CHAPTER 6:

INDIVIDUAL BATTLEFIELD STATUS

Individual Battlefield Status determines the rights and

protections afforded a fighter, if captured, as well as the
prohibitions that may apply to his/her conduct
Two categories of combatants:
o Members of the armed forces of a party to a
conflict other than medical and religious
personnel
o Any others who take a direct part in hostilities

NOTE: applicable only to Article 2

international armed conflicts; there are
no combatants in non-international
conflicts.
A lawful combatant is entitled to POW status upon
capture
o Generally, unlawful combatants are not entitled
to POW status. However, there is NO
REQUIREMENT that an unlawful combatant be
DENIED POW status
Lawful combatant:
o Has the right to participate directly in hostilities
o May be attacked anytime until he surrenders or
is otherwise hos de combat and not only when
actually threatening the enemy
o Remains a combatant even when he/she is not
actually fighting
o While he enjoys combatants privilege, he is
also a continuing target
How can they withdraw from hostilities?
o Retiring/demobilizing
o Becoming hors de combat
Retainees or retained personnel
o Are not POWs, but receive the same treatment
as POWs
o Chaplains,
medical
personnel,
dentists,
surgeons and other medical doctors

not included are medical orderlies or

chaplains assistants since they are
not considered permanent staff in
medical or pastoral terms

medics may be armed but with light

weapons only - used for self-defense
or for defense of the wounded in their
charge
o Retained with a view to providing medical care
or religious ministration to prisoners of war
o May not be lawfully compelled to do work other
than their medical or pastoral work
o When there no longer is a need for their
services, they are to be returned to their own
lines repatriated
o If they take direct part in hostilities, they
become unlawful combatants

Forfeit of noncombatant immunity

Become lawful targets

If captured, would still be considered

retained persons, but would be subject
to trial for unlawful precapture
combatant acts
Members of Other Militias and Members of Other
Volunteer Corps
o Should fulfill the following conditions to gain
POW status:

Commanded by a person responsible

for his subordinates

Have a fixed distinctive sign

recognizable at a distance

Carry arms openly

Conduct
their
operations
in
accordance with the laws and customs
of war

Additional requirements (as proposed

by some commentators):

Hierarchical organization

Belonging to a party to the

conflict

Nonallegiance
to
the
detaining power
o Reserve armed forces

A reserve force that, for whatever

reason, has not been integrated into
the armed forces but nevertheless
actively participates in hostilities, also
entitled to POW status
Regular Armed Forces Professing Allegiance to an
Unrecognized Authority
o Members of these are also considered as POW
Persons Who Accompany the Armed Forces without
Being Members Thereof
o Considered POWs if captured
o Such
as
war
correspondents,
supply
contractors, members of labour units or of
services responsible for the welfare of the
armed forces, provided that they have received
authorization from the armed forces which they
accompany
o Also extends to citizens who accompany an
army for whatever purpose, such as sutlers,
editors, reporters of journals or contractors
Merchant Marine and Civilian Aircraft Crews
o Entitled to POW status
o Does not include civilians who are aboard ship
or aircraft not as crew, but passengers
o Note: Medical aircraft and fishing boats are
exempt from capture
Leve en Masse
o Entitled to POW status
o Conditions of a leve en masse:

Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

Who, on the approach of the enemy,

spontaneously took up arms to resist
the invading forces

Without having had time to form

themselves into regular armed units

And at all times they carried arms

openly

And respected the laws and customs

of war
o Partisans, rebels, guerillas and insurgents are
not leve en masse for they are not a last-ditch
defense of a country
o Because of the character of a leve en masse,
its members are allowed to dispense with the
otherwise required commander responsible for
subordinates and the wearing of a fixed
distinctive sign

The only time that the four customary

requirements of POW status are
eased

However, the requirement of carrying

arms openly is significant to qualify
for the treatment as POW if captured
o Leve en masse can lawfully exist only during
the actual period of invasion a common
Article 2 conflict

Resistance beyond the period of the

actual invasion must be conducted by
the regular forces

Armed
resistance
by
civilian
combatants that continues into an
occupation renders the fighters
unlawful combatants unprivileged
belligerents
Direct Participation in Hostilities
o Specific hostile acts, and it clearly suspends a
civilians non-combatant protection
o Acts of war which by their nature or purpose
are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel
and equipment of the enemy armed forces
o Implies a direct causal relationship between the
activity engaged in and the harm done to the
enemy at the time and the place where the
activity takes place
o Civilians shall enjoy protection unless and for
such time as they take direct part in hostilities

Civilians in international armed conflict

persons who are neither members of
the armed forces of a party to the
conflict nor participants in a leve en
masse

Civilians in non-international armed

conflict civilian in its usual meaning,
which is a person not associated with
the military
o Criteria for direct participation in hostilities

Threshold of harm

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

Civilians at must be likely to

adversely affect the military
operations of a party to the
conflict or alternatively likely
to inflict death, injury or
destruction of persons or
objects protected against
direct attack

It is not required that the

harm be actual, only that
there
is
an
objective
likelihood for it to occur
Direct causation

There must be a causal link

between the act and the
harm likely to result
Belligerent nexus

Specifically be designed to
directly cause the required
threshold of harm in support
of a party to the conflict and
to the detriment of another
o Organized armed groups

The armed force of the non-state party

to the a non-international armed
conflict

Implies that the group belongs to a

party to the conflict, that it has a de
facto relationship with such party

Defining criterion: continuous combat

function
o Continuous combat function

A continuous function for the group

involving his or her direct participation
in hostilities which requires a lasting
integration into an organized armed
group acting as the armed forces of a
non-State party to an armed conflict
Unlawful Combatants/Unprivileged Belligerents
o A de facto individual status
o Not entitled to POW status
o Means all persons (civilians) taking a direct part
in hostilities without being entitled to do so and
who therefore cannot be classified as POWs
upon capture
Status of Taliban Fighters
o In a common article 3 non-international armed
conflict, Taliban fighters are terrorists, in
violation of domestic law
o If engaged in combat, they have a continuous
combat function and may be targeted at any
time by opposing forces
o Upon capture, they are criminals who enjoy
common Article 3 protections, but not POWs for
there are no POWs in a common Article 3
conflict

May be tried in domestic or military courts for

unlawful acts committed before capture
Status of Al Qaeda Fighters
o In a common article 2 armed conflict, they are
unlawful enemy combatants with a continuous
combat function who may be targeted
o If captured, not entitled to POW status
Out of Uniform, Out of Status?
o The removal of ones uniform or other fixed
distinctive sign in favor of civilian garb is not a
war crime
o But in an international armed conflict, if an
otherwise lawful combatant engages in combat
without a uniform or fixed distinctive sign, he
becomes an unlawful combatant/unprivileged
belligerent and, if captured, is not entitled to
POW status
o Members of the armed forces of a party to the
conflict lose their right to be treated as POW
whenever they deliberately conceal their status
in order to pass behind the military lines of the
enemy for the purpose of gathering military
information or for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life of property
o Spies who are captured in civilian clothing
behind enemy lines may be denied POW status
and are subject to trial for espionage under the
domestic law of the capturing state
Detainee
o A recently captured individual on his way to a
POW camp or holding facility, where his actual
status would be determined
o Any individual captured on the battlefield, the
circumstances of whose capture do not
immediately indicate a status
Enemy Combatant
o A person who, either lawfully or unlawfully,
engages in hostilities for the opposing side in
an international armed conflict
o Thus, civilians taking en even indirect part in
hostilities may be subjected to detention and
internment if absolutely necessary
Unlawful enemy combatant
o Persons not entitled to combatant immunity,
who purposefully and materially engaged and
supported hostilities during an armed conflict
Competent Tribunals
o Should there be any doubt, persons shall be
presumed to be POWs until it is determined to
be otherwise by a competent tribunal
o In US practice, there are five persons
necessary: an interpreter, an officer who acts
as both recorder and presenter of evidence,
and a panel of three officers who constitute the
tribunal
o

o
o
o

With the detainee present and his right to

present evidence and examine witnesses
having been explained, the tribunal hears the
evidence and the witnesses and makes its
determination
It is a fact-finding procedure rather than an
adversarial proceeding
Hearsay evidence may be considered
Unless it is established by a preponderance of
evidence that the detainee is not entitled to
POW status, upon majority vote of the tribunal
he is granted that status

Civilians
o The protection of civilians in time of armed
conflict, whether international or internal, is the
bedrock of modern humanitarian law
o Deliberate attack on civilians or civilian objects
are absolutely prohibited
o Civilians may never be purposely attacked
o Collateral damages are a part of almost every
military operation and are regarded as
acceptable to the extent that precautions are
taken so that the civilian casualties are not
disproportionate to the anticipated military
advantage
Protected Persons
o Are those who, at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of
a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party
to the conflict or Occupying power of which they
are not nationals
o A noncombatant who finds himself /herself in
the hands of the other side
o POWs are not protected persons; they have the
entire panoply of rights and protections of
Convention III which go far beyond those of a
protected person
o Limitations:

Protected person status does not

attach to nationals of a state that has
not ratified the Geneva Conventions
(none as of today)

Nationality requirement protected

person status applies to detained
persons whose nationality is different
than that of their captors

If a detained person is a national of a

state that is neutral in the conflict, or if
the detained person is an ally of the
detaining state and if the state of
which the detainee is a national has
diplomatic relations with the detaining
state, the detainee is not a protected
person
Minimum jus in bello Protections Due to Captured
Individuals

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

o
o

Humane treatment
Article 75, Additional Protocol I to Geneva
Conventions

Article 75 -- Fundamental guarantees

1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to
in Article 1 of this Protocol, persons who are in the power
of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from
more favourable treatment under the Conventions or
under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all
circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the
protection provided by this Article without any adverse
distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language,
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other
similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the person,
honour, convictions and religious practices of all such
persons.

(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused

to be informed without delay of the particulars of the
offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused
before and during his trial all necessary rights and
means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence
except on the basis of individual penal responsibility;
(c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a
criminal offence on account of any act or omission which
did not constitute a criminal offence under the national or
international law to which he was subject at the time
when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be
imposed than that which was applicable at the time
when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for
the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall
benefit thereby;

2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at

any time and in any place whatsoever, whether
committed by civilian or by military agents:

(d) anyone charged with an offence is

presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;

(a) violence to the life, health, or physical or

mental well-being of persons, in particular:

(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have

the right to be tried in his presence;

(i) murder;
(ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or

(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against

himself or to confess guilt;

(iii) corporal punishment; and

(iv) mutilation;

(g) anyone charged with an offence shall have

the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;

mental;

(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular

humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(c) the taking of hostages;
(d) collective punishments; and
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
3. Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions
related to the armed conflict shall be informed promptly,
in a language he understands, of the reasons why these
measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or
detention for penal offences, such persons shall be
released with the minimum delay possible and in any
event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest,
detention or internment have ceased to exist.
4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be
executed on a person found guilty of a penal offence
related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a
conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly
constituted court respecting the generally recognized
principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the
following:

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

(h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by

the same Party for an offence in respect of which a final
judgement acquitting or convicting that person has been
previously pronounced under the same law and judicial
procedure;
(i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have
the right to have the judgement pronounced publicly; and
(j) a convicted person shall be advised on
conviction of his judicial and other remedies and of the
time-limits within which they may be exercised.
5. Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons
related to the armed conflict shall be held in quarters
separated from men's quarters. They shall be under the
immediate supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases
where families are detained or interned, they shall,
whenever possible, be held in the same place and
accommodated as family units.
6. Persons who are arrested, detained or interned for
reasons related to the armed conflict shall enjoy the

protection provided by this Article until their final release,

repatriation or re-establishment, even after the end of
the armed conflict.
7. In order to avoid any doubt concerning the
prosecution and trial of persons accused of war crimes
or crimes against humanity, the following principles shall
apply:
(a) persons who are accused of such crimes
should be submitted for the purpose of prosecution and
trial in accordance with the applicable rules of
international law; and
(b) any such persons who do not benefit from
more favourable treatment under the Conventions or this
Protocol shall be accorded the treatment provided by
this Article, whether or not the crimes of which they are
accused constitute grave breaches of the Conventions
or of this Protocol.
8. No provision of this Article may be construed as
limiting or infringing any other more favourable provision
granting greater protection, under any applicable rules of
international law, to persons covered by paragraph 1.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Distinction
Military Neccessity
Unnecessary Suffering
Proportionality

DISTINCTION
grew from jus in bello practice that eventually matured
into customary law
relating to people: The parties must, at all times,
distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks
may only be directed against combatants, and not
against civilians.
relating to objects: The parties to the conflict must, at
all times, distinguish between civilian objects and military
ojectives. Attacks may only be directed against military
objectives, not against civilian objects.
has TWO aspects: (one relating to people, and another
relating to objects)
1. combatants must distinguish themselves as such
wear uniform or distinctive sign that is recognizable at a
distance so that they may be seen as lawful targets of
opposing combatants
2. combatants must target only military objectives
distinguish between military objectives and civilian
objects, must spare the latter
attacks on the following are prohibited unless they are
being used for military purposes: civilian dwellings,
shops, schools and other places of nonmilitary business,
places of recreation and worship, means of
transportation, cultural property, hospitals and medical
establishments and units
civilian workers in an enemy defense factory? Any
civilians killed or wounded are collateral to the attack on
the legitimate target, the factory
targeting of an enemy civilian just because she works in
a defense department office? To purposely target her
would violate distinction and be a grave breach, as well.
She is not a lawful target, the office in which she works
in is
civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this
Section, unless and for such time as they take direct part
in hostilities (ex. Acting as spotter for enemy
combatants, aiming a weapon at an enemy combatant)
The Al Firdos Bunker: was the bombing of the said
bunker lawful? The ICTY held that, to constitute a
violation of distinction, the act must have been
committed willfully, intentionally in the knowledge.. that
civilians or civilian property were being targeted..
this principle is not only violated when civilians or civilian
objects are attacked, but also when combatants use an
indiscriminate weapon/method

MILITARY NECESSITY (for protection of civilians)

CHAPTER 7 FOUR CORE PRINCIPLES of LOAC

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

Francis Lieber: Military necessity consists in the

necessity of those measures which are indispensable for
securing the ends of war, and which are lawful according
to modern law and usages of war.
Military necessityhas been defined as that principle
which justifies those measures not forbidden by
international law which are indispensable for securing
the complete submission of the enemy as soon as
possible.
Military Necessity, according to Napoleon: My great
maxim has always been, that in every injury done to
the enemy, even though permitted by the rules, is
excusable only in so far as it is absolutely necessary;
everything beyond that is criminal.
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the
laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to
compel the complete submission of the enemy with the
least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. It
permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and
other persons whose destruction is incidentally
unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the warbut it
does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for
purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill.
gaining military advantage, while minimizing human
suffering and physical destruction
Doesnt justify all actions that arguably enhance force
protection. The CIL prohibition against state practiced
murder, torture, cruel inhumane or degrading treatment,
and prolonged arbitrary detention serve as limitations to
what military necessity can justify. (ex. <1> The need to
extract information from a local civilian for the military
necessity of protecting the force does not justify
subjecting that individual to torture as means of
obtaining the information; <2> it is likewise unlawful for a
commander to put his prisoners to death because their
presence retards his movements or diminishes his
power of resistance, or because of self-preservation)
What constitutes military necessity?
1. Good faith on the part of the commander: that given
the information she had at the time she made the
decision, military necessity reasonably required that
she take the action she did
2. Reasonableness: Did the commander take
reasonable steps to gather the information she had,
for example, to determine the legitimacy of the
target, and that incidental damage would not be
disproportionate? Did she act reasonably in light of
the information gathered? In other words, would a
reasonably
prudent
commander
actin
ing
conformance with LOAC/IHL, knowing what the
commander knew, have acted similarly in similar
circumstances?
Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsrecht military necessity in
war overrides the law of war
Kriegsraison holds that military necessity overrides
and renders inoperative ordinary law and the
customs and usages of war; in extreme
circumstances of danger, one may abandon

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

humanitarian law in order to meet danger (necessity

might permit the commander to ignore the laws of
war when it is essential to do so to avoid defeat, to
escape from extreme danger, or for the realization
of the purpose of war)
Kriegsraison grants belligerents, even individual
combatants, the right to do whatever is required to
prevail in armed conflict, to do whatever they
believe is required to win.
It is the unlimited application of military necessity.
Military necessity should not be taken for military
convenience. Kriegsraison is rejected for a good reason,
and neither it nor military necessity are defenses to law
of war violations.

UNNECESSARY SUFFERING (for protection of combatants)

Defined as: harm greater than that avoidable to achieve
legitimate military objectives
It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
This principle is intended to restrain the suffering inflicted
on opposing combatants, rather than civilians.
Great suffering is not the measurement by which a
weapon is banned, the question is whether the suffering
caused is substantially disproportionate to the advantage
gained.

PROPORTIONALITY
How is a commander to balance human life against the
destruction of an enemy target? The right of belligerents
to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.
Combatants may not make war without regard to
civilians and their objects.
According to Protocol I of 1977, Proportionality in two
articles
o Art. 51.5 (b) an attack which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of a civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated
o Art. 57.2 (b) an attack shall be cancelled or
suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one orthat the
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss
of human life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated
Considers attacks on civilians, not on combatants
To violate proportionality, the discrepancy between loss
of civilian life and destruction of civilian objects must be
clearly disproportionate to the direct military advantage
anticipated
Must be assessed from several perspectives:

1- proportionality is a factor in the selection of

the target. If civilian losses are inevitable, these
must be balanced against the military
advantage
o 2- the means and methods of the attack must
be assessed. Some weapons are more likely to
involve indiscriminate damage than others.
o 3- the conduct of the attack itself must not be
negligent and involve unnecessary civilian
casualties
There is no reference to proportionality in Additional
Protocol II, relative to non international armed conflicts
Defenders, as well as attackers, have a responsibility to
minimize the potential for proportionality problems. Art.
58 of Additional Protocol I requires defenders to
endeavor to remove the civilian population and objects
from the vicinity of military objectives and to avoid
locating military objectives within or near densely
populated areas.
Often involves what is euphemistically referred to as
collateral damage (is the damage surrounding human
and non-human resources, either military or non-military,
as the result of action or strikes directed specifically
against enemy forces or military facilities)
Targeting mistakes that kill civilians, and are
unassociated with strikes against an enemy force, are
not collateral damage, they are just simple mistakes.
Usually, collateral damage refers to noncombatants who
are incidentally killed in attacking a lawful military
objective.
Proportionality used in LOAC/IHL is different with the
standards employed in civilian law enforcement (use of
force must be proportional to the legitimate object to be
achieved) and in international law (usually refers to
proportionality in high command considerations of
constraint in the use of force)
The main problem with the principle of proportionality is
not whether or not it exists but what it means and how it
is to be applied. Unfortunately, most applications of this
principle are not quite so clear cut. One cannot easily
assess the value of innocent human lives as opposed to
capturing a particular military objective.
o

There must be an armed conflict

o

test (Tadic): [A]n armed conflict exists

whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups within a State
. . . [I]nternational humanitarian law
continues to apply in the whole territory of
the warring States or, in the case of
internal conflicts, the whole territory under
the control of a party, whether or not actual
combat takes place there.

A serious violation of the laws or customs of war

which entails individual criminal responsibility under
international law.

Article 8(2) of the 1998 Statute of the International

Criminal Court (ICC) contains the most detailed
definition, listing four categories of war crimes:

grave breaches;

other serious violations of the laws and

customs applicable in international armed
conflict;

serious violations of article 3 common to

the four Geneva Conventions . . .
committed in armed conflicts not of an
international character; and

other serious violations of the laws and

customs applicable in armed conflicts not
of an international character.

War crimes are not subject to any statute of

limitations

Grave breaches and Universal Jurisdiction

States ratifying the Geneva Conventions are obliged

to enact criminal legislation that extends not only to
its own nationals, but to any person who has
committed a grave breach, including its enemies
o

The governing principle is then universality:

all States are empowered to try and punish
war criminals.

Prosecuting War Crimes

CHAPTER 8 WAR CRIMES
Defining war crimes

To allow prosecution, the war crime must be

incorporated into a criminal code, a prosecutorial
vehicle.

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

If a war crime or grave breach is charged, the

necessity of the connection between the conduct in
question and the ongoing conflict often called the
nexus is crucial in order to determine if one faces
a violation of domestic law or a war crime.

because the offenses of rape and torture contain

differing elements, an accused may be convicted of
both offenses for the commission of a single act of
rape.
Escaping Prisoners of War

If, for instance, a civilian merely takes

advantage of the general atmosphere of
lawlessness created by the armed conflict
to kill a hated neighbor or to steal his
property without his acts being otherwise
closely connected to the armed conflict,
such conduct would not generally
constitute a war crime...[T]here should be
no presumption...that, because a crime is
committed in time of war, it therefore
automatically constitutes a war crime.

Is it either a war crime or a grave breach for a POW

camp guard to shoot and kill an unarmed escaping
POW?
o

Prosecuting War Crimes: Who?

Any civilian who is an accessory to a violation of the

laws and customs of war is himself also liable as a
war criminal. The ICTY and ICTR have convicted
many civilians, including unlawful combatants, of
war crimes.
In short, anyone can commit a war crime. Absent
one of the usual exclusions for criminal
responsibility, diminished responsibility and insanity,
duress, mistake of fact, or mistake of law, both
combatants and civilians may be charged.

It is neither. Because POW status is given,

a common Article 2 armed conflict is
involved. As to the use of deadly force,
The use of weapons against prisoners of
war, especially against those who are
escaping or attempting to escape, shall
constitute an extreme measure, which shall
always be preceded by warnings
appropriate to the circumstances.

Firing on Mosques

Article 53 of Additional Protocol I reads, [I]t is

prohibited: (a) to commit any acts of hostility
directed against the historic monuments, works of
art or places of worship which constitute the cultural
or spiritual heritage of peoples . . .

Can the prohibition against firing on places of

worship be disregarded, thrown away, because the
enemy does not respect the sanctity of their own
churches or mosques?

Rape and Gender Crimes

Rape has always been considered a war crime,

although it was not mentioned as such in either the
Nuremberg Charter or the Geneva Conventions,
which probably reflects the fact that it was not
always prosecuted with great diligence.

It is not specified as a grave breach in the 1949

Geneva Conventions, nor is it mentioned in
common Article 3, although it is prohibited in
Geneva Convention IV, Article 27, in relation to
protected persons.

Article 5 of the ICTYs Statute, based on 1907

Hague Regulation IV, lists rape as a crime against
humanity. The Rome Statute of the ICC declares it a
war crime and a violation of the laws and customs of
both international and non-international armed
conflict.

Not only does rape constitute a crime against

humanity but, because it involves severe pain or
suffering, it also constitutes the war crime of torture.
Moreover, in an international criminal law context,
SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

Yes, in some cases the rule may be

disregarded. Article 53 of Additional
Protocol I also reads, [I]t is prohibited: (b)
to use such objects in support of the
military effort; Hague Regulation IV, Article
27,
is
clearer:
In
sieges
and
bombardments all necessary steps must
be taken to spare, as far as possible,
buildings dedicated to religion . . . provided
they are not being used at the time for
military purposes . . .

Hospitals and marked wounded collection points are

also protected locations. Like places of worship,
they lose their protection if used for improper
purposes.
o

Additional Protocol I, Article 12, refers to

military facilities: Medical units shall be
respected and protected at all times and
shall not be the object of attack. In
addition, Under no circumstances shall
medical units be used in an attempt to
shield military objectives from attack . . .

Hostages

taking of hostages is prohibited by LOAC/IHL, and

violations of the prohibition constitute a grave
breach.

The Hostages Case held, hostages may be taken

in order to guarantee the peaceful conduct of the
populations of occupied territories and, when certain
conditions exist and the necessary preliminaries
have been taken, they may, as a last resort, be
shot.

Explosive Vests and Burning Bodies

Human Shields

Is it a war crime or grave breach to employ human

shields closely related to hostages?
o

Article 51.7 of Additional Protocol I makes

clear that, the presence . . . of the civilian
population or individual civilians shall not
be used to render certain points or areas
immune from military operations, in
particular in attempts to shield military
objectives from attacks . . . The Parties
shall not direct the movement of the civilian
population or individual civilians in order to
attempt to shield military objectives from
attacks or to shield military operations.

In a common Article 2 conflict, Additional Protocol I,

Article 34.1, directs that The remains of persons
who have died for reasons related to occupation or
in detention resulting from occupation or
hostilities . . . shall be respected, and the gravesites
of all such persons shall be respected . . . These
general requirements are followed by directions
concerning grave sites and their registration and
tending. Geneva Convention III, Article 120, relating
to deceased POWs, calls for similar respect and
honorable treatment of the remains of deceased
prisoners.

Photos of POWs

Is it a war crime to photograph an enemy prisoner?

o

What if the individuals making up the human shield

are willing participants?
o

The principle of proportionality, then,

becomes central to the human shield
issue. However . . . the actual test of
excessive injury to civilians must be
relaxed. That is to say, the appraisal
whether civilian casualties are excessive in
relation to the military advantage
anticipated must make allowances for the
fact that if an attempt is made to shield
military objectives with civilians civilian
casualties will be higher than usual.

Some experts contend that acting as a voluntary

human shield constitutes taking a direct part in
hostilities.
In March 2003, as the U.S. invasion of Iraq began,
there were roughly 250 Americans and Europeans
voluntarily in Iraq to act as human shields for the
Iraq government to place at military objectives. On
April 1, two buses carrying the volunteers were fired
119
upon, reportedly wounding several.
Was a war
crime committed?

Yes, it was a LOAC/IHL violation. The party

to the conflict who uses human shields,
volunteers or not, is in violation of Article
51.7. The volunteer human shields, if killed
or wounded, have no cause of action
against the party who fired on them,
however. Military objectives protected by
human shields remain lawful targets
despite the presence of such shields.

It depends. Italian domestic law forbids the

publication of the photo of any police
prisoner showing him/her to be wearing
handcuffs. Geneva Convention III, Article
13, does not go that far: Prisoners of war
must at all times be humanely treated. . . .
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times
be protected, particularly against acts of
violence or intimidation and against insults
and public curiosity. . . . The Commentary
adds, The protection [due prisoners of
war] extends to moral values, such as the
moral independence of the prisoner
(protection against acts of intimidation) and
his honour (protection against insults and
123
public curiosity).

Whether a photo constitutes a war crime may turn

on the purpose for which it was taken and the use to
which it is put.

Burying the Enemy alive

A reasonable indication of the lawfulness of a

questioned jus in bello act may be determined by
examining it in terms of the four core LOAC
principles. In this case, there is no issue of
proportionality because civilians were not involved.

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

There is no issue of distinction because the

uniformed identity of the opposing combatants was
clear to both sides.

In cases not covered by the laws of war, the

Martens Clause requires adherence to the principles
of humanity. In modern armed conflict, humanity
can be a broadly interpreted term.

Pillage (to steal using violence)

The ICTY has defined it as the fraudulent

appropriation of public or private funds belonging to
the enemy or the opposing party perpetrated during
133
an armed conflict and related thereto.
It has
also been more simply defined as unlawful
134
appropriation of property in armed conflict.
The
latter definition seems preferable as there is no
customary law basis for limiting the crime to funds.

Double-tapping

10

It is the shooting of wounded or apparently dead

insurgents to insure that they are dead.

A reasonable definition of double-tapping is: during

the initial transit of a military objective, to
indiscriminately twice shoot a wounded or an
apparently dead enemy to ensure he is not feigning
death. A double-tap should not be confused with a
controlled double, which is the firing of two aimed
shots at a lawful enemy target.

At some level, every combatant knows that doubletapping shooting the wounded is contrary to
LOAC/IHL. In contrast, if a wounded but still living
enemy exhibits any offensive intent, he is a lawful
target, no matter how grievously wounded he may
be.

The Lieber Code mandates in Article LXI that,

[t]roops . . . have no right to kill enemies already
disabled on the ground, or prisoners captured by
other troops. The U.S. law of war manual prohibits
indiscriminate double-tapping: It is especially
forbidden . . . to declare that no quarter will be
given. and, . . . to kill or wound an enemy who,
having laid down his arms, or having no longer
means
of
defense,
has
surrendered
at
147
discretion.
Double-tapping is contrary to
Additional Protocol I, Articles 40 and 41, as well.
Article 40: It is prohibited to order that there shall
be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith
or to conduct hostilities on this basis. Article 41: 1.
A person who is recognized or who, in the
circumstances should be recognized to be hors de
SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

combat shall not be made the object of attack. 2. A

person is hors de combat if: (c) he has been
rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated
by wounds . . . and therefore is incapable of
defending himself.

TAKE NOTE as highlighted in Cabreras Discussion:

Common Elements of War Crimes:
1. Attack against a protected person;
2. Attack was in the context of or
associated with an armed conflict; and
3. Perpetrator knew his acts were linked
to the armed conflict.

War crimes under RA 9851, Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide,

etc.

Take note of all common elements

Befehl ist befehl Orders are orders.

Duress even if the subordinate realizes that the act he is called

upon to perform is a crime, he may not refuse its execution
without incurring serious consequences.
The threat must be Imminent, real, inevitable and reasonable.
It must be clear and present.
It must not be remote.
Article 31.1(d) of the ICC
Chapter 9: Obedience to Orders, The First Defense

Obedience to a superiors order is not a defense if the

subordinate knew, or should have known, that the order was
illegal.
What constitutes illegal order?
It must be manifestly illegal.
-

Manifest illegality requires not fine moral discernment

but obviousness.
patent and obviously unlawful.

A person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time

of that persons conduct:
(d) the conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime.
Has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of
imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious
bodily harm against that person or another person, and
the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this
threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause
a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.

DURESS- exempting
Obedience to an order Justifying

Any uncertainty about whether the defendants conduct was

manifestly illegal must be resolved in his favor.
Upon receiving a Manifestly Illegal Order

Difference between exemption and justifying

1. If He/she believes the order is manifestly illegal patently and

obviously unlawful or byond the authority of the superior issuing
the order, a a threshold matter the order should not be obeyed.

Justifying circumstances are those wherein the acts of the

actor are in accordance with law and, hence, he incurs no
criminal and civil liability. The justifying circumstances by subject
are as follows:

2. He/she should ask for clarification of the order to ensure it was

understood, or correctly heard, or was not merely misspoken by
the senior person. to make such senior officer realize the orders
illegality or bring realization that the subordinate appreciates its
illegal nature.
3. If the superior individual-Officer, noncommissioned officer, or
civilian authority persists in the manifestly unlawful order, after
refusing to obey the subordinate should report the incident to a
higher authority. If it was higher authority who issued or condoned
the order, the incident should be reported to still higher authority,
or to any judge advocate- that is, any military lawyer.

The subordinates duty is fulfilled when he refuses to obey and

reports the incident. He should not attempt to relieve the superior
of duty or, even more unwise , to take physical action, such as
resorting armed force, to stop a superiors unlawful plan.

1. xxxxxxxx
2. xxxxxxxx
3. xxxxxxxx.
4. xxxxxxxx
5. xxxxxxx
6. Obedience to superior order
Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose. (Art. 11, Par. 6)
It is required that the order in itself must be lawful; that it is for a
lawful purpose; and that the person carrying out the order must
also act within the law. But even if the order is illegal if it is
patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the
subordinate is not liable. (Nassif v. People, 78 Phil. 67) This is
due to a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
While Exempting circumstances are those wherein there is an
absence in the agent of the crime of all the condition that would
make an act voluntary and, hence, although there is no criminal

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

11

liability, there is civil liability. In exempting, the crime is committed

but there is absent in the person of the offender any element of
voluntariness, and so he is not criminally liable but is civilly liable
except in the exempting circumstances of accident and lawful or
insuperable cause.

Even if the order is illegal, the subordinate may still invoke

the exempting circumstances of compulsion of irresistible
force or acting under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
an equal or greater injury.

Under RA 9851
Sec. 12 Orders from Superior- the fact that a crime defined and
penalized under this act has been committed by a person
pursuant to an order of government or a superior, whether military
or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility
unless all of the following elements concur:
a. The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the
government or the superior in question;

CHAPTER 10 - COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY &

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Legal Bases:
1.
2.
3.

b. The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
c. The order was not manifestly unlawful.
For the purposes of this section, orders to commit genocide or
other crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.

Additional Protocol I;
Art. 86.1, LOAC (commanders inaction following
breaches, as well as grave breaches); and
Art. 86.2, LOAC (responsibility of commanders who do
not take measures to prevent foreseeable violations or
take action regarding violations already committed)

Mens rea of command responsibility is recklessness or willful

blindness, rather than mere negligence

Who is a commander?
All persons who had command responsibility - from the highest
level to leaders with only a few men under their command

What are a commanders basic duties?

1.
2.
3.

Prevent breaches;
If already committed, suppress or minimize them; and
Report violations

Requisites for proving command responsibility:

1.
2.

Existence of superior-subordinate relationship;

Commander knew/had reason to know that the
subordinate had, or was about to commit a violation; and
3. Commander failed to take necessary steps to prevent
the violation or to punish the offender.
*Absence of any condition is sufficient for acquittal

Also applies to civilian superiors i.e. President as commander-in-

12

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

chief; higher standard of proving:

1.
2.

He had information regarding the unlawful acts of

subordinates; AND
Consciously disregarded the information

*Note however that the totality of the routes to trial does not
mean that a commander is responsible for all that happens of fails
to happen on his watch. The determining factor is that the
commander is held accountable for his own act (of omission),
rather than vicarious liability for the acts of his subordinates.

Command responsibility and Respondeat Superior

RELEVANT CASES:
Yamashita vs. Styer

Command responsibility (aka superior responsibility)

1.
2.

3.

A soldier who obeys a manifestly unlawful order is

culpable for any violation of the law of armed conflict.
The superior who gave the unlawful order is equally
culpable for the subordinates violation by reason of
having given the unlawful order
The superior is not responsible for aiding or abetting the
commission of the crime, but for his neglect of duty in
regard to crimes that he knew were committed by his
subordinates.

G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945

Ponente: Moran, C.J.
Facts:

Respondeat Superior (let the master answer)

1.
2.

Broader than command responsibility;

There is no distinct definition in the LOAC or IHL.
However, in case law, command responsibility indicates
a commanders criminal liability for his illegal orders,
while in Respondeat Superior, although there was no
illegal order, the commander is responsible because he
initiated or acquiesced to the wrongdoing, or took no
corrective action upon learning of it.

Commanders seven routes to trial:

1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

A commander is liable for LOAC/IHL violations

personally committed - no command and subordinate
status;
A commander is responsible for LOAC/IHL violations
that he orders a subordinate to commit
A commander is responsible for disregarding LOAC/IHL
violations of which he is/should be aware, or for knowing
of them and taking no punish those involved - does not
require actual knowledge to be established;
A commander is responsible for LOAC that he incites even when orders are done indirectly, commanders are
still liable for end-result;
A commander is responsible for violations committed by
his troops whom he fails to control - (Yamashita case) it
is the duty of a commander to control his troops, and the
failure to do so is a violation of the Laws of War;
A commander is responsible for violations by his
subordinates, which he permits or acquiesces in; and
An officer may be responsible for violations committed
by subordinates pursuant to manifestly illegal orders that
he passes on to those subordinates

Yamashita was the Commanding General of the

Japanese army in the Philippines during World War 2.
He was charged before the American military
commission for war crimes.
He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition
against Gen. Styer to reinstate his status as prisoner of
war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner
also questioned the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

Held:
YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with
an act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.
2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take
any appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops
under his command to prevent acts which constitute violation of
the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged
with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such
measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague
Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague
Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among
others.
3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought
for restoration to his former status as prisoner of war and not a
discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military measure
and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.
4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not
life since the military commission is not made a party respondent
in the case. As such, no order may be issued requiring it to refrain
from trying the petitioner.

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

13

- See more at:

http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/12/yamashita-v-styerdigest.html#sthash.HKI7VqJd.dpuf

Prosecutor v. Blaki (2004)

The case concerned the crimes that have been

committed in the Lava Valley (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
between May 1992 and January 1994 in the ambit of the
conflict between the Croatian Defense Council (HVO)
and the forces of the Bosnian Muslim Army.
During this time, Tihomir Blaki was the Commander of
the HVO Armed Forces in Central Bosnia.
The Trial Chamber convicted Blaki of war crimes and
crimes against humanity on the basis of both individual
criminal responsibility (Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute)
and superior responsibility (Article 7(3) of the ICTY
Statute).
The Trial Chamber handed down a sentence of 45 years
of imprisonment
Blaki appealed the decision and filed a great amount
of additional evidence

Prosecutor v. Delalic
This Judgment is the first elucidation of the concept of command
responsibility by an international judicial body since the cases
decided in the wake of the Second World War. It emphasizes that
the doctrine of command responsibility encompasses "not only
military commanders, but also civilians holding positions of
authority ()" and "not only persons in de jure positions but also
those in such position de facto

In 1992 forces consisting of Bosnian Muslims and

Bosnian Croats took control of villages containing
predominantly Bosnian Serbs within and around the
Konjic municipality in central Bosnia.

Those persons detained during these operations were

held in a former JNA facility in the village of Celebici, the
Celebici prison-camp, where detainees were killed,
tortured, sexually assaulted, beaten and otherwise
subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment by the four
accused.

The trial of the four accused commenced on 10 March

1997 and covered a period of some nineteen months
during which the Trial Chamber heard the testimony
of 122 witnesses, received 691 exhibits and carefully
considered the arguments of the Parties.

Many procedural and evidentiary matters were also

raised to which the Judges gave full attention, always
bearing in mind the rights of the accused and the need
for a fair and expeditious trial. Finally, the crimes alleged
in the indictment are serious violations of international
humanitarian law and the Trial Chamber had to deal
with many complex issues of fact and law previously
unaddressed by any international judicial body.

Issue: W/N Blaki should be held liable

Held: With respect to the Trial Chamber's alleged errors made

under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, the Appeals Chamber held
that none of the Trial Chambers articulations of the mens rea for
ordering under Article 7(1) of the Statute, in relation to a culpable
mental state that is lower than direct intent, is correct. The
knowledge of any kind of risk, however low, does not suffice for
the imposition of criminal responsibility but only a person who
orders an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial
likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that
order, has the requisite mens rea.

Held:
Furthermore, the concurrent conviction pursuant to
Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) of the Statute in relation to the same
counts based on the same facts ... constitutes a legal error.

The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had

indeed erred in law with respect to the contextual elements of
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute.

Blaki was acquitted of numerous charges concerning

the crimes committed in the area of Ahmii (Bosnia and
Herzegovina) and in three other central Bosnian municipalities.
The Appeals Chamber imposed a new sentence of 9 years of
imprisonment.
14 SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

Commander Zejnil DELALIC is found NOT GUILTY of the 11

counts of Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
Violation of the laws and customs of war he was charged with due
to his alleged command over the Celebici prison camp at the
relevant time. He is also acquitted of the count charging him as a
direct participant in the unlawful confinement of civilians. The Trial
Chamber found that Mr. Delalic did not have command and
control over the Celebici prison-camp and over the guards who
worked there, such as to entail his criminal responsibility for their
actions.

Commander Zdravko MUCIC, charged with 13 counts of Grave

breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Violation of the laws
and customs of war, is found GUILTY on 11 counts and
sentenced to seven years imprisonment for his superior
responsibility for murder (9 victims), torture (6 victims), causing
great suffering or serious injury (4 victims), inhumane acts (6
victims), and for his direct participation in the unlawful
confinement of civilians in inhumane conditions.

Explaining its sentence, the Trial Chamber states the

following: "We wish to emphasize the duty of a commander of
any detention facility during an armed conflict Mr. Mucic was
clearly derelict in this duty and allowed those under his authority
to commit the most heinous of offences, without taking any
disciplinary action. Furthermore, as commander of the Celebici
prison camp, he was the person with the primary responsibility for
the conditions in which the prisoners were kept. The Trial
Chamber is appalled by the inadequacy of the food and water
supplies, and medical and sleeping facilities that were provided
for the detainees, as well as the atmosphere of terror which
reigned in the Celebici prison-camp

Some of the mitigating factors which the Trial Chamber took into
consideration were the fact that Mr. Mucic was not named by any
witness as an active participant in any of the murders or tortures
for which he was charged with responsibility as a superior. In
addition, the Trial Chamber also recognized that Mr. Mucics
actions were as a result of human frailty rather than individual
malice.

deputy commander and, although he has been found not to have

command responsibility for the offences of others within the
prison-camp, by his actions he encouraged others among the
camp guards to engage in their own forms of mistreatment of the
detainees
Esad LANDZO: charged with 24 counts of Grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions and Violation of the laws and customs of
war, is found GUILTY on 17 counts and sentenced to 15 years
imprisonment for killings (three victims), torture (three victims),
causing great suffering or serious injury (two victims) and
inhumane conditions.
Explaining its sentence, the Trial Chamber states the
following: "While we have dismissed his defense of diminished
responsibility, we have noted his young age at the relevant time
and his impressionability and immaturity, as well as his particular
personality traits and the effect that the armed conflict in his
home town had upon him. It is these factors which have led us to
impose a less severe sentence than the seriousness and cruelty
of his crimes would ordinarily require. The Trial Chamber does
not, however, accept that Mr. Landzo was the mere instrument of
his superiors, lacking the ability to exercise independent will. The
nature of his crimes is suggestive of significant imagination and a
perverse pleasure in the infliction of pain and suffering. It is most
disturbing to see such propensity for violence and disregard for
human life and dignity in one so young

Hazim DELIC: charged with 38 counts of Grave breaches of the

Geneva Conventions and Violation of the laws and customs of
war, is found GUILTY on 13 counts and sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment for murder (two victims), torture and rape (two
victims), causing great suffering or serious injury (one victim),
inhumane acts involving the use of an electrical device and
inhumane conditions.
Explaining its sentence, the Trial Chamber states the following:
the accused "displayed a singular brutality in causing the deaths
of two men detained in the Celebici prison-camp and a calculated
cruelty in the torture and mistreatment of many others. He raped
two defenseless women on several occasions, seeking to exert
his power over them and instill absolute fear in them. The Trial
Chamber considers the rape of any person to be a despicable
act, which strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical
integrity. Throughout Mr. Delics tenure as deputy commander in
the Celebici prison camp he was instrumental in creating an
atmosphere of terror by his actions and his threats to and
humiliation of the detainees. It appears that he took a sadistic
pleasure in causing the detainees pain and suffering, most clearly
illustrated by his frequent use of a device to inflict electrical
shocks. Mr. Delic abused his position of authority and trust as a

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

15

NOTE:
*A White Flag is a sign of a desire to communicate with the
enemy. It does not necessarily indicate surrender.

*Booby-Trap - any device or material, which is designed,

constructed, or adapted to kill or injure and which functions
unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an
apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.

CHAPTER 11 RUSES AND PERFIDY

PERFIDY

RUSES

any attempt to gain the enemys confidence by

assuring his protection under the law of war, while
intending to kill, wound, or capture him
deliberate attempt to instill confidence with an intent
to betray
prohibited in both international and non-international
armed conflicts (LOAC violation)
punishable under the Rome Statue
o for acts like improper use of a flag of truce,
or the uniform of the enemy

deceit employed in the interest of military operations

for the purpose of misleading the enemy
intended to confuse the enemy, to induce him to act
recklessly to make a mistake or to act imprudently.
permitted in both international and non-international
armed conflicts
Captured enemy equipment may be used by the
opposing side as long as their identification
markings are replaced with the capturing states
markings before using them in combat

Three Elements:
1.
2.
3.

inviting the confidence of an enemy

a subjective intent to betray that confidence
an actual betrayal involving the protection afforded by
LOAC

If there is no intent to kill, wound, or capture the

enemy, the act does not constitute perfidy

Examples:

feigning incapacitation
feigning civilian, noncombatant status

feigning protected status (by use of signs, emblems, or

uniforms of a neutral body)
feigning a cease-fire (white flag)
falsely marking an historic building or monument to indicate
protected status
fighting in the enemys uniform
using a booby-trap in the form of an apparently harmless
objects
16 SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

Examples:

camouflage
decoys
dummy artillery pieces, aircraft, or tanks
ambushes
mock operations
feigned attacks or retreats

communicating with non-existent units

simulating the noise of an advancing column
using small units to simulate large forces
allowing the enemy to intercept false documents
altering landmarks and road signs
misinformation

NOTE:
*Spies - although engaging in acts not considered unlawful, are

considered unlawful combatants civilians taking a direct part in

hostilities, although being an unlawful combatant is not itself an
LOAC violation.

*Warships - may disguise themselves (by flying false flags of

neutral colours) except when going into action. Before opening
fire, the vessels true flag must be displayed.

As regards the use of the national flag, the military insignia and
the uniforms of the enemy, theory and practice are unanimous in
prohibiting such use during actual attack and defense since the
principle is considered inviolable that during actual fighting
belligerent forces ought to be certain of who is friend and who is
foe

Article 39.2, Additional Protocol I

if a combatant is captured in an enemy uniform with

no showing that he engaged in combat while so
dressed, it probably would be a violation of
Additional Protocol I, and a minor LOAC violation.
if captured while directly participating in hostilities in
enemy uniform, the wearer has committed a war
crime and forfeited POW status.

CHAPTER 12 TORTURE
Torture
a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute of
the ICC
In international law, the 1984 UN Convention Against
Torture (CAT), and its Optional Protocol and the UDHR
prohibits torture
a jus cogens offense a peremptory norm in
international law; a state may not opt out of the
criminality of torture or of the enforcement of
international legal provisions against it
Perpetrators may be held criminally responsible
notwithstanding national or international authorization by
legislative or judicial bodies to apply torture.

States that have not ratified Additional Protocol I

are not bound by Article 39.2 and may apply the

traditional rule (articulated in Trial Of Otto Skorzeny
and Others): wear the enemy uniform until the
moment of combat, then revert to the combatants
true uniform.

Examples:
1. Wrenching fingernails from a prisoners fingers
2. Electrecuting a detainees genitalia
3. Hammering a captives toes
4. Tying the a POWs arms behind his back until his elbows
touch, then raising him off the floor by his bound arms via an
overhead rope until his shoulders dislocate,
DEFINITION: Article 1, CAT (a frequently cited human rights
oriented definition)
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having
ICTYs Kunarac decision: involvement of a public
official is not required
There is no actual list of acts which constitutes torture.
No document could. Torture, like reasonableness, is a
moving target. It cannot be defined with exactness.
Not always physical in nature. (i.e. Psychological torture)
THREE categories of torture may be distinguished:

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

17

1.

2.

3.
-

it as a crime against humanity under international

criminal law as applied by international criminal legal
bodies such as the ICTY
it as a crime under customary international law, relating
particularly to the CAT, as prosecuted most often in
domestic courts;
it as a war crime
2002 Bybee memo, after Asst. Atty. Gen. Jay S. Bybee
o Severe Pain - the level of pain that would
ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently
serious physical condition or injury such as
death, organ failure, or serious impairment of
body functions
o Specif Intent - that the infliction of such pain
must be the defendants precise objective; only
guilty of it is with express purpose of inflicting
severe pain or suffering

3.

4.

5.

6.

To constitute a violation the CAT, Article 1 requires the

actual infliction of torture. Apropos to the Daschner
case, however, the European Court of Human Rights, in
a 1982 decision, held that a threat to torture which is
sufficiently real and immediate itself constitutes torture.
No military case involving a threat to torture has been
located.

information or a confession, punishment,

intimidation, or coercion or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind.
Such person or persons were protected
under one or more of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
The perpetrator was aware of the actual
circumstances that established that protected
status.
The conduct took place in the context of and
was associated with an international
armed conflict.62
The perpetrator was aware of factual
circumstances that established the existence
of an armed conflict.

There is no difference in meaning between cruel and

inhuman treatment.
ICTY defines both cruel treatment and inhuman
treatment as treatment which causes serious mental or
physical suffering or constitutes a serious attack upon
human dignity, which is equivalent to the offence of
inhuman treatment in the framework of the grave
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
torture and cruel treatment are differentiated by the
degree of seriousness required for the two offenses,
and by the requirement of a prohibited purpose for the
offense of torture.

Defining Torture as a LOAC Violation

Torture is prohibited by:

1907 Hague Regulation IV, Article 4 (by implication)

1949 Geneva Convention common Article 3, and

common Article 50/51/130/147

1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 75.2 (ii); Additional

Protocol II, Article 4.2.(a)

Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR

State practice establishes this rule [against torture] as a

norm of customary international law applicable in both
international and noninternational armed conflicts.
LOAC/IHL similarly prohibits cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment.
The prohibitions against torture international, domestic,
military, and civilian are universal and
comprehensive
Rome Statute of the ICC, Article 8(2) (a) (ii)-1, lists the
war crime of torture committed in an international
armed conflict.
That war crime has six elements, akin to a definition of
torture:
1.

2.

18

The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or

mental pain or suffering upon one or
more persons.
The perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for
such purposes as obtaining

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

Why Torture?
According to ethicist David Luban there are five aims, or
purposes:
1. as a form of victors pleasure
2. to instill terror
3. as punishment
4. extracting confessions
5. intelligence gathering

Waterboarding Is Torture
- considered as enhanced interrogation technique; called
simulated drowning
- other terms: water rag, water torture, wet bag, water cure, etc
- eg. Heads thrust repeatedly into water until the victim is halfdrowned

Two camps with regard to torture:

1. absolutists - contend that torture is never justified, no matter
the seriousness of the circumstances or the human
consequences of not acting
2. consequentialists - argue that torture may be necessary in
extreme circumstances when its perceived benefits exceed its
costs; may be permissible or even mandatory as an immediate
response to urgent circumstances: a criminal defense by
necessity; acceptable in exceptional circumstances
R.A. 9745

AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,

INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR (Anti-Torture
Act)

1.

Any person who actually participated Or induced

another or who cooperated in the execution of the act
shall be liable as principal

2.

Any superior military, police or law enforcement

officer or senior government official who issued an
order to any lower ranking personnel to commit torture
for whatever purpose shall be held equally liable as
principals.

3.

The immediate commanding officer of the unit

concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior public
official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies
shall be held liable as a principal

4.

Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an

accessory if he/she has knowledge of the commission

Torture - act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical

or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as
-

obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a

confession
punishing him/her for an act he/she or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed
or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
person in authority or agent of a person in authority
> inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains a
level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or
debasement to the latter.
Who are Criminally Liable.

SIIL LOAC (CHAPTER 6 17)

19