Adams, Robert M. - Actualism and Thisness (1981) PDF

Actualism and Thisness
Author(s): Robert Merrihew Adams

Source: Synthese, Vol. 49, No. 1, Demonstrative and Indexical Reference, Part I (Oct., 1981),
pp. 3-41
Published by: Springer
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ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ACTUALISM
ADAMS
AND THISNESS*
1. THE
THESIS
are purely qualitative

insofar
except
My thesis is that all possibilities
exist. I have argued else
as they involve
that actually
individuals
where (Adams, 1979b) that thisness holds a place beside suchness as a
not only of reality but also of
feature of reality-and
fundamental
are
that are not
also possibilities,
some possibilities.
and
There
facts,
all the
that
is
the
of
The
thesis
essay
present
purely qualitative.
I
are
individuals.
for
actual
possibilities
non-qualitative
possibilities
claim
this
of
the
will begin by trying to explain
1);
(Section
meaning
some of its implications
it (Section 2), and develop
then I will defend
facts de re there
the chief is that what modal
of which
for modality,
3 and 4).
on
are depends
what individuals
actually exist (Sections
1.1 Essences
it with an
in understanding
my thesis by contrasting
to
has proposed
Alvin Plantinga
(very elegantly)
position.
opposing
assure that there are all the possibilities
de re there could have been,
there could
there are not all the individuals
that while
by holding
are
essences
the
individuals
there
all
of
have
there
been,
possibly
essence
an
An
in
of
have been
could possibly
1976).
(Plantinga,
a
a
would
in
that
in
is
dividual a,
sense,
possess
property
Plantinga's
no
a
that
other
which
would
and
world
in
exist,
every possible
It is a property
that
in any possible world.1
individual would possess
We
be aided
may
to a and that no other individual could possess.

is essential
a proposition
A possibility
that could have been true
is presumably
or a state of affairs that could have obtained.
and I cannot
Plantinga
a
an
that
does not
for
individual
that
say
consistently
possibility
a
or
that in
state
affairs
that
has
of
exist
is
actually
proposition
no
are
as
a
we
in
such
for
think
that
there
dividual
constituent,
dividuals
(though there could have been individuals
a possibility
that there actually
are). But maybe
other than those

for a non-actual
Synthese 49 (1981) 3-41. 0039-7857/81/0491-0003 $03.90

Copyright
1981 by D. Reidel
Publishing
Co., Dordrecht,
Holland,
and Boston,

U.S.A.
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
or state of affairs
individual
could be a proposition
that has an
essence
of that individual,
the
rather than
individual
itself, as a
are
From this point of view, whether
constituent.
there
non-qualita
on whether
tive possibilities
for non-actual
individuals
there
depends
are non-qualitative
essences
of non-actual
I think that
individuals;
some possible
with
there are not. Plantinga
has not
qualifications,
committed
himself as to whether
there are non-qualitative
facts at all;
to the view
but he is committed
that there actually
exist all the
essences
essences
there could have been, including non-qualitative
if
there could be any of them.
The chief reason he gives for affirming this is that "Properties,
like
are necessary
and possible
worlds,
propositions
beings"
(Plantinga,
in Loux,
to think of
1979, p. 268). I agree that it is plausible
as
also
and
(and
properties
propositions
worlds)
perhaps
possible
we
as
of
them
think
constituted
existing necessarily,
if
purely quali
that there is good reason to deny that
tatively. I shall argue, however,
non -qualitative
are necessary
(cf. Fine,
1977, p.
properties
beings
1976;
129f.).
us. (i) The
Three
there might be will concern
types of essences
are
most
A
thisnesses.
sense
in
the
intended
thisness,
important
or of being
of being a particular
here,2 is the property
individual,
identical with that individual.
It is not the property we all share, of
some
or other. But my
with
identical
individual
being
particular
thisness
is the property
of being me; that is, of being identical with
me. Your
is the property
thisness
of being you. Jimmy Carter's
thisness
is the property of being identical with Jimmy Carter (not: of
called
are
and so forth. All
thisnesses
Carter");
being
"Jimmy
essences
an
in Plantinga's
essence
and
of
individual
is
sense,
every
with
the
coextensive
thisness
of
that
individual.
necessarily
Plantinga
seems to imply that there are thisnesses,
as well as other essences,
of
all
the individuals
there could possibly
have been,
including many
that do not actually exist (Plantinga,
individuals
1976; in Loux,
1979,
pp. 268f., cf. 262f.). I have argued in an earlier paper (Adams,
1979b)
that there could be thisnesses
not be equivalent
that would
to any
are
and
that
thisnesses
therefore primitive
purely qualitative
property,
in the sense of being in principle
distinct
from all purely qualitative
I will argue
Here
that there are no thisnesses
of in
properties.
dividuals
that never actually
exist - although
of course
there could
have been other individuals
than those that there are, and if they had

AND
ACTUALISM
THISNESS
I think this is a necessary

have had thisnesses.
they would
no
in
would
be
there
of individuals
world
thisnesses
truth;
possible
that do not exist in that world.
essence would
be a purely qualitative
(ii) A qualitative
property
that is an essence.
for
there is some conjunction
C
Suppose,
example,
are
of
that
infinite)
(perhaps
qualitative
purely
properties
jointly
in actual fact, by me alone, and that could not possibly
be
possessed,
existed
In that case the property of

jointly possessed
by any other individual.
or
C
of
that possesses
(that is,
possibly
possessing
being something
as
a
could have possessed
could
be
C)
plausibly
regarded
qualitative
essence
of me. Part of what I have argued in Adams,
1979b is that
essences.
not have qualitative
that would
there could be individuals
Indeed we do not know that we have them.
if we do not have qualitative
essences,
(iii) Even
perhaps we have
to our thisnesses.
in addition
'a' is employed
as
a
useful
here, following Plantinga's
convention,
proper name of the
a
even
were
not
still
actual world
would
be
if
it
(a
actual, though of
course
not be the actual world
it would
if it were not actual). By
I mean an essence
that has the form, bearing R
essence'
'a-relational
essences
a-relational
to ax,
a2,
a3,...,
where
au
a2,
a3,...
are
certain
individuals
that
exist
in a, and R is a relation such that bearing R to some (unspecified)

jci,
or other is a purely qualitative
For
let
x2, x3,...
property.
example,
the sperm and egg cells from which
I sprang be named "Dick" and
I think some philosophers
"Jane" respectively.
would
say that the
property of being the sole person that sprang from the union of Dick
essence.
and Jane is an essence
of me. This would be an a-relational
It would
also be a non-qualitative
it involves
because
the
essence,
thisnesses
of Dick and Jane. And though if it really is an essence
it is
I think it is distinct
coextensive
with my thisness,
from
necessarily
It is the property
of bearing a certain relation to Dick
my thisness.
and Jane, whereas
is the property
of bearing a certain
my thisness
to me.
relation (identity)
or a-relational
If there are qualitative
essences
at all, perhaps
there
are such essences
of non-actual
individuals. That is, perhaps there are
not actually possessed
properties,
by any individual, which would be
such essences
of any individual that had them. I am not denying
that.
or a-relational
And
if I have a qualitative
it might
have
essence,
existed without me. The property of being the sole person that sprang
from the union of Dick and Jane, for instance,
is a property
that could

ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
if Dick and Jane had existed but never

have existed,
unexemplified,
come together and I had never existed. And any qualitative
essence
as an unexemplified
could have existed,
abstract object, without
the
to which
it belongs.
is nothing
in this that is in
individual
There
with the thesis that all possibilities
consistent
as
that
insofar
involve
individuals
except
actually exist.
they
We will not need a special classification
for another possible
type
If P is a property
that plays a part in Plantinga's
of essence
argument.
then the world-indexed
and w is a possible world,
property Pw is the
w.
P
in
Thus
"a-transform"
of P) is the
of
Pa (the
property
having
a
P
in
actual
for
has
of
(the
world). Plato,
property
having
example,
holds
that
the property
of being-a-great-philosopher-in-a.
Plantinga
are essential
in general,
and world-indexed
a-transforms,
properties
to
to whatever
have them; and further, that if P belongs
individuals
an
essence
one
in
is
of
that
individual.
individual
w, Pw
exactly
essences
We need not pay separate attention here to world-indexed
reason. A world-indexed
for the following
essence, Pw, could form the
on actual
not founded
of a non-qualitative
in
basis
possibility
or
one
two
if
of
if
dividuals
conditions
obtained
both
(i)
namely
only
or if
nor an a-relational
P were neither purely qualitative
property,
a possible
not constituted
world
by purely qualitative
(ii) w were
nor
alone,
propositions
plus pro
propositions
that exist in a. But I deny that there are
about individuals
positions
or possible worlds
of these sorts. Of course
it is open
any properties
to argue against me on this point by trying to show how
to anyone
on actual
not founded
there could be non-qualitative
propositions
But until that is done it would
be begging
the question
essences
to appeal to world-indexed
in order to explain
not founded on actual
there could be non-qualitative
possibilities
individuals.
against me
how
individuals.
1.2 Singular
Propositions
is
that will play an important part in our discussion
Another
notion
a
A singular proposition
that of a singular proporision.
is, roughly,
an
or
not
to
and
refers
individual
that
involves
directly,
proposition
or its relations
to another
in
properties
by way of its qualitative
x
a
an
or
of
individual
thisness
has
that
A
dividual.
itself,
proposition

ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
would
be a singular proposition
about x. A
x, as a constituent
or a-relational
essence
that has a qualitative
of x as a
proposition
not as such be a singular proposition
would
constituent,
however,
about x. If there were
about non-actual
in
singular propositions
for non-actual
could be founded on
individuals
dividuals,
possibilities
I will give for thinking there are no thisnesses
them. But the reasons
of non-actual
individuals will also be reasons for thinking there are no
singular
propositions
about
non-actual
individuals.
1.3 Actualism
thesis is an actualist
is the doctrine
thesis. Actualism
that there
no things that do not exist in the actual world.
The actualist
that there could have been
of course,
agrees,
things that do not
in
could
have
been
there
individuals
other
exist;
actually
particular,
than those that there are. But he disagrees with those (whom we may
My
are
can be put,
think
who
this point
in sober
"possibilists")
are
that
there
truth,
by saying
metaphysical
infinitely many possible
that do not exist in the actual world but that do exist in
individuals
other possible
worlds.
Possibilists
that
affirm, and actualists
deny,
can
enter
but
non-actual
entities
into
relations
and
have
possible
and can therefore
be values of variables
in the logic of
properties,
call
predicates.
If possibilism
is true, my thesis is false. If there is a non-actual
there is also its thisness,
the property
of being
identical
individual,
with
that individual,
and there are presumably
all the singular pro
and all the non-qualitative
about
that in
positions,
possibilities,
dividual
that there would
be if the individual
I
existed.
actually
that possibilism
is false and actualism
is true (cf.
believe,
however,
Adams,
1974). I will not argue for that here, but will argue that if
actualism
is true, then there are no thisnesses
of non-actual
in
no singular propositions
about them, and no possibilities
dividuals,
that are non-qualitative
are in
insofar as actual
individuals
except
It is indeed one
actualism
and possibilism,
into mere
entry of thisness
volved.
of
the
substantive
between
differences
that actualism
the
restricts
opinion,
a
in
that
does
way
possibility
possibilism
in my
not.

ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
1.4 Construction
to one
in Section
1.3 is subject
said
important
The
and
affirmed by pos
relations,
entities,
qualification.
predictions
as primitive
are to be understood
sibilists and denied by actualists
features of a metaphysical
scheme. For suppose definitions
could be
a
which
"non-actual
devised
individual"
with
many
by
properties
out of things that actually
could be logically
constructed
exist. A
on
"hard" actualist
insist
1974, p. 224) might
(cf. Adams,
rejecting
But that would
such definitions.
be sticking at a verbal point. The
actualism
be more
that I espouse
characterized,
might
accurately
What
I have
as the doctrine
that there is (tenselessly)
nothing but what
and
whatever
out of
is
constructed
exists,
(tenselessly)
logically
that
exist.
actually
things
The most
issues in this area will have to do
important metaphysical
to know
with
the primitive
entities
and primitive
facts. If we want
as they
whether
all possibilities
insofar
except
involve actual individuals, we want to know whether
the possibilities
at the primitive
level, and whether
they involve
therefore,
at the primitive
actual individuals
level. For if the primitive
data for
or a-relational,
a constructed
the construction
at bottom,
will not be non-qualitative,
insofar as it
except
possibility
involves
actual
individuals.
1.5 Illustrations
We may be able to understand
the meaning
of my thesis better and
more concretely with the aid of two examples
of its consequences.
(A)
a particularly
The
thesis makes
and
clear metaphysical
large
sort. I have argued (in Adams,
in a case of the following
difference
a
that
there
could
be
that would
be
1979b)
pair of individuals
from each other
indiscernible
(having all their purely
in
and
such individuals would
that
common),
qualitative
properties
no
essence.
in
have,
effect,
pro
qualitative
Any purely qualitative
perty that one of them could have had, the other could have had. Let
us suppose3 that there could have been a pair of individuals,
qualita
from each other, which
do not exist
in a, and
indiscernible
tively
neither of which could have borne any relation to any individual
that
qualitatively

ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
to that same
in a that the other could not have borne
does exist
to introduce an abbreviation
It will be convenient
and say
individual.
those conditions
that any pair of individuals meeting
would
be an
an
the
members
of
differ
would
from
each
other
Since
"I-pair."
I-pair
nor in the a-relational
in the qualitative
could
neither
they
properties
nor a-relational
essences.
have had, they would have neither qualitative
that 'a' is a proper name of a possible world
(Here we must remember
actual. To say that there could have been
that is only contingently
essences
not have had a-relational
that would
is not
individuals
a
such
individuals
in
which
to
if
that
world
w,
exist, had
deny
necessarily
been actual, they would have had w-relational
essences.)
By considering
inwhat
that would not differ a-relationally
the possibility
of individuals
of actual individuals.
could be true of them, we exclude the involvement
in what could
By supposing also that they would not differ qualitatively
the difference
between
be true of them, we set up a case in which
can
be
and
manifested.
clearly
non-qualitative
possibilities
qualitative
a case for which
These
two features
together make
particularly
are
follow from the thesis that all possibilities
as
insofar
involve
actual
individuals.
except
they
purely qualitative
be a difference
there would
between
If an I-pair existed,
poss
one
ibilities
the
member
and
the
regarding
possibilities
regarding
other-for
between
the
one
of
this
to
example,
possibility
ceasing
exist
and the possibility
of that one ceasing
to exist. And
the
difference
between
these possibilities
could not be stated in purely
terms.
is
also
I tried to show in Adams,
of
what
(That
qualitative
part
that the members
of an I-pair do not actually
1979b.) Given
exist,
it follows
from the thesis of the present paper that there is
however,
between
not, in fact, any difference
possibilities
regarding the one and
interesting
consequences
the other. There

is not actually any such thing
possibilities
regarding
as a difference
between
the possibility
of this one ceasing to exist and
the possibility
of that one ceasing
to exist. For no such difference
could be understood
or in terms of the involve
either qualitatively
ment of actual individuals,
since there is neither a qualitative
nor an
a-relational
difference
the members
between
I
it
find
and
others
(B)
natural,
may at least
context.
I suppose
my thesis in a theological
whether
and how to create a world, knew all
could have existed or happened.
That is, he
of an I-pair.
find it vivid, to think of
that God,
in deciding
the kinds of things that
had before His mind a

10
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
or purely qualitative
array of all the suchnesses
properties
complete
But did He also have
have been exemplified.
that could possibly
or
before His mind an infinite array of merely
individuals,
possible
or
about
of them, or singular propositions
thisnesses
them,
pos
in such
a way
that He could have chosen

in every purely
indiscernible
individuals,
possibly
one
to
I think
be
created
than
rather
another?4
respect,
qualitative
not. God can create a woman
charac
of such and such a qualitative
ter. And when He has done so, she is an individual and has a thisness,
of being her; and there may be non-qualitative
which
is the property
are
But that property and those possibilities
her.
regarding
possibilities
a
on
not
in
her
actual
her
existence.
did
They
parasitic
pre-exist
sibilities
regarding
from a number of
them,
at
of properties
and possibilities
and necessarily
storehouse
eternally
are
no
in
God's
There
except
non-qualitative
disposal.
possibilities
it is a fact, and not an
sofar as they involve
about whom
individuals
that they are actual individuals.5
still up for decision,
uncertainty
2.
THE
ARGUMENT
My thesis rests on the view that there is, so to speak, no ontological

in
in actual
for non-qualitative
foundation
except
possibilities
can perhaps best be seen in the example
this means
dividuals. What
there can be
in which
is no way
I claim
that there
of I-pairs.
are
an
distinct
from similar
that
of
member
for
one
I-pair
possibilities
are
such
For
if
member.
there
the
other
for
possibilities,
possibilities
for the other member?
how do they differ from similar possibilities
nor in their relation to actual individuals,
for it is
Not qualitatively,
a
nor
an
that
is
neither
there
of
of
the
definition
qualitative
I-pair
part
between what could be true of one member
difference
cannot be satisfied
and what could be true of the other. An actualist
in that this pos
differ simply
that the possibilities
with the answer
in
the
that that
the
to
of
this
member
related
is
way
pair
sibility
this
that
and
the
to
member
of
that
is
related
pair,
possibility
of
For the members
is primitive and not further analyzable.
difference
enter
cannot
into
and
an I-pair do not actually
therefore
exist,
they
to actualism.
relation, according
any primitive
in
that the possibilities
to consider
the suggestions
It remains
about
to
in
their
relation
could
differ
question
of the
of the I-pair, or in their relation to the thisnesses
the members
an a-relational

ACTUALISM
THISNESS
11
to some other
sort of
I
the
shall
argue
I-pair.
non-qualitative
for distinct non-qualitative
that none of these foundations
possibilities
of any
is available - first by trying to show that there are no thisnesses
no
are
that
and
there
that do not actually
individuals
exist,
singular
members
the I-pair,
essences
of
or
AND
of
in their relation
of
the members
then by arguing that it is

about non-actual
individuals;
propositions
sort of non-qualitative,
not plausible
to suppose
that there is another
essence
to non-existent
in
that could
non-a-relational
belong
In effect I shall be arguing both that there are no essences
dividuals.
of members
of an I-pair, and more
at all that could be essences
can be non-qualitative
no
in
there
there
which
is
that
way
generally,
except by relation to actual individuals.
possibilities
that
It is hard to see how an acttmlist could consistently
maintain
individual. For if there were one, it
there is a thisness of a non-actual
of being identical with that individual. To be
would be the property
individual
is to stand,
the property of being identical with a particular
a
with
This
that
in
individual.
relation
relation
unique
primitively,
an individual and its thisness
It
is the crux of the argument.
between
that being the property of being identical
would be absurd to suppose
not
of my
with me could be a purely
internal
feature
thisness,
me.
an
to
and
The
between
individual
relation
relation
implying any
to both of them. My thisness
is a property
that
its thisness
is essential
I would
in which
in every possible
world
exist-but
not
It
mine.
exist
without
could not
could
thisness
being
equally, my
Robert
Adams.
Merrihew
thisness
So if
exist without
the
of
being
a thisness
of a non-actual
it would
there were
individual,
stand,
to actualism
in a relation to that individual. But according
primitively,
enter primitively
cannot
It
into any relation.
non-actual
individuals
seems to follow that according
to actualism
there cannot be a thisness
of a non-actual
individual.
an
to suppose
It would not be plausible
that the relation between
I would
have
that individual
of being
identical with
individual
and the property
but could be analyzed
in terms of that pro
need not be primitive,
or to purely qualitative
to other individuals
relations
proper
perty's
not provide
would
thisnesses
for
ties. Moreover
this supposition
of I-pairs. For by the definition
of an I-pair there are not
members
nor any purely qualitative
that
any individuals,
actually
properties,
a
are related differently
to the two members
of an I-pair. Hence
of an I-pair rather than the
thisness cannot be related to one member

ROBERT
12
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
of any relation to actual individuals

or purely qualita
seems
in
And
it
evident
that a relation
properties.
general
to individuals
from other relations
constructed
(which must be actual
to
and
to
individuals,
actualism),
proper
according
purely qualitative
for non-qualitative
that
ties, cannot provide a foundation
possibilities
are not founded
in actual individuals.
other
by virtue
tive
similar argument
singular
propositions
shows
about
that an actualist must deny that there are

non-actual
A singular pro
individuals.
x is a proposition
that involves or refers
about an individual
position
to x directly,
or relations
and not by way of x's qualitative
properties
to another
individual. This relation
is surely part of what makes
the
what
it
it
to
is
essential
the
and
the
is;
proposition
proposition,
not
x.
could
exist
without
to
But
related
proposition
being directly
a proposition
to actualism
cannot bear such a relation
to
according
individual.
any non-actual
are conclusive
I believe
so long as the thisness of
these arguments
an individual x is conceived,
as I conceive
it, as the property of being
identical with x, and so long as a corresponding
of singular
conception
But some may object
that these concep
and that thisnesses
have
sometimes
been
as
or
more
essences,
conceived,
historically,
non-qualitative
perhaps
as non-qualitative
of a different
could
entities,
sort, which
broadly
are.
exist without
the individuals whose
to
thisnesses
they
According
on
I
such an alternative
a
in
thisness
that
my
conception
depend
way
on me; for certainly
it does not depend
I could not have existed
without
it. And it might be held that singular propositions
should be
as having
sense
as con
in this alternative
conceived
thisnesses
propositions
tions are
is maintained.
too
narrow,
stituents.
The crucial
is whether
there are any
here, metaphysically,
question
or other non-qualitative
essences
entities
that could
non-qualitative
are
this
We
role.
concerned
to
know
whether
there
play
particularly
are any that could do it for non-actual
individuals
that would have no
or a-relational
such as members
of an I-pair. I
essence,
qualitative
shall argue that there are not. In doing so, to avoid confusion,
I shall
reserve
the term rthisness of xn for the property
of being
identical
with x, and use rhaecceity
of x1 for the supposed
non-qualitative
entities
that could largely play the part of a thisness of x even if x
never existed.
It is not easy to say what haecceities
would be. That is indeed the

ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
to them. Suppose H* is my
chief objection
It would
have been if I had never existed?
an actualist
to claim that H* would
have
thinks
for
he
there
would
have
been
case,
to. But one might hold that H* would have
of an individual, and
have been a haecceity
13
haecceity. What would H*

at best for
be misleading
been my haecceity
in that
no me for it to be related
been something
that could
that could not have been a
in different
individuals
of different
worlds.
That
haecceity
possible
not
in which
I myself
would fit it to represent me in worlds
would
it might be claimed that there are infinitely many such
exist. Likewise
here for individuals
in the actual world,deputizing
entities
that would
exist in other possible worlds. But what would
these entities be?
If H* existed and I never did, I do not see how H* or anything else
of being
could be the property
identical with me;
for a primitive
to that property.
relation to me is surely essential
But maybe
there
as a haecceity.
the unactualized
of having H*
property
or per
H*
would
be
itself
this
(self-referentially)
property;
Perhaps
a
as a
not
at
H*
would
be
Even
if
all.
H*
property
haps
having
were
coextensive
with
with
identical
me, I
haecceity
necessarily
being
think they would be distinct.
a
the nature of the difference
Here we can see clearly
between
a
of
in
and
of
that
haecceities
thisnesses,
my sense,
theory
theory
could exist without
their individuals.
On my view
the individuals
themselves
the
basis
for
facts, by their iden
provide
non-qualitative
In
distinctness.
of
and
the
haecceities
this basis
is pro
theory
tity
and they are necessarily
vided
instead by the haecceities,
existent
could
be
are not qualitative

abstract
proper
entities) which
the basis for non-qualitative
facts is provided by the
- that
to
of the haecceities
is, by their inability
incommunicability
bear a certain relation to more than one individual
in the same or in
on my view the fundamental
non
worlds.
Hence
different
possible
are
on
of
the
with
but
identical
x;
form, being
qualitative
properties
the other view they are of something
like the form, having h as a
entities
(perhaps
ties. Specifically,
haecceity.
The nature
of the supposed
is still very obscure,
haecceities
see this, we may begin by thinking again of an I-pair.
as detailed
as you like, provided
Make
their description
only they
to their qualitative
remain indiscernible
with respect
and
properties
to
their relations
actual
Now
individuals.
ask yourself, which
(if any)
member
of the I-pair would you rather have exist, if only one of them
however.
To

14
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
were
to exist. The question
is absurd, not merely
because
you have
no reason to prefer one to the other, but because
no
have
way of
you
or
one
out
to
of
them
the
rather
than
other, even in
referring
picking
us
one of them
course
own
can
"Let
You
of
call
mind.
say,
your
'Castor' and the other 'Pollux,'" but that does not enable you to refer
to one of them rather than the other, any more
in
than the variables
(3x)(3y)(x
is a horse & y is a horse & x^ y)
cannot pick out one

refer to one horse
rather than another. You
an
the
because
of
member
you have no
other,
I-pair, rather than
essence
with
at all) of
any haecceity
acquaintance
(or indeed any
either of them.
of our
"Of course not; but is that just an unfortunate
limitation
than that; at any
you may ask. I think it is more
cognitive
powers?"
even
a
see
I
cannot
mind
could pick out one of
rate
how
superhuman
or
a
with
non-actual
such
be acquainted
objects,
pair of indiscernible
no
are
course
not
of
that
does
that
there
them.
Of
haecceities
prove
of
but
such obscurity
haecceities
such non-actual
surely
objects,
in them less attractive.
makes belief
some singular
It may be objected
that we do seem to apprehend
about
fictitious
non-actual
individuals
about
namely,
propositions
we
must
haec
be
with
and
that
therefore
individuals;
acquainted
we
be
Must
for
of fictitious
individuals.
ceities
not,
example,
a
to
in
order
under
with
of
Sherlock
Holmes
haecceity
acquainted
was a detective?
This is
that Sherlock Holmes
stand the proposition
account
not the place to try to give a positive
of the role of proper
names
in fiction, but I think there is good reason to deny that there
are primitive
individuals.
For consider
of fictitious
haecceities
the
following
of events,
sequence
it
not.
did
probably
which
surely
could
have
though
In 1870, before
happened,
had written
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
any of his
a
a story
wrote
in
retired
schoolteacher
stories,
Liverpool
an
amateur
of
detective
the Joneses"
about
"The Hound
called
And
the name was not the only coin
"Sherlock
Holmes."
named
"The Hound
of the Joneses" was not a very good story, but
cidence.
so similar to those that
in it were
of the detective
the characteristics
had
that if Doyle
Holmes
has in Conan Doyle's
stories
Sherlock
"The Hound
of the Joneses"
in 1920, it would
and published
written
as a story about
have been accepted
(if not applauded)
certainly
famous

ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
15
It
Sherlock Holmes.
As it was, however,
it was destined
for oblivion.
was never read by anyone but its author, who died in 1872. The only
was burned by the author's niece when
she cleaned
the
manuscript
on Conan
in 1873, and it never had the slightest
house
influence
I want to raise is whether
of
the question
"The Hound
Doyle. Now
or in other words
the Joneses" was a story about Sherlock Holmes,
in "The Hound
whether
of the Joneses" was Sherlock
the detective
was
whether
he
identical
with that prince of ficti
Holmes-that
is,
known to us from Conan Doyle's
tious detectives
stories.
seem possible,
Three answers
The
in "The Hound
detective
of
(i)
was
the Joneses"
of
Sherlock
because
the
Holmes,
certainly
qualita
tive similarity he bears to the hero of Conan Doyle's
stories, (ii) The
of "The Hound
of the Joneses" may or may not have
protagonist
on whether
been Sherlock Holmes,
its author and Doyle
depending
to have attached
the same haecceity
haec
(or equivalent
on
to their heroes.
same
it
that
hit
the
is
(How likely
they
on
we
are
will
the
mechanism
which
haecceity
presumably
depend
by
with
Sherlock
famous
Holmes
Sher
haecceities.)
(the
(iii)
acquainted
lock Holmes,
that is) certainly does not appear in "The Hound of the
it is a necessary
because
condition
of a story's being about
Joneses,"
Sherlock
Holmes
that it be appropriately
connected
by historical
to Conan Doyle's
stories.
influences
Of these answers
the second seems to be the one that ought to be
those
who
believe
there are primitive haecceities
of fictitious
given by
happen
ceities)
But I think it is absurd, and the third answer

individuals.
is pretty
one.
the
This
as
that
such
fictitious
clearly
suggests
right
individuality
on the individuality
individuals
have
is parasitic
of their (actual)
authors.
Even
of haecceities,
the incommunicability
is supposed
to
which
a
for
a
basis
is
If
to
relation
facts,
provide
non-qualitative
mysterious.
not
is
to
individual
essential
what
God
particular
haecceities,
keeps
from using
the same haecceity
to create
two different
in
twice,
even
dividuals
with
the same haecceity,
in the same world? Why
couldn't Woodrow
Wilson
and Harry Truman,
for example,
have had
the same haecceity?
Was Wilson's
"used
in
haecceity
up," perhaps,
a
Wilson?
Someone
who
holds
of
haecceities
making
may
theory
are silly, because
the central point of his
reply that these questions
is the postulation
theory
municable
in the relevant
as entities
of haecceities
no doubt
And
respects.
that are incom

it is an analytic

16
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
is a haecceity
that nothing
unless
it is incommunicable
in the
sense.
answer
But
not
does
the
the
that
about
indicated
question
to be haecceities,
entities that are supposed
what it is about them that
and thus enables
makes
them incommunicable
them to count as
truth
haecceities.
are postulated
as "some
from thisnesses)
Haecceities
(as distinct
we
some
to
not
what"
fill
know
role. Sometimes
thing,
metaphysical
to play a part in a theory according
to
they have been postulated
- indeed universals
- are constituents
which
in
of
which
properties
are (at least partly) composed.
Such a theory naturally gives
dividuals
a
to
of
what
from
rise
individuation:
keeps an individual
problem
a
must
to
uni
universal?
What
be
added
the
being
(complicated)
or
to particularize
of the individual,
versals
that are constituents
a
as
it?
is
The
constituent
of
the
individuate
haecceity
postulated
to perform
this individuating
function.6
individual,
(On this theory the
fundamental
would be of the form, having
non-qualitative
properties
h as a constituent,
where
h is a haecceity.)
as a constituent
The idea of the haecceity
of the individual may
to
the
could
exist
without
the individual
haecceity
help
explain why
but the individual
for such a
could not exist without
the haecceity;
an
one
of
its con
often
individual
obtains
between
and
relationship
stituents. But the nature of this constituent
is still a mystery.
Indeed
here that seems quite acute on
another problem may be mentioned
with some but
this theory. Presumably
is compatible
every haecceity
I am a person
not all consistent
For
properties.
qualitative
example,
but could not possibly
have been a musical
My haec
performance.
must
therefore
of being
be, necessarily,
ceity constituent
capable
but incapable of being combined with the
combined with personhood
But what
of being a musical
is the ground of
property
performance.
We
cannot
and
them by
this necessary
incapacity?
explain
capacity
a
a
can
out
I
be
but
could
not
been
musical
that
have
person
pointing
are
to
for
modal
be
my
performance;
properties
supposed
explained
exist and have its
since the latter would
by those of my haecceity,
even if I never existed and had no properties.
It may
modal properties
out that there is a great categorial
be pointed
difference
between
as events. But this
as substances,
and musical
persons,
performances,
a
to
the
since
there
is (as I argued
level,
only pushes
problem
deeper
as
reason
non
to
in Adams,
much
1979b, pp.
14, 23)
postulate
as
essences
events
If
of
of
substances.
is an
my haecceity
qualitative

ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
17
of me, and distinct from all qualitative

properties
independent
what
the
of substantiality),
is it about this entity
property
(including
it could join with substantiality,
but could not join
by virtue of which
to form an individual?
I do not see an answer to this
with eventhood,
entity
question.
Moreover
are constituents
I do not believe
that properties
of which
are wholly
or partly composed.
If we do not think of
as composed
a
in that way, we will not need to postulate
or
to
them
them
from
constituent
"individuate"
special
keep
being
to make
Neither
universals.
do we need a special constituent
them
or distinct
can be
identical with themselves
from each other. Those
seen as primitive
to themselves
relations
of the individuals
and to
individuals
individuals
each other. Of course

this presupposes
that the individuals
them
are given;
selves actually
it presupposes
for an actualist
that they
actually exist.
The
facts has suffered
from its historic
idea of non-qualitative
association
with the idea of a mysterious
of
constituent
individuating
some have been
in order to avoid such obscurity
individuals. Perhaps
as constituted
inclined to see the world
facts.
But we can have a primitive
as
with
much
less
the
thisness,
mystery,
a
we
of
with
not
if
identical
certain
do
individual,
property
being
of the individual.
suppose that the thisness could exist independently
The property of being identical with me can be thought of as formed
so far as I can see) from the
(innocent,
by a partial abstraction
that
Robert
Merrihew
is identical with me. Or
Adams
proposition
as
thisness
could
be
the ordered pair whose
conceived
my
perhaps
first member
is the relation of identity and whose
second member
is
me. In that case I would be a constituent
of my thisness,
rather than
of me, and it would
be particularly
that my
obvious
my thisness
thisness could not have existed
if I had never existed.
The arguments
for non-qualitative
facts are directly arguments
for
or facts of identity and
the non-qualitative
character
of properties
with
individuals
(Adams,
1979b), and thus give rise
non-identity
given
to
the
of
in
thisnesses
my sense. That concep
naturally
conception
answers
to questions
to important
tion also provides
corresponding
we
in
that
found
about
If my this
haecceities.
perplexities
thinking
ness
is the property of being identical with me, the incommunicability

of thisnesses
is easily understood,
it follows from the logical
because
character
of identity that a property of the form, being identical with

18
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
in the same or in
x, cannot be possessed
by more than one individual
we
as identities of
If
understand
worlds.
thisnesses
different possible
we
a
can
individuals, moreover,
actually existing
give
fairly plausible
account of why my thisness could not have been combined with the
The explanation
is that I am
property of being a musical
performance.
a
are
and
there
of trans
conditions
person,
necessary
(in fact)
follow (perhaps analytically)
identity which
temporal and trans-world
from the concept
of a person
and which
that no musical
entail
same
as
one that is in
could
have
been
the
individual
performance
it follows
fact a person-from
which
that no musical
performance
could
have
the property
of being
1979b, p. 24f.).
(Adams,
thisness
3.
had
OUR
POSSIBLE
identical
NON-EXISTENCE
with me,
AND
ITS
which
is my
LOGIC
3.1 An Objection
that there are no things that never exist. No such things have
or enter into relations.
I hold further that there are no
properties
thisnesses
of non-actual
and no singular propositions
individuals,
I hold that these are necessary
about them. And
truths. But now
- for
a singular negative
consider
existential
the
proposition
example,
never
I
a
that
exist.
That
expresses
proposition
proposition
logical
and metaphysical
for I am not a necessary
possibility,
being. Doesn't
it follow, then, that there is a possible world
in which
the proposition
must
is true? But a proposition
be in order to be true. So it seems
I hold
in which
is a possible
world
there is a singular proposition
a
an
true
about
individual
in that
one)
(indeed
(me) that never exists
to what
I have claimed
world - contrary
(cf. Plantinga,
1974, pp.
it seems
that in that world
this individual
that
144-148). Moreover
never exists enters
into a relation
with all the things
(non-identity)
to what I have claimed.
that do exist in that world - again contrary
we
At this point we face a temptation.
If
believe
that I have a
or
an
we
could agree that if I never
a-relational
essence,
qualitative
existed there would be no singular propositions
about me, in the strict
sense of 'singular proposition'
that I have adopted,
but we could
never
I
maintain
that if
existed
there would
still have been pro
there
positions
involving
my
qualitative
or a-relational
essence.

Among
ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
19
at least one would presumably

to the
such propositions,
be equivalent
not
I
the
do
and
of
that
exist,
my non
proposition
possibility
in terms of the possible
truth of that
existence
could be explained
with
the individuals
that
my
non-identity
Similarly,
proposition.
I would not exist could be explained
would exist in a world
in which
or a-relational
essence.
in terms of their relation to my qualitative
This solution to the problem would yield a neater and easier basis for
modal
than we shall get by rejecting
the temp
logic, in some ways,
tation.
to reject
I think it is wise
to qualitative
it. As
Nevertheless
we do not know
that we have them. As to a-relational
essences,
it is at least philosophically
controversial
whether we have
essences,
we
if
and
do
have
involve
individuals
that
them,
them;
they probably
in which we would not
would not exist in some of the possible worlds
our a-relational
essences
exist. In those worlds
would no more exist
not be used to explain
than our thisnesses,
and they could therefore
in those worlds. Thus it seems that
the possibility
of our not existing
we cannot count on qualitative
or a-relational
essences
in solving this
assume
I
set
will
the
and
So
henceforth
aside,
problem.
temptation
is to be accounted
that our possible
for in terms of
non-existence
thisnesses
and singular propositions
that would not exist if we did not
exist.
In reply to this objection

I deny, then, that rIt is possible
that p1
that
true.
the
could
have
been
always
implies
proposition
that-p
to
have
found
it
often
natural
characterize
Philosophers
possibilities
and necessities
in terms of what propositions
would have been true in
some or all possible
as we like to say).
situations
(or possible worlds,
so
as
This seems harmless
it
is
assumed
that all pro
enough
long
are necessary
if (as I hold) some
positions
beings. But it is misleading
exist only contingently.
From an actualist point of view,
propositions
are not to be under
modalities
modalities)
(especially
non-qualitative
stood in terms of a non-modal
could
(truth) that propositions
property
that actually
had, but in terms of modal
properties
existing
entities do have. To say that I might never have existed
is not to say
that the proposition
that I never exist could have been true. There
is
but if I ever exist it is false, and if I never existed
such a proposition;
it would not be true because
it would not exist. To say that I might
never have existed
is to say something
about the modal
properties
that I actually have-and
about the modal properties
by implication
have

20
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
that I exist, actually have. It is

and the proposition
thisness,
a
am
I
to
that
is
contingent
being, that my thisness
saying
equivalent
not necessarily
I
that
is
that
the
exist
and
exemplified,
proposition
not a necessary
truth. It seems to me evident
that these entities
all
but I have argued that
exist and actually have these modal properties;
if actualism
is correct, none of them would have existed or had any
I conclude
if I had never existed.
that an actualist
should
properties
about an individual depends
hold that whether
there are possibilities
that my
on whether
are propositions
about
the individual,
there actually
there would
have been such propositions
if
rather than on whether
had been realized.
the possibilities
in question
it is true that if I never existed
the things that did exist
Similarly,
not be identical with me, but that is not to say that I would
would
enter into a relation of non-identity
with them. It is rather to say that
in that case be identical with
the proposition
that I would
them is
not
and that proposition
is one that actually
exists but would
if I never existed. The foundation
of the fact that things that
if I never did would not be identical with me is not
might have existed
in a relation that they would bear to me, but rather in the logic of
of the property
of being
identity together with my actual possession
never
even
some
if
have
existed
did
exist.
that
something
might
things
false;
exist
3.2 Truth
at a World
treatments
use of the
so much
of modality
make
Contemporary
of possible worlds,
notions
and of propositions
true and false in (or
that we can hardly rest content with
the solution
at) such worlds,
we
in
see
more
3.1
Section
until
what
it implies
proposed
clearly
about a possible worlds
for the modal notions with which
semantics
we
are concerned.
In beginning
to develop
such
implications,
I wish to state plainly
that I do not pretend
to be giving a
a
or
a
of
formulation
modal
of
for a modal
semantics
complete
logic,
- much
to
less
be
the
of
logic
proving
completeness
anything. My aim
is rather to clarify and justify the metaphysical
I think a
constraints
modal
must
if
to
it
be
is
suitable for the understanding
of
logic
satisfy
and necessity
that interests us here.
possibility
If there are any possible worlds,
actualism
implies that they, like
however,
anything
else, must
be, or be constructed
from,
things
that exist

in the
AND
ACTUALISM
THISNESS
21
treatment of possible worlds

More
than one actualistic
no doubt; but as a working
is available,
let us assume that
hypothesis
are
or
maximal
sets
constructed
consistent
worlds
are,
from,
possible
sets
of actually
Such
be
called
"world
may
existing
propositions.
in the sense, not merely
that there is no
stories." They are consistent
actual world.
in each
in them, but that all the propositions
contradiction
as
true
could
be
is
together;
possibly
'possibly'
world-story
accepted
a primitive
here. The intuitive
idea behind calling the world-stories
is that for every proposition
"maximal"
contains
p, each world-story
either p or the negation of p. This idea needs to be modified
in some
on
two
the
will
of
limitations
world-stories
ways;
completeness
provable
concern
us
here.
(i) In a typical non-actual world there would exist some individuals

If such a
that never exist in the actual world
(cf. Section 4.1 below).
about those
world were actual, there would be singular propositions
be true. But no such pro
and some of them would
individuals,
are
in
the
of such worlds,
included
world-stories
since no
positions
The world-stories
therefore
do not
true
that
would
and
be
exist
if the
propositions
were
even
not
worlds
actual.
Some
world-stories
may
corresponding
a world completely.
I think there could
contain enough to determine
that differed from each other only by the
be a pair of possible worlds
two
of
that do not exist
individuals
(or sets of individuals)
interchange
4.4 below). The
in the actual world (Adams,
cf.
Section
1979b, p. 22f.;
one
true
in
of
worlds
and false
that
would
be
those
only propositions
in the other are singular propositions
that do not exist in the actual
are represented
world.
these worlds
Therefore
both
by a single
such propositions
include all the
actually
exist.
that does not discriminate

between
them. I said there
world-story
I
"could be" such a pair of worlds
rather than there "is" one, because
believe
worlds
than
is
there is no more of non-actual
given
possible
In this sort of case the world-story
by their world-stories.
gives us a
world. Out of
rather than a completely
determinate
type of world
to speak of "possible
I shall continue
habit
and private
public
worlds."
I do, it should be understood
but when
that some of the
"worlds" are types that could be further differentiated
by the addition
of singular propositions
about
that do not exist
individuals
in the
actual world. This may be less than we wanted
in the way of possible
but actualist
intuitions make
workds,
that it's all there is. Of course nothing
the claim
extremely
plausible
that has been said here keeps

22
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
the possible worlds or world-types

from being completely
determinate
in every purely qualitative
respect.
a world-story
to
should be complete
with respect
(ii) Intuitively,
those
about
that
would
still
actual
individuals
be
in the story were true, and should contain
actual if all the propositions
at all about
those actual
that
individuals
would not exist and
would not exist in that case. For the propositions
therefore could not be true, if the individuals did not exist. Let us say,
and s is the set of all the
that if w is a set of propositions,
therefore
that w contains
actual
individuals
about,
any singular propositions
that is exclusively
and p is a singular preposition
about one or more
of s, then w is not a world-story
unless w includes either p
members
or its negation.
if a world-story
contains
Furthermore,
any singular
an
must
at
it
all
about
individual
contain
the proposition
i,
proposition
set of propositions,
that i exists. But a consistent
otherwise maximal,
still counts as a world-story
if it contains no singular propositions
at
the
all about one or more actual individuals,
that
existence
provided
is not entailed
of those
that are
individuals
by any propositions
in the world-story.
The singular proposition
that I exist, for
entail
the
about
that
my mother,
singular proposition
example, may
If so, every world-story
the former pro
that includes
she exists.
position must also include the latter.
about me con
that includes no singular proposition
A world-story
I would not exist. It
a possible world
in which
stitutes and describes
included
not by including the proposition

represents my possible non-existence,
that I do not exist but simply by omitting me. That Iwould not exist if all
were true
it includes, and no other actual propositions,
the propositions
that
but an observation
is not a fact internal to the world that it describes,
we make from our vantage point in the actual world, about the relation of
to an individual of the actual world.
that world-story
in point of view by saying that the
this difference
Let us mark
true at many
never
is
I
that
exist
(in the actual world)
proposition
are
none.
included in a
that
in
but
Only propositions
possible worlds,
it
actual pro
are
true
in
the
describes.
world
Among
world-story
were
true
are
ones
if
that
world
would
be
that
the
they
positions
in which Napoleon
would
worlds
it is true at possible
actual. Thus
but that
exist and I would not, that I am not identical with Napoleon;
it would not exist in
because
is not true in those worlds,
proposition
if one of
them (and I would not enter into any relation of non-identity
them were actual).

ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
23
3.1 I argued that whether

there are possibilities
about an
are
on
whether
there
about
actually
propositions
depends
there would
have been such
rather than on whether
the individual,
in question
if the possibilities
had been realized. This
propositions
can be incorporated
in a possible
worlds
semantics
conclusion
by
In Section
individual
for
stating the conditions
truth at a possible world
that
exist)' ['It is possible
out to be true in our modal
true in any possible world,
and only if rpn is true in
in terms of
the truth of modal propositions
'O ~ (I
instead of truth in a possible world.
it be not the case that I exist'] should turn
'~
since
(I exist)' is not
logic. Therefore,
we should not conceive
of rOp1 as true if
some possible world. Rather, we shall say
that rOp1 is true if and only if rp1 is true at some possible world;
and similarly
rDpn is true if and only if rp1 is true at all possible
worlds.
is going to play such a

If the notion of truth at a possible world
we
to give a more precise
shall
have
central role in our modal
logic,
is true
account
of it. Our first inclination may be to say that what
I do not exist is only that I do not exist.
about me at a world
in which
I think we cannot quite get away with that; I shall argue that '~(I
'~
at which
for example
is true at any world
have blue eyes),'
(I
is true about me at a
exist)' is true. What we can insist is that what
I do not exist must be determined,
in accordance
in which
with
world
that I do not exist, together
some logical criterion, by the proposition
true at that world, which are not about me.7
with other propositions,
so what
I do not exist I have no properties;
in which
For in a world
I pro
there?
The
else about me could determine
criterion
anything
cases
in
In
the
will
be
truth-func
pose
stages.
developed
simplest
tional
the logical
is the only
form,
propositions,
Let w be a possible
not exist in w; then:
(Cl)
(C2)
(C3)
Among
which
to the non-modal
pertaining
logic of
we
to
form
that
need
consider.
logical
and a an actual individual
that would
world,
form
that are included

in the world-story
All propositions
of w
are true at w as well as in w.
r~
If rp1 is an atomic singular proposition
about a, then
p1
is true at w.
All
that follow
propositions
truth-functionally
w
are true at w.
true
at
positions
the singular
I would
not
about me
propositions
this
exist, by
criterion,
from
that are true at worlds

are those expressed

pro
in
by
24
MERRIHEW
ROBERT
ADAMS
'~
'~
'-(lama
(I exist),'
(I have blue eyes),'
(I am a person),'
'~
=
Merrihew
Merrihew
Adams
Robert
and
(Robert
fish),'
Adams),'
am
a
a
am
D
'I
On
the
non-fish'
is
other
atomic
hand,
'(I exist)
fish).'
(I
I would not exist.
in which
false at worlds
and therefore
I be a
If I did not exist, would
This is as it should be, intuitively.
fish? No, I would be nothing at all. Is it true then that in that case I
would not be a fish? Yes. We capture these intuitions by saying that 'I
'
am a fish' is false, and ~ (I am a fish)' true, at all possible worlds
in
means
'I am a non-fish'
I would
not exist. But
that I am
which
'~
to me the property
that is not a fish; it ascribes
of being a
something
I have that property? Might
I be
If I did not exist, might
non-fish.
a
I
not
at
is
would
and
would
that
fish?
be
all,
No,
something
nothing
'I am a non-fish'
have no properties.
Hence
is appropriately
counted
I do not exist.
in which
false in worlds
In effect I am treating every atomic singular proposition
about a as
as
a
a
to
that
is
and
therefore
a,8
property
saying
something
ascribing
that has the property.
The denial of such a proposition
correctly
not only states of affairs in which a would be something
characterizes
that lacked the property, but also states of affairs in which a would not
of any sort at all. I would not claim that we always use
be anything
logically
principle;
ordinary
in accordance
with
atomic and non-atomic
expressions
a minor
on
at worst,
but it imposes,
regimentation
habits.
linguistic
3.3 Quantification
and Truth
this
our
at a World
'I am shorter than the Empire State Building'

is false, and its
even
I
not
at
in
if they do
is
do
worlds
which
true,
exist,
negation
But what about '(3x)(I am shorter
contain the Empire State Building.
than x)'? It ought to be false too, and its negation ought to be true, at
inwhich I do not exist; for I cannot enter into any relation where
worlds
to provide
I do not exist. My criterion must be extended
for this.
that would
and a an actual individual
Let w be a possible world,
By
(C2),
not exist
(C4)
in w;
then:
If r(f)(a, Xi,...,
Xi,...,
(3xi)...
Other
questions
xn
to
Xn1 is an atomic
singular
(Bxn)(<t>(a,
about
Xi,...,
Xn))1
quantification
function
propositional
about
propositions
is true
remain
at
a,
from
then
r~
w.
to be
answered.

AND
ACTUALISM
might
there
(1)
even
have existed
be possible worlds
never
should
~(I
exist) & Napoleon
THISNESS
if Napoleon
in which
25
had been
a general.
So
is a general
to think that
is true. It is plausible
~
(2)
(3x)(
(I exist) & x is a general)
But this is not provided
for by (C4),
is also true at those worlds.
'~
x
an
a
not
is
is
&
atomic
because
(I exist)
propositional
general'
Generalization
function.
(EG);
(2) does follow from (1) by Existential
is true at
and that might suggest we ought to say that any proposition
a possible world w if it follows by standard predicate
logic (including
that are true at w.
EG) from propositions
'~
This suggestion
however.
For
has unacceptable
consequences,
~
(x exists),' which
(I exist)' is true at many possible worlds, but '(3x)
to
follows
from it by EG, is false at all possible worlds,
according
is a similar problem
about
the rule of Universal
actualism.
There
is true at all possible worlds,
but 'I
Instantiation
(UI). '(Vx)(x exists)'
follows from it by UI, is false at many possible worlds.
exist,' which
what
is known as a "free logic,"
Several
logicians have developed
as a logic of
which may be characterized,
for our present purpose,
in
and
which
rules
the
of
EG
and UI are
predicates
quantifiers
to permit
the inference
restricted
of r(3x)(</>(x))n from r</>(a) & a
exists,1 but not from r<?(a)n alone,9 and of
(fria)1 from ra exists &
can be
This conception
alone.
not
from
but
r(Vx)(</)(x))1
(Vx)((/)(x)),1
used in our criterion.
Let w be a possible
(C5)
world,
All propositions
from propositions
and a an actual
individual
that would
that follow by a "free" quantification

true at w are true at w.
logic
It would not do to replace (C3) and (C5) by the simpler statement

true at w are
from propositions
that all propositions
that "follow"
in which
true at w. For there is a variety
of cases
the truth of a
from the truth of another
p al
q follows
proposition
proposition
are
at
true
is
is
false.
worlds
which
and
there
q
p
though
possible
are several
that obtain among all
There
logical relations
important
true propositions,
that are true
and indeed among all the propositions
that are
in any one possible world, but not among all the propositions

26
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
true at any one possible world. The standard, unrestricted

rule of EG
is our first example of this.
a
If a singular proposition
world,
</>(a)n is true in any possible
must exist, and satisfy r<t>( ),1 in that world. Therefore
that
something
in that world
exists
satisfies
r</>(y there; so r(3x)(</>(x))n is true in
Thus unrestricted
truth in any possible
EG preserves
true in the world will
lead us
applying EG to a proposition
a
to
true
in the world.
that is also
truth is
Since
only
proposition
with truth in the actual world,
coextensive
the same reasoning
shows
that unrestricted
EG preserves
truth.10
We have seen, however,
that unrestricted
EG does not preserve
a
at
to
truth
it
that is true
every possible world. Applying
proposition
as
at some possible world
takes us to a
'~(I exist)') sometimes
(such
at
that is false
that world,
and indeed at all possible
proposition
But there is no counterexample
worlds
(such as '3x)~(x
exists)').
that world.
world;
EG preserves
here to the thesis that unrestricted
truth, and truth in any
'~
one possible
is neither
for
true, nor true in
world;
(I exist)'
it exists only in worlds
at which
because
it is
any possible
world,
false.
For
(3)
follows
(4)
reasons
these
(3x)(x
from
the truth of
exists
Dx
is a son of Arthur
and Margaret
Adams)
the truth of
I exist
DI
am a son of Arthur
and Margaret
Adams,
even
in which
though (4) is true at, and (3) is false at, possible worlds
exist.
neither I nor any other son of my parents would
forms that have a sort
EG gives rise to propositional
Unrestricted
no
are false, or false in
that
in
that they have
instances
of validity,
but that lack necessity
world,
any possible
stances that are false at some possible world.
(5)
because
they
have
in
In particular,
(M>0D(3x)((Mx))
are true; and

instances
form all of whose
is a singular propositional
are true in that
world
that exist in any possible
all of its instances
in which
that are false at worlds
world. But it has instances
they, and
neces
are
not
its
And
therefore
do
exist.
the individual
about,
they
sitation,
(6)
has
D[<My)D(3x)(<Mx))L
instances
that are simply
false.

AND
ACTUALISM
THISNESS
27
here arise, not from EG alone, but

that the problems
This suggests
with the rule of Necessitation,
which pro
from EG in combination
so is rDp.n Perhaps we can safely rely
vides that if rp1 is a theorem,
on standard quantification
unrestricted
EG and UI)
logic (including
truths from truths, if we restrict
the rule of Neces
for inferring
sitation to provide only that if rp1 is a theorem of a "free" fragment of
our system (a fragment
in which EG and UI are restricted)
then TUp1
is a theorem of our system. This will enable us to have
(5) as a
we
are
its
all
instances
theorem
since
without
want,
true)
(which
since it has false
(which we don't want,
(6) as a theorem
having
theorem."
instances). We might want to say that (5) is a "contingent
as an expression
of the idea that logical
The rule of Necessitation,
are necessary
truths, must be treated in general with great
principles
if
there are varies from one possible world
what
caution,
possibilities
to another. A famous thesis about truth provides
another case, having
an
to
in
with
do
which
important
logical
nothing
quantification,
is not.
but its necessitation
is acceptable
principle
(7)
The
proposition
that-p
is true if, and only
if, p
but no false
has instances
that are false at some possible
worlds,
that are false in any possible world. For
instances
and no instances
a proposition
'I never exist' expresses
(call it P*) that is true
example,
at some possible
But 'The proposition
worlds.
that I never exist is
an atomic singular
true' is false at those worlds,
because
it expresses
not
P*
in
and
does
exist
those
worlds.
about
In any
P*,
proposition
a
can
true
be
if
it
however,
exists,
only
possible world,
proposition
and then the proposition
that it is true will also be true in that world.
Hence
if a proposition
is (actually)
that it is
true, so is the proposition
true. (7) may be admitted
as a "contingent
in a formal
theorem"
system,
(8)
but
its necessitation,
D(The
proposition
that-p
is true if, and only
if, p)
are
as a theorem
if singular propositions
not be accepted
on the rule of
as substitution
restriction
instances.11 Another
is required here, if (7) is to be a theorem.
Necessitation
I shall suggest)
These
that obtain
(and others
logical relations
not
true
all
but
that
all
that
among
among
propositions
propositions
are true at any one possible world may make the notion of truth at a
must
allowed
world
possible
odd
something
seem
about
rather
it; we
anomalous.
are using
Perhaps
it to do
indeed
something

there
that
is
is
28
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
I think we have plenty of reason to do

awkward,
although
two diverse
of pro
A possible
world
involves
groups
a
one
true
second
that
could
all
be
and
group
positions:
together,
to
that
the
actual
relations
of
first
certain
group
expresses
group
we
as
two
think
of
the
individuals.
groups
Intuitively
jointly defining a
and
that
is
could
have
been;
single way things
right. But they do not
true together,
not
form a seamless whole.
all
for the
could
be
They
not have existed,
and therefore would not have
second group would
been true, if the possible world the two groups jointly define had been
so to
actual. The first group define a possible
from within,
world
our
the
it
from
while
second
characterize
group
only
point of
speak,
inherently
it anyway.
view in the actual world.

The awkwardness
is not due to the notion
of possible
worlds,
however.
That (6) and (8) have false instances
though (5) and (7) do
I think, from any satisfactory
treatment of the
actualistic
not, follows,
or
our
with
without
worlds
of
non-existence,
possible
possibility
It is as if we were
of my
semantics.
trying to paint a picture
a
me
out of
We
do
of
could
non-existence.
my family, leaving
portrait
a
a
not
it and perhaps
that
is
in
of
likeness
anyone
including
figure
seem
unam
not
to
of
but
that
does
instead
me;
capture
particular
to express.
all that we meant
The classic
and obvious
biguously
is to frame the picture and put a plaque on the frame saying,
solution
"The Non-existence
of Robert M. Adams";
and that is probably
the
we
must
to
to
But
not
the
do.
of
be
the
message
expect
thing
plaque
in the same way
related
to the figures
in the picture
that they are
related
to each other.
3.4 Which
Modal
Propositions
Are True
at Which
Worlds'?
a criterion
for truth at a
in developing
The most
difficult problem,
if any,
modal
which
is to determine
propositions,
singular
world,
in
individuals
as
true at worlds
which
should be counted
they are
as
that such propositions
about would not exist. I believe
'0(Jimmy
am a musical
should be
and 'D^(I
Carter
performance)'
exists)'
to the individuals
they are about, and
regarded as ascribing properties
as
atomic propositions
should be treated here in the same way
(and
is stronger
such as '(3x)0(x
that propositions
should receive a corresponding
treatment).
than Muhammed

Ali)'
ACTUALISM
Let w be a possible
(C6)
(C7)
This
world,
AND
THISNESS
and a an actual
29
individual
that would
If rOp1 and rDpn are singular propositions

about a, then
r~
r~
w.
are
true
and
at
Op1
Op1
r~
If
and
x,,...,
(3x0 - - (3x?)0((/>(a,
x?))n
are
Xi,...,
(3xi)...
xj)"1
(3xn)D(</>(a,
about a, then they are true at w.
treatment
of
modal
is metaphysically
propositions
inconvenient.
satisfying,
though formally
It is metaphysically
from an actualist
satisfying,
point of view,
or necessities
because
there are no possibilities
de re about non
actual individuals.
So if I were not an actual individual there would be
none about me. The singular propositions
that I exist and that I do not
exist would not exist to have the logical properties,
or enter into the
some or all world-stories,
relations with
of which
virtue
my
by
or non-existence
or necessary.
existence
be possible
would
I there
~
fore say that '0(I exist),'
'O ~ (I exist),'
'D(I exist),' and 'D
(I exist)'
are all false, and their negations
I do not
in which
true, at worlds
nor my non-existence
exist. Neither my existence
would be possible
or necessary
if I did not exist.
In accepting
(C6) and (C7) one opts for a modal
logic that reflects
the idea that what modal
facts there are (or would
on
be) depends
what individuals
there are (or would be). Inasmuch as there would be
different
in different possible worlds,
individuals
the modal facts de re
differ from world
to world. This
should not be surprising.
I have
are
that
what
worlds
there
will
differ
from
already argued
possible
to world.
world
It is characteristic
of actualism
that modal facts, like
all other facts, have their whole ontological
basis in the actual world.
This makes
it possible
to understand
how the modal
facts might be
different
if another world were actual.
The most
of my
treatment
of singular
consequence
disturbing
singular
modal
is that the familiar modal
axiom
will
propositions
'pDOp'
'
have instances
that are not necessarily
true. For ~ (I exist) D O ~ (I
in which
I do
exist)' is an instance of 'p D Op' that is false at worlds
not exist.
I was
to
on
inclined
this
resist
but
initially
conclusion,
it seems to me metaphysically
reflection
plausible. When we say that
what
is actual must be possible,
we are leaving out of account
the
no
that
there
be
to
there
bear
the relevant
possibility
might
entity

30
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
but what I have been arguing is that if I had never

modal property;
have
that I do not exist would
I nor the proposition
existed neither
been there to have any property of possibility.
I agree that what
is actual
there is a sense in which
Nonetheless
that
is another logical principle
must be possible.
The axiom 'p DOp'
even
that are false, or false in any possible world,
has no instances
For all
that are false at some possible worlds.
though it has instances
It
in which
could
exist.
its instances will be true in any world
they
as a contingent
its
but
therefore be admitted
necessitation,
theorem;
and would have to be excluded
by a
'D(p D Op),' has false instances
on the rule of Necessitation.12
suitable restriction
not be possible
if I did not
would
To say that my non-existence
has no
to
it
not
would
be
exist is
say that
'pD ~D~p'
impossible.
instances
that are false at any possible world, and may be regarded as
'~
~ '
as a
a "weak"
function
Indeed
version
of 'p D Op.'
D
may
'
'~
~
a
as
O
"weak
and
"weak
necessity
possibility
operator,"
for clearly on the view that I am advancing
they are not
operator";13
as they are in most
to 'O' and 'D' respectively,
necessarily
equivalent
familiar modal
logics.
of the systems S4 and S5
The axioms characteristic
can be divided
which
hold for
into "weak" versions,
do
which
and "strong"
all possible worlds,
versions,
are
as
The
admitted
instances).
following
propositions
of modal
logic
at
all instances
not (if singular
are only some
examples:
Strong
Weak
Dp D DDp
~
~
Dp D D O p
OpDDOp
OpDD-D-p
~D~pDD~D~p
~D~pD~OD~p
and
The modal
by (C6) and (C7) will thus be weaker
logic generated
more complicated
than we may have wanted.
on metaphysical
I believe
anyway,
(C6) and (C7) are justified
more
far
than
correctness
is
doubtful
that
their
but I grant
grounds;
us
at
three
look
of my criterion.
So let
that of the first five clauses
treatment
of singular modal
to my
alternatives
(i) It
propositions,
could be held that unlike other singular propositions,
singular modal
are true at a possible
as well as affirmative,
negative
propositions,
have the con
if and only if they are true in it. This would
world
'~
nor
be true at
would
that neither
0(I exist)'
'0(I exist)'
sequence

ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
31
I do not exist. It seems unfortunate

to admit such a
in which
worlds
at
this
truth-value gap into our modal
when
there are (as I
logic
point,
have argued) strong reasons
for responding
with a clear 'No' to the
if I never existed,
it would
be the case that 0(I
question whether,
us
still
Moreover
this
leaves
with
the consequence
exist).
approach
~
at
true
not exist, and
that 'O
is
not
worlds
in
I
which
do
(I exist)'
therefore
that 'p DOp'
has instances
that are not true at all possible
worlds.
(ii) It may occur to us

relation of accessibility,
could say that a possible
possible world w{ if and
to try to deal with the problem

in terms of a
or relative possibility,
between
worlds. We
in (or accessible
world w2 is possible
from) a
if
that
in
individual
exists
w2 and
every
only
also exists in the actual world exists in wi. The reason for saying this
is that the complete
of w2 will exist in Wi only if this
world-story
is satisfied. We could then say that rDpn and rOq1 are true
condition
at a possible world w if and only if rp1 is true at all, and rq1 is true at
least at one, of the worlds
that are possible
in w. Since
the ac
seen
here
is
to
be
relation
defined
and
reflexive
cessibility
easily
transitive but not symmetrical,

S4 would be the right modal
logic for
it. That is a formally convenient
result.14
I have passed over certain refinements
in this theory, because
they
to it, which
do not affect the strongest objection
is that it implies that
~
is true at w if I do not exist in w. For all the worlds
'D
(I exist)'
a world must be worlds
in
I do not exist. In
such
in which
possible
other words,
the theory has the consequence
that if I had not existed,
would
have been necessary.
This
is intuitively
my non-existence
not
I
If
I
had
think
not
existence
would
existed,
my
unacceptable.
have been possible;
but it seems even clearer that my non-existence
not have been necessary.
most
The
to my
treatment
alternative
of singular
(iii)
tempting
I think, would begin by rejecting
modal propositions,
the whole
idea
of relativizing
to different
their truth and falsity
worlds.
possible
are not to be included
Modal
it might be claimed,
in
propositions,
would
world-stories.
the finished
They arise only when
system of world
it
of
is
is on this
(as
exists,
course)
actually
surveyed. There
sense in which modal propositions
are true in
view no non-arbitrary
or at possible worlds. But we could stipulate arbitrarily
that
stories
(C6')
No matter
what
the form of rpn, a proposition
of the form

32
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
r~
r~
rOp,n rDp,n
Op,1 or
Dpn is true at all possible
if and only if it is true (actually true).
worlds
we could help ourselves

to the powerful
and convenient
modal
of
S5.
logic
This stipulation would
violate
the requirement
in ?3.2
(laid down
an
a
a
true
a
at
is
that
what
about
individual
in
world
which
above)
not exist must
does
be determined
a's
non-existence
there,
by
true at that world,
that are not about a.
together with propositions,
a is the actual world premiere
of Beethoven's
ninth sym
Suppose
w
a
a
nor
in
and
is
world
I
which
neither
would
exist.
phony,
possible
Then I think (C6') implies that at w it would
still be true that a could
Then
have been a musical

and I could not. This difference
performance
a and me at w could hardly have been determined
between
by our
some
are
non-existence
there
not
that
(common)
plus
propositions
at w between
such a difference
two individuals
about us. To suppose
not exist
in w seems at least uncomfortably
to
that would
close
w
w.
at
to
not
individuals
that
would
exist
in
ascribing properties
if we are firmly agreed
Of course
that the truth of modal
pro
a
a
at
matter
world
is
of arbitrary
it is
positions
possible
stipulation,
are
we
But
to
hard to raise a metaphysical
reduced
objection.
really
If there cannot be singular propositions
here?
arbitrary
stipulation
individuals
that never
about
then there
is a non-arbitrary
exist,
in the relations of singular modal propositions
to different
difference
I
think
it
would
to be
worlds.
be
for
this
difference
good
possible
as
not
in our modal
it
reflected
is
in
S5.
logic,
to (C6); we cannot get an alternative
to (C7)
(C6') is an alternative
in the same way. For (C7) determines
the
(in
negative)
questions
in a possible world
in which an individual a would not
about whether,
one sort or another that would be
there
would
be
of
individuals
exist,
a
one
or
to
in
another. We cannot
related
way
just say that
possibly
true that the individual
if it is actually
in
the answer
is affirmative
so
to
could
be
related
if
it
is actually
false
a, and negative
question
in question
could be so related to a. For the "other
that the individual
individual" we are asking about might well be one that does not exist
in a (the actual world);
and in that case there are not actually
any
about that individual,
and it is neither actually
true nor actually false that that individual could be related to a in the
to (C7), therefore, would
relevant way. An alternative
require some
on
and rationale other than those
which
(C6') is based.
approach

AND
ACTUALISM
4.
SOME
OF
PROBLEMS
33
THISNESS
CONSTRUCTION
the various
say about what
things that most of us sometimes
to
case
actual
various
with
reference
the
been
have
individuals,
might
of various
or to non-actual
individuals
sorts, there are some about
which we may well wonder what sense can be made of them on the
to
of the extent
here. Some consideration
I have advocated
views
can
in
be
constructed
a few of these supposed
which
possibilities
with my principles may be helpful both in understanding
accordance
Among
and in assessing
those principles.15
Individuals
4.1 Non-actual
an
I can assert
how
'There could have been
It may
be asked
not have been
individual
that would
identical with any of the in
relations
dividuals
that actually exist' without
(of
admitting primitive
in different
that
between
individuals
exist only
may
non-identity)
to be equivalent
to
I take the assertion
possible worlds.
is a world-story
(3w)(3<?)(w
~
that (3x)(0(x))
&
(3x)(w
& w
includes the proposition

the proposition
that
includes
<M*)))
- where
<?>ranges over infinitely
or propositional
functions.
4.2.
Trans-world
as well
as finitely
complex
properties
Relationships
son whose
eyes
My parents could have had, instead of me, a different
would have been just a little bluer than mine are. But how can that be
in
of a world
It seems that we want to assert the possibility
possible?
I would not exist but there would be a man who does not exist
which
have the property
of having
in a (the actual world)
and who would
a.
a
are
in
bluer
than
mine
That
little
eyes just
property appears to be
a relation between
him and me, however;
and my metaphysical
views
me
a
in a
not
him
relation
between
and
that
there
could
be
imply
in which
I would never exist (nor in a, since he does not exist
world
there
here). (Let us ignore for the time being any additional problems
a
or
one
to
in
in
which
related
worlds
may be about things being
of the individuals of a would not exist.)
to this problem
One approach
is to construct
a
stories
relation between
the actual color of my
more
in terms
eyes
of world
that
and colors

34
ROBERT
other
people's
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
be if I did not exist. We
might
is the color
(3c)(3x)(3y)(3w)(c
my parents & w is a world-story
about me & ~(3z)(w
proposition
that z is a son of x and y) &
is a son of x
that (3z)(z
position
little bluer
could
say,
of my eyes & x and y are

& w contains no singular
the proposition
contains
w does contain
the pro
and y & z has eyes just a
than c)).
some
to being rather laborious,
this approach
has what
as
a
in
it
that
involves
may regard
quan
disadvantage
metaphysical
(in this case, shades of color). But I doubt that
tifying over qualities
we can find a significantly
in terms of possible
better construction
In addition
worlds.
so long as we do not try to
A less artificial approach
is available
in
the
of possible
dress all our modal
worlds.
panoply
judgments
are
our
most
with
natural
and
actual
probably
samples
Comparisons
color.
"What
shade
of
blue
do
of
shades
of
indicating
primitive way
a
to
this."
It
is
natural
little
than
ascribe
mean?"
"Just
bluer
you
as well as
non-actual
shades of color in this way when
describing
"What color are you thinking his eyes might have
actual situations.
are." The actual color of my
been?"
"Just a little bluer than mine
to
have been. Here we are
is
how
blue
his
used
say
eyes
might
a possible
in
but non-actual
situation from our perspective
describing
the actual world, as we do when we say that I might not have existed.
I would
not
in which
If we were describing
"from inside" a world
we
use
as
a
not
color
could
my
eyes
exist,
sample.
in terms of the
of the possible
characterization
as
not
to be con
It
does
have
be
may
regarded
primitive.
itmay
structed in terms of possible worlds. Metaphysically,
however,
an
us
free
from
whether
be doubted
this approach
would
really
to
colors.
commitment
ontological
This
"external"
actual
4.3 Similar Worlds
with Disjoint
Domains
there is a possible
world
It is a controversial
just
question whether
none
same in
with
but
of
the
world
like the actual
qualitatively
in the present essay
as the actual world. Nothing maintained
dividuals
such a world on my
It is not difficult to construct
settles this question.
no singular
there is one if there is a world-story
containing
principles:

ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
35
that are not true. The question

and no propositions
propositions
- or in other
remains whether
there is such a world-story
words,
in that way is possible.
whether what would be constructed
views begin to be more
however,
My metaphysical
constraining,
when
is raised whether
there could be two possible
the question
but sharing no in
worlds
just like the actual world
qualitatively
dividual with the actual world or with each other. We can take a first
If there is a world-story
of such worlds.
step toward the construction
that are not
and no propositions
containing
as
a
must
it
of
virtue
its
contain all
true, by
world-story
completeness
true non-singular
it
Hence
contains
itself
the
propositions.
proposition,
(9)
no singular
is a world-story
containing
that are not true.
and no propositions
There
propositions
and true in this case. So if there

proposition,
but with
like the actual world
qualitatively,
w
true
in
it would
be
that there is a
different
individuals,
w
but with entirely different
world w' just like
qualitatively
For (9) is a non-singular

w just
a world
were
entirely
possible
individuals.
The next
into the abyss of

stage of the construction
collapses
w' is distinct
For the question whether
however.
from a
non-being,
no
answer.
a
not
It
is
fact that the
(the world that in fact is actual) has
individuals
of wf are the same as those of a, nor that all or some of
of a. There are no relations at
them are distinct from the individuals
to speak of
w' and a; indeed it is somewhat misleading
all between
w
between
them in the same sentence. For in a there is no distinction
no
and w', since there is in a only one world-story
containing
singular
that are not true. And in w, for the
and no propositions
propositions
same reason, there would be no distinction
w' and a.
between
there
From the standpoint of a first world (a), figuratively
speaking,
a
with
the
but
be
like
first
world
second
may
entirely
just
possible
In the first world,
there is no dis
different
individuals.
however,
tinction between
the individuals
of a second such world and those of
a third, since the individuals
of the second world do not exist and
there are no singular propositions
about them. In a second such world
from those of other
its individuals would
indeed be distinguishable
of the first
but there the identity of the individuals
similar worlds,
from* which
be lost. Thus there is no standpoint
three
world would

36
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
can be distinguished.
similar worlds
I think this should be
as
a
of the dependence
of non-qualitative
consequence
accepted
on actual individuals.
possibilities
Of course we have not considered
here every possible
to
approach
the construction
of three perfectly
similar possible
but I
worlds,
doubt that any approach will succeed,
except perhaps for very special
sorts of world.
could there be three perfectly
similar
(For example,
sets of individuals
that
possible worlds
entirely populated
by disjoint
exist in a ?)
perfectly
4.4
Interchange
of Non-actual
Individuals
The problems
in Section 4.3 may leave the reader wondering
explored
how I can say (as I did in Section
3.2) that there could be a pair of
that differed from each other only by the interchange
possible worlds
of two individuals
that do not exist in the actual world. One answer to
this question
is that there could be such a pair of possible worlds
if
the following
is true:
(3w)(3</>)(3i/0(3(^(3i/O(h>
is a world-story & ~(3x)(w
contains
the proposition
that <f>(x)) & ~(3y)(w
the proposition
that ip(y)) & w does
contain
contains
the pro
position that (3x)(3y)(3w')3w")(</>(x) & ^(y) & w' is a

& w" is a world-story
& w' is just like w"
world-story
that
the
that
except
propositions
<?)'(x) and that i//(y) are
contained
in w' and not in w", and the propositions
that 4>'(y)
and that ifs'(x) are contained
in w" and not in u>'))16
as finitely
as well
<f), ifj,$', and
if/' range over
infinitely
In other words,
functions.
the possibility
of
complex
propositional
that would
worlds
differ only by the interchange
of two individuals
can be expressed
in terms of a perfectly
of a
general characterization
in which both of the individuals would exist; we do not
possible world
need singular propositions
about the individuals
for this construction.
-where
4.5
I-pairs
important part of the argument of Section 2 was stated in terms of

as a pair of individuals,
I-pairs. An I-pair was defined
qualitatively
from each other, which
indiscernible
do not exist
in a (the actual
An

ACTUALISM
AND
THISNESS
37
could have borne any relation to any

and neither of which
world),
individual that does exist in a that the other could not have borne to
It may be suspected
that this definition violates
that same individual.
own
The
notion of an I-pair is
constraints
my
position.
imposed by
to the problem
in Section
related
discussed
4.4; for if an I-pair
be possible worlds
there would presumably
existed,
differing only by
of the members
of the I-pair (or of sets each including
interchange
one member
of the I-pair). But there is also a more difficult problem
of the
do I mean by saying that neither member
I-pairs. What
not
to
that
the
other
could
have
had
relations
could
have
had
I-pair
of
a?
the
members
of
the
would
individual
any
Very
likely
I-pair
some
in possible
worlds
from which
exist only
individual
(some
there is no
event, at least) that exists in a would be absent. Perhaps
about
possible
positions
world
about
in which
there would
one or both members
be
both singular modal

pro
the I-pair, and universal
of a and what relations
they
of
about all the individuals

generalizations
could have had.
For this reason there may indeed be no acceptable
of
construction
one
or
more
terms
true
in
of
would
in
what
be
worlds.
I-pairs
possible
construction
in
But from my point of view there is an acceptable
terms of what would be true at some possible world. An I-pair would
exist in any possible world w that satisfies, from the standpoint
of a,
or
some
to
with
the following
three conditions
respect
property
function
</>:
propositional
(10)
(11)
(3x)(at w it is true that 4>(x))

At w it is true that (3x)(3y)(</>(x) & <f>(y)
& x is qualita
(12)
~(3z)(at w it is true that (3i/0[(3x)(4>(x) & Oi/f(x, z)) &

(3y)(</>(y)& ~0*(y,z))])
tively
These
indiscernible
from
y).
will be satisfied by any possible world represented

no singular
in a, by a world-story
that contains
but
the
that
contains
is qualita
propositions
proposition
(3x)(3y)(x
from
indiscernible
That
such
world
satisfies
any
tively
y).
(10) and
or
some
to
function
(11), with
respect
property
propositional
<f>
or
conditions
constituted,
is obvious.
It also satisfies
for example)
(existence,
(12) with respect
to any <f>at all. For a world-story,
no singular
in a, that contains
or
a
no
constitutes
in
world
which
represents
propositions
possible
individual of a would exist. And at any such world, for any individual

38
ROBERT
z that exists
of
extension
cate position.
MERRIHEW
it is false
to
deal with
(C7)
in a,
ADAMS
that
(3t/f)(3x)0(t/j(x,
over
quantification
z)), by
variables
a natural
in predi
in all
of (12) is trivial in this case (and perhaps
The satisfaction
are satisfied). This triviality may
cases
in which
all three conditions
that (10), (11), and (12) are not jointly
give rise to a suspicion
to
set
conditions
of
that one would
any
regard as jointly
equivalent
of an I-pair if one held metaphysical
sufficient
for the possibility
in the
views that differed from mine on some of the issues discussed
present paper.
if this construction
the original notion
Even
should fail to capture
is a ladder by which we have
that notion
of an I-pair, however,
climbed up but which we could afford to kick away now. I assumed
that // my thesis, that all possibilities
except
insofar as they involve actual individuals,
is false, then there should
of I-pairs and possibilities
for one member
of an
be both possibilities
are
I
distinct
from
similar
for
the
other.
Then
that
possibilities
I-pair
no
are
sort.
the
The
distinct
of
latter
that
there
argued
possibilities
not be impaired
to
if I were
force of my argument would
obliged
that there are no possibilities
of I-pairs at all. It is those who
reason
to
insist (and no reason to deny)
who
have
thesis
reject my
that there could be I-pairs.
conclude
University
of California,
Los Angeles
NOTES
*
In writing
with
many
David
and
revising
this paper
including
people,
Saul Kripke,
Kaplan,
Marilyn
Alvin
I have
McCord
helped by current and past discussions

Keith Donnellan,
Daniel Hunter,
Adams,
I am particularly
and Nathan
Salmon.
been
Plantinga,
to Tyler B?rge, Kit Fine,
of the paper
and David
for reading versions
Lewis,
are due to all the participants
comments.
in discussions
at
and giving me helpful
Thanks
the New
Association
(December
1979), the Rice Uni
Jersey Regional
Philosophical
of
Conference
(March
1980), and the Catholic
University
versity
Spring
Philosophy
indebted
or parts of the paper were

read. It was written
versions
1980), where
(April
a sabbatical
and spent as a visiting
leave granted
fellow at Princeton
by UCLA
I am happy
to express
and Princeton
my
ap
University
Theological
Seminary;
to all three institutions.
preciation
1
on the ground
that historically
'essence'
I used to object
to this broad use of 'essence,'
has referred
1977, p. 187; 1979b, p. 6). I
(Adams,
properties
only to purely
qualitative
we need a term with
that Plantinga
the sense
because
have changed
my mind,
chiefly
America
during

AND THISNESS
ACTUALISM
in use for that purpose.

currently
the observation
that while
Scotus
to 'essence,'
is the term
and 'essence'
assigns
are slightly undercut
historical
also by
scruples
are "distinct
insist that haecceities
from every
term
essence
where
3, Part 1, Questions
1973, pp. 480 and 419f.
i.e., Dist.
most
be very clear that the properties
often
spoken
purely
2
See
My
does
to
he also seems
quidditative
entity,"
in the ordering
of predicates*"sMb
("infimum")
is being
contrasted
with
existence
(Duns Scotus,
as the bottom
the haecceity
essentiae"
regard
ratione
39
we must
5-6 and 3). Nonetheless
as "essences"
are
of historically
qualitative.
Adams,
1979b,
pp.
6-9,
for more
on
this
and
on
the meaning
of
'purely
qualitative.'
3
but cf. Section
4.5 below.
enough;
Plausibly
4
For
discussions
of this question
interesting
see Edwards,
1957, p. 391, and Prior,
in this essay
is reminiscent
of views
of
defending
see especially
1960.
Prior's,
Prior,
differences;
though
5
This bears on a question
discussed
in Adams,
(too briefly)
1979a, p. 55f. Could God
have created
all the evils
that preceded
to be? It might
be
you without
your coming
so by simply deciding
to create
that He could have done
suggested
something
having
1978,
your
p.
142. The
position
some
with
in a world
thisness
possible
be of some
without
are not
individuals
I am
evils.
But
to God
for
those
available
I am claiming
here
that kind of decision.
that thisnesses
This
thesis
of
may
but some theologians

for theodicy,
may be offended
by the implication
not know as possible
all the singular propositions
that would
be
actually
true if He created
sorts of world
certain
(cf. Duns
Scotus,
1894, p. 35, col. 2, top-i.e.,
Book
that Leibniz
that primitive
2, Dist.
12, qu. 7). And we may
(i) believed
speculate
that God
use
does
on the actual
depend
therefore
be a feature
thisnesses
would
thisnesses
would
possible
independently
as theologically
sequence
motives
of
which
for rejecting
indiscernibles.
6
to whom
Duns
Scotus,
this
sort.
world
objectionable.
thisnesses
primitive
See
1, Questions
with
relevant
existence
of
the thisses,
(ii) saw that primitive
as
that God could not have known
and (iii) regarded
this con
actualized,
of
the world
He
I think
this may have been

the necessity
and affirming
one
of
of Leibniz's
the
identity
of
we owe the term 'haecceity,'

seems
to have held a theory of
Duns
and 474-484-i.e.,
Dist.
Scotus,
1973, pp. 416-421
3, Part
especially
to Marilyn
me
McCord
Adams
for acquainting
2, 3 and 5-6. I am indebted
texts and views,
and for much
Scotistic
about them. See also
discussion
1979.
Brown,
7
similar, called
Something
132. Fine there provisionally
"the
Indifference
is advocated
in Fine,
1977, p.
Principle,"
Convention"
that is (at least roughly)
adopts a "Falsehood
I shall develop
but I do not regard
below;
(C4) in the criterion
conventional.
to (C2) and
equivalent
(C2) and (C4) as merely
8
in terms of a
the treatment
of this problem
Thus
I am essentially
in agreement
with
in Plantinga,
and "impredicative"
between
distinction
"predicative"
seems both more
and more attractive
to me
1974, pp. 149-151. The distinction
intelligible
now than it did
9
The
inference
does
not matter
1977, p. 185f.
if r<f>(a)1 is atomic. This refinement
</>(a)n alone can be allowed
in (C5) because
atomic
world
r<f>(a)1 will not be true at any possible
in Adams,
from
unless
too.
is true at that world
<f>(a) & a exists1
10
It is crucial
to this argument
that it is about propositions,
about non-actual
I do
individuals.
singular
propositions
and
I hold
not mean
that there
to be making

are no
any
ROBERT
40
MERRIHEW
ADAMS
one way or the other, about the validity

as
of EG,
in the actual world,
pronouncement,
or other
names
to linguistic
utterances
constants.
individual
proper
applied
containing
11
That
the contingent
of propositions
existence
is allowed,"
is
(8) will not hold "once
out by Fine,
1977, p. 136.
pointed
12
are related problems
There
about the notion of a qualitative
essence
of an individual.
Such an essence
would
be equivalent,
in a way,
to the individual's
thisness.
Under
my
preferred
treatment
qualitative
essence
of
modal
of
the
however,
singular
propositions,
interchange
in a proposition
the thisness
will not always
truth at a
preserve
and therefore
will not always
truth in a modal
If
world,
preserve
possible
proposition.
essence
as a
a qualitative
of a contingent
being a, then rO(3jc)(<?(x)),n
r<f>( )n expresses
=
modal
will be true, and rO(3x)(x
purely
qualitative
proposition,
a)1 as a singular
a does not exist,
modal
about a, will be false, at possible
worlds
in which
proposition
the two propositions
will have the same truth value
in every possible
in
world
although
=
which
they both exist. And
rDO(3x)(x
a)1 will be simply false
although
rDO(3x)
should be familiar
to us by now. And we can say in
(</>(x))n will be true. This pattern
and
a qualitative
if r<\>(Y expresses
general,
(13)
is true: at every possible

world,
for truth
(C6) of my criterion
a does
which
(14)
not
exist.
of
a,
but a is <f>and a is (f> if a exists. But by clause

nothing
at a possible
in
worlds
world,
(13) is false at possible
Therefore
nC\(Vx)(<t>(x)^x
a),
of (13), is simply
distinction
between
the necessitation
13
An analogous
Prior,
essence
= =
D(Vjc)(<M*) x a)
false.
was proposed
in
strong and weak modal
operators
the problem
under discussion
here. In Prior's
system
are neither
true nor false
at worlds
in which
with
1957, ch. 5, for dealing
Q, however,
singular
propositions
individuals
they are about do not exist.
14
It is noted by Fine,
1977, p. 139.
15
and discussion
After
considerable
thought
I am
to what
uncertain
extent
the
of possibilist
and of various
entities
quantifiers
proposals
in Fine,
with my principles.
of possibilism
from the universe
1977, can be reconciled
to the reader.
Is the motivation
of some of Fine's
This
is left as a problem
(Hint:
for actualistic
construction
definitions in conflict with (C6) and (C7)?)

16
This
is a construction
individuals
worlds
the pair
would
in which
(though
for
in both
exist
the
each
of
both
would
a pair of worlds
in which
It is easy
to modify
worlds.
both
of
the
it to construct
interchanged
a pair of
would
of
exist
in only one world
individuals
interchanged
a starting
in a common
world
that provides
exist
point).
REFERENCES
Adams,
Loux,
Adams,
tinga),'
Adams,
Nous
Robert
Merrihew:
1974,
'Theories
of Actuality,'
Nous
8, 211-231;
reprinted
1979.
Robert
Noms
Robert
Merrihew:
1977,
11, 175-191.
Merrihew:
1979a,
'Critical
'Existence,
Study:
The Nature
Self-interest,
of Necessity
and
the Problem
13, 53-65.

(A. Plan
of Evil,'
in
ACTUALISM
AND THISNESS
Robert
'Primitive
Merrihew:
Adams,
1979b,
Journal
76, 5-26.
of Philosophy
O. J.: 1979, Individuation
and Actual
Brown,
Thomistic
Duns
Assessment,'
Joannes:
Scotus,
New
Scholasticism
1894, Opera
tata Parisiensia),
Paris.
Vives,
Duns
Joannes:
Scotus,
1973, Opera
Dist.
1-3), Vatican
Jonathan:
Press,
Vatican
Thisness
and
Existence
53,
41
Primitive
in Scotistic
Identity,'
The
Metaphysics:
347-361.
Omnia
(Wadding
Omnia
(Vatican
edition,
edition),
revised),
vol.
vol.
7 (Ordinatio,
City.
of the Will,
ed. by Paul Ramsey,

Yale
1957, Freedom
and London.
Press, New Haven
in A. N. Prior and Kit Fine, Worlds,
Times
1977, 'Postscript'
Fine, Kit:
of Massachusetts
Press, Amherst.
University
Edwards,
23
Book
2,
University
and
J. (editor):
Michael
and
the Actual:
1979, The Possible
Readings
Cornell University
Ithaca.
Press,
Metaphysics
of Modality,
Alvin:
Clarendon
1974, The Nature
Press, Oxford.
Plantinga,
of Necessity,
and Possible
Alvin:
Theoria
1976, 'Actualism
Worlds,'
42, 139-160;
Plantinga,
Loux,
(Repor
Selves,
in
the
reprinted
in Loux,
1979.
Clarendon
1957, Time and Modality,
Prior, A. N.:
Press, Oxford.
Review
1960, 'Identifiable
Prior, A. N.:
Individuals,'
13, 684-696.
of Metaphysics
and Future,
Clarendon
1978, Past, Present
Prior, A. N.:
Press, Oxford.


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Actualism and Thisness

Author(s): Robert Merrihew Adams

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

are purely qualitative

to a and that no other individual could possess.

other than those

Synthese 49 (1981) 3-41. 0039-7857/81/0491-0003 $03.90

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

I think this is a necessary

In that case the property of

in a, and R is a relation such that bearing R to some (unspecified)

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

if Dick and Jane had existed but never

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

the other. There

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

that He could have chosen

My thesis rests on the view that there is, so to speak, no ontological

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

then by arguing that it is

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

of any relation to actual individuals

that an actualist must deny that there are

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

haecceity. What would H*

are not qualitative

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

is a horse & y is a horse & x^ y)

cannot pick out one

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

But I think it is absurd, and the third answer

that are incom

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

of me, and distinct from all qualitative

each other. Of course

is the property of being identical with me, the incommunicability

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

at least one would presumably

In reply to this objection

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

that I exist, actually have. It is

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

treatment of possible worlds

(i) In a typical non-actual world there would exist some individuals

that does not discriminate

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the possible worlds or world-types

not by including the proposition

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

3.1 I argued that whether

is going to play such a

that are included

that are true at worlds

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'I am shorter than the Empire State Building'

This content downloaded from 150.212.86.240 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 16:03:23 PM

exist) & Napoleon

that follow by a "free" quantification