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1. INTRODUCTION
The linguistic data to which children are exposed appear to be insufficient
to determine, by themselves, the linguistic knowledge which children eventually attain. The gap between available experience and attained competence
forms what has been called the logical problem of language acquisition. The
approach to a solution which has been followed in linguistic theory over the
past two decades is to suggest that the gap is bridged by an innate Universal
Grammar: by a system of knowledge of what 'a human language can be and
by innate domain-specific procedures for arriving at a grammar. The classic
statement is that of Chomsky:
A consideration of the character of the grammar that is acquired, the
degenerate quality and narrowly limited extent ofthe available data, the
striking uniformity of the resulting grammars, and their independence
of intelligence, motivation and emotional state, over wide ranges of
variation, leave little hope that much of the structure of language can be
leamed by an organism initially uninformed as to its general character.
[11:58].
Adults may also learn foreign languages. Abstractly, the logical problem
of adult foreign language learning is the same: that of explaining how
acquisition takes place, even given the limitations of the data. But the
problem is also different, in important ways. Foreign language learning
A version of this paper, with this same title, circulated widely in manus~ript fonn during
1986, both in the U.S. and in Europe. That version has been cited both as a University of Texas
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2.1.
LACK OF SUCCESS
2.2.
GENERAL FAILURE
Selinker [67] even suggested that the rare cases of apparent complete success
could perhaps be regarded peripheral to the enterprise of second language
acquisition theory. The rare successes may have the same 'pathological'
status for adult acquisition as the rare failures in first language acquisition are
considered to have. 2 One has the impression ofineluctable success on the one
hand, and ineluctable failure on the other. For a theory which holds that adult
foreign language acquisition and child first language development are
fundamentally different, this follows naturally. Language is not merely
difficult to learn with only general cognitive strategies, it is virtually
impossible. This is one important reason for attributing an innate domainspecific language faculty to children. Below, in 3, I will consider how the
fundamental difference hypothesis can accommodate this fact that adults do
even as well as they do.
ROBERT BLEy-VROMAN
different people will view the problem to be solved in different ways and will
set different goals in a given domain. A keyboard student may want to be able
to play popular songs by ear at parties, or to play harpsichord continuo with
friends in the math department. A friend of mine once had as primary goal to
be able eventually to play the promenade from Moussorgsky' s Pictures at an
exhibition and that was all. Differing goals will require setting differing
, subgoals, involving perhaps different learning strategies. All of this is
commonplace in general human problem-solving. Children, on the other
hand, driven by the inexorable operation of the domain-specific language
faculty, do not have the luxury of setting their own individuals goals. For
children, the' goal' - if one can speak of it as such - is predetermined by the
language faculty and not under learner control.
FOSSILIZATION
It has long been noted that foreign language learners reach a certain stage
of learning - a stage short of success - and that learners then permanently
stabilize at this stage. Development ceases, and even serious conscious
efforts to change are often fruitless. Brief changes are sometimes observed,
but they do not 'take'; the learner 'backslides' to the stable state. Selinker [67]
called this phenomenon 'fossilization'. Fossilization seems often to be
observed in learners who have achieved a level ofcompetence which ensures
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10
ROBERT BLEy-VROMAN
communicative success, even though the grammar may be very unlike that
of a native. Fossilized learners are the despair of language teachers, nothing
seems to have an effect. Sometimes in a classroom drill with abundant
opportunity for conscious monitoring, a change is observed. But minutes
later during the break, all the old forms reappear - completely unaffected. In
children, of course, there is no fossilization (short of success). Stages are
inevitably passed through, the system remains plastic until success is achieved.
It is not entirely clear exactly what to make of this difference. What
triggers fossili~ation in foreign language learners is not understood (for some
thoughts, cf. Selinker and Lamendella [68] and the references cited there.)
The reason why 'defossilization' seems so difficult is also mysterious. The
phenomenon of fossilization is at least anecdotally known in other areas of
human learning.s There seems to be little systematic psychological study of
fossilization (but the concept of brain rigidity/plasticity of Penfield and
Roberts [55] may possibly be relevant). Nonetheless, since the phenomenon
is so frequent in foreign language learning, and unknown in child language
development, it constftutes a serious obstacle to the assertion that adult and
child language acquisition are fundamentally the same.
2.7.
INDETERMINATE INTUmONS
11
atic grammar has yet been produced for any substantial portion of any
learner's language (cf. Bley-Vroman [7] for discussion). Such fundamental
differences in kind between the knowledge systems produced in first and
foreign language acquisition suggest that the same cognitive learning system
does not give rise to them both.
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
12
2.9.
NEGATIVE EVIDENCE
Child language acquisition seems not to use - and surely does not rely
upon - any consistent source of negative evidence. Indeed, all serious
attempts to construct formal first language learning theories assume that
negative evidence is not used and that success is possible nonetheless
(Wexler and Culicover [73]; Pinker [56]). Even attempts made outside the
tradition of generative grammar make this assumption (e.g., Moulton and
Robinson [46: chapter 6]).
Among teachers and learners of foreign languages there is general
agreement that negative evidence is at least sometimes useful, and sometimes, though not always, necessary. Experimental evidence is inconclusive,
but suggests that correction, in particular, may be helpful (Cohen and
Robbins [14]). As shown by theoretical work, some of the errors made by
foreign languages learners suggest that they hold hypotheses requiring
negative evidence for disconfinuation (Bley-Vroman [7]). Despite the lack
ofvery convincing empirical evidence, even scholars who argue for essential
similarity of first and foreign language acquisition are forced cautiously to
conclude that the unclear fmdings of empirical studies on the efficacy of
correction "do not mean that correction plays no role in language learning,"
and that one may expect that research will "uncover specific situations in
which error correction may be effective" (Dulay, Burt and Krashen [19:36]).
2.10.
13
and hard to measure; different groups and different situations show different
sorts of correlations; explanations are in short supply; Still, the central role
of affect in foreign language learning is absolutely indisputable.
'syste'tn.
In order to be more precise, let us say that the child learner possesses a
language acquisition system which contains the following two components:
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ROBERT BLEy-VROMAN
14
A. Universal Grammar
B. Domain-specific
learning procedures
There are two ways in which the native language knowledge can provide
partial infonnation about Universal Grammar. First, the learner's general
problem-solving systems may directly observe the native language itself,
considering both its general character and specific facts about its individual
sentences. ~d"'(andtnotespeculatively),the general cognitive system
may be able'to access the internal representation of the particular native
7 The term 'Universal Grammar' is sometimes also used to comprise both A and B. This is
especially appropriate within evaluation metric theories where the procedure for selecting a
grammar is so closely related to the formal properties of rules. I shall use the term in the more
restricted sense.
15
16
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
17
He pointed out also that learners can develop a 'psychotypology' of languages, so that the Finnish learners of English who already know Swedish
correctly expect English to be more like Swedish than like Finnish.
In summary, for what success is achieved in the foreign language learner,
the knowledge of the native language can assume much of the burden taken
in child first language development by the assumption of access to an innate
Universal Grammar. The foreign language learner is not a Martian, nor a
hypothetical blank-slate infant. But because the indirect knowledge of
Universal Grammar possible through the native language is incomplete and
accidental, and since it also depends on the individual learner's ability to
construct a UG-surrogate, one can expect some partial success, little chance
of perfect success, and some considerable individual variation. This, of
course, is exactly what is found. 8
3.2.
The purpose ofthe preceding discussion has been simply to point out what
a rich - though incomplete - source of information about the nature of
language a particular language is, even considered quite superficially. From
a different perspective it is possible to pose much more specific questions:
wha.ti.s the relationship of Universal Grammar to the adult's representation
of a particular grammar and how does foreign language learning reflect this
relationship? Som~ ~epresentationof a particular grammar clearly must exist
'inside the learner's head'. Although this representation is clearly not open
to conscious contemplation, it is entirely possible that it does interact with the
cognitive systems responsible for adult language learning. It is well known
that human cognition regularly must use knowledge representations which
are not available to conscious inspection. There is little reason to believe that
8 Although it seems to me that the view is quite plausible that both components of the
domain-specific acquisition have ceased to function in adults, there are other reasonable
possibilities. A potentially interesting one is that the principles which define 'possible
language' may still be around, but that the means of constructing a particular grammar, given
the data of experience, may not be. Thus A is still functioning but B is not. Clahsen (personal
communication) and Schmerling (personal communication) have suggested this. Shuldberg
(63] has developed a model of L2 acquisition which seems to make this assumption. Though
this alternative view is conceptually coherent, I do not pursue it here. The empirical issue is
essentially whether there are characteristics of learner language which prove a knowledge of
, possible language' above that which can be obtained as a byproduct of the native language.
As of now, there is no clear evidence of such characteristics. If such evidence should tum up,
a somewhat less radical view of the fundamental difference hypothesis than that proposed here
may be justified.
18
19
20
ROBERT BUy-VROMAN
particular system is constructed. But the principles which govern the interpretation of rules are clearly not only active in the process of setting up the
grammar, but also control its day-to-day operation. A reasonable guess might
therefore be that these principles are 'still around' in a much more direct sense
in the representation of a particular grammar and might, therefore, be
accessible in foreign language learning, or even operate directly on the
foreign language grammar. 10 For example, even if a particular grammar rule
of wh-fronting exists, it may well be that the general Binding constraints on
the operation ofrules (preventing wh-movement, say, from relating elements
across a relative clause boundary) are still around. This view of the place of
the principles of UG in a particular grammar is, again, not necessary, only
plausible. It is also possible that particular grammars really do contain
principles as specific as, for example, Ross constraints, although this possibility does seem unlikely given the intricacy ofthe facts which the principles
have to explain and the necessity of accounting for subtle intuitions in
constructions as exotic as parasitic gaps. Again, one may imagine intermediate possibilities in which the general principles of UG are still around (to
handle the exotic cases), but where there are also particular constraints
governing, for instance, 'movement' out ofcomplex noun phrases. (It is even
conceivable that the principles are directly encoded into particular rules,
though to allow this would seriously undermine the project of putting
constraints on possible rule systems and would require substantial rethinking
of the relationship between Universal Grammar and a particular grammar.)
Again, these are questions of fact.
An i.rtmguing pessibility implitit in the view offoreign language learning
argued here is that adft!t'f:fil~geacquisitiortcan'pl'OVideindirect evidence
on just such questions of the representation of a particular grammar. If fIrst
language knowledge takes the place of Universal Grammar itself in foreign
language acquisition, then foreign language learning may provide indirect
evidence regarding the representation of a particular grammar. Consider, for
example, the implications of the work of White [74] on the acquisition of
phenomena associated with the 'pro-drop' parameter in adult language
learning. White showed that speakers of a 'pro-drop' language, such as
Spanish, learning English (non 'pro-drop') had great difficulty 'resetting the
parameter' . Indeed, it appears that they were learning the individual effects
ofthe parameter piecemeal, as if they were peripheral constructions. I I At one
10 I am indebted to C.L. Baker for emphasizing the potential importance of the distinction
between rules and such principles.
11 This is my interpretation, not White's conclusion. She was concerned to show the
relevance of parameter setting to foreign language learning research.
21
,level, of course, this is strong evidence for the view that foreign language
learning is unlike first language development. One might even say that
foreign language learning is 'all peripheral'. At another level, the result is
most happily accommodated in a theory of the representation of a particular
grammar in which parameters are no longer even around to be reset (or, at
least, are inaccessible to the learner).1213
From a slightly different perspective, foreign language learning can also
provide evidence for or against a specific proposal that something is a
consequence of Universal Grammar. To the extent that Universal Grammar
is unavailable to the foreign language leamer, one will expect that something
which follows from Universal Grammar and which is underdetermined by
the data of experience (plus the representation of the particular native
language grammar) will be unlearn'able by the adult. Since first language
acquisition takes place in the presence of Universal Grammar and foreign
language learning takes place without it, 0Re'''tlftft tmpe that the comparative
study of fIrst and foreign language learning can contribute to the delineation
ofthe character ofthe innate learning system. Chomsky [13:9] suggested that
the study of 'language deficit' might, in principle, make a contribution to our
understanding of these issues. In the framework adopted here, foreign
language learning is rightly considered a case of 'language deficit', in this
sense.
22
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
4. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
The proposal advanced here to explain the substantial obvious differences
between child language development and adult foreign language learning is
that in adults the language acquisition device ceases to operate, and that
15 One way to view this aspect of the problem is from the perspective of mathematical
linguistics. Because general human cognition must be able to deal with such a wide variety of
systems (not just the human languages), it clearly runs the danger of trying to pick out the
language from much too large a set. If that set is really much too large (like the set ofrecursively
enumerable languages), then Gold's [30] theorems would apply, and the impossibility of
foreign language learning without negative evidence would follow.
23
4.1. THE Ll
INTERFERENCE HYPOTHESIS
The idea that interference from the first language is the major obstacle to
adult foreign language learning was dominant in (at least American) applied
24
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
linguistics from the forties through the late sixties. Here is a classic statement
of the position:
The basic problems [of foreign language learning] arise not out of any
essential difficulty in the features of the new language themselves, but
primarily out of the special 'set' created by the fIrst language habits
(Charles C. Fries, in his forward to Lado's contrastive analysis textbook
[39:vD.
16 Actually, it has been pointed out that even within habit formation theory, there were
reasons to reject proactive inhibition, since the relevant animal studies which provided the basis
for the notion normally dealt with cases where an old set of habitual responses is extinguished
and replaced by a new set. First languages are not extinguished when second languages are
learned (Selinker [66]).
17 The most influential early study is that of Dulay and Burt [15]. Dulay, Burt and Krashen
[19:102-8] provides a summary of the research in the seventies.
25
The important point is that many errors are clearly not the result of interference, no matter how one counts.
26
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
no real change in the language acquisition device occurs at puberty. The LAD
does not shut off, nor does it even 'degenerate'. Rather, the necessary input
may be kept out" [36:216]. Children either do not have such a filter, or it is
relatively weak. The filter strengthens (or arises) around puberty, and once
strengthened, it may stay strong indefinitely. Hence, the correlation of age
with degree of success.
With the positing of the filter, the input hypothesis changes from an
appealingly concrete explanation to one based on difficult to specify internal
states ofmind. What is this filter exactly? How can one tell whether it is strong
or weak (apart from noticing how successful language learning is)? Most
what specific characteristic does the filter have (What is
'bandwidth'?) which cuts out particular aspects of the input? And how does
the lack of just these particular input characteristics account for acquisition
failure? Note that it makes little sense to think that the hypothetical filter
would eliminate, say, every third sentence to which the learner is exposed,
and that this could explain failure. Krashen, borrowing terminology from
Stevick [70], speaks of the input in some cases as "striking deeper" [36:212].
We are now sliding from theory into metaphor.
In order to evaluate the input-cum-filter proposal, it will be necessary for
its proponents to tell us much more exactly what the filter is, how it arises or
is strengthened, and how its operation on the input can result in failure of the
LAD (which is presumed still to operate and which, after all, is an extremely
powerful engine, well-designed to be resistant to degenerate data and input
deficiencies). This last and most essential step will also require some
specification of the theory of the LAD (or at least of its crucial vulnera6Ie
aspects). Adherents of the input hypothesis have not yet addressed this
question.2 The input hypothesis still lacks any specified acquisition model.
4.3.
27
dult learning undeniably is. I have taken this as an argument that child first
:anguage development and adult foreign language learning are fundamentally different.
However, affect can be built into a version of the L1 =L2 perspective, and
has been used in attempts to explain differences in success. This requires a
denial of the (apparently) obvious, i.e., that child language development is
not crucially influenced by affective factors. Given the universal success of
children, these crucial affective factors, whateverthey are, must be invariably
present in childhood. Th~ difficult.y with this approach i~ that .it is not ch~ar
how to specify these cruCial affectIve factors and how to IdentIfy them WIth
the factors seen to influence adult language learning. For example, Heyde
[31] shows a correlation between proficiency and self-esteem in adult
learners. Do all children have equal (and perfect) self-esteem? Naiman,
Frohlich, Stem and Todesco [51], in a general study of what makes a good
language leamer, report an apparent lack of self-confidence among less
successful second language learners. Do all children have equal (and perfect)
self-confidence? There is a real danger here that concepts like 'self-esteem'
(etc.) may end up being defined as 'self-esteem (etc.) in whatever sense
children all may be said to have it and use it for language development.'
Although efforts have so far failed to define exactly what these crucial factors
are which all children have and which adults do not always have, one should
perhaps not give up entirely. Young children are, after all, very different from
adults in many respects.
However, even if one could spot some consistent affective difference, it
would still be necessary to present a theory oflanguage acquisition in which
such a difference could be expected to influence language acquisition in the
observed ways. This requirement is analogous to that which filter theorists
must meet in showing just what the filter is, and how it would work in a
general theory of language acquisition. As it stands, the affect hypothesis
amounts to saying that children have a certainje ne sais quoi that is absent in
adults, and which is crucial to language acquisition je ne sais comment.
In many foreign language learning studies which purport to zero in on the
affective factors, it seems just as likely that the affective variable is the result
of proficiency, rather than the cause. If this is true, then one might truly
conclude that if a child should (for some mysterious reason) fail to acquire its
native language, it would have, for example, a poor self image - be anxious,
withdrawn, unwilling to speak. But now the explanation is backwards. For
example, in the Naiman, Frohlich, Stem and Todesco study cited above, it
was discovered that learners of French who enthusiastically raise their hands
in class to volunteer also tend to do well on proficiency tests. The poorer
r'
1
28
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
29
Felix has suggested that adults do not suffer from some lack, but rather
from an excess. Adult general problem-solving gets in the way of a still
fun9tioning language acquisition system [22], [24], [25]. The story proceeds
as follows. We know that language is a complex and abstract fonnal system.
We know that children of age two cannot, in general, deal with abstract
formal systems (compare Piaget's stage ofconcrete operations). Since young
children can develop language, we can argue that a Language Specific
Cognitive System (LSC) allows the child to come up with the fonnal
properties oflanguage, even though fonnal systems in general are beyond the
child. In young children, the LSC is the only cognitive module capable of
dealing with language. (The LSC is the Language Acquisition Device of
other terminology.) So far we are on familiar ground.
Around puberty, humans develop a general ability to deal with abstract
fonnal systems. Felix identifies this development with the onset of Piaget's
stage of fonnal operations. Felix calls the newly available general fonnal
ability the 'Problem Solving Cognitive System' (PSC). Now the adolescent
has two ways to approach the processing oflanguage data: either through the
LSC or the PSC. That is,theProblem Solving Cognitive System begins to
compete. with the LattgnageSpeCific Cognitive System in the analysis of
languagedat!. However, the PSC, unlike the LSC, is not particularly wellequipped to deal with language acquisition. (All the standard arguments
about general problem-solving being unable to account for language acqui-
This law is not absolute. Some people seem not to depend so much on overt success for
self-image, and some people like to do things which they are not good at. This variation may
explain why the observed correlations in the French study are only modest (r is about .3 to .4).
22 Felix, ofcourse, recognizes this problem. He suggests a sort ofloop or bleed-across, where
some of the input which makes its way past an affective filter into the PSC might then also feed
the LSC. In this way, the affective filter on the PSC might indirectly affect the LSC. To the
extent to which modifications of this sort are necessary, the model loses much of its appeal.
4.4.
21
ROBERT BLEY~VROMAN
30
(Asher and Garcia [4], Seliger, Krashen and Ladefoged [65]). The obvious
explanationfor these successes within the framework ofcompeting cognitive
systems would have to be a delayed development of fonnal operations. This
surely cannot be the reason. From the perspective adopted by the fundamental difference hypothesis, the decline of the LAD is not a consequence of the
rise offormal operations, but an independent development. It clearly does not
take place at puberty, but some years later, perhaps toward the end of the
teens. We might therefore expect that the early teens, where both fonnal
operations and the LAD are available, would even be an especially good time
for foreign language learning. This would be in accord with the evidence
cited by Snow [69].
A final difficulty is conceptual. It is implausible that an existing cognitive
system, designed perfectly for a specific task, should then be somehow
blocked by a later arising system, ill-suited for that task. It is not impossible
that such a situation should arise in evolution, but it seems unlikely. Humans
possess a good system for depth perception. This they have at a very young
age, long before formal operations. After the onset of formal operations,
humans do not then cease to use the old system for depth perception, instead
relying on formal geometrical analysis (and bumbling about). Rather, humans regularly use general problem-solving precisely for cases in which no
specific cognitive module provides an adequate solution. General problemsolving will ordinarily be observed to supplement domain-specific systems,
not to supplant them. If the LSC did cease to operate, as argued here, then it
would be natural for the PSC to take over. If the LSC did continue to be
available and in good shape, it is difficult to see why it would not process
linguistic data, as it is designed to.
31
DIFFICULTY ORDERS
The second argument that the same system underlies child and adult
language learning is the one most frequently cited. It is based on the fact,
abundantly documented in numerous studies, that there exists a 'difficulty
order' (or 'acquisition order') for L2. For example, learners have been shown
in many studies to be more accurate in their use of the progressive -ing than
in their use of the third person singular -s. 23
The idea is that such invariant orders are characteristic of an internally
driven developmental process. This style of argumentation is due primarily
23 Well known examples of difficulty order studies include especially those of Dulay and
Burt [15] [16] [17] [18]; Bailey, Madden and Krashen [5]; Larsen~Freeman [40]; and Hakuta
[30]. A large number of applied linguistics doctoral dissertations of the late seventies also deal
with the issue. Many of these studies deal with children learning second languages, as well as
adults. This does not affect the argument here.
32
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
33
morphemes are mastered and the score on the SAl difficult to interpret.
Although the method is not completely circular, the interaction of the
measure with the order does weaken the conclusions.
No study of morpheme difficulty order is without its problems. Still, a
variety of experimental designs and data analysis procedures have tended to
yield roughly comparable orderings. The fact that different experiments are
flawed in different ways, yet all tend toward the same conclusion, suggests
that there is indeed something to the difficulty order phenomenon which is
not entirely artifactitious. Although the concept of 'invariant acquisition
order' is somewhat overdrawn, more errors are indeed made at any given
point on certain morphemes, and those morphemes also take longerto master.
It seems fair to say that some aspects of a language are, in fact, more difficult
than others.
The observed first and second language orders are not the same, although
there is a partial similarity. For example, possessives, quite early in first
language acquisition, are later in second language acquisition; articles and
'contractible' copulas are earlier in second language acquisition than in first.
There is no agreed on explanation for these differences.
However, even if one accepts as an established fact that there is an L2
difficulty order and that it resembles the L1developmental sequence, it is still
not correct to conclude that the same processes underlie fIrst and second
language acquisition. The difficulty is that similar phenomena may have
quite different explanations. (One recalls the evolutionary biologist's distinction between homology and analogy.) Although the Ll order may
conceivably have its roots in the operation ofa language-specific acquisition
faculty, the L2 order may be caused by other factors. Arguing from similarity
of effect to similarity of cause i~ especially problematic when, as in the case
of language acquisition, no adequate theoretical account exists of either
phenomenon.
We do not know what causes the fIrst language orders. Of the range of
suggestions which have been made, including especially such notions as
complexity, salience, frequency, essentialness, concreteness, or the like,
none seem entirely satisfactory. And especially important to the extent
they are adequate, such general concepts as these "may also occur in the
acquisition of other cognitive tasks than language," as Taylor [71:235]
correctly points out. That is, they may be consequences ofsome more general
property ofhuman learning, and not attributable ofnecessity to some specific
property of a domain-specific language acquisition system. John R. Anderson makes a similar point from an evolutionary perspective: "It seems only
reasonable to suppose that the mind would evolve multiple overlapping
34
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
35
which finds some aspects oflearning a language more difficult than others. 24
As an analogy, one might point out the logical errors of an even weaker
argument in favor ofL1=L2. This is the so-called'silent period' argument (cf.
especially Jones [33] and the references cited there). Children do not begin
to speak at birth. A year or more often passes before they begin to talk, and
dramatic syntactic development usually waits till the third year of life. One
also can observe in second language learners (for example, elementary
school or kindergarten children who have moved to a new country) a period
of perhaps some months where they say little or nothing (Newmark [53]
reports such a case in a Dutch Montessori school). Occasionally, one sees this
in adults, especially when. they are not instructed, or when there is no
particular pressure for early production. Is the fact of this 'silent period' in
both L 1 and L2 learners evidence that both groups are using the same
acquisition process? We do not really know what causes this silent period in
either LI or L2learners. However, one may quite reasonably speculate that
young infants have not yet undergone the necessary physical- in particular,
neurological- development for language to be produced. What of the silent
period of second language learners? Perhaps they are insecure. Perhaps they
simply don~t know enough yet. Perhaps it helps in learning a complex task
(especially without instruction) just to observe and listen for a time, (this was
Newmark's conclusion). Adults learning to play poker (like language,
frequently a high-stakes game) often prefer to watch for a time before
playing. Does this reflect a maturational development, driven by an innate
poker acquisition faculty?
The- general point is that one need not be driven to accept a kind of
linguistic recapitulationism simply because of superficial similarities between the course of child language development and the process of adult
foreign language learning, especially when we have no adequate theoretical
explanation for either. 25
24 One particular explanation for the general phenomenon of child language developmental
sequences poses special difficulties in its extension to adult foreign language learning. This is
the proposal, specifically advanced by Felix [24], and explored by Eubank [21], that the stages
are the result of (presumably physical, neurological) maturation of the language faculty itself.
(Felix draws an analogy to the development of the human dentition.) It is difficult to see how
this explanation could apply to adult acquisition stages, when neurological development is
presumably complete (cf. Eubank for one interesting proposal).
2S The points made here with respect to morpheme orders apply equally to the even less clear
cases of syntactic developmental sequences which one might cite, such as the cases ofGerman
word order studied by Clahsen, Pienemann, Meisel and others (cf. Meisel et al [47]).
.,.
0
.
36
ROBERT BLEy-VROMAN
37
(6)
(7)
38
ROBERT BLEy-VROMAN
Note that the logic of this type of experiment does not require a commitment to any particular theory ofwhat aspects ofUG give rise to these effects,
only that they are UG effects. Felix points out that if there is knowledge of
a relevant contrast, it cannot result from classroom instruction:
... because in general language teachers are not even aware of this
contrast, so that the relevant asymmetry is not commonly taught.
Consequently, it seems a reasonable guess that correct intuitions about
the relevant contrast result from exactly the same source that is responsible for this knowledge in first language acquisition, namely Universal
Grammar. If, however, our subjects did not have access to Universal
Grammar and were merely reproducing what they had been taught in
class, they should be unaware of the relevant contrast in English. [25:4]
It is also important, ofcourse, that the native language not have equivalent
examples which show the effects of UG in exactly the same way. Felix's
subjects were native speakers of German. 26 In German, for example the thattrace effect does not show up since neither subjects nor objects can be
extracted from that-clauses; there are no superiority effects in German at all
(although the reasons are still unclear); and there are no believe class 'EeM'
verbs ('Raising to Object' verbs). Felix suggests in each case that merely
relying on the grammaticality ofnative language equivalents would not allow
the learner to make the correct judgements. Because the study is very
preliminary, I will not review these arguments in detail. What is important is
the logic of the experiment, and it is correct.
In Felix's study of 48 native speakers of German learning English as
adults, they performed significantly better than chance, getting correct
judgements in about 70% of the cases. They correctly accepted 57% of the
grammatical examples, and correctly rejected 80% of the ungrammatical
examples. On the face of it, these results don't look good for either position
on adult access to Universal Grammar. If adults do have access to Universal
Grammar, surely they ought to perform better. Less than 60% correct on the
grammatical cases (where 50% would have been possible by random guessing) is especially embarrassing. Nevertheless, it is better than chance, and
Felix concludes cautiously that "it seems difficult to maintain that adult
26 Felix also gave the test to three native English speakers. They didn't do much better than
the Germans. Felix uses this result to strengthen his argument for similarity between native and
non-native speakers. It could as well show a defect in the design ofthe test, or show the difficulty
in getting subjects to understand what is meant by a grammaticality judgement, or show that
three subjects is not an adequate number.
39
second language learners do not have any consistent intuitions about grammaticality contrasts involving Universal Grammar" [25:10]. These results
are too tentative and ambiguous to justify detailed scrutiny here. Felix and
others (Georgette Ioup, ofthe University of New Orleans, andI) have refmed
the experimental technique and have collected similar evidence from Japanese and Korean adult learners ofEnglish. Preliminary analysis of the results
suggests results similar to Felix's: performance is not very good, but it
appears better than chance in many cases. Lydia White, at McGill University,
is doing work with the same logic. In the near future we can probably expect
to see many such studiesY
If additional work along these lines should show that adult learners do
have knowledge which somehow requires access to principles of Universal
Grammar, this will constitute clear counterevidence to the position argued in
this paper (at least in its absolute form, cf. footnote 8).
40
in exactly equivalent examples. There are two possibilities here: 1) the native
language does have a contrast in equivalent examples, although that contrast
has a different (perhaps non-UG) basis; and 2) the native language does have
a contrast based on UG in the same way, although not in exactly equivalent
examples.
Felix's study of knowledge of the contrast between Jones was easy to
persuade to come to the party vs. *Jones was easy to expect to come to the
party can provide an example of both possibilities. The contrast in these socalled tough-movement examples depends on the difference between Control ('Equi') verbs like persuade (I persuaded Jones to come) vs. 'Exceptional Case-marking' ('Raising to Object') verbs like expect (l expected
Jones to come to the party). This difference in verb type interacts with
principles ofUG to yield the grammaticality contrast in the tough-movement
examples. In German, the expect-class verbs are not ECM verbs; they cannot
occur in accusativum cum infinitivo (*1ch erwarte ihn zu gehen "I expect him
togo'). So, Felix argues, the learnercannotknow the properties ofECMverbs
from the properties of the German equivalents of expect-class verbs. Can
knowledge of German nevertheless allow the learner of English to get the
grammaticality contrast right? This can happen in two ways, corresponding
to the two possibilities outlined above.
First, there is, of course, a syntactic contrast in German between verbs of
the persuade class (zwingen, iiberreden, etc.) and verbs of the expect class
(glauben, erwarten, etc.). German verbs of the persuade class (Control or
'Equi' verbs) can occur in accusativum cum infinitivo (Ich zwang ihn zu
gehen) while the expect class verbs cannot. Thus, German itself provides the
relevant verb classes, and the learner may already expect to find syntactic
differences between these classes in English. Suppose, further, that the
learner attempts to 'translate' the English examples into German. German
does have a construction like tough-movement. Er ist leicht zu sehen 'He is
easy to see. ' The ungrammatical English expect sentence, if translated using
the tough-movement structure is ungrammatical in German as well, but the
grammatical English persuade sentence is clearly better. (Although some
speakers may find it awkward, all find the iiberreden sentence much better
than the erwarten sentence.)
(8)
(9)
41
The reason the German sentence in (9) is ungrammatical is, of course, not
the same as the reason the English sentence is ungrammatical. The German
sentence is ungrammatical because erwarten cannot occur in accusativum
cum infinitivo. The English sentence is ungrammatical even though expect
can occur in accusativum cum infinitivo. Here, the native language provides
a corresponding grammaticality contrast in equivalent examples, even though
the native language contrast does not have the same basis as the foreign
language contrast. If the learner makes such equivalences, he may get the
foreign language judgement right, though for the wrong reasons.
But suppose the learner does not make these equivalences. The learner
may still be able to find out the properties of'ECM verbs' in tough-movement
constructions from the native language. Here is where the second possibility
comes in. Although German expect class verbs are not ECM, German verbs
of sensory perception (sehen, horen, etc.) do occur in structures which are
arguably 'ECM' (Ich sah ihn kommen 'I saw him come'). These structures
cannot 'undergo tough-movement' (*Er ist leicht kommen zu sehen; *Er ist
leicht zu sehen, kommen). Thus, although UG does not constrain exactly
equivalent examples, UG may constrain other examples in the appropriate
way.
Since, in these cases, the correspondence between native and foreign
language is not exact, but only partial and indirect, we can expect to see
learner scores on judgement tests which are better than chance, though not
perfect. And we should expect considerable inter-subject variation, depending on whether and on how the indirect connections are made.
42
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
43
44
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
6. CONCLUSION
On balance there is as yet no clear evidence for the continuing operation
of a domain-specific acquisition system in adult foreign language learning.
Although more research should be done, especially with respect to subtle
intuitions of grammaticality in adult learners of a language typologically
quite distinct from their native language, at present it is prudent to assume that
foreign language learning is what it so clearly seems to be: an instance of
general adult problem-solving.
This is not necessarily a pessimistic conclusion neither for a person
actually trying to learn a foreign language as an adult nor for a person teaching
adults,29 nor for the researchers attempting to fmd out something about
human cognition and the structure of language by studying adult language
learning.
Even though adults may not be able to learn a language 'like a child', there
is clearly no reason to believe that they still cannot, with effort, motivation,
and the proper learning environment, achieve an ability to perform in ways
nearly indistinguishable from native speakers. The fact that adults already
have perfect knowledge of at least one language is a valuable' leg up' , and the
general human learning capacity is very powerful indeed. A fundamental
difference between the two sorts of language learning also legitimizes the
traditional pedagogic search for better methods of helping adults learn methods which go beyond trying to get the adult to learn as a child. It suggests
28Parsing difficulty may easily be the explanation for the results on the Right Roof
Constraint obtained by Ritchie [57], especially since Ritchie did not obtain absolute
grammaticality judgements, but only relative rankings on parts of sentences.
29 Many researchers in second language acquisition perce"ive that it is pessimistic (or
nihilistic) to conclude that adults cannot learn (and succeed) like children and that this could
'imply a lowered expectancy on the part of both teachers and students' (Krashen [36:205]).
Jones, for example, says that an important motivation for his attempts to show the inadequacy
of the critical period hypothesis 'is to dispel the suggestive barrier to SLA [second language
acquisition] in both learners and teachers' [33:85].
45
REFERENCES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
r
46
ROBERT BLEY-VROMAN
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
47
r
Linguistic Analysis, Volume 20, Numberl-2, 1990
McGill University
1. INTRODUCTION
Within the principles and parameters framework, it is assumed that certain
aspects of language must be innately present in the first language (Ll)
learner, helping to account for the fact that the child manages to acquire all
the complexities and subtleties ofgrammaralthough these are underdetermined
by the input data (Chomsky [3]). This innate structure is known as Universal
Grammar (UG) and it consists of principles which predispose the child to
organize language in certain ways, leading to rather limited possibilities for
grammar construction instead of the full range that would be logically
allowed if language learning consisted only of applying general inductive
learning strategies or problem-solving procedures. In addition, there is some
parametric variation within Universal Grammar: a limited number ofoptions
are associated with certain principles, which, in consequence, work slightly
differently from language to language. These options are assumed to be built
in so that the language learner's range of choices is severely circumscribed.
Data from the language being learned will trigger the relevant option.
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the potential relevance
ofUG, particularly as realized in Government and Binding Theory (Chomsky [3]), for explaining certain aspects of foreign or second language (L2)
acquisition. Some argue that UG might be a component in an overall theory
of L2 acquisition. Those who disagree nevertheless feel that the issue is
sufficiently important that they should make their reasons for disagreement
clear.
* This paper was originally presented at the Second Language Research Forum, Los
Angeles, Feb. 1987. I should like to thank Mike Sharwood Smith for arranging the testing of the
Dutch learners of ESL. The research reported here was supported by grant noAI0-84-0211
from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, for which I am grateful.
50
Linguistic Analysis, 20:50-63 (1990)
51
There are several reasons for this interest. In the first place, with the
introduction of the concept of parametric variation, mainstream generative
grammar has accommodated the fact of language variation, something it
previously tended to neglect. This has opened up the possibility ofexplaining
areas where different languages are involved, as is, of course, the case with
L2 acquisition. Secondly, it is only comparatively recently that the "logical
problem" of language acquisition has been well-articulated. Linguists, as
well as L1 and L2 acquisition researchers, have paid more attention to
learnability arguments which focus on the complexity of the end result of the
acquisition process. Many properties of the target grammar are
underdetermined by the input, i.e., could not be acquired on the basis of some
general learning mechanism extracting regularities from the data the learner
is exposed to. Input is misleading in certain ways, and insufficiently precise,
and negative evidence is not reliably available. In consequence, linguists
argue that UG must have certain specific properties in order to explain how
language is acquired. Thirdly, although an innate component has always been
assumed in the Chomskyan framework, in early years proposals for the
content of this component were surprisingly sparse, so that it was quite
difficult to come up with specific proposals as to what might be guiding the
language learner. Most early work on universals in L2 acquisition reflects
this; there is an assumption that there are universals without suggesting what
they might be, and those that were proposed were often not the type of
universals assumed in linguistic theory at that time. In contrast, at the present
time, the form and content of UG are the subject of extensive investigation
within linguistic theory. Proposals are considerably more precise than they
were and it becomes possible to consider seriously whether or not UG plays
a part in the second language acquisition process.
2.
PARAMETERS OF
A number ofL2 researchers have chosen to look at cases where the L1 and
L2 differ in terms ofthe values the two languages require for some parameter
ofUG. Hilles [11], Phinney [16] and White [21,22] have all investigated the
pro-drop parameter (Chomsky [3]), arguing that L2learners initially carry
over the LI value of that parameter. Hilles, Phinney, and White independently found that native speakers of Spanish incorrectly treat English as if it
were a pro-drop language.
Related claims are made by Flynn [10] who investigates a parameter
relating to the position of heads of phrasal categories. Head position varies
52
LYDIA WHITE
from language to language; in some cases, heads are to the left of their
complements while in others, they are to the right. Flynn claims that when
the head positions ofL1 and L2 are different, this leads to a delay in acquiring
properties associated with the L2 parameter setting.
Others have looked at cases where there is either a parameter with more
than binary values or where multiple parameters are involved. As an example
of the former, Finer and Broselow [9] considered the five-valued parameter
for reflexive binding proposed by Wexler and Manzini [20]. They found that
Korean learners of English assume a binding domain for reflexives which is
an option of UG exemplified in neither the Ll nor the L2 but which is
permitted in other languages. Similarly, duPlessis et al. [6] have suggested
that several parameters may interact in L2 acquisition, feeding into each other
in ways which, again, do not necessarily lead to the correct L2 value or the
incorrect L 1value, but to a combination ofvalues characteristic ofsome other
language. Even though the Ll parameter settings were not adopted in the
above cases, the L 1 might indirectly have contributed to the failure to adopt
the L2 values.
3. ON THE AVAILABILITY OF UO
Some of the above results suggest that the L2 learner's access to UG is
mediated via the LI. This claim is actually consistent with two very different
positions (White [23]). On the one hand, UG might be available to L2
learners, with the L 1 providing temporary access, that is, with L 1 parameter
settings being adopted by learners as an interim theory of how the L2 is
organized, but with parameter resetting to the L2 value not ruled out in
principle. Some such assumption underlies most of the work reported above.
On the other hand, UG might be unavailable, with the Ll providing tJIe
learner's only access to UO-like knowledge. A number of researchers have
recently argued for the latter position. They accept that UO guides Ll
acquisition, but claim that it is no longer available to adult learners (BleyVroman [2]; Clahsen and Muysken [5]; Schachter [17]).
The clearest exponent of this position is Bley-Vroman [2], who argues for
a fundamental difference between child Ll acquisition and adult L2 acquisition. He claims that second language acquisition is guided by mechanisms
which are not specifically linguistic, in contrast to first language acquisition.
The kinds of rules that adult L2 learners internalize are not constrained by
UG; they are not natural language rules but are the result ofproblem-solving,
similar to problem-solving in domains other than language. This difference
accounts for a number of well-known differences between Ll and L2
53
r
54
LYDIA WIDTE
55
and
or
(ii) a. is co-indexed with ~.
Government requires a. and ~ to be within the same maximal projection, with a. minimally
c-commanding~. On this definition the proper governors are N, V, A and P, or a coindexed
antecedent within the same maximal projection.
4 For ease of discussion, I will assume the analysis of that-trace phenomena as it was prior
to Chomsky [4].
LYDIA WHITE
56
In other words, the positive evidence from English does not indicate any
particular difference between cases where that is retained and cases where it
is omitted.5 If L2 learning proceeds only by means of general problemsolving, the learner could reasonably make the generalization that the
occurrence of that is optional. The only indication that it is not always
optional is the non-occurrence of forms like (1 c). It is usually assumed in the
learnability literature that it is impossible for learners to detect such nonoccurrences without negative evidence (Berwick rll: Wexler and Manzini
[20]).
Assuming, then, that the impossibility of that in structures like (1c) is not
self-evident in the input, Bley-Vroman's first condition has been met: the
English input underdetermines the correct characteristics of the language
with respect to extraction of subjects from embedded clauses. Could L2
learners resort to his second condition and reconstruct the impossibility of
that on the basis of the L 1 situation? The learners to be considered here are
native speakers of Dutch. In Dutch, that trace violations are possible
(Engdahl [7]; Koopman [14]; Koster [15]). That is, in contrast to the situation
in English, an embedded subject can be extracted in Dutch, leaving a
complementizer next to the empty category, as in (4):
(4)
57
mentizer cannot be deleted in these cases. The surface data in the Ll Dutch,
then, do not appear to allow the L2learner to work out the relevant properties
of English.
However, the question at issue is really whether more abstract properties
ofUG could be reconstructed via the L 1. Both Dutch and English observe the
ECP, in that empty categories must be properly governed. They differ in how
this is achieved. In the Dutch sentence (4), the empty subject position after
a complementizer must be properly governed in some way to avoid an ECP
violation. This can be achieved if it is assumed that languages differ with
respect to what categories they allow as proper governors (Huang [12]). In
Dutch, COMP is a proper governor (duPlessis et al. [6]) and hence it can
govern the trace left by an extracted subject. (Koopman [14] gives a slightly
different analysis which has the same effect. She suggests that in Dutch, but
not in English, the index of the trace in COMP can percolate up to the COMP
node which then acts as a proper governor:)
IfL2learners can only reconstruct UG via the L 1, one would expect Dutch
learners ofEnglish to assume that COMP is a proper governor in English and
hence that that-trace sequences are possible. If, on the other hand, UG is still
fully reactivatable, then not only should the ECP still be available, but so also
should the possibility of detecting differences in the permissible proper
governors allowed by different languages.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE.
Data from a pilot study ofDutch-speaking learners ofEnglish suggest that
they have unconscious knowledge of the difference in status between
extractions of embedded subjects and extractions of objects over a complementizer, in particular that they recognize the need for the complementizer
to be absent in the case of subject extractions.
Subjects were sixty two Dutch adults, who started learning English as
adolescents at high school in the Netherlands and who were, at the time of
testing, studying English intensively at a university, at an advanced level.
Thirty adult native speakers of Canadian English served as controls. The test
was a preference task in which subjects were presented with pairs of
sentences, in written form. They were asked to compare the sentences and
choose one of three responses: the first sentence seems better; the second
sentence seems better; they seem the same. The sentence pairs involved
identical vocabulary and structure, and differed only as to the presence or
absence of the complementizer, which was found sometimes in the first
sentence of the pair, sometimes in the second. Three of the sentence pairs
58
LYDIA WHITE
were like (Ia) and (lb), involving extractions of objects, and six of the pairs
were like (1 c) and (Id). where subjects were extracted. In other words, the L2
learners had to compare subject extractions with subject extractions, and
object extractions with object extractions. with and without the complementizer. They never had to compare a subject extraction with an object
extraction. (See Appendix for test sentences.) In addition, there were pairs
relevant to other structures, which will not be discussed here.
Results are tabulated in (6) according to whether subjects preferred the
sentence where that was retained (+ that) or the sentence where that was
omitted (-that) or whether they thought both to be equally acceptable (same).
The table gives both the absolute numbers of responses and these responses
expressed as percentages.
(6)
Subjects
+ that
Objects
+ that
- that
8
9%
73
81%
Same
9
10%
+ that
+ that
23
- that
112
12.5% 61%
Same
49
26.5%
The results show that both the native speakers and the Dutch learners of
English treat extraction over a complementizer differently in the two cases.
If they are comparing sentences involving the extraction of the subject, there
is a strong tendency to prefer the sentence without the complementizer that.
If they are comparing sentences involving the extraction of the object, the
sentence without the complementizer is still preferred, but to a lesser extent.
In the case of subject extractions the [-that] choice is made almost without
exception by the control group. In the case of object extractions, this is still
the preferred option, but other possibilities are also allowed. In the latter case.
I had expected the native speakers to show a greater incidence of responses
of same, since the sentence is grammatical whether or not that is present.
However, the important thing to note here is that there is a significant
59
difference between the responses choosing the [-that] option for the two
cases: 98.5% for extracted subjects versus 81 % for extracted objects (X 2 (1,
n = 270) = 25.947,p < 0.001). This difference suggests that native speakers
do indeed treat extraction of subjects differently from extractions of objects
as far as the complementizer is concerned.6
A similar differential treatment shows up in the L2 learners: they choose
the [-that] option in 82.5% of cases of subject extractions and in 61 % of the
object extractions, and the difference is again significant (X 2 (1, n =549) =
30.616,p < 0.001). It is this differentiality that does not appear to be obvious
from the L2 input and that cannot be worked out on the basis of the way the
ECP operates in the Ll. If they were simply making the generalization that
English allows optional that-deletion, one would not expect differential
treatment of subject and object extractions with respect to the complementizer. 7 These results suggest that Dutch L2learners of English have unconscious knowledge of the relevant properties of English. In other words, UG
is reactivatable when there are parametric differences, in this case between
permissible proper governors, so that learners are not necessarily stuck with
the L 1 value (even though this may be what they start out with). What learners
know about the L2 appears to be more than they could have induced directly
from the input and more than they could have reconstructed via the L 1 alone. 8
I suggest that the above data support the contention that L2 learners still
have the ability to acquire subtle and complex properties ofthe L2. Since they
did this even though the input was misleading or insufficient, and even
though surface phenomena in the L 1 were different. as well as different
6 However, a drawback of such preference tasks is that the data do not show the status of
the various sentence types in the grammars of these people. For example. one cannot be sure
that extraction of a subject over a complementizer is disallowed, only that it is not preferred.
A more traditional grammaticality judgment task would be needed to establish this point.
7 In the case ofobject extractions, the L2learners also quite frequently use the response of
same. This is also not an LI based response, where the option of [+ that] would be required.
8 Jordens [13] tries to argue that the differential acceptance ofthe complementizer in subject
and object extractions can be traced back to properties of the Ll, Dutch. He offers two different
kinds of explanation; one depends on surface word order differences between English and
Dutch in the case of subject extractions; the other depends on the fact that object extractions
are easier to parse than subject extractions. While such a parsing difference is undoubtedly real
(ct. also Schachter and Yip [18D. it is irrelevant here. Jordens has misunderstood the issue (as
well as the nature of the task performed by these subjects) and neither of his alternative
explanations will work. As the Dutch learners ofEnglish were never asked to make a preference
judgment between a subject extraction and an object extraction, a parsing explanation or an L 1
word order explanation relying on general differences between subject and object extractions
cannot account for the differential treatment of the complementizer in the two cases (ct. Eubank
[8] for related comments).
60
LYDIA WmTE
6. CONCLUSION
It is important to remember that the fundamental difference hypothesis is
a claim about child/adult differences, rather than about Ll/L2 acquisition
differences per se. Since the subjects reported on above started learning their
L2 as adolescents, Bley-Vroman might claim that they had learned the
relevant properties before the "death" of DG, and thus that they do not
constitute a counterexample to the fundamental difference hypothesis. This
raises the issue of when (at what age) UG ceases to be available to the
language learner. If teenagers still have true access to UG (i.e., are not limited
to reconstructing UG via their LIs), then they presumably do not learn in
ways fundamentally different from child L 1 learners. In that case, none ofthe
ten fundamental characteristics of adult foreign language learning ought to
hold for teenage learners (or for child L2 learners). Yet I suspect that many
of these characteristics do hold; that is, that teenagers (and maybe even
younger children) are not guaranteed success in the L2, rarely show complete
success, show substantial variation in degree of success, fossilize, have
indeterminate intuitions, are influenced by affective factors, etc. If they
reveal these characteristics and at the same time show behavior that suggests
unconscious knowledge of aspects ofUG that could not have been obtained
via the L 1, it suggests that L 1 and L2 acquisition can be alike with respect to
the operation of UG and yet differ in other respects, and that the differences
outlined by Bley-Vroman as evidence for a lack of UO are not in fact related
to the UG issue.
Bley-Vroman notes that general similarities between Ll and L2 acquisition cannot be used to argue for the availability ofUG in L2 acquisition, since
similar behaviors might have different causes. But the same point applies in
reverse to his use of general differences between L 1 and L2 acquisition as
evidence for a lack ofUG. These differences might not relate to UG at all, but
to other factors in the L2 acquisition situation. The theory of UO involves a
claim that the native speaker's knowledge oflanguage is mediated by abstract
principles, and that child first language acquisition is constrained by such
principles. The availability or non-availability of UG in adult L2 acquisition
can only be investigated within this same domain. Indeed, much current
research focuses on the availability of specific principles and parameters of
UG to adult learners, so we may soon be closer to an answer as to whether
there really is a fundamental difference in the DO domain. (See White [23])
61
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62
LYDIA WHITE
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60. Schachter, J., A.F. Tyson and FJ. Diffley. 1976. Learner intuitions of
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61. Schumann, J. 1976. Social distance as a factor in second language
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62. Schumann, J. 1978. The pidginization process. Rowley, Mass: Newbury
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63. Shuldberg, K. 1986. Syntactic and semantic issues in second language
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71. Taylor, I. 1976. Introduction to psycholinguistics. New York: Holt,
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