ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v.

JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL
ENBANC
G.R. No. L-14639
March 25, 1919
PONENTE: J. MALCOLM
FACTS:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's
Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25, 1918
beyond the womens consent and knowledge.

Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia

Street, in the district of Sampaloc, Manila.

Thereafter the women were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where

they were signed as laborers.
The purpose of sending this women to davao is to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years.
That when the women, its relative and lawyers filed for habeas corpus, the City of
Manila Mayor and police moved to dismiss the case saying that those women
were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of
Davao instead.
ISSUE RELEVANT TO SECTION 1 ARTICLE II of the Constitution
1. WHETHER OR NOT MAYOR LUKBAN WHO IS AN OFFICER OF THE STATE, TO
ERADICATE VICES IN ITS CITY HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEPORT SAID WOMEN OF
ILL-REPUTE?
OTHER ISSUE
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITY OF MANILA DOES NOT HAVE A JURISDICTION
TO ISSUE A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS TO DAVAO CITY TO PRODUCE THE BODY
OF THE WOMEN SINCE IT IS OUT OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND THUS,
DISOBEYING THE WRIT ISSUED BY THE COURT TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE
WOMEN?

HELD:

The petition was granted. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court for not
following the order of the court to produce the body of the women and shall pay into the
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos
(P100)
RATIO:
1. On the first issue, the courts decision is based on the principle of Republicanism
wherein Ours is a government of laws and not of men

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed thatNo freeman shall be
taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. No
official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum
which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors
2. On the second issue, the court believed that the true principle should be that, if the
respondent (Mayor Lukban) is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power
to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should
be compelled to do so. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at
liberty.
3. In other words, If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to
Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process,
may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her
to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts,
while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
NOTE:
HABEAS CORPUS as defined by the Black Law Dictionary
Literally means- That you have the body
It is a writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to
ensure that the partys imprisonment or detention is not illegal.
In addition to being used to test the legality of the arrest or
commitment, the writ maybe used to obtain review of (1) the regularity of
the extradition process (2) the right to or amount of bail or (3) the
jurisdiction of a court that has imposed a criminal sentence.
In other words, it is a writ which compel someone to produce the body
of the person under the name of the law.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni Digest

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Ponente: Moran, C.J.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the
country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and
other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission
was establish under Executive Order 68.
2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the
military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)
3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the
2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal
jurisdiction is valid
HELD:
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was
enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution
which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance
with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague
Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established
by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan,
preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and
customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that
time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations
(US and Japan)
2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of
interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which
petitioner was being charged of.
3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as
to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision
of this special law.

Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195

Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of
Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo
Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a
vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition
cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for
30 minutes. It was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection,
and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the
expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the
unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a
regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or
less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to
enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure
communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
factual record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in
overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute
was oppressive was fantasticbecause the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is
concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because its installed when parked
for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate any
constitutional provision.

LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only
prescribes rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement
for installation of ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of
principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled
legal doctrines.

Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act.
No. 1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage
in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8
of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public
welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there
not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with
private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power
and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it
be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean
license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must
be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of
the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in
the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter
of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected;
and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.

Gonzales vs Hechanova

G.R. No. L-21897 October 22 1963 [Executive Agreements]
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources.
Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals
or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration
or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the President of the
Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the
Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA
3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the
government has already constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of
conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the
American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been
sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive
agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said
agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by
statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may
not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.

People of the Philippines vs Tranquilino Lagman

66 Phil. 13 Political Law Defense of State

In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section
60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman
refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he
does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the
said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed
except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens
would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient
men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it
establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The defense of the
State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may
be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

Aglipay v. Ruiz Digest

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
Laurel, J.:
Facts:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance
of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the
fulfilment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a member of the Philippine Bar,
to denounce the matter to the President. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of
Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said
stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part remained unsold.
3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of Section
23, Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated in the issuance and selling of the
commemorative postage stamps. It was provided therein that, No public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation of the principle of separation of church
and state
NO.
1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds
and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. In so far as it instils into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence,
in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of
the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious
sects and denominations.
3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new
designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling
the postage stamps in question, still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the
exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be
filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional
inhibition. The court resolved to deny the petition for a writ of prohibition.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005


Facts:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28,
1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed
a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the
Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a
matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities
in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members
of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. Civil Courts
will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection
of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and
the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession
of church property. Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.


Group 6 DigestCalalang vs. Williams
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo CalalangRespondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.Ponente: Laurel,
J:
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed apetition
for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.It is alleged in the petition that the National
Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passingalong Rosario Street extending from
Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30
pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from therailroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one yearfrom the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission
on July 18, 1940 recommended to theDirector of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
themeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of th
eCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from theSecr
etary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations toregula
te and control the use of and traffic on national roads.On August 2, 1940, the Director
recommended to the Secretary the approval of therecommendations made by the Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission withmodifications. The Secretary of Public Works
approved the recommendations on August 10,1940.The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and causedto be enforced the rules and regulation.
As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are notallowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
Issue:
1.
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondentspursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitutean unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridgedthe right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon
theconstitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice toinsure the well-
being and economic security of all the people?


Held:
1.
No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoidobstructions
on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Inenacting said law, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by the desire to relievecongestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety.
Public welfare liesat the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state
inorder to promote the general welfare may interfere with personalliberty, with
property, and with business and occupations

. Persons andproperty may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
securethe general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamentalaims of
the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty isa blessing
which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall
into slavery.
The paradox lies in the factthat the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the
very means of insuring its preserving.
2.
No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, theadoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a propereconomic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of thecommunity, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable,or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existenceof all governments on the time-honored principles of
salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of
theprotection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as acombined force
in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamentaland paramount objective of
the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the
greatest good to the greatest number.
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

Estrella OndoyvsVirgilio Ignacio

Art II Sec 10 of the Constitution of the Philippines : The State shall promote social justice in
all phases of national development.
F
acts:
Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio
Ignacio. According to thechief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of
the workforce. He was invited byfriends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter
was found dead. Therefore, Estrella wasasking for compensation from the death of her son
while in the respondentAs employ. However, thestatement given by the chief engineer and
oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and thereforedismissed the claim for lack of
merit. Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was alsodenied by the
Secretary of Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is
social justiceapplicable in this case?
Ruling:
Yes.Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It
merely disregardedthe statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the
principle of social justice applied inthis case is a matter of protection, not equality. The
Court recognized the right of the petitioner to theclaim of compensation because her son
was shown to have died while in the actual performance of hiswork. To strengthen the
constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, The Courtquoted another
case as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who
hasresources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the
strictercompliance.

Section 10, Article II

Section 10, Article II states that
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development .
Salonga vs. Farrales
Facts:
1.Farrales was the titled owner of a parcel of residential land that was leased.
2.Prior to the acquisition by Farrales of the aforesaid land, Salonga was already alessee of
some portion of the land. She had built a house and paid rentalsthereon.
3. Sometime prior to November 1968, Farrales filed an
ejectment case
(one of theold forms of action for recovery of the possession of real property) for non-
payment of rentals against Salonga. The lower court rendered a decision infavor of Farrales
and ordered Salonga and the other lessees (Pascual et al.) tovacate the portion occupied by
them and to pay rentals in arrears, attorneysfees and costs.
4.Even before the rendition of the decision of the lower court, Farrales sold toPascual et al.
(the other lessees of Farrales) the areas occupied by them.
5.Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales the portion of land that Salonga wasleasing.
Farrales persistently refused the offer and insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the
ejectment case. Hence if Salongas offer to purchasewas persistently refused by Farrales, it
is obvious that no meeting of the mindstook place and no contract was ever perfected
between them. It was revealedthat Farrales wanted the payment of the portion of land
under consideration tobe in cash but Salonga did not have any money for that purpose that
is whyFarrales persistently refused to sell the portion of the leased land to the lessee.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of Salonga on the groundthat
no legal contract exists between Farrales and Salonga.
Held:
- Contracts are only enforceable from the moment of perfection. In the case atbar, Farrales
rejected and did not accept the offer of Salonga to buy the land inquestion. There being no
consent there is, therefore, no contract to sell tospeak of. In the case of the other lessees
(Pascual et al.) who were able to buythe portion of land that they occupy, there was an
existing contract betweenthem and Farrales, unlike Salonga who does not have the right to
buy the landin question because the contract between her and Farrales is non-existent.
- Section 10, Article II states that The State shall promote social justice in all phases
of national development . The aforementioned provision is applicable tothe case at bar. The
social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who are also
entitled for protection under our Constitution. Thesocial justice consecrated in our
Constitution was not intended to take awayrights from a person and give them to another
who is not entitled thereto. Theplea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations
and contracts.

FACTS:

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the
CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right
to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation
and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.
The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish
the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the
Manalos custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials
involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under
military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP
appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

HELD:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of
the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available
to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private
individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty,
and security. The circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court explained.
(GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)

Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo from a search
warrant.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It said
that the production order should be likened to the production of documents or things under
sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that upon motion of any party
showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf
of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or
control. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)

Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge Case Digest

Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191, March 21, 1978
Facts:
On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for
the writ of habeas corpus, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that
thepreliminary examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him
was auseless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, (1) failed to
meetthe strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a
probablecause. (2) He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that
tainted theprocedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was
clearly excessive. (3) It was in the amount of P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set
beingimputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus,
returnable to it on Wednesday,March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on
March 8, 1978, justified theissuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no
impropriety in the way thepreliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive
character of the bail, heasserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail
Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge in Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the
amount to P8,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence
of probable cause was constitutionally deficient?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court declared that the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the
Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978.The Court issued the following Resolution:
Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court
Resolved pursuant to section 191of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-
yearold minor, to order the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his
parentsFrancisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his Counsel, Atty. Guillermo
B.Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further
proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law. This
Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare
Code. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring asum that is excessive.