Abuan v. People, G.R. No. 168773, October 27, 2006, First Division, J.

Callejo
Facts: On May 5, 1998, Calasiao Police Station received information from an
informant Marissa Gorospe that Appellant Abuan was conducting illegal drug
activities in her house and is a known drug pusher. The officers searched the
house of appellant Abuan for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No.
6425 and had the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu),
weighing scale, aluminum foil, and burner. Appelant claims that the search
warrant was void because the circumstances leading to its issuance were not
based on probable cause but on mere fabrications because Marissa Gorospe,
the informant, is a fictitious person. She and Gorospe were never employed
by Avon Cosmetics and were not even acquainted.
Issue: Whether or not the Search warrant issued is void because the
circumstances leading to its issuance were not based on probable cause but
on mere fabrications?
Ruling: No. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The evidence seized by the police
officers based on said search warrant may be suppressed if the accused
presents clear and convincing evidence that the police officers made a
deliberate falsehood. However, innocent and negligent omissions or
misrepresentation of a police officer or government informant will not
invalidate a search warrant. Even if the police officer or government
informant may have deliberately made a falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth in his affidavit/deposition but the remaining portions thereof are
sufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant will not be quashed
for lack of probable cause.
Figuracion vs. Figuracion-Gerilla
G.R. No. 151334
Topic: Partition of inherited property (intestate) originally belonging to CPG
but was not immediately liquidated and delivered to heirs upon death of one
of the spouses.
Date: February 13, 2013
Petitioners: CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA
FIGURACION-ANCHETA, namely: LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO
ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A. FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA FIGURACIONMANUEL, MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND
HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M. FIGURACION, LEANDRO M.

FIGURACION,
II,
and
ALLAN
Respondents: EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA,

M.

FIGURACION

FACTS:
Petition
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision dated December 11, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed and set aside the Decision dated June 26, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49.
The RTC decision:
Dismissed respondent Emilia Figuracion-Gerillas (Emilia) complaint for
partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages, and
Annulled the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by petitioner Carolina
(Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion (Carolina).
Antecedent Facts
The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate
in May 1958.
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, which were acquired by Leandro during his lifetime. These
properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299 and (2) Lot No. 705.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 originally owned by Eulalio
Adviento (Eulalio),
Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko
(Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had another
daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa
(Faustina).
On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the
eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia.
On December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and
exclusive heir of her deceased parents, Eulalio and Faustina. Carolina also
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners
Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the cancellation of OCT
No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names.
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the
Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return and relying on the Deed of
Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her
agents threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was
prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and
705.
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into:
W/N Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 are the exclusive properties of Leandro
W/N respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half of Lot No. 707

RTC rendered its Decision dated June 26, 1997:

RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since
their ownership is yet to be transmitted from Leandro to his heirs
RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half () share to
Felipa and Hilaria and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to
Agripina was void.
RTC refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lots eastern half portion in
favor of respondent Emilia since a settlement of the estate of Eulalio is yet to
be undertaken.
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated
December 11, 2001, ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No.
707.
The CA agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 is
indeed premature considering that there is a pending legal controversy with
respect to Lot No. 705 and Lot No. 2299
The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot No. 707 under
judicial administration since Carolina had long sold her pro indiviso share
to Felipa and Hilaria.
The proper action in such case is for a division or partition of the entire lot.
A new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lot No. 707 to be owned by:
appellant Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla [herein respondent], pro indiviso share
appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share,
appellee Hilaria Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share
Respondent Emilia appealed the CAs decision to the Court
In a Decision promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court denied the appeal,
concurring with the CAs ruling that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705
would be inappropriate considering that: (1) the ownership of Lot No. 705 is
still in dispute; and (2) there are still unresolved issues as to the expenses
chargeable to the estate of Leandro.
The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who attribute this
sole error committed by the CA.
Position of Petitioner
The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim
of ownership because the Deed of Quitclaim executed in her favor by
Agripina was in fact a deed of donation that contained no acceptance
Position of Respondent
Respondent Emilia contends that the Deed of Quitclaim should be considered
an onerous donation that requires no acceptance as it is governed by the
rules on contracts and not by the formalities for a simple donation.
ISSUE:
W/N the decision rendered by the CA is contrary to law and existing
jurisprudential dicta laid down by the honorable SC.
HELD/RATIO:

No, CA committed no reversible error in holding that the respondent is

entitled to have Lot No. 707 partitioned. The CA judgment must, however, be
modified to conform to the below-discussed apportionment of the lot among
Carolina, Hilaria, Felipa and Emilia.
Issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time
in a petition filed under Rule 45
The Court finds that the issues on the supposed defects and actual nature of
the Deed of Quitclaim are questions of fact. It is settled that questions of fact
are beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of
facts
The respondent can compel the partition of Lot No. 707
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of
ownership.
The respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707
from the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Agripina, who in turn, was the coowner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio.
The respondents right to demand for partition is not barred by acquisitive
prescription or laches.
The Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the proximity of the
period when the co-ownership was expressly repudiated and when the herein
complaint was filed.
Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
More so, laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate
fraud and injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the
rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently
registered in the name of another.
Partition of Lot No. 707
Under the Old Civil Code which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and
Marcelas marriage, Lot No. 707 was their conjugal property.
When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio,
the surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Marcelas
rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted to her legitimate child,
Agripina and surviving spouse Eulalio.
When he remarried, Eulalios one half portion of the lot representing his
share in the conjugal partnership and his usufructuary right over the other
half were brought into his second marriage with Faustina.
When Eulalio died on July 20, 1930, portion of the lot was reserved for
Faustina as her share in the conjugal partnership. The remaining were
transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and Eulalios children, Carolina
and Agripina.

Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 were in turn inherited
by Carolina.
Consequently, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the
remaining 3/8 pertains to Carolina.
Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected
only 3/8 portion of the subject lot. Since the Deed of Quitclaim, bequeathed
only the eastern portion of Lot No. 707 in favor of Emilia instead of
Agripinas entire 5/8 share thereof, the remaining 1/8 portion shall be
inherited by Agripinas nearest collateral relative, who, records show, is her
sister Carolina.
Final Ruling:
The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in dated
December 11, 2001, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
3/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain in equal shares to Hilaria Figuracion
and Felipa Figuracion-Manuel
portion of Lot. No. 707 shall pertain to Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
1/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain to the estate of Carolina (Carlina)
Vda. De Figuracion.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Branch 49, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and
effect the actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the
improvements that lie therein, in the foregoing manner.
Galvez v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 157954, March 24, 2006 Chico-Nazario
FACTS: Timotea Galvez died intestate in Apri. 1965 leaving behind her
children Ulpiano and Pax Galvez as heirs. Ulpiano died in July 1959, thereby,
predeceased Timotea and was suruvived by his son, Porfino. Timotea left a
4,304.5 sq. m. land in Pagdaranan, San Fernando, La Union covered by a tax
declaration. In May 1970, Paz executed an affidavit of adjudication stating
that she is the true and lawful owner of the property. In June 2002, Paz,
without the knowledge and consent of Porfino, sold the property to Carlos
Tam for P10,000 who had it titled and sold the same to Tycoon Properties,
Inc. Porfino filed an action for legal redemption and damages.
ISSUES: 1. Has Porfinos cause of action prescribed? 2. Did Paz make a
repudiation of the co-ownership?
HELD: No. (1) Under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, prescription shall not run in
faovr or co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership. For title to prescribe in favor of a co-owner, there must be
a clear showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners
and the latter has been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is
making to the property in question. The rule requires a clear repudiation of
the co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. It is only when
such unequivocal notice has been given that the period of prescription will

begin to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them of their
own title if they do not seasonably defend it. To sustain a plea of prescription,
it must always clearly appear that one who was originally a joint owner has
repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners were apprised
or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive
ownership before the alleged prescriptive period began to run. (2) Possession
of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to
the other co-owner but in fact beneficial to all of them. The execution of the
affidavit of self-adjudication does not constitute such sufficient act of
repudiation as to effectively exclude Porfino from the property. Thus, Porfino
is entitled to redeem the whole property and to damages.
Padilla vs. Magdua G.R. No. 176858 | September 15, 2010
FACTS On 26 October 2001, petitioners (Padilla) filed an action with the RTC
of Tacloban City, Branch 34, for recovery of ownership, possession, partition
and damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the sale of the land by
Ricardo s daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent
Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale (through misrepresentation by
Ricardo) was made during the lifetime of Ricardo. Dominador filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed value of
the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan,
Leyte. In an Order (2006) the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount of
P590.00 was less than the amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership
and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary
estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE Should the RTC take cognizance of this case?
RULING YES. When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to
recover ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1) the due
execution and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of
Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land to the
exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the
land, and (2) the validity of the deed of sale executed between Ricardo s
daughters and Dominador. Since the principal action sought here is
something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Wellentrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. xxx Under Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following actions: Section1.

Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 19.
Jurisdiction in civil cases. exclusive original jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise "(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;xxx
People v. Tira
G.R. No. 139615
May 28, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. AMADEO TIRA and CONNIE TIRA,
appellants.
FACTS:
SPO3 Manibog formed a team to conduct the surveillance at the residence of
Tira due to reported rampant drug activities. The group observed that more
than 20 persons had gone in and out of the Tira residence. They confronted
one of them and the person revealed that Amadeo sold shabu, and that he
was a regular customer. The group reported this to P/Supt Victorio, who
instructed them to make an affidavit of surveillance preliminary to an
application for a search warrant. Judge Gayapa subsequently issued a search
warrant.
A team then implemented the search warrant. They proceeded to the Tira
residence, where they found Ernesto Tira, father of Amadeo at the porch.
They introduced themselves and told him that they had a warrant
authorizing them to search the premises. Ernesto led them inside. The
policemen found the newly awakened Amadeo inside the first room of the
house. With Brgy Kagawad and Amadeo Tira, they proceeded to search the
first room to the right and found the items (shabu, paraphernalia, etc).
The Tiras contend that the search conducted by the policemen was made in
their absence, thus, in violation of Sec 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They argue that the articles are inadmissible in evidence, being
the fruits of a poisonous tree.
ISSUE: Was the search in compliance to Sec 7 Rule 126? YES
HELD:SEC. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of
two witnesses. No search of house, room, or any other premise shall be
made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member
of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
Contrary to their claim, Amadeo Tira was present when the policemen
searched the inner room of the house. The articles and substances were
found under the bed on which Amadeo slept. The policemen did not find the
articles in any other room in the house.
Also, Amadeo was not the only witness to the search; Kagawad Conwi and
Ernesto were also present. Ernesto even led the policemen inside the house.

The Tiras also contend that the inner room searched by the policemen was
occupied by other people: Chris Tira and Gemma Lim. This was rejected by
the court. We are in full accord with the trial court. It bears stressing that the
trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the house of the appellants, and
thus, had first hand knowledge of the layout of the house.
Ramos vs. Director of Land
Facts:
In 1882, Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a tract of
land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija.
Ponce obtained a possessory information title of the land (by taking
advantage of the Maura Law or Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1994) and
registered the land in 1896.
In 1907, the part of the land (Parcel 1) was sold by Ponce to petitioner Ramos
and to his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
The Director of Lands and Director of Forestry opposed the application on the
following grounds: Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government; The first parcel was forest land.
RTC and CA ruled against Ramos.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to Ramos at least
held this tract of land under color of title.
Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the
instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of
land?
Held: YES.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general
rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not
in the adverse possession of another.
Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in OPN possesion
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to
apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements
of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural
public land.
Important law: Act NO. 926

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as
amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of
July, nineteen hundred and four (July 26, 1904), except when prevented by
war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the
same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter.
There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land is a
forest land
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When
the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular
piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the
land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes.
Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid
by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with
authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the
Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory
evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Ruling:
Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked
registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No.
926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and
the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and Ponces possessory information.
RTC shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1,
as described in plan Exhibit A.
JOSEPHINE WEE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 177384, DECEMBER 8, 2009
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
DOCTRINE: In land registration cases, the applicant has the burden to show
that he or she is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land sought
to be registered. In Director, Land Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals,
we explained that x x x The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful and in concept of owner, by which characteristics private

respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere
conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The
burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear,
positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents
was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without
more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden
of proof to the oppositor.
FACTS: Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over a 4,870-square
meter parcel of land situated in Silang, Cavite, designated as Lot No. 8349. She
alleged in her application that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject
property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Julian Gonzales in her
favor. Petitioner claimed that she and her predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession of the land since time
immemorial.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Opposition alleging that neither
the petitioner nor her predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 8349 since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto. The OSG likewise averred that the muniments of title and
tax payment receipts submitted by the petitioner do not constitute competent or
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the subject lot, or of the
petitioners open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. It asserted
that Lot No. 8349 is part of the public domain and consequently prayed for the
dismissal of the application for registration.
RTC promulgated a judgment in favor of the petitioner.
The OSG filed its Notice of Appeal alleging that the RTC erred in granting the
application for registration considering that petitioner failed to comply with all the
legal requirements for judicial confirmation of her alleged title. In particular, it
claimed that Lot No. 8349 was classified as alienable and disposable land only on
March 15, 1982, as per Certification issued by the DENR. Thus, petitioner and her
predecessor-in-interest could not have been in possession of the property since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. The OSG also pointed out that the tax declarations
presented by petitioner are fairly recent and do not show petitioner and her
predecessor-in-interests nature of possession. Furthermore, the original tracing
cloth plan was not presented in evidence.
The CA reversed the RTC Judgment. It held that petitioner failed to prove that she
and her predecessor-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has sufficiently proved that she and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject property and such possession is in the concept of an
owner.
HELD: NO. Petition lacks merit. Petitioner failed to prove open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property and his possession in
the concept of an owner.
In Director, Land Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals, we explained that
x x x The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in
concept of owner," by which characteristics private respondent describes his
possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring
evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private
respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that
the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by
law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence
that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.
Here, we find that petitioners possession of the lot has not been of the character
and length of time required by law. First, there is nothing in the records which
would substantiate her claim and these unsubstantiated statements do not meet
the required quantum of evidence in land registration cases. It bears stressing
that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957, 1961,
1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45
years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged
ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation.
Second, and more importantly, the petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the
alleged possession was in the concept of an owner, since she could not point to
any acts of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over the
property. Petitioner claims that because the property is planted with coffee, a
fruit-bearing tree, it automatically follows that the lot is cultivated, showing actual
possession and occupation. However, petitioner failed to explain who planted the
coffee, whether these plants are maintained or harvested or if any other acts were
undertaken by petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest to cultivate the property.
Even if we were to assume that the coffee was planted by petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to
exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to ownership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners, vs.BALTAZAR PACLEB,
Respondent.

ERNESTO
V.
YU
and
ELSIE
O.
YU, Petitioners,
vs.BALTAZAR
PACLEB, Respondent.
NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed to set aside the decision made
by the Court of Appeals in ruling that the respondent has the better right
over the subject property and is the true owner thereof.
FACTS: Respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are
the owners of parcel of land in Langcaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite covered by a
transfer certificate of title.
Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier offered the said land to
spouses Ernesto and Elsie Yu. Javier claimed that he purchased the property
from Rebecca Del Rosario who bought it from spouses Baltazar Pacleb and
Angelita Chan. Despite the alleged sales being unregistered, the spouses Yu
accepted the offer and made a down payment and entered into an
Agreement for the sale of the property. After giving the amount, the spouses
Yu discovered that a portion of the property was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb,
one of the respondent's sons. The petitioners then demanded the
cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial payment.
Javier then made arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to
pay Ramon for his disturbance compensation. With that, Javier and the
spouses YU proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell. But, Javier failed to
comply with his obligations. So, on April 23, 1993, the petitioners filed with
the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages against Javier to
compel Javier to deliver to them ownership and possession, and the title to
the property.
However, Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared
in default, so, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners.
The decision and its Certificate of Finality were annotated in the title of the
property.
On March 10, 1995, the petitioners and Ramon and his wife entered
into an agreement that the spouses will pay Ramon P500,000 in exchange
for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the land.
On October 12, 1995, the respondent filed a Complaint for annulment
of deed of sale and other documents arising from it claiming that the deed of
sale supposedly executed between him and his late first wife and Del Rosario
was spurious and the signatures were forged. He also moved for the
summons to be served upon Del Rosario via publication since her address
cannot be found, but was denied. So, respondent moved to dismiss the case
which was granted by the trial court.
On November 23, 1995, the petitioners filed an action for forcible
entry against the respondent with the MTC. They contend that they had prior
physical possession over the property through their trustee Ramon Pacleb,
until the respondent ousted them in September 1995. The MTC and the RTC
ruled in favor of the petitioners, but the Court of Appeals set aside the
decisions of the lower courts. The CA decided that it was the respondent who

had prior physical possession of the property which was shown by his
payment of real estate taxes thereon.
On May 29, 1996, respondent filed an instant case for removal of
cloud from title with damages alleging that the deed of sale between him
and his late first wife could not have been executed on the date appearing
thereon. He claimed that he was residing in the US at that time and that his
late first wife died 20 years ago.
On May 28, 1997, while the case was still pending, the respondent
died, hence, he was substituted by his surviving spouse and some of his
children.
On December 27, 2002, the respondent's case was dismissed and the
petitioners were held to be purchasers in good faith. The trial court also held
that the petitioners' action for specific performance against Javier was
already final, and the trial court also ordered the respondents' heirs and all
other persons claiming under them to surrender the possession of the
property to the petitioners. Upon appeal by the respondent, the CA reversed
the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the action for specific performance filed by the petitioners
against Javier is not merely an action in personam, but an action in rem, and
is thus, conclusive and binding upon respondent even if he was not a party
thereto since it involves a question of possession and ownership of real
property.
HELD: The action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners
against Javier to compel him to perform his obligations under their Contract
to Sell is an action in personam.
The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of
the purchase price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property
in favor of the petitioners. The obligations of Javier mentioned attach to
Javier alone and do not burden the property. Thus, the complaint filed by the
petitioners is an action in personam and is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard. So, the action cannot bind the respondent since he was not a party
therein and considering the fact that his signature and that of his late first
wife were forged in the deed of sale. Hence, the petition is denied and the
Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the respondent having a better
right over the property as the true owner thereof.