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G.R.No.150644

SECONDDIVISION

EDWARDV.LACSON,G.R.No.150644
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,J.,Chairperson,
versusSANDOVALGUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA,and
GARCIA,JJ.
MAOWEEDABANLACSON
andMAONAADABANPromulgated:
LACSON,representedbytheir
motherandguardianadlitem,
LEADABANLACSON,August28,2006
Respondents.
xx

DECISION

GARCIA,J.:

PetitionerEdwardV.Lacson,fatheroftherespondentsistersMaoweeDabanLacsonandMaonaaDaban
Lacsonandhusbandoftheirmotherandguardianadlitem,LeaDabanLacson,hascometothisCourt
viathispetitionforreviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCourttoseekthereversalandsettingasideof
[1]
the Decision dated July 13, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 60203, as
[2]
reiteratedinitsResolution ofOctober18,2001denyinghismotionforreconsideration.

Fromthepetitionanditsannexes,therespondentsreplythereto,andotherpleadings,theCourtgathers
thefollowingfacts:

The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner
Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while
Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal
homeinMolo,IloiloCity,virtuallyforcingmotherandchildrentoseek,apparentlyforfinancialreason,
sheltersomewhereelse.Foramonth,theystayedwithLeasmotherinlaw,AliciaLacson,thenwithher
(Leas)motherandthenwithherbrotherNoelDaban.Aftersometime,theyrentedanapartmentonlyto
returnlatertothehouseofLeasmother.Asthetrialcourtaptlyobserved,thesistersandtheirmother,
from1976to1994,orforaperiodofeighteen(18)years,shuttledfromonedwellingplacetoanothernot
theirown.

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for
support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give
support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support,
despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward
occasionallygavetheirchildrenmeageramountsforschoolexpenses.Throughtheyearsanduptothe

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occasionallygavetheirchildrenmeageramountsforschoolexpenses.Throughtheyearsanduptothe
middlepartof1992,Edwardsmother,AliciaLacson,alsogavesmallamountstohelpintheschoolingof
MaoweeandMaonaa,bothofwhomeventuallytookupnursingatSt.PaulsCollegeinIloiloCity.Inthe
earlypartof1995whenLea,inbehalfofhertwodaughters,filedacomplaintagainstEdwardforsupport
beforetheRegionalTrialCourtofIloiloCity,Branch33,Maoweewasabouttograduate.

[3]
InthatcomplaintdatedJanuary30,1995, as amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185, Maowee
andMaonaa,thrutheirmother,averredthattheirfatherEdward,despitebeinggainfullyemployedand
owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged
that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed
moneyfromherbrotherNoelDaban.Asshewouldlatertestify,LeahadreceivedfromNoel,bywayofa
loan,asmuchasP400,000.00toP600,000.00.

In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. He
explained,however,thathislackofregularincomeandtheunproductivityofthelandheinherited,not
hisneglect,accountedforhisfailureattimestogiveregularsupport.Healsoblamedfinancialconstraint
forhisinabilitytoprovidetheP12,000.00monthlyallowanceprayedforinthecomplaint.

As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa
supportpendenteliteatP12,000.00permonth,subjecttothescheduleofpaymentandotherconditions
[4]
setforthinthecourtscorrespondingorderofMay13,1996.

Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as
represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth
therein,orderedtheirdefendantfatherEdwardtopaythemaspecificsumwhichrepresented216months,
[5]

or18years,ofsupportinarrears.Thefalloofthetrialcourtsdecision reads:

WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendered:

1) OrderingdefendanttocompensateplaintiffssupportinarrearsintheamountofTWO
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETYSIX THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00) PESOS from
whichamountshallbedeductedONEHUNDREDTWENTYFOUR(P124,000.00)PESOS
thatwhichtheyreceivedfromdefendantfortwoyearsandthatwhichtheyreceivedbyway
ofsupportpendentlite

2)OrderingdefendanttopayTWENTYTHOUSAND(P20,000.00)PESOSasattorneysfeesand

3)Paycosts.

SOORDERED.

Therefrom,EdwardappealedtotheCAwhereathisrecoursewasdocketedasCAG.R.CV.No.60203.

[6]
Eventually,theCA,inthehereinassailedDecisiondatedJuly13,2001, dismissed Edwards appeal,
disposingasfollows

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepresentappealisherebyDISMISSEDandtheappealedDecisioninCivil
CaseNo.22185isherebyAFFIRMED.

Doublecostsagainstthedefendantappellant[EdwardLacson].

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Doublecostsagainstthedefendantappellant[EdwardLacson].

SOORDERED.(Wordsinbracketadded.)

In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate court in its
[7]
equallyassailedResolutionofOctober18,2001.

Hence,EdwardspresentrecourseonhissubmissionthattheCAerred

I.XXXWHENITAFFIRMEDTHEGRANTOFSUPPORTINARREARSFROM1976TO1994.

II. XXXINAFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORT BY RESPONDENTSUNCLE

NOELDABAN.

III.XXXINAFFIRMINGTHEAWARDOFSUPPORTEVENIFPETITIONERISNOTFINANCIALLY
CAPABLEOFPROVIDINGTHESAMETORESPONDENTS.

IV.XXXWHENITORDEREDPETITIONERTOPROVIDESUPPORTTOXXXRESPONDENTSEVEN
IF PETITIONERS OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELY
SATISFIED BY THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WHICH WERE
ALLAPPROPRIATEDBYTHERESPONDENTS.

Thepetitionlacksmerit.
Petitioneradmitsbeingobliged,asfather,toprovidesupporttobothrespondents,MaoweeandMaonaa.
Itishisthresholdsubmission,however,thatheshouldnotbemadetopaysupportinarrears,i.e.,from
1976to1994,nopreviousextrajudicial,letalonejudicial,demandhavingbeenmadebytherespondents.
HeinvokesthefollowingprovisionoftheFamilyCodetocompletehispoint:

Article203Theobligationtogivesupportshallbedemandablefromthetimethepersonwhohasarightto
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicialdemand.

Topetitioner,hisobligationtopayundertheaforequotedprovisionstartsfromthefilingofCivilCase
No.22185in1995,sinceonlyfromthatmomentcanitbesaidthataneffectivedemandforsupportwas
madeuponhim.

Petitionersaboveposturehaslittletocommenditself.Forone,itconvenientlyglossedoverthefactthat
heveritablyabandonedtherespondentsistersevenbeforetheelderofthetwocouldcelebratehersecond
birthday.Tobesure,petitionercouldnotplausiblyexpectanyofthesistersduringtheirtenderyearsto
go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his
wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with him. For another, the requisite
demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no
extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor
commonlyusedbylegaladvocatesinademandletter.Nonetheless,whatwouldpassasademandwas,
however,definitelymade.Askingonetocomplywithhisobligationtosupportowingtotheurgencyof
thesituationisnolessademandbecauseitcamebywayofarequestoraplea.Asitwere,thetrialcourt
foundthatademandtosustainanawardofsupportinarrearshadbeenmadeinthiscaseandsaidsoin
itsdecision,thus:

From1976,[respondents]mothernowandthenwenttotheir[paternal]grandmothershousebytheirfather
and asked for support this notwithstanding their fathers commitment for this purpose which the latter
embodiedinanotedatedDecember10,1975.Fortwentyoneyearsthattheyneededsupport,[petitioner]
compliedwithhisobligationforonlytwo(2)years.

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xxxxxxxxx

Last December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for the support of his children, the [respondents]
herein but failing, plaintiffs mother asked extrajudicially for her childrens support since 1976, when she
[8]
wenttohermothershouse.. (Wordsinbracketandunderscoringadded.)

Theappellatecourtmadeaparallelfindingonthedemandangle,formulatingthesameinthefollowing
wise:

Wecouldnotconferjudicialapprovalupon[petitioners]postureoftryingtoevadehisresponsibilitytogive
support to his daughters simply because their mother did not make a formal demand therefor from him.
[Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his
acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his own
handwriting.Saidnote[statingthathewillsustainhistwodaughtersMaoweeandMaonaa]alsostatedas
requested by their mother thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by
[respondents] mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that [petitioners] obligation to pay support in
[9]
arrearsshouldcommencefrom1976. (Wordsinbracketadded).

TheCourtfindsnoadequatereasontodisturbthefactualdeterminationoftheCAconfirmatoryofthatof
thetrialcourtrespectingthedemandLeamadeonthepetitionertosecuresupportfortherespondents.As
a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not
[10]
finality,saveforthemostcompellingandcogentreasons.
Notoneofthewellrecognizedexceptions
to this rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the Court
cannotgrantthepetitionerspleaforareviewoftheCAsfindingsbearingontheactualitythat,asbasis
foranawardofsupportinarrears,anextrajudicialdemandforsupporthadbeenmadeonthepetitioner
asevidencedbytheDecember10,1975noteadvertedto.Lestitbeoverlooked,thejurisdictionofthe
Courtinapetitionforreview,ashere,isgenerallylimitedtocorrectionoferrorsoflaw.Complementing
that postulate is the rule that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
[11]
alreadyconsideredintheproceedingsbelow,
exceptwhen,asearlierindicated,compellingreasons
demandareviewofthefactualconclusionsdrawnfromsuchevidence.

PetitionerssecondspecificationoferrortouchesontheCAsaffirmatoryholdingthatrespondentsuncle,
NoelDaban,advancedthemoneyfortheirsupport.Again,petitionerslamentonthematterisaveritable
callforreviewoffactualdeterminationsofthetwocourtsbelow.Itneednot,accordingly,detainuslong.
Suffice it to state in that regard that, of their close relatives, the respondents appeared to have stayed
longestwiththeiruncle,NoelDaban.Noteworthyalsoisthefactthatpetitioner,from1976to1994,only
gave Maowee and Maonaa token amounts for schooling when support comprises everything
[12]
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance and education,
or, in short,
whateverisnecessarytokeepapersonalive.Logically,thesisterswould,thrutheirmother,turntotheir
uncle(NoelDaban)fortheirsustenanceandeducationwhenpetitionerfailedtogivethesame,afailing
which stretched from their preschooling days to their college years. Since such failure has been
established,itisnotamisstodeduce,asdidthetrialcourtandtheCA,thatNoelDabanwho,owingto
considerationofkinship,hadreasonstohelp,indeedlenthissisterLeamoneytosupportherchildren.
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the
petitioner.Theprovisionreads:

Whenthepersonobligedtosupportanotherunjustlyrefusesorfailstogivesupportwhenurgentlyneeded
by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement
fromthepersonobligedtogivesupport.

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Mentionmayalsobemadethat,contextually,theresultingjuridicalrelationshipbetweenthepetitioner
[13]
and Noel Daban is a quasicontract,
an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching
himselfattheexpenseofanother.
Asfortheamountofsupportinarrears,thereisalsonoreasontodisturbtheabsolutefiguresarrivedat
bythetwocourtsbelow,appearingastheydotobereasonableandproper.Arbitrarinessrespectingthe
determinationofthefinalnumberscannotplausiblybelaidonthedoorstepsoftheCA,andthetrialcourt
beforeit,consideringthattheyfixedsuchamountbasedonthevaryingneedsoftherespondentsduring
theyearsincludedinthecomputationandtothefinancialresourcesofthepetitioner,asprovedbythe
evidenceadducedbelow.Asamatteroflaw,theamountofsupportwhichthoserelatedbymarriageand
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
[14]
meansofthegiverandtotheneedsoftherecipient.

PetitionercloseshispetitionbyurgingtheCourt,asitdidtheCAearlier,toconsideratransactionthat
transpired after the trial court had rendered judgment. We refer to the sale by Lea of half of what
petitionerclaimstobehisexclusiveorcapitalproperty.AsthepetitionerwouldhavethisCourtbelieve,
LeaandtherespondentsistersappropriatedtheP5Millionproceedsofthesaleforthemselves.Pressing
on, he alleged that the amount thus received from the sale is more than enough to fully satisfy thus
releasehimfromcomplyingwiththeunderlyingjudgmentforsupport,assumingexgratiaargumentihis
obligationtopaysupportinarrears.

Petitioners above submission is flawed by the premises holding it together. For firstly, it assumes as a
factthatwhatwassoldforP5Millionwasindeedhisexclusiveproperty.But,astheCAaptlyobserved,
there is no showing whether the property subject of the transaction mentioned by [the petitioner] is a
conjugal property or [his] exclusive property, as in fact [respondents] mother asserts that she and
[15]
[petitioner]hadseparatelysoldtheirrespectivesharesonsaidproperty.

Secondly, the respondent sisters were not party to the sale aforementioned. Petitioners suggestion,
therefore,thatpartoftheproceedsofthesalewenttothemandmaybesetoffforwhatpetitionerowes
thembywayofsupportinarrearsisunacceptable,beingatbestgratuitousandselfserving.

Petitioner,unlikeanygoodfatherofafamily,hasbeenremissinhisdutytoproviderespondentswith
support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a
neglectfulfatherofthebasicnecessitiesinlifeasifitistheirfaulttohavebeenborn.Thisdispositionis
thusnothingmorethanabelatedmeasuretorightawrongdonethehereinrespondentswhoarenoless
petitionersdaughters.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed CA decision and resolution are
AFFIRMED.

Costsagainstpetitioner.

SOORDERED.

CANCIOC.GARCIA

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CANCIOC.GARCIA
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

REYNATOS.PUNO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

ANGELINASANDOVALGUTIERREZ
AssociateJustice

RENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJustice

ADOLFOS.AZCUNA
AssociateJustice

ATESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

REYNATOS.PUNO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,SecondDivision

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttoArticleVIII,Section13oftheConstitution,andtheDivisionChairperson'sAttestation,itis
herebycertifiedthattheconclusionsintheabovedecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecase
wasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

ARTEMIOV.PANGANIBAN
ChiefJustice

[1]
PennedbyAssociateJusticeMartinS.Villarama,Jr.,withAssociateJusticeConradoM.Vasquez,Jr.,andAssociateJusticeSergioL.Pestao
(ret.)concurringRollo,pp.4449.
[2]
Id.at51.
[3]
Id.at56etseq.
[4]
Page2ofCADecisionId.at45.
[5]
Id.at6680.
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Id.at6680.
[6]
Supranote1.
[7]
Supranote2.
[8]
Page14ofRTCDecisionRollo,p.79
[9]
CADecision,p.4Id.at47.
[10]
Republicv.CA,G.R.No.116372,January18,2001,349SCRA451.
[11]
Velasquez,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.138480,March25,2004,426SCRA309,citingcases.
[12]
Art.194oftheFamilyCode.
[13]
Sta.Maria,PersonsandFamilyRelationsLaw,3rd [1999]ed.,p.684.
[14]
Art.201,FamilyCodeBaltazarv.Serfino,No.L.17315,July31,1965,10SCRA189.
[15]
CADecision,pp.56Rollo,pp.4849.

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