Seton-Watson and the Treaty of London

Author(s): Arthur J. May

Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1957), pp. 42-47
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1872585
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DOCUMENT
SETON-WATSON AND THE TREATY OF LONDON
ARTHUR J. MAY

a biography is written on the late

Professor Robert W. Seton-Watson,
no doubt the most knowledgeable British
private citizen on the affairsof south-central
Europe just prior to World War I, a substantial chapter will necessarily be devoted
to his tenacious, resourceful, and indefatigable wartime crusade on behalf of the
Czechoslovaks, the Rumanians, and the
Southern Slavs whom he knew so well and
admired with lively, though not uncritical,
affection.' The correspondence with his
friends printed here illustrates at once that
concern and his success in accumulating information on the secret Treaty of London
IWHEN

For the career and meaning of Seton-Watson

consult the Times (London), July 28, 1951 and
August 7, 1951; an appreciation by George Glasgow,
close associate of Seton-Watson in the publication of
the wartime New Europe, in Contemporary review,
CLXXX (1951), 179-82, which corrects certain
statements in the Times; an obituary notice in the
Slavonic and east European review, XXX (1951),
251-55; "Tributes to R. W. Seton-Watson: a symposium," ibid., pp. 331-63; and Gertrude SCHOPF,
"Die bsterreichische-ungarische Monarchie und Seton Watson" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 1953). A large part of this study, which is ratber
thin and short on personal judgments, relates to the
period of World War I. Miss Agnes HeadlamMorley, professor of international relations at
Oxford University, wrote to the author in October
1952:
"Some people in the English government wanted
to avoid the break-up of Austria-Hungary and to
bring about a separate peace.
"Seton-Watson thought that the quickest way
to win the war was to encourage all enemies of the
Central Powers.... He acted by conviction-not
only because the break-up of Austria-Hungary
would be a great advantage to the Allies, but because he really believed that the war was being
fought for democratic freedom and that the 'oppressed' nationalities had a right to independence.
He may have been wrong but he certainly believed
it."

42

with Italy in 1915, so damaging to South

Slav interests. Mr. William Miller, to whom
the first letter was dispatched, had made
himselfan expert on currentsouth European
complexities and at the time was stationed
in Rome as correspondent for the London
Morning Post. For permission to examine
and make use of their father's papers in the
war years, I am indebted to ProfessorHugh
Seton-Watson,of the University of London,
and Mr. ChristopherSeton-Watson,of Oriel
College, Oxford.

LONDON,

June 12, 1915.

I shouldhave liked to writeyou morethan

once,but had no reallycertainmeansof getting
a letter to you. Now at last I am able to send
this in the safe handsof Trevelyan. 2
The only practicalthing to do is for me to
tell you what I knowand to leave you to pick
out of my narrativewhat is of interest.Those
of us who are interestedin the Italo-Slavproblem formsucha tiny group,that it was obvious
from the first that we should fail to restrain
the powersthat be, if once they set theirheart
upon the wrongpolicy;but I can honestlysay
thatwe left no stoneunturned.AlsoI amgladto
say that the variousmemorandaandlettersand
reportswhichsome of us firedoff at the F[oreign] O[ffice]in the courseof the winterhave
not beenutterlywithouttheireffect.Whenthe
criticalmomentat last arrived,I was able to
convince myself that those with whom the
decisionrestedknewa greatdealmoreaboutthe
subjectthanI shouldhave daredto hope at the
beginningof the war,and that thereis a quite
genuinedesireon theirpart to do what is possible for the SouthernSlavs. But they have
the very vaguestidea of what is possible,have
2 GeorgeM.
Trevelyan,distinguishedCambridge
historian,intimate friendof Seton-Watson.

SETON-WATSON AND THE TREATY OF LONDON

been more than once led astray by quite fictitious arguments, and, I can't help feeling, they
have paid a higher price than really expert
bargainers would have given.
Here in London we first got wind of what
was up on Wednesday, April 21 [1915]-I mean
in a really concrete form (there had been rumors
of course for a long time back); and by arrangement with Steed3 my letter appeared in the
Times two days later.4 Next day Sir A. N[icolson]5 definitely expressed approval of its contents and of the idea of another letter from Sir
A. E[vans]6 appearing in the same place-in
conversation with the Editor, and at the same
time expressed his anxiety as to the delicacy
of the situation on this very question. But by
Monday [April26] the atmosphere had changed;
everyone was very secretive, and they succeeded
in not merely preventing the publication of a
leader of Steed on the subject, but also the
letter of a Liberal M.P. whom I had mobilized
to write of the [London] pact and who knows
what he is talking about. On Tuesday afternoon Steed left for Paris and during his absence
the Times was absolutely a closed door. Annan
Bryce7 wrote about it, and the editor twice
sent it back for revision (or bowdlerization)
till B[ryce] gave up the attempt in disgust.8
3 H. Wickham Steed, influential British journalist, at this time foreign editor of the Times. He was
a warm partisan of the Habsburg Slavs, and his
book The Hapsburg moharchy (New York, 1913)
went through many editions and was translated
into several languages.
4 "Italy and the Southern Slavs."'
5 British
diplomatist; undersecretary of the
foreign office, 1910-16.
6 British archeologist, with long-standing interest in the South Slavs. See Joan EVANS, Time and
chance: the story of Arthur Evans and his forbears
(New York, 1943), pp. 368-72.
7John Annan Bryce, Liberal M.P.
8 The Bryce note to Seton-Watson, May 7, 1915,
reads, in part:
"I had a letter from Robinson [Geoffrey Robinson, editor of the Times, who later chaDged his
name to the better-known Geoffrey Dawson] saying
that he could not put in my letter because it was
altogether too strong.
"I then sent him a much bowdlerised version,
which he also returns saying that since he wrote the
first he has learned that my view is somewhat
exaggerated, and that in these circumstances he
thinks it is not desirable-would be a pity to irritate
Serbia by suggesting that her prospects are worse
than they really are.
"I hope this means that Steed has brought or

43

Meanwhile we were of course getting information through the Serbian Legation, from
Pdris, Petrograd (Supilo),9 and Rome. On
Tuesday, the 27th, Boskovic10 was officially
assured that no treaty had as yet been signed;
this must have been, as we afterwards found, a
few hours before the actual signature. Sir A.
E[vans]'s letter thus appeared on the morning
of the treaty."'
written home reassuring news, not merely that he
[Robinson] has been bulldozed by the F[oreign]
O[ffice]."
Frano Supilo, editor of Novi List of Fiume,
former member of the Croatian parliament and
delegate to the Hungarian parliament.
10Math6os Boskovit, Serbian charg6 d'affaires in
London, a narrow Pan-Serb, unsympathetic to
Croatian sensibilities. So thoroughly did SetonWatson dislike Boskovit that he considered "quite
definitely working for an independent Croatia." Of a
jealous disposition, Boskovit resented the influence
that Supilo had acquired in London. Since Boskovit
was "a fatal obstacle" to cordiality between the
British and the Serb governments and between the
Serb legation in London and friends of Serbia in
Britain, Seton-Watson decided that "he must go
quam celerrime." (These observations are contained
in a memorandum evidently prepared by SetonWatson in the spring of 1915 for a conference with
South Slav leaders.)

"The Evans letter was published in the Times

on Apr. 27, 1915. A sheaf of letters from Arthur
Evans to Seton-Watson yields additional illumination on the course of events. On Apr. 4, 1915 Evans
professed to be "very anxious about the attitude of
Italy. Boskovicts [sic] seems incapable of grasping
the whole Yugoslav question." Evans hoped Supilo
would soon return from Russia, "and then we shall
have an authentic account. I have prepared a memorandum for the Foreign Office on the whole South
Slav Question . .. the impossibility of separating
off Croats and Slovenes from Serbs and stressing
that expansion to the Save Valley by a friendly
Some
power is an important British interest....
kind of neutralization of the Dalmation Coast as
regards naval armament would be fair to Italy and is
in our own interest." Evans wrote on Apr. 21, 1915,
"Italy . . . cannot quite make up her mind whether
she wants to attack her own allies or oursl"
Announcing the dispatch of a letter to the Times,
Evans on Apr. 26, 1915 went on, "I hope this news
of Russia selling Dalmatia to Italy may prove to be
exaggerated. If there is any truth in it Englishmen
must help to show its authors up. It is awkward ...
attacking one's ally, but it must be done."
And, finally, on May 1, 1915 Evans wrote:
"I am getting rather uneasy . . . with regard to
the Times. I wrote and believe you [did] too at their
direct request on the understanding that the Jugo-

ARTHUR J. MAY

44

By the end of the week we had a general

summary of the contents of the treaty and this
was so scandalous that some of us were definitely prepared to organize a campaign against the
whole intrigue or "perish in the attempt." On
Saturday [May 1] Supilo wired a long appeal
to Grey12 and Asquith"3 reminding them of
their former attitude and asking me to transmit
the telegram, instead of leaving the Legation
to do so formally.14This I did, and on Monday
[May 3] was rung up and asked to go and see
Grey on the following day. Meanwhile the
Jugoslav delegation had at last reached London,
after endless delay and difficulties (the final
slav point of view was to be backed up and I further
gathered with the approval of the Foreign Office.
Now day after day passes and the Times makes no
sign.... Taking one thing with another, I can not
help thinking that the Foreign Office has gone back
on the Times.
"The cause which we support does not however
depend on any diplomatic bargaining. It is straight
and clear and is that which the Government themselves have announced as their aim.... Have they
now the intention of handing over Dalmation populations to an alien rule? We have the right to hold
Asquith and Lloyd George and Grey himself ... to
plain professions made."
12 Sir Edward Grey, British
foreign secretary. In
his Twenty-five years (2 vols.; New York, 1925),
Grey skates over this thin ice very swiftly (II,
212-14).

13 Herbert
14

H. Asquith, British prime minister.

obstacle being the refusal of the British Consulate in Paris to vise their passports-which
at the time we put down to Italian intrigue but
was probably due merely to red tape.) (One of
us had sent them an urgent wire every day for
a week, on the plea that it was vital that they
should publish their manifesto before the fait
accompli of Italy's entry).
I, therefore, had to make it clear to Sir
E. G[rey] at the very outset that I was in the
close confidence of the Slavs and therefore
would not be playing the game in allowing him
to tell me absolute secrets, as he seemed on the
point of doing (I should then have been in an
absolutely impossible position between two
camps). He was however extremely open and
friendly, and we talked for nearly an hour, with
maps on the details of the whole Adriatic settlement."5This conversation and others with his
juniors certainly reassured me considerably and
proved to me that the informationwhich we had
pieced together from Paris and Petrograd was
unduly pessimistic. What I gathered was
however unsatisfactory enough in all conscience
and was not improved by the inside information
which Steed brought home from Paris. Since
then I have been able to fill in many gaps, and
I will now summarize the facts.
(1) The secret treaty between Italy and the
Entente powers was signed on 27 April16a
week before the Triple Alliance was denounced.
(2) Italy made a conditio sine qua non from
the very first, that no other power save herself,
Russia, France and Britain, should under
any circumstance be allowed to take part in the
negotiations and be either informed or consulted; and that only persons actually conducting the negotiations should be let in on the subject. This was of course directed against Serbia.
(3) An attempt was made to include among
the conditions a clause preventing the future
union of Serbia and Montenegro after the war,
but this was too much for our statesmen.
(4) Italy's claims to the following territory
were recognized in principle, though probably
not in detail (of this I am not positive).'7

The wire from Supilo read:

"From all sides I am assured that the British
Government wholly approves of Italy occupying our
Adriatic coast, on which we Serb-Croats have an
enormous compact majority.... Sir Edward Grey
declared to me that the British Government wishes
to settle our future according to the principle of
nationality. The same assurance was given me by
Mr. Asquith.... A terrible injustice will be done
to our cultured and civilized nation, if Italy is
allowed to occupy our shores .... Italy does not
enter to liberate but to conquer.... The vow of the
[my) whole nation would be the liberation of their
brothers, which means a new war.
"These reasons . . . compel me to place once
16 Cf. R. W. SETON-WATSON, Masaryk in Engmore before you our just cause and to beseech you land (New York, 1943), p. 62.
not to allow our nation to become the victim of such
April 26 was the actual date of the signing.
an historic crime .... We shall be grateful to the
great British nation....
17 The British text of the treaty is conveniently
"Signed, SUPILO; countersigned,PASITCH."
available in Rene ALBRECHT-CARRIi, Italy at the
On these matters consult Pavle D. OSTOV16, Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1938), pp.
The truth about Yugoslavia (New York, 1952), pp. 334-38. Articles 4 and 5 contain the territorial
58-61; for an apologia see David LLOYD GEORGE, arrangements. Cf. Carlo SFORZA, "Sonnino and his
The truth about the peace treaties (2 vols.; London, foreign policy," Contemporary review,, CXXXVI
1938), I, 28-37.
(1929), 721-32. Beyond doubt, additional informa-

SETON-WATSON AND THE TREATY OF LONDON

45

1) Trentino 2) Trieste 3) Istria 4) the islands possible to work with him, but providentially
of the Quarnero and the whole Dalmation we have Professor Cvijic20here. Even Vesnic21
mainland from the Zrmanja river southwards has not altogether risen to the occasion and set
(including the archipelago opposite Zara) to Delcasse's22back up at the critical moment.
the following line: Solta aAd Bua with Trau Spalajkovic23is unpopular in official circles in
and the three western Castelli to Italy, and the Petrograd, presumably because he underfrontier to strike inland to include Drnis, Knin, stands the Jugoslav idea, which is now out of
Vrlika and even Sinj! The Entente negotiators favour with the small clique which would like
were so ignorant that they thought they were
20 Jovan Cviji6, distinguished Serbian geographer
saving Spalato in a thoroughly satisfactory and authority on Balkan affairs. On April 4, 1915
way for Serbia, quite failing to recognize that Seton-Watson reminded him that the voice of
Vranjica (Piccolo Venezia) is the future port Russia would be decisive on the South Slav question
of Spalato not the existing harbour, and that it and begged him to urge Supilo (then in Petrograd)
would be in Italy's power under such circum- to do everything possible to keep the Russian govstances to bottle and control the trade of ernment and press loyal to the Jugoslav idea. SetonWatson informed Cviji6 in Paris on Apr. 15, 1915:
Spalato at every turn.
"I have talked to Mr. Steed on the phone and he
is
represented
side
of
intrigue
the
(5) One
by Izvolsky,18 who under the influence of the fully agrees with me that immediate publication of a
Jugoslav programmeis of vital importance. We both
Holy Synod and reactionary Orthodox in- therefore urge you to telegraph to Supilo to that
fluences, wants to keep Serbia a purely Ortho- effect. If he can draw up a programme in brief form
dox state and to throw the Croats and Slovenes and telegraph it to London in cipher, we will arrange
to the winds. He cut a pretty figure when it for its immediate publication.
"Please also wire to Nig [headquarters of the
was pointed out to him by some of the Jugoslav deputation that this arrangement sacrifices Serbian ministry], asking them to tell Dr. Trumbi6
to Italy all of the Orthodox population of Dal- la Croatian politician, former member of the Dalmamatia while leaving not less than 800,000 tian diet and the Austrian parliament; president of
the Jugoslav Committee in exile] that his presence
Catholics to Serbia (in Dalmatia and Bosnia). is
urgently required in London, and that he ought
He knew so little about the affair that he fancied to come here as soon as poss[ible] after talking with
all the Orthodox in Dalmatia were in the necessary people in Ni.....
Bocche.
"Finally I would suggest your inquiring from
(6) Italy's game is to prevent Croatia and Mr. Vesni6 as to whereabouts of Dr. Hinkovit
Serbia from being united. Her efforts to empha- [Croat, member of the Jugoslav Committee], besize the difference between Serbia and Croatia cause if Supilo sends programme, we must obtain
there
fitted in with Izvolsky's ideas, which are still Hinkovit's consent for his name to appear
under the spell of the Frank party and confuse is not a day to be lost.
"Meanwhile I am wiring to
[Professor
Ivo Frank"9with Croatia and the Croat race!!! Thomas G. Masaryk, deputyMas[aryk]
in the Austrian
The result of this emphasis has however been to parliament and leading spirit of the Czech emigres
impress upon the mind of Sir E. G[rey] the working for an independent Czecho-slovakia],
fact that the Croats are an element in the situa- asking him to come to London as soon as poss[ible].
tion which deserves to be reckoned with and He will be of great assistance, not merely in Bomay conceivably even attain its independence. h[emian], but also in S[outh] Slav Q[uestion].
"P.S. Steed is afraid that Italy is on point
This is I believe what has saved Fiume for
of
entering."
[A South Slav "Appeal to the British
of
to
think
absurd
Croatia, it being obviously
nation and parliament," protesting cession of terrian independent Croatia without its only port.
tory occupied by their fellow nationals to Italy,
Serbia has been badly served by her diplo- appeared in the Times (London), and Manchester
matists. The one here is unspeakable. It is im- Guardian, May 13, 1915.]
21

tion on this subject will be revealed in the great

Italian diplomatic papers, I documenti diplomatici
ilaliani, 5th ser., now in process of publication.
18Alexander Izvolsky, Russian diplomatist, at
the time ambassador to France.
19Ivo [Josef] Frank, leader of the Croatian clerical faction, the Party of Pure Right, which desired
a kingdom of Croatia either under the Habsburg
crown or as an independent state.

Milenko R. Vesni6, Serbian minister to France.

Delcass6, French foreign minister.
On May 1, 1915 Delcasse explained to Steed, "Italy
put a pistol to our heads .. ." (H. W. STEED,
Through thirty years [2 vols.; London, 1924], II, 66;
Wickbam STEED, "Hommes d'6tat et diplomats
pendant la guerre," Revue de Paris, XXXIV, No. 6
[1927], 5-41).
23 Miroslav Spalajkovic, Serbian minister to
Russia.
22 Thophile

46

ARTHUR J. MAY

to run everything. Supilo is unpopular in

Petrograd, because he has found out Sazonov.24
The latter lied steadily to him, assured him that
the Jugoslav cause was in safe hands, etc., etc.
Then Supilo got at the real truth elsewhere,
went to Sazanov and cornered him, with the
result that Sazanov admitted the facts but will
never forgive him, though he dismissed him
with compliments.
You may have noticed the skilful way in
which the Italian press agencies, etc., have
sown the British press during the critical period
with references to an agreement between Italy
and Serbia and alleged utterances of Pasi625
on the subject. Two instances. On Saturday the
1st of May a member of the D[aily] Chron[ide]
staff told a great friend of mine ... that a
representative of Imperiali26had been to his
office almost every day for the prevoius [sic]
fortnight and positively denied the agreement
to have any bearing on Dalmatia, and maintained also that Serbia had been consulted all
along! Obviously a premeditated lie. As you
are certain to be aware, so far from Serbia being
consulted, Pasic was at the critical time and
after it sending urgent and ultra-confidential
wires to his various ministers urging them to
find out all they could about these negotiations. On the first of May acting on P[asic]'s
instructions Boskovic made a formal demarche
at the F[oreign] O[ffice] protesting against
these secret negotiations behind the back of
Serbia.
(b) A wire was sent round our press, dated
from Rome, and then when it was not commented on sufficiently, was repeated a few days
later, dated from Paris-telling how a secretary
to the Serbian F[oreign]O[ffice],a Mr. Jankovic,
who does not exist and was invented specially
for the occasion, had expressed his satisfaction,
on leaving Nish, at the conclusion of an agreement between Serbia and Italy.
The fact that Italy was asking Austria for
the central Dalmatian islands at the very moment that she was asking for the north Dalmatian islands and mainland from us, has been
totally suppressed in our press. So far as I am
aware, I am the only person who has referred
to the fact, in a letter to the Nation. This
roused [Raffaello] Piccoli, of Cambridge to a
long attack on me a week ago; but it was prob-

ably too personal to have much effect.27

I still cling fondly to the hope that Sonnino28
regards the Dalmatian coast as something to
bargain with at a later date, and that Italy
will not plunge into an adventure far worse than
Adua29ever was. I am of course being decried
as anti-Italian, and if it is anti-Italian to object
to Italy occupying large tracts of Slav country
and thus landing herself in endless racial difficulties of the kind which she has hitherto been
able to avoid-then I plead guilty to the charge.
But it seems to me that the real friends of Italy
will all unite in dissuading her, and are neglecting their duty unless they do so. Reluctantly I
am being driven to the conclusion that the facts
must be made public, and I propose to do so
shortly in the form of a pamphlet, if I can find
a form which will unveil the intrigue without
giving too much offence.30
I am more uneasy than ever about the
27 Under the title "Italy and Dalmatia," SetonWatson excoriated Entente diplomatists for the
"whole intrigue" which violated the principle of
nationality, deplored the impetus that had been
given to the Italo-Serbian feud, and reaffirmed that
the Serbian leaders had set the liberation and unity
of the South Slavs as their goal. While expressing
the hope that the extravagant Italian territorial
claims might be intended merely for "future bargaining," he appealed to statecraft in Rome to seek
a durable understanding with the Serbs. Seconding
that plea, the editor of the Nation trusted that Italy
would not sacrifice its "noble record" in matters of
nationality "for the false and perilous glory of ruling
over unwilling subjects."
In his counterblast Piccoli upbraided SetonWatson and "other academical thinkers" for
"absolute lack of understanding" of the Dalmatian
problem. Short on political knowledge, short on
political insight, the South Slav champion, Piccoli
argued, was sowing seeds which must intensify
antagonisms among Adriatic peoples (Nation [London], XVII [1915], 289, 320-21).
28

Sidney Sonnino, foreign minister of Italy.

29 Scene

of the humiliating defeat in March 1896

of Italian forces by the armies of Abyssinia.

30 That intention
was carried out in The Balkans,
Italy, and the Adriatic (London, 1915), a longish
pamphlet on the implications of the war for southeastern Europe; about a third of the space searchingly analyzed competing Italian and Southern
Slav territorial aspirations. Eschewing open discussion of the secret- diplomatic negotiations of the
24 Sergei D. Sazonov, Russian foreign minister. Entente governments, Seton-Watson contended that
"Germany has as good a right to Belgium and
26 Nichola Pagi6,prime ministerof Serbia.
Holland as Italy to Dalmatia" (p. 74). Cf. H. N.
26 GuglielmoImperiali, Italian ambassadorto
BRAILSFORD,"Italy's bargain," New Republic,

Great Britain.

III (1915), 196-98.

SETON-WATSONAND THE TREATY OF LONDON

Morning Post's policy towards Hungary; but I
have left myself no time to write of this to-night.
I send with this letter my little book on Roumania3' and Evans' letter in the Guardian32in
case you did not see it (its reference to Fiume
is inaccurate as it was written at the moment
of our greatest pessimism). I hope that Mr.
Gregory33is working with the Southern Slavs
as well as with the Roumanians. The Croat
Clericals are more and more favourable to the
idea of unity.
Professor Masaryk may be in Rome shortly
and will I hope see you. I enclose his confidential
memorandum.
Believe me, Yours very sincerely.
Replying on June 22, 1915, Miller wrote:
. In reading the contents of your letter,
I was reminded of a certain incident of 1772,
with Albert Sorel's comments thereon."
...

II
From his friend George M. Trevelyan,
who had gone to Italy to take charge of an
ambulance, where he would not "have to
talk or think any more," Seton-Watson on
June 22, 1915 had a letter beseeching him
against public militancy on the Treaty of
London:

47

knows little or nothing about it [the Treaty

of London]and the less it knowsthe better.If
you challengethe questionyou will arousea
passionateagitation here for the treaty, the
whole treaty and nothingbut the treaty.
Second,the moreyou agitate and write the
morewill the Serbsthink themselvesaggrieved
... [which will] cause untimely quarrels be-

tween the Alliesin the face of the enemy.

Third, the English will begin taking sides.
... Italians will say the English are turning

anti-Italian;they will not be persuadedbut

enraged.On the other hand, if any people in
Englandwrite againstyou it will only encourage the Italians in error.

. [and cause] strife

betweenEngland,Italy and Serbianowbefore

the bear's skin is won.... I want the same
thingsas you do. But I am sure that the best
chanceof attainingthem is to be quiet at present and let things grow.... My advice isleave them alone at present.

The Germanslost the game here by giving

the Italians too muchadvice.If they had left
them morealone they wouldhave donebetter.
The Italiansare the most touchypeoplein the
world.... The only way to get them to do
things is to let them find out for themselves.
...

Ask Steed if this is not so.

Despite the sagacity and the logicality of

the coursewhich Trevelyan advocated-and
more in a kindred vein followed-Seton... I do not take a less serious view of the
Watson
could not resist the compulsionsof
in
possibilities of evil than you do. And I am
agreement with your views. But as a matter of duty as he understood them. Presently his
tactics and proceeding I have formed the very pent-up wrath boiled over in a merciless
strong opinion that the less said the better at assault upon Sir Edward Grey which may
present. If we leave the Italians alone they will have contributed a mite to Grey's withlearn by experience in the war; already they drawal from the foreign office. By awarding
are having great trouble with the Slovenes on some 700,000 Slavs in Dalmatia to Italy, the
the Isonzo.... Long before the question of an- foreign minister had robbed Britain of the
nexing Dalmatia becomes practical militarily,
moral right, Seton-Watson charged, to dethey will have found out what South Slav
sentiment really is.... If you continue your nounce the German conquest of Belgium.
campaign by pamphlets or otherwise two bad "This treaty," he declared, "was the work
of a small group of diplomatists following
results will follow.
First, the Italians will get angry and say, thoroughlyMetternichianprinciples."Hon"No, we must have such and such parts of estly aimless and naively obstinate as Grey
Dalmatia"-just because you raise the ques- had proved himself, his resignationwould be
tion.... At present [Italian] public opinion "the most serious and disconcerting blow
which the Germanshad yet received."34
31 Roumaniaandthegreatwar (London,1915).
32"Italy and Dalmatia," occupying three col- UNIVERSITY
OFROCHESTER
Guardian,May 13, 1915.
umnsof the Manchester
34R. W. SETON-WATSON,
"The failure of Sir
83Apparently J. D. Gregoryof the Britishdiplomatic service, attached to the embassyin Vienna Edward Grey," English review, XXII (1916),
135-61.
beforethe war.