of error merit little or no consideration. Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its
counterpart in assignments of error 5 and 6 in the murder case), in which it is attempted to
establish that Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caa, Juan Abarquez, Mariano
Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay,
Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro
Elayda, Hilario Hibalar, P. M. Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the
Santa Lucia Barracks in the night of the tragedy, is predicated on the special defense raised in
the lower court for these defendants and three other and which was found untenable by the trial
court. Any further discussion of this question falls more appropriately under consideration of
assignment of error No. 4, relating to the conspiracy between the accused.
Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the trial court that it had not been shown that
the policemen were not aware of the armed attack of the Constabulary, However, we find that
the evidence supports this conclusion of the trial court.
The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the
prosecution (assignment of error No. 2, murder case); (2) the conspiracy between the accused
(assignment of error No. 4, sedition case; assignment of error No. 3, murder case); and (3) the
conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law (assignment of error
No. 5, sedition case).
1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76
Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions.
It is alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the impression that those
who had taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did
not in fact so participate, affirmed that they because of a desire to leave Manila; that other
stepped forward "for the good of the service" in response to appeals from Colonel Sweet and
other officers; while still others simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks of
Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and their declarations
were sometime taken in al language which was unintelligible to them. Counsel for the accused

entered timely objection to the admission in evidence of Exhibits C to C-76, and the AttorneyGeneral is worn in stating otherwise.
Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote good order and discipline in the Philippines
Constabulary," and reading: "No confession of any person charged with crime shall be received
as evidence against him by any court of justice unless be first shown to the satisfaction of the
court that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat,
menace or of promises or offers of reward or leniency," was repealed by the first Administrative
Code. But the same rule of jurisprudence continues without the law. As he been repeatedly
announced by this and other courts, "the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made
freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort". If the confession is freely
and voluntarily made, it constitutes one of the most effectual proofs in the law against the party
making it. (Wilson vs. U. S.[1896], 162 U. S. 613.)The burden of proof that he confession was
not voluntarily made or was obtained by undue pressure is on the accused. (U. S. vs Zara [1912,
42 Phil., 308.)
What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is clearly explained in the records.
The source of the rumor that the defendant would be transferred to Mindanao if they signed the
confession is not established. One the contrary it is established that before the declaration were
taken, Lieutenant Gatuslao in response to a query had shown the improbability of such a
transfer. With military orders given in English and living in the city of Manila where the dialect is
tagalog, all of the defendants must have understood the substantial part of Colonel Sweet's
remarks. What is more important, there could be no misunderstanding as to the contents of the
confessions as written down. In open court, sixty-nine of the defendants reiterated their guilt.
The officers who assisted in the investigation were of the same service as the defendants in their
own men.
It must also be remembered that each and everyone of the defendants was a member of the
Insular Police force. Because of the very nature of their duties and because of their practical
experience, these Constabulary soldiers must have been aware of the penalties meted out for
criminal offenses. Every man on such a momentous occasion would be more careful of his
actions than ordinarily and whatever of credulity there is in him, would for the moment be laid
aside. Over and above all desire for a more exciting life, over and above the so called esprit de
corps, is the instinct of self preservation which could not but be fully aroused by such stirring
incidents too recent to be forgotten as had occurred in this case, and which would counsel
prudence rather than rashness; secretiveness rather than garrulity.

psychology of crowds theory. In other words, it is claimed that at the time of the commission of
the crime the accused were mere automatons obeying the insistent call of their companions and
of their uniform. From both the negative failure of evidence and the positive evidence, counsel
could deduce the absence of conspiracy between the accused.
The attorney-General answers the argument of counsel by saying that conspiracy under section
5 of Act No. 292 is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. In this law officer for the
people may be on solid ground. However, this may be, there is a broader conception of the case
which reaches the same result.
It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act, each is
responsible for all the acts of the other done in furtherance of the common design; and " the
result is the same if the act is divided into parts and each person proceed with his part unaided."
(U. S. vs Maza [1905], 5 Phils., 346; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918] 37 Phil., 599; decision of supreme
court of Spain of September 29, 1883; People vs. Mather [1830], 4 Wendell, 229.)
Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances
which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. It be proved that the defendants
pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another part of the same, so
as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the
conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.)
Applied to the facts before us, it is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the
same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A
common feeling of resentment animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training
was followed.
The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology and metaphysics is unavailing in the
face of actualities. The existence of a joint assent may be reasonably inferred from the facts
proved. Not along are the men who fired the fatal shots responsible, not along are the men who
admit firing their carbines responsible, but all, having united to further a common design of hate
and vengeance, are responsible for the legal consequences therefor.
We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring that there a c conspiracy between the
accused.
3. The conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sediton Law

These confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily without
any promise of immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses
whose credibility has not been successfully impeached.
We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution.
2. The conspiracy between the accused
The contention of the appellants is that evidence is lacking of any supposed connivance
between the accused. Counsel emphasizes that in answer to the question in the confession,
"who asked you to join the riot," each of the accused answered, "Nobody." The argument is then
advanced that the appellants cannot be held criminally responsible because of the so called

Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise
publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie
objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any
official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government. The trial
court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been committed,
and we believe that such finding is correct.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act
No. 292 it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a
public functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed

bodies of the Philippine Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5

of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies.
In one scene there was a fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but it
was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.
We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the violation of section 5,
paragraph 3, of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
JUDGEMENT
The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any person guilty of sedition as defined
in section 5 of the law, punishment by fine of not exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not
exceeding ten years, or both. In this connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each
of the private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Decea,
Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Liron (Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero,
Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel, Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway,
Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Timoteo Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto
Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo, Francisco Lusano,
Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo Inis,
Julian Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Petronilo Antonio, Domingo
Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano Caa, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel
Coralde, Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Marcos Marquez,
Victorino Merto, Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito,
Pascual Dionio, Marcial Pelicia, Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de
la Cruz, Juan Miranda, Graciano Zapata, Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and
Vicente Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten years, and to pay one seventy-seventh part of
the costs; the private Francisco Garcia, who sawed the bars of the window through which the
defendants passed from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the corporals E. E. Agbulos,
Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario
Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P5,000 and
one seventy-seventy of the costs; and each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual
Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P10,000
and one seventy-seventy of the costs. The trial judge appears to have made a reasonable
exercise of the discretion which the law reposes in him.
We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without making our own the pertinent
observations found in the decision of the trial court in this case. Therein, along toward the closed
of his learned opinion, Judge Harvey said:
Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been registered a crime so
villainous as that committed by these defendants. The court is only concerned in this
case with crime of sedition. The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292,
imprisonment for ten year and a fine P10,000, is not really commensurate with the
enormity of the offense. Impelled by hatred, employing their knowledge of military
sciences which is worthy of a better cause, and in disregard of the consequences to
themselves and their innocent loved ones, and using the means furnished to them by
the Government for the protection of life and property, they sought by force and
violence and outside of legal methods to avenge a fancied wrong by an armed and
tumultuous attack upon officials and agents of the government of the city of Manila.

Although in view of the sentence which is being handed down in the murder case, affecting
these same defendants and appellants, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose
penalties in this case, yet it is obviously our duty to render judgement appealed from, with one
seventy-seventh of the costs of this instance against each appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-1451

March 6, 1906

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO TOLENTINO, defendant-appellant.
Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case, was convicted upon an information charging him
with the crime of "uttering seditious words and writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous
libels against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands, committed as follows: That said Aurelio Tolentino, on or about the 14th day of May,
1903, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, did unlawfully utter seditious words and speeches
and did write, publish, and circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tend to obstruct the lawful
officers of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in the
execution of their offices, and which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for
unlawful purposes, and which suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots, and which
tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which said seditious words and speeches are false and
inflammatory, and tend to incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the government
established by law within the Philippine Islands, and tend to incite, move, and persuade great
numbers of the people of said Philippine Islands to insurrection, riots, tumults, and breaches of
the public peace; which said false, seditious, and inflammatory words and scurrilous libels are in
Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by said Aurelio Tolentino, and which was presented
by him and others on the said 14th day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon gayon at Bukas' (Yesterday, To-day, and Tomorrow). An exact translation of the said drama is included in the information, and various parts
thereof are specially assigned, which, in the opinion of the prosecution, were more especially in
violation of the statute in such cases made and provided.
It was proven at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did in fact write the drama
and the announcement thereof, substantially as set out in the information, and did, with other
members of a theatrical company, of which he was director, utter and publish the same
substantially in manner and form as charged, and as we understand it, the only question for
decision is whether, in writing, publishing, and uttering the drama, the accused was in fact guilty
of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, upon which the
information was based.
This section is as follows:

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate
scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall
knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
Counsel discussed at some length the question whether the drama or any part of it was of a
"scurrilous" nature in the legal acceptation of the word, but for the purposes of this decision we
do not deem it necessary to make a finding on this point. In the case of the United States vs.
Fred L. Dorr and Edward F. O'Brien,1 decided May 19, 1903, this court said:
The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a writing, in order to be
punishable as a libel under this section, must be of a scurrilous nature and directed
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, and must, in addition, tend to some one of the results enumerated
in the section, the article in question being described in the complaint as "a scurrilous
libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, which tends to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and
the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and
which tends to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and
which suggests and incites rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities, and which disturbs the safety and order of the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands." But it is a "a well-settled rule in considering indictments that where an
offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any
particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes
specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one of them, provide
that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense." (Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick.
Mass. 206, 215), and the defendants may, therefore, be convicted if any one of the
substantive charges into which the complaint may be separated has been made out.
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are define in that
section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing,
publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing,
or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing
his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which
tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the
community, the safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such
evil practices.
In accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding paragraph the judgment of
conviction in this case must be sustained, if it appears from the evidence in the record that the
accused was guilty as charged of any one of those offenses. We are all agreed that the

publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tend to instigate others to
cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies
and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety and order of the Government.
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its
presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the
Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal object
and intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire together for the secret
organization of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose
of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its stead.
Counsel for the appellant insists that the intent of the accused to commit the crime with which he
is charged does not appear from the evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely
literary and artistic production wherein the legendary history of these Islands and their future, as
imagined by the author, are presented merely for the instruction and entertainment of the public.
This contention can not be maintained. The public presentation of the drama took place in the
month of May, 1903, less than two years after the establishment of the Civil Government. The
smouldering embers of a wide-spread and dangerous insurrection were not yet entirely
extinguished, and here and there throughout the Islands occasional outbreaks still required the
use of the armed forces of the Government for their suppression. A junta in the city of Hongkong,
composed of persons whose announced purpose and object in organizing was the overthrow of
the present Government, was actively engaged in the endeavor to keep the people of these
Islands from peaceably accepting the authority of that Government, and this junta, acting with
confederates in the Philippines, was still able to keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and
uncertainty which it hoped to fan into open revolt and rebellion at the first favorable opportunity.
The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time and under such
conditions, renders absurd the pretense that it was merely or even principally a literary or artistic
production, and the clumsy devices, the allegorical figures, the apparent remoteness, past and
future, of the events portrayed, could not and in fact were not intended to leave the audience in
doubt as to its present and immediate application, nor should they blind this court to the true
purpose and intent of the author and director of the play.
It is further contended that even though the accused were in fact guilty as charged, the court
erred in imposing an excessive and unjust penalty, and in fixing the amount of the fine in dollars
instead of Philippine currency. As to the latter objection it is sufficient to say that the use of the
word "dollars" was in strict conformance with the words of the statute, and that the equivalent of
that word in Philippine currency is fixed by law. The penalty was within the limits prescribed by
law, and we are not prepared to hold that the trial court erred in the exercise of its discretion in
imposing it.
The judgment and sentence appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-2990

December 17, 1951

OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate
scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir
up the people againts the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the Court of First Instance
of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
because according to said court.
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the
town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear
as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree,
when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After securing
copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of
general circulation (Exhibit C, F, G, H, I), not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout
the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to
appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's
supposed wife translation of which letter or note in hereunder reproduced:
Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don't plant a
cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need them.
Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I
have committed suicide, I still have the right to burried among Christians.
But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your
lives.
My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it
because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world
about this.
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the
situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the
Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.lawphil.net
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one.

I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot

hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government.

such legislation aimed at anarchy and radicalism presents largely a question of policy. Our
Legislature has spoken in article 142 and the law must be applied.

I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the
Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self.

In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right to freedom
of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled
license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of
those who abuse this freedom. 4" So statutes against sedition have guaranty, although they
should not be interpreted so as to agitate for institutional changes. 5

The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted and caused its
publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang and other local
periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous
name in said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he
was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree."
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls our government one of crooks
and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis and a Fascistis i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible
with the disposition to remain loyal to the government. 2
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the
confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not
only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the
destruction of the very government itself (See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as seditious
libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings since early times in England. (V op. cit.).
As explained by Paterson, 3 ". . . the great factors of government, consisting of the Sovereign,
the Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts of justice, must be recognized as holding
functions founded on sound principles and to be defended and treated with an established and
well-nigh unalterable respect. Each of these great institutions has peculiar virtues and peculiar
weaknesses, but whether at any one time the virtue or the weakness predominates, there must
be a certain standard of decorum reserved for all. Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery
invective, each burst of indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards
the depository, for the time being, of every great constitutional function. Hence another limit of
free speech and writing is sedition. And yet within there is ample room and verge enough for the
freest use of the tongue and pen in passing strictures in the judgment and conduct of every
constituted authority."
Naturally, when the people's share in the government was restricted, there was a disposition to
punish even mild criticism of the ruler or the departments of government. But as governments
grew to be more representative, the laws of sedition became less drastic and freedom of
expression strife continue to be prohibited.

Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government officials and to
submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition
of the market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or
tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such
wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the article
now under examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is
called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or
commissions are set forth. Instead the article drip with male-violence and hate towards the
constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all public servants headed by
President Roxas whose pictures this appellant would burn and would teach the younger
generation to destroy.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress
thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is
not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to
martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not
on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot
apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only
President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas
people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this
score alone the conviction could be upheld. 6
As heretofore stated publication suggest or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to
stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who
may seek to silence the writer. 7Which is the sum and substance of the offense under
consideration.

The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July 14, 1798 containing
provisions parallel to our own article 142. Analogous prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act
of June 1917 and the seditious libel amendment thereto in May, 1918.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general
discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal
methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press
upon their minds. 8

Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to become a weapon of intolerance
constraining the free expression of opinion, or mere agitation for reform. But so long as there is
a sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part of the defendant to produce illegal action-

"The idea of violence prevades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals.
"The mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his "dirty government" to the point of taking
his own life, is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense

of dissatisfaction against its duly constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter of the
situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are
instances of flagrant and armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted authorities
cannot but be interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance
by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted government, the attempt against the life of President
Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a
state on lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very much better than the
maladministration of said President and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had
"no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the
expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary
and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no
other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the
administration of Roxas and his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the
findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us. 9

referring to the them Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to
sedition in a judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports. That
precedent is undeniably opposite. Note that the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm
probably of speech. Adopting his own words we could say, "Here the person maligned by the
accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the President of
the United States and other high office, under form of government, instead of affording immunity
from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the
attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More
than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which
could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the
legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.
Pablo,
Padilla,
Montemayor
Jugo, J., concurs in the result.

and

Reyes,

JJ.,

concur.

Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas
officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority of Legislators including the Chief
Executive himself). And such suggestion clinches the case against appellant.
In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matter with several persons in a
public place uttered theses words: "Filipinos must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head"
G.R. No. L-34022 March 24, 1972
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
and THE CITY WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents.
The question raised in these certiorari proceedings, one to which no authoritative answer has
been yielded by past decisions, is the scope to be accorded the constitutional immunity of
senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress
and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the
peace. 1 Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin 2 and Fernando Bautista, Sr.,3 as delegate of the
present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the
above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal
Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest
or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable
under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor." 4 For under the Constitutional
Convention Act, 5 delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a
representative. 6 Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against
petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations
against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor
General, on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, 7 would dispute such a
contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal

prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that
insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be
unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative. A careful study of the above constitutional
provision, in the light of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, adopting the then wellsettled principle under American law and of the purposes to be served by such an immunity,
persuade us that the stand taken by the Solicitor General is correct.
These certiorari proceedings cannot prosper.
The facts in both petitions for certiorari are not in dispute. Petitioner Martinez y Festin 8 alleged
that on June 10, 1971, an information against him for falsification a public document was filed.
Its basis was his stating under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to that
Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he knew
that he was born on June 20, 1946. There was on July 9, 1971, a special appearance on his part
questioning the power of respondent Judge to issue a warrant of arrest and seeking that the
information be quashed. On the same day, there was an order from the lower court suspending
the release of the warrant of arrest until it could act on such motion to quash. Then came on July
22, 1971 an omnibus motion from him, with previous leave of court, to quash the information, to
quash the warrant of arrest, or to hold in abeyance further proceeding in the case. It was not
favorably acted on. On August 21, 1971, respondent Judge rendered an order denying the
petitioner omnibus motion to quash. In his belief that the information and the warrant of arrest in
this case are null and void, the petitioner did not post the required bond. He was arrested by the
City Sheriff in the afternoon of September 6, 1971. At the time of the filing of the petition he was
confined at the City Jail in the custody of respondent City Warden of Manila. He was on his way

to attend the plenary session of the Constitutional Convention. Such arrest was against his will
and over his protest. He was arraigned on September 9, 1971. There was at such a time a
motion by petitioner to reconsider the court's order of August 21, 1971. It was denied in open
court. On the very same day, he filed the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, but having
been released thereafter on bail on September 11, 1971, the petition is now in the nature solely
of a certiorari proceeding. 9
As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was alleged that he is a duly elected and proclaimed
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He took his oath of office and assumed the
functions of such office on June 1, 1971. He has continued since then to perform the duties and
discharge the responsibilities of a delegate. Two criminal complaints, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 146(57) and 148(58), were directly filed with the Court of First lnstance of Baguio
and Benguet by a certain Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-aspirant who placed 15th in the
order of votes garnered against the petitioner, and his co-accused for alleged violation of Section
51 of the Revised Penal Code in that they gave and distributed free of charge food, drinks and
cigarettes at two public meetings, one held in Sablan and the other in Tuba, both towns being in
Province of Benguet. Respondent Presiding Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of
said criminal complaints. Thereafter on August 7, 1971, he issued an order for the filing of the
corresponding informations. Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases could be issued,
petitioner in a motion of August 14, 1971 invoked the privilege of immunity from arrest and
search, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971
Constitutional Convention Act, in relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution and Article 145
of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge, on the very same day, issued an order, holding
in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest and setting the hearing of said Motion on August
23, 1971. As scheduled on August 23, 1971, there was a hearing on such motion. Petitioner
however did not prevail notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on his claim for immunity, a
warrant of arrest being ordered on the same day. On September 11, 1971, there was a motion to
quash such order of arrest filed by petitioner. He was unsuccessful, respondent Judge, in an
order of said date, ordering his immediate arrest. His petition for certiorari and prohibition was
filed with this Court on September 15, 1971. 11
What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and Bautista, Sr. is that the respective
warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed on the claim that by virtue of the
parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article VI
of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, they are
immune from arrest. In the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin, he is proceeded against for
falsification of a public document punishable by prision mayor. 12 As for petitioner Bautista, Sr.,
the penalty that could be imposed for each of the Revised Election Code offense, of which he is
charged, is not higher than prision mayor. 13
The respondents in the above petitions were required to answer by resolutions of this Court
issued on September 10 and September 20, 1971, respectively. An answer on behalf of
respondent Judge Jesus P. Morfe in the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin was filed on
September 20, 1971 with an answer in intervention filed by respondent Executive Sheriff of
Manila and the Chief of Warrant Division likewise filed on the same date. His petition was duly
heard on September 14, 1971, Delegate Estanislao A. Fernandez vehemently pressing his claim
to immunity. Thereafter on October 29, 1971, a memorandum, comprehensive in scope and
persuasive in its analysis of the constitutional question presented, was filed on behalf of
respondent Judge Morfe by Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, two Assistants Solicitors General
Bernardo P. Pardo and Rosalio A. de Leon as well as Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. A

memorandum on behalf of President Diosdado Macapagal of the Constitutional Convention, who

was given permission to submit such a pleading, was submitted on March 8, 1972 by the
Committee on Legal Affairs of the Constitutional Convention. 14
As for the petitions of Bautista, Sr., the answer on behalf of respondent Judge was filed on
September 29, 1971. When the matter was heard on October 14, 1971, he appeared through
counsel, Delegate Juanito R. Remulla, while respondent Judge was represented by Assistant
Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. With the submission, on
October 30, 1971, of an able memorandum on behalf of respondent judge, again, by the same
counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General as well as a carefully-prepared memorandum of
petitioner Bautista, Sr., on December 1, 1971, the matter was deemed submitted for
adjudication.
As noted at the outset, certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants of arrest issued against
petitioner Martinez y Festin as well as petitioner Bautista, Sr. Their reliance on the constitutional
provision which for them should be supplemented by what was provided for in the Revised
Penal Code is futile. There is no justification then for granting their respective pleas.
No other conclusion is allowable consistently with the plain and explicit command of the
Constitution. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not
cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the
accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and
comfort. 15 A felony is act or omission punishable by law. 16 Breach of the peace covers any
offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled
principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders
one susceptible to prosecution. Certainly then from the explicit language of the Constitution,
even without its controlling interpretation as shown by the debates of the Constitutional
Convention to be hereinafter discussed, petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor
does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a provision that took
effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became operative on November 15, 1935.
As will be shown, the repugnancy between such an expansion of the congressional immunity
and the plain command of the Constitution is too great to be overcome, even on the assumption
that the penalty to which a public officer will be subjected in the event that he did arrest one
entitled thereto for an offense punishable by less than reclusion temporal suffices to widen its
scope. This is so considering not only the history of such a Constitutional grant of immunity but
also its basic purpose and objective.
1. Even if the provision granting the legislative immunity of freedom from arrest were clothed in
language less clear, its history precludes any other interpretation. As submitted to the
Constitutional Convention of 1934, the draft proposal was worded as follows: "The Members of
the National Assembly shall in all cases except treason, open disturbance of public order, or
other offense punishable by death or imprisonment of not less than six years, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going to and
returning from the same." On December 4, 1934, upon its being considered by the Convention,
an amendment was proposed by Delegate Aldeguer so that it would read: "The Members of the
National Assembly shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in
going and returning from the same." What was sought by him was to retain the provision of the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, with phraseology identical to that found in the American
Constitution.

He defended his proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is the same phrase granting
parliamentary immunity to the members of the Parliament of England. It is the same phrase
granting parliamentary immunity to members of Congress. It is the same phrase granting
parliamentary immunity to members of the various state legislators of the Union. Now, in reading
the draft proposed by the Sub-Committee of Seven, I found out that it is a broad rule. Mr.
President, the question is not whether we should grant privilege of immunity to the members of
the National Assembly ... " 17 He was interrupted by a point of order raised, but he was allowed
to continue. He went on: "As I was saying, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention, the
draft gives to the member of the National Assembly more privileges than what the nature of the
office demands. My question is that if the members of the Congress of the United States, if the
members of the Parliament, if the members of the various State Legislatures were able to
perform their functions as members of law-making bodies with the privileges and immunities
granted by the phrase "breach of peace." I wonder why the members of the future National
Assembly cannot perform their duties with the same limitations and with the same privileges. Mr.
President and members the Convention, the history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was
never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest. When
American sovereignty was implanted into these Islands, a new theory of government was
implanted too. This theory of government places every man equal before the eyes of the law.
The grant of certain privileges to any set of persons means the abrogation of this principle of
equality before the eyes of the law. Another reason, Mr. President and Members of the
Convention, is this: The State Legislature is the agent of the State. The power or the right of the
Legislature to claim privileges is based on the right of self-preservation. The right of the State to
claim privileges is due to the fact that it has the right to carry its function without obstacle. But we
must also remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The State is the principal.
Any crime committed, whether such crime is committed by a colorum or by a gangster,
endangers the State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the
expense of the principal, which is the State, is not a sound policy. So that, Mr. President, and
Members of the Convention, believing that under the phrase "breach of peace", our future
members of the Assembly can very well perform the duties incumbent upon them. I submit my
amendment for the consideration of this Convention." 18

against the peace, the phrase "breach of the peace" would seem to extend to all indictable
offenses, as well those which are in fact attended with force and violence, as those which are
only constructive breaches of the peace of the government, inasmuch as they violate its good
order." 24

Delegate Manuel Roxas on behalf of the sub-committee of seven did not object. As a matter of
fact, he was for such amendment. He considered it "well-founded" and was for such immunity
complying "with the wording of the [Philippine Autonomy Act] in this particular." 19 The
Convention readily approved the amendment by acclamation.

The Constitution is equally explicit on the following point: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such
laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution until amended, altered,
modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the
government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to
the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution." 29 In People v.
Linsangan 30 decided in December, 1935, barely a month after the Constitution took effect, the
continued applicability of Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code that would allow the
prosecution of a person who remains delinquent in the payment of cedula tax, 31 this Court, in its
opinion thru the pen of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos, after setting forth that
the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment for debt on non-payment of poll tax, 32 held: "It
seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code
is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution in that, while the former
authorizes imprisonment for non-payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows
that upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the
Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based
thereon." 33

It does not admit of doubt therefore that the immunity from arrest is granted by the Constitution
was understood in the same sense it has in American law, there being a similar provision in the
American Constitution. 20 Its authoritative interpretation in the United States was supplied by the
Williamson case, a 1908 decision. 21
According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White who penned the opinion, "the term
"treason, felony and breach of the peace," as used in the constitutional provision relied upon,
excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses, ... " 22 He traced its historical
background thus: "A brief consideration of the subject of parliamentary privilege in England will,
we think, show the source whence the expression "treason felony, and breach of the peace" was
drawn, and leave no doubt that the words were used in England for the very purpose of
excluding all crimes from the operation of the parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave that
privilege to apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature." 23 Story's treatise on the Constitution
was likewise cited, his view on the matter being quite emphatic: "Now, as all crimes are offenses

As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick 25 and Willoughby 26 could use
practically identical appraising such immunity, the former stating that it "is not now of great
importance" and the latter affirming that it "is of little importance as arrest of the person is now
almost never authorized except for crimes which fall within the classes exempt from the
priviledge." The state of the American law on this point is aptly summarizedby Cooley: "By
common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil
process during the session of that body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable
them to go to and return from the same." 27 A prosecution for a criminal offense, is thus excluded
from this grant of immunity. So it should be Philippine law, if deference were to be paid to what
was explicitly agreed upon in the Constitutional Convention.
2. Would it make a difference however in the availability of the writs of certiorari sought by
petitioners considering that Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code would impose upon any
public officer or employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular or special session, arrest
or charge any member thereof except in case such member has committed a crime punishable
by penalty higher than prision mayor? 28 The assumption here indulged is that the effect of the
above in the Revised Penal Code was to expand the grant of parliamentary immunity under the
Philippine Autonomy Act, although its literal language does not go that far. It is to be
remembered, however, that it took effect on January 1, 1932 before the enforcement of the
present Constitution in 1935. Considering that both under the then organic law, the Philippine
Autonomy Act and equally so under the present Constitution, such a more generous treatment
accorded legislators exempting them from arrest even if warranted under a penal law, the
question as to whether it did survive becomes unavoidable. It is our opinion that the answer
must be in the negative.

So it was in De los Santos v. Mallare. 34 Again under the provision of the Revised Administrative
Code the President could remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials under the Charter of

the City of Baguio. 35 Relying on such a provision, the then President Quirino removed petitioner
De los Santos who was appointed City Engineer Baguio of on July 16, 1946, and chose in his
place respondent Gil R. Mallare. The Revised Administrative Code was a legislation that dates
back to 1917, 36 eighteen years before the Constitution prohibited any officer or employee in the
civil service being removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. 37 Again this
Court, in the light of aforecited provision in an opinion of Justice Tuason, held: "So, unlike
legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned
part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of
nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent,
outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate
before the petitioner was appointed." 38 In the language of the constitutional provision then that
portion of Article 145 penalizing a public official or employee who shall while the Congress is in
regular or special session arrest or search any member thereof except in case he has committed
a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor is
declared inoperative.
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations.
There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable
them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their
conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would
be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from
the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal
law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government
might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all
the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption
of course is that the judiciary would main independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by Delegate Manuel Martinez by
Festin in L-34022 and the petitions for certiorari and prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista,
Sr. in L-34046 and L-34047 are hereby dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

[G.R. Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANIEL QUIJADA Y
CIRCULADO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30 September 1993 of
Branch
1
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two offenses separately charged
in two informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for the first crime and an indeterminate penalty ranging from
seventeen years, four months, and one day, as minimum, to twenty years and one day, as
maximum, for the second crime.[1]
The appeal was originally assigned to the Third Division of the Court but was later referred
to the Court enbanc in view of the problematical issue of whether to sustain the trial court's
judgment in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People vs. Tac-an,[2] People vs. Tiozon,
[3]
People vs. Caling,[4] People vs. Jumamoy,[5]People vs. Deunida,[6] People vs. Tiongco,[7] Peopl
e vs. Fernandez,[8] and People vs. Somooc,[9] or to modify the judgment and convict the
appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant
to People vs. Barros,[10] which this Court (Second Division) decided on 27 June 1995.
The informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of
Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of superior
strength, the accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the victim was unarmed,
suddenly attacked the victim without giving the latter the opportunity to defend himself, and with
evident premeditation, the accused having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to
the incident of murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm, hitting the latter on his head and
causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the deceased.
Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with aggravating
circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought for or taken advantage of by the accused to
facilitate the commission of the crime.[11]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of
Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, carry and have in his possession,
custody and control a firearm (hand gun) with ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary
permit or license to possess the said firearm from competent authorities which firearm was
carried by the said accused outside of his residence and was used by him in committing the
crime of Murder with Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim; to the damage and prejudice of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of P.D. No. 1866.[12]

Having arisen from the same incident, the cases were consolidated, and joint hearings
were had. The witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon (Acting
Chief of Police of Dauis, Bohol), SPO Gondalino Inte, Dr. Greg Julius Sodusta, Rosita Iroy, and
Teodula Matalinis. The defense presented as witnesses Alfred Aranzado, Edwin Nistal, Julius
Bonao, Saturnino Maglupay, and the appellant himself.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in
the Brief for the Appellee as follows:
On 25 December 1992, a benefit dance was held at the Basketball Court of Barangay
Tinago, Dauis, Bohol.On this occasion, a fist fight occurred between Diosdado Iroy and appellant
Daniel Quijada as the latter was constantly annoying and pestering the former's sister. Rosita
Iroy (TSN, Crim. Cases 8178 & 8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 32-35; August 5, 1993, pp. 14-15).
In the evening of 30 December 1992, another benefit dance/disco was held in the same
place. This benefit dance was attended bv Rosita Iroy, Ariel Dano, Teodora Badayos, Ado
Aranzado, Largo Iroy and Diosdado Iroy.
While Rosita Iroy and others were enjoying themselves inside the dancing area, Diosdado
Iroy, Eugene Nesnea and Largo Iroy, who were then sitting at the plaza (the area where they
positioned themselves was duly lighted and was approximately four meters from the dancing
hall), decided to just watch the activities in the dance hall directly from the plaza.
After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to leave and went outside the gate of the dance
area. Subsequently, or around 11:30 of the same night, while facing the direction of Diosdado
Iroy, Rosita lroy saw appellant surreptitiously approach her brother Diosdado Iroy from
behind. Suddenly, appellant fired his revolver at Diosdado Iroy, hitting the latter at the back
portion of the head. This caused Rosita Iroy to spontaneously shout that appellant shot her
brother; while appellant, after shooting Diosdado Iroy, ran towards the cornfield.
Diosdado Iroy was immediately rushed by Elmer Nigparanon and Largo Iroy to the
hospital but the injury sustained was fatal. In the meantime, Rosita Iroy went home and relayed
to her parents the unfortunate incident (TSN, Crim Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 922, inclusive of the preceding paragraphs).
At around midnight, the incident was reported to then Acting Chief of Police Felipe
Nigparanon by Mrs. Alejandra Iroy and her daughter Teodula Matalinis. The police officer made
entries in the police blotter regarding the shooting and correspondingly, ordered his men to pick
up the appellant. But they were unable to locate appellant on that occasion (TSN, Crim. Case
Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 9, 1993, pp. 2-6).
In the afternoon of 31 December 1992, appellant, together with his father Teogenes
Quijada went to the police station at Dauis, Bohol. There and then, appellant was pinpointed by
Elenito Nistal and Rosita Iroy as the person who shot Diosdado Iroy. These facts were entered in
the police blotter as Entry No. 1151 (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, ibid. p. 14, June 14,
1993, pp. 4-6).[13]
The slug was embedded at the midbrain.[14] Diosdado Iroy died of Cardiorespiratory arrest,
secondary to tonsillar herniation, secondary to massive intracranial hemorrhage, secondary to
gunshot wound, 1 cm. left occipital area, transacting cerebellum up to midbrain.[15]
The firearm used by the appellant in shooting Diosdado Iroy was not licensed. Per
certifications issued on 26 April 1993, the appellant was not a duly licensed firearm holder as
verified from a consolidated list of licensed firearm holders in the province [16] and was not
authorized to carry a firearm outside his residence.[17]

The appellant interposed the defense of alibi, which the trial court rejected because he
was positively identified by prosecution witness Rosita Iroy. It summarized his testimony in this
wise:
Daniel Quijada y Circulado, the accused in the instant cases, declared that in the
afternoon of December 30, 1992 he was in their house At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon he went
to Tagbilaran City together with Julius Bonao in a tricycle No. 250 to solicit passengers. They
transported passengers until 10:30 o'clock in the evening. They then proceeded to the
Tagbilaran wharf waiting for the passenger boat Trans Asia Taiwan. Before the arrival of Trans
Asia Taiwan they had a talk with Saturnino Maglopay. They were able to pick up two passengers
for Graham Avenue near La Roca Hotel. They then returned to the Tagbilaran wharf for the
arrival of MV Cebu City that docked at 12:10 past midnight. They had a talk with Saturnino
Maglopay who was waiting for his aunties scheduled to arrive aboard MV Cebu City. They were
not able to pick up passengers which, as a consequence, they went home. They had on their
way home passengers for the Agora Public Market. They arrived at the house of Julian Bonao at
Bil-isan, Panglao, Bohol at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1992 where he passed
the night. He went home to Mariveles, Dauis, Bohol at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. [18]
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution and found the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and sentenced him
accordingly. It appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery considering
that the appellant shot the victim at the back of the head while the latter was watching the
dance. The dispositive portion of the decision dated 30 September 1993 reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 8178, the court finds the accused Daniel
Quijada guilty of the crime of murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of
the law and to pay the cost.
In Criminal Case No. 8179, the Court finds the accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime
of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition punished under Sec. 1 of R.A. No.
1866 as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence from
Seventeen (17) years Four (4) months and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and
One (1) day, as maximum, with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.
The slug or bullet which was extracted from the brain at the back portion of the head of the
victim Diosdado Iroy is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government.
It appearing that the accused Daniel Quijada has undergone preventive imprisonment he
is entitled to the full time he has undergone preventive imprisonment to be deducted from the
term of sentence if he has executed a waiver otherwise he will only be entitled to 4/5 of the time
he has undergone preventive imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence if he has
not executed a waiver.[19]
On 29 October 1993, after discovering that it had inadvertently omitted in the decision an
award of civil indemnity and other damages in Criminal Case No. 8178, the trial court issued an
order directing the appellant to pay the parents of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of their son and P10,000.00 for funeral expenses. [20] The order was to
form an integral part of the decision.
The decision was promulgated on 29 October 1993.[21]
The appellant forthwith interposed the present appeal, and in his Brief, he contends that
the trial court erred
I
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND FELIPE NIGPARANON.

II
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE WITNESSES EDWIN NISTAL
AND ALFRED ARANZADO, AND IN DISREGARDING THE PICTORIAL EXHIBITS OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICULARLY THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DIOSDADO IROY,
ROSITA IROY, EDWIN NISTAL, AND ALFRED ARANZADO.
III
. . . IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND SP04
FELIPE NIGPARANON HAD MOTIVES IN FALSELY TESTIFYING AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.[22]
The appellant then submits that the issue in this case boils down to the identity of the killer
of Diosdado Iroy.To support his stand that the killer was not identified, he attacks the credibility of
prosecution witnesses Rosita Iroy and SP04 Felipe Nigparanon. He claims that the former had a
motive "to put him in a bad light" and calls our attention to her direct testimony that her brother
Diosdado, the victim, boxed him on the night of 25 December 1992 because he allegedly
"bothered her." He further asserts that Rosita could not have seen the person who shot
Diosdado considering their respective positions, particularly Rosita who, according to defense
witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, was still inside the dancing area and ran towards the crime
scene only after Diosdado was shot. And, the appellant considers it as suppression of evidence
when the prosecution did not present as witnesses Diosdado's companions who were allegedly
seated with Diosdado when he was shot.
As to SPO4 Nigparanon, the appellant intimates improper motives in that the said witness
is a neighbor of the Iroys, and when he testified, a case for arbitrary detention had already been
filed against him by the appellant.The appellant further claims of alleged omissions and
unexplained entries in the police blotter.
Finally, the appellant wants us to favorably consider his defense of alibi which, according
to him, gained strength because of the lack of evidence on the identity of the killer. Furthermore,
he stresses that his conduct in voluntarily going to the police station after having been informed
that he, among many others, was summoned by the police is hardly the actuation of the
perpetrator of the killing of Diosdado Iroy -- specially so if Rosita Iroy's claim is to be believed
that moments after the shooting she shouted that Daniel Quijada shot Diosdado Iroy.
In its Appellee's Brief, the People refutes every argument raised by the appellant and
recommends that we affirm in toto the challenged decision.
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the
parties, we find this appeal to be absolutely without merit.
The imputation of ill-motive on the part of Rosita Iroy and the basis therefor hardly
persuade. The appellant was the one who was boxed by and lost to Diosdado Iroy in their fight
on the night of 25 December 1992. It is then logical and consistent with human experience that it
would be the appellant who would have forthwith entertained a grudge, if not hatred, against
Diosdado. No convincing evidence was shown that Rosita had any reason to falsely implicate
the appellant in the death of her brother Diosdado.
The claim that Rosita could not have seen who shot her brother Diosdado because, as
testified to by defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, she was inside the dancing hall and
rushed to her brother only after the latter was shot is equally baseless. The following testimony
of Rosita shows beyond cavil that she saw the assailant:
Q You said that you were initially dancing inside the dancing place and you went out,
about what time did you get out?
A 11:00 o'clock.

Q And you were standing about two (2) meters from Diosdado Iroy until 11:30 when the
incident happened?

Q And in your estimate, how far was the source of light of the house of Fe and Berto to the
place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?

A Yes, I was standing.

A About six (6) meters distance.[24]

Q And where did you face, you were facing Diosdado Iroy or the dancing area?
A I was intending to go near my brother. I was approaching and getting near going to my
brother Diosdado Iroy and while in the process I saw Daniel Quijada shot my brother
Diosdado Iroy.[23]
xxx xxx xxx
Q And in your estimate, how far was your brother Diosdado Iroy while he was sitting at the
plaza to the dancing place?
A More or less four (4) meters distance.
COURT:
From the dancing hall?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And in your observation, was the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting lighted or
illuminated?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of light illuminated the place?
A I do not know what kind of light but it was lighted.
Q Was it an electric light?
A It is electric light coming from a bulb.
Q Where is that electric bulb that illuminated the place located?
A It was placed at the gate of the dancing place and the light from the house.
Q You said gate of the dancing place, you mean the dancing place was enclosed at that
time and there was a gate, an opening?
A Yes, sir.
Q What material was used to enclose the dancing place?
A Bamboo.
Q And how far was the bulb which was placed near the entrance of the dancing place to
the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A Five (5) meters.
Q You mentioned also that there was a light coming from the house, now whose house
was that?
A The house of spouses Fe and Berto, I do not know the family name.
Q Was the light coming from the house of spouses Fe and Berto an electric light?
A Yes sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What was the color of the electric bulb in the gate of the dancing place?
A The white bulb.[25]
The trial court disbelieved the testimony of Nistal and Aranzado. It explicitly declared:
The factual findings of the Court in the instant case is anchored principally in ". . . observing the
attitude and deportment of witnesses while listening to them speak (People vs. Magaluna, 205,
SCRA 266).
thereby indicating that on the basis of the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the
declarations of Nistal and Aranzado failed to convince the trial court that they were telling the
truth. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect.For, the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the
angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; [26] or the furtive glance, the
blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat,
the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. [27]The appellant has miserably failed to convince us
that we must depart from this rule.
Neither are we persuaded by the claimed suppression of evidence occasioned by the nonpresentation as prosecution witnesses any of the companions of Diosdado who were seated
with him when he was shot. In the first place, the said companions could not have seen from
their back the person who suddenly shot Diosdado. In the second place, the testimony of the
companions would, at the most, only corroborate that of Rosita Iroy.Besides, there is no
suggestion at all that the said companions were not available to the appellant. It is settled that
the presumption in Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply when the testimony of the witness is
merely corroborative or where the witness is available to the accused. [28]
The alleged improper motive on the part of SP04 Nigparanon simply because he is a
neighbor of the Iroy; remains purely speculative, as no evidence was offered to establish that
such a relationship affected SP04 Nigparanon's objectivity. As a police officer, he enjoyed in his
favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. [29] As to the alleged
omissions and unexplained entries in the police blotter, the same were sufficiently clarified by
SP04 Nigparanon.
The defense of alibi interposed by the appellant deserves scant consideration. He was
positively identified by a credible witness. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of
alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. [30] Besides, for that defense to
prosper it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[31] As testified to by defense witness Julian
Bonao, the Tagbilaran wharf, where the appellant said he was, is only about eight to nine
kilometers away from the crime scene and it would take only about thirty minutes to traverse the
distance with the use of a tricycle.[32] It was, therefore, not physically impossible for the appellant
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Finally, the appellant asserts that if he were the killer of Diosdado Iroy, he would not have
voluntarily proceeded to the police station. This argument is plain sophistry. The law does not

find unusual the voluntary surrender of offenders; it even considers such act as a mitigating
circumstance.[33] Moreover, non-flight is not conclusive proof of innocence.[34]
The evidence for the prosecution further established with moral certainty that the appellant
had no license to possess or carry a firearm. The firearm then that he used in shooting Diosdado
Iroy was unlicensed. He, therefore, committed the crime of aggravated illegal possession of
firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which reads:
SEC.
1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition
or Instruments Usedor Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition -- Th
e penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.
In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-an,[35] and reiterated
in People vs. Tiozon,[36] Peoplevs. Caling,[37] People vs. Jumamoy,[38] People vs. Deunida,[39] Peo
ple vs. Tiongco,[40] People vs. Fernandez,[41] and People vs. Somooc,[42] that one who kills
another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses of (1) either
homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (2) aggravated illegal possession of
firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, we sustain the decision of the
trial court finding the appellant guilty of two separate offenses of murder in Criminal Case No.
8178 and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.
Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to the issue of whether there is a violation of the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy if an accused is prosecuted for homicide or
murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule
that these are separate offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the
second under a special law; hence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not
apply. We observed in Tac-an:
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a
second or later prosecution for thesame offense, and that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is
no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm
penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that
of murder punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two
(2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the
subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in
a prohibited second jeopardy.
And we stressed that the use of the unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for
homicide or murder; however, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm, by
express provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm.
In Tiozon, we stated:
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1
because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the
homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results
whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by
a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification, as

implied from the exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms
and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation
of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, x x x." In fine then, the killing of a person with
the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249
(Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or,
stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is
punished by a special law while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised
Penal Code.
In People vs. Doriguez, [24 SCRA 163, 171], We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one
does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles
of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is not obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
In People vs. Bacolod [89 Phil. 621], from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine gun which
caused public panic among the people present and physical injuries to one, informations of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public disturbance were
filed. Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he sought to dismiss the second
on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may be an
offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution
under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offense[s] -- the first against a person and the second
against public peace and order -- one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on
double jeopardy.
In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person charged with aggravated illegal possession of
firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 can also be separately
charged with and convicted of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and punished
accordingly. Thus:
It seems that the Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there is such a thing as "the special
complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for
and defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended," and declaring Caling
guilty thereof. The legal provision invoked, "Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as amended," reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
[or] Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition.
The
penalty
of reclusion temporalin
its
maximum
period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal
in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death
shall be imposed."
What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the present case is the sole,
simple act of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully possess any firearm x x x (or)
ammunition x x x." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary permit
and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is attached the penalty
of reclusiontemporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua. Now, if "with the use of (such) an
unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or murder is committed," the crime is aggravated and is more
heavily punished, with the capital punishment.
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possession of a firearm
without license. The crimemay be denominated simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from it
s aggravated form. It is Aggravated if the unlicensedfirearm is used in the commission of a homi
cide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is notabsorbed in the
crime of possession of an unlicensed firearm; neither is the latter absorbed in the former. There
are twodistinct crimes that are here spoken of. One is unlawful possession of a firearm, which m
ay be either simple or aggravated,defined and punished respectively by the first and second par
agraphs of Section 1 of PD 1866. The other is homicide ormurder, committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. The mere possession of a firearm without legal authorityconsummates the cr
ime under P.D. 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is made heavier by the firearm's use i
n akilling. The killing, whether homicide or murder, is obviously distinct from the act of possessio
n, and is separately punishedand defined under the Revised Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)

decision in Lazaro vs. People, involving the violation of P.D. No. 9, which the investigating
prosecutor invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no longer controlling in view of our decisions
in People vs. Tac-an, People vs. Tiozon, and Peoplevs. Caling.
In Somooc, we once more ruled:
The offense charged by the Information is clear enough from the terms of that document,
although both the Information and the decision of the trial court used the term "Illegal
Possession of Firearm with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes been supposed to
connote a "complex crime as used in the Revised Penal Code. Such nomenclature is, however,
as we have ruled in People vs. Caling, a misnomer since there is no complex crime of illegal
possession of firearm with homicide. The gravamen of the offense penalized in P.D. No. 1866 is
the fact of possession of a firearm without a license or authority for such possession. This
offense is aggravated and the imposable penalty upgraded if the unlicensed firearm is shown to
have been used in the commission of homicide or murder, offenses penalized under the Revised
Penal Code. The killing of a human being, whether characterized as homicide or murder, is
patently distinct from the act of possession of an unlicensed firearm and is separately punished
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing doctrine suffered a setback when in our decision of 27 June 1995
in People vs. Barros,[43] we set aside that portion of the appealed decision convicting the
appellant of the offense of murder and affirmed that portion convicting him of illegal possession
of firearm in its aggravated form. We therein made the following statement:

In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and amplified the rationale on why an accused who kills
another with an unlicensed firearm can be prosecuted and punished for the two separate
offenses of violation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and for homicide or
murder under the Revised Penal Code. Thus:

[A]ppellant may not in the premises be convicted of two separate offenses [of illegal possession
of firearm in its aggravated form and of murder], but only that of illegal possession of firearm in
its aggravated form, in light of the legal principles and propositions set forth in the separate
opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, to which the Members of the Division,
the ponente included, subscribe.

Coming to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
penalizes, inter alia, the
unlawful
possession
of
firearms
or
ammunition
with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. However, under the second
paragraph thereof, the penalty is increased to death if homicide or murder is committed with the
use
of
an
unlicensed
firearm. It may thus be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense because both a
re circumstanceswhich increase the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or mu
rder is absorbed in the offense. If these wereto be so, an anomalous absurdity would result wher
eby a more serious crime defined and penalized under the Revised PenalCode will be absorbed
by a statutory offense, one which is merely malum prohibitum. Hence, the killing of a person with
theuse of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) the violation of Se
ction 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b)the violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicid
e) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one to bar the other; stated otherwise,
the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked as the first is punished by a special law
while the second - Murder or Homicide - is punished by the Revised Penal Code. [citing
People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, 379 (1991); People vs. Doriguez, 24 SCRA 163
(1968)]. Considering, however, that the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the
Constitution, the proper imposable penalty would be the penalty next lower in degree,
or reclusionperpetua. (emphasis supplied)

The pertinent portions of the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado referred
to therein read as follows:

In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action in withdrawing an

information for murder and pursuing only the information for "Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearm," this Court categorically declared:
At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the prosecution's legal position in withdrawing
the information for murder, the offense defined in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and,
therefore, does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent prosecution of the latter crime.The 1982

This premise accordingly brings up the second query as to whether or not the crime should
properly be the aggravated illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm through the use of which
a homicide or murder is committed. It is submitted that an accused so situated should be liable
only for the graver offense of aggravated illegal possession of the firearm punished by death
under the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866, and it is on this point
that the writer dissents from the holding which would impose a separate penalty for the homicide
in addition to that for the illegal possession of the firearm used to commit the former.
If the possession of the unlicensed firearm is the only offense imputable to the accused, the
Court has correctly held that to be the simple possession punished with reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua in the first paragraph of Section 1. Where,
complementarily, the unlicensed firearm is used to commit homicide or murder, then either of
these felonies will convert the erstwhile simple illegal possession into the graver offense of
aggravated illegal possession. In other words, the homicide or murder constitutes the essential
element for integrating into existence the capital offense of the aggravated form of illegal
possession of a firearm. Legally, therefore, it would be illogical and unjustifiable to use the very
same offenses of homicide or murder as integral elements of and to create the said capital
offense, and then treat the former all over again as independent offenses to be separately
punished further, with penalties immediately following the death penalty to boot.
The situation contemplated in the second query is, from the punitive standpoint, virtually of the
nature of the so-called, special complex crimes," which should more appropriately be called
composite crimes, punished in Article 294, Article 297 and Article 335. They are neither of the

same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48, since they do not
consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies nor do they involve
an offense being a necessary means to commit another. However, just like the regular complex
crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is
imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses.
On the other hand, even if two felonies would otherwise have been covered by the conceptual
definition of a complex crime under Article 48, but the Code imposes a single definite penalty
therefor, it cannot also be punished as a complex crime, much less as separate offense, but with
only the single penalty prescribed by law. Thus, even where a single act results in two less grave
felonies of serious physical injuries and serious slander by deed, the offense will not be
punished as a delitocompuesto under Article 48 but as less serious physical injuries with
ignominy under the second paragraph of Article 265.The serious slander by deed is integrated
into and produces a graver offense, and the former is no longer separately punished.
What is, therefore, sought to be stressed by such alternative illustration, as well as the
discussion on complex and composite crimes, is that when an offense becomes a component of
another, the resultant crime being correspondingly punished as thus aggravated by the
integration of the other, the former is not to be further separately punished as the majority would
want to do with the homicide involved in the case at bar.
With the foregoing answers to the second question, the third inquiry is more of a question of
classification for purposes of the other provisions of the Code. The theory in Tac-an that the
principal offense is the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and the killing shall
merely be included in the particulars or, better still, as an element of the principal offense, may
be conceded. After all, the plurality of crimes here is actually source from the very provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 which sought to "consolidate, codify and integrate" the various
laws and presidential decrees to harmonize their provision" which must be updated and revised
in order to more effectively deter violators of said laws.
This would be akin to the legislative intendment underlying the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972, wherein the principal crime to be charged is still carnapping, although the penalty
therefore is increased when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. The
same situation, with escalating punitive provisions when attended by a killing, are found in the
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 and the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974,
wherein the principal crimes still are piracy, highway robbery and cattle rustling. Also, in the
matter of destructive arson, the principal offense when, inter alia, death results as a
consequence of the commission of any of the acts punished under said article of the Code.
In the present case, the academic value of specifying whether it is a case of illegal possession of
firearm resulting in homicide or murder, or, conversely, homicide or murder through the illegal
possession and use of an unlicensed firearm, would lie in the possible application of the
provision on recidivism. Essentially, it would be in the theoretical realm since, taken either way,
the penalty for aggravated illegal possession of a firearm is the single indivisible penalty of
death, in which case the provision on recidivism would not apply. If, however, the illegal
possession is not established but either homicide or murder is proved, then the matter of
recidivism may have some significance in the sense that, for purposes thereof, the accused was
convicted of a crime against persons and he becomes a recidivist upon conviction of another
crime under the same title of the Code.
Lastly, on the matter of the offense or offenses to be considered and the penalty to be imposed
when the unlawful killing and the illegal possession are charged in separate informations, from
what has been said the appropriate course of action would be to consolidate the cases and
render a joint decision thereon, imposing a single penalty for aggravated illegal possession of
firearm if such possession and the unlawful taking of life shall have been proved, or for only the

proven offense which may be either simple illegal possession, homicide or murder per se. The
same procedural rule and substantive disposition should be adopted if one information for each
offense was drawn up and these informations were individually assigned to different courts or
branches of the same court.
Indeed, the practice of charging the offense of illegal possession separately from the homicide or
murder could be susceptible of abuse since it entails undue concentration of prosecutorial
powers and discretion. Prefatorily, the fact that the killing was committed with a firearm will
necessarily be known to the police or prosecutorial agencies, the only probable problem being
the determination and obtention of evidence to show that the firearm is unlicensed.
Now, if a separate information for homicide or murder is filed without alleging therein that the
same was committed by means of an unlicensed firearm, the case would not fall under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Even if the use of a firearm is alleged therein, but without alleging
the lack of a license therefor as where that fact has not yet been verified, the mere use of a
firearm by itself, even if proved in that case, would not affect the accused either since it is not an
aggravating or qualifying circumstance.
Conversely, if the information is only for illegal possession, with the prosecution intending to
file thereafter the charge for homicide or murder but the same is inexplicably delayed or is not
consolidated with the information for illegal possession, then any conviction that may result from
the former would only be for simple illegal possession. If, on the other hand, the separate and
subsequent prosecution for homicide or murder prospers, the objective of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 cannot be achieved since the penalty imposable in that second prosecution will only
be for the unlawful killing and further subject to such modifying circumstances as may be
proved.
In any event, the foregoing contingencies would run counter to the proposition that the real
offense committed by the accused, and for which sole offense he should be punished, is the
aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm. Further, it is the writer's position that the
possible problems projected herein may be minimized or obviated if both offenses involved are
charged in only one information or that the trial thereof, if separately charged, be invariably
consolidated for joint decision. Conjointly, this is the course necessarily indicated since only a
single composite crime is actually involved and it is palpable error to deal therewith and dispose
thereof by segregated parts in piecemeal fashion.
If we follow Barros, the conviction of the appellant for murder in Criminal Case No. 8178
must have to be set aside. He should only suffer the penalty for the aggravated
illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.
The Court en banc finds in this appeal an opportunity to reexamine the existing conflicting
doctrines applicable to prosecutions for murder or homicide and for aggravated illegal
possession of firearm in instances where an unlicensed firearm is used in the killing of a
person. After a lengthy deliberation thereon, the Court enbanc arrived at the conclusion that the
rule
laid
down
in Tac-an, reiterated
in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida,Tiongco, Fernandez, and Somooc is the better rule, for it
applies the laws concerned according to their letter and spirit, thereby steering this Court away
from a dangerous course which could have irretrievably led it to an inexcusable breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers through Judicial legislation. That rule upholds and enhances
the lawmaker's intent or purpose in aggravating the crime of illegal possession of firearm when
an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of murder or homicide. Contrary to the view of
our esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion in the case under consideration, Tac-an did not enunciate an unfortunate doctrine or a
"speciously camouflaged theory" which "constitutes an affront on doctrinal concepts of penal law
and assails even the ordinary notions of common sense."

If Tac-an did in fact enunciate such an "unfortunate doctrine," which this Court has
reiterated in a convincing number of cases and for a convincing number of years, so must the
same verdict be made in our decision in People vs. De Gracia,[44] which was promulgated on 6
July 1994. In the latter case, we held that unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in
furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 and also for a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on
rebellion. A distinction between that situation and the case where an unlicensed firearm is used
in homicide or murder would have no basis at all. In De Gracia, this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, made the following authoritative pronouncements:
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989
up to and until December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not
appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from
him was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person
merely participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had
been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the
Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding
the explosives and "molotovbombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the
lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court
below as a basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed
on
him. It must be made clear that appellant is charged withthe qualified offense of illegal possessio
n of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which,in law, is disti
nct from the crime of rebellion punished under Article 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. T
here are twoseparate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised
Penal Code treats rebellion as a crimeapart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, suc
h as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably becommitted in the course of a rebelli
on. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime ofillegal
possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion.
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, the Court hasexplained that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mer
e fact that the same act is penalized under twodifferent statutes with different penalties, even if c
onsidered highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to theaccused. It follows that, su
bject to the presence of requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensedfir
earm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section
1 of Presidential DecreeNo. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Pe
nal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this casecannot be invoked because the first is an offe
nse punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by theRevised Penal Code
with variant elements.
We cannot justify what we did in De Gracia with a claim that the virtue of fidelity to a
controlling doctrine, i.e.,of Tac-an, had compelled us to do so. Indeed, if Tac-an enunciated an
"unfortunate doctrine" which is "an affront on doctrinal concepts of penal law and assails even
the ordinary notions of common sense," then De Graciashould have blazed the trail of a new
enlightenment and forthwith set aside the "unfortunate doctrine" without any delay to camouflage
a judicial faux pas or a doctrinal quirk. De Gracia provided an excellent vehicle for an honorable
departure from Tac-an because no attack on the latter was necessary as the former merely
involved other crimes to which the doctrine in Tac-an might only be applied by
analogy. De Gracia did not even intimate the need to reexamine Tac-an; on the contrary, it

adapted the latter to another category of illegal possession of firearm qualified by rebellion
precisely because the same legal principle and legislative purpose were involved, and not
because De Gracia wanted to perpetuate an "unfortunate doctrine" or to embellish "the
expanding framework of our criminal law from barnacled ideas which have not grown apace with
conceptual changes over time," as the concurring and dissenting opinion charges.
The majority now reiterates the doctrine in Tac-an and the subsequent cases not because
it has become hostage to the "inertia of time [which] has always been the obstacle to the virtues
of change," as the concurring and dissenting opinion finds it to be, but rather because it honestly
believes that Tac-an laid down the correct doctrine. If P.D. No. 1866 as applied in Tac-an is an
"affront on doctrinal concepts of penal laws and assails even the ordinary notions of common
sense," the blame must not be laid at the doorsteps of this Court, but on the lawmaker's. All that
the Court did in Tac-an was to apply the law, for there was nothing in that case that warranted an
interpretation or the application of the niceties of legal hermeneutics. It did not forget that its duty
is merely to apply the law in such a way that shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or construction it should not make or
supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel,
or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.[45]
Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code [46] as crimes
against persons.They are mala in se because malice or dolo is a necessary ingredient therefor.
[47]
On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of firearm is defined and punished by a
special penal law,[48] P.D. No. 1866. It is a malumprohibitum[49] which the lawmaker, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise of his martial law powers, so condemned not
only because of its nature but also because of the larger policy consideration of containing or
reducing, if not eliminating, the upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to
the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition, and
explosives. If intent to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the decree and its policy
or purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence, there is conceded wisdom in punishing illegal
possession of firearm without taking into account the criminal intent of the possessor. All that is
needed
is intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled,
of
course,
by animuspossidendi. However, it must be clearly understood that this animus possidendi is
without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which an accused may have harbored in
possessing the firearm.[50]
A long discourse then on the concepts of malum in se and malum prohibilum and their
distinctions is an exercise in futility.
We disagree for lack of basis the following statements of Mr. Justice Regalado in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, to wit:
The second paragraph of the aforestated Section 1 expressly and unequivocally provides for
such illegal possession and resultant killing as a single integrated offense which is punished as
such. The majority not only created two offenses by dividing a single offense into two but, worse,
it resorted to the unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original offense as a single
integrated crime and then creating another offense by using a component crime which is also an
element of the former.
It would already have been a clear case of judicial legislation if the illegal possession with
murder punished with a single penalty have been divided into two separate offenses of illegal
possession and murder with distinct penalties. It is consequently a compounded infringement of
legislative powers for this Court to now, as it has done, treat that single offense as specifically
described by the law and impose reclusion perpetua therefor (since the death penalty for that
offense is still proscribed), but then proceed further by plucking out therefrom the crime of
murder in order to be able to impose the death sentence. For indeed, on this score, it is beyond
cavil that in the aggravated form of illegal possession, the consequential murder (or homicide) is
an integrated element or integral component since without the accompanying death, the crime
would merely be simple illegal possession of a firearm under the first paragraph of Section 1.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not warrant and support a
conclusion that it intended to treat "illegal possession and resultant killing" (emphasis supplied)
"as a single and integrated offense" of illegal possession with homicide or murder. It does not
use the clause as a result or on the occasion of to evince an intention to create a single
integrated crime. By its unequivocal and explicit language, which we quote to be clearly
understood:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death
shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
the crime of either homicide or murder is committed NOT AS A RESULT OR ON THE
OCCASION of the violation of Section 1, but WITH THE USE of an unlicensed firearm, whose
possession is penalized therein.There is a world of difference, which is too obvious, between (a)
the commission of homicide or murder as aresult or on the occasion of the violation of Section 1,
and (b) the commission of homicide or murder with the useof an unlicensed firearm. In the first,
homicide or murder is not the original purpose or primary objective of the offender, but a
secondary event or circumstance either resulting from or perpetrated on the occasion of the
commission of that originally or primarily intended. In the second, the killing, which requires
a mens rea, is the primary purpose, and to carry that out effectively the offender uses an
unlicensed firearm.
As to the question then of Mr. Justice Regalado of whether this Court should also apply
the rule enunciated here to P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974),
P.D. No. 533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), and P.D. No. 534 (Defining Illegal Fishing and
Prescribing Stiffer Penalties Therefor), the answer is resoundingly in the negative. In those
cases, the lawmaker clearly intended a single integrated offense or a special complex offense
because the death therein occurs as a result or on the occasion of the commission of the
offenses therein penalized or was not the primary purpose of the offender, unlike in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. Thus, (a) Section 3 of P.D. No. 532 provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties. -- Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein
defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a. Piracy. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion
thereof,
the
penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall
be
imposed. If
rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or
when
the
offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage.-- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period shall
be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed during or on the occasion of the
commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum
periods
shall
be
imposed. If kidnapping
for
ransom
or
extortion,
or murderor homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of
death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
(b) Section 8 of P.D. No. 533 reads in part as follows:
SEC. 8. Penal provisions. -- Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein defined shall,
irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished by prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty
of reclusion temporal in
its
maximum
period
to reclusion perpetua shall
be

imposed. If a person is seriously

injured
or killed as a result or on the occasion of thecommission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusio
n perpetua to death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
and (c) Section 3 of P.D. No. 534 reads as follows:
SECTION. 3. Penalties.-- Violations of this Decree and the rules and regulations mentioned in
paragraph (f) of Section 1 hereof shall be punished as follows:
a. by
imprisonment
from
10
to
12
years,
if
explosives
are
used: Provided, that if the explosion results (1) in physical injury to person, the penalty shall be
imprisonment
from
12
to
20
years,
or
(2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall beimprisonment from 20 years to life, or deat
h;
b. by imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, if obnoxious or poisonous substances are
used: Provided, that if the use of suchsubstances results (1) in physical injury to any person, the
penalty
shall
be
imprisonment
from
10
to
12
years,
or
(2) in theloss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from 20 years to life, or deat
h; x x x (emphasis supplied)
The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to respect
and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code
and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in
killing a person. Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or
modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in such a way that if an
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder, either of these crimes, as
the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
would not anymore be separately punished. Indeed, the words of the subject provision are
palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of homicide and murder, as
crimes mala in se under the Revised Penal Code, is obliterated as such and reduced as a mere
aggravating circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is
used in killing a person. The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed
in the first paragraph of Section 1 -- reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua --to death, seemingly because of the accused's manifest arrogant defiance and
contempt of the law in using an unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the same time,
to absolve the accused from any criminal liability for the death of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with
death if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such
use merely as a qualifying circumstanceand not as an offense. That could not have been the
intention of the lawmaker because the term "penalty" in the subject provision is obviously meant
to be the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the penalty for homicide or murder. We
explicitly stated in Tac-an:
There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance
in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death
weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second
offense of homicide or murder to death .... The essential point is that the unlicensed character or
condition of the instrument used in destroying human life or committing some other crime, is not
included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code.
A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a qualifying
circumstance. This would not be without precedent. By analogy, we can cite Section 17 of B.P.
Blg. 179, which amended the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425). The said section

provides that when an offender commits a crime under a state of addiction, such a state shall be
considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of the crime and the
application of the penalty under the Revised Penal Code.
In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even vaguely, a legislative intent
to decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, or to convert the offense of illegal possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if
the firearm so illegally possessed is used in the commission of homicide or murder. To charge
the lawmaker with that intent is to impute an absurdity that would defeat the clear intent to
preserve the law on homicide and murder and impose a higher penalty for illegal possession of
firearm if such firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder.
Evidently, the majority did not, as charged in the concurring and dissenting opinion, create
two offenses by dividing a single offense into two. Neither did it resort to the "unprecedented and
invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another
offense by using a component crime which is also an element of the former." The majority has
always maintained that the killing of a person with the use of anillegally possessed firearm gives
rise to two separate offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (b)
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form.
What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an interpretation of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that would make it define and punish a single integrated
offense and give to the words WITH THE USE OF a similar meaning as the words AS A RESULT
OR ON THE OCCASION OF, a meaning which is neither born out by the letter of the law nor
supported by its intent. Worth noting is the rule in statutory construction that if a statute is clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation,[51] leaving the court no room for any extended ratiocination or rationalization of the
law.[52]
Peregrinations into the field of penology such as on the concept of a single integrated
crime or composite crimes, or into the philosophical domain of integration of the essential
elements of one crime to that of another would then be unnecessary in light of the clear
language and indubitable purpose and intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866. The realm of penology, the determination of what should be criminalized, the definition of
crimes, and the prescription of penalties are the exclusive prerogatives of the legislature. As its
wisdom may dictate, the legislature may even create from a single act or transaction various
offenses for different purposes subject only to the limitations set forth by the Constitution. This
Court cannot dictate upon the legislature to respect the orthodox view concerning a single
integrated crime or composite crimes.
The only apparent obstacle to the imposition of cumulative penalties for various acts is the
rule on double jeopardy. This brings us to the proposition in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Regalado that the majority view offends the constitutional bar against double jeopardy under the
"same-evidence" test enunciated in People vs. Diaz.[53] He then concludes:
In the cases now before us, it is difficult to assume that the evidence for the murder in the first
charge of aggravated illegal possession of firearm with murder would be different from the
evidence to be adduced in the subsequent charge for murder alone. In the second charge, the
illegal possession is not in issue, except peripherally and inconsequentially since it is not an
element or modifying circumstance in the second charge, hence the evidence therefor is
immaterial. But, in both prosecutions, the evidence on murder is essential, in the first charge
because without it the crime is only simple illegal possession, and, in the second charge,
because murder is the very subject of the prosecution. Assuming that all the other requirements
under Section 7, Rule 117 are present, can it be doubted that double jeopardy is necessarily
present and can be validly raised to bar the second prosecution for murder?
In fact, we can extrapolate the constitutional and reglementary objection to the cases of the
other composite crimes for which a single penalty is imposed, such as the complex, compound

and so-called special complex crimes. Verily, I cannot conceive of how a person convicted of
estafa through falsification under Article 48 can be validly prosecuted anew for the same offense
or either estafa or falsification; or how the accused convicted of robbery with homicide under
Article 294 can be legally charged again with either of the same component crimes of robbery or
homicide; or how the convict who was found guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 can
be duly haled before the court again to face charges of either the same rape or homicide. Why,
then, do we now sanction a second prosecution for murder in the cases at bar since the very
same offense was an indispensable component for the other composite offense of illegal
possession of firearm with murder? Why would the objection of non bis in idim as a bar to a
second jeopardy lie in the preceding examples and not apply to the cases now before us?
We are unable to agree to the proposition. For one, the issue of double jeopardy is not
raised in this case. For another, the so-called "same-evidence" test is not a conclusive, much
less exclusive, test in double jeopardy cases of the first category under the Double Jeopardy
Clause which is covered by Section 21, Article III of the Constitution and which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Note that the first category speaks of the same offense. The second refers to the same act. This
was explicitly distinguished in Yap vs. Lutero,[54] from where People vs. Relova[55] quotes the
following:
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause
20, Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense." (italics in the original) The second sentence of said clause
provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence
prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one
may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with
different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the
crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are
not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the
other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been attached under one
of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the
same
statute
or
by
different
statutes,
the
important
inquiry
relates
to
the identity of offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged.[56] The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set
out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved.[57]
It may be noted that to determine the same offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America which reads:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb . . . .
the rule applicable is the following: "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two

offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."[58]
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America was
brought to the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902, whose Section 5
provided, inter alia:
[N]o person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment . . . .
This provision was carried over in identical words in Section 3 of the Jones Law of 29 August
1916.[59] Then under the 1935 Constitution, the Jones Law provision was recast with the addition
of a provision referring to thesame act. Thus, paragraph 20, Section 1, Article III thereof provided
as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
This was adopted verbatim in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and in Section 21,
Article III of the present Constitution.
This additional-element test
in Lutero and Relova and
in Blockburger, Gore, and Missouri would safely bring the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 out of the proscribed double jeopardy principle. For, undeniably, the elements of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different from the elements of homicide or
murder, let alone the fact that these crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and
the former is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the fear that the
majority's construction of the subject provision would violate the constitutional bar against double
jeopardy is unfounded.
The penalty which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8179 for illegal possession
of firearm in its aggravated form must, however, be modified. The penalty prescribed by P.D. No.
1866 is death. Since Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetual must be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 30
September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol finding accused-appellant
DANIEL QUIJADA y CIRCULADO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in
Criminal Case No. 8178 and of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form in Criminal
Case No. 8179 is AFFIRMED. The penalty imposed in the first case, as amended by the Order
of 29 October 1993, is sustained; however, the penalty imposed in the second case is changed
to Reclusion Perpetua from the indeterminate penalty ranging from Seventeen (17) years, Four
(4) months, and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as maximum.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 124212. June 5, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILFREDO FELOTEO, accusedappellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused WILFREDO FELOTEO was charged with and convicted of the crimes of Murder,
as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and Illegal Possession of
Firearm, a violation of Section 1of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The Informations against accused read:
In Criminal Case No. 11109
"That on or about the 6th day of May, 1993, in the evening, at Sitio Nagbaril, Barangay Bintuan,
Municipality of Coron, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, while armed with a
firearm and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with his
firearm, to wit: an armalite rifle, one SONNY SOTTO, hitting him on the vital part of his body and
inflicting upon him a gunshot wound on the left side of his chest, thru and thru, which injury was
the direct and immediate cause of his instantaneous death. (emphasis ours)
"CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with aggravating circumstance of treachery."
In Criminal Case No. 11644
"That on or about the 6th day of May, 1993, and prior thereto, at Sitio Nagbaril, Barangay
Bintuan, Municipality of Coron, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control, one armalite rifle with Serial No. 9035914 and
ammunitions, without any license or permit to possess the same and that this firearm was used
in shooting to death one SONNY SOTTO in a case of Murder filed with the RTC of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11109 and that this crime have no relation
or in furtherance of the crime of rebellion or subversion. (emphasis ours)
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
When arraigned, accused pled not guilty. Trial ensued.
The records show that in the evening of May 6, 1993, the victim, SONNY SOTTO, and his
friends, ARNEL ABELEDA and JOHNNY ABREA, were walking along the highway in
Barangay Bintuan, Coron, Province of Palawan. They had a few drinks earlier that day and were

on their way home to Sitio Nagbaril. Abrea walked ahead of the group, about thirteen meters
away from Sotto, followed by Abeleda. They were in a lively mood as Abeleda playfully walked
backwards, facing Sotto.[1]
The accused, WILFREDO FELOTEO, appeared on the opposite side of the road and
walked past Abrea and Abeleda. He was armed with an armalite rifle. Abeleda and Abrea
recognized the accused, their barriomate, as the moon was shining brightly. They did not pay
much attention to the accused as Abeleda was playing "habulan" with Sotto. Without uttering a
word, the accused aimed the armalite at Sotto and pressed its trigger. Sotto was hit above the
left chest and fell on the ground, face down. Abeleda and Abrea scampered away to find help,
while the accused fled from the crime scene. [2] Ten (10) minutes later, Abeleda and Abrea,
accompanied by Barangay Tanod Tito Abrina and a certain Inyong Adion, returned to the locus
criminis. They found Sotto dead.
Sotto was brought to the hospital for autopsy. The Autopsy Report showed that he
sustained a gunshot wound, with the bullet entering the left side of his collarbone and exiting at
the spinal cord. The bullet came from an M-16 armalite rifle. He also had abrasions on the knees
and face. Dr. Hew G. Curameng of the Palawan Provincial Hospital opined that Sotto fell on his
knees before he slumped on the ground, face down. There were no powder burns on his body,
indicating that the victim was shot from a distance. The cause of death was massive blood loss
secondary to gunshot wound.[3]
The firearm used in the shooting incident belongs to SPO2 Roman Adion. On May 6,
1993, SPO2 Adion went to the house of Teofisto Alaquin in Sitio Nagbaril. He brought with him
his official service firearm, an M-16 armalite rifle, [4] as he has been ordered to go to Jandanao
the next day to investigate a land dispute. He slept early. At around 6:30 p.m., Alaquin woke him
up and informed him that the accused stole his armalite. SPO2 Adion, together with Nazario
Adion and Frank Adion, immediately looked for the accused. They heard a gunshot coming from
a distance of about four hundred (400) meters and rushed to the place where it emanated. They
saw Sotto lying prostrate on the road, shot on the chest. SPO2 Adion suspected that his armalite
was used in the shooting incident and he continued his hunt for the accused. The next day, May
7, 1993, at 5:00 a.m., he nabbed the accused in Sitio Cabugao, five (5) kilometers away from
the crime scene. The accused surrendered the armalite to him. Upon inspection, SPO2
Adion found nineteen (19) bullets left in the armalite. There were twenty (20) bullets inside the
armalite chamber and magazine before it was stolen.[5]
SPO4 Jose Ansay, Chief of the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) in Tiniguiban, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, affirmed that the accused was not
duly licensed to carry a firearm.[6]
The accused denied that he stole SPO2 Adion's armalite and alleged that the shooting of
Sotto was an accident. He averred that on May 6, 1993, he was in his sister's house in Barangay
Bintuan, Coron, when SPO2 Adion passed by and invited him over to the place of Teofisto
Alaquin in Nagbaril. They boarded SPO2 Adion's tricycle and arrived at Nagbaril at about 3:00
p.m. Frank Adion dropped by the house of Alaquin and borrowed the tricycle of SPO2
Adion. Frank Adion later returned on foot and told SPO2 Adion that the tricycle's engine broke
down so he left it along the road. SPO2 Adion checked on his tricycle and left behind his
armalite rifle. Before leaving, he instructed the accused to wait for him at Alaquin's house.[7]

After thirty minutes, the accused decided to follow SPO2 Adion. He took the armalite and
walked the road leading to Bintuan. At about 7:00 p.m., he met Sonny Sotto's
group. They zigzagged as they walked. In jest, the accused said to Sotto, "Boots, don't get near
me, I'll shoot you." He pointed the armalite to Sotto and pressed its trigger, allegedly unaware
that it was loaded. It fired and hit Sotto. The accused fled but was apprehended by SPO2 Adion
the following day. He told SPO2 Adion that he accidentally shot Sotto.[8]
After trial, the accused was found guilty as charged. [9] He was sentenced to suffer the
penalties of reclusion perpetua, for murder, and imprisonment of twenty (20) years, for illegal
possession of firearm. He was furtherordered to pay the heirs of Sotto the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), as civil indemnity.

Appellant was convicted under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, the governing law at the time
the crime was committed. It provides:
"SEC. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms,
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition.- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition of machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death
shall be imposed." (emphasis ours)

In this appeal, appellant contends:

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY AS ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME ALLEGED AND IN
HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE KILLING OF SONNY
SOTTO."
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
We reject the argument of the appellant that he should not have been convicted for
murder as treachery was not duly established by the prosecution. Allegedly, Sotto knew of the
impending attack for it was frontal. Moreover, Sotto was warned, albeit jokingly, that he was
going to be shot.
Under par. 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of
the crime which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising
from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make. [10] The settled rule is that
treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim
no opportunity to repel it or defend himself. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack,
without the slightest provocation from a victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or to retaliate.[11]
In the case at bar, treachery is present for there was a sudden attack against the unarmed
Sotto. When Sotto and his friends encountered appellant on the road, they were in a "jovial
mood" as they just came from a drinking spree. Although they saw appellant carrying an
armalite, they did not suspect anything untoward to happen.However, without any
provocation, appellant shot Sotto. The fact that the attack was frontal cannot negate
treachery. The shooting was unexpected. There is no showing that the alleged warning given by
appellant to Sotto afforded the latter sufficient time to defend himself. Indeed, Sotto could not
defend himself as he was unarmed and a bit drunk-- as observed by the appellant himself, the
victim was walking in a zigzag manner. There was no way for Sotto to avoid the armalite bullets.
We now come to the penalty imposed on appellant for the illegal possession of firearm in
view of the recent amendments to P.D. No. 1866 by R.A. No. 8294.

The penalty for the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866 is
death. Since at that time, the death penalty cannot be enforced in view of Article III (19) (1) of
the 1987 Constitution, appellant should have been sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,[12] not twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
Nonetheless, Republic Act No. 8294, amended P.D. No. 1866, by reducing the penalties
for simple and aggravated forms of illegal possession of firearms.[13] The law now provides:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition.- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm such as
rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, ammunition, or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition:Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .45
and also lesser caliber firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22
center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two
or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. - The term unlicensed firearm shall include:
1) firearms with expired license, or
2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime."

Clearly, the penalty for illegal possession of high powered firearm is prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine of P30,000.00. In case homicide or murder is committed with the use
of unlicensed firearm, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be merely considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
The enactment of R.A. No. 8294 can be given retroactive effect as it favors the appellant.
[14]
So we held in People vs. Simon,[15] viz:
"Since obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act 7659 could neither have been involved
or invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present
stage, can sua sponte apply the provisions of Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on
appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al.,
ante., thus:
`x x x. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of
penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and
nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of
whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the
prescription of the crime and the penalty.'
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in
Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving
sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic consideration would warrant and
necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas
corpus." (footnote omitted)
As mentioned above, the penalty for simple illegal possession of high powered firearm is
prision mayor in its minimum period.[16] This penalty was taken from the Revised Penal Code,
hence, although P.D. No. 1866, as amended by RA 8294, is a special law, the rules in said Code
for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied.[17]
In the case at bar, an unlicensed firearm was used in committing murder, thus,
aggravating the crime and increasing the imposable penalty to the maximum period of prision
mayor minimum, the duration of which ranges from seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to eight (8) years.[18]
We determine the minimum and maximum sentence pursuant to the first part of Section 1
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law[19] which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the
minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense."
Accordingly, the minimum range of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from any of
the periods ofprision correccional maximum, the penalty next lower in degree to the penalty
of prision mayor minimum. Prision correccional maximum has a duration of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. On the other hand, the maximum penalty to be

imposed, taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance attending the commission of
the crime, shall be taken from the maximum period of prision mayor minimum which ranges from
seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to eight (8) years.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment against appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 11109 (for
Murder) and Criminal Case No. 11644 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm) is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that, in Criminal Case No. 11644, appellant should be sentenced, as he is
hereby sentenced, to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as the
minimum term, and eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum term. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 128618. November 16, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELICISIMO NARVASA, JIMMY
ORANIA and MATEO NARVASA, accused, FELICISIMO NARVASA and JIMMY
ORANIA appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
What crime or crimes are committed when a killing is perpetrated with the use of
unlicensed firearms? In the absence of the firearms themselves, may illegal possession of
firearms be proven by parol evidence?
The Case
Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania seek the reversal of the October 11,
1996 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case Nos.
2629-A, 2648-A and 2646-A, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession
of firearms in its aggravated form and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Emiliano A. Rabina filed three Informations [2] against the
appellants and their co-accused, Mateo Narvasa. In Criminal Case No. 2648-A, the Amended
Information filed on November 10, 1993 charged Felicisimo Narvasa (in conspiracy with the
other accused) with aggravated illegal possession of firearm allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about February 6, 1992 at Sitio Bugtong, Barangay Patar, [M]unicipality of Agno,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, New [sic] Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody an M-14 Rifle without first securing the
necessary license or permit from the lawful authorities and which firearm in conspiracy with
Jimmy Orania and Mateo Narvasa was used in the killing of one SPO3 Primo Camba, victim in
Crim. Case No. 2629-A.

In Criminal Case No. 2629-A, Felicisimo Narvasa, Jimmy Orania and Mateo Narvasa were
charged with homicide allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about February 6, 1992, at Sitio Bugtong, [B]arangay Patar, [M]unicipality of Agno,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, New [sic] Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill, armed with high powered guns, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously shoot SPO3 PRIMO CAMBA which caused his instantaneous death
as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania were arrested, but Mateo Narvasa remained at
large. When arraigned, the two appellants, assisted by their counsel, [3] pleaded not guilty.[4] Trial
proceeded in due course. Thereafter, the court a quorendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises and the evidence presented, this
Court finds both accused Felicisimo Narvasa in Criminal Case No. 2648-A and Jimmy Orania in
Criminal Case No.2646-A [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of [i]llegal [p]ossession
of [f]irearms in its aggravated form in these cases and therefore, both accused are sentenced to
death penalty but for reasons that the law at that time of the commission of the crime prohibits
death sentence penalty, these two accused therefore shall each suffer the sentence of single,
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua and are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and moral damages of P100,000.00
each, plus cost.
In Criminal Case No. 2629-A for [h]omicide, this Court has considered this case as [a] necessary
component of the crimes of [i]llegal [p]ossession in their aggravated form, as the same is merely
an element of the principal offense of [i]llegal [p]ossession of [f]irearms in [its] aggravated form,
which is the graver offense.
With respect to accused Mateo Narvasa, since he has not been arrested and never brought to
the jurisdiction of this Court, this case in the meantime, is ordered archived insofar as said
accused Mateo Narvasa is concerned.
Let an Alias Warrant of Arrest issue as against accused Mateo Narvasa.

In Criminal Case No. 2646-A, Jimmy Orania (in conspiracy with the other accused) was
charged with aggravated illegal possession of firearm in the Amended Information which reads:
That on or about February 6, 1992 at Sitio Bugtong, Barangay Patar, [M]unicipality of Agno,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, New [sic] Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody a .30 U.S. Carbine without first securing
the necessary license /and/or permit from the lawful authorities and which firearm in conspiracy
with Mateo Narvasa and Felicisimo Narvasa was used in the killing of SPO3 Primo Camba,
victim in Crim. Case No. 2629-A.

The [b]ailbond posted by accused Felicisimo Narvasa is hereby ordered cancelled.

Appellants counsel then filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. [5] In an
Order dated October 24, 1996, the trial court deemed the appeal filed by Felicisimo Narvasa
and Jimmy Orania perfected, and effected the transmittal of the case records to the Court of
Appeals. Realizing the mistake, the Court of Appeals subsequently forwarded the records to this
Court.[7]
[6]

The Facts

Evidence for the Prosecution

tested. Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania were found positive of gunpowder burns (Tsn.,
August 16, 1994, pp. 11-15).[9]

In his Brief, the solicitor general[8] presented the following narration of facts:
Evidence for the Defense
On February 6, 1992, after lunch time[,] Villamor Laderas and Ernesto Nagal, councilmen of
Quinaoayanan, Bani, Pangasinan, acting on a report that there were missing carabaos, pigs and
goats, repaired to the far-flung Sitio Bugtong of the town of Bani and to Sitio Patar of the
adjoining town of Agno in Pangasinan, which they reached at around 5:30 that afternoon. Then
Laderas and Nagal patrolled the area. Along their way, the two chanced upon the gang of
appellants[.] [T]hey were five and three of them were armed. Jimmy Orania was holding a
caliber .30 U.S. carbine, Mateo Narvasa was armed with [an] M-16 and Felicisimo Narvasa was
carrying an M-14.
The two are familiar with those kind[s] of guns as they have seen similar ones carried by
policemen. They said, a carbine is shorter than [an] M-14 and [an] M-16 is longer than [an] M-14
(Tsn., April 21, 1994, pp. 1-35, December 13, 1995, pp. 1-12).
Laderas and Nagal simply stared at the five and then they proceeded to their way home.
Unluckily for the goons, the two councilmen met the two policemen[,] SPO3 Primo Camba and
PO2 Simeon Navora who were on patrol and they reported what they saw (Ibid).
The two policemen were also responding to a report about the missing animals and they
suggested that all of them should track down the armed goons (Ibid).
After walking some distance, the four responding men saw the house of appellant Felicisimo
Narvasa on a hilly portion around 100 meters away from their path. They decided to investigate
at the house but before they could negotiate the distance, they were met by a volley of gunfire.
The four[,] who were ten meters apart[,] dove and sought cover (Tsn., April, 1994, p. 11). When
the firing took a halt, Laderas had the courage to raise his head and [view] xxx the source of the
gunfire. Laderas saw Felicisimo Narvasa in a squatting position aiming at the two policemen and
Jimmy Orania was seated near him guiding him at his target. Mateo Narvasa was also aiming
his gun. There was an exchange of gunfire as the policemen were able to take proper positions.
Unfortunately, SPO3 Camba was hit. Navora summoned Laderas and Nagal to get closer to give
aid to Camba. Laderas and Nagal carried Camba as they retreated and, Navora followed
moving backwards as he kept firing at their enemies (Ibid, tsn., July 20, 1994, pp. 1-8; tsn.,
August 15, 1994, pp. 2-30).
In the process of the retreat, Camba [bled] profusely and he died even before he could be
brought out from the scene of the crime.
The body of Camba was left at the scene of the crime while his companions escaped and called
for help. Several policemen arrived. Pieces of evidence like empty shells of M-16, M-14 and
caliber .30 U.S. carbine bullets were gathered and some policemen were tasked to track down
the goons (Exhs. C, C-1 to C-4; tsn., August 16, 1994, pp. 6-10).
Shortly thereafter, Felicisimo Narvasa, Glicerio Narvasa, Rederio Narvasa and Jimmy Orania
were apprehended. Mateo Narvasa was not found. The four were investigated and paraffin

Appellants deny the charges against them. Felicisimo Narvasa even claims that his son
Arnel was shot by Ernesto Nagal, Villamor Laderas and PO2 Simeon Navora. In their Brief,
[10]
they state:
Felicisimo Narvasa testified that he was sleeping at his house on the afternoon of February 6,
1992 when Glicerio Narvasa woke him up and informed him that his son Arnel was shot. He
went downstairs and saw his co-accused Jimmy Orania embracing his son. He asked his son
who shot him and the latter told his father that it was the group of Councilman Laderas who shot
him. He instructed Orania and his wife to bring his son to the hospital but the latter died at the
hospital. He further averred that before he slept, Jimmy Orania, Glicerio Narvasa and Rederio
Narvasa were in his house drinking two bottles of gin after helping him [fix] the fence in his
house. Accused-appellant Narvasa when asked to explain the charge against him denied
committing the same. On March 17, 1992 he gave his affidavit naming Ernesto Nagal, Villamor
Laderas and Simeon Navora as the assailants of his son. (TSN, August 8, 1999, pp. 3-17)
Jimmy Orania testified that on February 6, 1992, he was in the house of his co-accused
Felicisimo Narvasa because he was invited to work on the fence of Felicisimo. After finishing
their work, Jimmy[,] together with Glicerio and Rederio Narvasa[,] drunk two bottles of gin. At
about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon he instructed Arnel Narvasa to get their carabaos grazing
around 100 meters north of the house of Felicisimo, when he heard a gunshot coming from that
direction. Arnel shouted for help, so he proceeded to the place where Arnel was shot and carried
him to the house of Felicisimo. The latter was awakened by Glicerio and when he asked his son
who shot him, Arnel answered that it was the group of Laderas.
Jimmy Orania further averred that he knew nothing and denied participation in the killing of
Primo Camba. That on the day after February 6, 1992, they were picked up by the police. (TSN,
August 20, 1996, pp. 3-13).[11]
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court accorded credibility to the prosecution witnesses and held that mere denial
could not overcome the prosecution evidence showing that appellants used high-powered
firearms to shoot at the prosecution witnesses, thereby resulting in the death of SPO3 Primo
Camba. Further supporting said testimonies were the results of the paraffin test conducted on
appellants and the recovery of various cartridges and shells matching the firearms purportedly
used in the crime. Though these unlicensed firearms were not presented as evidence, the trial
court, citing People v. Ferrera,[12] ruled that appellants may still be convicted of illegal possession
of firearms.
Finally, the trial court found that appellants acted in conspiracy in the killing of Primo
Camba. However, on the basis of People v. Barros,[13] it held that the homicide was merely an
element of the illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form; thus, homicide in the present

case was taken into account not as a separate crime but as an aggravating circumstance which
increased the penalty for the illegal possession of firearms.

Nonetheless, their uncertainty on whether Navora had fired back is immaterial to the crime
charged and too insignificant to impair their credibility. In any event, the Court has ruled that a
witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of minute details.[18]

Hence, this appeal.[14]

Second Issue: Sufficiency of the Evidence
Assignment of Errors
In assailing the trial courts Decision, appellants interpose the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
AGGRAVATED ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM.[15]
In the main, the resolution of this case revolves around the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence and the characterization of the crime
committed.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is not meritorious. In light of Republic Act 8294,[16] however, appellants should
be convicted only of homicide, with the special aggravating circumstance of the use of illegally
possessed firearms.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellants question the credibility of Witnesses Laderas and Nagal because of an alleged
inconsistency in their testimonies. Laderas testified that there was an exchange of fire between
appellants and PO2 Simeon Navora, while Nagal declared that only the appellants
fired. Appellants point out that conflicting testimonies on a material and relevant point casts
doubt [on] the truthfulness or veracity[17] of such testimonies.
Appellants contention is untenable. The circumstances of the instant case explain the
seeming inconsistency in the testimonies of the two witnesses. At the time, they were under fire
and in fear of losing their lives. Moreover, they did not take cover in the same place that Navora
did.

Appellants cite People v. Lualhati,[19] wherein this Court ruled that in crimes involving
illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof,
viz: the existence of the subject firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or possessed
the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same. Appellants
contend that the existence of the firearms was not sufficiently proven because the prosecution
had not presented the firearms as evidence. It is necessary, they argue, that said firearms
allegedly possessed by the accused-appellants and allegedly used in the killing of Policeman
Primo Camba be presented in evidence as those firearms constitute the corpus delicti of the
crime with which they are sentenced.[20]
Appellants argument is not persuasive. In People v. Lualhati, this Court merely stated that
the existence of the firearm must be established; it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be
presented as evidence. Thus, in People v. Orehuela,[21] the Court held that the existence of the
firearm can be established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said firearm.In the
said case, Appellant Orehuela was convicted of qualified illegal possession of a firearm despite
the fact that the firearm used was not presented as evidence. The existence of the weapon was
deemed amply established by the testimony of an eyewitness that Orehuela was in possession
of it and had used it to kill the victim, viz.:
We consider that the certification was adequate to show that the firearm used by Modesto
Orehuela in killing Teoberto Canizares was a firearm which Orehuela was not licensed to
possess and to carry outside his residence on the night that Teoberto Canizares was shot to
death. That that firearm was a .38 caliber pistol was shown by the testimony and report of NBI
Ballistician Bonifacio Ayag. When the above circumstances are taken together with
the testimony of the eyewitness that Modesto Orehuela was in fact in possession of a
firearm and used the same to kill Teoberto Canizares, we believe that accused Orehuela was
properly found guilty of aggravated or qualified illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
In the present case, the testimonies of several witnesses indubitably demonstrate the
existence of the firearms. Villamor Laderas stated that when he went to Barangay
Quinaoayanan, Bani, Pangasinan to investigate a report regarding missing carabaos, pigs and
goats, he saw the appellants carrying long firearms. We quote hereunder the relevant portion of
his testimony:
Q And when you saw the two accused together with the three others, what have you noticed
in their persons?
A They were holding long firearms, sir.

Q Who of the five persons did you see was holding long firearms?

A Jimmy Orania was holding a carbine; Mateo Narvasa was holding an M-16.

Q And while the gunfire was going on, did you know who fired those gunshots?
A We know sir, because we can see them.

Q About Felicisimo Narvasa, what was he holding?

A Felicisimo Narvasa was holding [an] M-14.[22]

Q Whom did you see?

A Felicisimo Narvasa, Jimmy Orania and Mateo Narvasa, sir.[24]

Ernesto Nagal likewise stated that he saw appellants carrying long firearms, as his
testimony indicates:

Q What did you notice in the persons of the five persons you met?
A They were carrying arms, sir.
Q What kind of firearm were the five persons, or some of them, carrying?
A Jimmy Orania is carrying a caliber .30.

Q How about Mateo Narvasa?

A Mateo Narvasa is carrying [an] M-16.

Q How about Felicisimo Narvasa?

A A long firearm was carried by Felicisimo Narvasa, sir, but I dont know the caliber.[23]
That herein appellants were the ones who had shot at the prosecution witnesses was
confirmed by Laderas, who testified as follows:
Q How did you know that the gunfire came from the west?
A Because we were facing west.

In addition, Primo Camba was hit by a bullet, and empty shells of M-16, M-14 and .30
caliber carbine bullets were later on recovered in the vicinity of the place where the shooting
occurred.
The above facts, duly proven and taken together, sufficiently establish the existence of the
subject firearms and the fact that appellants possessed and used said firearms in firing at
Villamor Laderas, Ernesto Nagal, and Simeon Navora, as well as Primo Camba who succumbed
to the gunshot wound he had sustained.
The present case can be distinguished from People v. Navarro[25] wherein the Court held
that illegal possession of firearm could not be deemed an aggravating circumstance because the
existence of the said firearm was not proven. In said case, a witness testified that he saw
appellant shoot the victim with a short firearm. No firearm, however, was presented as evidence,
although a gun was recovered from the accused when he was arrested. Moreover, no proof
was adduced to show that the firearm allegedly seen by the witness was the same one
recovered by the authorities from the accused. Thus, the Court held:
In the case at bar, the Information alleged that on January 5, 1991, the appellant had in his
possession an unlicensed firearm which he used in killing Ferdinand Rabadon. This firearm was
allegedly recovered on January 5, 1994, when appellant was arrested. However, said firearm
was not presented in court or offered as evidence against the appellant. Although Rabago
testified that he saw the appellant with a short firearm when the latter shot Rabadon on January
5, 1991 no other proof was presented to show that such gun, allegedly used on January 5,
1991, was the same one recovered on January 5, 1994. The prosecution was not able to
establish sufficiently the existence of the subject firearm x x x.
In other words, the evidence on the existence of the firearm was beset with doubt and
conflict. Such uncertainty is not found in the present case, for the testimonies of several
witnesses indubitably established that the subject firearms were in the possession of the
appellants.
As to proof that appellants had no license or permit to possess the firearms in question,
we have held in People v. Villanueva[26] that the second element of illegal possession of firearms
can be proven by the testimony or the certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the firearm in question. The Court ruled:

As we have previously held, the testimony of, or a certification from the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused-appellant was not a licensee of the said firearm would have
sufficed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal
possession.
The prosecution submitted a certification showing that Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and
Jimmy Orania were not licensed firearm holders,[27] a fact that was attested to by SPO4 Roberto
Manuel, a member of the PNP stationed at the provincial headquarters of the Pangasinan
Provincial Command as Assistant Firearms and Explosives NCPO, who testified thus:

A We dive[d] to the ground for safety, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q Upon diving to the ground, what happened to Primo Camba?
A Primo Camba was hit, sir[.]
Q How did you come to know that Primo Camba was hit by the first exchange of gunfire?

Q And did you bring with you the Master List of the firearm licensed holders in Pangasinan?
A Just after we dived to the ground, xxx Primo Camba told me that he was hit.
A Yes, sir.
Q And when Primo Camba told you that he was hit, what did you do?
Q Will you please produce it?
A I signalled the two (2) councilmen to get near me.
A (Witness showing a folder, which is the Master List of firearm licensed holders in
Pangasinan.)

xxxxxxxxx

Q And with the aid of that voluminous list of firearm holders in Pangasinan, will you please
tell his Honor if Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania appear therein as licensed
firearm holders?

''Q After giving instruction to the two (2) councilmen, what did you do?

A Their names do not appear, as manifested by our [Master List as licensed] holders of any
caliber, sir.[28]

Q Carried the body of Primo Camba, to what place?

Appellants did not present any evidence and neither did they even claim -- that they were
in fact licensed firearm holders.
Appellants Responsible
for Policemans Death
Laderas, Nagal and Navora testified that as their group, which included Primo Camba,
approached Felicisimo Narvasas house, they were suddenly fired upon. Camba was hit and it
was from that bullet wound that he died. That appellants were responsible for his death is clear
from Navoras testimony:
Q And on your way following them what happened?
A When we were about 100 meters North of the House of Ising Narvasa we were met [by] a
heavy volume of gunfire.
Q Now, if you were met according to you with heavy volume of gunfire, what did you xxx and
your companion [do]?

A They carr[ied] him while we were retreating.

A We retreated [to the] East direction, until we reach the yard of [a] certain Prudencio.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And when you reach[ed] the premises of Prudencio, what was the condition of Primo
Camba?
A He [was] no longer breathing, sir.[29]
Laderas was able to identify their attackers as Felicisimo Narvasa, Jimmy Orania and
Mateo Narvasa. As these three directed and fired their guns at Laderas, Nagal, Navora and
Camba, there was unity in action and purpose, and thus, conspiracy was present. Although it
was not ascertained who among them actually shot Camba, all of them are liable for his
death. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Third Issue:
The Crime
The totality of the evidence shows that appellants possessed unlicensed firearms, which
they used in killing Primo Camba. In its Decision, the trial court convicted appellants of [i]llegal

[p]ossession of [f]irearms in its aggravated form and considered homicide merely an element of
the principal offense of [i]llegal [p]ossession of [f]irearms in its aggravated
form.Applying People v. Barros[30] to the proven facts, the trial court imposed upon appellants the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, a new law has in the meanwhile been enacted.
Republic Act No. 8294,[31] which imposes a lighter penalty for the crime, provides:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen Thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition; Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty Thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .
44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by
burst of two or three; Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In People v. Molina,[32] this Court en banc explained that RA 8294 considers the use of an
unlicensed firearm only an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, viz.:
Under our ruling in People vs. Quijada, violation of PD 1866 is an offense distinct from murder;
appellants should perforce be culpable for two separate offenses, as ruled by the trial court.
Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers
the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,
and not as a separate offense.
Under RA 8294, appellants can be held liable only for homicide [33] and penalized
with reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,[34] RA 8294 should be
given retroactive effect.
Civil Liability
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, appellants are liable to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Primo Camba the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as indemnity ex delicto for
his death.

However, the award of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) representing moral
damages should be deleted since no evidence of anxiety, moral shock, wounded feelings or
similar injury was presented during the trial.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. For the death of Primo
Camba, Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania are found GUILTY of HOMICIDE with
the special aggravating circumstance of using unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, they are each sentenced to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and ordered to pay the heirs of Primo
Camba P50,000 as death indemnity. However, the award of moral damages is
hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-37168-69 September 13, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, alias Doming; CEFERINO
BELTRAN, alias Ebing; MANUEL PUZON alias Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising;
and ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy,accused-appellants.
RELOVA, J.:
Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran, alias Minong; Rogelio Bugarin, alias Boy; Cresencio Siazon,
alias Ising; Manuel Puzon, alias Noling; Domingo Hernandez, alias Doming; and, Ceferino
Beltran, alias Ebing, were indicted for murder and double attempted murder with direct assault in
the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 158- S. Likewise,
Delfino Beltran was charged with attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 160-S.
After trial they were convicted and sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused DELFINO BELTRAN alias Minong,
ROGELIO BUGARIN alias Boy, CRESENCIO SIAZON alias Ising, MANUEL PUZON
alias Noling, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ alias Doming and CEFERINO BELTRAN alias
Ebing, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the death of
VICENTE QUIROLGICO. There being no mitigating circumstance, the Court has no
other alternative than to impose the maximum penalty provided for by law. Accused
Delfino Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin, Cresencio Siazon, Manuel Puzon, Domingo
Hernandez and Ceferino Beltran are hereby sentenced to the maximum penalty of
DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of Vicente Quirolgico the sum of P 12,000.00 for the
loss of his life; P 75,000.00 as reimbursement for expenses covering medical funeral
embalming mausoleum and burial lot, and the further sum of P 50,000.00 for moral
damages, jointly and severally and to pay the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, taking into consideration the nature of the principal penalty
imposed.
The Court likewise finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of DOUBLE ATTEMPTED MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT and hereby imposes
upon an of them the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period and
orders them to undergo a prison term ranging from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day as
minimum to 17 years and 4 months as maximum and to pay the costs.
Under Crim. Case No, 160-S, accused DELFINO BELTRAN is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and hereby
sentence him to undergo a prison term ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3
years, 6 months and 20 days of prision correccional and to pay the costs. (pp. 402403, Record)
The People's evidence shows that in the evening of January 11, 1972, between 9:00 and 10:00,
in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by

the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran alias Minong, shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of
your mother). They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi
to his house he went to the house of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported the matter. The
newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.
They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with the intention to talk to Delfino Beltran and his
companions to surrender considering that he knew them personally as all of them were once
working for Congressman David Puzon When they came near the compound, they saw
appellants Delfino Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez and suddenly there was a
simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, who was with them, cried: " I am
already hit, Daddy." As he fell, Vicente pushed his father and both fell down. Mayor Quirolgico
and Patrolman Rolando Tolentino also suffered injuries. When the firing had stopped, they
decided to bring Vicente to the hospital. As the jeep left the compound three (3) men came out of
the Puzon Compound and fired at the fleeing vehicle. They were Cresencio Siazon, Ceferino
Beltran and Noling Puzon. Likewise, Domingo Hernandez and Minong Beltran and Boy Bugarin
tried to give chase. After a while, all the six men returned inside the compound.
An hour after admission to the hospital Vicente Quirolgico died. Autopsy examination on the
deceased Vicente Quirolgico showed the following findings:
1. Gunshot wound. inlet wound at the posterior portion of right Mid-axillary line, at the
level of the 5th costal ribs at the back, traversing the right side of the chest, harrowing
the right lung, and fracturing the four (4) postal ribs on the right side front causing an
outlet wound almost six (6) inches long over the right side of the chest diagonally from
above the right nipple downward near the right mid-axillary line. The inlet has almost
one (1) cm. diameter.
2. Gunshot, wound left knee inlet wound at the exterior and posterior side of the left
knee. almost (1) cm. diameter, directed towards the medial side of the left knee,
fracturing the left knee and inlet wound two (2) inches long.
3. Gunshot wound of the right thigh, inlet wound, anterior on front side of the right
thigh at the middle thirds, measuring almost one (1) cm. diameter.
4. Gunshot wound at the internal angle of the left eye inlet wound almost one (1) cm.
diameter, directed downwards and medially traversing the right side of the face.
CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE secondary to Gunshot wound of the
chest and left eye. (Exh. "B", p. 10, Records).
and the examination on Mayor Quirolgico shows the following injuries:
(1) Wound, gunshot, face right;
(2) Wound, gunshot, upper lips right;
(3) Wound, gunshot, leg, right;
(4) Wound, gunshot, big toe, right;
(5) Wound, gunshot, 2nd toe, right (Exh. "A-1", P. 22, Record)

and on Patrolman Rolando Tolentino, the following injuries:

(1) Wound, gunshot, amper fated index, middle and ring fingers, right;
(2) Wound, lacerated, 1 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep lumbar region, right;
(3) Wound, lacerated 1/4 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep forearm, left.
(Exh. "A", p. 20, Record.)
On November 23, 1982, this Court, upon receipt of the information of the death of appellant
Cresencio Siazon alias Ising on February 17, 1982 due to "Cardio Respiratory Arrest Secondary
to Carcinoma Liver, Pulmonary Tuberculosis," from Mr. Ramon J. Liwag, Officer-in-Charge, New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, as well as the Comment filed by the Solicitor General on the
aforesaid information, Resolved to dismiss the case insofar as the criminal liability of the
deceased Cresencio Siazon alias Ising is concerned.
Appellant Rogelio Bugarin claims that between 5:00 and 5:30 in the afternoon of January 11,
1972,, the armed men inside the passing jeep of Mayor Quirolgico fired at Rogelio Bugarin, who
was then standing at the main gate of Puzon Compound. After the armed men had passed by,
Rogelio Bugarin proceeded to the office of Congressman Puzon where he met Ebing Beltran
and Delfino Beltran who both asked him about the gun reports. They just dismissed the incident
as no one was hurt. Rogelio Bugarin played guitar while waiting for supper.
Around 10:30 in the evening of the same date, or after appellants had taken their supper at
Puzon Compound, they heard an unusual sound which appeared to be a six by six truck that
was bumped. Thereafter, at about 12:00 midnight of the same day, Delfino Beltran, posted
himself as guard and positioned himself in front of the gate of the Rural Bank. While at the place
he saw a group of persons, numbering more than ten, along the road in front of the Rural Bank.
Among the group of armed men, he was able to recognize the Chief of Police of Ballesteros,
Gavino Collado, holding a swinging flashlight, Gerry, Bundok Usita and Bunti Pinzon. When the
group reached the gate of Puzon Compound, he peeped and took hold of the gate with an iron
chain. Accidentally, he dropped the chain and it created a sound which caused the group of
armed men to fire upon his direction for about half an hour. In retaliation, he loaded his gun
following which he saw a man falling down from the fence. As the firing continued, he stealthily
mounted his gun on top of the fence and fired the same.

attended the commission of the crimes; (4) not finding that appellant Delfino Beltran acted in
self-defense; (5) finding appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault on Mayor
Quirolgico and Pat. Rolando Tolentino; and (6) not appreciating in favor of the appellants the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On the first assigned error, We reiterate the established doctrine that when the issue is one of
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the hearing, unless it
had overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of
the case.
The judgment of conviction is not bereft of evidence to support the same. Hereunder are the
testimonies of the prosecution's eyewitnesses, namely:
Carmelita Collado who declared the following:
Q Will you inform the Honorable Court who was that one shouting?
A Minong Beltran, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform the Court what was that?
A I heard the voice of Mr. Minong Beltran saying, 'Cida, Cida, you bring out the guns
now I have already shot at the BRQ jeep and they are sure to come back.

Q Can you tell us what you saw at that time?

When the firing ceased, he proceeded to the residence of Congressman Puzon. In the sala, he
saw Boy Bugarin, Doming Hernandez, Ising Siazon, Noling Puzon, Ebing Beltran and Floresida
Amayon, conversing. Upon seeing him, his companions asked him what was that firing all about.
He told them that he traded shots with a group of armed men. Thereafter, they hid in the
basement of the residence of the Congressman, staying there for one whole day. The following
day, Delfino Beltran surrendered to Captain Retuta, while the rest escaped but thereafter
surrendered.

A I saw these three persons, Minong Beltran, Boy Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez,
sir.

The defense of appellant Delfino Beltran, alias Minong, is self- defense; whereas appellants
Rogelio Bugarin, alias Boy, Ceferino Beltran, alias Ebing, and Manuel Puzon, alias Noling
denied having anything to do with the incident.

A When these three persons came out, they were already

In this appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erred in: (1) giving credence to the evidence
for the prosecution; (2) holding that conspiracy existed among them in the commission of the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 158-S; (3) finding that treachery and evident premeditation

Q Will you inform this Court what was that?

Q What else did you see if any?

A Upon coming out, Delfino Beltran ordered Doming Hernandez to go to the right side
of the old office of Congressman Puzon and he also instructed Boy Bugarin to seek
cover to the Rural Bank.

A 'Nala na si Mayor' (The mayor is already hit). (tsn., pp. 20, 21, 31-32, 58-59, Nov.
17, 1972 hearing)
Patrolman Rolando Usita stated that:

Q During all these time that these were happening, the going out of Doming
Hernandez, of Bugarin; the ordering of Minong Beltran to the two, did you see any
other persons inside the compound of Congressman Puzon aside from the three?
A After the three had placed themselves in their respective positions, I saw persons
coming out but I was not able to recognize them. (tsn., pp. 5-7, 42-45, Nov. 18, 1972
hearing.)
Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico testified as follows:
Q And do you know what happened after you walked a few steps to the south?
A When I was looking very well around the vicinity, at the southern part of the Rural
Bank about the corner of their fence, and as I tried to look intently, I recognized the
face of Minong Beltran.

Q You said that as the mayor was leaving the scene of the incident, you saw three of
the accused coming out of the guardhouse, do you confirm that?
A Yes, sir.

Q And the persons who came out from this point according to you are the accused
Ising Siazon, Ebing Beltran and Noling Puzon, do you confirm that?
A Yes, sir.

Q And after that the three other accused named as Doming Hernandez, Boy Bugarin
and Minong Beltran came out of the same compound?
A No, sir. They came out from here. (tsn., pp. 84, 87, February 19, 1973 hearing)

Q At the precise moment, when you saw Minong Beltran at the corner of the Rural
Bank, what else happened if any?
A As I tried to look near them, that was the time when there was a burst of gun fire, the
direction of which was coming from the place where they were staying.

Q Will you inform this Honorable Court who the other men were at that time?

Chief of Police Gavino Collado also pointed out the following:

Q May I see the sketch, your Honor?
A The mayor took this road in going to the hospital (witness pointing to the Bonifacio
Cortez Street), and as the jeep was going westward, and reached this point, three
men came out from this part of the compound and they fired at the vehicle in which
the mayor and his son rode on.

A Boy Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez.

Q So that the Court would now understand from your statement that it was only after
the jeep of the mayor has left already the scene when three persons came out from
the gate of the Puzon compound, that you saw for the first time these persons?
Q And after the shooting, there was the shout?
A Yes, sir.
A At the lulling of the shooting, I heard the shout.

Q And what were the words?

Q And these persons were Identified as Ebing Beltran, Cresencio Siazon and Noling
Puzon?

A Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 59, 80, January 9, 1973 hearing)

4. CIS 103 to CIS 154 were fired from one (1) firearm

The denial of appellants Rogelio Bugarin, Ceferino Beltran and Manuel Puzon cannot, therefore,
prevail over their positive Identification, as the perpetrators of the crime by the aforenamed
eyewitnesses who have not been shown to have any evil motive to testify falsely against them.

Q May we know your conclusion of this findings of yours?

Moreover, the physical evidence, as testified to by Dr. Gregorio R. Farin, Municipal Health
Officer of Ballesteros, Cagayan, who conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the
deceased Vicente Quirolgico, shows that several firearms could have caused his wounds:

A My conclusion is that, the 223 Caliber fired cartridges marked as CIS 28 to CIS 154
were fired from four different firearms but not from the above-entioned 223 Cal. M16
Armalite with SN-527226. (tsn., pp. 29-30, January 8, 1973 hearing)

Q Considering the nature of the injuries that were found on the body of the deceased,
could it be possible that several firearms could have caused these injuries?

and on cross-examination declared that:

Q Supposing that there are three SIG rifles of the same Serial number and the fired
cartridges from this three guns have the same number of similar characteristics or
congruency of striations?

A It is possible.

A They can have no similar characteristics.

Q It is also possible that wounds Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were caused by three different
bullets, 3 different guns, different calibers?
A Yes, sir. It is possible. (tsn., pp. 65-66, Nov. 17, 1972 hearing)

Q Do you mean to say that for every SIG rifle there is its own characteristics; that
congruency of striations?

The foregoing testimony of Dr. Farin finds support from the findings of witnesses Vicente de
Vera, a Ballistician, and Lt. Col. Crispin Garcia, Chief Chemistry Branch, both of the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, who conducted examinations on
the empty shells and on the firearms, respectively, recovered from the premises of the Rural
Bank and the Puzon Compound. Vicente de Vera testified on direct examination, the following:

A That is correct. (tsn., p. 36, January 8, 1973 hearing)

whereas, Lt. Col. Crispin B. Garcia on the witness stand declared:
Q With this request for examination of certain articles, what articles were actually
submitted to you for examinations?

Q Under your findings No. 1, will you inform us your conclusion?

A My conclusion was that the 27 fired cartridges marked as CIS-1 to 27 were fired
from the firearm marked as Exhibit 'R' (SIG Natu Rifle).

A Well one (1) rifle SIG, Switzerland made with SN-5721, the barrel group bearing
Serial Number 15721; the receiver group with SN-5720 and the barrel link bearing SN9641, and another firearm (Exh. 'R').

Q Your other findings, please tell the Court.

A Under findings Nos. 2: Microscopic examination and comparison of the 223 Cal.
fired cartridge cases marked as CIS 28 to CIS 154 revealed the non-congruency of
striations with the test cartridge cases fired from the abovementioned 223 caliber M16
Armalite rifle with Serial No. 527226. They further revealed the following:
1. CIS 28 to CIS 62 were fired from
2. CIS 63 to CIS 95 were fired from
3. CIS 96 to CIS 102 were fired from one (1) firearm;

one
one

(1)
(l)

firearm;
firearm;

Q Colonel aside from this article, Exhibit 'R', what other articles or guns did you
receive for examination?
A One Armalite with Serial No. 527226. (Exhibit 'S')

Q With reference to the first rifle which you have mentioned, which is marked as
Exhibit 'R', with different serial numbers, in the barrel group, receiver group, and the
barrel link, will you inform this Honorable Court your findings?
A I found that the barrel of the Armalite is positive for the presence of gunpowder, sir.

Q With reference to this Armalite, M15, marked as Exhibit 'S', in this particular case,
will you tell us your findings about the presence of gunpowder?
A Exhibit 'S', the barrel is positive of gunpowder. (tsn., pp. 52, 55, 57, & 58, January 8,
1973 hearing)
The above findings further confirm the truth of the statements of eyewitnesses Gavino Collado,
Patrolman Usita, Mayor Quirolgico and Carmelita Collado that appellants traded shots with the
Mayor's group, using long or high powered guns.
Anent the second assigned error, We agree with the trial court's finding on the existence of
conspiracy. In the case at bar, the sequence of events that transpired in the evening of January
11, 1972, from the time Delfino Beltran first fired upon the passing jeep of Mayor Bienvenido
Quirolgico, driven by witness Ernesto Alvarado at around 9:00, the subsequent preparations for
the arrival of the Mayor as testified to by eyewitness Carmelita Collado, the shooting on the
other passing jeepney to further provoke the Mayor, and the simultaneous and sudden firing at
the Mayor's group which had just arrived at about 12:00 midnight in the scene of the crime; the
final shooting of the fleeing Mayor; and, the simultaneous common retreat and escape of all the
accused, established the presence of conspiracy. For conspiracy to exist, it is enough that at the
time the offense was committed, the participants had the same purpose and were united in its
execution, as may be inferred from the attendant circumstances (People vs. Manalo, 133 SCRA
626). Further, conspiracy does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence, as conspiracy legally exists if, at the time of the offense, the accused had the same
criminal purpose and were united in its execution. Appellants' conduct and/or actuations before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 158-S are
circumstances proving conspiracy.
Conspiracy having established, the act of one is the act of all. It is no longer necessary to
specifically lay out the particular participation of each participant.
Relative to the third assigned error, the trial court properly appreciated the existence of the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. From 9:00 in the evening to
12:00 midnight of the same day, appellants had three (3) long hours to meditate and reflect on
their evil design and they clung in their determination to kill the Mayor, which fortunately failed.
Premeditation is present where there was a lapse of two hours from the
inception to execution.
The existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery was shown in the simultaneous and
sudden firing by the accused on the newly arrived Mayor's group, without warning. We are

convinced that they employed means, methods or forms which could have tended directly or
insured the accomplishment of their evil design against the Mayor, with whom they have no
personal grudge, without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party
had made. No one from herein appellants sustained a scratch as they were really prepared for
the coming Mayor.
With respect to the fourth assigned error, the claim of Delfino Beltran that he had just acted in
self-defense, suffice it to say, that the one invoking this justifying circumstance must prove
beyond reasonable doubt that all the necessary requisites of self-defense are present, namely:
(1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the offended party; (2) Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. Delfino Beltran had not proved any one of these. Thus, his claim of
self-defense was properly dismissed by the trial court.
Regarding the fifth assigned error, considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and
Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were
performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding of the
trial court that appellants are guilty of attempted murder with direct assault on the persons of
Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Tolentino is correct.
Relative to the last assigned error, following Our latest ruling in People vs. Nicolas Canamo, et
al., G.R. No. 62043, promulgated on August 13, 1985, We agree with appellants that they should
be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as they in fact presented
themselves voluntarily to the authorities. However, this mitigating circumstance is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 158-S, with the modifications that for lack of necessary
votes, the penalty imposed upon appellants Delfino Beltran alias Minong, Rogelio Bugarin alias
Boy, Manuel Puzon alias Noling, Domingo Hernandez alias Doming and Ceferino Beltran alias
Ebing, for the death of Vicente Quirolgico, is reduced to Reclusion Perpetua, and that the
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Vicente Quirolgico is increased to P30,000.00, the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED in an other respects.
For the double attempted murder with direct assault, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty imposed on the aforesaid appellants is reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 160-S, applying also the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed
to the accused Delfino Beltran is reduced to Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70639

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DOLLANTES, HAMLET DOLLANTES, ALFREDO DOLLANTES, LAURO
DOLLANTES, MONICO DOLLANTES, SIDRITO LOKESIO, MERLANDO DOLLANTES,
HUGO GRENGIA, DANNY ESTEBAN AND LEONILO VILLAESTER, accused-appellants.
PARAS, J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, 7th Judicial
Region, Branch XL, in Criminal Case No. 5832, convicting the nine (9) accused, Pedro
Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio, Merlando
Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, all equally guilty of the complex
crime of "Assault upon a Person in Authority Resulting in Murder" and sentencing the
abovementioned accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of P30,000.00 to pay attomey's fees in the
amount of P3,000.00 and to pay the costs.
All of the accused were charged as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1983 at nighttime, in the Municipality of Tayasan,
Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping
one another with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Marcos
Gabutero, Barangay Captain of Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, an agent of a
person in authority and which fact accused had full knowledge, while the latter was in
the lawful performance of his official duty or function as Barangay Captain or on the
occasion of such function, with a bolo and hunting knives with which the accused were
then armed and provided, thereby inflicting the following wounds in the victim, viz:
1. Stab wound measuring three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and half
(1/2) cm. in width, ten (10) cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect
of the trunk at the level of the 3rd intercostal space, 5 cm. away from the
anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented horizontally and directed
vertically and slightly to the back. Ventricle and lung tissue penetrated.
2. Stab wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width, eleven and
a half (11 1/2) cm. depthness, located at the right anterior aspect of the
trunk, at the level of the 2nd intercostal space about five (5) cm. away from
the anterior and midline, the wound was oriented horizontally and directed
downward and slightly to the back.
3. Incised wound five (5) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at the left
anterior aspect of the trunk about 26 cm. below the left clavicle and four (4)
cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely.

5. Incised wound measuring one and a half (1 1/2) cm. in length, half (1/2)
cm. in width located at the anterior aspect of the upper extremity about nine
(9) cm. above the wrist joint one and a half (1 1/2) cm. away from the
anterior mid-line and medially. The wound was oriented vertically.
6. Incised wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at
the lateral aspect of the right upper extreme about five (5) cm. above the
elbow joint and five (5) cm. away from the posterior midline laterally. The
wound was oriented horizontally.
7. Through and through stab wound located at the left upper extremity the
wound of entrance measuring about three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length
and one (1) cm. in width located at the posterior aspect of the forearm
above five (5) em. below the elbow joint, three (3) cm. away from the
anterior mid-line medially. The wound was oriented vertically.
8. Incised wound measuring 3 cm. in length half (1/2) cm. in width located at
the lateral aspect of the left upper extremity about five (5) cm. below the
elbow joint and (5) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was
oriented horizontally.
9. Stab wound measuring one and one-half (1 1/2) cm. in width and four (4)
cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect of the trunk, about seven
and a half (7 1/2) cm. above the ihac crest and twelve (12) cm. away from
the anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and directed
downward, slightly to the right and posteriority, perforating part of the
intestine.
10. Stab wound measuring three (3) cm. in length, one (1) cm. in width and
seven and a half (7) cm. in depthness, located at the left posterior of the
trunk about three (3) cm. above the lower angle of the scapula, and seven
(7) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely
and directed downward and slightly to the left.
11. Stab wound measuring three(3) cm. in length, one (l) cm. in width and
twelve (12) cm. in depthness, located at the left posterior aspect of the trunk
about thirteen (13) cm. below the lower angle of the scapula and six (6) cm.
away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and
directed anteriority to the left.
12. Hemothorax on the left pleural cavity, which wounds caused the latter's
untimely death.
Contrary to Art. 248, 148 and 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Information, Original Record, pp. 3-4)

4. Incised wound measuring two (2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width,
located at the right anterior aspect of the trunk about twenty-one (21) cm.
below the right clavicle and eight (8) cm. away from the anterior line. The
wound was oriented obliquely.

The findings of facts of the trial court are as follows:

That deceased Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental; that due to the approaching fiesta of

barangay Maglihe, a dance was held in said barangay in the evening of April 21, 1983;
that while the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start the dance, the
accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance
movement known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and
challenging everyone as to who was brave among the people present; the Barangay
Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to keep quiet and not to
disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the
Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm; that accused Hugo Grengia held
the left hand of accused Pedro Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the
hand of Pedro Dollantes the hunting knife. Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet
Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the Barangay Captain
at the back and the other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay
Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not armed. Except for the accused
Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester who were merely holding
stones, the other co-accused participated in the stabbing incident. When the Barangay
Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused in this case took turns in kicking the
dead body of the Barangay Captain and were dancing around said dead body; that
the Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different parts of his body,
two of which happened to be at the back of his dead body. According to the attending
physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of
"Severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds." (Decision, Crim.
Case No. 5832, Rollo, p. 75).
The evidence for the prosecution consisted principally of the testimonies of Dionilo Garol,
Bonifacio Cero, Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the deceased, Pat. Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogelio
Kho who conducted the post mortem examination of the deceased, Ponsimillo Balasabas, the
Municipal Treasurer of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and Pat. Jose Amis of the Integrated National
Police.
On the other hand, the defense presented the following witnesses: Accused: Hugo Grengia,
Leonilo Villaester, Danny Esteban, Alfredo Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, and other witnesses:
Machim Dollantes and Tacio Fausto.After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the trial court was
convinced that all the accused in this case conspired in the commission of the crime.
Thus on February 20, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding all the accused guilty of
the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority resulting in murder. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of all the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court hereby finds the accused Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet
Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesia,
Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, guilty of the
complex crime of assault upon a person in authority resulting in murder, and hereby
sentences the above-mentioned accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Marcos Gabutero, jointly and severally, the sum
of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, to pay attorney's fees in the amount of
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 79)
From the aforementioned decision, all the accused appealed. Accused Hugo Grengia submitted
a separate brief.
The appellant raised the following assignment of errors:

FIRST ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE
BIASED, INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES DIONILO GAROL, BONIFACIO CERO AND
MARCIANA GABUTERO AND IN NOT CONSIDERING AT LEAST THE
UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY OF INDEPENDENT WITNESSES DOLLANTES
AND TACIO FAUSTO.
SECOND AND THIRD ERRORS
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE EXPERT
PROSECUTION WITNESS DR. ROGELIO R. KHO WHICH IN EFFECT
CONTRADICTS THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION AND THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTS.
FOURTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FROM NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF
ACCUSED HUGO GRENGIA, LEONILO VILLAESTER alias "Laon," DANILO
ESTEBAN, HAMLET DOLLANTES, ALFREDO DOLLANTES AND THE TESTIMONY
OF INDEPENDENT WITNESSES TACIO FAUSTO AND MCLEAN DOLLANTES.
FIFTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF ASSAULT UPON A PERSON IN AUTHORITY RESULTING TO
MURDER AND SENTENCING THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF MARCOS GABUTERO, JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY, THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS, and TO
PAY THE COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS. (Brief for Accused-Appellant, Rollo, p.
62)
In his separate brief, accused Hugo Grengia assigns the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the admission of
accused-appellant Hamlet Dollantes that he was the lone perpetrator of the alleged
stabbing of victim Marcos Gabutero.
2. The lower court erred in not considering the testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
namely: Patrolman Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogeho Kho which in effect buttressed the
theory of the defense.
3. The lower court erred in not considering the entry in the police logbook of the
Tayasan Integrated National Police, dated April 21, 1983, as testified to by Patrolman
Jose Amis.
4. The lower court erred in holding that conspiracy exist in perpetration of the felony.

5. The lower court erred in holding that the case of People vs. Agag (L-64951, June
29, 1984) is applicable to the case at bar to justify the conviction of the accusedappellants.

It will be noted that the above witnesses were categorical and straightforward when they stated
that they saw appellants stab the victim. They even specified the type of weapon used by each
of said appellants.

6. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the testimony of the
defense witnesses.

There is no possibility that they could have been mistaken in their Identification for apart from
being near the crime scene which was well illuminated with two Petromax lamps (TSN, page 6,
Oct. 19, 1983), these witnesses are familiar with the appellants since they are all residents of the
same locality. Furthermore, there is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify
falsely against the appellants.

7. Finally, the trial court erred in holding that the accused-appellant herein is guilty of
the crime charged. (Brief for accusedappellant Hugo Grengia, pp. 1-2)
The appeal is without merit.
The issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses.
The accused were positively identified by three (3) prosecution eye witnesses. They were:
Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero and Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim. Except for the
latter, the two other witnesses Garol and Cero are not related to the victim or the accused. The
testimonies of these three (3) witnesses were subjected to a lengthy cross-examination and
were found credible and free from material contradictions by the trial court (Rollo, p. 75).
Dionilo Garol who was six (6) meters away, saw clearly what happened. He testified that when
the Barangay Captain started to deliver his speech, the accused Pedro Dollantes brandishing a
knife shouted "Who is brave here?" (TSN, page 6, Oct. 7, 1983). The victim then approached to
admonish him t the latter stabbed the victim on the arm. Garol immediately approached the
accused Pedro Dollantes and tried to wrest the knife away from the hand of the accused. The
accused Hugo Grengia also tried to grab the knife but it was Garol who succeeded. The accused
Grengia then told him "Do not try to intervene because you might be included in the plan." (TSN,
page 8, Oct. 17, 1983). Then Grengia made some signs by nodding his head and the accused
Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes rushed to and attacked the victim followed by the other
co-accused in this case who also rushed at and stabbed the victim. He specified that accused
Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes and Sidrito Lokesio were carrying knives
while the accused Merlando Dollantes was carrying a bolo; and that they stabbed the victim one
after another. He said that the accused Danny Esteban, Hugo Grengia andLeonilo Villaester
were all carrying stones which they threw at the store of the victim's wife (TSN, pp. 7-10; Oct.
17, 1983).
This testimony was fully corroborated by another prosecution eyewitness Bonifacio Cero who
was about three (3) meters away and whose narration tallied on all material ints with that of
Dionilo Garol as to what transpired that night. He stated further that when he saw the Barangay
Captain being stabbed he tried to approach the group but he was held by Danny Esteban who
said "do not try to interfere, you are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have
been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Thereafter, he ran away but Alfredo Dollantes,
Pedro Dollantes and Danny Esteban stoned him because they intended to kill him also. He also
testified that when he returned to the crime scene, he saw Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and
companions simultaneously kicking the dead body and shouting "who is brave among here. "
Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim funy corroborated the testimonies of Garol and Cero.
She also added that Hugo Grengia wanted to be a Barangay Captain and she happened to
know that as a fact, because he told the crowd not to long as Barangay Captain. She also
testified that the accused Leonilo Villaester splashed one glass of tuba on the face of the
deceased and that the victim had had a misunderstanding with the Dollantes on a theft case
involving Hamlet Dollantes (Rollo, pp. 68-69).

In fact, under similar circumstances, the Court has held that where the scene of the stabbing
was clearly lighted and no motive was shown why prosecution witnesses would incriminate the
appellants, identification would be given full faith and credit (People v. Escoltero, 139 SCRA
218).
The theory of the defense in this case is that it was only the accused Hamlet Dollantes who
stabbed the victim while the other accused did not participate in the stabbing incident (Rollo, pp.
75-76).
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellants pointed out that there are
certain inconsistencies that render the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, incredible.
For one thing they claim that Dionilo Garol could not have een Hamlet Dollantes stab the victim
because as Garol himself stated, when said accused rushed towards the victim, he ran away.
The evidence shows however, that Garol clearly testified that he saw au of them stab the Barrio
Captain, one after another and it was only after the Barrio Captain fell to the ground that he ran
towards the municipal hall to report the incident to the police (TSN, page 11, Oct. 17, 1983).
Another circumstance allegedly raising grave doubts on the credibility of Dionilo Garol was his
failure to report to the police authorities the fact of stoning (Rollo, pp. 71-72).
However, the fact of stoning was not the means used to kill the victim and the omission of the
same in the narration in the report does not detract from the established fact that the victim was
stabbed several times which caused his death.
It was also pointed out that Dionilo Garol testified that the store of the victim's wife was stoned
while Bonifacio Cero also testified that he was the one being stoned.
There appears to be no inconsistency between the two testimonies. The fact that the store of the
victim's wife was stoned does not preclude the possibility that Bonifacio Cero was also stoned.
Finally, appellants maintain that Bonifacio Cero could not have seen with precision the stabbing
of the victim while he was being hugged by Danny Esteban and he had a feeling that he would
be killed by the group. Much less could it be possiblefor accused Danny Esteban, Leonflo
Villaester, Sidrito Lokesio and Alfredo Dollantes who were at the store of Severina Cadillero, to
join in stabbing the victim, the appellants argued (Rollo, pp. 73-74).
The records show that Cero testified that he saw appellants stab the deceased before he was
embraced by appellant Danny Esteban who told him "do not interfere you are not a party to this.
We have already gotten what we have been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Clearly,
the language is unmistakable that in that at said point, the stabbing and the killing being
described by all the witnesses had already been accomphshed.

Indeed, if there be any inconsistency or contradictions in their testimonies, the same are trivial
and merely refer to minor matters which do not affect credibility. They do not detract from the
essential facts or vital details of the crime pinpointing their criminal responsibility (Appellee's
Brief, p. 16). As held by this Court, discrepancies in minor details are to be expected from an
uncoached witness (People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 31). Such minor variations would rather show
the sincerity of the witnesses and the absence of connivance between them to make their
testimonies tally in every respect (People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA 419, 423). Truth to tell, such
trivial differences constitute fail-safe reliability.

accused in this case. They were found to be holding stones which they threw at the store owned
by the victim and his wife; they participated in kicking and dancing around the dead body of the
Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried to wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes, he
clearly told Dionilo Garol when the latter succeeded in getting the knife and was holding the
hands of Pedro Dollantes, "do not try to intervene here because you might be included in the
plan." (TSN, pp. 7-10, Octoer 17, 1983). Danny Esteban uttered the same statements to
Bonifacio Cero, saying "do not try to interfere you are not a party to this. We have already gotten
what we have been aiming or." (TSN, pp. 9-14, October 18,1983).

Accused Hugo Grengia claims that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the admission of
accused Hamlet Dollantes that he was the lone perpetrator of the killing incident (Brief for
Accused-Appellant Hugo Grengia, p. 7). Thus the defense argues that the accused Pedro
Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes, Merlando Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio, Monico
Dollantes and Leonilo Villaester, did not stab the victim and were not at the scene of the crime
and that it was only accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim.

Furthermore, as previously stated, while the victim was delivering a speech, Hugo Grengia was
telumg people not to listen to the victim as he will not stay long as a Barangay Captain. It is also
to be noted that although he was a compadre of the victim, he never tried to help the former
while he was being stabbed and after the incident, he never visited the victim's family.

As found by the trial court, such claim is not supported by sufficient evidence. On the contrary,
an entry in the Police Logbook (Exhibit "D") of the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros
Oriental, shows that one Gloria Callao, wife of the accused Lauro Dollantes, turned over to the
police two (2) hunting knives owned by the accused Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, such theory is behed by the
Identification made by the prosecution witnesses and by the number and location of the victim's
wounds which are mute evidence that several persons comn)itted the crime (People's Brief, p.
17).
As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, the claim of alibi by the accused cannot prevail over
positive Identification by credible witnesses (People v. Tirol, 102 SCRA 58); more so where as in
the case at bar, it was not demonstrated that it was physically impossible for the accused to
have been at the scene of said crime at the time of its commission (People v. Mercado, 97
SCRA 232).
On the other hand, the claim of Hamlet Dollantes of self-defense when he stabbed the victim is
not sustained by the records. As found by the trial court, the victim was not armed at the time of
the incident, so that there was no danger to the life and limb of the accused. The latter claims
that he had to stab the victim who boxed him and would not release his wounded hand (Rollo, p.
76). Apart from the obvious disproportion of the means used to repel the alleged attack, three
witnesses of the prosecution testified that the accused Hamlet Dollantes rushed towards the
victim and stabbed the latter at the back. Said testimonies were corroborated by the Post
Mortem Examination (Exhibit "A") and the Sketch (Exhibit "B") of the human body of the victim
which showed a stab wound at the back. Furthermore, the nature, character, location and extent
of the wound suffered by the victim, negates the accused's claim of self-defense. (People v.
Tolentino, 54 Phil. 77). In fact, the eleven (11) wounds suffered by "he victim are indicative of
aggression (People v. Somera, 83 Phil. 548; People v. Mendoza, L-16392, Jan. 30, 1965).
Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of
conspiracy. Among others, he pointed out that he was unarmed at the time of the incident, that
his name was not mentioned in the report made by Dionilo Garol to Patrolman Barrera as to the
perpetrators of the crime; that his name was not included in the entry in the police logbook of the
Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and that he had no participation in the
commission ofthe felony except the alleged nodding of his head at a time when he was trying to
wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes which is not an indication of conspiracy (Brief for Grengia,
pp. 13-16).
While it is true that the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester did not
participate in the stabbing, the lower court finds them equally liable as principals with the other

Thus, the lower court found the existence of conspiracy as follows:

The accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester by their acts,
aimed at the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent, are in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments. The conduct of the defendants, before, during
and after the commission of the crime clearly shows that they acted in concert.
(People v. Emilio Agag, L-64951, June 29, 1984, Justice Relova) There being
conspiracy, the Court finds them guilty of Murder. (Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832,
Rollo p. 77)
In one case, this Court held "that while the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of
their co-accused, there is no question that they were all prompted and linked by a common
desire to assault and retaliate against the group..... Thus, they must share equal liability for all
the acts done by the participants in the felonious undertaking." (Pring v. Court of Appeals, 138
SCRA 185-186 [1985]).
Appellant Hugo Grengia lays much stress on the testimony of Dr. Rogeho Kho that it is possible
that all the stab wounds were inflicted by the same weapon, in a desperate effort to show that
only one person committed the crime and that there is no conspiracy.
The records show however, that said Doctor merely replied to he questions propounded by the
defense lawyer as to the different possibilities on how the wounds of the victim may have been
inflicted. But testifying specifically on the case at bar, he categorically stated that actually the
wounds could be produced by a single bladed weapon with different sizes but not necessarily
only a single bladed weapon.
Thus, the Doctor testified as follows:
Atty. Jayme:
Q Basing upon your physical findings, Doc, upon the victim Marcos
Gabutero, is it possible Doc, that in accordance with your drawing that the
wounds inflicted was caused by a single bladed weapon, is it possible,
Doctor, that this wound was caused by a single bladed weapon? Is it
possible that this. I repeat the question, your Honor.
Q According to your drawing which is labelled "BS" which according to you
"blunt and sharp bladed weapon which is practically single bladed weapon,

according to your physical findings there is similarly in the weapons used,

could we say practically, Doctor, that these stab wounds as well as those
incised wounds may be caused by one single-bladed weapon?
A Actually it could be produced by a single bladed weapon with different
sizes but not necessarily only a single bladed weapon.
Q According to you it was a single bladed weapon with different or several
sizes, now, what is your honest observation upon your physical findings,
what will be themaximum weapon used? I have here a zerox copy for your
own reference.
A With respect to the length of the wound there are two wounds that have
three em. in length, it could be possible that the same kind of weapon or
instrument has been used. This refers to Wounds Nos.10 and 11. By the
way, Sir, this refers to the stab wounds because the size of the incised
wounds is difficult to determine.
Atty. Jayme:
Yes, the stab wounds only.
A It's hard to determine Wound No. 9 because the length is not indicated
here, so it is possible that there are 3 or 4 kinds of instrument or weapons
being used. (TSN, pp. 26- 27, December 15, 1983)
Appellant Hugo Garcia also emphasizes the testimony of Dr. Kho that the latter did not observe
any contusions on the body of the deceased, obviously to disprove that appellants danceda
round and kicked the body after the victim was slain.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "although the examining doctor failed to find any
contusion or abrasion on the cadaver of the victim, nevertheless, such absence is not conclusive
proof that appellants did not kick the deceased. It might be possible that kicks did not cause or
produce contusions or abrasions or that they were not noticed by the doctor." (Appellee's Brief,
p. 22). Moreover, the fact of dancing and kicking complained of, is only one of the acts showing
conspiracy, without which, conspiracy cannot be said not to have been established.
The lower court also found that treachery was present in the commission of the crime, and that
the accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio and Merlando
Dollantes are as equally guilty as principals by direct participation. These accused took turns in
stabbing the victim. In fact the victim was caught by surprise and did not have time to defend
himself.
Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro
Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was
therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA
113), this Court ruled that "As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and
ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people
who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with assault upon a
person in authority."

There is no qeustion that the trial court's conclusions on credibilitY of witnesses are entitled to
great weight on appeal. (People v. Oliverio, 120 SCRA 22). After a careful review of the records,
no plausible reason could be found to disturb the findings of fact and of law of the lower court in
this case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31839 June 30, 1980

EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial Fiscal and BONIFACIO C. INTIA 1st Asst. Provincial
Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of Camarines Sur and
ELIGIO ORBITA,respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminay injunction, to annul
and set aside the order of the respondent Judge, dated January 26, 1970, directing the
petitioners, Provincial Fiscal and Assitant Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, to amend the
information filed in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of CamarinesSur,
entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused," so as to include,
as defendants, Governor Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of
Camarines Sur; as well as the order dated February 18, 1970, denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the said order.
In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita, a
Provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and
punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, committed, as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of Taculod, municipality of
Canaman, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur and
specially charged with the duty of keeping under custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo
Denaque, did then and there with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence leave the
latter unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity to run away and escape,
as in fact said detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from the custody of
the said accused. 1
In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the cross-examination of prosecution
witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur, the defense brought
forht and confronted the witness with a note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by Gov.
Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a
fence at his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur, then leased by the province and used
as an official guest house. Jose Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who
ahnded the note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature appearing
therein and that he was not preszent when the note was made and signed by Gov.
Cledera. 2 Beleiving that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov.
Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for
which tha accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the defense cousel filed a motion in court
seeking the amendment of the information so as to include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as
defendants therein. 3

Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition of the prosecution officers 4 and finding that
"the court cannot grant the motion or order the inclusion of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda at
this stage unless an investigation is made," the respondent Judge directed the Fiscals office,
within 15 days from date, to cause the further investigation of the case, taking into consideration
the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in
order to determine once and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province and his
assistant have any criminatory participation in the circumstances of Pablo Denaque's escape
from judicial custody. 5
In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation of the case for December 19,
1969. Summonses were issued to Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial
warden, and the accused Eligio Orbita to be present thereat. 6 Dr. went thereat But, on the date
set for the reinvestigation of the case, only Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo Padua
appeared. The accused Eligio Orbita did not appear. Neither was the note (Exhibit 2) produced.
Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2, 1970
that "after conducting a reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and intelligent analysis
of the facts and law involved, no prima facie case against Governor Cledera and Jose
Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged. 7
On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" praying
"that the Order of this Honorable Court dated December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering
the Fiscal to reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the evidence already adduce during the trial
of this case, he be ordered to amend the information on to include Cledera and Esmeralda it
appearing the on record that their inclusion is warranted. 8
On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued the order complained of, the dispositive
portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of the facts brought about by the prosecuting
fiscal let the charges be so amended by including in the information the author or writer of
Exhibit 2 and the person or persons who carried out the said orders considering the provisions
of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code. 9
The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order,
February 18, 1970. 11Hence, the instant recourse.

10

but the motion was denied on

From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the respondent Judge committed an error in
ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as to include Armando Cledera and Jose
Esmeralda as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur. It is the rule that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular
criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support the allegations
thereof. 12 Although this power and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the
evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is
not absolute and subject to judicial review, 13 it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting
attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so because in his
opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced
of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the
Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor.

Besides, it cannot be said that the Fiscal had capriciously and whimsically refused to prosecute
Cledera and Esmeralda.
In his order directing the Fiscal's office to conduct a further reinvestigation of the case, the
respondent Judge candidly ad. muted that without a reinvestigation of the case, he cannot
determine once and for all whether or not to include Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda in the
information. Pursuant thereto, a reinvestigation was conducted by the fiscals office. Summonses
were issued. But, no additional fact was elicited since Eligio Orbita did not appear thereat.
Neither was the note (Exh. 2) presented and produced. Gov. Cledera could not admit nor deny
the genuineness of the signature appearing in the note since it was not on hand. Such being the
case, the prosecuting officers had reason to refuse to amend the information filed by them after
a previous pre examination and investigation.
Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a prima facie case against Gov.
Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. The order to amend the information is based upon the following
facts:
1. Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, while working at the Guest
House of Governor Cledera on September 12, 1968;
2. The Governor's evidence at that time is being rented by the province and its
maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the province of Camarines Sur,
3. That neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was charged or entrusted
with the duty of conveying and the detainee from the jail to the residence of the
governor.
4. That the de worked at the Governor Is by virtue of an order of the Governor (Exhibit
2) which was tsn by Lt. Esmeralda; and
5. That it was the accused Orbita who himself who handpicked the group of Prisoners
to work at the Governor's on 12, 1968. 14
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

person released To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means
to furnished that person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly
facilitate his escape. 15 The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who
removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public
officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of
prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera
as governor, is the jailer of the province, 16 and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial
warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the
Revised Penal Code. There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under
Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads, as follows:
ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any Public officer
who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall
be punished
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
temporary disqualification in its minimum period to perpetual special
disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment
to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special
disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but
only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or
municipal ordinance.
In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the
public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or
charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an
essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner.
If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then
he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. 17 For sure no connivance in the escape
of Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced from the note
of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house, it appearing
that the notes does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house;
and that it was the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose the work party.

Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. The city Of arrests mayor in its maximum
period to prison correccional in its minimum Period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall remove from any jail or penal establishment t any person confined therein or
shall help the escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery.

Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under Article 224
of the Revised Penal Code. This article punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a
prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is definite amounting to
deliberate non- performance of duty. 18 In the constant case, the respondent Judge said:

If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If the escape
of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the guards by
surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.

We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the Idea that the escape. of
Denaque was facilitated by the Governor's or . his assistants negligence.
According to law, if there is any negligence committed it must be the officer
who is charged with the custody and guarding of the ... 19

The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or
penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To remove means to take
away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the

We find no reason to set aside such findings.

WHEREFORE, the orders issued on January 26, and February 18, 1970 in Criminal Case No.
9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, entitled: "The People of the Philippines,
plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent Judge
or any other judge acting in his stead is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Without
costs.

Barredo (Chairman), Abad Santos and De Castro, * JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27191

February 28, 1967

ADELAIDA TANEGA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch V, and the CHIEF OF POLICE OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Pressed upon us in this, an original petition for certiorari and prohibition, is the problem of when
prescription of penalty should start to run. The controlling facts are:
Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City petitioner appealed. Found guilty once
again by the Court of First Instance, 1 she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to
indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 We declined to
review on certiorari.3 Back to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, said court, on January
11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's
motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and
hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to
issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was
never arrested.1wph1.t

ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade
service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment 6 by reason
of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by
means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or
by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through
connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall
be prision correccional in its maximum period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;
(2) he "is servinghis sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service
of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. 7 This must be so. For, by the express
terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence", by " escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving
sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides
for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by
breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise,
deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of
the penal institution, ... "8 Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail
breaking".9
A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its
Article 134 from whence Articles 92 and 93 of the present Review Penal Code originated
reads:
Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben:

Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to quash the warrants of arrest of
February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused
has to be served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance
of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present petition.

Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte aos.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Las leves, al ao.

Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty.4 By Article 92 of the Revised
Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of
prescription of penalties so the succeeding Article 93 provides "shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence".5

El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia en que se notifique

personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o desde el quebrantamiento de la condena si
hubiera esta comenzado a cumplirse. x x x

What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence Article 157 of the Revised Penal
Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:

Note that in the present Article 93 the words "desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al
reo la sentencia firme", written in the old code, were deleted. The omission is significant. What
remains reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code is solely "quebrantamiento de la

condena". And, "quebrantamiento" or evasion means escape.10 Reason dictates that one can
escape only after he has started service of sentence.
Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty consists of imprisonment,
prescription shall only begin to run when he escapes from confinement. Says Viada:
El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en que ha tenido lugar
la notificacion personal de la sentencia firme al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba
que la notificacion hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126 se consigna que el
termino de la prescripcion se cuenta desde que se notifique la sentencia, causa de la
ejecutoria en que se imponga la pena respectiva. Luego ausente el reo ya no podra
prescribir hoy la pena, pues que la notificacion personal no puede ser suplida por la
notificacion hecha en estrados. Dada la imprescindible necesidad del requisito de la
notificacion personal, es obvio que en las penas que consisten en privacion de
libertad solo porda existir la prescripcion quebrantando el reo la condena pues que si
no se hallare ya preso preventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su
encerramiento en el acto de serle notifirada personalmente la sentencia. 11
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who sentenced to imprisonment by
final judgment was thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does
not run in her favor.
For the reasons given, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition. No
costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-1960

November 26, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.
Carlos
Perfecto
for
appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Manuel Tomacruz for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of
sentence under the following information:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any
place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final
judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and
commit vagrancy.

ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. Sera castigado con prision correccional

en sus grados medio y maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena,
fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . . . .
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665,
668). It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous
translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally
clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting
imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present
case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of
Manila. This view has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26,
1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it
is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and
escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in
that case was ratified by this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus,
(45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370) 1, where it was held that one evades the service of his
sentence of destierrowhen he enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction,
and he cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its
provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence
of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of
Manila, he entered said City.

Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
He is appealing from that decision with the following assignment of error:

Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.

1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence
of destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are
imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention
on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article which in part reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of
his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code been
in the English language, then the theory of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is the
Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish text of article 157 in part reads
thus:

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The legal question raised in this case is whether or not appellant, for having violated his
judgment of destierrorendered by the Municipal Court of Manila, can be sentenced under article
157 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of
his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance
with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its maximum period.

Appellant invokes in his favor the negative opinion of author Guillermo Guevara (Revised Penal
Code, 1946, p. 322). This negative position is supported by another author, Ambrosio Padilla
(Revised Penal Code annotated, p. 474).
The prosecution invokes the decision of this Court in People vs. De Jesus, L-1411,2promulgated
April 16, 1948, but said decision has no application because in said case the legal question
involved in the case at bar was not raised. The Supreme Court did not consider the question of
interpretation of the wording of article 157. Undoubtedly, there was occasion for considering the
question, but the Court nevertheless failed to do so. This failure to see the question, at the time,
is only an evidence that the tribunal is composed of human beings for whom infallibility is
beyond reach.
The prosecution maintains that appellant's contention, supported by two authors who have
considered the question, although tenable under the English text of article 157, is not so under
the Spanish text, which is the one controlling because the Revised Penal Code was originally
enacted by the Legislature in Spanish.
There is no quarrel, therefore, that under the above quoted English text, the appellant is entitled
to acquittal. The question now is whether or not the Spanish text conveys a thing different from
that which can be read in the English text. The Spanish text reads as follows:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. Sera castigado con prision correccional
en sus grados medio y maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena,
fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; pero
si la evasion o fuga se hubiere llevado a efecto con escalamiento, fractura de puertas,
ventanas, verjas, paredes, techos o suelos, o empleado ganzuas, llaves falsas,
disfraz, engano, violencia o intimidacion, o poniendose de acuerdo con otros
sentenciados o dependientes del establecimiento donde a hallare recluido la pena
sera prision correccional en su grado maximo.
The question boils down to the words "fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de
libertad por sentencia firme," which are translated into English "by escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." The prosecution contends that the words
"privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text is not the same as the word "imprisonment" in the
English text, and that while "imprisonment" cannot include destierro, "privacion de libertad" may
include it.
The reason is, however, the result of a partial point of view because it obliterates the
grammatical, logical, ideological function of the words "fugandose" and "by escaping" in the
Spanish and English texts, respectively. There should not be any question that, whatever
meaning we may want to give to the words "privacion de libertad," it has to be conditioned by the
verb "fugandose," (by escaping). "Privacion de libertad" cannot be considered independently of
"fugandose."
There seems to be no question that the Spanish "fugandose" is correctly translated into the
English "by escaping." Now, is there any sense in escaping from destierro or banishment, where
there is no enclosure binding the hypothetical fugitive? "Fugandose" is one of the forms of the
Spanish verb "fugar," to escape. The specific idea of "evasion" or "escape" is reiterated by the
use of said words after the semi-colon in the Spanish text and after the first period in the English
text. Either the verb "to escape" or the substantive noun "escape" essentially pre-supposes
some kind of imprisonment or confinement, except figuratively, and Article 157 does not talk in
metaphors or parables.

"To escape" means "to get away, as by flight or other conscious effort; to break away, get free, or
get clear, from or out of detention, danger, discomfort, or the like; as to escape from prison. To
issue from confinement or enclosure of any sort; as gas escapes from the mains." (Webster's
New International Dictionary.)
"Escape" means "act of escaping, or fact or having escaped; evasion of or deliverance from
injury or any evil; also the means of escape. The unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits
of his custody. When the prisoner gets out of prison and unlawfully regains his liberty, it is an
actual escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)
"Evasion" means "escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.) .
The "destierro" imposed on appellant banished him from Manila alone, and he was free to stay
in all the remaining parts of the country, and to go and stay in any part of the globe outside the
country. With freedom to move all over the world, it is farfetched to allege that he is in any
confinement from which he could escape.
The words "privacion de libertad" have been correctly translated into the English "imprisonment,"
which gives the idea exactly conveyed by "privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text.
Undoubtedly, the drafters of the latter could have had used a more precise Spanish word, but
the literary error cannot be taken as a pretext to give to the less precise words a broader
meaning than is usually given to them.
"Privacion de libertad," literally meaning "deprivation of liberty or freedom," has always been
used by jurist using the Spanish language to mean "imprisonment." They have never given them
the unbounded philosophical scope that would lead to irretrievable absurdities.
Under that unlimited scope, no single individual in the more than two billion inhabitants of the
world can be considered free, as the freest citizen of the freest country is subject to many
limitations or deprivations of liberty. Under the prosecution's theory, should an accused,
sentenced to pay a fine of one peso, evade the payment of it, because the fine deprives him of
liberty to dispose of his one peso, he will be liable to be punished under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code to imprisonment of from more that two years to six years. The iniquity and
cruelty of such situation are too glaring and violent to be entertained for a moment under our
constitutional framework.
There is no gainsaying the proposition that to allow the violation of a sentence
of destierro without punishment is undesirable, but even without applying article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code, the act of the appellant cannot remain unpunished, because his violation
of the sentence of destierro may be punished as contempt of court, for which imprisonment up to
six months is provided.
It is deplorable that article 157 should not provide for a situation presented in this case, but the
gap cannot be filled by this Court without encroaching upon the legislative powers of Congress.
Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be punished, as provided by the old Penal Code,
by an increased in the evaded penalty. This will be more reasonable that the penalties provided
by article 157, which appear to be disproportionate and arbitrary, because they place on equal
footing the evader of a sentence of one day of imprisonment and a life-termer, one who commits
an insignificant offense and one who perpetrates the most heinous crime. At any rate, this is a
problem for Congress to solve.
The appealed decision should be set aside.

BRIONES, J., concurring:

I concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion, because evidently the word "fugandose" in the
Spanish text refers to imprisonment, not to destierro.

G.R. No. 76872

July 23, 1987
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres,
presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. We issued the writ and during the
hearing and from the return filed by the respondents through the Solicitor General, and other
pleadings in this case, the following facts emerged:
1. Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in the records before this
Court), petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven
(11) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9)
months and one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases
Nos. 68810, 91041 and F-138107). These convictions were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and 17694-CR). The maximum sentence would
expire on 2 November 2000.1
2. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the
President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of
the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."2 Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to
recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the
petitioner. In making its recommendation to the President, the Board relied upon the
decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939])
and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence
before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had
been charged with twenty counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q20756, which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City). The record before the Board also showed that on
26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
(Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this conviction
was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Board also had
before it a letter report dated 14 January 1986 from the National Bureau of
Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the
records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the
petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes including
estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of
firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police functions).
Some of these charges were Identified in the NBI report as having been dismissed.
The NBI report did not purport to be a status report on each of the charges there listed
and Identified.
4. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the
Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of
the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner.

5. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the

petitioner.
6. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the
President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner
was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of
his sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he
did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the
twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the
crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926. 3Petitioner also contends that he was not given
an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly
claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of
a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation
of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original
sentence.
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three times in the past. This Court
was first faced with this issue in Tesoro Director of Prison.4 Tesoro, who had been convicted of
the crime of falsification of public documents, was granted a parole by the then GovernorGeneral. One of the conditions of the parole required the parolee "not [to] commit any other
crime and [to] conduct himself in an orderly manner." 5 Two years after the grant of parole, Tesoro
was charged before the Justice of the Peace Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery
said to have been committed with the wife of Tesoro's brother-in-law. The fiscal filed with the
Court of First Instance the corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for nonappearance of the complainant. The complainant then went before the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence and charged Tesoro with violation of the conditions of his parole. After investigation by
the parole officer, and on the basis of his report, the Board recommended to the President of the
Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the petitioner. Tesoro contended, among other
things, that a "judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime" is necessary
before he could properly be adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Moran, held that the
determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested exclusively
in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that such determination would not be
reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the
judgment of the power that had granted it, we held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the
courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was
ordered."6 Thus, this Court held that by accepting the terms under which the parole had been
granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that the Governor-General's determination (rather than that
of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by
committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him.
In reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code which empowered the Governor-General
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial,
conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole, remit fines, and
order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions
as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any such person
who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition or conditions, of his
pardon, paroleor suspension of sentence. (Emphasis supplied)

In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,7 the petitioner had been convicted of the crime of frustrated
murder. After serving a little more than two years of his sentence, he was given a conditional
pardon by the President of the Philippines, "the condition being that he shall not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he shall be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."8 Eight years after the grant of his
conditional pardon, Sales was convicted of estafa and sentenced to three months and eleven
days of arresto mayor. He was thereupon recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion
of his original sentence. Sales raised before this Court two principal contentions. Firstly, he
argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by Article 159
of the Revised Penal Code. He contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution (Article III [1], 1935 Constitution). This
Court, through Mr. Justice Ozaeta speaking for the majority, rejected both contentions of Sales.
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did not repeal Section 64 (i)
Revised Administrative Code. It was pointed out that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, expressly preserved the
authority conferred upon the President by Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and
Section 64 (i) could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision did not
necessarily preclude action under the other. Sales held, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not
repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due process. This Court in effect held that since the
petitioner was a convict "who had already been seized in a constitutional was been confronted
by his accusers and the witnesses against him-, been convicted of crime and been sentenced to
punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of
whether he had breached the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense. Thus:
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity for any action by the
courts in the premises. The executive clemency under it is extended upon the
conditions named in it, and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that
the governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the
governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the
convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted
and agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the
conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison
should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him. 9
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,10 the petitioner had been convicted of the crime of
inciting to sedition. While serving his sentence, he was granted by the President a conditional
pardon "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines."11 Espuelas accepted the conditional pardon and was released from confinement.
Sometime thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court in Tagbilaran, Bohol, of
the crime of usurpation of authority. He appealed to the Court of First Instance. Upon motion of
the provincial fiscal, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case provisionally, an important
prosecution witness not having been available on the day set for trial. A few months later, upon
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President ordered his recommitment
to prison to serve the unexpired period of his original sentence.
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect of Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. This Court, quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and
been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting
to sedition, with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his
conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional
prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the
authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of

the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government
[has] such power been intrusted. 12
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the
following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the
proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or
it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to
proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for
the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his
trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well understood rules and doctrine on
this matter.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the
parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What
is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that
he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition
upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we here deal
with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict
granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be
convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him.
Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the
parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed in Article 159.1avvphi1
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or
(ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon."
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative
and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-38346-47 October 23, 1964

T Pagdating ninyo sa ward 6 ano ang inyong ginawa?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEOFILO DIOSO and JACINTO ABARCA, defendants-appellants.

S Tumuloy ho ako kay Reyno at tinamong ko kung saan si Intsik [Gomez]

ngayon tinuro ni Reyno sa akin. Sabi ho iyong nakakulambo.
Pagkatapos, sinabi ko naman kay Abarca ang lugar ni Intsik ngayon,
pinuntahan naman niya. Pagtapat niya kay Intsik, sinipa ko si Reyno
sabay bunot ng aking matalas at sinaksak ko sa kanya. Noong sa pagaakala kong patay na, iniwan ko at tumulong ako kay Abarca sa
pagsaksak kay Gomez. Noong tumihaya na si Gomez, sumigaw ako kay
Abarca na labas na tayo. Tumakas ka palabas at noong nasa pasilyo
kami ng hospital nasalubong namin iyong guardiya at doon namin
sinurender ang mga matalas namin. Tapos karning makapag-surrender,
dinala kami ng guardiya sa Control Gate tuloy dito. [Exhibit "D", p. 21]

ESCOLIN, J
Mandatory review of the death sentences imposed by the Circuit Court of Rizal upon Teofilo
Dioso and Jacinto Abarca for the crime of murder.
The crime was committed inside the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa, Rizal where both
accused were serving sentence, Abarca having been previously convicted by final judgment of
the crime of homicide, and Dioso, of robbery.
At the time of the incident, Dioso and Abarca were members of the "Batang Mindanao" gang,
while the victims Angelito Reyno and Fernando Gomez, also prisoners at the New Bilibid
Prisons, belonged to a group known as the "Happy Go Lucky" gang. These rival factions had
been involved in intermittent, and sometimes bloody, clashes, the latest of which resulted in the
death of one Balerio a member of the "Batang Mindanao" gang
Suspecting that Reyno and Gomez had authored the slaying of their gangmate, the two accused
set their Minds to avenge his death. They found the occasion to execute their nefarious design
when they learned that Reyno and Gomez were sick and confined in the prison hospital. At 6:15
in the 'morning of September 12, 1972, Abarca, feigning illness, went to the hospital to seek
admission as a patient. He was accompanied by his co-accused Dioso. Inside Ward 6 of the
hospital they saw their intended victims: Reyno was taking breakfast with Gomez was lying
down on a "tarima" [wooden bed] under a mosquito net. Dioso approached Reyno and spoke
briefly to him, while Abarca headed towards the "tarima". Then, both accused suddenly drew out
their improvised knives matalas Abarca raised the mosquito net over the "tarima" and stabbed
Gomez, as Dioso, almost simultaneously, attacked Reyno with his knife. And after the latter had
fallen, Dioso strode to the "tarima" to help his co-accused finish off Gomez.
When the accused rushed out of Ward 6, they were met at the corridor by Prison Guard
Enriquito Aguilar Both gave themselves up and handed their weapons to him.
Dr. Ricardo E. Baryola medico-legal officer of the NBI, who performed the autopsy, found that
both accused died of massive bleeding due to multiple stab wounds on the chest and
abdomen. 1
The accused were immediately interrogated by prison investigator Buenaventura dela Cuesta;
and they; readily executed their respective sworn statements, wherein they admitted
responsibility for the death of the victims. 2
In his sworn statement, Teofilo Dioso narrated how he delivered the death blow on Reyno,
thus: t.hqw

Jacinto Abarca on the other hand narrated his version of the killing as follows: t.hqw
T Pagkatapos ninyong mapagkasunduan na manaksak sa ward 6, ano
ang inyong ginawa?
S Ang sabi pa niya na bukas na tayo titira pagkatapos ng almosalan
tapos naghiwalay na kami baka pa marinig ng iba. Kaninang umaga .
pagkatapos naming kumain lumabas na ako sa ward 2 at nakita ko siya
sa pintuan ng ward 4 na naghihintay sa akin. Ngayon, pumasok muna
siya sa ward 4 at kumuha ng sigarilyo at pagkatapos tumuloy kami sa
ward 6. Pagdating namin sa ward 6, siya ang umuna dahil sa hindi ko pa
alam kung saan naka puwesto ang mga Happy Go [gang]. Pagkatapos
lumapit siya doon sa nakaupo hindi ko alam kong kumakain o hindi at
ako naman ay umupo sa isang tarima sa tabi ni intsik iyong tinira ko
tapos bigla na lang siya bumunot ng matalas niya bago tinira iyong
nakaupo sabay sabi na "tira na". Pagkatira niya, ako naman ay lumapit
doon sa tarima ni intsik [Gomez] bago ko biglang tinaas ang kulambo
dahil nakahiga siya tapos tumakbo. Hinabol ko tapos paghabol ko,
nadapa siya tapos sumuot sa silong ng tarima. Doon ko siya inabutan at
sinaksak ko. Ngayon sa pagsaksak ko sa kanya, biglang dumating itong
si Dioso at tumulong sa akin sa pagsaksak. Hindi nagtagal, sumigao si
Dioso ng 'tama na' bago kami tumakbo palabas ng ward 6. Noong nasa
pasilyo kami ng hospital, nasalubong namin iyong guardiya at doon
namin sinurender ang mga matalas namin. Pagkatapos naming ma
surrender ang mga matalas nang dinala kami ng guardiya sa labas.
[Exhibit "C ", p. 2].
Dioso revealed the motive for the killing as follows: t.hqw
T Bakit naman ninyo ni Abarca sinaksak sina Reyno at Gomez sa ward
6?
S Dahil po doon sa nangyari kay Balerio. Si Balerio po ay sinaksak ng
mga "Happy Go" at iyong panaksak namin kanina ay iyon ang ganti
naming mga BM sa mga "Happy Go". [Exhibit "D", p. 1]

Of similar tenor is the following statement of Abarca: t.hqw

T lbig mo bang sabihin, iyong mga sinaksak ninyo sa hospital kanina ay
iyon din ang pumatay sa sinasabi mong kakusa ninyo na si Balerio?
S Hindi ho pero katatak nila iyong pumatay kay Balerio. Pareho silang
miembro ng "Happy Go Lucky" gang. Ngayon ang pagka panaksak
namin kanina sa hospital noong dalawa na miembro ng "Happy Go" ay
ganti naming mga BM [Batang Mindanao] sa pagkapatay nila kay Balerio.
[Exhibit "C", p. 1].
When arraigned for the crime of murder, both accused voluntarily entered the plea of guilty.
Thereafter the trial court required the presentation of evidence to determine the degree of their
culpability. At the hearing, they acknowledged the voluntary execution of their respective
confessions.
The trial court correctly found that the crime was perpetrated with alevosia. As revealed by the
accused themselves, they inflicted the fatal blows while Gomez was lying down under a
mosquito net, and Reyno was taking his breakfast. Clearly, neither of the victims was in a
position to defend himself from the sudden and unexpected assault.
It is thus noted that in their briefs, no attempt was made to impugn the lower court's conclusion
as to their guilt. Instead, they seek attenuation of the death sentence imposed by the trial court
by invoking the circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. We find no necessity to
discuss at length the effects of such mitigating circumstances on the penalty imposed. Suffice it
to say that the accused are quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime charged while serving
sentence for a prior offense. As such, the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the new felony
[murder] is death, regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstance or the complete absence thereof. 3
But for lack of the requisite votes, the Court is constrained to commute the death sentence
imposed on each of the accused to reclusion perpetua
ACCORDINGLY, accused Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto Abarca are hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of
P30,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16806

December 22, 1961

ART. 169. How forgery is committed. The forgery referred to in this section may be
committed by any of the following means;

SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
P.
N.
Stuart
del
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order

mentioned therein, the appearance of a true and genuine document.
Rosario

for

petitioner.

CONCEPCION, J.:
Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and
Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession
of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years
and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of P5,000, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate part of the costs. On appeal, the
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said
indeterminate penalty which was increased to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor.
The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario.
It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine one-peso bills
Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe that
the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in fact they were
genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had been
altered and changed, the aforementioned defendants had succeeded in obtaining P1,700.00
from said complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of
financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines. The only
question raised in this appeal is whether the possession of said Exhibits C, E, G and H
constitutes a violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant maintains that, being
genuine treasury notes of our government, the possession thereof cannot be illegal. We find no
merit in this pretense.lawphil.net
It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had been
erased and changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and changes had been made in
the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the last digit in Serial No. D716326
of
Exhibit
G,
and
in
the
last
digit
9
of
Serial
No.
D-716329 of Exhibit H.
Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other
instruments of credit. Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions
of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his
possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this
section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said
articles.

2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters,

words or signs contained therein.
It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines
any of "the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased and or altered,
with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein and his co-defendants in
the manner adverted to above, is punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166,
subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36
Phil., 785).
Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the decision appealed from is, accordingly,
affirmed, with costs against petitioner Sergio del Rosario. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 31012

September 10, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.

There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not disputed either
by the prosecution or by the defense:
The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justice
Norberto Romualdez of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as his secretary
on November 1, 1921, and continued as such until September 15, 1928.

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Manila:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of falsification of
public and official documents, committed, according to the information, as follows:
That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by appointment of
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, was then taking part in the
discharge of public functions as secretary to the Honorable Norberto
Romualdez, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and by reason of
said duty had under her care the compositions and other papers and
documents having reference to the examinations for the admission of
candidates to the bar held in the months of August and September, 1926,
which were then kept in the archives of the said court, confabulating with
her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting in common accord with him, who
was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar Examinations,
willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives of the
Supreme Court certain public and official documents, to wit: the
compositions, which were written, prepared and submitted by the accused,
Luis Mabunay in that examination. Once in possession of the same, the said
accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay, conspiring together and
acting in common accord, willfully, illegally, and criminally erased the grade
of fifty-eight (58%) given by the correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to
the composition in Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the
accused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also
erased the grade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson
and Amado del Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written and prepared
by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote seventy-three (73%), and
by means of these alterations the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay were able to change the relative merits of those compositions,
thereby attributing to the said correctors, statements and declarations
contrary to what they really made, and the accused Estela Romualdez and
Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of falsifications made by them in
the aforesaid public and official documents in making it appear that Luis
Mabunay obtained the general average required by the rules of the
Supreme Court, and in securing the latter's admission to the practice of law,
as in fact he was admitted, to the great prejudice of the public.

The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to the bar
examinations held in 1926.
The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed to that office
on July 11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex oficio of the examination
committee for admission to the bar.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto Romualdez
as chairman of the examination committee for admission to the bar in the year 1926,
and upon recommendation of Clerk Vicente Albert, he appointed the following as
members of the examination committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney
Francisco Ortigas, Civil Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney
Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law; Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C. A.
DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General Delfin Jaranilla, Political Law; and
Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.
Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a committee of
correctors was appointed, composed of the following attorneys: Amado del Rosario,
Assistant Director of Civil Service, and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the
Supreme Court, as correctors in Civil Law; Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice
Johnson, and Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of Justice Malcolm, as correctors in
Mercantile Law; Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and Remo, of the Bureau of
Audits, as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of Audits and
Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of the
Executive Bureau, and the accused Estela Romualdez, as correctors in Political Law;
Rufino Luna, of the Executive Bureau, and Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as
correctors in International Law; and Anatalio Maalac, of the Bureau of Lands, and
Jeronimo Samson as correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness, Mr. Remo was
substituted by Jeronimo Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All said correctors were
designated by clerk of court Albert with the approval of the chairman of the
examination committee.
The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to the preparation
of the questions in their respective subjects and of a memorandum or note of the
articles, legal provisions and jurisprudence showing the sources from which the
questions were taken. The work of reviewing and grading the compositions was
entrusted to the correctors designated for each subject. Each corrector was furnished
with this note or memorandum, and a set of rules, patterned after those of the Civil
Service, was prepared by corrector Amado del Rosario to guide the correctors in
grading the examination papers.

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.

Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral and
documentary, the presentation of which consumed considerable of the court's time.
UNDISPUTED FACTS

The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject
assigned to them, noting the grades given to each answer, not on the composition, but
in a separate note book, which were later checked with the grades given by the other
corrector in the same subject, for the purpose of determining the general average to
be given to the composition.

The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar examination for
the year 1926 was submitted, under date of March 2, 1927, to the Supreme Court and
was published on the fifth of said month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C5) there appeared the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of
75%. The grades of Mabunay in each subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2, which
was prepared after the publication of the result of the examination, are: 73 in Civil
Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 in Political Law, 86 in International
Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises. However, a later
revision of the composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the grades of seventy-three
(73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2) had
been written on the first page of said compositions after striking out the grades of
sixty-three (63) therefore given to the composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fiftyeight (58) theretofore given to the composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The
investigation of this irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the
information in this case.
Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez
Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence tending to show
the identity of the person who altered the grades appearing on the first pages of the
compositions Exhibits-B-1 and B-2, the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously
and with the conformity of her attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p.
395, s. n.):
"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in
parenthesis are in my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the words
sixty-four and the figures 64% inclosed in parenthesis appearing in said
composition are also in my regular handwriting."
Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades
In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she was the
person who wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the words and figures
alleged to have been falsified, it now appears that the burden of establishing the
authority under which said changes and alterations were made is on the accused. On
this point the evidence for the defense tended to show that the accused Estela
Romualdez, both in her capacity as private secretary of the chairman of the
examination committee and as corrector and at the same time supervisor of the
correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the compositions already
reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given by them.
Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he considered
the accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson as supervisors of the
correctors; and explaining the powers of the former he said (page 721, s. n.):
"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to
understand that in order to do justice to the compositions, she could review
the compositions already graded by the other correctors; provided, I want to
add, that the new revision was done in order to do justice to the
compositions and before the names of the candidates were known."

Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to the grades
given by the corresponding correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same
witness testified that said alterations were made within the limits of the powers he had
given to said accused (pages 723, 726, s. n.).
For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her own behalf,
said that the chairman of the examining committee, gave her to understand that she
"was authorized to correct any composition in any subject" in the bar examinations of
the year 1926 and that she had never corrected any composition after the name of the
corresponding candidate was identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied having
known Luis Mabunay, and said that the first time she saw him was on the first day of
the trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).
Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney
The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused Estela
Romualdez may be summarized in two following propositions: 1st that Justice
Romualdez, as chairman of the examination committee, did not have authority to
delegate to his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, the power to revise
compositions in subjects in which she was not a corrector and which had already been
graded by the other correctors, and much less the power to alter or change the grades
given to and written on said compositions; 2nd that granting that the chairman of
the examination committee had such authority, the accused Estela Romualdez did not
exercise the same in the manner prescribed by said chairman, namely, in order to do
justice to the compositions and on the condition that the revision and the changes of
grades should be made before the names of the candidates, to whom the
compositions belonged, were known.
In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice
Romualdez was appointed by the Supreme Court as chairman of the bar examination
committee of the year 1926, so that he would supervise the examinations in
accordance with law and the rules, and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the
chairman can not by himself exercise the individual powers of the committee, among
which were the powers to review, and to change or alter the grades given to the
compositions.
As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, specially the testimony of the Deputy Clerk Samson,
shows that the accused Estela Romualdez made the changes in the grades given by
the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis
Mabunay, to whom she knew said compositions belonged, thus violating the
conditions imposed upon her by the chairman of the examination committee when she
was given said authority.
As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains that the
evidence for the prosecution shows that he was in connivance with the accused Estela
Romualdez in the alteration by the latter of his grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law
for the purpose of raising to 75% the general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.
Theory of the Defense
In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues that the
power of supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his secretary, the accused Estela
Romualdez, is not contrary to law, rules or precedents. This assertion is based on the

testimony of said Justice that the appointment of a committee of attorneys in

accordance with section 2 of the rules had not been followed by the Supreme Court
for a number of years prior to 1926, and that when said court designated Justice
Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee without designating the
examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and conferred upon him ample
powers to do what in his judgment was most in line with justice and the law, and that
no Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to determine the propriety or illegality of the
procedure employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or of the powers
conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman was responsible only
to the Supreme Court for his acts.
The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not have known to
whom compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at the time of making the alteration
of the grades appearing on the first pages thereof, because, according to the
testimony of said accused, corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of
those who helped in the preparation of the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the
envelopes containing the names and the identification numbers of the candidates
were opened just one day before the publication of the result of the examination, and
that in order to finish this work and to place the names of the candidates on said list,
they had to work continuously from 8 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the
evening on the day prior to the publication of the result of the examinations.
Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties
Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a witness for the
defense, the court finds that the accused Estela Romualdez, as secretary of the
chairman of the examination committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the
Supreme Court were considered by said chairman not only as correctors in the
subjects assigned to them but also as supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. n.),
both of them with equal powers and authority so that neither could consider himself
superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It appears, however, that while the chairman of
the committee gave his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, to understand that
she "was authorized to revise the compositions already graded by the other correctors
provided the new revisions were made for the purpose of doing justice to the
compositions and that the same were mad before the names of the candidates were
known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the same with respect to Deputy Clerk
Jeronimo Samson, to whom he said nothing about this matter (page 768, s. n.). It also
appears that the accused Estela Romualdez had never informed the chairman of the
committee about the corrections or alterations made by her in compositions Exhibits
B-1 and B-2; neither did the latter examine said compositions to determine whether or
not their merits justified the changes so made, and he only knew of said changes
upon the filing of the information against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For her
part, she made no report to the chairman of the examination committee of any error or
injustice committed by any corrector, and she only told him during the progress of the
work of grading the papers that they were being graded very strictly and that "she
feared that some injustice might be committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for that reason
Justice Romualdez told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a case of the
kind come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in order to do
justice," that is to say, if any person should bring to her attention any such case in
which, in her opinion, some injustice had been committed, she was authorized to put
things in order (page 781, s. n.), and the revision in such cases was left to the
judgment of his secretary (page 780, s. n.).
The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman
of the examination committee upon his secretary, Estela Romualdez, gave her so
ample a discretionary power of supervision that in its exercise she should act

independently, not only of the correctors and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson,
but also of the examination committee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a
chairman of the committee appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar
examinations of 1926, was authorized to confer such power of supervision upon his
secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did she exercise that power when she
made the changes in the compositions in question?
The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, made the
alterations of the grades originally given by the correctors to compositions of Exhibits
B-1 and B-2, is the only person who could give an account of and explain the
circumstances under which said alterations were made. But said accused, testifying
as a witness in her own behalf, was not able to explain how and under what
circumstances she made those alterations. When pressed by the fiscal during the
cross-examination to state the circumstances under which she came across those
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez said: "If I were to
make any statement with reference to the circumstances under which I came across
these compositions, you would compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really
remember" (page 823, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did not put
her initials under or at the side of those alterations she made on compositions Exhibits
B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to say, when she saw the other compositions (Exhibits 31, X, X-1 and X-2) bearing her initials which were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that
she placed her initials on said compositions because she graded them as corrector,
and she did not put her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 because she
revised them in her capacity as supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also said, that,
as corrector, she had instructions to put her initials when writing the original grade on
any composition, but as supervisor "she was under no obligation" to put her initials
(page 830, s. n.) and that the chairman of the examination committee "has not gone
into such minor details" (page 831, s. n.). Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to
why she wrote the altered grade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the same line and
immediately before the initials of the correctors she said: "Because on that occasion it
pleased me to do so" (page 836, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember whether
or not she exercised her supervisory authority with respect to the other five
compositions forming part of those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.);
and when asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase given by her to
the grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising the general
average of the compositions of the same candidate to 75%, the accused answered
that "the fiscal ought to know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848,
s. n.). With these answers and others appearing in her testimony, the accused instead
of giving a satisfactory explanation of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the
encouragement given by Justice Romualdez to the effect that the new revision of the
compositions was left to her discretion (page 780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers
exercised by her in the bar examinations of 1926 were such that she could revise any
composition in any subject already graded and increase or decrease the grades given
by the correctors; in other words, that she could, at her pleasure, do or undo the work
done by the correctors without the necessity of accounting to anybody for it (page 834,
s. n.), or of keeping a note or memorandum of the compositions so revised and the
alteration of the grades.
The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his
capacity as chairman of the examination committee, the compositions of the
candidates who filed motions for reconsideration of the grades given them, after the
publication of the result of the examinations, performed his work with such diligence
and zeal that he noted in a memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to
each answer of the candidate, but also the total grade obtained by the candidate in
the revision, together with such other data which would explain the increase of the
grades of this or that candidate.

The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his secretary to
understand that she had such unlimited powers, or that the Supreme Court in
designating said Justice as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year
1926, authorizing him to confer such powers upon his secretary, because it is an
undisputed fact that his designation was made so that he should conduct the
examinations in accordance with law and the rules.
But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the grades given
by the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she acted in the exercise of the
powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the examination committee, is there
any ground in support of her claim that she made those alterations only to do justice to
the compositions, and without knowing the name of the candidate to whom they
belonged?
Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, Juan
Villaflor, which, according to the defense is not worthy of credit because of the
contradictions and inconsistencies therein noted, the record contains other evidence
establishing certain facts from which such knowledge can be inferred.
It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the compositions
numbering over 8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in pencil. This list was
prepared with the intervention of the said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine Stevens,
assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflor and the accused Estela Romualdez.
However, before the preparation of this list, sometime during the first day of February,
1927, the sealed envelopes containing the identification numbers attached to each
composition were opened. Said numbers were written either on the upper part of each
envelope or on the first page of the composition, and that work lasted several days
(pages 162, 163, s. n.). In the list Exhibit C-1 the numbers of the candidates contained
in the envelopes attached to the compositions were first written (page 166, s. n.), and
then the grades in each subject, followed by the general average (pages 71, 184, s.
n.), leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page 166, s. n.). Deputy
Clerk Samson wrote on an adding machine the grades in each composition as they
were read out by one of the helpers, and then the corresponding general average as
computed by him (page 71, s. n.), and, at the same time, Josephine Stevens wrote
said grades in the space corresponding to each subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of
paper used by Deputy Clerk Samson on the adding machine was presented as Exhibit
C-6.
After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the general
average of each candidate, who was theretofore known by his identification number
only, was prepared, the envelopes containing the names corresponding to the
identification numbers written on said list were taken from the safe of the office of the
clerk, and the names of the candidates were inserted in said list by those who
assisted in the preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.) among whom was the
accused Estela Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-examination, having written
many of the names appearing on several pages of said list (pages 859-861, s. n.).
After said list Exhibit C-1 was prepared the examination committee submitted to the
Supreme Court a report recommending the admission to the bar and not only for
those candidates with a general average of 75% or more, but also of those who had
obtained a general average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said automatic
increase was ordered noted on said list Exhibit C-1. However, this recommendation
was not approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that said automatic increase
was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s. n.), and for that reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert,
instructed his deputy, Mr. Samson, to prepare another list containing only the names
of the candidates who had originally obtained a general average of 75% without
having obtained less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance thereof the

typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was prepared (page 77, s. n.), which was approved by the
Supreme Court and published on March 5, 1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is included
with an average of 75%.
Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations the list Exhibit
C-2 was prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking the grades directly from the
compositions; while one of the helpers read them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them
on the adding machine and computed the general average of each candidate. The roll
of paper used by Deputy Samson on this occasion was also presented and marked as
Exhibit C-7.
Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in
the office of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out when the investigation of the
irregularities in the examinations of 1926 was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in
the course of that investigation it was discovered that the grades of candidate Luis
Mabunay, identified with number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list Exhibit C-1,
which had been prepared simultaneously, did not agree, because, while roll Exhibit C6 shows that the grade in Civil Law of candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1
shows that the grade of the same candidate is 73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows
that the grade of candidate No. 898 was 58 (in Remedial Law), his grade in the list
Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in the same subject), a difference also being noted between the
general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-6, which is 72.8%, and his general
average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages 73, 74, s. n.). This discovery led to the
revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in the examinations of 1926, which were
united to his personal record (Exhibit B), which showed that the grades given to, and
written by the respective correctors on the compositions of said candidate in Civil Law
Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and further, that the
grades that appeared on said compositions before the alterations were identical with
those that appeared on the roll, Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of said
Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers 73, 64, and 75 in the columns
corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and General Average, respectively, were
written after erasing with rubber what was there originally written. It may also be
noted, upon an examination of the alterations appearing on the first pages of
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally written by the correctors,
authenticated by their initials, had been stricken out in such a way that it is difficult to
make out said original grades, leaving, however, intact, the initials of the correctors.
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and altered the
grades written by the correctors on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B2 wished to make it appear that said alterations had been made by the correctors
themselves; second, that said alterations were made after the grades written by the
correctors had been noted on the adding machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list
Exhibit C-1 which were prepared simultaneously; third, that after said alterations had
been made, and in order that the grades so altered should agree with the grades
already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law were
erased with rubber, and in place thereof were written the grades now appearing in
said compositions. The accused Estela Romualdez having admitted that she was the
author of such alterations, the only logical inference from her admission and the facts
above set out, is that she was also the person who erased not only the grades
originally written by the correctors on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also
those appearing in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the
list Exhibit C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades now appearing in said
columns, and which agree with those written by her on compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2. Now, if the accused Estela Romualdez erased in the manner stated the grades
originally written, and substituted for them the grades now appearing in said
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as well as in the columns corresponding to Civil
Law and Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be doubted that in making

such erasures and alterations she not only acted with the intent of concealing her
identity, but she also knew the number and the name of the candidate to whom said
composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and the names of the
candidates were already written on the list Exhibit C-1, and that list was kept in the
office of Justice Romualdez (page 83, s. n.), were she had complete and absolute
control as private secretary and supervisor of the examinations.
Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay
Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that one Luis
Mabunay called up the accused Estela Romualdez on the telephone a few days
before the publication of the results of the examinations, there is, indeed, no direct
proof in the record showing the participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However,
there is other evidence for the prosecution establishing certain facts which show
strong indications that he operated in the act before or at the time of its execution by
his coaccused. It has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused Luis
Mabunay was one of the candidates who took the bar examinations in 1926; that the
general average obtained by him, according to the computation appearing on the roll
Exhibit C-6 of the adding machine and that originally written in the list Exhibit C-1 was
72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the recommendation of the examination
committee that all grades from and between 70% and 75% be automatically raised to
75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of successful candidates which was
published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the
increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2),
which was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades theretofore
given by the correctors.
It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that she had no
motive whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis Mabunay, testified that she did not
know him and that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this
case. However, in view of her inability to explain why precisely the compositions of
said Luis Mabunay had been benefited by the revision, and in view of the admission of
Justice Romualdez that the power to revise conferred upon Estela Romualdez could
be exercised by her in the compositions already graded by the correctors in all cases
of injustice which came to her knowledge, or which might be brought to her attention
(page 781, s. n.), her testimony lacks foundation, because it is absurd to believe that
her revision of the compositions of her coaccused Luis Mabunay was due only and
solely to a happy coincidence.
Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for the
prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the amount of P600 from his savings
account in the Philippine Trust Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three
days before the publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when
correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400 made by the accused Estela
Romualdez in her current account (Exhibit H) with the Bank of the Philippine Islands
on the seventh day of said March, 1927, may, perhaps, give an explanation of the
motive of said accused for increasing the grades of Mabunay with just the necessary
points to reach the lowest passing general average. It is also true that Estela
Romualdez testified that said amount had been sent to her by her cousin named
Prisca Magpayo Redona from the province for the purchase of merchandise for sale
at the latter's store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that respect was not
corroborated either by her said cousin, or by any other persons mentioned by her as
the bearers of said amount, or by the corresponding check or postal money order, as
she had done when referring other deposits in the bank.
Conclusion

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the allegations of the
information are sufficiently supported by the evidence and that the accused, Estela
Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as
principal and the latter as accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official documents
with which they are charged and, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing Estela
Romualdez, who was a Government employee at the time of the commission of the
crime, to suffer, in accordance with article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by
section 1 of Act No. 2712, six years and one day of prision mayor with the accessory
penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in
view of the nature of the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis Mabunay, who was a
private individual with respect to said examination, to suffer, under the provisions of
article 301 as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code,
the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties
of the law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the costs.
The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following assignments of
error:
I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of
"falsification of public and official documents" and in sentencing her to suffer
imprisonment without due process of law, contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, entitled "An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United
States as to the future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to
Provide a More Autonomous Government for those Islands".
II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully
authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the composition papers of Luis
Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2 of the Government, and in denying full credit to the
uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar
examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.
III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela Romualdez a fair and
impartial trial.
The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed the following
errors:
I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice
Romualdez with reference to his authority as chairman of the bar examination
committee of the year 1926, to confer upon the accused Estela Romualdez, the
powers he in fact conferred upon her, in connection with said examination.
II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez as
to the fact that he, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, really and
truly conferred upon the accused Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised
in that examination.
III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the
powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar examination committee of
1926, within the limits fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading
of the compositions be made in order to do justice thereto, and before the names of
the corresponding candidates were known.

IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez changed the
general average and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial
law on the list Exhibit C-1.
V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode,
Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and 27, containing the
opinion of said lawyers as to the grades to which said compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 were justly entitled.
VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same powers
exercised by the accused in the bar examination of 1926.
VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-1
and B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded
them, the court erred in concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the
information.
VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar examination committee
of 1926, was not authorized by the Supreme Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez
the powers which she exercised in that examination, the court erred in concluding that
she altered the grades of said compositions willfully and feloniously.
IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez intended to
conceal her identity when she revised and regraded compositions Exhibits B-1 and B2.
X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in exercising her
powers as supervisor of the correctors in said bar examinations, revised compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 only, in order to regrade them.
XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading said
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had received from her
coaccused Luis Mabunay the sum of P400.
XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense of falsification
with which she is charged, the lower court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay
participated in its commission.
In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a joint
memorandum on July 10, 1929. The Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the People of the
Philippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.
The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez, was
disqualified to sit in this case. Upon a consideration of the case on its merits, four justices were
in favor of affirming the decision of the trial court and the same number were in favor of
acquitting the defendants. The court being unable to reach a decision in the usual course, an
attempt was made on February 11, 1930 to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by the following
resolution:
The court having under consideration again the case of People vs. Romualdez, et
al., No. 31012, those participating being all the members of the court, except Mr.
Justice Romualdez, who was disqualified, it was moved that following precedents

elsewhere, particularly in the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that when
there is an equal division in the court and there is no prospect of a change in the vote
the judgment appealed from stand affirmed, and in accordance with the action taken in
the case of Nacionalista Party vs. Municipal Board of Manila, No. 21265 the
judgment in the case at bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Avancea and Messrs.
Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns voted in favor of the motion. Messrs. Justices
Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real voted against the motion. Mr. Justice
Johnson based his dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in force in the
Philippine Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.
The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case until the
further order of the court.
On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him be
considered separately and he be absolved from the complaint. This motion was denied by the
court. He renewed his motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the ground
that no severance had been asked for in the lower court, and for the further reason that there
was a prospect that the membership of the court would soon be increased.
The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death or retirement
of three justices only six of the former members remained. On June 23, 1932 Courtney Whitney
as attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case be set for a rehearing
before the court as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On July 2, 1932 he filed a
motion for the dismissal of the information, alleging that because of the inability of the court to
reach a determination from the facts as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant-appellant
Estela Romualdez, she had been denied her right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.
After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an additional
memorandum, to which the Attorney-General filed a reply.
Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that even if the
lower court's findings of fact be justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to sustain that any
criminal offense, recognized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has been committed." They
contend that the appointment of the committee of attorneys by Justice Romualdez to read and
grade the examination papers was not warranted by law, and that therefore the alteration by the
defendant Estela Romualdez, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades
in question did not constitute a crime.
The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely refutes this
contention. He testified that the bar examining committee was composed of two groups of
attorneys: Those that were appointed to prepare the questions, and those that were appointed to
grade the papers. He further testified that the court was informed of the way in which the
examination was conducted and that it approved thereof. There were more than a thousand
candidates and some eight thousand papers. According to the contention of appellant's
attorneys only the seven attorneys appointed to prepare the questions or the court itself could
lawfully grade these papers. Such a contention is clearly untenable. The attorneys that prepared
the questions did not intervene in the grading of the papers, but they prepared a key to the
questions, which served the other group of attorneys, the readers or "correctors", as a guide in
grading the papers. The intervention of the "correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys
that prepared the questions, and the intervention of the two groups of attorneys was perfectly
regular and valid.
It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela Romualdez altered
were not public or official documents. That contention is likewise without merit. As stated by her
attorneys, the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot

therefore be maintained with any show of reason that the papers submitted by the candidates in
the course of the examination were not public and official documents, or that the alteration,
under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades given to such papers by the
"correctors" was not a crime. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court refers to the
falsification of his examination papers as "falsification of public documents"; People vs. Castro
and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the conviction of Castro for the falsification of his examination
papers was affirmed.)
In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members each year
make all the necessary arrangements for the bar examination, the Chief Justice in 1926
designated Justice Romualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he appointed one
group of attorneys to prepare the questions and another group to grade the papers. If any of
these attorneys were designated by the clerk of the court, it was with the advice and consent
and on the authority of Justice Romualdez.
The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code in
the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical meaning, and according to article 300
may be committed in the following eight ways:

wished to know whether such a bill, if enacted, would be an unconstitutional interference with
the functions of the Judicial Department, and asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court
for an advisory opinion. They replied that such a law would be unconstitutional. In the course of
the opinion they said: "If the judicial department decides that the marking of the written
examinations may be performed by competent persons not members of the board but acting
under the direction of such members, that pertains directly to the ascertainment of the
qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of the judicial department and not an
immaterial incident." It was also stated that the plan of employing assistants to aid the bar
examiners in marking the papers had been approved by the Supreme Judicial Court.
In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that the trial
court erred in not finding that she was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact made
on the examination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in denying full credit to
the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining
committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.
In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the
authority which she claims to have received; and in the second place, even if it be assumed that
he gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance with the terms thereof.

1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.

2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate.
3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them.
4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
5. By altering true dates.
6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning.
7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original.
8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry or official book.
The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the
grades in such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors" had participated therein,
because she blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades
opposite their initials, without indicating by her own initials that she had made the alterations.
She in that way attributed to the "correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them.
Her only explanation of why she altered the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do so.
A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to in
the American Bar Association Journal for August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in the
Massachusetts Senate prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of applicants for
admission to the bar by any person not a member of the board of bar examiners. The Senate

The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary, Estela
Romualdez, and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves "correctors" as
supervisors of the other "correctors", and that he authorized Estela Romualdez to revise any
grade to correct an injustice, without consulting or notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the
"correctors' who had graded the paper, without requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make
any record thereof or any report to him or to anybody else.
Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in
accordance with the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had no such authority as he is
alleged to have given his secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance
with the law, and it is inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give or attempt to
give his secretary the unlimited authority which she claims to have received, thereby enabling
her to alter at will any grade or any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to
anybody. The mere statement of such a claim shows that it is preposterous.
No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was regarded by
him as a supervisor of equal rank with Estela Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he
was regarded as a supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity.
Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the accused Estela
Romualdez.
It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive statement.
Justice Romualdez testified that he believed that on a certain occasion he gave his secretary to
understand that if a case should be brought to her attention she might revise any grade to
prevent an injustice, so long as she did not know the name of the candidate to whom the paper
belonged. When asked where she was when the pretended authority was given to her, the
accused could not remember.
There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from revising the
revision of Estela Romualdez, because she did not initial the changes made by her, and he was
supposed to be a supervisor of equal rank.

If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the
authority which she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the
grades now in question, because when she made the changes she already knew that the papers
belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining that conclusion is
carefully set forth by the trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony of
Justice Romualdez to the effect that the accused acted within the authority granted her in
changing the grades in question was a mere expression of opinion. It was clearly inadmissible
and not binding on the court. The accused Estela Romualdez did not even attempt to explain
under what circumstances she raised the grades of her coaccused so as to enable him to obtain
the necessary general average of 75 per cent. She did not confer with the "correctors" who had
graded the papers in question. She di not attempt to explain how she arrived at the increased
grades, or how she came to revise the grades in question, how she happened to pick these two
papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that had been altered by
her.
Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that she
freely and voluntarily admitted from the start of the trial of her case that the alterations had been
made by her, and concludes therefrom that she acted in good faith. We cannot agree either with
the statement of fact or the conclusion. The accused Estela Romualdez did not admit that the
alterations were made by her until after the prosecuting attorney had presented three hundred
and fifty pages of testimony and announced his readiness to prove by three handwriting experts
that the alterations were in the handwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that before the
trial defendant's attorney from the fiscal's office a photograph that had been made for the
purpose of comparing a specimen of defendant's handwriting and that of the altered grades. The
fact that the defendant Estela Romualdez made the alterations under the circumstances which
we have mentioned, when she already knew that the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves
any contention that she acted in good faith.
In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:
When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by competent
evidence, criminal intent may be and will be presumed, unless such intent is rebutted
by the introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, and
satisfactorily disclosing the absence of such criminal intent.
The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial court
erred in failing to extend to her a fair and impartial trial. We shall not waste much time on this
assignment of error, which is utterly without merit. The record itself completely refutes any such
contention. If the learned trial judge erred, it was in permitting the attorneys for the defendants
too great latitude in arguing their objections. Arguments four and five pages long were
incorporated into the stenographic record of the evidence. The record shows a most unjustifiable
attack on the good faith of the fiscal and a persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his
evidence against the accused.
The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the most part
embraced in the assignments of error of his coaccused which we have already considered.
These remain only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his fifth assignment of
error it is alleged that the lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of attorneys
Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which
contain the opinion of said attorneys as to the correct grades which the examination papers
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.
The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these three
attorneys on the ground that it was not the best evidence, and suggested that the defense might
call the members of the examining committee that prepared the questions in Remedial Law and

Civil Law and the key thereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see fit to adopt the
suggestion of the court. It is not true therefore that the lower court deprived the accused of an
opportunity of showing that the examination papers in question deserved the increased grades
which the defendant Estela Romualdez gave them. The attorneys that prepared the questions
and the key to the answers were certainly the persons best qualified to decide whether or not
the questions were correctly answered. The opinion of other attorneys, who had nothing to do
with the examination, would only lead to confusion. We find no merit in this assignment of error.
The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the motive of the
accused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and regrading the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her co-accused Luis Mabunay.
The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez
committed the crime of falsification imputed to her in the information, the court erred in
concluding that the accused Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.
For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error together.
In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela Romualdez
ever reviewed the examination papers of her coaccused. So far as the evidence shows, she
merely raised his grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her
own words, a passing mark. She could not or would not enlighten the court as to why she raised
the grades of Luis Mabunay so as to enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already stated, the
record does not show that she raised the grades of any other candidate.
The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that he
failed in the examination in question, receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar
examining committee recommended that not only those having the required general average of
75 per cent be admitted, but also that those who had received between 70 and 75 per cent. This
is referred to in the record as "an automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and
was disapproved by the Supreme Court, and the committee was directed to prepare a new list
and to include therein only those who had obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The name
of Luis Mabunay was included in the new list submitted three days later, notwithstanding the fact
that he had obtained a general average of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela
Romualdez had in the meantime raised the grades now in question so that he appeared to have
obtained the general average required for admission to the bar.
The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine
Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the
Philippine Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for
what purpose he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the first list was disapproved.
In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the court
said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does
not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he
fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of
easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek
to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself
but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.

In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief Justice
Shaw laid down the following rule:
When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the
charge, and it is apparent that the accused is so situated that he could offer evidence
of all the facts and circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that
the suspicious circumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence,
and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if produced,
instead of rebutting, would tend to sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously
applied, and only in cases where it is manifest that proofs are in the power of the
accused, not accessible to the prosecution.

the bar. It was subsequently found that alterations had been made in his examination papers,
and he and Juan Villaflor were prosecuted for the falsification of a public document. Villaflor
assumed full responsibility for the commission of the crime, and testified that Del Rosario did not
know anything about the making of the alterations. The trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but
upon a view of the case for the purpose of taking disciplinary actin against him Justice Malcolm,
speaking for the court in banc, said:
It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe
del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the
falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.
The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.

Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and only
P10 by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400 came from.
She said it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods,
but she could not name the person that brought the money to her, or explain why she deposited
it in the bank. She did not attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the
purchase of goods for her cousin. She did not call her cousin as a witness.
An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of failure to
produce evidence. The inference, unless the failure to produce evidence is explained
away, is that the tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would not support the
party's case. (U. S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)
In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by Dean
Wigmore in his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148:
The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to
inference against a party accused, with the same limitations applicable to civil parties.
Here the effect of the burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that
the burden is on the prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of
law to produce evidence; but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference from
nonproduction. This seeming paradox, which has been already sufficiently noticed in
treating of the general principle, has misled a few courts to deny that any inference
may be drawn.

In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with the
falsification of a public document. The evidence showed that in the Register of Attorneys the
name of an attorney had been erased, and that the accused had written his own name in that
space, although he had not admitted to the bar. The accused contended that he wrote his name
in the register under the direction of an employee of the court, and that he acted in good faith.
He was convicted, and on appeal the decision was affirmed. This court in its decision said: "The
trial court suggests in the opinion that the offense committed required the participation of some
unfaithful employee of the court. But this fact, as the court found, did not lessen the criminal
responsibility of the appellant."
It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common accord
in the commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can seldom be
proved except by circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the
conspirators are the acts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)
The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and,
from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts
and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely
parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. Evidence of actual participation, rather than of passive
acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of
others is relevant to show the criminal intention of the passive party, and generally the
smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or words of one
against the others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)

The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and
benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after the
Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The
alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money after he
had time to learn from his coaccused that he had failed. It was under those circumstances
incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to present evidence to show for what purpose he
withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank. As this court said in the case of Worcester vs.
Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by the
evidence.

When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his
power to offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which
the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the
natural conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the
inferences against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion.

As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the
crime, the trial court found her guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended
by Act No. 2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor, and the
accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer perpetual
disqualification to hold any public office.

The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed for the
third time in the bar examination of 1926. He then filed a motion for the revision of his grades,
based on an alleged mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and he was admitted to

The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and one
day to twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the same, and there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the

penalty should be imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight years and one day to ten
years. The penalty imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight
years and one day of prision mayor.
The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article 301 of
the Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the performance of his duties as an
employee of the Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day of arresto
mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay
one-half of the costs.

but that has been changed by the Revised Penal Code to prision correccional in the medium
and maximum degrees, and the medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six months,
and twenty-one days to four years, nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of Luis
Mabunay is therefore increased to three years, six months, and twenty- one days of prision
correccional.
The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is
affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.
Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He
was a conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301 of
the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum degree,
G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981
SALUD
P.
BERADIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, Salud P. Beradio, an election registrar of the COMELEC in
Rosales, Pangasinan, who was convicted on four (4) counts of the crime of falsification of public
or official documents of the seven (7) separate informations filed against her for making false
entries in her daily time records, elevates to the Court, the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. No. 20319 to 20322 promulgated on September 18, 1978, affirming in toto the
judgment of conviction rendered on July 30, 1976 by the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial
District, Dagupan City. The dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court reads as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION, and with the prosecution not having
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the herein accused and for
insufficiency of evidence or the lack of it, the Court hereby finds. as it so holds,
accussed Salud P. Beradio NOT GUILTY of the charges in Criminal cases Nos. CCC0258, CCC-0259, and CCC-0263; consequently, she is hereby acquitted therefrom
with costs de oficio; and decreeing the bail bonds posted for her provisional release in
these cases cancelled and discharged.
On the other hand, however, the Court so finds and holds accused Salud P. Beradio
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public or official
document as charged in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 as to entry on July 13, 1973
only, Criminal Case No. CCC-0261; Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 as to entry on May
28, 1973 only, and Criminal Case No. CCC-0264, defined and penalized under Article
17 1, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and absent any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Act, hereby
accordingly sentences said Salud P. Beradio to serve an indeterminate prison term in
the following manner, to wit:
a) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the
law, to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and, to pay the cost;

b) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0261 a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the cost;
c) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 - a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correcional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to
pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
d) In Criminal Case No. CCC-026-1 a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and 0NE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of
the law, to pay fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2.000) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
The penalties herein imposed shall be served successively with the maximum duration
of the sentences not to exceed threefold the length of tune corresponding to one
penalty imposed upon tier in accordance with Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to charges of falsification on July 12, 1973 in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260, and on
May 30, 1973, the Court finds no sufficient Evidence to hold the accused liable.
Consequently, the accused is hereby absolved therefrom.
The facts pertinent to the specified dates of falsification as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
... On the following particular dates, as reflected in her daily time records (Exhs. "D" to
"H"), BERADIO reported her attendance in office and actual hours of work performed
as:
On

give due course to said petition it appearing that the issues raised are, in the main questions of
law rendered novel by the peculiar circumstances of the case. Thus, he raised the following legal
issues:
I
WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF
THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 171, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE IS LEGAL AND PROPER.
II
WHETHER THE PETITIONER COULD STILL BE LEGALLY AND PROPERLY
PROSECUTED FOR AN OFFENSE WHERE SHE WAS NO LONGER A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL
The veracity of the foregoing reports were negated by the following:
III
1) On March l5, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the applicants at the initial
hearing and reception of evidence in land Registration Case No. 19-R before the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Rosales, in both morning and
afternoon sessions (Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "K-2").
2) In the morning of March 23, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the petitioner
in the hearing of Special Proceedings No. 24-R (summary settlement of the estate of
Vicente Oria, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, at Resales, which
was called first in open court and later, in chambers (Exhs. "M" and M-1 ").
3) On May 28, 1973, in the same case, Sp. Proc. No. 24-R, BERADIO again appeared
as counsel for the petitioner in the same court which held sessions from 8:45 to 11:45
(Exh. "M").
4) In the morning of June 6, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the defendant
in CAR Case No. 19882-.TP '73, entitled "Pepito Felipe vs. Ismael Pontes and Camilo
Tamce before CAR Branch 11 in Tayug, Pangasinan (Exh. "J"). Minutes of the pre-trial
conference which the appellant attended are manifest in the pre-trial order that was
dictated in open court (Exh. "J-1").
5) In the morning of June 22, 1973, Beradio appeared in Sp. Proc. No. 24-R before
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV at Rosales (Exh. "M").
6) In the morning of July 13, 1973, Beradio appeared as counsel for plaintiff at the pretrial conference of Civil Case No. 137R, "Venancia Diaz vs. Armando Ordonio" before
Branch XIV of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Exhs. "L" to "I-3").
It is thus clear that while in the six abovementioned dates, BERADIO made it appear
in her daily time records that she was in her office and performed her work on the
dates and hours she specified, the facts were that she was elsewhere attending court
sessions. 2
From the said decision of the Court of Appeals and the denial of her motion for reconsideration
on November 28, 1978, Salud Beradio filed the instant petition for review on certiorari to the
Court. We asked the Solicitor General to comment on the petition and thereafter, We resolved to

WHETHER PETITIONER !S UNDER LEGAL OBLIGATION TO FILL UP AND SUBMIT

TIME RECORD.
IV
ASSUMING THAT SHE IS, DO THE STATEMENTS THEREIN REFLECTED IN HER
TIME RECORD BEAR ANY' COLOR OF TRUTH'.
V
WHETHER DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OR
OFFICIAL DOCUMENT IS TOTALLY OF NO MOMENT.
VI
IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT. UNDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE LAW AND WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONER
IS ENTITLED TO ACQUITTAL ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
Salud P. Beradio, petitioner, is a lady-lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on February 1, 1964 (Exhibits A and A-1). In 1972 and
1973, she was stationed in Resales, Pangasinan, as Chief of Office, Office of the Election
Registrar, COMELEC holding office beside the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon
and from 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As the nature of her job was field work,
she was required to fill up and submit to the COMELEC's main office in Manila her daily time
records after having been counter-signed by her provincial supervisor. 3
On March 29, 1973, the COMELEC by resolution (Exhibits 1 and 1-A, CCC-0261) granted her
request for permission to appear as counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the case
before the Court of Agrarian Relations in Rosales, Pangasinan. 4

During her assignment as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, one Raymundo Valdez
filed with the COMELEC, sometime in September, 1973, an administrative complaint charging
her of unauthorized practice of law. On the other hand, Salud Beradio tendered her resignation
as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, which, by COMELEC resolution (Exhibit B) of
October 25, 1973, was accepted and made to retroact on the close of office hours on September
30, 1973. She was duly granted clearance by all the offices of the COMELEC, and she received
her retirement benefits under the law.
Raymundo Valdez made an inquiry with the COMELEC on the status of his administrative case
against Salud P. Beradio, and upon being informed of her separation from the service, he
initiated the filing of criminal charges against Salud Beradio on grounds of falsification of daily
time records defined and penalized under Article 17 1, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
as falsification of public documents. In the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan where he
lodged the criminal charges, Jose Peralta, and his wife Paz de Guzman-Peralta, trial attorney of
Agrarian Legal Assistance (DAR) submitted affidavits in support of the charges against Salud P.
Beradio.
On August 4, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed seven (7) separate informations all
dated July 7, 1975 with the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City, charging
Salud P. Beradio with falsification of public or official documents for making false entries in her
daily time .records on: 1) October 12, 1972 in Criminal Case CCC-0258; 2) September 4, 1973
in Criminal Case CCC-0259; 3) July 12 and 13, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0260; 4) June 6 and
22, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0261; 5) May 28 and 30, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0262; 6)
April 3, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0263; and 7) March 15 and 23, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC0264 that she submitted to the Commission on Election in Manila. 5 The separate informations
allege that petitioner was absent the whole day on the days mentioned therein but to the
"damage and prejudice of the National Government," she made it appear in her time records that
she was not so absent from the office, when in fact she well knew that on such date or time she
was in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Resales, Pangasinan, appearing
in her cases .
While petitioner raised the above-quoted legal issues which, to Us, point to the more basic
issues inherent in acts mala in se as contra distinguished from mala prohibita, We narrowed
down these issues, for proper disposition of the instant case, into whether or not the alleged acts
of falsification of public documents imputed against the petitioner were tainted with criminal
intent (dolo), and whether or not the act of alleged false narration of facts in the daily time record
bears, under the law, some semblance of colorable truth. This We did in full considerations of
the peculiar circumstances which render the instant case novel in some respects, worthy of
pronouncements from this Court.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a conviction of the offense of falsification of public
or official documents, defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, the requisite elements thereof must be clearly established, namely: 1) the offender makes
in a document false statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false, and 4) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third
person. 6
Of weight in Our criminal justice system is the principle that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent (dolo), without which it cannot exist. 7 Actus non facit reum nisi mens set rea, the
act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so. Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code clearly indicates that malice or criminal intent (dolo) in some form is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offenses defined in the Code, except in those cases where the
element required is negligence (culpa).

On one point, however, the claim of the petitioner that she is not under strict obligation to keep
and submit a time record is not at all empty with justification. While it is true, as held by the
respondent court, 8 that the obligation to disclose the literal truth in filling up the daily time record
is required of all officers and employees in the civil service of the government in accordance with
Civil Service Rule XV, Executive Order No. 5, Series of 1909, this vague provision, however, is
rendered clear by Section 4, Rule XV of the Civil Service Rule, dated December 3, 1962, later
Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1965 which exempt from requirements of keeping and
submitting the daily time records three categories of public officers, namely: 1) Presidential
appointees; 2) chiefs and assistant chiefs of agencies; and 3) officers in the three branches of
the government. Clearly thus, petitioner as Chief of theOffice, Office ofElection Registrar,
COMELEC in the municipality of Rosales, Pangasinan exercising supervision over four (4)
subordinate employess, would fall under the third category aforementioned. An Election
Registrar of the municipality performing the powers, dutied , responsibilities of the COMELEC, a
constitutional body, in the conduct of national or local election, referenda, and plebiscites, in
aparticular voting district may be regarded as an officer who rank higher thab such chiefs or
assistant chiefs of agencies although he may not be a presidential appointee. Notwithstan ding
such an exemption, if the election registrars of the various municipalities all throughout the
country, who occassionaly work more than ordinary eight-hours on the last day of the registration
or on lection day, are keeping and submitting the daily time records to the main office in Manila,
it may be only to the sake of adminstrative procedural convenience or as a matter of practice,
but by reason of strict legal obligation.
On the main point, assuming, however, that petitioner is under strict legal obligation to keep and
submit the daily time records, We are definitely inclined to the view that the alleged false entries
made in the time records on the specified dates contained in the information do not constitute
falsification for having been made with no malice or deliberate intent. Noteworthy is the fact that
petitioner consistently did not dispute, but admitted in all candor her appearances in six (6)
different ways, on March 15, March 23, May 28, June 22, July 13,, all in 1973 before the Court of
First Instance, Branch XIV, Rosales, Pangasinan, in the aforementiones cases, claiming that she
did not reflect this absences in her daily time records because they were for few minuteduration, the longest was on March 15, 1973 being for forty-five (45) minutes; they could be
absorbed within the allowed coffee breaks of 30 minutes in the morning and in the afternoon;
that as Chief of Office, and all Election Registrars of the COMELEC for that matter, she is
allowed to have one (1) day leave during week days provided she worked on a Saturday: and
that her brief absences did not in any way interfere with or interrupt her official duties as an
Election Registrar. Above all, petitioner categorically emphasized that her appearances in court
were duly authorized by the COMELEC, which in certain instances were as counsel de oficio,
and no remuneration whatsoever from her clients was received by her,
Finding that the justifications claimed by Beradio as unavailing, the Court of Appeals ruled that
her various appearances in court were not on official business, and the permission granted her
by the COMELEC was to appear in behalf of her relatives, and she was still obligated to reflect
in her daily time records only the hours when she was actually in the office. 9
We are not convinced. The Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, in Rosales, Pangasinan, is only
two (2) meters from her own office as Election Registrar in the said municipality. She had
standing authority to act as de oficio counsel given by the COMELEC evidently in furtherance of
the free legal aid service program of the Integrated Bar, and an Identical policy of the
Government itself, 10 especially as COMELEC lawyers, before any election had been held during
the regime of martial law, did not have much office work to keep them busy. This state of virtual
absence of electoral activities is what prompted COMELEC to authorize its lawyers to take
active part in the free legal aid program above adverted to, if to do so would not unduly interfere
with their work. In recognition of the long standing policy of the COMELEC in response to the
legal aid program of the Government 11 and the "free access to the courts" provision of the 1973
Constitution, 12 the COMELEC, by Resolution No. 1401, 13 formally created the Legal Assistance
Office thereby constituting all COMELEC lawyers with rank of division chief and below as
COMELEC Legal Assistance Officers. Even prior to the formal creation of the Legal Assistance

Office, the liberal policy of the COMELEC in allowing its Election Registrars to act as counsel in
areas where there are no lawyers available is, indeed, laudable.
Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the instant case, no criminal intent to commit the
crime with which she is charged can be imputed against the petitioner. In the information, it was
alleged that the petitioner was not in her office for the full office hours from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00
noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the specified dates therein as she was then busy
attending her cases in court. On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution belies its
allegation of the wholeday absence in office as Election Registrar. Records reveal that petitioner
had stayed in court for only 5, 30, 40 or 45 minutes a day for her appearances therein, at no
instance exceeding one (1) hours.
If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the six days in question making it appear that she
attended her office from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. there is more
than color of truth in the entry made. It is not shown that she did not report first to her office as
Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, before going to the courtroom just two (2) meters
away. Petitioner thus likened her appearance to going out for the usual coffee breaks. The
comparison is not even apt for during the while she appeared in court, she was rendering
service more, if not wholly, for the public good, than just for her own well-being as when she
goes out for snack during the coffee-break period. The court being only two (2) meters away
from her office, she did not even have to go so far as when one goes out for snack. What is
more, everytime she appeared in court, she surely must have made this fact officially of record in
the court proceedings, something which is not done with leaving the office room for coffee
breaks. In fine, the entries in petitioner's daily time records were not absolutely false. The
alleged false entry may be said to have a color of truth, not a downright and willful falsehood
which alone would constitute falsification as a crime. 14 As Cuello Calon stated: "La mera
inexacted tio es bastante para integrar este delito(Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal 6th Ed. Vol. 11,
p. 216, cited in People vs. Villena, et al., 51 O.G. 5691; People vs. La Corte, CA-G. R. No.
05818-CR; U.S. vs. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518)."
In thus preparing her daily time record the way she did, it was evidently in her belief in her belief
that she was just making of record the fact that, as was her honest opinion, she was entitled to
receive her full pay even for those days she appeared in court, rendering what she felt was no
less a public service, being in furtherance of a public policy on free legal assistance. As a lawyer,
and as in officer of the court, she, for one, aids in the administration of justice, oathbound
servant of society whose duty is not solely for the benefit of her clients but for the public,
particularly in the administration of justice. The court a quo itself recognize, that the COMELEC
registrars, at that time, are directed to appear as counsel de oficio when there are no lawyers to
represent the parties in litigation. 15 If petitioner is not at all appointed as counsel de oficio strictly
in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, it is an undisputed fact, as reflected in
court records, that petitioner, true to her oath, acted as counsel in certain cases. On this point, if
one fills up his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis of the time so indicated therein,
she is merely making an honest claim for the pay corresponding to the time so indicated, no
intent to commit the crime of falsification of public document can be ascribed to her. In the case
of the herein petitioner, she was only submitting a time record she knew would be the basis for
computing the pay she honestly felt she deserved for the period indicated. Indeed, the time
record is required primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of serving as basis for the determination
of the amount of pay an employee is entitled to receive for a given period.
Further, on the issue of malus animus or criminal intent, it was ruled by the court a quo,
confirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals, that in falsification of public document, in
contradistinction to private document, the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is
unnecessary, for, what is penalized is the undermining or infringement of the public faith and the
violation of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, invoking the case of People vs. Po Giok Te,
96 Phil. 918. Arguing against this ruling, petitioner cited the case of People us. Pacana, 47 Phil.
48, which the ponente in the instant case upheld in the case of People vs. Motus, CA-G.R. No.

18267-CR when he was in the Court of Appeals, that although the Idea of gain or the intent to
injure a third person is unnecessary, htis Court emphasized that "it must, nevertheless, be borne
in mind that the change in th epublic document must be such as to affect the integrity of the
same or change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or
change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could not
exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by Article 1
(now Article 3) of the Penal Code.
We find the petitioner's stand tenable. the evident purpose of requiring government employees
to keep time record is to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly.
Closely adhering tot he policy of no work no pay, a daily time record is primarily, if not solely,
intended to prevent damage or loss tot he government as would result in instances where it pays
an employee for no work done. The integrity of the daily time record as an official document,
however, remains untarnished if the damages sought to be prevented has not been produced.
As this ponente observed in the case of People v. Motus, supra while it is true that a time record
is an official document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as
when it does not cause damage to the government. It may be different in the case of a public
document with continuing interest affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that
document is falsified where the truth is necessary for the safeguard and protection of that
general interest. In the instant case, the time records have already served their purpose. They
have not caused any damage to the government or third person because under the facts duly
proven, petitioner may be said to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper
permission from her superiors. They may now even be condemned as having no more use to
require their continued safe- keeping. Public interest has not been harmed by their contents, and
continuing faith in their verity is not affected.
As pointed out, the obligation to make entries in the daily time records of officers and employees
in the Government service is a matter of administrative procedural convenience in the
computation of salary for a given period, characteristically, not an outright and strict measure of
professional discipline, efficiency, dedication, honestly and competence.
Under the proven and admitted facts, petitioner-appellant surely is entitled to receive the pay as
if she had stayed in her office the whole period covered by the official hours prescribed. ,She
had perhaps made herself even more useful in the general benefit of the public than if she had
remained practically Idle in her office as Election Registrar with perhaps no work at all to attend
to, its is generally the case long before elections take place, specially during the martial law
regime. The COMELEC must have been fully cognizant of the legal implications of the peculiar
facts and circumstances that obtained in this case, when it gave petitioner full clearance after
she presented her resignation when an administrative charge was filed against her by the same
complainant as in the criminal charge. The courts, in the present criminal prosecution, should do
no less. It would be too harsh and cruel for the courts to punish petitioner not only with
imprisonment but with general disqualification and possible disbarment, for an act or omission
which she performed or failed to perform without any criminal intent. Such an insignificant
transgression, if ever it is one, would not beam the scales of justice against the petitioner, for
courts must always be, as they are, the repositories of fairness and justice. It is inconceivable
that a person who, without any attempt to conceal her appearances in court for this is a matter
always made officially of record in the court proceedings, emphatically, not for his own private
gain, but animated by the zeal of service not wanting in public benefit, and as an officer of the
court, petitioner could have acted with a deliberate criminal intent. Moreover, what she stated in
her daily time record, as earlier observed, had more than a mere color of truth to exclude such
act from the pale of the criminal offense of falsification of public document with which she is
charged.
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of petitioner not to have been established beyond reasonable
doubt, the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent court in affirming that of the trial court
is hereby reversed, and petitioner, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22, 1982

PILAR S. LUAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 22414-16 CR which
affirmed the decision of The Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch X, convicting the petitioner
of three counts of falsification of commercial documents in Criminal Cases Nos. 599, 600 and
601.
The facts are stated in the poorly written decision of the Court of Appeals thus:
Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district office of Laoang II, Northern Samar,
died at the G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
January 24, 1972 after he was confined in said hospital since January 3, 1972.
Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased's salary warrants
[Exhibits A (599), A (600) and A (601)] to the Superintendent of schools at Catarman
Northern Samar who in turn forwarded them to the District Supervisor, Florencio
Guillermo. A payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks.
The paychecks delivered, Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registers
certifying that on his official oath, each employee whose name appeared on the rolls
had received the salary warrant indicated opposite his name on February 7, 1972,
February 17, 1972 and February 25, 1972, respectively, and returned the same to
Jose Figueroa, the District Administrative Officer of Northern Samar.
Exhibit A (599) was personally received by Pilar S. Luague, while Exhibit A (600) was
received by Glen S. Luague. Exhibit A (601) was received by Edmundo Echano, a
relative of Iliuminado Luague and who claimed to be employed in the Office of the
District Supervisor.
Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he asked appellant to
return the treasury warrants issued in the name of her husband Iluminado Luague,
further claiming that appellant promised to do so, but actually did not. Upon the receipt
of the xerox copies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of Public Schools, Guillermo
discovered that the treasury warrants in question had been encashed by appellant
and Glen Luague with different local stores at Laoang. Exhibit A (599) was cleared on
February 22, 1972, while Exhibit A (600) was deposited to the account of a certain Lee
and/or Nicol Chu, Jr. at Philippine Bank of Communications; and Exhibit A (601) was
deposited to the account of Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. Appellant admitted
having endorsed the treasury warrants by means of which she was able to encash the
same.

For signing the name of her husband Iluminado Luague as payee on three treasury
warrants for purposes of endorsement, appellant stands charged with the crime of
Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. [Note: The appellant was charged
with three counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial document but was
convicted of falsification only.]
It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well as in the Court of Appeals that she acted in
good faith or had no criminal intent when she cashed her deceased husband's paychecks. As
stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals:
Appellant puts up the defense of good faith in signing theme of her deceased husband
in the treasury warrants in question.
Her version: The late Iluminado Luague was on leave from January 3 to February 9,
1972, as evidenced by his approved application for sick leave. On January 23, 1972,
the Principal, Jose Infante, while visiting Iluminado Luague in the hospital, handed to
Luague a check representing his differentials. Luague in turn handed over the check
to his wife, the herein appellant, who was then present. Before Infante left, he
informed the Luague spouses that Luague's pay check for the second half of January
1972 had arrived and advised Mrs. Luague to get the same from Florencio Guillermo
so that she could use it to pay for medicine and hospital expenses of her husband.
Iluminado Luague instructed her [his (sic)] wife to get the check from Florencio
Guillermo. Appellant went to the house of Guillermo in the afternoon of January 23,
1972. Guillermo asked her to sign the name of her husband on the payroll warrant
register and counter-sign with her initials. Guillermo then handed her the treasury
warrant [Exhibit A (599)].
Iluminado Luague died on January 24, 1972. From the proceeds of the warrants they
received were paid the amount the Luague family owed the drugstores owned by
Amor Carandang, Purisima Saba and Luz Tan. A treasury warrant was also paid to
Edward Kam from whom they bought construction materials for the tomb of the
deceased and to Ong Kiat store for the payment of materials used for the coffin of the
late Iluminado Luague which were purchased on credit.
Upon the instruction of Amor Carandang and on her belief and upon suggestion of
Florencio Guillermo himself that the warrants could be used to settle their financial
obligations incurred by the hospitalization and death of her late husband, appellant
indorsed the said treasury warrants by signing the name of Iluminado Luague.
Heirs of deceased government employees are entitled to whatever unpaid salaries the
deceased employee failed to receive. Appellant claims that it was upon this honest
belief that she endorsed the treasury warrants of her late husband to defray for the
necessary expenses incurred due to the latter's hospitalization, funeral and burial.
The Court of Appeals did not reject the petitioner's version, except in respect of the date when
the first paycheck was delivered. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
followed the simplistic procedure of applying literally the letter of the law, namely: there was

falsification because the petitioner "signed her husband's name in indorsing the treasury
warrants in question." The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts: That
the petitioner signed her husband's name to the checks because they were delivered to her by
no less than her husband's district supervisor long after the husband's death which was known
to the supervisor; that she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her
husband's last illness and his burial; and that she believed that she was entitled to the money as
an advance payment for her husband's vacation and sick leave credits the money value of which
exceeded the value of the checks. In the fight of these circumstances, We cannot ascribe
criminal intent to the petitioner. We sustain her claim that she acted in good faith.
During the hearing, it was brought out that the government did not sustain any financial loss due
to the encashment of the checks because the petitioner's husband had accumulated vacation
and sick leaves the money value of which exceeded the value of the three paychecks and the
value of the checks was simply deducted from the money value of the leaves. This explains why
the petitioner was not convicted of estafa but of falsification only. While we do not mean to imply
that if there is no damage there can be no falsification, We do say that the absence of damage is
an element to be considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent.
We notice here the lack of compassion on the part of the prosecuting fiscal, the trial judge, and
the Court of Appeals. Even the Solicitor General who is alert in seeking to correct improper
convictions by trial courts has somehow misappreciated the evidence in this case.
The accused is a poor widow who was obviously in a state of bewilderment due to the recent
death of her husband when she cashed the paychecks. She was also in dire need of money to
settle the expenses for her husband's last illness and his burial. A compassionate attitude
repeatedly urged by the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, would have been highly in order
under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed;
the petitioner is acquitted of the charges against her. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-67472

July 3, 1987

DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Under separate informations both dated September 20, 1982, the Office of the Tanodbayan
charges Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez on two (2) counts, with the
crime of Falsification of Official Documents allegedly committed in the following manner:
(1) Criminal Case No. 6529
That on or about March 29, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and
Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, both public officers being then employed as Securities
Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or controlled corporation,
conspiring together, taking advantage of their official position and committing the crime
herein charged in relation to their Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify ... Securities Delivery Receipt dated March 9, 1982 ... evidencing,
among others, receipt by them in their official capacity of Treasury Bills bearing Serial
No. A-000064 up to A000082 of the 795th series, by then and there making alterations
and/or intercalations thereon to the effect that only treasury bills bearing SN-A-000064
to A-000076 were received by them on March 9, 1982, for the purpose of hiding or
concealing the loss while in their custody of six (6) treasury bills bearing SN-A-000077
to A-000082 of the 795th series, thereby changing the meaning of said Securities
Delivery Receipt.
(2) Criminal Case No. 6938
That on or about March 30, 1982 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and
Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, both public officers, being then employed as Securities
Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or controlled corporation,
conspiring together, and taking advantage of their official positions and committing the
crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify the Daily Report of Securities/Documents under custody dated
March 30, 1982, which is an official document evidencing the securities transactions
and/or operations of the Makati Branch of the aforenamed bank, and which it was their
official duty to prepare and submit to their superiors, by then and there indicating in
said document, for the purpose of hiding the loss or disappearance while in their
custody of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series, with face value of P500,000.00
each, that the beginning balance of securities under their custody as to volume was
1,533 pieces, when, the ending balance as to volume in the previous day's report was
1,539 pieces and that the beginning balance as to face value in the previous day's
report was P610,095,000.00 and thereafter falsely stating in the footnote of the same

document that the reduction was due to "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming)
dated 3/09/82" the truth being that the six (6) pieces of treasury bills with aggregate
face value of P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously entered in either the Securities
Delivery Receipt or the Daily Report of Securities /Documents under Custody, both
dated March 9, 1982, but were discovered to have been missing after an inventory
conducted by accused on March 20, 1982, thereby making an untruthful statement in
a narration of facts in violation of par. 4 of Articles 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in both cases, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 6529 ACQUITTING the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and
Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio and ordering their bail bonds in the
said case cancelled.
2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:
a) Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of Falsification of a Public or Official
Document defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph No. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances;
and applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
b) ACQUITTING accused Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio,
an ordering his bail bond cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
The instant petition is an appeal, interposed by herein petitioner Dario Cabigas y
Cacho from the foregoing decision in Criminal Case No. 6938.
The following pertinent facts are not disputed: Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the
Securities Custodian of the Securities Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines
assigned to its branch at Makati, Metro Manila. Assisting him in his work is Benedicto
Reynes, the securities receiving clerk. The Fund Management Department (FMD) of
the Land Bank of the Philippines is engaged in money market and securities trading
transactions. The securities which are in the form of treasury notes and bills are in turn
deposited with the Securities Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati
Branch.
On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department, delivered to the Securities
Section, Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines, for safekeeping, 112

pieces of treasury notes and treasury bills worth P46,000,000.00 and for which a copy
of the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) Exh. D, was issued to the Fund Management
Dept. while the original of the same was retained by the Securities Section. Included
in the securities received on March 9, 1982 are 19 pieces of treasury bills with Serial
Nos. A-000064 to A-000082, 795th series, in the denomination of P500,000.00 each,
or a total amount of P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities, the accused would
prepare the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC)
evidencing the securities transactions and operations of the Makati Branch of the
Land Bank of the Philippines. This has been the routine procedure being adopted by
the accused in the performance of his duty as a Security Custodian.

acquitted in Criminal Case No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho was
convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938, while his co-accused was acquitted therein.
In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho, the Sandiganbayan stated in its now
assailed Decision that

On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury notes and bills
deposited with them, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six (6) treasury bills
of the 795th series with a total value of P3,000,000.00. Upon verification that
Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) dated March 9, 1982, Exhibit C, was the source
document of the missing securities which were delivered to them for safekeeping,
accused Reynes crossed out with a red ink in the said document the last two digits
"82" and the addition after them of the figure "76" on the serial numbers A-000064 to
A-000082 of the 19 treasury bills of the 795th series with a total maturity value of
P9,500,000.00. Then at the bottom of the SDR Cabigas placed the notation "For
adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82." Then upon Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes
reported the incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram When the DR SDUC for
March 29, 1982 was prepared, the number of treasury bills of the 795th series stood
at 1,539 pieces with a total face value of P610,095,000.00.

In the case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under

Custody (DR SDUC) for March 30, 1982, the alleged falsification consists of
the following entries (figures) pertaining to treasury bills: "1,533",
"607,095,000.00", "1,533 and 607,095,000.00 "marked on the document as
Exhibit G-1, and the legend of the asterisk (*) sign at the bottom portion
reading, "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" marked
as Exhibit G-2. The numbers "1,533" and "607,095,000.00" represent the
volume and the total face/maturity value, respectively, of the treasury bills
supposedly in the custody of the Securities Section as of March 30, 1982.
Those entries were falsifications, the prosecution maintains, because the
correct number of treasury bills deposited with the Securities Section as of
that date was 1,539 valued at P610,095,000.00; that the said figures were
altered to "1,533 and 607,095,000.00," respectively, to conceal the loss or
disappearance of 6 treasury bills worth P3,000,000.00, and that the footnote
at the bottom portion of the document (Exh. G-2) was written to attribute the
reduction in the number of treasury bills from "1,539" to "1,533" to mistake
or error in the entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982
(Exh. C).

The following day, Reynes prepared a draft report for March 30, 1982 by Carrying
forward the ending balance of the treasury bills of the 795th series reflected in the DR
SDUC dated March 29, 1982. However, instead of following the draft prepared by
Reynes, Cabigas prepared his own report-DR SDUC (Exh. "G ") dated March 30,
1982 wherein he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills of the 795th series with a total
amount of P607,095,000.00 which the latter claimed to be the number of securities of
the 795th series in his possession at the time of the preparation of said report. At the
bottom of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas place the notation "Adjustment on Erroneous
Entry (incoming) dated March 9, 1982" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign which
appears after the figure "1,533."

The discrepancy in the figures is indeed apparent. In the DR SDUC for

March 29, 1982 (Exh. F), the ending balance on the number of treasury bills
at the close of office hours on that day was 1,539 pieces with a total
face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00 (Exh. F-1). Accordingly, the
beginning balance on the number of the same treasury bills on the following
day, March 30, 1982, must also be 1,539 pieces with a total face/Maturity
value of P610,095,000.00. But as it was made to appear in the DR SDUC
for March 30, 1982 (Exhs. G and G-1), the beginning and ending balances
on the number and value of treasury bills for that date were 1,533 pieces
and P607,095,000.00 maturity value.1avvphi1

On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the
Central Bank of the Philippines a treasury bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A000082 in the amount of P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was
discovered that the Land Bank of the Philippines Makati Branch Manager, Aurora
Pigram was the one who negotiated the said treasury bill with the Gainsbo
Commodities. Further investigation revealed that the five (5) missing treasury bills with
series numbers A-000077 to A-000081 were negotiated by Pigram with the Home
Savings Bank to secure a loan. The Land Bank immediately sought the assistance of
the NBI in investigating the case. On May 24, 1982, Cabigas and Reynes were
investigated by NBI agents. After the investigation, Cabigas and Reynes were arrested
for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying the Securities Delivery Receipt
(SDR) dated March 9, 1982 (Exh. "C") and the Daily Report on Securities/Documents
under custody (DR SDUC) Exh. G dated March 30, 1982 and for which the
corresponding informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Both accused were

The question now is, who caused the alterations and what was caused the
alteration and what was the purpose behind them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

By changing the original figures in the draft of the DR SDUC from "1,539"
and "610" to "1,533" and "607" respectively, and causing Reynes to type the
final copy of the DR SDUC on the basis of the corrected draft Cabigas
caused the document to show that the treasury bills in their custody as of
March 30, 1982 were 1,533 pieces with a total face/maturity value of
P607,095,000.00. By placing, likewise, an asterisk (*) sign after the figure
"1,533" and writing the words "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming)
dated 3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign, Cabigas caused to make it

appear that the discrepancy of 6 treasury bills valued at P3,000,000.00 was

due to error in the entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9,
1982(Exh. C). Considering that the said SDR of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C) did
not contain any error but reflected the number of securities received by
them on that day, it is obvious that Cabigas made the alterations in Exhibit
G and the misleading footnote (Exh. G-2) in order to suppress, hide or
conceal the fact that the 6 treasury bills comprising the discrepancy were
lost while in their custody.
The alterations amounted to falsification of Exhibit G, a public or official
document, under paragraph No. 4, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code,
by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. As Securities
Custodian, Cabigas was under obligation to disclose in the said document
the correct number and total maturity value of the securities under his
official custody as of March 30, 1982.
It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par. No. 4 of Article
171, which reads-"by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts,"-the
following elements must concur(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts;

therefore, was not under "legal obligation" to disclose in the DR SDUC or SDR, the
correct number and total maturity value of the securities under their official custody as
of a given date. It is purely optional on the part of petitioner to use the said forms.
The Honorable Solicitor General recommends that the accused be acquitted because

There is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982, Exh. G, for the alleged
falsification of which petitioner was convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the
submission of which was or is required by law. In the petition for review, petitioner
points out that as testified by him the form was not an official form of the Land Bank.
The form was his own initiative adopted "for our own convenience and also for
reference purposes." Petitioner therefore, was not under legal obligation to disclose or
reveal the truth by said DR SDUC. In the absence of such obligation and of the
alleged wrongful intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime of
falsification of public document with which he is charged. (People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil.
333).
WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 6938 is hereby REVERSED and another one rendered ACQUITTING the petitioner,
Dario Cabigas y Cacho.
Cost de oficio.

(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him;
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
(d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not present in the case at
bar. The correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the actual
number of treasury under custody is not falsification because it was made to speak
the truth (US vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324). The placing of an asterisk (*) sign after the
figure "1,533" and writing the words, "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated
3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk sign, contrary to the ruling of the respondent court,
was not effected to hide or conceal the fact that the missing 6 treasury bills were lost.
It would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if there was no asterisk or
footnote in the DR SDUC Exh. G. In fact, the evidence discloses that immediately
upon discovery of the loss on March 29, 1982, petitioner reported the matter to his
immediate supervisor, Estela L. Espiritu and Branch Manager of the Securities
Section, Aurora Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of motive on the part of
petitioner to conceal the said loss.
Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report on Securities/Documents under
Custody (DR SDUC) is a form purely devised and adopted by him. This form was
never required, neither was it introduced nor prescribed by the Land Bank. Petitioner,

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN
SAMSON anddefendant-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969
Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson
y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio
Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in
order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend
"ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is
supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's
representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a
certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the
expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not
signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works
projects.
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is
signed by the provincial engineer.
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and
funds being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.
Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February
28, 1969, reads:
I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount
of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in
check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.
This is signed by the auditor.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in
the provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and
is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer
signs two part of the voucher.

Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As
accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan
Samson, a point which is disputed by him):
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of
Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in
full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by
Check No. .................................
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below
the stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences
the payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber
and hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the
Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher
makes reference to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co
The alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company
to the provincial government
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher
(RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma
the signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer;
Rodolfo P. Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer,
and Ricardo B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied
that their signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved:
For and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not
the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18,
1969, containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is
fake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the
company's invoice No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla
denied that his alleged signature on Exhibit B is his signature.

(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged.
Those documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is
due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of
lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso
P. Martinez, a district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures.

The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber
and hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake
official receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7)
bearing the serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions
with the provincial government.

(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature
on the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).

Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee
of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the
provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He
represented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial
engineer and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the
employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).

The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.

Other five forged voucher. Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of
certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials
supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the
following:
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81 for
number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the
Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge
at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at
the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at
the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).

The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were handcarried by Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the
provincial engineer's office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a
laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded
Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the
upper lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the
provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him,
Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for
processing and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW).
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He
asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).

(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at
the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).

Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the
voucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office
where the amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of
by check) as representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the
payments on March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face
of the vouchers.

As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that
their signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who handcarried the said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the
papers supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those
supporting papers could not be presented in evidence.

The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly
authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's
defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the
provincial office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and
approved by the auditor.

Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co.,
testified that the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never
delivered by his company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the
said vouchers were cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The
projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious.

Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that
he received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber
and hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s
treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are
genuine.

In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with
malversation through falsification in three docketed as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February
28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871
dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28,
P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L33253.
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29,
1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson
guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the
following penalties:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and twentyone days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to
indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in the
same amount; and
(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twentyone days of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to
indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount.
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed.
Death extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing
Sendaydiego's appeal read s follows:
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the
judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and
executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the
personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary
penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67
SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower
court had issued an order of attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum
of P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific assignment of error
affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is
directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the
decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly
appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the
deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17,
Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten
children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida,
Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased).
The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto the
following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which
is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be
liable.

Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not
necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition
of reclusion perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no
complex crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private
prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the
accused to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the
prosecution of the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to
the termination of the trial on July 29, 1970.
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor
inquired whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor
in representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that
there was a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he
had authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private
prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of
Criminal Case No. 23350).
After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of
Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all
dated November 4, 1969.
At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial
fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal
moved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to
our (the fiscal's) control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to
examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted the
motion (155 tsn).
The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal
were present together with the private prosecutor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the
rule that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal"
and that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules
of Court; sec. 1683, Revised Administrative Code).

The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have
been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the
proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its
impartiality. The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative
value of the documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which
the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction.
Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the
propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion
perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's
conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation
through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers,
evinced "malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the
assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial
to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual
procedure because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached
Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete
to initial the voucher because it was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had
already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court
erred in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in
them. After the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial
(75 tsn July 3, 1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the
amounts covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the
symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The
bookkeeper was in. instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he
(Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be made
in cas. There were instances when the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other
than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where
the cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE).
As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's
office when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the
Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the
vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were
received, was blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or
to require the exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.

Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would
have been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the
payments had been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would
have returned them to the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any
payments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with
Samson.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the
provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were
paid to Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by
Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the
payments were made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was started.
On May 27, 1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial ,
stating that he paid to Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal
and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13).
Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the
treasurers inner office because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was
about fifteen meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers
office because the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier
came out of the treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation
is a crime which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is
the same). This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by
the prosecution show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing
the six questioned vouchers.
The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the
auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that
contention because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its
evidence against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice,
whereas, the treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the
undeniable fact that the treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment"
before they were passed upon by the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's
certification which the auditor apparently assumed to have been made in good faith when in
truth it was made in bad faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an
unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability
was established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the
amounts malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal. Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court
erred in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his
signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in
relying on circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.

As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself
"in fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he
had conducted the preliminary investigation.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced
by the fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the
case and convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show
that he had already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a
preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable
cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The
rule assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try
the case on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they
would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and
then tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a
preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after
terminating the preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to remand the case to
the Court of First Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits
(People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88
Phil. 196). The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained bias or
undue prejudice.
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the
Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not
his signatures.
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars)
of Samson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures
and the exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20).
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and
contentions of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the
trial court) there are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.
But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in
implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in
his residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried
Construction Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname
Samson is encircled.

On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial
government are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures
terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.

As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the
trial court made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and
Sendaydiego, is not correct.

Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious
transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his
signature in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of
the Carried Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were
received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms
of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970).

We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that
Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or
fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and
Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner
office, instead of in the cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The
trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with
Samson (Ibid, p. 26).

Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as
and when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts,
pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers
were Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the
vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the
supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to
the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office
for payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is
presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material
author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents
was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to
have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and
therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45
Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs.
Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged
document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals,
L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30
SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial
government and another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the
deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the
certification in the first voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers,
Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).

Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of
the vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong
circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers).
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid
under the six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are
genuine (although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no
proof that the amounts covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in
the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant
manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in
the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the
carried Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds
of the six vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from
Sendaydiego. The six vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious
sales of construction materials.
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after
Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from
Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is
based on a shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not
correct.
Recapitulations. In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his
exculpation on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the
provincial engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had
approved the vouchers. The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the
payments of the proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier,
Carried Construction Co.

On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he
received the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office.

The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single
criminal impulse.

These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the
inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing
in the offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers
and denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.

Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes
six separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).

The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts
(Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith
or having committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the
provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which
have some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were
intrinsically fake.

And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes

of malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve
offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in
possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies from the
provincial treasurer.

Penalties. The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.

He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial
treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person
conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and
Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).

The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and
malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act
constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to
commit malversation.

Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of
parricide or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft
but only of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3,
article 62 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).

In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the
falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil.
671; People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).

Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of

the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
of not more than P5,000.

In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal
treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some
persons worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the
two amounts covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from
the municipal funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project and
the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex
crime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations.
Each falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be
punished separately.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct
penalties were imposed.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road
and bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The
falsification was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers
Nos. 11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the
Revised Penal Code is prision mayorminimum and medium.
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers
Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided
in paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the
imprisonment penalty.
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no
modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an
indeterminate sentence.

WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six
crimes of malversation.

twelve (12) years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six
(36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs. Peas, 68 Phil. 533).

In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties:

The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of
art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69
Phil. 58).

For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four
(4) years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand
pesos.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in
the amount of P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252).
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in
the sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254).
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson
is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum,
to thirteen (13) years ofreclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60,
and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38,
and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L33253).

The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan
in the sum of P57,048.23.
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal
Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989
MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan,
Isabela, of the crime of falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:
That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela,
and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian,
being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such
Municipal Mayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign a false
document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An official communication to the Civil Service
Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by law in order to support the appointment
of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary
which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and making it appear in said document that there
was such a position existing and that funds therefore were available. When in truth and in fact,
as said accused well-know (sic), there was no such position or item and no funds were available
for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, nor was there any special
ordinance creating said position and appropriating the necessary funds therefor.
xxx
[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article
70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning
that the maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the case
ensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:

It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single
and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the
Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of the
Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if
there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she went to see the accused in
his house.
The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the
Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the
accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should be
included in the budget. The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed that she could report for work.
One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was
there. When she went to the accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to
work for her appointment papers.
She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on
July 1, 1975 by the accused.
xxx
Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds CS
Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the
requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of
Civil Service, Manila (Exh. "C").

In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year
1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the
Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of the
Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 19741975, was filled up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G.
Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to
the office of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the
appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4").
As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was
appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K" and "K-l").
xxx
[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]
After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and decreed:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public document as charged in the information, the Court hereby
sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS
of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

xxx
Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work
on the same day. Her monthly salary was P 120.00. She rendered services for the months of
July, August, September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5").
She was not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to
receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went
to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who
told her that there was no money. because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at
the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her unpaid salaries.
She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her
if she had complete appointment papers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April
20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit
"G" and "G-1").
It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to
enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and
"H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year
1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for
the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 19751976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is
hereby therefore affirmed. Costs against the accused- appellant.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]
Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner
Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a question of
substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of the trial court
convicting him of the crime of falsification despite the following
A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness,
shows the absence of criminal intent on the part of the accused.
B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor
when he made the allegedly falsified certification.
C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a
conclusion of law.

D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded
with the trial in his absence despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme
Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]

In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position
and funds therefor referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided
by the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41).

Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.

It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal
year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan,
Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal
Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was
appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year
1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly false.
The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made in the document is met when there exists
not even an iota of colorable truth in what is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10
Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third
requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.

The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by "any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making
untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification,
the following requisites must concur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No.
67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.
All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then
the mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the
narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the
appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public
official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil.
765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the
certification was addressed received the document issued by petitioner. Since the certification
was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the government
(specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with
the character of a public document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209
(1908)] falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here,
falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were
available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality,
the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor.
Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but
rather a conclusion of law is not meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor
General's arguments, correctly ruled as follows:
Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning
from a fact or combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the
facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362].
From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that
'funds for the position are available' does not require the application of the artificial rules of
law. To certify that funds are available for the position what one should do was (sic) to refer to
the budget and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item
exists and funds are allocated therefor.

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and
regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original
Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be
filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the
authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification which is designated as
Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as to the availability
of the funds for the position being filled up.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not
necessary when the falsified document is a public document. This has already been
authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court
in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to
injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document.
The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents
has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official documents,
whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the Idea of
gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v.
Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling
consideration is the public character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to
third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial [People v.
Pacana, supra].
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the
absence of criminal intent on his part must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith
as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to exonerate
the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at
bar.

Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela
presides at all meetings of the municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code]
and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council [Section 2624 (c),
Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for the
Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which
was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was reenacted and (2) that under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no
funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge of these
facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of
these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1"
and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of
the availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he issued such certification
on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already commenced and no new ordinance
creating the new position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the
municipal council.
In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of
issuing the absolutely false certification as to the availability of funds for the subject position. The
law considers his act criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement in a narration of facts
in a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will to
commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the
law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In
this case, the presumption that petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose
from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.
Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in
falsifying the document should likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a
public document by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the
influences prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v.
Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender
falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or
preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil.
376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was
charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa
Carreon.

It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice
but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035,
December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion to determine
whether an accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due process of law:
. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and
proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished
after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law,
then he has had due process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875,
October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73
(1946); Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present
evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the
trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to be
present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right to
adduce evidence on his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]
It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the
date set for the hearing of the petitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial
court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to appear
[See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one
of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial court that he was - withdrawing as
counsel for his client for the reason that he has lost contact with the latter who already went
abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its
decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the
same is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded
with the trial of the case in the absence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of
venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful and thorough review of the record
reveals that petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court, in view of the
absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the defense to present its evidence
although the prosecution had rested its case as early as December 7, 1978. [ See Original
Records, p. 253, et seq.]
[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.] 192 SCRA 521

REGALADO, J.:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON

and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered by Judge Manuel
Castaeda on January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, and the order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976 by his
successor, the herein public respondent, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order of dismissal.

Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo
Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary
Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful
attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the
People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney,
and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the
special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of
Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964.:- nad
After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having been
paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon
Serafica and Vileta Quinto who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said
property. In January, 1972, complainant allegedly discovered that their property was already
registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for
the ejectment of the former from the premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public document
was filed against private respondent in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the
information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a
private individual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the signature of one MARIANO F.
CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing and making it appear that the said MARIANO F.
CARRERA, signed and affixed his signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public
document, when as a matter of fact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in
anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor gave his permission, and in order to make good
the acts of falsification, with intent of gain and by means of fraud and other deceits, the said
accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified public document (Power of Attorney)
did succeed in securing the loan from the People's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of
EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the
knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other consequential damages." 2
After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial and
the prosecution presented complainant Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig from the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G.
Fernandez, a handwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the same was not continued as
counsel for private respondent moved for and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein it was alleged that the crime
charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect that he
authorized private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the land owned by him
and his brother. Said partial testimony of complainant was quoted, with the emphasized portions,
as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.
Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?
A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the reason why it was
foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to
sign a document as a witness and I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to
Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to
me, my brother said.
Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you
to sign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that land
owned by you and your brother. Do you have any document to show that?
xxx
ATTY. DIAZ:
Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the purpose of
identification, and may we request that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This
document consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as Exhibit B and
the second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable Court what is
this?
A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to sign, sir.
xxx
(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is no sufficient
basis for the charge and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more than ten (10) years had
elapsed from the time the crime was committed. Since the information charges the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall be that for the more
serious crime which shall be applied in its maximum period, as provided for by Article 48 of the
Penal Code. The more serious crime in the present case is the falsification of the public
document which is punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and
a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. Prision correccional being a correctional penalty, the same
prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the case merely alleged the
date of the commission of the crime which was February 5, 1964 and the information was filed
only on March 29, 1974. This being the case, private respondent claims that more than ten (10)
years has passed from the commission of the crime to the filing of the information. No other
allegation having been made as to the discovery of the alleged crime, private respondent
claimed that the period of prescription commenced on the day on which the crime was
committed. He asserts that, from the date appearing in the transfer certificate of title covering the
land mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage documents were duly registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1984, hence the alleged crime became public
knowledge on the same date. To support his theory, private respondent made the following
citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the crime if it
is known at the time of its commission.:-cralaw
"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered, because the entire
series of transactions was by public instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in
connection with said transaction was known to the offended party when it was committed and
the period of prescription commenced to run from the date of its commission. People v. Dinsay,

C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition
1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-712)." 5
The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that what was intended
was an authority to mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to his brother and he was only
quoting what his brother told him when he said that ". . . this is an authority to Federico de
Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my
brother said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since the date to be considered
should not be the date of registration of the alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964. It
argued that the crime was actually discovered only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica
filed an action to eject complainant from the premises, which fact was not alleged in the
information because it was considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which
would not be in accord with the legal truism that an "information must allege only ultimate facts
and not evidentiary matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent, petitioner submits that
"(t)he same has only a persuasive effect and not to be considered as an interpretation of Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code as the same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castaeda of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime
had prescribed. The People's motion for reconsideration was denied by the succeeding
Presiding Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both orders of the trial court. In
a resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court required the prosecution to file a petition for review
on Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter, said petition for review and
the corresponding comment and reply of the parties having been filed, on February 21, 1977 the
Court resolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required petitioner and private
respondent to submit their respective memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the following issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because the private respondent
would thereby be placed in double jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the private
respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact; and,
3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is already extinguished by
prescription. 11
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in People vs.
City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the
defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113).
However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the
trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with
the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed
upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the
case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant." 12
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient
basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a public document
may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized

to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent
to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by
the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to be
mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to
complainant, otherwise complainant would not have quoted his brother's words. The theory of
petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the same. We agree that the
offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant Mariano
Carrera and of the record, as regards the first ground, the court finds that the contention of the
defense that the authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not sustained by
the evidence because a cursory study of the answer made by the witness complainant clearly
shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to
Severo Carrera, excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant. (T.S.N.. pp. 8-10, hearing
on June 18, 1974). In other words, the alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get
a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera only.
This finding is based on the following quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman
to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He merely quoted his
brother Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted
by Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, the resolution of the issue on prescription is, however,
determinative of the validity of the impugned orders of public respondent.: nad
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex crime is that for the
most serious component offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In the crime of
estafa thru falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the falsification which
carries with it the correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes
punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the
Code, and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptive period commences to run "from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special power of attorney registered
in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent
to mortgage a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure
a loan of P8,500.00 from the People's Bank and Trust Company. The information for estafa thru
falsification of a public document was filed only on March 29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim
that the ten-year period commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in
January, 1972 by reason of the ejectment suit against him.
People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that registration in a public
registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as
all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of
what it contains. On these considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et
al., 16 to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public document the prescriptive period
commences from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after
the document was registered with the Register of Deeds is not without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from the
discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes annulment, in case of
mistake or fraud, within four years from the time of the discovery of the same, the Court also

held that the discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the document was
registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the
whole world and this should apply to both criminal and civil cases.: nad
We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said rule on
constructive notice in the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most
certainly be favorable to private respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of the crime
shall have to be reckoned with earlier, that is, from the time the questioned documents were
recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered on February 13, 1964.
The criminal information against private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974,
or more than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with which private respondent was charged has
indubitably prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged orders of
public respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner
Michael T. Dava, then holder of non-professional driver's license No. 1474427 1 with official
receipt No. 7023037, 2 bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas,
causing death to former and physical injuries to the latter.
As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to Mandaluyong Police headquarters
where his driver's license was confiscated by Cpl. Daniel Severino who later submitted Dava's
driver's license to the fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal. license was thereafter presented as
prosecution evidence in criminal case for homicide and serious physical injuries reckless
imprudence filed against Dava in the then Court First Instance of Rizal in Pasig. 3
On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava
driving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car with plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's
driver's license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic violation receipt had been
issued to Dava, Roxas sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in
apprehending Dava for driving without a license. 4 The Ministry of Defense later indorsed Roxas'
request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG).
At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya
of the CHPG saw the maroon Volkswagen car described by Roxas parked in front of the Uniwide
Department Store near the then Nation theater in Cubao, Quezon City. When the driver and his
companion arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted them and asked the driver for his license. They
were shown non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 5 with official receipt No.
0605870 6 issued by Agency 2L Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about
the source of his license, Dava informed them that his officemate had secured it for him.
Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame, Quezon City for questioning.
Dava refused to give a statement upon the advice of his lawyer. Lising then submitted a spot
report to Col. Maristela stating therein that "subject had violated Section 31 of RA 4136 for false
representation in the application of a driver's license intended to be used as a legal license." 7 In
his affidavit of apprehension dated November 16, 1978, Lising stated that he was 'about to book
him for violation of Section 31 of Rep. Act 4136, when subsequent investigation revealed that
the Driver's License above-mentioned is a Fake and a Falsity' and therefore a case for
falsification and use of falsified documents under Section 172 of the Revised Penal Code should
be filed against Dava. 8 Lising concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he
compared it with the xerox copy of Dava's license which was attached to the record of the
criminal case in Pasig, the signatures and the dates of birth indicated in the two licenses did "not
tally." 9

Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document was filed against Dava in the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. 10 One of the prosecution
witnesses was Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation
(BLT). He testified that hen was then the registrar of the said office when Dava's driver' license
was brought to him by lawyer Jose Francisco who was interested in knowing whether it was
genuine or fake and if was issued by the Angeles City agency of the BLT. He examine it and
found out that it was "fake or illegally issued" because form No. 2706887 was one of the fifty (50)
forms which had been reported missing from their office sometime in November, 1976 and that it
was never issued to any applicant for a license. 11 He added that any license that was not
included their office index card was considered as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally
issued by any agency." 12
Vinluan stated that although the form used for the license was genuine, 13 the signature of the
issuing official was fake. 14 He "believed" certain persons had been apprehended for
"plasticization" of licenses outside their office 15 and that sometime November, 1976, agents of
the National Bureau of Investigation raided the house of a certain person who had in his
possession some of the forms which had been missing from office. 16 He concluded that the
license was fake because the form was issued by the central office to the Angeles agency, the
license appeared on its face to have been issued the San Fernando, Pampanga agency. 17
Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then Court of Appeals 18 which
affirmed the lower court's decision on January 29, 1982. Dava filed a motion for reconsideration
of the said decision contending that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the case. On April
27, 1982, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its decision and issued a resolution the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered and set aside, and
another judgment shall be entered annulling the proceedings in the court a
quo without prejudice to the refiling of the charges with the proper court. (Rollo, pp.
35-36.)
Consequently, the case was refiled with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 47 at
San Fernando as Criminal Case No. 2422. The information for falsification of a public document
reads as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and for sometime prior thereto, in the
municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MICHAEL T. DAVA, a
private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or
cause to be falsified, a Non-Professional Driver's license with Serial No. 2706887
covered by Official Receipt No. 0605870, dated January 24, 1978, a public document,
by making it appear that the signatories therein who are officials of the Pampanga LTC
Agency participated in the preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact they did not so
participate and the accused made use of the same knowing it to be falsified.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio Roxas who testified on how he saw Dava driving
a car and that, knowing that Dava's license had been confiscated as a result of the filing of the

homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence case, he thereafter sought
the assistance of then Minister Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a license. 19 For
his part, Domingo Lising, who apprehended Dava, narrated in court how he first saw Daya
driving a car along Banahaw and N. Domingo Sts. in Quezon City until he finally confronted
Dava at the vicinity of the Araneta Coliseum and confiscated his driver's license. As earlier
stated, he conclude that the driver's license shown to him by Dava was fake because he noticed
that, when compared with the license attached to record of the criminal case filed against Dava,
the license confiscated bore a different signature and date of birth. 20
Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that he investigated the traffic
incident along Shaw Boulevard on October 19, 1975 which involved Dava and the two relatives
of Antonio Roxas. He himself confiscated Dava's no professional driver's license No. 1474427
which he later turn over to the fiscal's office. 21
In the course of Severino's testimony, the defense counsel informed the court that, upon a
resolution of the Court of Appeals, Dava was allowed by the lower court having jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 16474 to withdraw his driver's license 1474427 from the records of said
case. 22 When confronted by the court, Dava volunteered that he withdrew said license in
December, 1982 and surrendered it to the BLT Western District Office so that he could renew his
license. 23 Hence, the evidence presented before the Court was a mere xerox copy of said
license 24 which also bears a notation that Dava received original driver's license and its receipt
on December 15, 1982. 25
Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San Fernando Pampanga branch of the BLT and
whose name appears registrar thereof in official receipt No. 0605870 which was supposed to be
attached to Dava's driver's license No. 270688 admitted that the form of the said license was
genuine although he could not tell whether its contents were likewise genuine because it was
"opened" and "spliced." 26 He asserted, however, that since the said form "did not emanate" from
his office and "a facsimile was not printed" over his name, said license was "not OK". 27
Martin said that he was informed by the property section of the BLT regional office that the
number in the license was one of "the numbers requisitioned by (the) Angeles City
agency." 28 He affirmed that drivers license No. 2706887 "was not issued by (their)
agency" 29 although when recalled to the stand, he admitted that the "2L" filled in the space for
"Agency Code No." on the face of license No. 2706887 referred to the San Fernando
agency. 30 Martin also confirmed the genuineness of official receipt No. 0605870 although it was
his assistant who signed it for him 31 and affirmed that the amount of P10.00 indicated therein
had been collected and received by his office. 32
Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to the Angeles City office of the BLT to see its chief
and inquire about the number of driver's license issued to Dava and whether said office had
indeed issued them. According to him, the head of the office, Caroline Vinluan, advised him to
verify from the index card in the possession of the License Division head whether the Angeles
City agency had indeed issued Dava's license. 33 Thereafter, the officer-in-charge of the License
Division of the BLT in East Avenue, Quezon City, Leonardo R. Medina, issued a certification
dated December 24, 1979 to the effect that non-professional drivers license No. 2706887 in the
name of Dava was "not registered in (their) Index Card." 34

Francisco also informed the court that Carolino Vinluan, the former head of the Angeles City BLT
agency, had died on May 12, 1980. 35 He offered in evidence Vinluan's death certificate as Exh.
J.
Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimony of Carolino Vinluan which was taken on January 8, 1980 at the trial of Criminal Case
No. Q-10759 before the then Court of First Instance Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. It was
marked as Exh. K said exhibit was part of the record of Criminal Case No. 10759 which was
transmitted to the Regional Trial Court Pampanga. 36
The defense presented only one witness: Felizardo Manalili. A friend of Dava and his former cotrainee at the Sandoz Philippines, a pharmaceutical firm, Manalili testified that Dava quested him
to secure a driver's license for him because he had none. Manalili went to the San Fernando
office of the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) where he used to secure own license. At the
LTC branch office, he was "approached" 37 the fixers who roamed around the compound. When
he as them how much it would cost to secure a driver's license, he told that it would amount to
P70 .00. 38 He agreed to pay amount and gave the fixers the personal data of Dava. 39
After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the license which was inside a plastic jacket. (Manalili
identified the license as Exh. B.) He examined it and found out that it looked "like a genuine and
authentic driver's license" to him. The license, which opened and unsealed, bore a signature in
the portion which showed the name Romeo Edu and contained all the personal data of Dava.
Because it did not bear the signature of Dava Manalili immediately gave the license to Dava and
told him to sign it immediately. Dava did so in Manalili's presence. 40
On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a decision 41 finding that the license in question
was "fake or spurious", that was not duly issued by any proper government licensing age and
that the accused directly participated in the commission of the falsification or caused said
falsification. The court took into account the facts that Dava was "in dire need' of a license
because of his work as a detailman; that he received his genuine license from the court only on
December 15, 1982, and that Dava himself personally requested his friend, Manalili, to secure
the license for him. It arrived at the conclusion that since Dava was the possessor or user of the
fake license, he himself was the forger or the one who caused its forgery or falsification. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Michael T. Dava guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the came of Falsification of a Public
Document, as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, and considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentences him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer
an indeterminate imprisonment of one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correecional as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional as maximum; and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Five Hundred
(P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus the costs of this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dava appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, 42 which on September 30, 1985
affirmed in in toto the decision of the trial court. On February 27, 1986, the appellate court

denied Dava's motion for the reconsideration of said decision finding that no new grounds had
been raised therein. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the courts below on the testimony of Carolino Vinluan on
the ground that being a part of the annulled proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-10759, it may
not be considered as admissible in evidence as it cannot qualify as a "testimony at a former trial"
under the provisions of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious. The resolution of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR, expressly annulled the proceedings had in Criminal
Case No. Q-10759 for lack of jurisdiction of the Quezon City court over the case. That ruling is
founded on solid jurisprudence. We had time and again held that in the absence of proof that the
party raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by estoppel, 43 a decision rendered by a
court without jurisdiction is a total nullity. 44 Being worthless in itself, all the proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. 45 Hence, the testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in
evidence but may well be considered as totally nonexistent.
With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan out of the way, is there sufficient evidence to
warrant the conviction of petitioner for the crime charged?
The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his driver's
license No. 2706887 that "officials of the Pampanga LTC agency participated" in in-preparation
and with having used the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified. The charges
therefore are found on the provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which
punishes any private individual who shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article 171
specifically paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons
(public officials) have participated in any act proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
The information also charges Dava with having knowingly used a false document under the last
paragraph of Article 172.
The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no driver's license,
asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him. Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who
used to get his own driver's license in San Fernando, Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's
driver's license No. 2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation Commission (LTC)
agency in said locality. 46 On January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his license at the said office
by paying the amount of P10.00 for which he was issued official receipt No. 0605870. 47
In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an official receipt
showing that at the previous year the licensee had paid for his driver's license to any agency of
the LTC, and to pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did not involve the issuance of
"another form," a driver did not have to fill up an application form for the renewal of a license.
The said agency would then issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of the license but
the driver's license itself would not be changed. 48
Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with official receipt No.
864321 49 were presented to the San Fernando LTC agency, the personnel therein issued
official-receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although the receipt was not personally
signed by office registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant, the receipt 50was genuine and the
amount indicated therein was actually paid to and collected by the San Fernando agency. 51 The

driver's license itself may not have been issued by said agency 52 but its form was likewise
genuine. However, according to Martin, it was 'not OK' because it "did not emanate" from his
office and "a facsimile was not printed over" his name therein. 53 Moreover, according to the
officer-in-charge of the license Division of the Bureau of Land Transportation in East Avenue,
Quezon City, non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa
"is not registered" in their index card. 54
Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the
evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there are
pieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification and
made use of the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so.
The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in
a judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the
offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is
embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such
document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage to
another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage. 55 Except for last, all of these
elements have been proven beyond reason doubt in this case.
It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. He
misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver's license. 56 Through
this misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a
driver's license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman,
petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in
securing the subject driver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could obtain a
drivers license in so short a without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated,
Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere desire to help a friend, did not
hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid
P70.00 for the license even if the legal fee then was only P15.00. 57 As it was in truth petitioner
who induced and left Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was
Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the
charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the
commission of said crime.
Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second driver's license No.
2706887. Having already obtained a driver's license, he knew that it was not legally possible for
him to secure another one. Otherwise, there would have been no need for him to misrepresent
to his friend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license. But even with this
misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe that Manalili would be able to secure
a driver's license through legal means in about an hour's time. 58 The patent irregularity in
obtaining driver's license No. 2706887 was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an
ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. In fact, Manalili
testified that he himself was surprised when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the
driver's license of Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hours after he had sought the
fixer's assistance. 59 In those days, all plastic jackets emanated from the LTC Central Office,
which accounted for the delay in the release of the license applied for. Under these
circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded man" would say that petitioner did not know that
his license was a fake. 60

A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank
form of the drivers license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished. 61 Thus,
when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature
of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was
simulated, the driver's license became a public document.
The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when petitioner was
apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in his possession and it was what he presented
Lising to show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use
of a car, it is probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978,
petitioner used driver's license No. 2706887.
The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to
another person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In
falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein. 62
In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in People vs.
Sendaydiego, 63 should be applied in his favor:
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made
use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or
uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery
that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the
forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in
the forgery (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 PMI. 754; People vs.
Domingo, 49 Phil. 28: People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People vs. Manansala, 105
Phil. 1253). In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in
possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the
forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People
vs.
Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not
absolute as it is subject to the exception that the accused should have a satisfactory
explanation why he is in possession of a false document. 64 His explanation, however, is
unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated above,
Manalili himself could not have acted on his own accord without the prodding of petitioner.
We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in government
agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who could do things fast for the right amount. He is
"not necessarily involved in the commission of forgery or falsification of official documents" and
he shares his fees with "insiders." 65
Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing agencies. Why they
proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our bureaucracy but also on our own people. While
not all fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple serve as "facilitators," they
nonetheless provide sources for exploitation of the unknowing common people who transact

business with the government and for corruption of the gullible government employees. Their
unwanted presence must be dealt with accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our
government agencies the better for all of us.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed. Let a copy of
this decision be served on that Department of Transportation and Communication. Cost against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988

MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
YAP, C.J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in ACG.R. No. 01119 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Melencio Gigantoni y Javier," promulgated
on November 13, 1985, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 159,
Pasig, Metro Manila, finding the accused guilty of usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code with modification of the penalty by reducing the same to one (1) month and
one (1) day of arresto mayor to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, after
crediting the accused with a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary confession of guilt.
Petitioner Melencio Gigantoni y Javier, was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Pasig, with the crime of usurpation of authority in violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code upon an information alleging that the crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th and 15th day of May, 1981, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who is not a bonafide agent of the CIS, Philippine
Constabulary, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and falsely
represented himself as a bonafide agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, said
accused, knowing fully well his representation to be false.
After arraignment during which the accused pleaded not guilty and after trial, the lower court
rendered judgment finding the accused guilty as charged. On appeal to the appellate court, the
judgment was affirmed with modification only as to the penalty imposed.
The facts of the case, as recited in the decision of the appellate court, are as follows:

During the period material to this case, or in 1981, accused-appellant Melencio

Gigantoni was an employee of Black Mountain Mining Inc. and Tetra Management
Corporation, which are both private companies doing business in the Philippines ....
On May 14, 1981, as an employee of said companies, Gigantoni went to the office of
the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) at Vernida Building, Legaspi Street, Makati, Metro
Manila, allegedly to conduct verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's
officials. Upon reaching the said PAL office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL
legal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and requested that he
be shown the PAL records particularly the passenger manifests for Manila-BaguioManila flights covering the period February 1 to 3 1981. He explained that he was then
at the tracking stage of aforementioned kidnapping case. ... To further convince the
PAL officials of his supposed mission, Gigantoni exhibited his Identification card
purporting to show that he was a PC-CIS agent. ... Thereupon, his aforesaid request
was granted, and PAL legal officer Atty. Conrado A. Boro showed to him the requested
PAL records. Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the requested manifest ...and the
used PAL tickets of one Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor, and that of a certain
Daisy Britanico, an employee of Black Mountain. Thereafter, he left the PAL premises.
When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr.,
inquired from Atty. Boro about Gigantoni's purpose in securing copies of PAL records.
They then became suspicious of the accused" real identity prompting them to conduct
verification from the PC-CIS office. They subsequently learned from General Uy of
PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he had
been dismissed from the service for gross misconduct ... brought about by the
extortion charges filed against him and his final conviction by the Sandiganbayan for
the said offense.... Upon discovering the foregoing, Atty. Puno immediately alerted the
NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to the PAL office the following day. ...
On May 15, 1981, when Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office, he was brought
by Atty. Puno to their conference room while awaiting for the arrival of the NBI agents
who were earlier contacted. In the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security,
Gigantoni was confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real Identity. He later admitted that
he was no longer with the CIS; that he was working for the Black Mountain Mining
Corporation; and that he was just checking on a claim for per diem of one of their
employees who had travelled. ...
Upon the arrival of NBI agents Teodoro Pangilinan, Lolito Utitco and Dante Crisologo,
Attys. Puno and Boro turned over the person of Gigantoni to the NBI. They also
submitted a complaint affidavit against Gigantoni .... On that same day, after the
investigation, arrest and booking conducted by the NBI, Gigantoni was charged before
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, thru its office in Makati, with the crime of
Usurpation of Authority.
The petitioner-accused raised substantially the same errors on appeal to respondent appellate
court, to wit:
1. The appellate court erred in interpreting that presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed, its applicable in the case at bar;

2. The appellate court erred in its interpretation of the difference between suspension and
dismissal.
The gist of petitioner's contention is that he could not be guilty of the crime charged because at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense, he was still a CIS agent who was merely
suspended and was not yet informed of his termination from the service. Furthermore, he avers
that the receipt by him of the notice of dismissal, if there was any, could not be established on
mere presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed.
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official functions, under
which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and falsely
represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under pretense of official
position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to
do so. The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority under which the petitioner
stands charged, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.
The question before us isdid petitioner knowingly and falsely represent himself as an agent of
the CIS, Philippine Constabulary? Petitioner admits that he received a notice of his suspension
from the CIS effective June 20, 1980. This admission is supported by the record (Annex "D")
which shows the letter of Lt. Col. Sabas Edades to petitioner, dated June 23, 1980, regarding
said action. Said official letter was also sent to the Commissioner of the Merit Systems Board,
Civil Service Commission, the Minister of National Defense and the Commanding General of the
CIS. However, as to petitioner's alleged dismissal effective June 20, 1980, he denies having
been informed thereof. The record is bereft of any evidence or proof adduced by the prosecution
showing that the dismissal was actually conveyed to petitioner. That is why the court, in
convicting him, relied on the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed, that is, that it is presumed that he was duly notified of his dismissal.
The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the
service negatives the charge that he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS
agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overturned by competent and
credible proof and never by mere disputable presumptions, as what the lower and appellate
courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal by applying the
G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984
CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review and reverse a decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court.

disputable presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed." It was not for the
accused to prove a negative fact, namely, that he did not receive the order of dismissal. In
criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. Hence, it
was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by positive evidence the allegation that the
accused falsely represented himself as a CIS agent, by presenting proof that he knew that he
was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present
proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was
already dismissed from the service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his
dismissal would not be sufficient.
The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference whether the
accused was suspended or dismissed from the service, "for both imply the absence of power to
represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he
knowingly was deprived of " (Emphasis supplied). The observation of the Solicitor General is
correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official function (second part of Article
177), but not if he is charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177). The
information charges the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and
falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government."
Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the
information given by PAL to the accused was confidential and was given to him only because he
was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. He was not charged in the
information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the case that the
information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily made available to
the accused because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was
the only offense with which he was charged in the information, that he knowingly and
falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent.
Premises considered, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court affirming the judgment of
conviction of the Regional Trial Court is reversed and set aside. Petitioner-accused, Melencio
Gigantoni y Javier is hereby aquitted of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

In the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias
in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended. The information against her reads:
That on or about November 4th, 1974, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully use the substitute or alias name
CORAZON L. REYES, which is different from Corazon Legamia y Rivera
with which she was christened or by which she has been known since
childhood, nor as a pseudonym for literary purpose and without having been
previously authorized by a competent Court to do so; that it was discovered
only on or about November 4th, 1974. (Rollo, pp. 11-12.)

She was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to an indeterminate prison term of only
(1) year, as minimum, to two (2) years, as maximum; to pay a fine a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to pay the costs. The trial court recommended,
however, that she be extended executive clemency. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence the instant petition.

office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first
time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the Bureau of
Immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births
have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized have one year from the approval of this act within which to register
their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise
the patronymic name and one or two surnames. (As amended by R.A. No.
6085.)

The facts:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955 to September
26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was
named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18, 1971.

The issue:

From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as
Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as
Mrs. Reyes.

Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated?

Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when
he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of
Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed
"Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of
P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use
the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another
woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A
number of women can be Identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and
social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name
blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been
charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and
understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be
construed.

For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who
was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution. Parenthetically, the
amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which is due to each legitimate child in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code" per advice given by Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado
of the Agricultural Credit Administration to Felicisima. (Rollo, pp. 14-15.)
The law:
Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television,
radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use
of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any
name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the

G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990

REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
PARAS, J.:

The resolution:

In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to
the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or
personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for
Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could
not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them
probably had their own Corazons.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside; the petitioner is acquitted of the
charge. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In Criminal Case No. 934 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District,
Branch VI, San Fernando, Pampanga, petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of
Falsification of Official Document committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of December 1972, in the Municipality of San Fernando,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Reolandi M. DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad
Santos High School and, therefore, a public employee, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit falsification of official documents, to wit: by
executing and filing in the office of the Civil Service Commission of said municipality a

Personal Data Sheet, CS Form No. 212(65), an official document, stating and malting
it appear therein that he was a fourth year Bachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which document is a requirement for his
reappointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the Jose Abad Santos High
School and wherein the academic requirement to said Position is at least a fourth year
college undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the said accused well knew that the
statement is false and he did not reach the fourth year in a Bachelor of Arts degree
course, and consequently, by reason of said untruthful narration of facts, his
appointment to the said position was approved by the Civil Service Commission.

It is the contention of petitioner that he is entitled to an acquittal because

All contrary to law. (p. 44, Rollo)

3. The Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding that the
transcript of records (Exhibit I) is spurious.

After trial following a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, petitioner was found guilty as charged.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Reolandi
M. Diaz guilty as charged of the crime of falsification of official document penalized
under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and he is therefore
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against the accused. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid judgment of conviction to the Intermediate Appellate Court,
said appeal being docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. 24580- Cr.
In its Decision promulgated on April 7,1983, the respondent court modified the trial court's
decision by increasing the maximum of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment in the event of
non-payment of the fine due to insolvency, but affirmed the verdict of conviction in all other
respects. The pertinent and dispositive portions of respondent court's decision read:
The penalty for the offense of falsification of an official document committed under
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is (prision mayor) and a fine not
to exceed P5,000.00. The correct penalty that should be imposed on the appellant
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is imprisonment of Two (2) Years, Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day of (prison correctional) as minimum to Eight (8) Years and
One (1) Day of (prision mayor) as maximum In cam of non-payment of the fine of
P1,000.00 due to insolvency, the appellant should be subject to subsidiary
imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the decision appealed from is affirmed
in all other respects with costs against accused- appellant' (P. 68, Rollo)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present recourse.

1. The findings of the lower court adopted by the respondent intermediate Appellate Court that
he was not a fourth year A-B. College student is contrary to the evidence presented.
2. The respondent intermediate Appellate Court gravely commuted an error of law in convicting
him as he did not have any legal obligation to state in CS Form 212 that he was a fourth year
college student.

Upon the following facts, found by both the trial court and respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court, to have been sufficiently and satisfactorily established by the evidence on record, it
appears that petitioner Reolandi Diaz was a senior clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School in
San Fernando, Pampanga.
In 1972 he sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the same school and as
one of the requirements for appointment to said position, filled up the prescribed personal
information sheet, Civil Service Form 212, and swore to the truth and veracity of the data and
information therein furnished by him before the proper administering officer. As one of the
required informations, he indicated in Exh "A" that his highest educational attainment was Fourth
Year A.B. (Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued or obtained at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian
Colleges, respectively, during the years 1950 to 1954 inclusive. On the basis thereof, he was
extended an appointment as School Administrative Assistant I (Exh. "B"). His personal
information sheet (Exh. "A") together with his appointment paper (Exh. "B"), the certification as
to the availability of funds for the position (Exh. "C") and the resolution of the Provincial Board of
Pampanga creating the position (Exh. "D") were all forwarded to the Civil Service Commission
for the approval of petitioner's appointment.
But contrary to petitioner's claim that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B.
which he allegedly took at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges during the years 1950 to
1954, he was never enrolled at the Cosmopolitan Colleges which later became the Abad Santos
Educational Institution and still later the Ortanez University-at any time during the period
covering the years from 1950 to 1954, inclusive as certified to by the Registrar of Ortanez
University, Mr. Atilano D. Solomon. Likewise, petitioner was never a student at the Harvardian
Colleges in Tondo, during the first quarter of school year 1953-1954, inclusive, as certified to by
the school's President, Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap.
Neither did petitioner ever enroll as a collegiate student at the Harvardian Colleges in San
Fernando, Pampanga after he finished his secondary course in the same school in June 1950,
as certified to by its Executive Director, Atty. Arnulfo Garcia.
Also, the name of petitioner was not included in all the enrollment lists of college students
submitted to the then Bureau of Private Schools of the Department of Education by the
Harvardian Colleges at San Fernando, Pampanga and at Tondo, Manila, during the period
during which petitioner claimed to have been enrolled. The same thing is true with the list
submitted by the Cosmopolitan Colleges to the said bureau.

The petitioner did not take the witness stand. He only presented in evidence an alleged
transcript of record (Exh. 1) purporting to show that he took up collegiate courses at the
Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the school
year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of school year 1953-1954 which transcript of record was
allegedly signed by Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap, for and in behalf of the then President of the
school, Ildefonso Yap. But Mrs. Virginia Yap, testifying for the prosecution disowned the said
signature. Besides, at the bottom portion of the transcript is a printed notation reading this is
only valid with the college seal and signature of Pres. Ildefonso D. Yap. Exhibit "I" lacks the
imprint of the college seal and the signature of President Ildefonso Yap himself. No other
corroborating piece of evidence was presented by petitioner.
Contrary to petitioner's posture, there was ample, solid and conclusive evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove that he was not a fourth year A.B. undergraduate.
It was clearly established that the statement made by the accused that he reached fourth
year A.B. and that he studied for this course (Liberal Arts) at the Cosmopolitan Colleges and the
Harvardian Colleges from the years 1950-1954, is devoid of truth. The records of these colleges
do not at all reveal that petitioner was even enrolled at any time from 1950 to 1954 in its College
of Liberal Arts. His name does not appear and could not be found in the enrollment lists
submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools by these colleges.
While the petitioner in his defense presented an alleged transcript (Exh. purporting to show that
he took up collegiate course at the Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning
from the first quarter of the school year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of the school year
1953-1954, both the trial court and the respondent court correctly disregarded said transcript as
having emanated from a spurious source. The transcript presented lacks the authenticating
marks-the imprint of the college seal and the signature of the President of the college.
As correctly observed by the trial court
It is also quite significant to note in this score that the accused in his
defense failed to present any corroborating piece of evidence which will
show that he was indeed enrolled in the Philippine Harvardian Colleges
from the first quarter of the school year 1953- 1954. If he had enrolled as a
student during this period of time and he was positive that the transcript of
records issued to him and in his possession is genuine and valid, it could
have been easy for him to introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the
testimony of any of his classmates or teachers in the different subjects that
he took to support his claim that he studied and passed these collegiate
courses at the said school. But this he failed to do despite all the
opportunities open to him and in the face of damning evidence all showing
that he had not really enrolled in this school or in the other school
mentioned by him the personal information sheet that he filed up as
requirement for his appointment. (p. 53, Rollo)

Following the doctrine laid down, however, in the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz, No. L-15132,
May 25,1960,108 Phil. 255 and the earlier case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119,
the crime committed under the foregoing facts, is perjury. This offense, as defined in Article 183
of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or
affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. The said article provides
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation.
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who,
knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the
provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an
affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath,
shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three
preceding articles of this section shall suffer respective penalties provided
therein.
In that case of People v. Cruz, supra, the accused Rufo B. Cruz failed up an application form
(Civil Service Form No. 2) for the patrolman examination. He stated therein that he had never
been accused, indicted or tried for violation of any law, ordinance or regulation before any court,
when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, he had been prosecuted and tried before
the Justice of the Peace of Cainta, Rizal, for different crimes. The application was signed and
sworn to by him before the municipal mayor of Cainta, Rizal.
This Court in that case held:
This article is similar to Section 3 of Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, which was formerly the law punishing perjury. Under said
section 3 of that Act, this Court, in the case of United States v. Tupasi
Molina (29 Phil. 119), held that a person, who stated under oath in his
application to take police examination that he had never been convicted of
any crime, when as a matter of fact he has previous convictions, committed
perjury. The facts in that case are almost exactly analogous to those in the
present, and we find no reason, either in law or in the arguments of the
Solicitor General to modify or reverse the conclusion of this Court therein.
More so, because all the elements of the offense of perjury defined in Art.
183 of the Revised Penal Code concur in the present case.
The elements of the crime of perjury are
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive
and administer oath.

(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.
All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar.
Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code carries a lesser penalty. The penalty for this
crime is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. Since
there is no mitigating and aggravating circumstance the penalty should be imposed in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty should be from four (4)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is modified
as follows:
(a) The accused Reolandi Diaz is found guilty of the crime of perjury defined and penalized
under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(b) The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from four (4) months of arrests
mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40203 August 21, 1990

PATERNO J. OUANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO B. ECHAVEZ, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land with an area of about 3,710 square
meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, Identified as Philippine Railway Lot No. 3-A-1 It was
covered by Torrens Title No. 7618 in the name of the registered owner, Rehabilitation 'Finance
Corporation (RFC), now the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are
lands belonging to Francisco Echavez, private respondent herein, and petitioner Paterno J.
Ouano. What will have to be resolved are the conflicting claims over this lot by the vendee
thereof, Echavez, and Ouano.
The property was offered for sale by public bidding by the RFC on April 1, 1958. 1 Actually this
was the second public bidding scheduled for the property. The first 2 in which both Ouano and
Echavez participated, together with others was nullified on account of a protest by Ouano. 3
Now, it appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only
Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in
proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success of their enterprise, they also agreed
to induce the only other party known to be interested in the property-a group headed by a Mrs.
Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid. 4 They broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group.
The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the sale; and Ouano's wife paid it
P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses. 5

between us, Francisco B. Echavez and Paterno J. Ouano, that we share the
said lot between us according to the herein sketch:
(Sketch omitted ...)
That each of us takes care in paying direct to the RFC office Cebu Branch,
the installments, interests and amortizations on a ten-year plan in our
respective names, such that we would request the RFC to have the said Lot
3-A-1 subdivided into two portions: A portion of Lot 3-A-1 for Francisco B.
Echavez to contain 1882.5 sq. m. more or less depending on the actual
survey based on the above sketch, and another portion of Lot 3-A-1 for
Paterno J. Ouano to contain 1827.5 sq. m. more or less also based on the
above sketch.
That they have agreed to share proportionately all legal expenses that may
be assessed and incurred in connection with the acquisition of the said lot in
case such expenses are levied as a whole against Francisco B. Echavez,
but if such expenses are levied separately after the RFC consents to the
subdivision and registration in our respective names our share of the said
lot, then we take care individually of paying such expenses if there be any.
In witness whereof, we hereby set our hand and sign this agreement this
15th day of April, 1958 at Mandawe, Cebu, Philippines, subject to the
approval of the RFC, Cebu Branch and Manila.
On the same day that the "Agreement" was executed, Echavez set down in writing a
computation of the sharing of expenses of his joint venture with Ouano, viz.: 11

As expected, the highest bid submitted, and thus accepted by the RFC, was that of Francisco
Echavez, who offered P27,826.00 for the land . 6 Echavez paid the sum of P5,565.00
representing 20% deposit of the prefferred price. 7

1827.5 No. of sq. meters for Paterno Ouano 7.50 91375 127925

A week later, Echavez sent a letter to Ouano regarding the P2,000.00 paid by the latter's wife to
the Bonsucan group. 8 It said:

-1016.55 Share of Echavez for the P2,000.00 given to Mrs. Bonsucan &
Companions

Because the owner of the money which I deposited for your share has
stipulated that today is the last day for the return of his money ... I would like
to request you that for the P2,000.00 which you have advanced to Mrs.
Bonsucan and company, I will just give you 250 sq. meters right in front of
your house at P8.05 per sq. meter ... (N.B. 250 x P8.05 equals P2,012.50.)

P1,724.70 Balance payable by Mr. Ouano to FB Echavez for the deposit

made by the latter at the RFC. This is subject to the approval of the RFC,
Cebu Branch.

Still later, or two weeks after Echavez won the bid, a document simply
entitled "Agreement," was signed by him and Ouano. 9 That document,
prepared by Echavez in his own handwriting, reads as follows: 10 |par
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Inasmuch as it was Francisco B. Echavez who won in the public bidding
held at the RFC office for Lot 3-A-1 last April, 1958, it is hereby agreed

P13706.25 .20 P 2741.25

Mandawe, April 15, 1958.

(Sgd.) F.B. ECHAVEZ.
Thereafter, on various dates, Ouano and/or his wife delivered sums of money to Echavez
aggregating P1,725.00, obviously in payment of the balance indicated in Echavez's computation
just mentioned, viz.: P500.00 on April 19,1958, another P500.00 on April 20, and P725.00 on
April 27,1958. Receipts therefor were given by Echavez, all similarly worded to the effect that the

money was being received "as part of their reimbursement for the deposit (of P5,565.00) I have
made with the RFC for Lot 3-A-1 which I won in the bidding and which lot I have consented to
share with Mr. Paterno J. Ouano, subject to the approval of the RFC. 12
However, the RFC never approved the sharing agreement between Echavez and Ouano
concerning Lot 3-A-1. It approved the sale of the lot to Echavez only, on May 9, 1958, on the
condition that the purchase price of P27,825.00 be paid in cash. Apparently Echavez found great
initial difficulty in complying with this condition. It took all of four years, and patient negotiation
and diligent effort on his part, for him ultimately to acquire title to the property, which came about
in December, 1963. His travails are succinctly narrated by the Trial Court as follows: 13
... Apparently, the successful bidder was caught flatfooted, for he was not
able to comply with this condition, notwithstanding the fact that he has been
making efforts to acquire the property (See Exhibit 21, letter of March 29,
1958; also Exhibit 22). So, he exerted much effort to change the terms of
the sale from cash to monthly amortization plan (Exhs. 24 and 10). But the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was adamant. The terms of the bid
giving the option to pay the balance of the purchase price either in cash or
within ten years on monthly amortization plan at 6% interest
notwithstanding, said Corporation denied defendant's request in a letter
dated September 18, 1958 signed by Chairman Romualdez (Exh. 11). This
went on for more than 4- years, with none of the parties herein having
secured the conformity of the RFC or DBP to a novation of the original
terms of the sale. Thus, the said sale was finally cancelled, and the deposit
of P5,549.72 made by the defendant to the RFC forfeited as of April 4, 1962
(Exh. 12). However, on July 18, 1962, upon request of the defendant, this
cancellation was considered under the condition, among others, that the
price of the sale of P27,825.00 be payable 20% down and the balance in 5
years at 8% interest per annum on the monthly amortization plan,
commencing retroactively on June 9, 1958, and that a payment of
P2,000.00 be applied to the total arrearages of P25,799.00, which had to be
paid within 90 days. The defendant paid on August 28, 1962 a further
amount of P2,000.00. On September 3, 1962, the deed of conditional sale,
covering the property in question, was entered into by the DBP and the
defendant (Exh. D, same as Exh. 4), culminating in the signing of the
corresponding promissory note dated September 7,1962 (Exh. E, same as
Exh. 5). It is admitted that the defendant is now the registered owner of the
property, after having fully paid P29,3218.87 on account of the price to the
Development Bank of the Philippines, as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 9,1963 (Exhs. 14 and 34).
It was pursuant to the absolute sale of December 9, 1963 just mentioned, that a Torrens title
(TCT No. 10776) was issued in Echavez's name. 14
Ouano, in his turn, tried to have DBP either accept and implement his sharing agreement with
Echavez, or allow him to pay the full price of the lot in Echavez's behalf. By his own account, he
sent a letter dated June 3, 1 963 to the DBP, "handcarried by his wife," "requesting among
others, that he be permitted to pay immediately either for his share in the aforesaid lot
comprising 1,828 sq. meters at the bid price of P7.50 per sq. meter including charges, or for the

whole lot;" and that he in fact tried to make such payment but the Bank turned down his
request. 15
Shortly after his representation with the DBP were rebuffed more precisely on June 24, 1963,
months before the deed of absolute sale was executed by the DBP in Echavez's favor Paterno
J. Ouano filed suit for "specific performance and reconveyance" in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu against Francisco Echavez and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). 16
In his complaint, 17 Ouano recited substantially the facts just related, and further alleged that
... on June 3, 1963 plaintiffs wife and his attorney conferred with
defendant ... Echavez for the purpose of again requesting said defendant to
sign a document which would be notarized and to permit plaintiff to pay for
his share direct to the defendant DBP, but said defendant refused and
instead informed them that there had been no agreement regarding joint
bidding and joint ownership of Lot 3-A-l.
The complaint was amended a few weeks later, chiefly to allege that DBP was on the point of
rescinding its contract with Echavez; and that Ouano's offer to the DBP to pay in Echavez's
behalf the price of the lot in full (P28,206.61), had been rejected; and that consequently, and "to
show his good faith," he had consigned the amount with the Court "for and in behalf of
defendant ... Echavez. 18 The amended complaint specifically prayed that
1) pending trial, and upon such bond as may be fixed by the Court, a writ of
preliminary injunction issue to restrain Echavez and RFC "from rescinding,
cancelling or in any way terminating the conditional sale contract with
respect to Lot 3-A-1 TCT 7618;"
2) after trial, Echavez be ordered" to sign an agreement in accord with
Annex A and the foregoing allegations which should be notarized;"
3) by virtue of aforesaid agreement and his deposit in Court of P28,206.61,
Ouano be declared as "legally subrogated to the rights, interest and
participation of defendant ... Echavez in Lot 3-A-1 to the extent of 1,828.5
sq. m.
4) Echavez be ordered to reimburse Ouano P14,358.37 corresponding to
defendant ... Echavez' share of 1,882.5 sq. m.
5) should Echavez be unable to pay said amount within 15 days, Ouano be
declared "legally subrogated to the rights, interest and participation of ...
Echavez in Lot 3-A-1 to the extent of 1,882.5 sq. m.;"
6) DBP be ordered to consider the deposit made by Ouano for and in behalf
of Echavez as "complete and valid payment of Lot 3 A-1 and to execute
the necessary documents of sale in (the former's) favor ... for 1,827.5 sq. m.
and in favor of ... Echavez for 1,882.5 sq. m.

7) DBP be ordered to hold the deed of sale in favor of Echavez for 1,882 sq.
m. in abeyance until the latter has reimbursed Ouano "the amount of
P14,385.3 7 corresponding to ... Echavez's share of 1,882.5 sq. m and
should Echavez be unable to do so within 15 days, DBP be ordered to
"execute said deed of sale in favor of plaintiff and
8) Echavez be ordered to pay Ouano P1,000.00 as attorney's fees,
P5,000.00 as moral damages, and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, as
well as the costs of suit.
The DBP moved to dismiss the amended complaint, alleging that no cause of action was therein
stated against it.19 The Court found the motion to be well taken, overruled Ouano's opposition
thereto, dismissed the amended complaint and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction, by
Order dated August 27, 1963. 20 It subsequently denied Ouano's motion for
reconsideration. 21 Ouano appealed but on learning of the absolute sale of Lot 3-A-1 executed by
DBP in Echavez's favor on December 9, 1963-which according to him rendered moot the case
for legal subrogation and injunction as far as DBP was concerned he withdrew the appeal and
moved instead for admission of a second amended complaint, 22 which the Court admitted in the
absence of opposition thereto. In the second amended complaint, dated January 4, 1964, 23 the
DBP was no longer included as a party. Echavez was the sole defendant. The second amended
complaint adverted to the dismissal of the case as against the DBP and additionally alleged that
Echavez, "in gross and evident bad faith, mortgaged the whole of Lot 3-A-1 to one Dr. Serafica."
It prayed particularly that Echavez be commanded:
1. To execute a public document embodying and confirming the oral
contract of joint ownership of Lot 3-A-1, TCT 7618, of April 1, 1958 between
plaintiff and defendant...;
2. To execute a deed of reconveyance of 1,827.5 sq. m. of Lot 3-A-1 ... after
reimbursement of the sum of P14,821.24 by the plaintiff;
3. To pay plaintiff P1,000 as attorney's fees, P5,000.00 as moral damages,
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and the expenses of litigation; and
4. To pay the costs.
Trial ensued after which the Trial Court rendered judgment on June 29,1968. It found that the
sharing agreement between Ouano and Echavez could not be enforced in view of the absence
of consent of the RFC (DBP) which the latter never gave; apart from this, the agreement had an
unlawful cause and hence could "Produce no effect whatever" in accordance with Article 1352 of
the Civil Code, because involving a felony defined in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:

ART. 185. Machinations in public auctions. any person who shall solicit
any gift or promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part in any
public auction, and any person who shall attempt to cause bidders to stay
away from an auction by threats, gifts, promises, or any other artifice, with
intent to cause the reduction of the price of the thing auctioned, shall suffer
the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine ranging
from 10 to 50 per centum of the value of the thing auctioned.
The decision accordingly dismissed the Second Amended Complaint, ordered Ouano, "to vacate
the portion of Lot No. 3-A-1 he occupied pursuant to Exhibit C," and also dismissed Echavez's
counterclaim.
Ouano appealed to the Court of Appeals. Here he fared no better. He enjoyed initial success, to
be sure. Judgment was promulgated on February 28, 1974" setting aside the Trial Court's
judgment, and directing: (a) Echavez "to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of plaintiff of
1827. 5 square meters as the latter's share in the property in controversy and (b) Ouano "to pay
defendant the amount of P14,821. 24 representing the cost of his share." However, on a second
motion for reconsideration presented by Echavez, the Appellate Court, on November 21, 1974,
reconsidered its decision of February 28, 1974 and entered another "affirming in toto the
decision appealed from without costs. 25 This second decision found that the documentary
evidence 26 preponderantly established that "the parties have manifested their intention to
subordinate their agreement to the approval of the RFC." "Consequently," the decision stated,
... had the plaintiffs and defendant's proposal been accepted by the RFC
(DBP) two separate contracts, covering the two segregated lots according to
the sketch would have come into existence, to be executed by the RFC
separately in favor of the pi plaintiff and the defendant. But unfortunately,
the RFC disapproved the proposal as the sale was to be for cash. As a
result, the obligatory force of the 'agreement' or the consent of the parties,
which was subordinated to the taking effect of the suspensive condition that
the agreement be subject to the approval of the RFC never happened. This
being the case, the agreement never became effective. The rule is settled
that:
When the consent of a party to a contract is given
subject to the fulfillment of a suspensive condition, the
contract is not perfected unless the condition is first
complied with' (Ruperto vs. Cosca 26 Phil. 227).
And when the obligation assumed by a party to a
contract is expressly subjected to a condition, the
obligation cannot be enforced against him unless the
condition is complied with (Wise & Co. vs. Kelly, 37
Phil. 696; Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine Trust
Co., 68 Phil. 48).
At best, the non-fulfillment of the suspensive condition has the effect of
negating the conditional obligation. It has been held that what characterizes
a conditional obligation is the fact that its efficacy or obligatory force is

subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the

suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the
conditional obligation had never existed Gaite vs. Fonacier, L-11827, July
31, 1961, 2 SCRA 831).
Motions for reconsideration and for oral argument filed by Ouano were denied by Resolutions
dated February 6, February 11, and February 21, 1975, the last containing a suggestion "that
appellant go to the Higher Court for relief. 27
Ouano is now before this Court, on appeal by certoriari to seek the relief that both the Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals have declined to concede to him. In this Court, he attempts to make
the following points, to wit:
1. The verbal agreement between the parties to acquire and share the land in proportion to their
respective abutting properties, and executed by the immediate occupation by the parties of their
respective shares in the land, is a perfected consensual contract and not "a mere promise to
deliver something subject to a suspensive condition" (as ruled in the second decision of the
Court of Appeals); hence the petitioner is entitled to compel private respondent to execute a
public document for the registration in his name of the petitioner's share in the land in question
pursuant to Art. 1315 of the Civil Code (as held in the first decision of the Court of Appeals).

These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had
promised to share in the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining from
taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in
causing another bidder to stay away from the auction. in order to cause reduction of the price of
the property auctioned In so doing, they committed the felony of machinations in public
auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.
That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby
only one bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land in consequence of which Echavez
eventually acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties not only
have no action against each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of
their agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in
accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.
Article 1409 of said Code declares as "inexistent and void from the beginning" those contracts,
among others, "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy," or "expressly prohibited ... by law." Such contracts "cannot be ratified "the
right to set up the defense of illegality (cannot) be waived;" and, Article 1410 adds, the "action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence ... (thereof) does not prescribe." Furthermore,
according to Article 1411 of the same Code 30
... When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the
contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari
delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be
prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the
disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things
or the price of the contract.

2. The agreement to acquire and share the land was not subject to a suspensive condition.
3. Assuming in gratia argumenti the agreement to be subject to a suspensive condition, since
the condition consisted in obtaining the approval of the RFC-a third party who could not in any
way be compelled to give such approval the condition is deemed constructively fulfilled because
petitioner had done all in his power to comply with the condition, and private respondent, who
also had the duty to get such approval, in effect prevented the fulfillment of the condition by
doing nothing to secure the approval.
4. The circumstances show that Echavez clearly acted in bad faith, and it is unjust to allow him
to benefit from his bad faith and ingenious scheme.
Two material facts, however, about which Ouano and Echavez are in agreement, render these
questions of academic interest only, said facts being determinative of this dispute on an
altogether different ground. These facts are:
1) that they bad both orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid at the second bidding
called by the RFC, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to
their adjoining properties; and
2) that to ensure success of their scheme, they had also agreed to induce the only other party
known to be interested in the property a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from
presenting a bid, 28 as they did succeed in inducing Mrs. Bonsucan's group to withdraw from the
sale, paying said group P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses. 29

xxx xxx xxx

The dismissal of Ouano's action by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals was thus
correct, being plainly in accord with the Civil Code provisions just referred to. 31 Article 1411 also
dictates the proper disposition of the land involved, i.e., "the forfeiture of the proceeds of the
crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed," as mandated by the provisions
of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, this being obviously the provision "of the Penal Code
relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime" that Article 1411 makes "applicable
to the things or the price of the contract."
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED, so that in addition
to affirming the Trial Court's judgment dismissing Ouano's complaint and Echavez's
counterclaim in Civil Case No. R-8011, Lot No. 3-A-1 subject of said case is ordered
FORFEITED in its entirety in favor of the Government of the Philippines. No pronouncement as
to costs. Let copy of this Decision be furnished the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.