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Contrary Destinies
University Press of Florida

Florida A&M University, Tallahassee
Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton
Florida Gulf Coast University, Ft. Myers
Florida International University, Miami
Florida State University, Tallahassee
New College of Florida, Sarasota
University of Central Florida, Orlando
University of Florida, Gainesville
University of North Florida, Jacksonville
University of South Florida, Tampa
University of West Florida, Pensacola
CON T R A RY DESTINIE S
A Century of Americas Occupation,
Deoccupation, and Reoccupation of Haiti
Leon D. Pamphile

Gainesville / Tallahassee / Tampa / Boca Raton
Pensacola / Orlando / Miami / Jacksonville / Ft. Myers / Sarasota
Copyright 2015 by Leon D. Pamphile

All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
This book may be available in an electronic edition.
20 19 18 17 16 15
6 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pamphile, Leon D., author.
Contrary destinies : a century of Americas occupation, deoccupation, and
reoccupation of Haiti / Leon D. Pamphile.
pages cm
ISBN 978-0-8130-6102-3
1. United StatesForeign relationsHaiti. 2. HaitiForeign relationsUnited
States. 3. HaitiHistory. 4. HaitiHistoryAmerican occupation, 19151934. I. Title.
E183.8.H2P36 2015
327.7307294dc23 2015006576
The University Press of Florida is the scholarly publishing agency for the State
University System of Florida, comprising Florida A&M University, Florida Atlantic
University, Florida Gulf Coast University, Florida International University, Florida
State University, New College of Florida, University of Central Florida,
University of Florida, University of North Florida, University of South
Florida, and University of West Florida.
15 Northwest 15th Street
Gainesville, FL 32611-2079
http://www.upf.com
This book is dedicated

to Dr. Charles Poisset Romain,
the eminent Haitian scholar who inspired me
to undertake this vast project,
for his dedication to education
in order to further
a better Haiti.
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Chronology xi
Prologue xv
1. Two Contrary Destinies 1
2. Legacies of the Occupation 23
3. Deoccupation in a Culture of Dependency 45
4. In the Throes of the Cold War 68
5. The Reoccupation of Haiti 90
6. Under the Watch of the United States and the United Nations 112
7. The Americanization of Haiti 135
Epilogue 156
Notes 159
Bibliography 185
Index 195
Acknowledgments
In the course of undertaking the research for this project, I became immensely
indebted to a host of people. In the first place naturally comes my family that
has been always supportive of all my undertakings. I am particularly indebted
to my wife, Rozelle, who never fails to stand by my side in everything I do. I am
also grateful to my daughter, Franoise Martine, who hosted me at her house
while I was visiting the National Archives in Maryland.
I am immensely grateful to David A. Langbart, an archivist in the Textual
Archives Services Division of the National Archives and Records Administration. When I went to the National Archives, I was painfully struggling to secure
materials for the project until Mr. Langbart came to my rescue. He knew exactly what I needed since he had been working with the records of the Department of State for more than thirty years. He got an index card and put down
the guidelines that helped me navigate the maze of the National Archives. I
spent a full week there and returned for another week as I reviewed all the
materials he recommended.
From there, I headed to the Hillman Library of the University of Pittsburgh,
where I did my graduate studies. I ran into Tom Twiss, who had been working
at the library since I first met him there in the 1970s. Tom is now the liaison
librarian in the University Library System Research and Educational Support
Department. He is the author of the Guides of Declassified and Classified U.S.
Government Information for Hillman Library. Tom went way beyond the call
of duty to give me access to whatever documents I requested.
I am also thankful to Ellen Little at the Pittsburgh Theological Seminary
library for helping me access many articles related to American imperialism.
Yven Destin, a doctoral student in sociology at the University of Pittsburgh,
superbly assisted me at various stages of this research.
From Pittsburgh, my research took me to New York, to the Dag Hammarskjld Library. It was the dedicated effort of Sophie Lamour that enabled me
Acknowledgments
to access the library. I am thankful to Jelle Sciboz of the UN Research Guides

for leading me to the relevant documents for my research.
After I drafted the text, Derek Kauneckis, professor of public policy of the
University of Nevada, Reno, took time out of his busy schedule of teaching
and research to read the text and make useful comments. The manuscript was
then entrusted to the sharp editing skills of my friend Tom Forgrave. Tom had
helped me before through two previous book projects. I had full confidence in
his skills. He did a fantastic job.
I am also grateful to those who helped me when this project took me to
Haiti. Dean Rogeda Dorc Dorcil of the Facult de Linguistique Applique,
Universit dEtat dHaiti advised me well on the topic. He guided Ren JeanWilky and Moles Paul in visiting various institutions that yielded relevant information for the last chapter of this book, focused on the Americanization of
Haiti. My research at the Bibliothque Nationale in Port-au-Prince was also
fruitful, as I gained access to the local newspapers.
May all those who have made possible the writing of this text find here the
expression of my deepest gratitude.
Chronology
1492 Columbus lands in Haiti to establish the first Spanish colonial

outpost in the New World.
1508 King Ferdinand of Spain sends the first official African slaves to the
New World.
1607 The first permanent English settlement is established in North
America.
1697 By the Treaty of Ryswick, Spain recognizes Frances claim to the
western part of the island of Hispaniola.
1751 Makandal leads an insurrection against the French.
1776 The thirteen English colonies declare their independence from
England.
1779 France sends troops from Saint-Domingue to support Americans
in their War of Independence; they fight at the Battle of Savannah,
Georgia.
1789 July 14: The Bastille is stormed.

August 26: The Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen is
proclaimed.
1791 August: A revolt of slaves marks the beginning of the Haitian
Revolution.

September: Toussaint Louverture joins slave revolt.
1792 French colonists with their slaves begin to emigrate to the United
States.
1793 Sonthonax decrees the liberation of slaves.
1797 Sonthonax appoints Louverture commander-in-chief of French forces.
1800 Gabriel Prosser, inspired by Toussaint Louverture, leads an
insurrections in Richmond, Virginia.
1801 Louverture adopts a constitution and becomes governor-for-life
of Saint-Domingue.
1802 Louverture is betrayed and sent to France, where he dies.
xii
Chronology
1803 May 18: The Haitian flag is adopted at Arcahaie.

November 18: The Battle of Vertieres takes place; the French evacuate
Le Cap.
1804 Haitian independence is declared by Dessalines in Gonaves.
1806 October 17: Dessalines is ambushed and killed at Pont-Rouge.

February 17: Christophe is proclaimed president of the newly created
state of Haiti in the north.

March 11: Ption is elected president of the Republic of Haiti.
1809 A second wave of French colonists settles in Louisiana.
1818 Boyer becomes president of Haiti.
1825 France grants independence to Haiti.
1847 Faustin Soulouque is elected president of Haiti.
1859 Fabre Nicolas Geffrard becomes president after Soulouques
abdication.
1860 A concordat between the Vatican and Haiti is signed.
1861 A second emigration movement from the United States to Haiti
begins. The American Civil War erupts over slavery.
1862 The United States recognizes Haitis independence.
1863 President Abraham Lincoln issues the Emancipation Proclamation.
1869 Ebenezer Don Carlos Bassett is appointed U.S. envoy to Haiti.
1889 Frederick Douglass is appointed U.S. minister to Haiti.
1904 The centennial of Haitian independence is celebrated.
1915 July 28: U.S. Marines land in Port-au-Prince.

August 11: The National Assembly elects Sudre Dartiguenave president
of Haiti.

August 21: Americans take charge of Haitian Customs.
1919 Charlemagne Peralte dies. The Caco War ends in the north against
American occupation.
1920 The NAACP board of directors sends James Weldon Johnson to
investigate reports of brutality by U.S. Marines in Haiti.
1922 General John Russell is appointed high commissioner.
1929 A student strike at Damiens is followed by a general strike.
1930 Stenio Vincent is elected president of Haiti.
1934 The American occupation ends.
1937 A Dominican massacre and the deportation of Haitian citizens occur.
1940 Elie Lescot is elected president of Haiti.
1946 Dumarsais Estim is elected president of Haiti.
Chronology
1949 The Port-au-Prince International Exposition opens.

1950 May 10: Estim is deposed.

December 6: Colonel Paul Eugne Magloire is inaugurated president
of Haiti.
1954 Haiti celebrates its sesquicentennial anniversary of independence.
1956 Magloire is deposed.
1957 Franois Duvalier is inaugurated president of Haiti.
1964 Duvalier declares himself president-for-life.
1971 January 22: Duvalier announces that Jean-Claude, his son, will
succeed him.

April 21: Franois Duvalier dies.
1979 Boat people begin appearing in U.S. waters.
1986 Jean-Claude Duvalier goes into exile in France.
1990 Diasporic Haitians take over the Brooklyn Bridge to protest FDA
regulation linking Haitians to AIDS.

Jean Bertrand Aristide is elected president of Haiti with 67 percent of
the vote.
1991 Aristide is ousted by an army coup. Raoul Cdras heads the junta.
1992 President George H. W. Bush orders repatriation of tens of thousands
of refugees bound for America.
1993 July 3: President Aristide and junta leader Raoul Cdras sign the
Governors Island accord.

October 11: Junta-backed thugs prevent docking of the USS Harlan
County.
1994 May 6: The UN Security Council approves an embargo on most trade
with Haiti.

September 15: President Bill Clinton gives a television address on the
upcoming invasion of Haiti.

September 18: Jimmy Carter, Colin Powell, and Sam Nunn reach an
agreement avoiding military conflict in Haiti.

September 19: Upon reaching agreement, UN-sponsored invasion
forces enter Haiti without resistance.

October 15: President Aristide returns to Haiti.
1995 Ren Prval becomes president of Haiti.
2000 Aristide is reelected president of Haiti.
2004 The UN Security Council authorizes MINUSTAH, Mission des
Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation dHaiti.
xiii
xiv
Chronology
2010 A catastrophic earthquake destroys Haiti.

2011 Michel Martelly is elected president of Haiti.
2012 The U.S. ambassador in Haiti states that President Martelly does not
hold American citizenship.
2014 The UN Security Council extends MINUSTAHs presence in Haiti
through 2016.
Prologue
In the fall of 2011, the presidency of Michel Martelly was less than six months
old when there was a major problem. Senator Mose Jean Charles set up a
special commission to investigate reports that certain government members,
including Martelly, held double nationality, something that was not allowed
according to the Constitution of 1987. At first, the president said he was not
an American citizen and refused a Senate request to submit his passports for
verification. He did not budge from this position until he was forced to submit them when the Senate linked ratification of a new prime minister to the
presidents compliance with the demand for the documents. The controversy
is reminiscent of President Barak Obamas own citizenship argument in the
United States during the election of 2008.
Kenneth H. Merten, the American ambassador in Port-au-Prince, sided
with the president and said Martelly was not a U.S. citizen. Finally, on March
8, the ambassador confirmed Martellys Haitian nationality at a news conference given by the president and attended by his cabinet, the diplomatic corps,
and a group of religious leaders known as Religion pour la Paix. Despite this,
on March 30, Merten expressed anger that the Senate commission had not yet
abandoned this investigation.
This incident highlights American influence in Haiti. First, it confirms the
American ambassador as a power to be reckoned with in Port-au-Prince. In
this context, Senator Nnl Cassy, a member of the Commission of Inquiry,
raised a serious question: Does not this intervention amount to an interference in the countrys internal affairs?1
Second, it is remarkable the president of Haiti would be considered an
American citizen. American cultural influence has grown exponentially since
1915. In its investigation, it should be noted, the commission discovered that
several ministers did have American citizenship.
xvi
Prologue
The United States and Haiti have the distinction of being the first two independent republics in the Western Hemisphere. But their history has taken
different courses: the United States has become the worlds sole superpower,
while Haiti is known as the poorest nation of the Western Hemisphere, ranking
last in health, education, and welfare.
Americas interests running contrary to Haitis interests has contributed immensely to the political and socioeconomic demise of the Haitian people. In
the nineteenth century when Haiti became a nation, America lodged an economic embargo against her to keep her isolated from the rest of the world. For
the United States and colonial powers, Haitian independence was considered
a subversive challenge to the ideology of white racial superiority.2
By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States was becoming an
expansionist and imperial power engaged in acquiring lands and subjecting
peoples. In the view of Emily Rosenberg, the United States was not so much
an empire as an assortment of empires. Her inventory of American dominations included conquest and incorporation of lands in the West; overseas territories like Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico; protectorates like Cuba
and Panama; administrative dependencies like the Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Liberia, and Nicaragua in the early 20th century, and the Marshall Islands after
World War II.3
In 1915 American national interests in the guise of the Monroe Doctrine
led the Wilson administration to intervene in Haiti. The United States occupied Haiti for two decades, the longest in the history of American occupation. The Marines took steps to safeguard lives and property from the
political instability of the time. While there, they controlled everything
from finance to education, health care, and public works. They also built an
armyla Garde dHaitito maintain the changes they had implemented.
The second independence, called the Dsoccupation, took place in 1934 with
President Franklin Delano Roosevelts Good Neighbor policy. The United
States still maintained control through the election of compliant Haitian
presidents.
As we approach the centennial anniversary of the 1915 occupation, it is relevant to assess the state of the relations between these two oldest republics in
the Western Hemisphere: the one that succeeded and the one that has failed.
Looking at the particular influence of the Spanish and British colonies, there
are data to suggest that colonial powers have immense impact on their colonies. Sociology professor Matthew Lange of McGill University has concluded,
Colonization shapes socioeconomic and cultural institutions of post-colonial
Prologue xvii
societies.4 In the same perspective, it is also assessed that colonial institutions

even shaped long-term human well-being.
But consider that nearly all imperial leaders imagine their enterprises as
both exceptional and exceptionally virtuous and fail to see or understand the
damage they cause. American occupiers felt they pulled Haiti from darkness
to light, from backwardness to modernity. Haitian scholar Leslie Manigat explains, Even the American occupation of 19151934, which violated the national sovereignty of this despised little country, can claim some positive elements of accomplishment in taking stock of a global failure.5
In this book I seek to demonstrate that the two decades of American occupation made a lasting impact on Haitian society. The United States used its
influence to reach long-standing control for its own security interests. Americans viewed Haiti as a secure and ideal climate for investments and the establishment of U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere. The occupation allowed them to
achieve these objectives. Since the Dsoccupation, Haiti has largely remained
under American control. The evidence of this is demonstrated politically, economically, and culturally.
Politically, Cold War reality led the United States to keep policies in place
that are in line with its own national security interests at the expense of Haitian
sovereignty. The United States is a vital force in regime changes in Haiti. As
a clear sign of political dependence, Haitian presidents seek American validation to gain and maintain themselves in power. Hence, President Martelly
took careful steps to resolve his early citizenship tests. Although theoretically a
great defender of democracy, the United States has hindered the flourishing of
democracy in Haiti for its own convenience. From 1957 to 1986, the U.S. government supported the brutal dictatorship of the Duvalier dynasty. Its leaders
looked the other way despite the many human rights violations, the regimes
ruthless brutality, and the abject poverty of the majority of Haitians. Subsequently, Haitis political sovereignty nearly disappeared with the reoccupation
by American forces to reinstate Aristide and the continued presence since 2004
of the UN stabilization forces of MINUSTAH, the Mission des Nations Unies
pour la Stabilisation dHaiti.
Economically, the past four decades have seen Haiti as more financially
dependent on the United States. In 1967 Haitis national budget was 30 percent dependent on foreign aid. Today that proportion is more than 60 percent. America also imposed a neoliberal economic policy that has driven the
country to the edge of socioeconomic disaster. The Haitian economy is subject
to the action of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S.-
xviii Prologue
dominated multilateral donors, the World Bank and International Monetary

Fund.6 These agencies impose a structural adjustment program to open the
country to foreign markets and to provide a source of cheap labor.
Finally, the United States stands now as the supreme conqueror. Haiti is
gradually becoming Americanized. About a million Haitians now live in the
United States, the equivalent of 10 percent of the estimated current population of Haiti, an emigration that has had an immense impact on Haitian culture. The prevalence of English in French-speaking Port-au-Prince is readily
noticeable in everyday communications. Throughout the executive and parliamentary branches of the Haitian government are planted officials holding
American residency green cards if not U.S. citizenship. American economic,
technological, and cultural power transcends the borders of every nation but
perhaps more onerously those of Haiti.
The book is thematically structured into seven chapters. The first chapter
highlights the historical evolution of Haitian-American relations from the colonial period to the era of the first occupation. Chapter 2 focuses on the first
American occupation of the island. Chapter 3 demonstrates that despite control, the Haitian people wanted an end to the occupation.
Chapter 4 focuses on the Duvalier dynasty and how the country declined
further. Chapter 5 traces the history that led to the reoccupation of Haiti by
American military forces in September 1994. Chapter 6 assesses the reality
of reoccupation, from the election of President Bill Clinton to the end of the
American occupation. Chapter 7 shows the Americanization of Haiti as a process fueled by globalization and transnationality that transcends all borders.
In light of its socioeconomic conditions, Haitis dependency on the United
States and the international community seems sealed for the foreseeable future. In Contrary Destinies: A Century of Americas Occupation, Deoccupation,
and Reoccupation of Haiti, the story unfolds when these two independent republics begin relations through their dramatic historical journey beginning as
European colonies.
1
Two Contrary Destinies
On ne peut dfinir une politique extrieure sans tenir compte des USA. De
plus, lhritage historique caraiben est conditionn par lincertitude. . . .
Pour se situer dans la conjuncture il importe donc de connatre la politique
amricaine dans la rgion.
Michel Soukar
History records the end of the eighteenth century as an era of revolution.1

Guided by the Age of Enlightenment, philosophers laid the groundwork for
radical social change throughout western Europe. It was this same spirit that
led to the American Revolution. These newfound notions of individual liberty, political rights, equality, and democracy made their way into mainstream
thought.2
In France, revolutionaries proclaimed in 1789 the rights of men and the
ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. These ideas soon reached SaintDomingue, the former Spanish colony named Hispaniola at the time of Columbuss arrival. In 1697, Hispaniola was officially ceded to France by the Treaty
of Ryswick as part of the settlement of the War of the Grand Alliance. SaintDomingue became a prized colony of the French Empire. On January 1, 1804,
after a thirteen-year fight with French colonists and the defeat of Napoleon
Bonaparte, the black people of Haiti declared their independence, joining the
United States as the only independent republics in the Western Hemisphere.
That is where the similarities appear to end. The size and populations of
these two nations, their national interests, social makeup, economic background, and other factors such as race, cultures, and national visions all conspired, unfortunately, to put the two on a collision course. Even in the early
years, these differences led into a long history leaving us at the dawn of the
twenty-first century, with the two as the Western Hemispheres richest and
poorest countries.
Several indicators have conditioned Haitian-U.S. relations since their independence from European colonization. Commercial interests, predomi-
Contrary Destinies
nant races of the two countries, slavery, immigration, American security, and
various socioeconomic and political factors are indicators of the two different
courses taken. These issues led to American control of Haitis destiny during
two occupations that occurred in the twentieth century.
Within the Colonial Setting

Relations between Haiti and the United States appeared on the surface to have
begun developing even well before their independence. There was a need for
trade. Haiti had the sugar products America wanted, and America had the
lumber Haiti required.
Contacts between the two colonies began in early 1681, when French
colonists violated the mercantilist pact to trade exclusively with the mother
country by exporting molasses to New England colonies.3 Reciprocally, New
England colonists exported lumber and other goods to Saint-Domingue. This
trade grew exponentially. The value of American exports to the French West
Indies showed an increase, growing from [$]3.4 million in 1791 to [$]5.0 million in 1793.4 Saint-Domingue was to become the United States second major
trading partner behind England.5 Because of Haitis relative importance, the
British wanted to stop these commercial activities between the two.
Both colonies went through their own revolutionary wars. In a struggle for
independence, George Washington led Americans to their ultimate victory
over the colonial English forces. Blacks from Haiti contributed to that success
under the French flag. Commanded by the French admiral Count Jean-Baptiste DEstaing, the Saint-Domingue Black Legion fought alongside the Continental Army at the Battle of Savannah.6 Members of this legion including
Henri Christophe and Alexandre Ption would later return to Saint-Domingue
to fight their own independence war against French colonial forces.
Seeds of Conflict
The liberty and freedom issue was a common cause at the center of HaitianU.S. relations, but the different interpretations of freedom, slavery, and race
proved irreconcilable between the two. Americans subscribed to liberty as the
freedom to make their own political decisions.7 But the plantation economy
allowed Southerners to restrict the benefits of independence to just one people,
keeping another group in bondage. Haitians fought against this plantation system to promote liberty and equality for all. Historian Elizabeth Abbott captures
this conflicting attitude: The freedom-loving American Republic held slaves,

while the freedom-loving Black Republic was dedicated to smashing slavery
everywhere.8 These divergent positions crystallized during Haitis twelve-yearlong independence war.
To examine these contrary destinies, lets take a look at Saint-Dominque
during that time. The colony of Saint-Domingue was a polarized society of
30,000 whites, 30,000 people of mixed blood called affranchis, and 500,000
blacks of pure African descent. They were sharply separated not only along
these race lines but also in economic interests and political affiliations. Whites
towered at the top and refused to grant human rights to affranchis and pure Africans. Both whites and affranchis owned slaves and treated them inhumanely
in the highly profitable plantation system.
The slaves revolted against their oppressors in August 1791. They burned the
plantations in the northern part of the island and spread terror throughout the
colony. Toussaint Louverture became the leader of the revolution. Their revolution ended white supremacy for a time, something that was not unnoticed
by the Americans to the north.
To contain the slave rebellion, the Colonial Assembly in Saint-Domingue
asked for help from both England and the United States. The English sent ammunition from Jamaica and an expedition force that stayed for five years on the
island. In the United States, George Washington was caught between theory
and practice. While he believed in freedom, he also needed to pay the French
back for their support during the American Revolution.9 He chose to side with
the white French planters. He urged his country to extend aid to France so as
to crush the alarming insurrection of the negroes in St. Domingo.10 The first
U.S. president also helped with funds and arms for the French forces.
Despite the support from the Washington administration, the Haitian
slave system was dying. In 1793, the French commissioners, led by Lger Flicit Sonthonax, emancipated all the islands slaves. In France, the parliament
known as the Convention later ratified this emancipation. This measure sent
waves of hysteria across the southern United States. Planters feared that their
slaves might follow suit.
During the uprisings and war, immigration emerged as one of the indicators that would indelibly mark Haitian-U.S. relations. The revolution in Haiti
triggered the first migratory wave to the United States. In 1798, as the colonial
capital of Le Cap was engulfed in flames, Governor Franois Galbaud du Fort,
the defender of the old guard, and some one thousand white refugees, set sail
for the United States in a convoy of over 100 merchant vessels and French war-
Contrary Destinies
ships.11 When they reached Chesapeake Bay, Virginia, they dispersed to the
various Atlantic coastal cities.
Thomas Jefferson, then Americas first secretary of state, himself a Virginia
planter, sympathized with these French planters: We have received according
to our best abilities the wretched fugitives from the catastrophe of the principal
town of that colony, who, escaping from the swords and flames of that civil
war, threw themselves naked and houseless, without food or friends, money or
other means, their faculties lost and absorbed in the depth of their distress.12
Jefferson feared a reenactment of Saint-Domingue in the American South.
Throughout the nineteenth century, immigration remained high on the list of
issues of those concerned with Haitian-U.S. relations.
Within the Realms of Adams and Jefferson

A century later, historian Henry Adams remarked that the history of the
United States was from 1798 to 1803 (intimately) involved with the fate of
the most unhappy of islands.13 The leaders during that time were Toussaint
Louverture and U.S. President John Adams. Their interaction led to an act of
Congress on June 13, 1798, that banned all American ships from the colony
and suspended all commercial relations with France and its dependencies due
to French aggression in Haiti. This action highlights the mutual interest of
Louverture and Adams. Negotiating with Louverture gave Adams the opportunity to weaken if not destroy French power on the Caribbean island. Louverture wanted to use American commerce and military power to further his own
objectives of freedom for blacks and independence from France. He had the
vision of a black state ruled by a black leader, Toussaint Louverture himself.14
On November 6, 1798, Louverture took the first step by asking Adams to
resume trade. Louverture promised a guarantee of safety for American ships.
Although opposed to freedom for blacks, Adams nonetheless reopened negotiations to promote trade. He appointed West Indies native Edward Stevens,
married to the daughter of the Danish governor of Santa Cruz, as U.S. consul
general in Saint-Domingue. He arrived in Le Cap the following April.
American ships returned to the island even as Louverture blocked the
French ships.15 Stevens assured the secretary of state that depredations, aggressions and hostilities, which occasioned the restraints and prohibitions of
commercial intercourse between this Colony, and the United States will not
continue in the future and that the trade may of course be renewed with the
utmost safety.16 The United States reaped not only the benefits of advancing
commerce but also a chance of using Louvertures backing to protect its southern coasts. Adams granted permission to afford a temporary supply to the
Colony, at a moment when it was reduced to the extremest distress, by a total
want of all the articles usually imported from America.17
The policies emerging from these negotiations set the tone for at least two
other permanent forces that have driven the relations between the two countries. American policymakers demonstrated an eagerness to promote commerce in Saint-Domingue and to recognize the preliminary signs of Haitian
economic dependence on the United States.
A second leg of Haitian dependence on the United States and other foreign
powers is political. Historian Ludwell Lee Montague has noted that a sense of
insecurity dominated the foreign policy of Haiti as well as its internal organization.18 This insecurity stems from the political instability caused when Haitian
leaders feared revolt and coup dtat. Such revolts are organized and supported
by foreign powers to promote their own causes. In a small nation, Haitian leaders traditionally felt the need to operate under the security of a stronger power.
In both instances, Haitian leaders relied on the United States.
In a sense, then, American interests in the Haitian economic and political
issues drove the two countries in the very colonial context. These forces began
to unfold during a power struggle between Louverture and his rival Andr
Rigaud, leader of the southern part of the island. Their rivalry ended up in
open hostilities, then war, setting the tone for insurrections of opposing Haitian leaders for years to come. Haitian-U.S. relations would taint other events
as well. A first step took place when Louverture asked the United States for
assistance using armed boats to crush the resistance of his enemy.19
The United States took his side and granted the request. If Toussaint should
prove unsuccessful, all the arrangements we have made respecting commerce
must fall to the ground,20 acknowledged Edward Stevens. He insisted on the
wars end in favor of Louverture. The United States supported Louverture by giving him military aid. In March 1800, American ships blockaded and bombarded
the forts of a southern stronghold at Jacmel, handing Louverture the win.
For this, Louverture pledged his allegiance to do everything which can
preserve the existing harmony between this colony and the U. States, and
which can prove his attachment to our Government.21 Emerging as the uncontested leader who defeated Rigaud and deposed Sonthonax as the French
authority, Louverture offered the United States a greater opportunity to extend commerce to the rest of the island, especially in Rigauds former preserve in the south.
Contrary Destinies
Louvertures ultimate goal was to establish a sovereign nation controlled

by blacks. In 1801 he put in place a constitution demonstrating that SaintDomingue was no longer a French colony. This action and Louvertures intervention in the eastern part of the island got the attention of Napoleon
Bonaparte, who figured his best option was a military intervention against this
black leader. Bonaparte desired a French empire in the Americas, from SaintDomingue north to Louisiana. Saint-Domingue was the initial target of that
expansion. Napoleons mission of restoring French power was so important to
him that he entrusted General Victor Emmanuel Leclerc, his own brother-inlaw, as the commander of 20,000 choice troops.
Napoleons bold plan prompted an adverse reaction from Jefferson, who
wanted Louisiana as part of the United States. Despite the traditional republican ideals linking Jefferson to France, he saw Louvertures victory as an asset
for Americas own expansion. This outcome was not popular in the United
States, primarily due to the widespread fear of a black nation so close to the
Southern states. Yet Jefferson concluded, The black rebels would be less dangerous under Louvertures leadership than under the rule of France. With this
assumption, Jefferson pursued a policy of neutrality actually designed to help
the Haitian cause. Despite strong French protest, American commerce with
Louvertures Saint-Domingue continued. Leclerc complained to his marine
minister that the United States has brought the muskets, cannon, powder
and all munitions of war here. It is they who have egged Toussaint on to resistance.22
American aid helped Louverture resist, even though the French later managed to capture and deport him from the colony. Subsequently his lieutenants
Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Henri Christophe, and Alexandre Ption defeated the
French forces, weakened by yellow fever, to proclaim Haitis independence.
Napoleons defeat in Saint-Domingue set the stage for the Louisiana Purchase,
in April 1803, by the United States. Henry Adams concludes, The prejudice of
race alone blinded the American people to the debt they owed to the desperate courage of 500,000 Haitian Negroes who would not be enslaved.23 The
colonys loss crushed Napoleons ambition.
Not all eyes were, however, blinded by the impact of the Haitian Revolution. Alexander Hamilton acknowledged the Haitian contribution: Those
means which were originally destined to the colonization of Louisiana had
been gradually exhausted by the unexpected difficulties of this ill-started enterprise.24 He added that the first consul was forced to relinquish his darling
plan of colonizing the bank of the Mississippi. The Louisiana Purchase stands
perhaps as the greatest achievement of Jeffersons presidency because with it,

the United States doubled its size. The 800,000 square miles of land, bought
at a cost of about four cents per acrewould eventually be cut into all or part
of fifteen American states.25
Louisiana was a strong link in Haitian-U.S. relations. In fact, a large contingent of those who left Saint-Domingue settled there. These immigrants nearly
doubled the population of New Orleans. They also made a tremendous contribution, practically changing altogether the face of that state. Their contributions of labor, agricultural knowledge, and financial resources helped bring
stability and civilization to this wild frontier.
Like their contemporaries in Cuba, many in Saint-Domingue worked in agriculture and other economic activities to revive a dying sugar industry. With
the help of these now prosperous producers, sugar again became marketable.26
They also made significant cultural contributions to such local institutions as
newspapers, opera, theaters, pharmacies, music schools, and the book trade,
all of which flourished there for the first time.27 Haitian influences surfaced as
well in Louisianas language, songs, cuisine, dances, and folk religions.
The Postcolonial Trajectory

On January 1, 1804, the leaders of what was primarily seen as a ragtag army
Dessalines, Christophe, Ption, and other generalsdeclared the birth of the
newest nation in the Western Hemisphere. After a dozen years of hostilities,
popular forces prevailed over the French planters and Napoleon Bonapartes
expeditionary force. The toll was heavy for both sides. Beside the economic
ruin of the island, fifty thousand French and sixty thousand blacks lost their
lives during this revolutionary period.
The generals gathered in Gonaves to celebrate their victory, and they solemnly swore to abolish slavery forever from this new nation. The colonial name
Saint-Domingue was changed to Haiti, mountainous land, the name given by
its original inhabitants, the Taino. Following three centuries of European occupation marked by Spanish genocide of the indigenous tribes and the infernal
slavery system by French masters, Haitians became independent at last.
Historians continue to consider the significance of the Haitian Revolution.
African Americans were ecstatic. For Episcopal bishop to Haiti James Theodore Holly, Haiti was the Vindication of the Capacity of the Negro Race for
Self-government and civilized progress. Bishop Holly defended Haitian independence, arguing that Haiti made a name for us, that is imperishable as
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the worlds history.28 African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church pastor and
historian T. G. Steward compared the three revolutions: While the American
Revolution transformed dependent colonies in an independent state, and the
French revolution ended the monarchy and brought Napoleon to power, the
Haitian revolution was unique in that it provoked a prodigious social cataclysm.29 That is, the Haitian revolution gave birth to a new social and political
order. A new state was born that offered liberty to all people regardless of race
or ethnic origins. This thesis was reinforced more recently by former British
Prime Minister Gordon Brown: The Haitians transformed a colonial revolt
into a thoroughgoing social revolution.30
Even in the twentieth century, early civil rights activist James Weldon Johnson was adamant that Haiti is the one chance that the Negro has in the world
to prove he is capable of the highest self-government. In recent years, University of Florida historian David Geggus reminds us that the Haitian Revolution
can make several major claims to a prominent place in world history.31
The Haitian military establishment in charge at the beginning crafted the
nations first constitution. It was published in 1805 as a rationale for the newly
gained independence and provided the guarantee that slavery was forever
abolished. It forbade white men to settle in Haiti as masters and property
owners. They could not buy land within its boundaries. The new Haitian leaders also confiscated the property of the former masters.
To defend and preserve their national security and probably to assure that
the military leaders had a job in the future, the constitution set in place a strong
military establishment. In anticipation of French military aggression, Dessalines urged his generals to build military barracks and forts on hills, fortifying
the cities, plains, and harbors. Former slave and Haitian military leader Henri
Christophe proved himself invaluable with the construction of the Citadelle
Laferrire, a large mountaintop fortress in northern Haiti that remains one of
the worlds notable structures. It is a massive fortress built at the top of Bonnet
Levesque, a mountain that would repel any aggressor.
Poets and thinkers alike joined in defending and solidifying Haitian independence. In the early days, the first of renowned Haitian poets, Antoine
Dupr, in Hymne la libert, proclaims his love for Haiti with this warning:
If some day on your shores
Reappear our tyrants,
May their fugitive bands
Become fertilizers for our lands.32
Other poets followed suit. Tertulien Guilbaud and Massillon Coicou sang
the praises of Haitis heroes. Haitian thinkers and scholars also warned against
foreign aggression in Haiti. In 1884, journalist and historian Louis Joseph Janvier wrote Haiti aux Haitiens, in which he condemned any violation of Haitian
sovereignty.
Opposition to Independence
Professor of history and Asian studies at Amherst College Donald Robinson
argues that slavery played a major role in American foreign policy following
its independence: An analysis of American diplomacy in the early years would
show that sectional tensions arising from slavery were an important factor in
the conduct of the young republics foreign relations.33 Tensions connected
with race, slavery, and national interests explain the United States inconsistent
position toward Haiti.
If Adams and Jefferson earlier chose to support the Haitian revolution over
Napoleons imperial ambitions, the emergence of a black nation near the U.S.
borders later proved to be against the interests of slaveholding Southerners.
The first two independent nations in the Western Hemisphere emerged from
European colonial domination in opposite trajectories. Despite similar ideals
there were distinct differences. The American Declaration of Independence
spoke of the equality of all men, but slavery still lived on in fifteen Southern
states. In fact, the first three American presidents who handled Haitian-U.S.
relationsGeorge Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madisonwere
all slave owners.
These conflicting worldviews had an impact on Haitian-U.S. relations. Jefferson, who perhaps epitomized more than anyone else the ideals of the American
Revolution, embraced the concern of Southern slave owners. In conversation
with British Minister Anthony Merry, Jefferson suggested a quarantine that
would neutralize the newborn nation: The present situation of Things in the
island of St. Domingo . . . is naturally a Matter of much concern to the Southern
Parts of the United States. . . . All the Governments who have colonies in the
West Indies . . . should come to an Agreement not to suffer the former [slaves]
to have any Kind of Navigation whatsoever or to furnish them with species of
Arms or Ammunition; and that it would not be equally a right measure . . . to
[keep] them supplied with provisions.34
Matching words with action, the president introduced in Congress a bill
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forbidding arms trade with the Dessalines administration. On March 3, 1805,

the bill became law. It was Americas first embargo against Haiti. In early 1806,
Jefferson introduced yet another bill that would prohibit merchants from trading with any parts of the island not under French control.
To justify the embargoes, administration leaders and Congress relied on
fears that the Haitian rebellion would spread to America, either by the contagion of example or by the work of Negro guerrillas and pirates.35 In the
United States the growth of cotton capitalism increased the slave population
to approximately two million. It was, therefore, prudent to keep the Haitian
revolution as quiet as possible in the Union.
American traders defied the embargo, and trade with Haiti continued. The
situation prompted French Foreign Minister Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand
to complain: The existence of an armed Negro people, occupying places that
they have despoiled by the most criminal acts, is an horrible spectacle for all
the white nations; all of them should feel that, by allowing them to continue
in that state, they are sparing incendiaries and assassins.36 This was another
expression of the thinking behind white supremacy.
The United States shared these same French racist views. In preCivil War
days, blacks in America were considered physically and mentally inferior.37
Whites did what they could to persuade African Americans they were inherently inferior. African Americans experienced crushing blows to their
self-esteem. Due to their racist thinking, white Americans considered it unthinkable that blacks could ever exercise self-government. In fact, the United
States emerged into a nation greatly divided along racial lines through the
twentieth century and into the twenty-first. In 1970 historians William Chase
and Peter Collier affirmed, Racism has been part of our institutions and
laws, our culture and ourselves.38 Racist practices filtered into U.S. foreign
relations.
The reality of white superiority that characterized colonial society in
Saint-Domingue was neutralized in post-independence Haiti. French colonists, planters, and even mulattoes migrated en masse to American shores
and other Caribbean islands. Furthermore, Dessalines later carried out the
massacre of a number of the former masters. What subsequently emerged
was a hierarchical society dominated by mulattoes and blacks formerly called
affranchis. As they moved up to the top of the socioeconomic pyramid, they
gave rise to new social and political dynamics that weighed on Haitian-U.S.
relations already tainted by American racist attitudes.
In the Quest of Recognition

Despite the common traits of the American and Haitian Revolutions, the
United States refused to recognize Haiti during the first half of the nineteenth
century.39 Other European powers followed suit. The United States and colonial powers whose empires continued to rely on slavery were openly hostile
to the worlds first black republic, and for several decades there was a constant threat of invasion.40 Jefferson took the lead. The emergence of Haiti as
a sovereign nation in the West Indies created fears of a black uprising in the
United States. Slave insurgency and black liberation movements were a major
threat for Southern plantations. American slaveholders were both dismayed
by the successful revolution and feared the prospect that it might be exported
to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and their own land. A Petersburg, Virginia, newspaper
affirmed, We should not wish to see a powerful nation of blacks rise up so
near.41
Albert Galletin, Thomas Jeffersons secretary of the treasury, described to
Congress the people of Saint-Domingue as recently emancipated slaves who
received their first education under the lash of the whip. He argued, therefore,
against ever embodying so dangerous a description of men in our neighborhood, whose object may be plunder, and who might visit the States of South
Carolina and Georgia, and spread their views among the negro there, and excite dangerous insurrections among them.42
American fears were not altogether unfounded. There were certainly slave
rebellions, though on a smaller scale, in the South. In 1800 Gabriel of Henricho
County, Virginia, conspired with other leaders to fight for our liberty as any
men.43 Gabriel followed the example of his fellow blacks in Saint-Domingue.44
In 1820 Denmark Vesey, a freed black who lived briefly in Saint-Domingue,
took arms against the slavery system in South Carolina and called attention to
the success of Haitians in establishing and maintaining their independence.45
Gabriel sought assistance from Haitian leaders. Then came the surge of what
historian Herbert Aptheker called the Nat Turner cataclysm in Southampton
County, Virginia, referring to Turners ill-fated uprising to liberate his people.
Louisiana, Jeffersons crowning achievement, also showed signs of slave rebellion. A large contingent of French colonists who migrated with their slaves
to New Orleans for ethnic and cultural reasons sharply altered the political
landscape because of their long-standing tradition of freedom.46 To avoid as
much of the Haitian influence as possible, Congress prohibited importing foreign slaves to Louisiana. Still, uprisings flared up in this newly acquired terri-
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tory. In 1795, even before American acquisition, slaves on the Poydras plantation in Pointe Coupe rose up against their masters. Many Louisianans believed
the Pointe Coupe insurrection was connected to the Saint-Domingue Revolution, and planters on November 9, 1804, complained to Governor William
C. Claiborne that the news of the revolution of Saint-Domingue and other
places has become common among blacks.47 In 1811 Charles Deslondes from
Saint-Domingue led the largest slave revolt in North American history, in the
Orleans Territory. Even the assault James Brown mounted was inspired by the
Haitian Revolution.
There were two camps: one wanted Haitian recognition, the other didnt.
Yankee merchants desired the trade with Haiti, while slaveholders resisted
any relationship with what they viewed as a renegade state. In 1822 Haitian
president Jean-Pierre Boyer made the first official move for recognition. His
secretary general, Joseph Balthazar Inginac, requested American recognition
from Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. That letter was never answered, a
diplomatic blow ordered by President James Monroe. President Boyer pleaded
for trade relations while avoiding any action that could disturb the tranquility
of any portion of the union.48
Slaveholders ultimately won. Missouri Senator Thomas Hart wrote, The
peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful negro insurrection to be exhibited among them. It will not permit black ambassadors and
consuls to . . . give their fellow blacks in the United States proof in hand of the
honors that await them for a like successful effort on their part.49 President
Boyer sought a compromise that would alleviate Southern fears by promising
to send a diplomatic agent of such in color as not to offend the prejudices of
the country.50 Nonetheless, his efforts proved fruitless. During the same time,
the United States granted recognition to the recently liberated Latin American
nations of Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico on the basis of the Monroe
Doctrine of 1823.
When Republican Abraham Lincoln came to power with black support, this
occasion brightened Haitis quest for recognition. Mercantile forces outmaneuvered the Southerners by selling the commercial advantages of recognition.
James Redpath, an agent for Haitian President Fabre Nicolas Geffrard, led the
charge. He was supported by Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, who promoted recognition for the trade interests. The bill passed both houses of Congress to finally make U.S. recognition of Haiti a reality. It was signed into law
by Lincoln on June 2, 1862; Benjamin F. Whidden of New Hampshire became
the first U.S. commissioner and consul general agent at Port-au-Prince.
African American Emigration to Haiti

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a movement emerged to deport African Americans from the U.S. mainland. Historian D. W. Meinig has assessed
this intolerance: Their presence constituted the deepest human problem and
exposed the worst contradictions in American life: eagerly purchased for their
labor but generally despised as people, unwanted as a social presence, feared
as a potentially rebellious force.51 The effort to remove African Americans was
orchestrated by the American Colonization Society, established in Washington
by the Reverend Robert Finley, a Presbyterian minister from New Jersey who
preached in South Carolina.
Jefferson continued to defend the interests of Southern slave owners. Moving away from blocking diplomatic relations, he endorsed Finleys initiative
to deport blacks to Haiti and other Caribbean islands. He believed the West
Indies was a more practicable retreat than trade or diplomatic embargos: Nature seems to have formed these islands to become the receptacle of the Blacks
transplanted into this hemisphere. Of these islands, Jefferson favored Haiti,
where the Blacks are established into a sovereignty de facto, and have organized themselves under regular laws.52
The colonization movement became one of emigration as blacks strove to
take control of their own destiny. African Americans shied away from schemes
of the American Colonization Society. While this white-led society succeeded
in sending a handful of blacks to the new nation of Liberia, there was a greater
interest among blacks themselves in migrating to Haiti. President Boyer offered
them the blessings of freedom. The Reverend Richard Allen of Philadelphia,
founder of the AME Church, headed the organization of the first emigration
to Haiti. As a result of this effort, some six thousand African Americans chose
to migrate to Haiti in the mid-1820s.53
Though this first emigration movement ended up in failure, Haiti still remained a powerful magnet for American freedmen. In 1850 the Fugitive Slave
Law and the Supreme Courts Dred Scott decision motivated African Americans to look elsewhere for their freedom. By that time, the momentum again
reached high interest. Episcopalian priest James Theodore Holly led the effort to
move African Americans from second-class citizenship in the United States to
freedom in Haiti. Emigrationists were also moved by a missionary spirit. They
saw an opportunity to reinforce an incomplete revolution in Haiti for lack of
economic progress. Responding to the challenge, they wanted to provide the
commercial, agricultural, and industrial acumen that was required to bring the
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Haitian Revolution to a successful conclusion.54 Despite objections among African Americans about what some saw as the dubious benefits of such an emigration, those of this second movement reached Haiti in early 1861. They were
greeted with many new challenges that ended this emigration wave, among
them a tropical climate, cultural differences, and an increase in fatalities.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government pressed on with its own colonization
schemes. Lincoln favored colonization of African Americans to Haiti. In
his emancipation of the slaves, Lincoln sought a solution to the problem of
free African Americans. Besides compensating the masters for their human
property, he looked to colonize the freed blacks to another part of the world.
Haiti became once again a suitable place. In 1862, emancipated slaves from the
District of Columbia were offered a provision of $100,000 for the voluntary
emigration of freedmen to Haiti and Liberia.55 Lincolns policy of colonizing freedmen away from American shores led him to consider Haiti, among
other places, and particularly the Ile Vache, a small island off the southern
coast of Haiti, near the city of Aux Cayes, also called Les Cayes. Bernard Kock,
described as a freelance capitalist, led the effort that took some five thousand
African Americans to the island. The venture was mismanaged and ended with
their starvation.
Prelude to Occupation
Analyzing American policy in the Caribbean, historian Brenda Plummer argues, American relations with independent countries of the area were conducted in the spirit of its assumptions about orderly government, hemispheric
security and its own commercial advancement.56 This pattern demonstrates
an application to Haiti in light of its geographic position in the Windward
Passage.
At the time of recognition, the United States already was a major economic
and military power and had expanded its influence into the Caribbean. The
Monroe Doctrine of 1823 claimed the Caribbean as an American sea and promised military intervention to any aggressors in the region, a sign of this growth.
The doctrine upheld the concept of manifest destiny of the United States
to fulfill the divinely appointed mission of extending its beneficent institutions to all dwellers in outer darkness, from the Arctic to Cape Horn.57 The
proponents of manifest destiny pointed to Americas God-given responsibility to carry its superior civilization and democratic institutions to backward
people.58
American expansion went even further when President William McKinley

gave in to public pressure and declared war on Spain in April 1898 over the explosion of the USS Maine in Havana. It was known as the short and splendid
little war that boosted American ambitions to acquire an empire. Lieutenant
Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, who had recently resigned from the Navy Department, commanded the Rough Riders in a swift destruction of the Spanish forces. With the American victory over Spain came Americas dominance
over Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam.
With these new activities came a corresponding increase of American military intervention in the Caribbean. In 1903, Americans engineered Panamas
independence from Colombia, clearing the way for the construction of the
Panama Canal. American troops were also dispatched to Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti to promote American interests. The
stage was set in the Caribbean for the conversion of the area into an American
Mediterranean, if not altogether an American Lake.59
The disputes in the Caribbean and Central America, along with repeated
efforts to buy Cuba from Spain, provide evidence of Americas expansionistic dreams. American power and wealth after Reconstruction now made that
possible. The industrial output increases led American manufacturers to seek
more foreign markets for their products.
This was also backed by a fast-growing navy, equipped with modern cruisers and battleships. Haiti became an important target in this plan. To defend
American Caribbean interests, the U.S. Navy had been on the lookout for a
West Indian coaling station since 1849. There were three choices: Danish St.
Thomas, Samana Bay in the Dominican Republic, and the bay of Mle-SaintNicolas in northern Haiti. Political imbroglios were the inevitable result. In the
end, the United States failed to acquire either St. Thomas or the Dominican
Republic. That left Mle-Saint-Nicolas.
By the time Haiti became the preferred location for the fueling station,
the U.S. Civil War was in full swing. Admiral Bancroft Gherardi reinforced
the decision by claiming a military advantage for the Union in acquiring it:
The strategic value of this island from a naval point of view is invaluable and
this increases in direct proportion to the millions which American citizens are
investing in the Nicaragua [Panama] canal.60
The acquisition plan for the naval fueling station was tied to the ambition
of gaining political power. Using Mle-Saint-Nicolas as a carrot for more trade
and military protection, a number of Haitian presidents offered it as collateral. In 1868 Haitian President Sylvain Salnave pledged to lease the site to the
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United States in exchange for payment of the French debt and a guarantee of
defense from Haitis enemies.61 Secretary of State Steward did not endorse this
deal because of Salnaves precarious position. The United States then rejected
a similar offer from his successor, President Lysius Flicit Salomon, to cede
Mle-Saint-Nicolas, and the opportunity seemed to slip away.
Following the war, President Benjamin Harrison seized on a golden opportunity to seal a deal with his Haitian counterpart, President Florvil Hyppolite, an American ally. In Hyppolites struggle to win the Haitian presidency
against Franois Denis Lgitime, who was supported by the French, the U.S.
Navy delivered ten shiploads of weapons to Hyppolites forces.62 The arms
shipment proved politically unpopular in Haiti. By 1891 the Haitian administration resumed negotiations to lease Mle-Saint-Nicolas to the United States
by way of Admiral Gherardi.63 Despite the U.S. naval fleets presence, Haitian
Foreign Minister Antnor Firmin avoided surrendering to American pressure
when he asked Gherardi to produce his diplomatic credentials. Gherardis failure to do so torpedoed the negotiating process. The long-standing tradition of
Haitian reluctance to have a foreign occupation remained, and the U.S. fleet
retreated.
This failed venture by the United States took place during the time Frederick Douglass served as the U. S. minister in Haiti (18891891). Douglass did
not support the deal; he felt it imperialistic. Throughout his career, Douglass
remained a staunch defender of Haitis political independence, and he defended himself against the charge of being responsible for the failure of the
negotiations: I am charged with sympathy for Haiti. I am not ashamed of
that charge; but no man can say with truth that my sympathy with Haiti stood
between me and any honorable duty that I owed to the United States or to any
citizen of the United States.64 The race card was raised as a factor in these
failed negotiations. It was charged that a white man would have succeeded
where Douglass failed.
American Commercial Advancement

By the second half of the nineteenth century, American trade with Haiti emerged
as the main factor leading to American intervention. During the 1890s the
United States promoted American goods in Haiti against competing products
from Germany, the trade leader at the time.65
In 1897, in hopes of gaining American market share in Haiti, William F.
Powell was sent as U.S. envoy, and he aggressively pursued a policy of favor-
ing American products over European products. These efforts led to increased
American investments to exploit the copper deposits at Terre-Neuve, hardwoods at La Tortue, and railroad construction projects. Powells ambition was
to make American influence in Haiti paramount and permanent through
trade dominance.66
American investments increased. In 1899 the Haitian Exploration Company
of New York won concessions to develop copper mining, and in 1910 a contract
with the MacDonald company granted concessions for railway development
together with the right to exploit lands on both sides of the railway line. This
marked the beginning of significant U.S. penetration into the Haitian economy.67 The United States also dominated the export market to Haiti of ironware, machinery, furniture, wagons, and saddlery.68
Besides these interests, there was the deliberate effort by American bankers
to win the Banque Nationale away from French control. In 1910 the New York
based National City Bank was involved in the reorganization of Haitis national
bank. National City Bank found a strong ally in the U.S. State Department.
These efforts resulted in the proposal in 1914 by Secretary William Jennings
Bryan to place Haitian customs under an American receiver and to appoint an
American comptroller of accounts.
Later in 1914, President Woodrow Wilson tried to gain even more control
of Haitian finances when he directed his secretary of state to arrange for a convention providing for customs receivership that was similar to the one already
in place in the Dominican Republic.69 Though this convention was fiercely
opposed by Haitians, Americas crusade for financial dominance in the island
would not retreat.
Hemispheric Security
In 1823 President Monroe put in place his doctrine during the various wars
of independence throughout Latin America against the Spanish. The president guaranteed the security of these newly independent countries when he
declared the United States would regard any effort by European powers to
extend their system to this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.70
But the Monroe Doctrine was applied only when U.S. interests were at
stake. When Haiti fell prey to European aggression, the United States did nothing. Two German warships humiliated Haiti in 1897 in what is now known as
the Lders affair, which speaks eloquently of gunboat diplomacy at its worst.
Haitian-born Emil Lders, whose father was German, owned a stable in Port-
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au-Prince. Lders got into a fight with Haitian police over the arrest of one
of his coach washers. The German government intervened and wanted his
one-year prison sentence and $500 fine waived. When efforts to resolve the
issue through diplomatic channels failed, two German cruisers appeared unannounced in Port-au-Prince. They gave Haitian President Tirsias Simon
Sam three hours to pardon Lders and pay an indemnity of $20,000 or face
bombardment.
Appeals to President McKinley to exercise the Monroe Doctrine went unheard. Powell, the envoy in Haiti, finally intervened and reduced the tensions,
declaring his disappointment with U.S. inaction: The people so well as the
Haitian Gov. feel that in their sore distress the country to which of all countries
they looked for aid failed to respond to their cry of need. This is the first time
in my life, I have ever had cause to be ashamed of being an American.71
The Monroe Doctrine mattered, however, when it came to upholding U.S.
interests. Concerned with Haitis financial dealings with France and Germany,
President Theodore Roosevelt established the United States as the international
police power in this hemisphere. Nineteenth-century American policymakers
considered the Caribbean area a vital zone in Americas defense. Historical
writer Ludwell Lee Montague finds that Haitis location in the Windward Passage has given to that country significance for the United States out of proportion to its size and resources.72 In the views of policymakers, strategic interests
of the United States called for American domination and even annexation of
Haiti. The island nation fell into the range of control devices described by J.
Fred Rippy as (1) the invocation of the Monroe Doctrine, (2) the control of the
interoceanic transportation routes, (3) the control of naval bases and coaling
stations, and (4) the establishment of semi protectorates.73
By the end of the nineteenth century, Haitian-U.S. relations were marked by
a rivalry for cultural and economic supremacy among France, Germany, and
the United States. In this contest, the French held a definite and comfortable
advantage. French culture was well implanted in Haiti due to early French colonization. After its Proclamation of Independence in 1804, Haitis new leaders
chose to perpetuate French traditions and values even at the expense of their
own African heritage.
French became the national language. Antnor Firmin, one of Haitis major
intellectual figures, even raised doubt that Haitians would ever find a language other than French which responds better to the needs of our intellectual
and moral development.74 Haitian literature closely imitated French literary
trends. Haitian poet and attorney Etzer Vilaire, crowned by the French Acad-
emy, endorsed a national literature that was dependent on French artistic and
literary techniques.
Also favoring a French cultural grip in Haitian society was a Catholic
stronghold. The Church maintained a highly rated school system and performed meritorious work through religious orders and hospitals. And Haitian
parents preferred to send their children to France for advanced education. Haitian writer and politician Frderic Marcelin notes, There wasnt a father or a
mother who did not dream, in our island, of sending their sons to Paris . . .
to be educated, and return according to their aptitude, as accomplished men
of letters and gentilshommes or in the case of girls, to acquire the sovereign
elegance and irresistible charm which make the success of a woman.75 French
cultural supremacy was linked to Haitis economic interests.
The French held special commercial privileges in Haiti. They had controlling interests in the Banque Nationale and the Haitian government treasury.
Germany likewise had considerable influence in Haiti. During the nineteenth century, many German merchants established themselves in Haitis
principal cities. This was acknowledged in U.S. Senate inquiry in 1922: The
business of the country was in control of the Germans . . . the commerce of
the country, both the import and export business.76 German ships controlled
the shipping. No other vessels went there, with the exception of one occasional
ship from France. Germans easily got around Haitis constitutional prohibition
against foreign landownership by marrying Haitian women.
American officials feared German control. In 1914 the Washington Post reported that Germany wanted to control the much coveted Mle-Saint-Nicolas
for a coaling station similar to the one unsuccessfully proposed earlier for
American vessels. The Posts editors objected, claiming that any attempt to
control the destiny of an American republic on the part of a European power
is an act of aggression toward the United States.77 The editors helped persuade the U.S. government that it should protect American interests in the
Caribbean.
Germans countered with their own offensive. In 1912 they created a German school in Port-au-Prince, control of which was placed in the hands of
a committee chosen by resident Germans who formed a local association.
Contributions were solicited from abroad to defray expenses. The German
emperor himself contributed, as did other Germans interested in trading
with Haiti. When the school opened on April 24, 1912, as reported in an
official communiqu to Bryan, the German minister said it would serve to
uphold Germans or Germanize the descendants of Germans established in
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Haiti.78 Indeed, the school was seen as a major step by Germans to consolidate their interests. In the opinion of educator and poet Edmond Laforest,
the school was an arsenal and a fortress . . . a depot for the intellectual supplying of potential forces, when their commercial power will have to replenish
itself, from which their influence will come forth richer in vitality, to spread
itself over us.79
U.S. officials saw the German school as a threat to their interests. The State
Department claimed that the establishment of the German school was [of]
more than local interest.80 This development stimulated fear of an expansion
of European influence in an area considered of strategic importance to U.S.
security. British historian David Nicholls has commented, The State Department feared that France or Germany might emerge from the European war
strengthened and determined to extend its influence in the Caribbean. The
political [and] financial instability of Haiti was seen as constituting a standing
invitation to European intervention.81
It should be pointed out the United States tried through diplomatic channels to alleviate the cause for that fear, at least concerning the coveted coaling
site. A draft convention was submitted to the Haitian government in 1914 that
said, The President of the Republic of Haiti covenants that no rights, privileges
or facilities of any description whatsoever will be granted, sold, leased or otherwise accorded directly or indirectly by the Government of Haiti concerning
the occupation or use of the Mole Saint Nicholas to any foreign Government
or a national or the nationals of any other Foreign Government.82
The struggle for economic control and cultural supremacy found its ultimate denouement with U.S. military intervention. As Haiti struggled with its
own internal difficulties, Americans intervened to eliminate what they had
long seen as an international menace in the hopes of establishing an orderly
government.
Orderly Government
In December 1904, in his annual message to Congress, President Theodore
Roosevelt said he wanted to establish an international police power to control
chronic wrongdoing, or the impotence which results in a general loosening
of the ties of civilized society.83 This international force would prevent violations of the Monroe Doctrine, he said. Historians interpret this change in
U.S. foreign policy as a sharp transition from the expansionist impulse of the
nineteenth century to the hegemonic and missionary tendencies of the early
twentieth century.84 The objective of this policy change was not so much to
acquire territories as it was to warn away intruders from elsewhere.
Haitis continuing political instability made her a primary target for U.S.
occupation. Some historians cite the violence and instability as causing the
deaths of Haitian presidents beginning with the assassination of Jean-Jacques
Dessalines in 1806.85 Others have focused on political conflagrations that destroyed lives and properties.86 Civil strife prompted the United States to send
warships to Port-au-Prince harbor to protect American lives and property
nearly every year from 1902 until the Marines came to stay in 1915, once again
invoking the Monroe Doctrine as a rationale. Between 1911 and 1915, Haiti had
six presidents. Some American observers at the time argued that the United
States cannot refrain from intervening in Haiti. . . . Haiti is on the down grade.
Its people are unfit to govern themselves.87
While Haitians understood that their country needed reform to attain a
certain level of stability and prosperity, there was much debate among them as
they moved toward the one hundredth anniversary of independence in 1904.
Haitian anthropologist, journalist, and historian Antnor Firmin led the call
for policies of change. He sought to wean militarism from his country. He
campaigned for an enlightened citizenry and chastised the ruling class for its
neglect of education for the masses. To modernize the social and economic
structure of the country, Firmin favored a form of liberal capitalism.88 Similarly, Haitian statesman and thinker Fredric Marcelin argued for reform. He,
too, railed against the militarism that had damaged Haitian society, and he
sought the development of commerce, industry, and agriculture.89
Haitis friends were wary of its claim as torch bearer of freedom and trailblazer in self-government for colored people. Several African Americans who
had worked to defend Haitian independence from U.S. intervention raised
their voices against Haitian political instability. Bishop Holly, who settled in
Haiti, criticized his new country for its violent ways. American abolitionist and
first president of Virginia State University John Mercer Langston denounced
the pattern that Haiti is often disturbed by revolutions threatening its very
existence.90
U.S. policymakers envisioned an environment suitable for American investors. They sought to create a climate in which American businesses could
flourish. They were interested in sound financial policy that would keep out
European powers.
From their beginnings, the United States and Haiti were linked as two independent nations in the Western Hemisphere but divided by conflicting forces.
21
22
Contrary Destinies
Their destinies evolved into contrary trajectories. While the United States
defended slavery, Haiti abolished it. While the United States became a world
economic and military power, Haiti, once the wealthiest of French colonies,
became the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere. Haiti has been mired
in political instability and violence and often battered by natural disasters that
seem to hamper its progress.
U.S. Marines landed on Haitian shores on July 28, 1915, to implement their
governments policies. For the next two decades, Haiti, the worlds oldest black
republic, became for the first time a land subjected to foreign rule.
2
Legacies of the Occupation
The United States has endeavored to attain its objectives in the region by
diplomacystraightforward or devious but when diplomacy failed or patience, sometimes too meager, was exhausted, force and the menace of force
occasionally were employed as instruments of national policy.
J. Fred Rippy
On July 28, 1915, President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was assassinated by a mob
infuriated over the massacre of political prisoners.1 The violence once again
brought chaos to this troubled land. Because of it, President Woodrow Wilson
ordered U.S. troops to Haiti on what was called a necessary mission for the
protection of foreign lives and property . . . and to preserve order. Secretary
of State Robert Lansing reassured the Haitian people, The United States has
no object in view except to insure, establish, and help maintain Haitian independence and the establishing of a stable and firm government by the people.
Every assistance will be given to the Haitian people in their attempt to secure
these ends.2 That mission as defined was in line with Wilsons overall vision of
extending democratic principles to troubled nations.
U.S. Marine forces that were monitoring events in Haiti moved in to take
control of Port-au-Prince without any resistance. Pierre Sully, a Haitian soldier
of little stature, remained on guard at the harbor and refused to give ground to
the Marines. For this, he was summarily executed. For some time, he remained
the sole hero who fearlessly resisted the Marines.
At the request of Admiral William B. Caperton, commander of the expeditionary forces, additional reinforcements arrived from the naval station at
Guantanamo Bay and were assigned to other key points outside the capital
city. Within a few weeks, U.S. forces were in control of the situation despite
minor pockets of resistance.3 The American occupation would last for a couple
of decades. The original mission of restoring peace was changed to a policy
aimed at achieving long-standing objectives and control of Haiti for the sake
of American interests.
24
Contrary Destinies
The Legacies of Control

Now that the American occupation of Haiti nears its centennial, a look at the
legacies of control might offer some perspective into why things happened the
way they did. James Wittenberg of the Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, finds that with this perspective, the legacy
arguments come into a variety of forms, but one similarity that they share is
an attempt to assess the extent to which there is continuity or change between
past and the present.4 After two decades of control that was entangled in innumerable dramatic events, the United States left in Haiti several historical
legacies that imply both continuity of U.S. policies and change with the new
realities in the country.
There are two views on legacies created by the dramatic events of the first
occupation. Some historians focus on its more beneficial outcomes such as the
return of peace after years of chaos and an improved quality of life, with new
roads and buildings. Others, who sharply disagree with that assessment, have
seen the occupation as a resounding failure.
On the positive side, historian Ludwell Lee Montague cites as examples of
progress changes in the Gendarmerie (military), the Direction Gnrale des
Travaux Publics (public works), and the Service National dHygine (public
health service), which established health programs in the country. Above all, a
new interest by the occupiers in improving vocational and agricultural education is considered beneficial. Arthur Millspaugh, an advisor to the State Departments Bureau of Foreign Trade, said 1,200 kilometers of highways were
built during this time. While prior to the occupation Haiti had only three
operational automobiles . . . and no place for them to go, before the end of
the occupation there were more than 2,600 motor vehicles in the country.5
Crowning the favorable chart, U.S. envoy Ferdinand L. Mayer declared that
the occupation did not just give Haitians their first taste of efficiency and
honest government but real justice and liberty. . . . The large sums expended
per annum by the occupational forces were of immense economic as well as
psychological benefit to the country.6
On the other side of the debate, Haitis President Sudre Dartiguenave complained to President Harding: The Haitian people had the great hope that
the support of the United States was going to enable them . . . to develop their
moral and material wealth toward a rational uplift given to agriculture, industry, public education. I am sorry to say that nothing serious was done to
fulfill this hope.7 Even though this was an early judgment, many historians
later agreed with his assessment; among these is Plummer, who contends that
the occupation worsened Haitis political problems and intensified its severe
economic issues. She notes that the occupation made Haiti a commercial dependency during the interwar years by draining its capital to the United States
and reducing its ability to become a self-sufficient country.8
There was no dispute that American occupation forces and Washington
policymakers left behind legacies that still plague Haiti even at the beginning
of the twenty-first century. These legacies are evident in the reorganization of
the military, the restructuring of the administration, and the building of an
infrastructure for economic development. The occupation gave U.S. officials
the opportunity to reach their objectives of political and financial control to
establish an orderly investment climate. Repercussions of this policy left Haiti
politically and economically dependent on the United States.
Control
Arthur Millspaugh was a U.S. financial adviser and general receiver of Haiti
for two years beginning in 1927. He provided insights into U.S. policies and
control of Haiti, underscoring the interference in elections and imposition of a
treaty and a new constitution on Haiti. He also charged that the United States
commandeered the suspension from 1916 to 1930 of popular elections and an
elected legislature.9 U.S. officials engaged in these acts for their own interests
rather than to propagate democratic ideals.
In the early months of the occupation, events confirm Millspaughs analysis, beginning with the election of a president. Rosalvo Bobo was in line to
become the next president since he successfully headed the revolution that led
to the assassination of President Sam and he would have been elected by the
sitting Assemble Nationale. But the rules were changed under U.S. control.
The Americans goal was to elect a president who would pledge collaboration,
if not allegiance, to the United States. The chief concern of military occupiers
was to put in place men mentally supple enough to carry out policies agreeable to the State Department in Washington.10
With this plan Captain Edward L. Beach, Admiral Capertons chief of staff,
was to select the right man for the office. This was an initiation into what historian DArcy Morgan Brissman has called a de facto militarization of all aspects
of the occupation.11 Beach made overtures to prominent Haitians such as Solon Mnos, Tertulien Guilbaud, and Jacques Nicolas Lger, but they all refused
to compromise.
25
26
Contrary Destinies
Instead, Beach found Sudre Dartiguenave, president of the Haitian Senate, a

more flexible candidate. American officials described him as a man who realizes that Haiti must agree to the terms laid by the United States and said that
he will use his influence with the Haitian Congress to have such terms agreed
upon by Haiti.12 Washington approved this selection when, on August 10, 1915,
Admiral W. S. Benson, acting secretary of the Navy, forwarded a cable to Admiral Caperton that read, Allow election of President to take place whenever
Haitians wish. The United States prefers election of Dartiguenave.13
Confirming the American order, the Assemble Nationale elected Sudre
Dartiguenave as president of Haiti two days later, on August 12, 1915. Dartiguenave was nevertheless viewed as an American puppet. In 1917 George Marvin
described the subservient role played by the Dartiguenave administration as
only a marionette. . . . His cabinet is a kind of Punch-and-Judy show. They also
do what they are told to do. They cant possibly do anything else.14
After the 1915 election in Haiti, the Wilson administration took the next
step to legalize the occupation, breaking any promise of upholding Haitian
independence. U.S. officials provided a treaty, reportedly drafted by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, that included provisions the State Department had long
sought. This treaty was submitted to President Dartiguenave for ratification.
However, despite firm American control, getting that treaty accepted proved
to be a daunting task. Members of the Haitian legislature, the Assemble Nationale, exhibited open hostility to its ratification; their hostility ended when
Admiral Caperton applied pressure.
On November 10, 1915, Caperton forwarded this statement to President
Dartiguenave and his cabinet:
I am sure that you gentlemen will understand my sentiment in this matter, and I am confident that the intention to retain control in Haiti until
the desired end is accomplished, and that it will forthwith proceed to the
complete pacification of Haiti so as to insure internal tranquility necessary to such development of the country and its industry as will afford
relief to the starving populate now unemployed. Meanwhile, the present
government will be supported in the effort to secure stable conditions
and lasting peace in Haiti whereas those offering opposition can only
expect such treatment as their conduct merits.15
Thus, the Haitian legislature was offered an ultimatum of adopting the treaty
or losing what little freedom it had and risking the appointment of an American governor. Given these alternatives, the Assemble Nationale approved the
mandate, and the U.S. Senate followed suit on February 28, 1916. It provided
that the United States would aid the Haitian government in the proper and
efficient development of its agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources
and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis.16 To
achieve these objectives, American personnel were to be appointed in finances,
public safety, public works, and sanitation. The treaty also provided for the appointment of a financial adviser, for the creation without delay of an efficient
constabulary, and for engineers to work toward the public improvement of the
republic. The treaty made the United States the financial protectorate over the
republic.17
Haitians were divided about this invasion of their national sovereignty. Nationalists who opposed the occupation saw the treaty as wholesale loss of Haitian sovereignty; they repudiated it and called for a return to the way things
were. One opponent was Representative Raymond Cabche, who condemned
the treaty in the name of the Haitian people, in the name of its rights, sovereignty, independence, against the Haitian-American convention project.18
Proponents backed American intervention because of the immediate benefits. They argued that the treaty resulted from Haitis failed political system.
The task now was to promote our national independence in order, true liberty,
work.19 They tried to make the best of two possible worlds by maintaining
independence and gaining the promised benefits.
With the treaty in place, American control of the political establishment of
Haiti increased gradually. The occupiers overstepped their bounds of the treaty
when in 1918 the State Department required that all proposed Haitian legislation be reviewed by the U.S. authorities. U.S. envoy Arthur Bailly-Blanchard
served as the primary referee.
The treaty and its enforcement further encroached on the remnants of
Haitian independence.20 The Haitian legislature was suppressed when Major
Smedley D. Butler, commander of the Gendarmerie, dispersed the Assemble
Nationale after the Haitian constitution was amended to accommodate American economic objectives. The new constitution provided a key point, strictly
enforced since Dessalines in the constitution of 1805, that prohibited foreign
real estate ownership in Haiti.
The challenge of approving the American-sponsored constitution prevailed.
Since the Assemble Nationale was dissolved, the occupiers formed a plebiscite
that was supervised by the Gendarmerie that endorsed the constitution by a
wide margin: 69,337 in favor and 335 against.21 Throughout his presidential
campaign, Warren Harding denounced the process by which the constitution
27
28
Contrary Destinies
was jammed down their throats at the points of bayonets.22 As for Dartiguenave, he now governed with an appointed Council of State serving as the legislature. In the end, control rested with the Americans, who retained veto power
over any legislative measures. The Haitian people soon resisted American control, as Charlemagne Pralte led uprisings against the occupiers.
Political Dependence
By 1915, Haitians struggle to prevent a collapse of their independence had
reached a dead end. Earlier, in 1904, Haitians thought something like this
might happen if they were unable to master their economy. While commemorating the nations centennial anniversary, the intellectual class realized their
lack of progress and debated the problems of possible foreign intervention if
they were unable to provide political stability and socioeconomic reform. The
occupation confirmed these fears.
Historians agree that by losing sovereignty, Haiti ultimately became a protectorate of the United States. In 1929 Dants Bellegarde charged that under
American control Haiti lived under a false label; she has ceased to be a republic and became instead a colony or American possession.23 Historian Michel
Soukar likewise asserts that the treaty transformed Haiti into an American
protectorate.24
The treaty and puppet constitution put the United States in the drivers seat.
A commission sent in 1929 by President Hoover to investigate the occupation
found that there had not been on the part of the United States any desire
to impair Haitian sovereignty.25 This statement is false, as Secretary of State
Lansing himself admitted to President Wilson Haitis protectorate status in the
treaty ratification process. Lansing confessed how this method of forced negotiations, with Marines on hand to police the Haitians capital, was a deception:
It does not meet my sense of [a] nations sovereign rights and is more or less
an exercise of force [and] an invasion of Haitian independence.26 Lansing thus
acknowledged the demise of Haitian sovereignty long before Hoover took office.
Haitians were fully conscious of the reality of the situation. Delegates to
the United States from the Union Patriotique, a civil rights organization put
in place by George Sylvain to resist the occupation, commented, The Haitian Government, after the landing of the American troops, was . . . nothing
more than a purely nominal government.27 President Sudre Dartiguenave,
considered a puppet, probably would not have completed his term without
American support. He did not win a second term because he fell out of favor with Washington. Similarly, during the 1920s, President Joseph Louis
Borno relied on the support of High Commissioner John H. Russell for his
political survival. President Hoovers Forbes Commission revealed the open
secret that President Borno operated with the guidance and assistance of the
American officials.28 When Borno and his ministers testified before the commission, the president insisted that U.S. Marines remain on Haitian soil. He
expected to continue in the presidency with American backing. The president of the Forbes Commission, Cameron Forbes, said Borno stressed the
terrible misfortunes, the complete chaos that would engulf Haiti with the
withdrawal of American forces.29 Forbes did not grant him, however, the
chance for another term.
Military Control through the Gendarmerie

Chronicler Herbert Gold charges, The American occupation of Haiti still provides a textbook model of colonial brutality, including conscription of men to
build roads and routine racist degradation.30 This record of brutality is markedly documented within the Gendarmerie established by U.S. Marines. Such
services as public works and public health took a back seat. Immediately after
the election of a president hand-picked by Americans, the Gendarmerie became the guardian of U.S. control. The disbanding of the old military occurred
on February 1, 1915. Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller replaced Admiral Caperton
in early 1916 and directed this new phase of operation, assisted by Major Butler,
an officer with experience in occupying China, the Philippines, and Nicaragua.
Butler was assigned the task of organizing a constabulary.
In the Inquiry into the Occupation of Haiti and Santo Domingo ordered by
President Warren Harding in 1921, Major General John A. Lejeune described
the Gendarmerie as a force of 2,500 Haitians, officered chiefly by commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps.31 Under U.S. control,
the Gendarmerie was primarily composed of Americans. Almost all the officers were Americans, with the highest posts given to commissioned Marines.
They had unlimited authority over both local governments and military matters. Samuel G. Inman, leader of the Protestant Missionary Movement in Latin
America, even called these officers privileged:
The marine who becomes an officer in the gendarmerie finds himself
clothed with practically unlimited power, in the district where he serves.
29
30
Contrary Destinies
He is the judge of practically all civil and criminal cases, settling everything
from a family fight to a murder. He is paymaster for all funds expended
by the national government; he is ex-officio director of the schools, inasmuch as he pays the teachers. He controls the mayor and city council
since they can spend no funds without his OK. As collector of taxes he
exercises a strong influence on all individuals in the community.32
Members of the Union Patriotique agreed: There is not a branch of public
service in Haiti which has not had to submit, at one time or another, to illegal
interference, often brutal, either of the Gendarmerie laying down the law to
the Government or by the military Occupation the absolute master of the situation.33 It was this Gendarmerie that carried out the campaign to pacify the
north, where many were angered that their man Rosalvo Bobo did not become
president. Traditional Caco bands from the north rebelled, resulting in more
military strategies to control the rebels. Admiral Caperton instituted martial
law and enforced a disarmament campaign. The Marines launched attacks on
rebel strongholds until the Cacos relented and signed an armistice on September 29, 1915.34
The Gendarmerie became well established. Its status increased with the creation of the cole Militaire (military school). In his first annual report, High
Commissioner Russell, the top American leader in the country, reported that
the training of aspirant officers has been greatly extended in its scope, and
now approximates the training of American officers of that rank.35 Even in
the lower ranks, he acknowledged that recruitment improved to include those
from the best families in Haiti.
The Gendarmerie became perhaps the strongest legacy of control the
United States had. Historian Michel Soukar has referred to them as ArmyUSA.36 The later Forbes Commission would forecast some high objectives for
the Gendarmerie in Haitian society once the Marines left. On U.S. troop withdrawal from Haiti, the commission suggested that the orderly functioning of
the Haitian Government will depend in large measure upon the efficiency and
discipline of the Garde.37
With American backing, the Haitian army exercised tight control over the
countrys political process. Throughout the years, military officers made and
broke presidents. From Dartiguenave forward, the country knew civilian government, but most civilian presidents were prevented from completing their
terms due to the coups that returned the military to power.38 The army consistently used its power to attain political objectives for itself and the ruling elite.
Race as a Means of Control

Racial superiority motivated the American control of Haiti. Historians Garrity and Gray explain American imperialism of the late nineteenth century: A
rising group of Americans accepted as axiomatic the moral and intellectual
superiority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants over every other human type,
and they allowed this view to inform their social and political attitudes.39 The
feeling of racial superiority came about due to the long-standing segregation
and discrimination prevalent in the United States. While there was an overt
oppression of African Americans in the South, it was just as prevalent in the
North, as witnessed by the black ghettos of Harlem in New York City, the Hill
District of Pittsburgh, and the slums of Washington, D.C.
The American occupiers brought with them many oppressive, racist attitudes. Comparing Haitians to African Americans, Rear Admiral Harry Knapp
placed Haitians on an even lower level than Americas African Americans because Haitians had an infinitesimal number of whites living in their country.
He continued, The same traits of negro character that are found in the United
States exist in Haiti, both good and bad; but I consider that the bad traits are
more in evidence in Haiti than in the United States, where they are under better control.40
Once intervention began, mainland African Americans were concerned
about the transfer of U.S. racist patterns to the island. Booker T. Washington
warned Washington officials to do the right thing: There are only a few white
men in the United States who understand, or even undertake to understand,
the American Negro, and there are still fewer white men in this country who
can go into Haiti and get the sympathy, the co-operation and confidence of the
Haitians, simply and mainly because it is not possible for many white people to
even try to understand and work with black people.41 Washington suggested
that Americans be careful in the class of white men sent to Haiti as officials. . .
. They must fit themselves to be white men in a black mans country if they want
to live there and work there and have any influence there.42 He contended that
the racial lines drawn in America would not be tolerated in Haiti.
L. Hollingsworth Wood, president of the National League on Urban Conditions among Negroes, tried to make a difference. His organization attempted to
develop good relations between the two races in the United States. He offered
to the State Department his groups service to help improve the relations in
Haiti.43 But Undersecretary of State William Philips dismissed the offer, claiming that very little race feeling exists in Haiti.44
31
32
Contrary Destinies
Did the American occupation leaders consider these warnings? The answer
is obvious. U.S. policymakers believed Haitians could be controlled based on
white Americans own presumed racial superiority. Marines handled Haitians
like children. General Russell, who guessed the average Haitian mental age at
seven, used the supposed white superiority as justification for military control:
A military dictatorship for such a country in which the foundations of democracy do not yet exist is not necessarily a bad thing. Its first requirement is that it
is strong enough to give stable rule for a comparatively long time and second,
that it has some sense of obligation to the people.45 The Gendarmerie was
established as another means of assuring American subjugation. It became the
instrument of enforcing policy based on a presumption of racial superiority.
When U.S. Marines landed in Haiti in 1915, practically every uniform was
stuffed from tassel-crowned hat to the tip of the toe with Jim-Crowism.46
However, relations between Americans and upper-class Haitians got off to a
good start. University of Pennsylvania sociology professor Karl Kelsey has observed, At first the Haitian clubs were opened to the officers who attended
the balls and parties, danced with the girls and according to all appearances,
enjoyed themselves. Later, though, things turned for the worse: When the
families, prohibited at first began to arrive, not only did an American social
group grow up centering in the American club, but a line of social cleavage was
created because of color prejudice.47
The groups quickly became segregated. Schmidt reports, The American
colony concentrated around its own neighborhood, special Catholic masses
were created for Americans, and local hotels that catered to American guests
adopted Jim Crow standards.48 Even upper-class Haitians were treated with
contempt and rudeness. Criticizing the tactlessness of American officials, historian Otto Schoenrich has pointed out, Some officers forget that they are
supposed to be in Haiti for the purpose of advancing the happiness of the
inhabitants; they act as though they were in a conquered country, do not attempt to conceal their race prejudice, and have no regard for the feelings of the
natives.49
The Clash of Racism and Elitism

If the social climate of Haiti was polluted by racism, American contempt was
directed toward the Haitian elite. Members of this social group were viewed
as agitators who were living off the people. The peasants were treated with
condescending paternalism.
Haiti emerged from colonial times as a Francophone society. After defeating

the French, the Haitian intermediary socioeconomic class consisted of mulattoes and blacks and emerged as the new upper stratum. They became the elite
who unreservedly embraced the French language and culture. In fact, President Borno, a prominent member of this class, defined elitism as the coexistence of a small educated, elegant and refined bourgeoisie beside an immense
denuded popular mass incapable of either reading or writing, embedded in
deep superstition.50
American military officers resented this attitude. Major Smedley Butler
described Haitian society as being divided into two classes; one class wears
shoes and the other does not. The class that wears shoes is about one percent.51 He preferred the 99 percent because they were most kindly, generous,
hospitable, pleasure-loving people. Brigade Commander Eli K. Cole saw the
upper class as uppity Negroes who were vain-loving, excitable, changeable
beyond measure, illogical and double-faced. Many of them are highly educated and polished. . . . Under strain, however, they are almost sure to revert
to the black type of characteristics.52 John Houston Craige, a naval officer
who had been stationed in Haiti, explained this attitude from the Americans
traditional superiority complex to any man with negro or colored blood.53
Craige suggested this behavior of Americans at home could not be changed
overnight.
Haitians, who had cultivated a sense of pride in themselves and their
achievements, resented being treated as inferior in their own country. They
had a century of complete independence behind them, won by their own unaided efforts. They are accustomed in France, the country with which they have
most contact, to enjoy complete social equality. They are a very spirited, sensitive and proud people. Though the vast majority is illiterate peasants trained
by traditions, not schools, those who are cultivated are often highly trained and
brilliant men of the world, diplomats, writers and professional men.54 Pierre
Hudicourt, a Haitian scholar and political leader, offered this view: It is an
open secret that race prejudice played a great role in the irritation which exists among those people, the Haitians and the Americans. The Haitian people
in their own territory conquered by their forefathers, and which they have to
consider their own for the future, are considered with much contempt by the
newcomers. Those difficulties will be prevalent, predominant in Haiti until the
Black man has been restored to his privileges.55
The movement emerging against American racism witnessed attacks on the
elite as a deliberate effort to maintain the country under American control.
33
34
Contrary Destinies
Jean Price-Mars, a prominent thinker and leader of that generation, recognized

the dangers in the situation:
I know well that the current storm may destroy the bases upon which our
intellectual elite is nurtured, from which it draws its directives and from
which its thought is developed, but I also know well that the eventual
plan they [Americans] would like to see fulfilled would be to cause the
gradual leveling of the Haitian society so that, by taking the intellectual
level of the elite down a few pegs and by lifting the masses from the misery of their ignorance, they might establish the framework for domination by the foreign element.56
As in the United States, the lighter-skinned mulatto (mixed-race) elites were
favored by American officials over the darker-skinned blacks. Since independence, class and color issues had been a mainstay in Haitian society. Liberals
controlled by mulattoes claimed power should go to the most capable, while
blacks responded that it belonged to the largest number. During the occupation, American leaders sided with the mulattoes. According to historian Lyonel
Paquin, the Americans handed power to the mulattoes: Haiti went back to
Ption and Boyer times whereby government was almost entirely staffed by
the Mulatto elite.57 Though Americans considered mulattoes and blacks racially identical, they nonetheless gave the edge to the former. Mulattoes took
advantage of this favoritism to reinforce their socioeconomic standing, as the
Americans granted some concessions to the Mulattoes and even gave them
some semblance of supremacy.58
Repercussions of Control
Americas extensive control backfired from two-pronged attacks. The first came
from the elites, who had had enough as President Dartiguenave became more
and more uncooperative. In a daily briefing from November 29, 1920, General
Russell reported on the creation of the Union Patriotique by Haitian lawyer,
poet, and diplomat Georges Sylvain. James Weldon Johnson advised the group
from his international affairs position with the NAACP. The Union Patriotique
took the forefront against the occupation under the guidance of its African
American friends.
The second front was a popular uprising. In 1915 the new military occupation began constructing roads throughout the country. The military view was
that good roads between the principal towns were a military necessity due to
the chaotic condition prevailing in Haiti as a result of incessant revolutions.59

To do this, military authorities revived an old Haitian law known as corve, or
enforced road labor, and required locals to work six days a year on roads, but
thousands of Haitians were reportedly kidnapped by Marines and forced to
work under precarious conditions. Colonel Williams explained, As the corve
became more unpopular, more and more difficulty was experienced in obtaining men, and this difficulty caused the gendarmes to resort to methods which
were often brutal.60 Charlemagne Pralte, one of the more resourceful revolutionary leaders, protested this brutality by retreating to the hills and organizing
about five thousand Haitians into guerilla forces.
The Marines reacted by launching a full-scale campaign against the insurgents, resulting in indiscriminate killing of protestors. Torture was used to
make captives reveal information. Prisoners were summarily executed. Finally,
in 1919 the corve was formally abolished.
Reports of this Caco War of 19181919, as the resistance was called, appeared
in the American press in the summer of 1920. Journalists Herbert J. Seligman
and James Weldon Johnson traveled to Haiti and in a series of news stories
exposed the brutality of the American expeditionary forces. Seligman wrote
that some American soldiers considered the entire Haitian adventure as a
travesty upon humanity and civilization and a lasting disgrace to the United
States Marine Corps.61
In light of these revelations, officials in Washington were forced to justify
the conduct of the occupation force. Major General Lejeune admitted in a letter to the editor of the Nation, As in all work in countries like Haiti, mistakes
are bound to be made, and policies, orders, and instructions are sometimes
not carried out properly. As regards the Marine Corps, some officers and men
have failed, at times necessitating court-martials and other punishments, but it
has been and is the duty and aims of the Marine Corps authorities here and in
Haiti to work solely for the interests and advancement of Haiti and the Haitian
people.62
A naval court of inquiry headed by Admiral Henry T. Mayo investigated
conditions in Haiti in the fall of 1920. But this investigation was viewed as an
official whitewashing and believed that the admiral did not want to damage
the Marine Corps reputation. The Nation repeatedly called for Congress to be
prompt to investigate, and . . . tolerate no official whitewashing.63 The editors
demand was joined by Senator Medill McCormick, who asked for a searching
investigation of the charges made against the Corps and individual officers
and said prosecution should be instituted if the facts call for it.64
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The Haitian scandal, as it was described, became an important issue in the

1920 American presidential election. Finally, a Senate Committee of Inquiry
on American Activities in Haiti and Santo-Domingo was formally created.
Chaired by Senator McCormick himself, the committee was convened in
Washington on August 5, 1921, and conducted an extensive investigation of the
military occupation of Haiti. Its recommendations resulted in more centralized
control of the Marines in Haiti and fewer military abuses there.
Centralization of Control
The second decade of U.S. occupation confirmed the dictatorship initiated by
earlier American military leaders. The U.S. Senate Committee of Inquiry recommended reorganization of the occupation to eliminate confusion and inefficiencies and to end the brutality. The committee members well understood
that during the six years of the American Occupation in Haiti, there have been
half a dozen chiefs of the Latin American Bureau, half a dozen Commandants
of the Forces of Occupation, half a dozen Commanders of the Gendarmerie
dHaiti.65
As a remedy, a high commissionership was created to coordinate treaty services. Marine commander General John H. Russell was appointed by President
Harding on February 11, 1922, as high commissioner with the rank of ambassador extraordinaire. His mission was to represent the President of the United
States in Haiti for the purpose of investigating, reporting upon and supervising
the performance of their duties by the treaty officials in order that the purpose
of said treaty may be fully accomplished.66
Commissioned with such extensive authority, in March 1922 General Russell returned to Haiti, where he received a nineteen-gun salute. The high commissioner quickly took all steps necessary to consolidate his power base. As
he explained on January 1, 1923, in his first annual report to Secretary of State
Bainbridge Colby, he consolidated his base through the centralization of control in the office of the American High Commissioner over all officials representing the United States in Haiti, a vitally needed move that has done away
with friction, duplication of efforts, and has resulted in full cooperation and
interchange of ideas.67
About the same time, Joseph Louis Borno became president of Haiti, an
office he served from 1922 to 1930. Borno was a fine journalist, poet, botanist,
lawyer, legal scholar, and diplomat, and he was fluent in French, Spanish, and
English.68 He served as Haitis minister of public instruction and as foreign
minister on three different occasions. He proved to be an aggressive opponent

of U.S. policy in Haiti. In 1920 he told Bailly-Blanchard that his government
cannot accept the universal competency assumed by the American Minister
and the Financial Adviser who think that they are authorized to make sovereign decisions on all matters: legislation, finance, commerce, trade, public
works, education for a people whose customs, needs or aspirations they know
not.69
But Bornos position underwent a drastic change. Because of his earlier antiAmericanism, the State Department refused to confirm him as Haitian foreign
minister to Washington in 1918. By 1922, Borno had learned his lesson, and he
urged his countrymen to embrace the principles of confidence and cooperation between Haiti and the United States as spelled out in the treaty of 1915.
This treaty, he recalled, was motivated by the conviction that the solution of
the problems of law and order, of material improvements and social amelioration in Haiti could be better effected by collaboration with the United States.70
During the period 19221930, Haitian diplomatic and international relations
were a mirror of State Department policies.
Despite this, Borno was not an American puppet. He joined High Commissioner Russell in establishing what was called a joint dictatorship. Under
American control, Borno followed in Dartiguenaves footsteps and ruled without a legislature. He hand-picked members of his legislative council. Both Russell and Borno discarded the possibility of a democracy in Haiti. Borno even
argued that the rural population representing nine-tenths of the Haitian population, was almost totally illiterate, ignorant and poor.71 Russell agreed and
said that the peasants, who form the mass (85%) of the population . . . have the
mentality of a child of not more than seven years of age reared under advantageous conditions.72 With Bornos intellectual elitism and Russells apparent
racial prejudices, the future of democracy in Haiti seemed to be doomed. This
alliance between Borno administration and the Americans was aggressively
criticized by nationalist leaders. The editor of Le Nouvelliste asserted that the
government was deferring with drooped eyes to whatever is submitted by the
Americans, so it is our duty to defend the interests of the country.73
Though General Russell openly complained that Haiti had the worst history of dictatorship, his policies only contributed to that history. In fact, the
American occupation was staffed by a coterie of generals who governed
Haiti by a military psychology.74 There was little hope that democratic values
would flourish. Not surprisingly, the Haitian press was quieted by the American generals. Freedom of the press, complained General Russell, was con-
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strued (by Haitian journalists) to be unlimited license to attack not only the
Government of Haiti and the American occupation, but also the personal and
private character of any Haitian official.75 To prevent criticism, journalists
were imprisoned indefinitely without trial. In 1927, prominent editors Charles
Moravia of Le Temps, Ernest Chauvet of Le Nouvelliste, and Joseph Jolibois of
Le Courrier Haitien wrote to The Nation about their imprisonment, explaining
that they had been forbidden to have access to ink, paper and pencil in their
possession.76 These editors expressed their frustrations in being forbidden to
write.
Financial Control
American policymakers had their eyes on control of Haitian finances from
the start. Twice in 1914 the State Department asked the Haitian government
for a treaty permitting control of finances and customs in line with a similar
agreement Americans had with the Dominican Republic. Both requests were
refused by the Haitians.
The occupation provided an opportunity for American bureaucrats to reach
their objective. From the beginning, American financial control was demanded
of anyone who wanted to be Haitis president. Captain Beach underscored this
point: In order that no misunderstanding can possibly occur after election,
it should be made clear to candidates . . . that the United States expects to be
entrusted with the practical control of the customs and such financial control
over the affairs of the Republic of Haiti as the United States may deem necessary for efficient administration.77
The 1915 mandate provided for the establishment of the finances of Haiti
on a firm and solid basis. This provision corresponds to a major goal of the
Americans, to assure its financial strength to prevent European interference.
The mechanism began with a general receiver who was in charge of the customs service, the principal revenue source of the country. A financial adviser
was then entrusted with the responsibilities to devise an adequate system of
public accounting, aid in increasing the revenues and adjusting them to the
expense, inquire into the validity of the debts of the republic, enlighten both
governments with reference to all eventual debts, recommend improved methods of collecting and applying the revenues and make such other recommendations to the minister of finance as may deemed necessary for the welfare and
prosperity of Haiti.78
But subsequent actions of the financial adviser and customs receiver led
to administrative conflicts that complicated relations. Despite this broad approach, the treaty did not explain the extent of the power relationship between
the American financial adviser and the Haitian minister of finance, technically
the head of Haitian finances. This created friction between these two bureaucrats. When Addison Ruan, the first U.S. financial adviser to Haiti, arrived
on July 9, 1916, he soon found contrary ideas from the Haitian Ministry of
Finance. In fact, they were often directly opposed as to who had what power
in administering the Haitian economy. However, as the military occupation
consolidated its power over Haitian affairs, the American adviser succeeded in
centralizing all financial control to his office. He became the sole officer controlling government expenditures, drafting the budget, and even withholding
salaries, including that of the president of Haiti, whenever there was a disagreement on sensitive legislative and administrative issues.79
Financial control was further reinforced through a loan imposed on Haiti
by the American occupation on June 26, 1922. Dartiguenave had accepted the
loan but refused to sign since he viewed it as a bargaining chip for his own reelection. Borno, on the other hand, agreed to signing it. Haitian historian Franois Dalencour suggests that this loan was a political instrument that chained
Haiti so long as the annuities were not paid. By skillful maneuvers, Americans
maintained financial control through the convention of 1915 until 1952. Fiscally,
the former [Haitian national] bank was transformed and transferred to the
National City Bank of New York that became the fiscal agent and arbiter of the
Haitian government and destinies.80
During Bornos seven-year administration, U.S. officials strengthened their
control. Despite his policy of confidence and cooperation with the military
occupation, President Borno saw his paycheck withheld by the office of financial adviser W. W. Cumberland when Borno disagreed with Cumberlands
views on dealing with Haitian affairs.81
Haitians continued to resent the intrusive role of American financial control
but could do little about it. Bellegarde said the financial adviser was a dictator
who controlled Haitis financial destiny. In his view, American intervention
was inspired by particular financial interests to allow a few Americans to use
at will the Haitian treasury to satisfy their domineering instinct.82 Haitians
were not alone in this view. Senator Peter G. Gerry of Rhode Island charged
that the U.S. administration created a magnificent situation for the bondholders.83 He opposed a policy that appealed to banking interests only, and in so
doing, he prevented financial assistance that should have gone to Haitians.
The Committee of the Womens International League for Peace and Free-
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dom expressed skepticism over Washingtons version that Americans were in

Haiti solely as disinterested benefactors: If our officials have tried to benefit
the people of Haiti . . . it is also true that the occupation has cared for American
financial interests there, of a none too creditable sort, at the expense of our
poor and weak neighbors.84
President Hoovers 1930 commission led by Forbes offered this assessment:
The service of the Public debt has been cared for and several million dollars of the principal thereof paid out of revenues in excess of the amount
called for by the amortization plan. The wisdom of this course is open to
question; it might have been better to have reduced the taxation, especially the export tax, and left the debt to work itself out during its normal
term, thus keeping more money in the country where experience has
shown it was badly needed.85
Undeniably, the occupation served American interests. It allowed the Bank of
New York to complete its control of Haitian finances,86 and U.S. financial control over Haiti would linger for many years after the departure of the Marines.
Attempt at Cultural Control

Not satisfied with financial control, Americans ultimate effort to control Haitian society focused on education. Here, U.S. authorities took steps to ensure a
new direction in Haitian education. On September 11, 1917, Lionel Bourgeois,
a former superintendent of schools in Louisiana, was brought in to reorganize
the Haitian school system based on American methods. He sought to eliminate political influence, mismanagement, and corruption. On the surface these
goals appear worthy, but behind the plans lurked an intent for the schools to
be used to civilize Haitians.
Under General John Russell as high commissioner, new educational policies emerged as well. Agricultural programs designed to train Haitis masses in
new farming skills would allow exploitation of Haitis agricultural resources.
Such a pool of trained and cheap farm labor, it was thought, could attract
American investments to the island. The high commissioner also saw control
as a categorical imperative to improve the system. Under the treaty, control
was not feasible, and due to the overt reluctance by Haitian officials to accept
it, Russell bypassed the traditional Haitian school system to create vocational
schools aimed at increasing productivity. He brought in Dr. George F. Freeman, the chief of the Division of Cotton Breeding in the Texas Agricultural
Experiment Station, to design and put in place the new educational system
under American control.
Freeman launched the Service Technique de lAgriculture et de lEnseigne
ment Professionnel to implement that policy. This system was simply a fact
of the economic development program rather than as an attempt to increase
literacy or promote general education.87 To achieve control of the Haitian educational system, the high commissioner absorbed the national schools into
those to be run by the agricultural service. Though the service was designed
to achieve political stability, it was also tied to American notions of economic
progress. U.S. officials assumed that a new class of skilled workers, craftsmen,
and agriculturists with higher living standards would automatically become
better citizens. This new economic class would ensure government stability.
Implementation of such a policy strongly depended on increasing the countrys industrial and agricultural production. Haiti was to be integrated, under
American guidance, into the era of technological development according to
the plan. Education was the vehicle through which a new generation of Haitians would become productive. Productivity was defined by the high commissioner as the direct result of the intelligent and skillful use of his hands by
the individual. Anything that will help toward a harmonious development of
hand ability will, consequently serve as an efficient agent in the making of productive members of society.88 Modernization and improvements to Haitian
agriculture would assure financial growth. Since a major share of the countrys
revenue came from agriculture, the program is designed to be a means of increasing these revenues by increasing production.89 Americans forecast that
economic prosperity would bring reform of social and political institutions.
The educated mass would enjoy the political rights long granted by the Haitian constitution. It was favorably predicted that their standard of living would
improve.
In the high commissioners view, this policy was wise, one that would rapidly develop a middle class that will become the backbone of the country and
go far to assure stability of government, bridging over the tremendous gulf
that now separates the elite and peasant classes.90 The director of the Latin
American Division was even more ebullient over these bright prospects. He
was persuaded that the agricultural practices of the masses can be made at
least as modern as those prevailing in Cuba and Puerto-Rico. Competent observers believe that such a result will triple the wealth of Haiti, would lead to
the creation of a middle class with sufficient property interests to make it a
real factor in maintaining stable political conditions, and this would tend to
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eliminate the danger from the professional malcontents whose revolutionary

activities have been much a scourge to the country in the past.91
Resistance to Cultural Hegemony

Since it was not mentioned in the treaty of 1915, Haitians insisted the Americans
had no legal right to interfere in their educational institutions. The nationalists,
sensitive to the foreign intervention, urged the people to resist at any cost. As a
Haitian educator put it, the people of Haiti became increasingly scared by the
very idea of turning over the soul of the youth of Haiti to the occupation.92
Due to the objections, the scheme to increase economic productivity through
agricultural and vocational training failed to make much headway. Agricultural and geological surveys undertaken by American experts during the 1920s
suggested that Haitian resources were extremely limited. In 1930 the high commissioner conceded that plans to encourage foreign investment in large-scale
agricultural operations were complicated by the question of land ownership
. . . and the scarcity of really good land.93 He admitted that there were no
important mineral resources capable of profitable exploitation, under present
conditions, and industry is as yet insignificant.94
Added to the lack of resources, the Service Technique (agricultural service)
was in the midst of its own controversy. Since its inception, administrative
officers rarely consulted with those within the Haitian government or anyone else, for that matter. Their lack of communication with locals was probably the main reason the American program was never accepted in Haiti. The
lack of French-speaking Americans with agricultural or industrial training in
the different requirements doomed this approach to educate Haitians in the
American way. The Haitian elite and the Catholic Church opposed any such
takeover. The Haitian masses were just as distrustful of American meddling as
Haitian institutions were. Peasants were skeptical of American technology and
efficiency, forcing High Commissioner Russell to arrogantly claim that it was
a mistake to think that example is all that is necessary for the tropical peasant
to mend his farming ways.95
An unexpected result of American racist policies was the beginning of a
Haitian indigenous movement to examine its own culture. This national cultural renaissance was as much directed against the French-assimilated elites
who disassociated themselves from everything indigenous as it was at the
Americans. To promote the study of Haitian history and culture, the Societ
dHistoire et de Gographie dHaiti was launched in 1923. Jean Price-Mars,
taking note of an increased interest in Haitian history, ironically thanked the

Americans for their role because the American action compelled us to look at
ourselves, go over our mistakes and change, but also by the fact that it inspires
the enthusiastic and inconsolable souls the nostalgia of the past.96 There was
a revival in Haitian literature as well. In 1925 La Nouvelle Ronde was founded
and helped increase the influence of new writers who had a nationalistic tone;
young writers like Antonio Vieux and Philippe Thoby-Marcelin sharply criticized earlier writers who imitated Europeans. Two years later, La Troue and
La Revue Indigne continued this revolt against the past and called for a new
direction in Haitian literature.97
New cultural and literary trends contained many of the seeds that emphasized blacks contributions to Haitian civilization. Moreover, this ideological
trend was linked to the decolonization movement that swept the African continent for three decades of the twentieth century. Haiti was still at the avantgarde of freedom, black consciousness, and pride.
Restructuring Control
Discontent over the American presence in Haiti widened. While the RussellBorno coalition prevailed throughout the 1920s, its control was increasingly
challenged. First elected in 1922, Borno was reelected in 1926. Legislative elections were expected for 1930. Instead Borno, maneuvering for a third term,
refused to call for elections on the grounds that Haitians were not ready for
self-government.
Resistance to the agricultural service reached a boiling point when in 1929
students went on strike and rioted against the American occupation. Their action resulted in bloodshed. The opposition exploited the strike. Government
employees aligned with the students. The crisis reached a climax when nearly
a thousand Haitians charged a Marine patrol on the outskirts of Les Cayes in
the southern part of the country. Five Haitians were killed and twenty were
wounded in this battle. One Marine was hurt in a hand-to-hand encounter
with the leader of the band. High Commissioner Russell arranged for the evacuation of women and children from Les Cayes and nearby areas.
President Hoover, obviously concerned with the seriousness of the situation, mobilized a detachment of Marines on December 6, 1929. A day later he
asked Congress to investigate American supervision of Haiti. Headed by W.
Cameron Forbes, former governor of the Philippines, the commission arrived
in Port-au-Prince on February 28, 1930. Following hearings in the capital and a
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four-day trip into the interior, the commission reported its findings to Hoover.
The report called for a temporary president to organize the election of a Legislative Assembly consisting of two chambers which . . . would proceed to elect
a permanent president of the Republic for a full term of six years.98
Hoover sent a second commission, led by Dr. Robert Moton, to look into
the educational problems in Haiti. The president instructed Moton to undertake an exhaustive investigation into the educational system of Haiti with the
view to recommendations for the future.99 The Moton Commission sharply
criticized the dual educational system with unequal budgetary provisions put
in place by the occupation and called for a unified educational program in
Haiti.100 Occupation officials reacted rather bitterly to the commissions recommendations, criticizing it as unfair to the occupation establishment.
The Forbes Commission set the groundwork for another restructuring. Its
recommendations called for U.S. Marines to leave Haiti when the treaty expired
in 1936. The commission also suggested that American control be restructured
to give more rights to Haitians. The recommendations moved Haiti to its next
era, locally called the Dsoccupation, marking the end of the occupation.
3
Deoccupation in a Culture of Dependency
There is a contradiction in claiming, as we do, to represent democracy, and
yet support flagrantly undemocratic political elements.
Robert Spector, W. Cameron Forbes and the Hoover Commissions to Haiti, 1930
As the 1929 rebellion subsided, Haiti appeared to return to normalcy. Eugene

Roy, a respected businessman, was acceptable to the leaders of the opposition
as well as to President Borno, and he was elected interim president on May 21,
1930. His mission was to call an assembly of the two legislative chambers to
elect a new president.
The election took place on October 14, 1930, and on November 18 Senator Stnio Vincent was named president of Haiti. In 1921 Vincent, a staunch
nationalist and a former leader of the Union Patriotique, testified against the
American occupation before the U.S. Senate Committee of Inquiry. Vincent,
well acquainted with Haitis socioeconomic problems, was a mulatto who regained power because of American policies favoring his class. A prolific writer,
Vincent had the political savvy to be president. He governed by applying policies put in place by the American occupation, and his administration showed
all the signs of following the legacy of control of the Americans.
Transition to Haitianization
Soon after Vincents election, High Commissioner Russell was removed from
office, and Dana G. Munro, a civilian Foreign Service officer, was appointed to
the position of U.S. envoy. This was the first step toward the Forbes Commission policy to promote an increasingly rapid Haitianization of the services,
with the object of having Haitians experienced in every department of the government ready to take over full responsibility at the expiration of the present
treaty.1 The treaty was set to expire in 1936, but national sentiment contributed
to accelerating the Haitianization process. Haitianization essentially implies
deoccupation, the transfer of power from the occupiers to Haitians.
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A breakthrough came in August 1931 when Dana Munro and Haitian foreign minister Abel Nicolas Lger signed the agreement to permit the Haitian
government on October 1 to assume rightfully and definitely the administration and control of the Direction Gnrale des Travaux Publics, of the Service
dHygine, and of the Service Technique dAgriculture.2 According to the provisions of the constitution, the Haitian president was to appoint commissions
of Haitian engineers and physicians plus employees necessary for the functioning of the administration.
The 1931 agreement allowed for the abrogation of the accord of August 24,
1918, that obligated the Haitian government to communicate any changes to
the Treaty of 1915 prior to a legislative vote. The accord of December 3, 1918,
requiring approval of the financial advisers for payment issued by the Haitian
finance minister was also terminated. Martial law came to an end.
Haitian-U.S. relations, however, continued to be strained. The latest tension
was a financial agreement that guaranteed payment of $11 million to American
bondholders. In September 1932, Haitian and American negotiators attempted
to resolve this issue by what was called a treaty of friendship. The treaty was
unanimously rejected by the Haitian legislature. For these legislators, its financial provisions were grossly unsatisfactory, and they feared the bonds would
continue to bind Haiti.3
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, believing the United States was under the inescapable obligation to carry out the treaties involving the loan,
sent negotiators back to work.4 Finally, in 1933 a new agreement called for the
adjustment of the supervision of Haitian finances, the Haitianization of the
Garde, and the withdrawal of American Marines. This agreement was signed in
Port-au-Prince by U.S. envoy Norman Armour and Haitian Foreign Minister
Albert Blanchet.
American domination over Haiti continued since the provision for the supervision of the finances was a thinly disguised effort to reaffirm U.S. control
over Haitian financial affairs. The agreement provided for a fiscal representative
to be appointed by the president of Haiti on the nomination of the president of
the United States. This fiscal representative would replace the former financial
adviser and general receiver and had enough power to protect bondholders.
The Customs Service, a principal revenue source for the Haitian government,
was to remain under the direction of the fiscal representative until the complete amortization of the loan in 1944.
Anxious to have this financial arrangement adopted quickly, government officials in both countries agreed to its terms. By so doing, they bypassed the U.S.
Congress and avoided certain fire from the Haitian legislature even though it
was obvious to everyone involved that the new agreement was the same as the
one already rejected by the Haitian legislature in 1932. It was simply tailored to
protect the interests of American bondholders. In all negotiations, the needs
of the Haitian people were not considered.5 The U.S. government, to the very
end, held unfailingly to this policy of dollar diplomacy.
Following this new financial agreement, Americans congratulated President
Roosevelt for his satisfactory solution. This agreement was also considered
evidence that Roosevelt was determined to terminate all American military
occupations of foreign territory.6 Roosevelt initiated a new hemispheric and
Caribbean policy that America was to become the good neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others.7
The first test of this Good Neighbor doctrine was applied in Cuba. Political
instability threatened American interests there. Roosevelt did not interfere despite the recommendation of his ambassador, Sumner Welles. Haiti was next
in line, and Roosevelt decided to end military occupation there.
As a result of this cooperation, President Vincent went to Washington to
meet Roosevelt in the spring of 1934. Following their meeting, they agreed that
the policy of the good neighbor which the Government of the United States is
endeavoring to apply in its relations with the other American Republics will be
signally manifested in the results which will be obtained from this exchange of
views.8 In July 1934 Roosevelt reciprocated with a visit to Cap-Haitien to meet
with Vincent. They agreed to the restoration of complete independent relations
between the two republics, and Roosevelt pledged the U.S. Marines would be
withdrawn from Haiti immediately. On August 21, 1934, the American flag was
lowered at Port-au-Prince and the Haitian flag hoisted in its place. U.S. occupation of Haiti had finally come to an end.
Riding the Nationalist Spirit

Vincent inaugurated the era of the second national independence, or deoccupation. It was a personal victory for him because he rose to the presidency
on a platform of freeing the country from American imperialism. On Haitis
second liberation day, the president told the world he had just hoisted before
a large and excited crowd the Haitian flag, in the same place where for 19 years
the flag of the United States of America has floated.9 He was persuaded that
this gesture symbolized Haitis reintegration of her sovereignty.
Nationalistic events began to happen soon afterward. In the legislature,
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wanting Haiti to end its shameful past, Horace Bellerive and Descartes Albert
sponsored a resolution nullifying the treaty of 1915, a vote unanimously approved by the assembly. The resolution proclaimed that Haitian public powers
must quickly move in order to end without delay the impact of the Convention
and the military occupation of 1915.10 On August 10, 1931, deputy Edouard
Piou introduced a second resolution, this one demanding that the disoccupation of Haitian Territory by American troops . . . must commence at once. He
called for the definite cessation of the status of things which submits the little
Haitian Nation to the domination of American imperialism.11
Paradoxically, as Haitians regained independence, there was a new climate
giving rise to a mounting tide of pro-Americanism. Many seemed to have
buried any resentment. The American legation, while not too sanguine that
this reversal of feeling is permanent, honestly believes that the United States at
this time could do with Haiti what it wished and the entire approbation of 90%
of the literate Haitians, and 100% of the others.12 More than an outpouring of
feelings, this pro-American attitude was also a realistic anxiety about future
American economic and political interests in Haiti. Maurice Liautaud wrote in
his Haiti Journal column, The interests of these [two] republics, since the liberation of the national territory, are not divergent. They are rather complementary. They stem from reasons of economic and geographic nature that must
be clearly defined and draw the maximum benefits for the Haitian people.13
Liautaud seemed to consider President Roosevelt a leader concerned about the
efforts of a small state like Haiti in pursuing a true intra-American ideal.
The Imperative Necessity

Despite the tumultuous fanfare of Haitis official liberation, its dependence
on the United States became even more entrenched during this postoccupation period. President Vincent continued the tradition of Haitian presidents
maintaining close ties to the United States for both economic reasons and his
own political survival. The expression imperative necessity was coined by an
anti-Vincent group courting American goodwill for political power; it also describes Haitian dependence on the United States for national security through
political and economic guarantees.
Vincent understood this so-called imperative necessity as well. In 1935 Fernand Hibbert, his minister of foreign affairs, pledged Haitis complete support to the United States. At a peace conference in Buenos Aires in December
1936, Haiti adopted an attitude substantially helpful to the United States. En-
voy George Gordon reported, Nothing could be more illustrative of the new
spirit that exists in Latin America towards the United States than the manner
in which Haiti and Nicaragua are acting as enthusiastic boosters of the good
neighbor policy.14
U.S. officials accepted Haitis dependence. According to Welles, President
Vincent recognizes the impossibility of securing either economic aid or moral
support from any European country on terms compatible with Haitis independence and sovereignty. Therefore he has reoriented his policy to one of very
close collaboration with the United States.15 Ferdinand Mayer concurred but
with some reservations about the new president: President Vincent seems to
have come full circle, in so far as his public utterances are concerned. Privately,
I think he is still Anti-American, but he recognizes the imponderables and,
furthermore, has come to appreciate the popular surge toward confidence in
and cooperation with the United States.16 American officials were convinced
their government could rely on the full Haitian support at all international
conferences and that Haiti fell within the geographic and economic orbit of
the United States.17
The reality of imperative necessity led Vincent, a staunch nationalist,
to bargain Haitis national sovereignty. The coming of World War II raised
the concern of Haitian officials over their national security. Haitian Foreign
Minister Leon Laleau expressed uneasiness over the European situation and
Haitis future. He wanted Haiti to contribute to hemispheric defense through
a necessary protective works and air base . . . in the region of Gonaives . . . to
be undertaken and maintained by the United States.18 At first, the State Department welcomed the idea, saying that the Bay of Gonaives has been found
particularly adaptable for certain types of naval training operations. The Navy
Department has every intention of continuing its visits to Haiti as long as these
visits are welcome.19
But when Colonel George E. Weems, chief American military mission in
Haiti, researched the feasibility of such a base, the idea was flatly rejected. The
base was rejected, as Secretary Hull made clear to Vincent, because since the
earliest days of this Republic, it has been and still is a basic principle of policy
to decline, irrespective of circumstances, to enter into any offensive or defensive alliance.20
U.S. diplomats interpreted Haitis search for protection by injecting into the
process the race issue that is usually associated with Haitian-U.S. relations. In
envoy Ferdinand Mayers view, This is merely the natural consequence of that
defect or weakness in negro character which requires for the perfection of its
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own peculiar qualities, abilities, the instruction and constant support of the
white man. This feeling has now reached ground swell proportions accentuated
as is suggested by the unsettling and dangerous European situation as well as
by the haunting fear of Dominican aggression.21
Vincent overlooked this slight, realizing that he would have more problems if he called attention to it. Instead, he proposed in En Posant les Jalons a
Mutual Assistance Pact between the United States of America and the three
governments of the Antillean Ocean, that in case of peril and by reason of their
geographic position, they constitute the principal bases for the defense of our
continent.22 Haitian Foreign Minister Laleau reiterated the Haitian position
for such a pact: In this era of international demoralization where small, weak
countries are a prey to international brigands they feel desperately the need
of tying up directly with a strong and just friend and protector such as the
United States.23
U.S. officials were still wary of the sincerity of Vincents proposal. Welles
interpreted his move as a ploy to get financial aid: President Vincents attitude
on this point and Laleaus more positive views find their origin in Lescots continuous hammering away on the point that Haiti must do something to show
gratitude to the United States if it wants to secure additional American aid.
There was a trend to either embrace or submit to American control. During the
1940 election, the well-known Haitian nationalist Jean Price-Mars made this
pledge in his political platform. As a candidate for the presidency, Price-Mars
promoted the well-being of the Haitian people and democratic rule. Additionally, he desired a better understanding with the Government of the United
States of America and to work in close cooperation with it in all matters of mutual interest and support.24 His brother-in-law, Hermann Dsir, announced
that the United States would be allowed to have air bases in Haiti should PriceMars become president.
Though Vincent fully cooperated, American diplomats were concerned
about his friendship with Germans in Haiti. Mayer noted an increasing German influence on the Vincent administration, a potentially hostile tendency
given what was going on in Europe at the time. He contended that German influence in Haiti was the proximate cause of the Occupation and that the failure of the Haitian president to show up at the Fourth of July 1940 celebration
was a hostile act against the United States. With the war in Europe, he argued,
Germans should not have any political say in Haiti or in Latin America.25
To maintain control over the Germans, Mayer supported an American reintervention in Haiti. He recommended stronger action against Vincent: We
are looked [sic] so desperately for a sign of that strength which the negro mind
associates with the white race and demands as a mark of leadership and security.26 To meet the situation, he recommended that the United States establish
air bases in Haiti at once and adopt a just but forceful policy in its relationship
with the Vincent government. This position came from local conversations
with prominent Haitians who wished Vincent removed from office. Vincents
rivals wanted a drastic housecleaning, Mayer wrote, to replace the present
venal, pro-German and anti-American administration of President Vincent
by more honest, intelligent officials who realize the imperative necessity of
wholehearted cooperation with the United States.27
One could raise the question of whether Vincent was trying to play both
ends, for the Haitian president, too, was preoccupied with the Reichs involvement in Haiti. There was a rumor that Axis-power money was trying to influence the local elections. Additional rumors reported that the Reich wanted to
establish its own air base in Haiti. Vincent complained that the Reich gives
a little too much attention to our island.28 He found the rumors and news
serious enough that he ordered his foreign minister to write a confidential
communication to Sumner Welles at the State Department denying any relationship with the Germans. The communique also asked for the renewal of
the mutual assistance treaty between the three republics of the Antilles and
the United States. Even though this was proposed in July 1939, before the war
declaration, most recognized the inevitability of another world war.
The Vincent administration also faced a serious challenge with his Dominican neighbors. A high number of Haitian migrants were working in the canefields of the Dominican Republic. In October 1937 the dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo y Molina ordered the slaughter of Haitian squatters without any
clear reason. His army and the Policia Nacional killed some fifteen thousand to
twenty thousand Haitians.29 Vincent made but a weak response to the Dominican aggression. He settled for the Gondra Treaty of 1923 and the Conciliation
Convention of 1929, under which the procedure envisages the establishment
of [an] international conciliation commission.30 In the end, Trujillo only gave
$750,000, which was further reduced to $525,000, as compensation for the
victims.
Economic Dependence and Financial Control

U.S. control of Haitian finances, a key legacy of the occupation, became proof
that the deoccupation was not a full reality. It was the security American bank-
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ers demanded, forcing a lien on Haitian internal revenue when it was under
American control. The bankers requested and obtained protection for their
1922 loan during and beyond the life of the 1915 treaty. U.S. officials put in place
controls on Haitian internal revenues and continued collection of the customs
revenues that were under American supervision.31
Upon Haitianization, Haitians eagerly sought an end to U.S. financial control. In 1931 they tried to adopt a constitutional amendment declaring the constitution of 1918 invalid. American officials resisted by opposing projects for
changing the Constitution in such a way as to break down the American financial control and affect the validity of the Treaty of 1915.32
In 1936 the Vincent administration requested a new treaty to end this financial control. In the assessment expressed in a telegram to the State Department
from a U.S. official in Port-au-Prince, Vincent, the nationalist standard bearer,
looked forward to a political boost if he could bring about a total liberation
in view of the fact the opposition was becoming active with the approach of
the Presidents second inauguration.33 Americans resisted, claiming there was
no serious criticism of the Haitian Government for not yet terminating our
financial control . . . that the Haitian Government would be well advised to
leave this question in abeyance for the time being.34 In November 1936 the
Haitian government tried to suppress the Office of the Fiscal Representative
and its replacement by creating a service to control receipts and expenses of
the republic. The new service was to be administered by Haitians.
Yet economic dependence remained a stark reality. At the opening of the
fourth session of the Thirty-Second Haitian Legislature, Louis Zephirin,
president of the Haitian Senate, announced that Vincents visit to the United
States was for the purpose of discussing with President Roosevelt questions
of obtaining technical aid for Haiti, and if possible, a loan.35 President Vincent sought financial help with Haitis coffee surplus. This issue was critical because the British wanted a reduction in output of Haitian sugar and
cotton, creating an even greater financial need. Grard de Catalogne wrote
to Welles that Haitians are not receiving the treatment they deserve, that
their spirit of independence, their desire for freedom and their color is held
against them.36
A 1940 article in Le Matin focuses on the same issue: Our country needs
capital and technical assistance for developing its economy. It has the right to
expect that help from its great neighbor, the United States, whose policy of assistance to small countries has been seen even with regard to countries such as
Finland, which offer no direct interest to its security.37
While the United States tightened fiscal control and resisted economic assistance, its share of the Haitian markets steadily increased since Roosevelts
Good Neighbor policy did not seek to reduce U.S. economic and financial
control of Latin American and Caribbean countries.38 By 1935 the Standard
Fruit and Steamship Company obtained a twenty-year contract to develop the
Haitian banana industry. In fiscal year 193738, the United States displaced
France as Haitis chief exporter. At the same time, the United States supplied
the greater portion of Haitis import needs (54 percent), compared to 15 percent from Great Britain, 6 percent from Germany, and 5 percent from Japan.39
Sadie Alexander, then secretary of the National Urban League, wrote to W.E.B.
DuBois that the financial control of the country . . . remained in the hands
of foreigners. Even today the Bank is only nominally under the control of the
Haitian Governmentin fact the control of the Bank and the Port is in the
hands of Americans.40
Dictatorial Practices
After the Marines left, Vincent ruled as a dictator. In December 1940 he rigged
the legislative vote, resulting in the practically unanimous election of those
deputies supported by the present Government.41 The president selected all
the new deputies. In the Senate, he removed six incumbents and replaced them
with his followers.
The press was controlled by Vincent. Editors called for a third term after
a rule of eleven years. Le Matin of December 18, 1939, suggested that Vincent
should be drafted for a further period to carry out his policies. The Haitian
Senate signed a resolution extending Vincents term for five more years. Despite Vincents maneuvering, Roosevelt did not back the president. Lacking
Roosevelts support, Vincent chose to resign for reasons of health on August
14, 1940. So Washington remained in the drivers seat.
American Supreme Control

The two-decade occupation of Haiti allowed Washington to establish a system
of political, financial, and military control. The next Haitian president, Elie
Lescot, epitomized the highest level of American control in Haiti. His government displayed all the signs of yielding to this control. He adopted a policy that
would maintain his power and U.S. support throughout World War II. Lescot,
a veteran of Haitian politics, steadily rose to the top of all three branches of
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government. In the Assemble Nationale he served as the representative from

Le Borgne. He was a judge for many years. In the end, he became Haitian minister both in the Dominican Republic and in Washington.
Lescot ascended to the presidency with American help. Sharp opposition
came from the Garde dHaiti. Major Armand of the Palace Garde was described by American officials as the keeper of the keys of the Haitian ammunition dump. He was reported to have declared that even if Minister Lescot
were elected with the support of President Vincent, he [Armand] would not
abide by the decision.42 Armand planned to get himself or a confidant, Colonel Laraque, to succeed Vincent instead of Lescot. But in the end, American
backing prevailed. Lescot convinced the Assemble Nationale that the American Government desires him to be elected, and that, in the event of his election,
he was assured of obtaining an American loan of $60,000,000.43 Lescot was
elected on April 15, 1941, for a five-year term.
Lescot, too, fell into the dictatorial mold. He received extraordinary power
during wartime. All constitutional guarantees were suspended. He removed
and replaced members of the legislature at will. He assumed supreme command of the Garde dHaiti according to a decree of June 5, 1941. He sought to
eliminate any factional strife among officers in the military. The decree was
written with the help of American Colonels Weems and Bassette, and the
draft is largely of their making.44 American military control was strengthened
through the military mission what was already in place.
Lyonel Paquin considered Lescot an American pro-consul. In the wave of
pro-Americanism following deoccupation, Lescot advocated that security and
chance for advancement for Haiti is through closest cooperation with [the]
United States and Haiti should tell [the] United States that Haiti can always be
counted upon to back any move the United States might make.45
Lescot expressed his commitment to U.S. domination in a document he
drafted during his final months as Haitian minister in Washington. In that
Mmoire he pledged full allegiance to the United States. He called for closer
relations between the American military mission and the Haitian army and
expressed a willingness to further erode Haitian sovereignty by offering to
the Government of the United States full use of points in the country where
American military experts judge it suitable for continental defense works in
order that there may be assured complete collaboration by the Haitian Government and the Garde dHaiti with the American forces.46 Lescot invited
U.S.-selected agents on a permanent basis to establish a superior intelligence
service to watch possible activities of Nazis or foreigners settled in the land.
From theory to practice, Lescot put in place a pro-American cabinet. It included Charles Fombrun, the foreign affairs minister who cooperated with the
American occupation while serving as minister of the interior under Borno.
Fombrun was described as pro-American, a very astute politician, with relatively little background in foreign affairs. The State Department also liked the
appointment of Maurice Dartigue as minister of public instruction. He had
studied at Columbia University and proved to be cooperative with American
interests. Abel Lacroix, a French man in the cabinet, was skilled in financial
and fiscal matters and had visited the United States several times. He represented Haiti at the New York Worlds Fair.47 In 1942 Lescot reaffirmed his proAmericanism by declaring to a visiting delegation of U.S. officers, For the
duration of the war I would like your government to think of Haiti as another
state of the Union of which I am governor.48
With Lescot, the supremacy of mulatto control that was aided by the occupation reached its height, a representation of U.S. policy catering to mulatto interests. Lescots first cabinet was exclusively mulattoes except for one
French man. The cabinet make-up did not lead to friendly relations with the
legislature. In 1942, in fact, two members of this cabinet were attacked on the
floor of the legislature for being so pro-American to the effect that they were
sub-ordinating the best interest of Haiti by their pro-American attitude.49 In
1952 the American embassy assessed the status of what was called the MulattoBlack conflict in Haiti. This period of Haitis occupation and the years that
followed were years of mulatto rule. Despite considerable black participation
in administration, these lites were identified with the administration. They
became the established political ins or haves, while the blacks were the
political outs and the haves not.50 This government composition lingered
throughout Lescots presidency.
The American embassy noted with satisfaction that Lescots decrees did not
speak of the Year of the Liberation and Restoration of Haiti as occurred with
Vincent.51 Instead Lescot confirmed his wholehearted support of U.S. policy.
Lescots reports on political unrest in Haiti and his efforts to ascertain the
groups and leaders involved in possible opposition move were much appreciated in Washington.52 The American legation was elevated to embassy status
in 1943. John Campbell White was promoted to ambassador to Haiti on March
14, 1943.
Lescot credited American influence for his economic success. An increase
in the Haitian budget and a reduction of its national debt occurred during his
presidency. In his words, The excellent relations wisely maintained between
55
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the United States and Haiti have permitted us to pass, without hindrance,
through a period which was fertile in obstacles without precedent.53 Hoping to
be recognized for his international collaboration, Lescot declared war against
the German Reich in 1941. Orme Wilson, U.S. ambassador to Haiti, pointed out
that President Lescot consistently sided with the United States during the war
in all international and inter-American measures.54 By 1944 Lescot called for a
League of Nations declaration prohibiting the harboring of Axis war criminals.
Max L. Hudicourt, editor of La Nation, viewed Lescots actions as a sellout to
the United States. Due to his editorials, Hudicourt was forced into exile. Lescot
was intolerant toward any political opposition. In 1944 he had the constitution
amended to dispense with the electoral process until the end of the war.
Resistance to Financial Control

Despite Lescots unfailing commitment to do Americas bidding, he did have
some differences with Washington, especially regarding American financial
control. In his Mmoire to the State Department in 1941, he requested terminating the present services of the Fiscal Representative by conforming to the
terms of the contract of the purchase of the National Bank of Haiti in order
to provide guarantees to the bearers of the bonds of the loan of 1922.55 As
president, he asked for the cessation of lAgence Fiscale according to a previous
agreement between the two governments.
Lescot did not care for the repayment schedules for Haitis foreign obligations. He rejected a proposal by the Department and the Export-Import Bank
for a 20 year consolidation of the J.G White and SHADA credits by the Bank.56
His anger reached the breaking point when he authorized the New York law
firm of Pruitt, Hale, and Coursen to act as the Haitian governments representative in further negotiations with the bank and its bondholders.
But Lescots most ambitious economic development project ended in failure
despite American endorsement. This project was the contract with the Rubber
Development Corporation to cultivate cryptostegia, a vine whose leaves and
flowers produce rubber. Exploration of production had begun in 1903, and it
gained further interest during the Vincent administration. The war and the
interruption of production supplies from Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies
by an Axis blockade gave Haiti an opportunity. Lescot promoted large-scale
cultivation for economic development. In 1941 the Export-Import (Ex-Im)
Bank granted a $5 million loan establishing the Socit Haitiano-Amricaine
de Dveloppment Agricole (SHADA).57 SHADA was quickly transformed into
a war emergency project in 1942. American experts were sent to Haiti to control experiments.58
SHADA operated on land along Cap-Haitien, Limb, and Au Borgne and
an additional 5,000-acre patch in the Plaine du Nord. The exploration resulted
in the destruction of needed crop lands, and SHADA was associated with food
shortages in Haiti. By 1944 SHADA was reorganized, reoriented, and finally
dissolved due to the infeasibility of the project. That same year the program
was liquidated altogether.
An Upswing in Black Consciousness

The end of World War II brought about a deep sense of optimism in Haitian
intellectual and political circles despite the repression of the Lescot regime.
Haitian youth influenced by leftists demanded social change including the restoration of constitutional guarantees and new legislative elections. On January
7, 1946, students and teachers of Port-au-Prince schools went on strike to protest the government closing of their radical newspaper, La Ruche, which first
appeared in 1945.
The strike and the upheaval that followed gave the American-trained Garde
dHaiti its first opportunity to overthrow and make presidents. If students
pulled the trigger, it would be the American embassy and the military that
brought about Lescots downfall.59 On January 11, 1946, with three cannon
shots from Fort National, a Military Executive Committee took power. Colonel Lavaud read a proclamation on the radio that the Garde had asked the
president to resign. The general staff formed an executive committee to govern
until general elections. Colonel Lavaud, Major Levelt, and Major Paul Magloire assumed control of the government. The president became a prisoner
and then fled Haiti. The military dissolved the legislative chambers. In a cable
to Haitian Ambassador Jacques C. Antoine, the junta pledged to establish with
the American Government relations founded upon the traditional and strong
friendship which happily unites the two people.60
The events that brought about Lescots fall are commonly called by Haitians
the Revolution of 1946; Americans called them the Haitian revolt. Blackconsciousness fervor increased during this time. The black intelligentsia uniting in the struggle against the occupation and its mulatto-backed leadership
were ready to assume power.
In 1946 the Noirists, as they were known, called for social change to improve
living conditions of the peasants and urban masses, and this became their pri-
57
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mary cause. Black consciousness evolved from a promotion of Haitis cultural

heritage to a voice for political power. The revolution permitted an unprecedented freedom of expression in Haiti. New political groups came into being, including the Parti Populaire Progressiste and the Parti Socialiste Ouvrier.
Pierre Eustache Daniel Fignol launched his own Movement Ouvrier Paysan
(MOP) with Franois Duvalier as secretary. The Haitian ambassador in Washington considered this just a fundamental social revolution in Haiti, thinking
the dominant issue was that of colori.e., the blacks versus the mulattoes.61
The revolution reignited the fear of another American intervention in Haiti.
The U.S. embassy noted the resentment against the United States and the fear
of intervention shown by Haitians.62 The Haitian press asked, Can an intervention by the United States be considered? Ambassador Wilson denied the
threat because the U.S. is pledged to the principle of no unilateral intervention
in the affairs of the other American republics.63
In the gunboat diplomacy of the nineteenth century, U.S. warships appeared
off Port-au-Prince and reappeared from time to time. The same happened on
January 29, 1946, when four U.S. destroyers appeared about twenty-five miles
from Port-au-Prince. Ambassador Wilson reported, The incident immediately started circulation of rumors regarding the approaching landing of Marines.64 [Wilson] He said the fluidity of the political situation left the door
open for outside intervention. As he wryly argued, If they do not succeed . . .
I can foresee nothing but confusion and continued disturbance for Haiti and
the eventual possibility that other nations may be forced to take action.65
The Ascension of Dumarsais Estim

Dumarsais Estim emerged as the new leader of the Noirist movement that
had gained momentum during the 1946 Revolution. He was elected president
on August 16, 1946. Estim was born in the municipality of Verrettes in the Artibonite, a poor rural area about sixty-five miles north of Port-au-Prince. His
father and mother were peasants. He was able to rise above his roots, eventually earning a law degree, and taught at the Lyce Ption. He was a Vincent protg who was elected to the Haitian legislature and became minister of public
education, of agriculture, and of public works at various times. He had a strong
following among the labor classes.
Estim followed the traditional script of Haitian dependence on the United
States by pledging political and economic cooperation with Washington. A
former critic of U.S. policies, he made peace with American powers during
the Vincent years. The embassy recognized the change, finding that the former
president of the Chamber of Deputies had been a vigorous opponent of our
occupation while it was in effect, but that even in the two and one half years
that have now elapsed since evacuation he had had increasing occasion to recognize that to a very large degree the present order and stability in Haiti were
direct results of the Occupation. Estim was thought to be fully qualified for
an American endorsement.
During his first meeting with Ambassador Wilson, Estim spoke of the importance of good relations with the United States. American economic and
commercial assistance was absolutely necessary for Haitis existence. He described his plan of raising the living standard of Haitian peasants. He saw it
as a shame and disgrace that at a flying distance of only four hours from the
United States a mass of about 4,000,000 persons should be living in rags and
misery, barely able to scratch a living from the soil.66
Financial Liberation
Estim followed previous regimes on the issue of financial control and made it
the centerpiece of his political platform. During his inaugural speech he said
he would work for Haitis financial liberation. Since Estim had public backing,
the nationalists and other leftist leaders were able to demand that the United
States relinquish its financial and fiscal control over Haiti. A Haiti Journal article several months before the election had complained about the humiliating,
unique and wicked control of its finances under the strange pretext of giving
complete assurance to a few bondholders of New York and Chicago.67
Chauvet of Le Nouvelliste fully agreed. He said the Haitian government had
done everything necessary to liberate the countrys finances from American
control. Americans did not want this liberation. Many Haitians felt, though,
that since Americans had control of the finances, they intend to prolong it
indefinitely.68 Estim envisioned good relations with the United States but felt
the United States should stop collecting Haitis customs duties. In 1946 Haitian
customs and domestic taxes were still controlled by the National bank of Haiti,
whose board was made up of three Americans and three Haitians. Journalist
Stuart Morrison noticed that Haitians were tired of having Uncle Sam hold
their money purse strings, and President Estim . . . is launching a campaign
to do something about it.69 The newly elected Estim wanted the United States
to stop the collections.
Estims financial liberation policy bore fruit, and Haiti was able to pay off
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Contrary Destinies
the 1922 American loan. This measure led to the transfer of the National Bank
from American to Haitian hands. On September 25, 1947, Gaston Margron, a
Haitian, was elected chairman of the board. By negotiating with the American
embassy, Estim tried to have the service of the external debt either suspended
or greatly reduced. When the bondholders and the Ex-Im Bank refused to
accept Haitis suggestion, a goodwill mission went to Washington to present
Haitis demands. When this mission failed, negotiations were begun anew with
the embassy. This resulted in an internal loan of $5 million to carry out a public
works program.70
U.S. embassy officers reported that Estims chief objective was the establishment of honest government for the improved welfare of Haitians. They
recognized his determination to furnish moral impetus to the country through
elimination of foreign financial control Haitians regarded as humiliating.
The Estim government brought many changes to Haitis economy. One of
his finest achievements was the celebration of the bicentennial of the capital
city, Port-au-Prince, in 19491950. The president turned it into a world fair
with the participation of France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, the United States, and
other countries. At the opening, there was a parade of U.S. soldiers and Marines while a U.S. Air Force squadron flew overhead. Several public works projects changed the landscape of the capital. On the occasion of the celebration,
both houses of the U.S. Congress authorized construction of a pavilion at the
bicentennial exposition.
Political Dependence
Events leading to the end of Estims regime are similar to the other scenarios concerning the Haitian leaders political dependence on Washington. The
president desperately sought to change the constitution to extend his secondterm tenure. This effort was approved by the lower chamber of the Haitian
legislature but was blocked in the Senate in early 1950. Estim got caught in
what Ambassador William E. DeCourcy called the common spectre in Haiti
and elsewhere in Latin Americathe illegal second presidential term.71
The Haitian army once again flexed its muscles. Invoking a proclamation
that the country could not continue its peaceful course, it decided, through its
General Staff, to take the necessary measures to safeguard the public peace.72
According to the proclamation, the army claimed to have acted for the salvation of their native land.
The president believed he was faced with a coup dtat. He sought American
intervention to save his government, another example of Haitis dependence on

the United States. The embassy sympathized but did nothing more. It promised
to reiterate [the] well-known US position of deploring overthrow [of] any
established constitutional government.73 Estim was not satisfied with this
approach. During the visit of Ambassador DeCourcy before the presidents
departure for exile, Estim repeatedly asked whether the Government of the
United States could do something to help regain his position.74 It proved to be
a vain effort. The president was forced to resign handing over the government
to the military on May 10, 1950.
Conservative businessmen, elite mulatto elements, and the foreign population of Port-au-Prince greeted Estims demise with enthusiastic support. Included among the supporters were American business interests who expressed
the hope the United States would grant early recognition to the military committee.75 The U.S. ambassador did not recommend this recognition. Instead, he
promised early consultation with other American republics. He acknowledged,
though, that conversations with several diplomatic colleagues indicated their
governments are awaiting information of our attitude in view of our predominant influence here.76 American control remained. It was reinforced with the
arrival of a military government.
The Triumph of Militarism

Haiti is a country dominated by militarism. The presidency is generally a military office exercised by generalissimos.77 Governing through occupation, the
Haitian military served as the instrument of a lingering legacy of U.S. control.
In an interview with American charg daffaires Milton Barrel, Colonel Antoine Levelt, head of the military junta in 1946 and 1950, tried to establish a
link between the two. As Levelt put it, Both the United States and the Army
of Haiti would, no doubt, prevent a pro-communist Government from coming
to power in Haiti.78 Through the years, the Gendarmerie became the Arme
dHaiti under Estim and eventually turned into a trained U.S. instrument of
surveillance.
This intervention began after the Marines left, when Colonel Ptrus Dmosthne Calixte became the first chief of staff of the Garde. Calixte steadily
climbed the armys hierarchy to become its highest-ranking officer. From this
perch, he set the tone of military involvement. In 1937 Calixte became one of
the conspirators who with Dominican support attempted to overthrow President Vincent. These efforts failed, and Calixte was exiled to the Dominican
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Republic. The president declared then that every possible precaution must be
taken to keep the Garde aloof from politics.79
Though Calixtes efforts failed, the army persisted in its political involvement. Another example was Colonel Astrel Roland, a chief officer of the Garde
in the Artibonite valley who was sent as counselor to the Haitian legation in
Quito, Ecuador. Roland thought this assignment amounted to banishment and
instead went to the Dominican Republic, where he plotted with the Trujillo
regime to overthrow Estim. Roland, broadcasting from Ciudad Trujillo over
Voz Dominicana, criticized the Estim government.
After orchestrating two coups dtat, in 1946 and 1950, the American-trained
army climbed to the pinnacle of power through Colonel Paul Eugne Magloire
as president of the republic. Magloire was born in northern Haiti to a military
family. He trained in the cole Militaire, becoming military commander of
the Palace Guard under Lescot. Magloire, an easygoing colonel, mingled well
with high society, where he was acclaimed as the apostle of national unity. He
was one of the three men in the junta who overthrew the two previous administrations. He served as minister of the interior and rose to the presidency in
December 1950.
In his inaugural address, Magloire presented himself as a soldier who was
at the orders of the nation and bound not to disobey its injunctions. He
envisioned financial independence through agricultural development as the
only means to gain economic independence. Magloire used the army as an
example of discipline and respect of the law. In his view, the events of 1946,
during which the eminently social and human role of the soldier found the
occasion for affirming itself, did nothing but reinforce the integration of our
Corps in the Nations esteem. He credited the army and the Palace Guard as
the most stabilizing influence in the country in periods of revolution and normal times.80
As president, Magloire remained the citizen soldier. He promoted himself
to general of division in a ceremony at the National Palace on June 3, 1952. In
1954 the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate conferred the rank of general
in chief of the Army upon him to be effective at the end of his presidency.
Magloire sought to extend power beyond his constitutional mandate, a cue
he had taken from Generalssimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican
Republic. Ambassador Roy Davis offered this assessment: If the succeeding
president is hand-picked by General Magloire, and this would seem to be a
distinct possibility, General Magloire, of course, continues to be number one.81
Magloire became the symbol of the American military legacy in Haiti. U.S.
officials confirmed this, admitting that the Marines left a strongly entrenched
army and police force. These forces practically controlled the political situation since 1934. The military was instrumental in the fall of both Lescot and
Estim and also contributed to Magloires elevation to power by controlling
the election. Yet American officials accepted his military tactics for political
stability. Their position was that although military methods can and should be
criticized by those who desire to retain the idealism of democracy, their control
of the situation has resulted in stability.82 In this regard, the Army helped the
United States keep a close watch over the Haitian government.
Monitoring of Threats to U.S. Control

Magloire flourished during his presidency by providing reassurance to the
bourgeoisie and the Catholic Church that he did not tolerate radicals, especially communists. This policy suited the interests of the United States, where
there was also a wave of anticommunist sentiments during the 1950s. Magloire
earned American approval when he put in place a repressive policy called kansoferism, one of iron pants, connoting his authoritarian style.
Historically the earliest evidence of communist activity in Haiti appeared in
1940 when Jacques Roumain founded the Parti Socialiste Populaire, or Popular
Socialist Party. The party consisted primarily of mulattoes engaged in intellectual casuistry. Following Roumains death in Mexico in 1945, Max Hudicourt,
another prominent mulatto intellectual, took over leadership of the party. The
party existed only underground until after the fall of Lescot in January 1946.
Leftist ideas had their day in the Haitian legislature. Emile St. Lot, a prominent legislator and eloquent orator, introduced in the Assemble a resolution
calling for the immediate recognition of the Soviet Union and the beginning of
relations with the USSR. On September 9, 1946, Senator Alphonse Henriquez
introduced an even more aggressive resolution that would strike all anticommunist legislation from the Haitian penal code.
J. Edgar Hoover was monitoring Haitian communist activities. In March
1945 he noticed the movement of Nicholas I. Roude, a white Russian and
honorary Yugoslavian consul. In the past, Roude had limited his Russian propaganda activities to sponsoring benefit showings of Russian war films and
cultural shorts. On a larger scale, Roude promoted his activities to a wider
promotion of Russo-Haitian culture.83 Hoover considered the Popular Socialist Party and the growing labor movement as left-wing elements in Haiti.
On February 14, 1946, the U.S. embassy in Haiti told Washington that the
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communist party of Haiti has openly announced its existence as separate and
distinct from Max Hudicourts Popular Socialist Party. The party began publication of the newspaper Le Combat. In its manifesto, the party called for the
socialization of American enterprises and the conversion of the Garde dHaiti
into a peoples army which will be recruited by obligatory military service.84
The leader of the party was Felix Dorleans Juste, an Episcopal clergyman, with
Edris St-Armand serving as editor-in-chief of Le Combat.
U.S. officials monitored communist activities on the island. In 1947 Ambassador Harold H. Tittmann reported that a known communist has been
organizing unions and labor groups in Jacmel during the past two weeks, and
it is expected that he or another of the communist group will move on to Aux
Cayes and another point in the southern peninsula.85
The American embassy gave a lot of attention to the Movement Ouvrier
Paysan (MOP) and its director, the colorful demagogue Pierre Eustache Daniel
Fignol. The MOP was the party of the masses, with a strong following in Portau-Prince slums. Colonel Antoine Levelt confided to embassy officials that in a
period of unrest the MOP was the only party that could be relied upon to incite with any success the masses to systematic pillage and perhaps massacre.86
Fignol, though, defending himself, denied that he was a communist.
Soon after his ascendency to the presidency, Magloire moved against the
left both to consolidate power and to gain Washingtons favor. On December 30, 1950, Magloire outlawed the MOP. He also took action against the
Parti Socialiste Populaire by suppressing its daily publication La Nation, thus
removing the only communist publication in Haiti. Magloire asserted that
these political parties whose communist affiliations are well-known press
workers to maintain [an] atmosphere [of] agitation with [a] view of sabotaging installations established in Haiti by foreign capital.87 Even the U.S. embassy commented that Magloires action was meant to influence and impress
foreign, and particularly United States opinion, that foreign capital is safe in
Haiti and those movements which might adversely affect it will not be tolerated.88
In a letter to President Harry Truman, Magloire described how the two nations fought to safeguard the fundamental rights of man and suggested they
join efforts with those of other nations in the struggle against communist
forces of aggression.89 According to charg daffaires Robert Folsom, Opposition to communism is one of the cardinal points of President Magloires
policy.90 In 1952 the minister of state closed the bookstore Minerve for selling
communist literature in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien. French and Italian
citizens connected with the bookstore were expelled from the country. Magloires strategy against communism and the left brought tangible results.
In the end, American officials were determined that communism was not
a viable movement in Haiti. In their analysis, it was a practically nonexistent
political force: No person or group has yet, in Haitian history, been able to
establish a cohesive political party.91 While communist ranks in Latin America
rose to a high of sixty thousand in Brazil, the estimates were as low as five
hundred each in Haiti and Nicaragua. Americans felt no immediate threat of
communism under the Magloire administration. There did not appear to be
any possibility of the existence of anything other than a semi-underground
communism movement which will continue to attract a few intellectual malcontents and parlor pinks.92
The Magloire government gained a reputation as a bulwark against communism. As a matter of fact, the Haitian government invited the American
embassy to monitor leftist activities. For instance, the Port-au-Prince police
asked directly if there were not an officer especially assigned to the Embassy
to such activities.93 The police stood ready to work with such an agent. Army
Chief of Staff Antoine Level confirmed that any Haitian who becomes a communist automatically loses his citizenship and is undesirable.94
Communist weakness and government cooperation in the country were
seen as a positive development for the United States. Ambassador DeCourcy
reassured the State Department: It is believed that the present rather strong
Haitian delegation to the UN can be counted upon to go along with the US
point of view on the great majority of issues now on GA [General Assembly]
agenda.95
Magloires Visit to the United States

As early as 1951, Walter White of the NAACP sought an official visit for Magloire with President Truman. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson said Trumans schedule was already committed for the foreseeable future, but there
was an underlying reservation about Magloires politics. The State Department
viewed Magloire as one who came to power through a military coup which
overthrew the freely elected government of President Estim.96
White did not deny the rough methods that brought Magloire to power.
To justify a visit to Washington, White stressed the job Magloire was doing
with construction projects in Gonaves and his effort in combating malaria
and yaws, an infectious disease that affects the skin and bones. In addition,
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such a visit would have world-wide repercussions in answering communist

and other propaganda about American race prejudice.97 White persisted
against all odds. During the sesquicentennial celebration of Louisiana, White
reminded Eisenhower that it was Haitis successful struggle for independence
which forced France to sell the Louisiana Territory to the United States.98
Meanwhile, Magloires Haitian sesquicentennial independence celebration
received a favorable report in the United States in major newspapers and in
the black press. Magloire honored the fathers of Haitian freedom with bronze
bas relief obelisks depicting Haitian historical battle scenes. The obelisks were
sculpted by Cubas prize-winning sculptor Ramos Blanco. President Dwight
Eisenhower sent greetings and best wishes to Haiti, recalling how devotion to
freedom helped Haiti support Americas own Revolutionary War at Savannah
and Yorktown.99
With such an exchange of goodwill, U.S. officials finally gave favorable consideration to a presidential visit. Recommendations were made to the White
House that the Magloire government has been reasonably democratic, has
opposed communism, has encouraged foreign investment, and has been very
friendly toward the United States.100 Race also played a role, as demonstrated
by Ambassador Burns. He promoted the visit as a properly favorable relationship to our political domestic scene in that it would demonstrate to the negro
element in the United States that we honor our friends in the free world regardless of color.101
Magloire arrived on January 26, 1955, for a two-week official state visit in
the United States. He and his wife received a warm welcome in Washington,
hosted by the Eisenhowers and even spending a night in the White House.
Magloire spoke to a joint session of Congress and said the destiny of the two
countries is closely linked to that great American democracy for better or
worse.102 He talked about his campaign to stamp out communism in Haiti.
President and Madame Magloire were the guests of honor of Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles and his wife at an official dinner at Anderson House. In
New York City, Mayor Robert F. Wagner welcomed the Magloires with a city
ticker-tape parade attended by some ten thousand people. Magloire visited
Columbia University, where he was presented an honorary law degree from Dr.
Grayson Kirk, president of the university. He received an additional law degree
from Fordham University.
The president tried to make the best of the visit for political gain at home.
He desired to show issues that could demonstrate concrete accomplishments
favorable to Haiti. Magloire discussed Haitis debt issues involving the Ex-Im
Bank on the SHADA question.103 In the end, the visit only brought about a
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States
and Haiti. It was an empty gesture because of the absence of religious provisions in the treaty. Religious groups forced the U.S Senate to put the brakes on
ratification. These groups were upset over omission of a provision for liberty
of conscience and the right to hold public and private religious services.104 On
July 17, 1957, President Eisenhower withdrew the treaty from the Senate.
Following the visit, the Magloire regime was nearing its end. As they had in
the past, students revolted against the government. In May 1956 students attempted to unseat the government because they feared Magloire would try to
succeed himself. Magloire imposed a state of siege in the country, suspending
constitutional provisions that guaranteed various freedoms. Businesses went
on strike to bring down the government.
Not surprisingly, Magloire lost favor with Washington. Ambassador Zephirin complained to the State Department about the intervention of American
firms and American Government agencies in the political affairs of Haiti by
allowing Haitian employees to stay at home during these antigovernment
strikes.105 Ambassador Tasco Davis rejected such a charge, arguing that American companies could not force their employees to return. I [Davis] called attention to the fact that hundreds of Haitian companies and commercial concerns employing thousands of Haitians had found it necessary to close because
their employees had departed.106
Magloire, the maker and breaker of presidents who preceded him, was cornered. He vainly tried his own coup dtat by seeking a military provisional
government to be headed by himself. Nemours Pierre-Louis and other Haitian
Supreme Court judges refused to fulfill their constitutional duty of assuming
the role of president, and Magloire was more than willing to serve.107 The maneuver did not work as he wanted.
The bourgeoisie had its own man, Louis Djoie, ready to take over. The mulatto military officers of Magloires inner cabinet helped him escape. Magloires
downfall began yet another period of political instability, ushering in what
proved to be the most ruthless regime of all.
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4
In the Throes of the Cold War
Papa Doc was a terrible Latin American reflection of the Cold War,
which has always had the Third World as its hottest battlefield.
Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti
The twentieth century was dominated by a tense and at times a dangerous

rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. In part, this rivalry
fought for control of the Third World. The Cold War, as it was called since most
fights were on the diplomatic rather than the military level, had an impact on
the relationship between Haiti and the United States. For nearly three decades,
Papa Doc and then Baby Doc controlled Haitis fate with an iron fist.
The father, Franois Duvalier, was elected president on September 22, 1957,
after a hard-fought electoral campaign. The period between the ouster of President Paul Eugne Magloire in December 1956 and the election of September
1957 was marked by violence and chaos. Four different governments in succession proved unworkable. Finally, the Military Council of Government, a junta
of army officers led by General Antonio Kbreau seized power on June 14,
1957. This junta sent Provisional President Daniel Fignol into exile after only
nineteen days in office. From the field of three major candidates left, the army
preferred Duvalier against opponents Louis Djoie and Clment Jumelle.
Though both Djoie and Jumelle were officially running, they dropped out
of the race before the vote. After Duvalier was in power for fourteen years, he
transferred that power to his nineteen-year-old son, Jean-Claude, who ruled
until 1986.
The elder Duvalier was familiar with American culture. Following his medical studies at the University of Haiti in 1934, he attended the University of
Michigan at Ann Arbor, where he enrolled in the masters program for public
health. Under Major James H. Dwinelle of the U.S. Army Medical Corps, Duvalier served as the head of a rural clinic at Gressier, Haiti. In 1946 he was the
head of the malaria control section of the American Sanitary Mission. He also
served as Haitian head of the Point Four Program, a U.S. foreign aid project
aimed at providing technological skills, knowledge, and equipment to poor

nations throughout the world.
Primarily due to his assistance to the United States, Duvalier had American
backing in the 1957 election. U.S. officials hoped he would continue to follow
a policy of defending American interests in Haiti. During the Duvalierist era,
however, relations between Haiti and the United States followed a rollercoaster
track. Issues of race, immigration, hemispheric security, and Haitian political
and economic dependence were handled in quite a dramatic fashion, as this
chapter will show.
Roots of an Infamous Regime

The Duvalier regime emerged from the legacies inherited from the American
occupation that began in 1915 when the invaders crushed the nations sovereignty. Haitian military resistance was easily suppressed by the superior U.S.
Marines. Haitians held their ground only at the ideological level, falling back
on an indigenous ideology as the sole effective response against the long occupation.
A movement promoting the return of Haitian culture to its original African
origins may have won on its ideology, but in reality the search for a new political vision led to internal rivalries between leftists and nationalists. Radicals like
Jacques Roumain and Max Hudicourt proposed a Marxist solution for Haitis
socioeconomic problems. Other leaders like Franois Duvalier, Lorimer Denis,
and Louis Diaquoi adopted a black-nationalist ideology.
Duvalier became the leader of this second group, now called Griot intellectuals for the cultural journal he cofounded in 1939. They interpreted Haitian
history in terms of a struggle between the European-oriented mulatto lite,
in collusion with the French-dominated Catholic Church, and the majority
of authentic black Haitians.1 Denouncing the exploitation of most Haitians,
who were primarily peasants, by the minority mulatto lite, they proposed an
alliance between the black middle class and the masses to overturn mulatto
dominance.2 Noiristes, as the black nationalists came to be known, comprised
a movement of black political empowerment that emerged in post-occupation
Haiti to oppose mulatto control. Estim became the first Haitian president
from that movement, followed by Duvalier. They arose to power with Dumarsais Estim in the wake of the 1946 Revolution. Duvalier, a close associate of
Estim, served as cabinet minister of public health and labor.
Noirist politicians felt their movement fell short of accomplishing its mis-
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sion when the military caused the downfall of their leader. Duvalier took notice of the armys behavior in Estims demise. Claiming to follow the spirit
and policies of this popular president, Duvalier presented himself as the natural heir to Estims unfinished business. Duvalier was able to skillfully court
and win the support of dissatisfied black officers who resented the climb of
their light-skinned comrades under Lescot and Magloire.3 They became the
faithful supporters who eventually brought Duvalier to the presidency. He
saw his mission as solving the issues connected with social class structure in
Haiti.
Duvaliers rise was equally the result of the racist policies of the American
occupation that used race as a double-edged sword. Race allowed Americans
to cater to the upper-class mulatto interests over the dark-skinned masses and
reinforced patterns of ethnoracial stratification that were already in place. In
later years when American policymakers tried to get rid of Duvalier, they revisited the old strategy of empowering the light-skinned mulattoes. Coming to
grips with the consequences of promoting mulattoes, Americans themselves
argued against its latest application. They reasoned how this left them with
the problem [of] whether such a conservative calculus would merely represent
the reversion of the narrow kind of Haitian mulatto leadership that became
bankrupt politically many decades ago.4
All Haitians, regardless of color, suffered from American racism. Race remained a force driving Haitian-U.S. relations during the Duvalier years. Americans were frustrated since they neither understood nor knew how to handle
Haitians. To do a better job, a study of the Haitian social and cultural system
was recommended, using all the modern cultural anthropology, sociology, and
social psychology tools available. It was thought that such a study would provide an in-depth, motivational analysis of the Haitian cultural system and become a guide to improving U.S. relationships with Haiti. Such an understanding could become the strategy and tactics for implementing an aid program.
U.S. policymakers felt the problem they have encountered in dealing with
Haiti over many years in the past strongly indicates the need for a comprehensive understanding of the Haitian mind, the Haitian behavior patterns and the
Haitian social organization.5
Early Signs of a Troubled Relationship

The Duvalier government epitomized the Haitian tradition of dictatorship.
From its very beginning, the signs of a repressive and dictatorial regime sur-
faced. During his first news conference after the election, Duvalier promised
full cooperation with the United States. Yet this promise did not work out the
way Americans had thought. Under Duvalier, traditional American control of
Haiti came to a severe test.
Signs challenging U.S. control emerged even before Duvalier took the oath
of office. This initial conflict, known as the Talamas affair, continued for
months before a settlement was reached. It all began on September 29, 1957,
when Shibley Jean Talamas, born in Haiti to wealthy Syrian-descended parents
with U.S. citizenship, was beaten to death by Haitian police. Talamas, at three
hundred pounds and six feet tall, was believed to be a supporter of the defeated candidate Louis Djoie. Charged with complicity in a political crime,
Talamas voluntarily surrendered to the police when American embassy officers were assured he would not be mistreated. Police did not live up to their
promise.
The affair dragged on between Duvalier and the U.S. government. In 1957
Ambassador Gerald Drew flatly rejected the Haitian position that Talamas
died of a heart attack under interrogation. In meetings with Duvalier, Drew
asked for an investigation of the case and insisted on punishment of the guilty
parties. He also sought assurances for the protection of American citizens and
property in Haiti.6 Duvalier, who took personal charge of the matter, promised
that the guilty parties would be punished under the Haitian Military Code.
Subsequent steps along this line led to a final settlement of the case by February
1958.
The death of Talamas was nothing but a mere prelude of things to come in
the evolution of Haitian-U.S. relations under Duvalier. Beside Talamas, other
American citizens were believed to have been subjected to harassment by the
Haitian government. In March 1958, Haitian immigration police prevented
the departure from the Port-au-Prince airport of Arthur Thomas Payne. He
claimed to have been born in New York City and to have served as a deputy
sheriff in Dade County, Florida. Haitian police charged him with subversive
activities.7
Other unforeseen events tested relations between the National Palace and
the American embassy. On July 29, 1958, a group of eight men, five of them
American citizens, tried to overthrow the regime after they sailed from Florida
in a small U.S. yacht. The group was led by three former Haitian army officers,
Captain Alix Pasquet, Lieutenant Philippe Dominique, and Lieutenant Henri
Perpignan, all members of the former Magloire military. Though the men
managed to take control of the Casernes Dessalines, the Army barracks next
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to the National Palace, Haitian security forces overpowered and killed them.
Afterward, Duvalier went on the offensive, charging that Americans were involved and intimating that the United States was willingly sheltering enemies
of his government.
In New York, Jules Blanchet, Haitian minister without portfolio, kept up
the same line of attack. He criticized American Ambassador Gerald Drew for
meddling in Haitian affairs. He even asked for Drews recall. In the end, Drew
and Duvalier agreed that relations between the two Governments, and particularly between Haitis Foreign office and the American embassy at Port-auPrince, have never been closer than at the present.8
These cases demonstrated how the United States was losing control in Haiti.
Duvalier, who manipulated or destroyed all the institutions that could threaten
his hold on power, was leery of American influence in Haiti. Even in this early
stage of Duvaliers administration, Haiti was descending into chaos. The despicable acts of the Tontons Macoutes, Duvaliers personal police force, included
sanctioned murder, rape, and torture. These acts were on the rise. In May 1958,
the official residence of U.S. Ambassador Gerald Drew was spattered by rifle
fire by unidentified persons.9 The ambassador asked and received assurances
that such incidents would not be repeated. In general, foreign diplomats were
not spared the political violence.
The Diminished Army

The demise of the Haitian military was the first institution to signal a weakening of American control. The Army evolved from its inception under the Marines as the Garde dHaiti to the Arme dHaiti under Lescot. Duvalier changed
its name to the Forces Armes dHaiti. This was more than just a name change,
as the military underwent a steep decline during the Duvalier regime.
Before his election, Duvalier was considered a dull character. Military leaders saw him as the perfect prsident de doublure, that is, in Haitian traditional
mode, a puppet who would be easily manipulated.10 American journalist Louis
Lomax reported, The consensus here is that M. Duvalier will rule as long as
the army is satisfied with him.11 After his inauguration, the new president kept
a low profile as the seat of power remained with Army Chief of Staff Antonio
Kbreau. Friction was reported between the two. Kbreau went around the
presidents authority in his dealings with the American embassy. Kbreau even
sought to isolate the President and deprive him a full knowledge of facts,
while retaining for the Army at least a veto upon all important decisions taken
by the Government.12 The embassys assessment was that the army was to allow Duvalier the semblance of power while taking care to reserve to itself the
substance of power.13 Kbreaus relationship with Dominican strongman Rafael Trujillo reinforced the illusion that he was all-powerful. He felt that Haiti
should have a decreased dependence on the United States and form interests
with Latin American dictators.14
Duvalier, to the surprise of many, finally went on the offensive. His confrontation with Kbreau was perhaps the first master stroke of his liberation from
the army. When Kbreau learned over the radio that Duvalier had sacked and
replaced him with Brigadier General Maurice Flambert, he wisely fled to the
Dominican Republics embassy. Duvalier formally declared himself the head
of the Haitian government and the head of the armed forces.
Duvalier began his regime with some military cooperation with the United
States. The Eisenhower administration backed the dictator by reining in restless Haitian exiles from armed incursion against the regime.15 Duvaliers brutal
tactics were routinely overlooked. In 1958 two governmental delegations made
the journey to Washington. The first consisted of a three-man Army delegation to explore the possibility of establishing an American military mission in
Haiti. Their visit brought the desired result. In April 1958 it was reported that
an eight-man United States Marine Corps Survey Team, headed by Major
General James P. Risely, USMC, arrived in Haiti . . . to study at first-hand for
two weeks the operations of the Haitian Army and the feasibility of establishing a permanent Military Mission in Haiti composed of United States Marine
Corps personnel.16 By September an understanding was reached for a military
mission.
Nevertheless, the American presence did little to stop the decline of the
power of Haitis American-trained army. The president repeatedly purged the
institution, keeping only those who maintained faithful allegiance to him.17
Perhaps the best example of the armys demise was the execution of nineteen officers in 1967. They were all imprisoned at Fort Dimanche, the general
headquarters of the military district of Port-au-Prince that was, incidentally,
transformed into a prison after the American occupation. Under Duvalier, Fort
Dimanche became a death camp where both innocents and enemies perished.
On June 8, 1967, the officers were executed despite a last-minute intervention
by the pope to spare their lives. Duvaliers power was then unchallenged as the
leader of the armed forces.
Duvalier found an alternative to Army power by starting his own High Secret
Police of the Palace. This militia consisted of several score armed and masked
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plainclothesmen commanded by Major Pressoir Pierre and Clment Barbot.

This new military entity had the power to attack and imprison suspected political opponents of the Government. They chose to fulfill their assignments
mostly at night. This group evolved into the infamous Volontaires de la Scurit Nationale (VSN), commonly called the Tontons Macoutes, blindly devoted
to the president. The VSN became a full-fledged paramilitary operation that
maintained Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude, in power for three decades.
While the Army steadily decreased in influence, the militia increased exponentially in power. Foreign Minister Ren Chalmers said there were about
200,000 loyal militiamen. He indicated that nothing happens in Haiti that
these people dont know about and they quickly report any information they
collect to the central government.18 With the VSN, Duvalier crippled the
power of the army. Americans took note of this emasculation of the military.
Concern about a tamed military brought them to reminisce: We regret that
the military have been suppressed by a completely civilian regime which asserts its paramountcy over the military both through direct controls, as well as
by the creation of secret police, civil militia, etc.19
As U.S. officials shuffled the cards in an attempt to dislodge Duvalier, they
longed for the good old days of the Haitian militarys supreme power. In 1961
Ambassador Robert Newbegin described such a scenario: the only possibility
of a part-way acceptable replacement would perhaps be a junta composed of
either military officers or half-way acceptable civilians who would be strongly
and immediately supported by the United States.20
In the end, U.S. officials still maintained hope for a military takeover. In
1965 the State Department included in its diplomatic action the scenario of
involving General Gerard Constant, the army chief of staff, in bringing about a
possible downfall of Duvalier. They gave him the mission of keeping the army
together and maintaining order with the promise that the U.S. will guarantee
his safety and arrange the arrival in Port-au-Prince of Haitian civilian leaders
now in exile.21
As U.S. policymakers rehearsed this military option, they settled on the
development of a more reliable, constructive and respected military establishment to fulfill its constitutional role.22 This military was also to be at the behest
of the United States in its line of action against the Duvalier regime. When they
evaluated and appraised a potential alternative government, they saw support
coming from elements within Haiti, including especially the armed forces.23
They increased their intelligence to plan for such a goal, but that was to no
avail. Duvalier remained invincible.
In Full Dictatorial Mode

With Duvalier, the dictatorial policies practiced during the American occupation came into full bloom. For two decades of American control, the governments of Dartiguenave, Borno, and subsequent presidents steered clear of
democratic principles. Duvalier followed suit. Some observers said he refined
the tools of repression inherited from the U.S. occupation to become the sole
and absolute ruler of Haiti.
Duvalier was elected in 1957 for a six-year term. Like Borno, he was reelected for another six-year term by dictatorial maneuvering. In 1961, during
legislative elections, Duvalier added his own name as a candidate. Soon afterward came the greater bombshell of another Duvalier election that would
name him president for life in 1964. The plebiscite scheme begun by the
Americans under Dartiguenave evolved into a referendum to ratify his quest
of a presidency for life.24 The United States rejected the process, denouncing the maneuver as a transformation of Duvalier from a dictatorial but legally [elected] President into a dictatorial legal President.25 He managed to
overcome American opposition and remain in office. In 1965 Washington acknowledged that there were no alternative sources of political power in Haiti:
All power rests with President Duvalier who has relentlessly smashed all over
opposition.26
American control in Haiti dipped to its lowest level when Ambassador Raymond Thurston confronted Duvalier in the National Palace on behalf of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. The ambassador presented Duvalier with a package to allow him an opportunity to bail out of power that included political
asylum and the sum of $1 million in exchange for resettlement abroad with his
family. This dialogue took place while American warships patrolled Haitian
waters; it was yet another try at gunboat diplomacy. That very day, Duvalier
declared Thurston persona non grata and kicked him out of the country. The
president recalled Ambassador Louis Mars from Washington. Diplomatic relations between Haiti and the United States were at a stalemate.27 With Thurston
removed as ambassador, the diplomatic status between Haiti and the United
States was downgraded. In Port-au-Prince, American charg daffaires Glion
Curtis Jr. merely processed routine business.
But U.S. policymakers had mixed feelings about overthrowing Duvalier.
Had they pushed Duvalier over the cliff, they were not all that confident they
could regain U.S. control of Haiti. Their weakening influence was becoming
more evident. When Duvalier sent his henchmen to liberate asylum seek-
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Contrary Destinies
ers from the Dominican embassy in Port-au-Prince, he created a situation

that could have led to war. The editor of Crisis wrote, The United States
prayed for Duvaliers overthrow,28 suggesting American impotence toward
the dictator.
Auto-Determination and Dependence

Benson E. L. Timmons came to Haiti as the next U.S. ambassador, appointed
by the week-old Johnson administration on November 30, 1963. Following a
delay and as a show of strength, Duvalier accepted his credentials on February
13, 1964. The president used the occasion to declare that auto-determination
was a cardinal rule in Haiti. He had no intention of trying to tell the United
States what to do but [the] converse must equally be true.29 Duvalier acted
differently than his predecessors. Despite his aggressions, he could not shake
Haitis traditional dependence on the United States.
Duvalier relied on American economic and military power to stay in office. Under his rule, Haitis economic woes persisted. To get financial aid,
Duvalier astutely exploited American fears of communism. In 1959 he recognized the Castro regime. In 1961 he delivered the famous Jacmel speech using
communist threats to pressure the United States for money: There are two
poles of attraction in the world, if I am not drawn by one, Ill gravitate to the
other.30
Still, these acts did not mask Haitis ongoing dependence. In 1964 Duvalier
requested budget-supporting assistance as evidence of the genuineness of the
U.S. goodwill toward his Government.31 Secretary of State Dean Rusk rejected
the request, denouncing Duvalier as an egocentric man trying to bully his
way to get American support. The president seized every opportunity to seek
American aid. Following his inauguration as president for life, U.S. officials
interpreted in his inaugural address pleasant noises about his cooperation as
a sign he was ready to request loans. They expected that following its vote in
the OAS to back the US in its action in the Dominican Republic Haiti may seek
its reward.32 Though Duvalier was not a puppet in American hands, Haitis
economic woes forced his dependence.
The United States was equally conscious of Duvaliers dependence on its
economic might. Timmons acknowledged that the foundered economy in
Haiti cannot through its own efforts . . . be reinvigorated. Adequate injection
of money and capital to put the country back on its feet could only come
from the United States in form of generous aid, long-term loans, and tech-
nical assistance.33 Yet American financial assistance was provided because of

politics rather than the needs of a desperate population. As Timmonss memo
explains, The aid level for Haiti, although recognizing economic and humanitarian needs, has, as far as Special Assistance is concerned, been predominantly
determined on the basis of political considerations.34
Duvalier was a staunch nationalist. In 1959 he initiated the morning salute
to the flag as a manifestation of his opposition to foreign intervention on the
national territory.35 Yet dependence on American economic and military aid
forced him to bargain with the territorial integrity of his nation. When Haitian
Ambassador Ernest Bonhomme called on President Dwight Eisenhower, he
pledged Haitian support for the U.S. desire to establish a naval base in Haiti
as a replacement of a possible loss of Guantanamo in Cuba. As Bonhomme
describes it: Haiti wanted to reciprocate, possibly by facilitating the use of its
territory by the United States for training in tropical warfare or for a naval base,
perhaps with submarine facilities.36 At this time Duvalier committed himself
to cooperating with the Eisenhower administration. His actions were like those
of former presidents Vincent and Lescot, who made similar offers. It is a clear
sign of the continuity of the occupations legacy.
The Context of the Cold War

American concerns about the Duvalier regime must be considered as a reaction to the Cold War being waged with the Soviet Union. Following World
War II, a breakdown occurred in the wartime alliance of the United States and
Britain with the Soviet Union. In events that followed, the term Cold War
came to describe a whole complex of international tensions seen as deriving
from the bipolar antagonism of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and
the United States.37 The world was sharply divided between communist and
capitalist camps.
Nikita Khrushchev emerged from the post-Stalin era in 1957 as the new
Soviet leader. John F. Kennedy joined him as president of the United States
in November 1960. The two brought about a standoff that threatened open
warfare, with Cuba in the background. In 1959 the young Cuban rebel leader
Fidel Castro led an invasion force that ended the regime of the U.S.-backed
Fulgencio Batista. Castro sought American aid and was refused. He found
help in the Soviet Union, which was looking for a foothold in the Western
Hemisphere. U.S. interests were threatened when Soviet warships were found
to be carrying nuclear weapons to Cuba. President Kennedy in an October
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1962 nationwide television address told the Soviets nuclear war would result if the missiles were not removed from Cuba. The U.S. preoccupation
with communism and specifically with the Cuban Revolution formed a motif that runs through Haitian diplomacy with Santo Domingo as well with
Washington.38
American policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean focused on a
containment doctrine. This was a policy designed to prevent the spread of
communism in the Western Hemisphere. In this spirit of containment, the
United States intervened in Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, the Dominican
Republic in 1965, and Central America and Grenada during the 1980s.39 The
containment policy encompassed Haiti as well, based on the account of Cuban
missile crisis and the possibility of losing Guantanamo. Two questions preoccupied American policymakers: What are the strengths and capabilities of any
communist or Castro elements in Haiti? In what clandestine or other activities
are they engaged?40
U.S. officials also worried about Castros influence on exiled Haitians in
Cuba who might attempt to overthrow Duvalier. They reasoned that the presence in Cuba of large numbers of Haitians capable of being used by the Communists to infiltrate Haiti and conduct subversive activities poses a potential
danger which must not be overlooked.41 In 1968 a landing of some form took
place in northern Haiti. U.S. officials believed this was an invasion force seeking to topple the regime. The CIA dispatched a patrol ship in the Windward
Passage to act as a deterrent to the Cubans should they try to send forces into
Haiti.42
Knowing all too well the American paranoia about communism, Duvalier
never failed to use it for his own political advantage. In the process, he also used
the threat of communism against his enemies. The Cayard incident of April
1970 illustrates this trend. Colonel Octave Cayard, forty-seven years old, was
a Haitian Coast Guard officer. Since April 1963, he held various assignments
in the army and police before commanding the nations Coast Guard. Cayard
was considered one of a small group of leaders who, according to American
assessment, could assume power should Duvalier be removed. Cayard became
disgruntled over Duvaliers dictatorship and targeted the president by repeatedly bombarding the National Palace from a ship. He failed to dislodge the
dictator. Duvalier asked the United States to bomb the ship, claiming Cayard
is a Communist.43
Duvalier was not alone in playing the communist card for American support. Ferdinand Marcos used it to declare martial law and assume dictato-
rial powers in the Philippines in 1972. He was supported by the United States,
whose officials believed Marcoss protestations that his regime was the only
stable anticommunist power in much of the Pacific. Several Latin American
dictators used the same strategy effectively, among them General Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua.
Hemispheric Security
Based on the communist threat, the United States sought to control Haitis strategic position in the Windward Passage. The U.S. hemispheric policy was once
again anchored in Haiti due to the loss of Cuba to the Soviets. Ambassador
Thurston described Haitis importance to U.S. security in terms of nineteenthcentury policy when Americans sought to acquire Mle-Saint-Nicolas: Haitis
political importance to the United States lies primarily in her strategic position, beside the Windward Passage, which is of marked military significance,
especially with Cuba in communist hands.44 The U.S. objectives of assuring
that a noncommunist government be established in the country remained. In
the event of Duvaliers demise, U.S. officials wanted to be in a position to influence the character of a successor government.45
Caught in this Cold War hysteria, America looked the other way when the
atrocities of the Duvaliers dictatorship became evident. Policymakers recommended that in response to Duvaliers requests for economic assistance, the
United States would contribute to Haitian budgetary support $5,000,000, an
amount somewhat larger than the previous year. It would also continue its ICA
Economic Development Program at the previous level of $4,500,000, as would
also be the case with the technical assistance program.46
American officials were caught in a predicament. In light of Duvaliers tyrannical practices, there was enough reason to withdraw military aid, budgetary support, and technical assistance for economic development to bring about
the downfall of the regime. President Kennedys Alliance for Progress aimed
to signal the end of the traditional American tendency to support dictators,
however ruthless, in the name of political stability and anti-communism.47
Yet U.S. policymakers raised concerns that such a policy could backfire if there
was a regime change. There was the fear that Castro could make the best of this
scenario.
Policymakers were pressured on both sides. Duvalier requested help, and
the Haitian people criticized Americans for what they saw as support for the
corrupt and brutal regime. The conflicts went on unchanged for many more
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years, for Duvalier was resilient and managed to hold onto his power. In May
1963 the anti-aid camp won when the United States cut about $40 million in
annual grants and loans to Haiti.
In the end Americans settled on a policy called cool and correct to deal
with the regime. It derived from the failure of close cooperation that nearly
resulted in a complete severance from the regime.48 The policy reflected an
analysis of potential actions somewhere between consorting with Duvaliers
opponents to overthrow him and working with the regime despite its shortcomings. They agreed on maintaining a U.S. presence in Haiti but denying
Duvalier U.S. endorsement or economic assistance.49 This policy gave them
the advantage of carrying out their influence toward their specific objectives.
It also allowed them to take quick counter-measures if there was a communist
takeover before or after Duvaliers death.
Hemispheric Forum Considerations

A 1961 policy paper on Haiti describes American concerns about the adverse
role Duvalier could play on U.S. foreign policy: Anything we do to express our
disapproval of Duvalier, at a minimum, will place considerable strain on our
relations with his regime and destroy any possibility of counting upon Haitis in
support of our positions at international and hemispheric forums. In 1964 that
issue came up again when the State Department rejected Duvaliers request
for financial aid. In a policy paper prepared for the State Department, it was
suggested that the United States leave room for accommodation with Duvalier.
The United States continued to rely on Haitis vote relating to questions of
importance to the United States and the free world in international organizations and forums.50 In 1962 Haiti cast a decisive vote at the foreign ministers
meeting of the Organization of American States to sanction the Castro regime.
Washington rewarded Duvalier with $2.8 million toward construction of the
Port-au-Prince airport.51
Because of a concern for hemispheric security, the threat of intervention
was never far away. If a communist-oriented group appeared likely to replace
Duvalier, the U.S. government was ready to intervene militarily . . . to prevent
Castroist or other identifiable communist elements from taking over, seeking
simultaneously maximum possible OAS participation or action.52 Haitian officials encouraged this policy. Grard de Catalogne, the director of tourism and
editor of the paper Le Nouveau Monde, proudly declared, as reported in a Wall
Street Journal article, that the Government of Haiti has destroyed the Com-
munist Party.53 He presented Haiti as a strong defense against communism in

the Western Hemisphere.
Some questions were raised about the effectiveness of cooperating with
Duvalier. This policy could be harmful to the United States. Continued economic deterioration under American presence could work to the communists
advantage. Yet after reviewing alternative actions, policymakers accepted the
necessity to maintain a U.S. presence in Haiti on a normal basis as conditions
there permit, but deny endorsement or economic assistance.54 In 1965 officials
affirmed their continuing policy toward Haiti: maintain a substantial United
States presence in Haiti . . . so as to be able to influence the situation when the
inevitable change in regime occurs, either through Duvaliers death or through
his assassination or deposition, and to deny Haiti to the communists.55 The
need for Haitis vote in an international forum was crucial. The embassy recognized that Duvalier removed every obstacle to stay in power.
Holding onto Control

U.S. officials were fully aware of the difficult and high stakes involved in overthrowing Duvalier. Efforts by President John Kennedy, in collaboration with
Juan Bosh of the Dominican Republic, failed to secure the removal of Duvalier.56 The uncertainty of finding a replacement who could uphold American
interests was a factor in U.S. policy. Officials feared that by antagonizing Duvalier, he might accept either quietly or ostentatiously support from Castroists
and communists both from outside and inside Haiti.57
Duvalier made it clear he intended to remain in power until he died and
would use any means to achieve this objective. He would not tolerate any threat
to his political control.58 The United States had to walk a tightrope in its dealings with Duvalier and to keep some control in Haiti. In 1965 the American
embassy in Port-au-Prince congratulated itself on being successful in avoiding
clashes with the Duvalier regime and in executing its two-year-old mission of
maintaining its presence and preventing the expulsion of its personnel.59
For the sake of control, American intervention scenarios persisted. Galo
Plaza, the Ecuadorean secretary-general of the OAS, and William Bowdler of
the national security staff agreed in a meeting that the OAS cannot survive
another unilateral intervention and we should get the Latin American thinking
in terms of collective action now.60 In 1967 a senior interdepartmental review
indicated that in the event of an unplanned demise of Duvalier, U.S. forces
would need to evacuate American citizens and other foreign nationals, and
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Contrary Destinies
it would be probably necessary for those forces to take control of the city of
Port-au-Prince.61
In 1968, when an invasion force tried to topple the regime, the U.S. government was ready to intervene. The CIA knew the whereabouts of both civilian
and military Haitian exiles in case it becomes necessary on short notice to
put together a responsible government and get it into Haiti.62 The State Department went through the same exercise with U.S. officials with experience
in Haiti. In 1969 a CIA analysis of the situation included possible American
intervention. In case of the sudden death of Duvalier, the team concluded that
Haitis trouble is likely to become a hemispheric problemand this could
mean intervention.63
U.S. government officials recognized that they had little support for an intervention policy. They knew their Latin American neighbors abhor the idea
of intervention for any purpose, either collectively through the OAS or the UN,
or by a single nation. The recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had caused
many Latin Americans to harden their resistance to any interference by the
major powers. Yet the U.S. policy of not losing contact with Duvalier remained
in place because Haiti is only fifty miles from Cuba. Furthermore, his being a
sick man, officials felt that he could drop dead at any moment; and we want to
be around if and when it happens.64
U.S. policymakers persisted without finding an opportunity to get rid of
Duvalier. They continued discreet contacts with Haitians outside the Government (and with those in exile) in order to attempt to build up assets for the
future.65 The CIA was fully engaged in that process. It already had conducted
an intensive survey of Haitians of influence in and outside Haiti to pinpoint
those best suited, in terms of U.S interests, for inclusion in a post-Duvalier
provisional government.66 The CIA carefully checked these Haitians political
ideologies, responsiveness to the direction of the U.S. government, and influence in Haiti. Various steps were rehearsed in the event a crisis came about due
to the presidents failing health.
Transition to Baby Doc

Some eight months before Duvaliers death, a turnaround took place in Haitian-U.S. relations. By August 1970, American officials discovered an unusually
mellowed Duvalier. After more than a decade of troubled relations, a physically
feeble president was willing to reconcile with Washington. The CIA took notice
of conciliatory gestures toward the United States.67 These gestures included
negotiations to refund two Export-Import Bank loans in arrears since September 1967 and the settlement of the Valentine case involving an oil refinery
controversy. Still the CIA suspected a ploy on the part of Duvalier to qualify
for more foreign aid.
It was, however, the dawning of a new era. Clinton E. Knox became the
first black U.S. ambassador to Haiti since the nineteenth century. His appointment followed a highly publicized visit by then New York Governor Nelson
Rockefeller to Haiti. It was reported that the governor encountered the most
beautiful reception of his Latin American tour from Papa Doc. Knox recommended an increase in assistance for Haiti. He also revisited the long-standing
cool and correct policy in handling Duvalier. The ambassador argued that Duvalier heavily committed himself and his regime against communism. More
importantly, he wrote, Duvalier sought to place the United States in best position to influence developments here, since major US interests likely [will] be in
exposed [to] danger at that time.68
For fourteen years U.S. officials had wrestled with a Duvalier departure.
That long-awaited day finally came on April 22, 1971. The heir to the throne,
Jean-Claude Duvalier, summoned Ambassador Knox to the National Palace to
inform him that Franois Duvalier was dead. He confessed that it was no surprise in light of his failing health. The U.S. government noticed the upcoming
ascension of Jean-Claude. In January 1971, three months before the death of the
dictator, Haitis constitution was amended to provide for the nineteen-year-old
son to succeed his father as president for life.
The American ambassador received this information before it was announced to the Haitian people. The announcement inaugurated the return of
American control in light of two specific requests: the new regime asked that
Washington provide naval surveillance of the waters surrounding Haiti to prevent Cuban vessels from carrying out any invasion. It requested that appropriate moves by the United States are taken to frustrate any external groups from
mounting attacks against Haiti.69 David Nicholls has noted, The handover of
power from father to son was certainly facilitated by the United States government which was concerned lest any major changes might lead to political instability or to the advent of a radical or even communist government in Haiti.70
A Vassal Relationship
Unlike his father, whose government was perennially involved in ongoing
tensions with the United States, Jean-Claude Duvalier launched his adminis-
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Contrary Destinies
tration differently. Baby Doc inaugurated some cosmetic changes toward liberalization that pleased the Americans. Verbal criticism was now tolerated,
and friendly requests were extended to exiles to return home. He pledged full
cooperation with Washington. Surprised U.S. officials dubbed his overwhelming desire to cooperate as what amounts to a vassal relationship.71 Indeed,
Jean-Claude Duvalier or the collegium that counseled him stood ready to do
Americas bidding.
The new collegium consisted of cabinet members, key military officers, and
the elder Duvaliers widow. This collegium included Luckner Cambronne, the
secretary of state for the interior and defense; Foreign Minister Adrien Raymond and his brother General Claude Raymond, chief of staff of the Haitian
armed forces. Another member was Fritz Cinas, the secretary of state for information. This gang ruled Haiti in the name of the nineteen-year-old, inexperienced if not unprepared president. Not since Lescot had Haitians witnessed
such a greater commitment to defend American interests in the country. The
collegium expected from Washington reciprocal goodwill and sympathetic
hearings for their aid proposals. It turned out to be just another scheme for
financial and military aid.
Washington responded favorably. It offered to help the regime by allowing
Haiti to purchase light arms and equipment for two new battalions, called the
Leopards.72 Though there was little change from the policies and practices
of the past, U.S. officials were eager to secure Haitis support against lifting the
OAS sanctions imposed against Cuba in 1964.
At the UN General Assembly in October 1971, Foreign Minister Adrien Raymond represented the new regime during his meeting with U.S. Secretary of
State William Rogers. Arguing that Haiti was at a turning point that qualified
her for financial aid, he called for development projects and granting favorable considerations by international institutions. He expected U.S backing to
help Haiti as one of the most abandoned countries in the hemisphere.73 The
foreign minister requested the restoration of American assistance that was suspended in 1961. The flow of aid resumed in 1973. The United States provided
$218 million over the next decade. The reason for the American largesse was
that Haiti remains pro-American despite its proximity to Cuba. Further, Haiti
supports the United States in international forums.74 Canada and France followed the American lead and provided aid.
Under Knox, the change in U.S. policy toward Haiti actually began while
Papa Doc was in power and continued with Baby Doc. The ambassador abandoned the ideals of democracy in favor of more practical solutions to Haitis
problems. In his view, the United States should accept the political reality under Baby Doc even though the regime was by no means the best of all possible
governments but in a Haitian context is not the worst either. Moreover, there
is no readily available alternative that would serve U.S. policy interest better.75
He therefore embraced Haitian politics and society at face value by suggesting
that corruption and other issues of representative government be put aside.
Once freed of idealistic views, he expected to pursue policies of practical consequence that would benefit both countries.
The vassal relationship exhibited by Haitian officials bore some fruit. Secretary Rogers modified the U.S. cool and correct posture instituted under Franois
Duvalier to a more normal diplomatic policy. It was a shift based on a willingness to deal with the new government in the same way other governments were
treated. As a result, the new Duvalier regime benefited from the shift of emphasis from strictly humanitarian endeavors to include development-oriented
projects where consistent with overall U.S. policy and in response to Haitian
initiatives.76 While the State Department would continue to encourage multilateral institutions to become involved as the primary source of assistance to
Haiti, this did not preclude any bilateral capital assistance requests.
In later years, the Duvalier regime benefited from President Ronald Reagans Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Haiti had a higher foreign policy priority than other Caribbean nations. The United States became more involved
with Haiti, in terms of economic assistance and pressure for internal political
reform, than at any time since the Marine occupation ended a half century
ago.77 The rationale for providing economic aid to the Latin American region
was the containment of communism.
In the Shadow of the Communist Specter

Under Baby Doc, communism remained a paramount factor in Haitian-U.S.
relations. For about three decades the Duvaliers skillfully played the communist issue at the expense of the Haitian people, who continued living in abject
poverty and despair. Hiding in the shadow of the communist specter, Papa Doc
endorsed Americas Cold War anticommunist policy.
The Reagan administration likewise was concerned about a suspected Cuban desire to form Marxist-Leninist dictatorships in Central America and the
Caribbean. Under-Secretary of State Walter Stoessel described Castros action
to discredit basin governments, ridicule democracy and glorify armed violence.78 He also decried Soviet weapons delivered to guerrillas in El Salvador.
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Contrary Destinies
The United States rewarded Baby Doc by not putting a stop to his tyrannical
dictatorship. He continued his fathers agenda regarding Washington. Foreign
Minister Adrien Raymond emphasized that Haiti, like the United States, was
anticommunist. He pointed to Haitis action in 1969 of destroying communist
military cells that had been receiving aid from Moscow, Cuba, and China.
Though Jean-Claude made much noise about a liberalization campaign, his
anticommunist stance suggested the noise was just that. He put in place la loi
anti-communiste providing that persons who have made any declarations of
belief in communism, verbal or written, public or private or propagated communist or anarchist doctrines by conferences, speeches, conversations, by leaflets, posters and newspapers would be charged with crimes against the state,
tried by a military court, and if convicted punished by the death penalty.79
The Issue of Human Rights

When Jimmy Carter came to the presidency on January 20, 1977, he made
defense of human rights the cornerstone of his presidency. He presented a foreign policy that held other countries to the highest standard. This policy was
presented first in a commencement address he delivered at Notre Dame University in 1977. Such a policy collided with human rights violations routinely
practiced under Baby Doc Duvalier, as noted by the CIA in a Latin American
terrorist report.
Haiti was openly committed to upholding human rights. It had signed the
UN and OAS charters. Haiti approved the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. It now had to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Jean-Claude
Duvalier made the most solemn promise of a policy of liberalization. Yet he
resisted Carters pressure for respecting human rights. He stressed order and
gradualism as the country stepped toward liberalization and democratization.
Insisting on noninterference in the domestic affairs of another nation, he said
Haiti had no human rights lessons to learn from anyone.
Jean-Claude did not stand alone in this Latin American hall of shame. Chilean strongman Augusto Pinochet also had a dark record. He practiced such
repressive measures that he was censured by the United Nations for human
rights violations. Chile under Pinochet was characterized by its curfew and
state-of-siege restrictions. Besides Chile, the Human Rights Commission of
the World Peace Council condemned Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti and
called on the United States to suspend economic assistance to governments
found in violation.
Under Baby Doc, human rights violations proceeded. The Washington Office on Haiti reported to Congress, The Haitian Government is not willing to
tolerate the existence of any person or organization that effectively advocates
the promotion of human rights.80 Pastor Luc Nere found that out when he
was severely beaten by Duvaliers thugs. The Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights reported a consistent pattern of gross violations of
human rights.81 The presidents lavish wedding to Michelle Bennett, a woman
from a wealthy mulatto family, triggered more criticism. It was a wedding at
an estimated cost of $3 million to $7 million, an affair made even worse by the
abject poverty of most Haitians. Her opulent lifestyle added even more to the
resentment.
Reagans policy of supporting right-wing governments brought much relief
to Jean-Claude. When Carter lost the presidential contest to Reagan, Duvalier immediately took advantage of the opportunity to get rid of those journalists who were clamoring against him. Jean Dominique, the leading proponent for democratic principles, was forced into exile, and his radio station
was ransacked. The government pressed on with its heavy-handed methods
of repression. Haiti remained a police state as with Papa Doc. Nonetheless,
the State Department continued to approve the regime for American foreign
aid.82
Haitian Refugee Crisis

Due to the widespread repressions, the flow of Haitians leaving their country
in the quest for better living conditions increased. Yet Haitian immigration to
the United States was not isolated. It was a reflection of migratory patterns in
Latin America and the Caribbean. In an assessment by former U.S. national
security adviser Robert Pastor, The region has been the largest source of legal
and illegal immigration since the 1960s. More than one-third of all immigration since then, and 86 percent of immigration of the United States from Latin
America and the Caribbean has come from the Caribbean Basin.83
The United States had always been a country of immigrants. The Statue of
Liberty was long remembered by immigrants for its hearty welcome to the underprivileged. The reception for Haitians refugees was, however, not as warm.
While Cuban refugees were welcomed with open arms, Haitians saw the door
slammed shut in their faces.84 The Carter administration faced the first crisis
of boat people from Haiti. For a while both legal and illegal immigrants from
Haiti made it to the United States through normal channels. After a major pol-
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icy shift, thousands and thousands of Haitians risked their lives on the eighthundred-mile journey in small wooden boats to get to American shores.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service expedited procedures to get
rid of these boat people. In the end, it was Judge James Lawrence King who put
a stop to this procedure. He ruled that the Haitians failed to find justice in the
United States because they were confronted with an Immigration and Naturalization Service determined to deport them.85 In the context of the Cold
War, a crisis between communist and capitalist ideologies collided.
Cuban and Haitian refugees sought admission to the United States and got
two different results. Black Haitian refugees were rejected, while Latino Cubans
were welcomed. Haitians had to prove they were political exiles, while Cubans
did not have to bear that burden. Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada said the Cubans were the unfortunate victims of a tyrannical communist regime.86 Yet
Haitians were the unfortunate victims of a right-wing tyrannical regime supported by the U.S. government.
The chaos surrounding thousands of Cuban and Haitian refugees reverberated in Congress. It was a challenge to Americas noble humanitarian immigration tradition that called for a reexamination of the issue of U.S. refugee
policy. In the House, members of the Black Caucus defended the Haitian boat
people. Speaking on behalf of his colleagues, Representative Walter Fauntroy
of the District of Columbia said, The Congressional Black Caucus has been
watching with shock, outrage, and indeed increasing anger, the treatment of
Haitian refugeesthe black boat people.87 He criticized his government for
responding to Haitians with jailing, starvation, and deportation as they fled the
brutal political persecution prevalent in Haiti since 1972.
In the Senate, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy emphasized Americas past in supporting refugees: As a nation of refugees, we take pride in
America as a haven for those seeking freedom from oppression in other lands
and a better chance in life.88 Ambassador Palmieri, speaking for the Carter administration, declared, We will offer asylum to persons claiming well-founded
fear of persecution in their country of origin while their claims are being considered.89 The NAACP rejected this position and denounced the INS policy
as tainted by racial, ideological, and class discrimination. It called on President
Carter to demonstrate his commitment to human rights and grant political
asylum to the Haitian boat people.90
Human rights issues were closely intertwined with the refugee crisis. Before the 1970s, immigration legislation catered to asylum seekers fleeing governments or social systems considered contrary to United States interests.91
Communist regimes and Middle Eastern governments primarily fell into that
category. The Refugee Act of 1980 changed this by establishing a neutral standard for all refugees. It eliminated the geographical and ideological biases. The
United States could not send refugees back to countries where they would face
persecution for their race, religion, nationality, membership in social groups
or political opinions that were contrary to the majority in those countries.
The Reagan administration ignored the Refugee Act. Reagan signed an interdiction agreement with Baby Doc permitting the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept boats on the high seas that were transporting Haitians seeking to immigrate to the United States illegally. According to Amnesty International, The
United States interdiction program frustrates the intent of 1980 Refugee Act.92
It claimed the asylum process conducted at sea was thoroughly inadequate.
In January 1986 the U.S. administration, after years of supporting the
younger Duvalier, failed to certify that the regime was complying with the
human rights conditions that were required for U.S. aid. In the end, American
control in Haiti was never thwarted. Both father and son used all ways and
means to gain American favor for financial and military assistance. Yet Haitis
sovereignty continued to be eroded.
Jean-Claude Duvaliers regime ended just as it began, with the clearest evidence of influence by the U.S. government. On February 7, 1986, the beleaguered president called in the American ambassador, this time along with his
French counterpart, to inform them of his decision to resign.
It was a U.S. Air Force C-141 aircraft from Charleston, South Carolina, that
flew the disgraced president and his family to exile to France. With his departure, Haiti fell back to the instability reminiscent of the years before U.S.
occupation. In fact, the United States would return for a second occupation.
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5
The Reoccupation of Haiti
President Clinton rushed to invade, occupy and effectively run Haiti without
seeking any Congressional authorization.
Representative Benjamin A. Gilman, congressional hearing, February 24, 1995
Haiti was always a target for foreign intervention. In September 1968, OAS
Secretary-General Galo Plaza sought the views of the Organization of American States members about their reactions to a possible collapse of public order
in Haiti. The responses at that time generally favored nonintervention. Plaza
favored keeping the United States out of Haiti during a crisis but suggested the
creation of a UN non-Caribbean Latino peacekeeping force. Now that President for Life Franois Duvalier was believed to be terminally ill, the concern
took on greater meaning.1 Haiti moved from one Duvalier to the other, the
son replacing the father in April 1971, to establish the only dynasty in Haitian
history.
Upon the younger Duvaliers removal after fifteen years rule, the Reagan
administration saw an opportunity to break the pattern of Haitian history
which has alternated between periods of political instability and periods of
dictatorial ruleand to set Haiti on a path toward true democracy.2 It was a
wildly optimistic objective. The Haitian people, too, yearned for democracy
and prosperity. A democratic movement soon burgeoned in the country, raising the hope of change. Yet it collided with the status quo of the alliance between the bourgeoisie and the military, which resisted any change. Violence
and political instability once again befell the country, bringing back Galo Plazas scenario of foreign intervention.
Americas Unfinished Business

The second occupation demonstrates a failure of American policies. The reoccupation was similar to the first occupation and left many unsolved problems
of what historians identify as Haitis tragic history.3 The United States initially
went to Haiti for American control of the Western Hemisphere. It sought to
create a stable environment for American investment and to prevent European
intervention on this strategic island. To that end, Americans actively engaged
in educating Haitians about democracy and the rule of law.
Yet the new military apparatus Americans put in place became a problem
rather than a solution. To gain control, the U.S. Marines disbanded Haitis
corrupt army, replacing it with the newly created Gendarmerie. According to
the treaty, the American mission was the preservation of domestic peace, the
security of individual rights.4 But the Gendarmerie became as corrupt and
politicized as the former one.
Following the Baby Doc era, events showed just how much the American
mission civilisatrice of securing individual rights and building a society of law
and order with a disciplined military had failed. It was, at the very least, an
unfinished mission. The army had lost its way, becoming corrupt and engaging
in drug trafficking rather than providing security. At an ever quickening pace,
it carried out coup after coup, yielding a series of military governments that
ruled in 19861991.5
General Henry Namphy epitomized the militarys ineptitude. He was head
of the National Council of Government. President Reagan made a short-term
commitment of support to him in hopes of stabilizing the council by certifying it as eligible for U.S. economic assistance. He provided the Haitian armed
forces with military assistance for crowd control and public security following
the dissolution of the Volunteers for National Security, the feared Tontons
Macoutes.6 Reagans move was actually a continuation of U.S. policy supporting the Haitian military. In the mid-1980s the CIA created the Haitian Intelligence Service to secure political and military information. Haitian military
officers received millions of dollars for their services.7 This unit originally was
used as a Haitian antidrug force but soon became involved in its own narcotics trade.
General Namphy, described as well regarded by Washington,8 had the
strength to both promote and enforce traditional military practices. He presided over the November 29, 1987, presidential election that was marred by
the violent deaths of some thirty-four people. Namphy sharply disagreed
with the electoral council because he wanted to shift its constitutionally mandated responsibilities to the army. In January 1988 Namphy organized a new,
bogus election. That election was boycotted by the four prominent opposi-
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tion leaders: Louis Djoie, Marc Bazin, Sylvio Claude, and Grard Gourgue.
Primarily due to the boycott, underdog Leslie Manigat, an international relations scholar, became president. A few months later, Namphy forced Manigat
out of office. To add to the confusion, another military fellow, General Prosper Avril, overthrew Namphy and declared himself president in September
1988.
Under Avril, the violence continued. Avril declared a state of siege and imprisoned scores of political enemies and exiled others. These exiles included
Antoine Izmery and Louis Roy, who asked U.S. officials to change the policy of
supporting right-wing governments in Haiti that said they were fighting communism but did not respect human rights. The group invited the United States
to focus on the plight of the 6 million.9 The message was heard at the White
House. Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater confirmed, Washington was useful in
facilitating his departure.10 A U.S. C-141 took Avril from Port-au-Prince to the
Homestead air base in Florida.
Avrils ouster gave way to the only Haitian woman president, Ertha Pascale Trouillot, a Haitian Supreme Court judge. On May 24, 1990, she met with
President George H. W. Bush at the White House. Bush offered his economic
support for a democratic transition in Haiti. On August 9, 1990, Vice-President
Dan Quayle made a four-hour stop in Port-au-Prince during his Latin American tour to show Washingtons support for the Trouillot administration and for
the success of the electoral process.
Americas mission was similar in the first occupation and the reoccupation,
as was Haitis political situation. In the period 19141915, five governments rose
and fell in quick succession, triggering an American intervention. Again in
19861990, five governments ruled the country in fast succession. Historian
Robert Spector commented that the United States pulled out of Haiti before
the job was done and failed in our responsibilities.11
Both missions were far from finished. The first occupation aimed to establish
Haiti on solid financial and economic ground. During the second occupation,
destitution marked Haitis socioeconomic conditions. Haiti was considered the
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with the highest infant mortality
rate, the highest illiteracy rate, and the lowest nutrition standards. When Baby
Doc was in power, foreign aid accounted for 70 percent of the national budget.
Commenting on the Haitian dilemma, Richard Fletcher of the University of
Technology of Sydney, Australia, has pointed out that the countrys per capita
GNP in the 1980s pushed it towards the bottom of most international human
development reports.12
Intolerable Events in Haiti

The election and subsequent brutal downfall of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as
president of Haiti was seen as a continuation of the nations typical history.
Aristide was a former Catholic priest of the Salesian order who gained prominence through his inflammatory sermons against the Jean-Claude Baby Doc
Duvalier regime. He was a proponent of liberation theology advanced by the
Peruvian theologian and Dominican priest Gustavo Gutirrez and others.
A vocal critic of capitalism and imperialism, Aristide demanded that the colonial powers that dominated Haiti, including the United States, make amends
for the wrong inflicted on his nation.13 He was the focal point of a prodemocracy movement that began under Baby Doc and strengthened during the military transition regimes after the dictators exile. The American choice, though,
was Marc Bazin, a former World Bank economist who returned to serve his
country as finance minister. Americans considered Bazin the most qualified
since his views were closer to U.S. strategic interests than other candidates and
he was the man best able to attract American aid.
The United States invested heavily in these elections. After Duvaliers exile,
U.S. policy aimed to create and preserve Haitis constitutional process.14 President George Herbert Walker Bush supported the elections by providing $12
million to shore up the electoral process, in which three hundred international
observers participated.15 Aristide was elected in a landslide with 67 percent of
the votes cast to become the countrys first democratically elected president.
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard W. Aronson assured the president-elect that United States supports the democratic
process in Haiti.16 The other side of the coin was revealed by New York Congressman Charles Rangel, who acknowledged that Aristides election did not
set politically well within our State Department.17 Aristide therefore received
lukewarm American support.
On February 7, 1991, Aristide was inaugurated. He put aside his open anticapitalist and anti-American sentiments to begin his reforms aimed at curbing drug trafficking and corruption. During Aristides short-lived presidency,
former Vice President Dan Quayle visited Haiti and was favorably impressed.
In his address to the Haitian legislature Quayle claimed, The Government of
President Aristide, only six months in office, is undertaking reforms in public
administration and economic policy.18
Aristides record on human rights was, however, less stellar. Nina Shea, president of the human rights group Puebla Institute charged, Aristide governed
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as a populist demagogue, appealing directly to Haitis impoverished masses

through fiery orations that inflamed class resentment and at times condoned
mob violence.19 Aristide was a master of duplicity. First, he fervently preached
peace. Less than a week before his downfall, he gave the General Assembly
of the United Nations his Ten Commandements Dmocratiques speech, in
which he argued that his political party, Lavalas, raised up the weapon of unity
against that of violence.20
Back in Haiti a few days later, Aristide delivered the speech in which most
observers agree he endorsed violence. Under his watch, supporters began a
program of lynching critics and political opponents. The practice took the
name of Pre Lebrun, a horrific form of killing that involves igniting a gasoline-doused tire after it has been placed around the victims neck. Feeling
threatened and pressured, the American-trained army, backed by the elite who
were called MREs (Morally Repugnant Elite), made their move on September
30, 1991, just seven months after Aristide took office.
Lieutenant General Raoul Cdras became military commander and soon
got rid of Aristide in a horribly bloody coup. A graduate of the Haitian Acadmie Militaire, Cdras received additional training in the United States. He
was a member of the Scurit Intelligence Nationale, the army intelligencegathering agency funded by the CIA. Cdras had Aristide arrested and forced
into exile in Venezuela. As in the 1946, 1950, and 1957 coups, Cdras headed a
triumvirate, a three-man junta. The two other members, Lieutenant Colonel
Philippe Biamby and Lieutenant Colonel Michel-Joseph Franois, had similar
military training. Their action set the tone for the reoccupation of Haiti by U.S.
forces.
The question was raised about the American role following Aristides downfall. Considering Americas traditional control of Haiti, many Haitians felt the
United States was behind the coup. Grard Bissainthe, who served as the government information minister, commented that the U.S. could not have been
a stranger in the coup.21 This view certainly reflects Americas past involvement
in Haiti if not also in Latin America. Though Washington publicly condemned
the coup, the Republican-led Bush administration was not pro-Aristide. The
Bush administration contended that the cause of the political turmoil in Haiti
was Aristide and his proposed reforms in favor of the countrys poor rather
than the overthrow of Haitis first democratically-elected government.22 It is
therefore difficult to resolve the differences between its public defense of democracy for a return of Aristide and the hidden maneuver to maintain the
military and elite traditional status quo.
The New Crisis in Haitian-U.S. Relations

Aristides downfall triggered an international crisis. It was a surprisingly
disorderly act that took place while the Bush administration was putting in
place its New World Order policy. Following the downfall of the USSR, the
communist threat faded. Yet U.S. officials saw the world as one dominated by
conflicting ethnic tensions, border disputes, and regional rivalries that could
threaten American national interests. The Bush administration suggested that
the transnational threats posed by arms proliferation and international terrorism, crime, and narcotics trafficking continue and in some cases have increased
at the end of the Cold War.23 Bush equally saw the lack of a stable international
order and the absence of a police or imperial power to enforce the rules.
The push was still to promote democracy. Latin American nations moved
toward institutionalizing democratic governance and implementing free markets economic reforms.24 The American reoccupation of Haiti should be analyzed in the context of this larger U.S. policy. The United States intervened
to fill the gap between the military junta in what some officials considered a
hotspot of the world.
Was there an American interest in this invasion of Haiti? There are two
probable answers. Many observers have noted that the United States no longer
had any vital interests in Haiti. These observers consider disingenuous all the
talk about defending U.S. ideals and interests in Haiti.25 Others thought differently. Frank Wisner, under-secretary for policy in the Department of Defense,
maintained that in the midst of the Haitian crisis, the United States still had
a commitment to democracy and hemispheric security. In his view, without
stability in Haiti and without democracy, there is no way that nation can prosper and join the rest of the Caribbean. It will forever be a problem to itself, to
us and to the rest of the area.26
Throughout several congressional hearings, U.S. officials were particularly
concerned about the thousands of Haitian refugees arriving on U.S. shores.
Foreign policy analyst Strobe Talbott saw the scenario of tens of thousands of
Haitian refugees seeking refuge as posing a threat to Americas borders and
regional security.27 The second issue of American interests was that under
military rule Haiti was a transit point for illegal drugs bound for the United
States. U.S. policy in Latin America and Caribbean focused on this issue.
From the beginning, President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker
vowed that the action of the Haitian military would not be allowed and that
Aristide would be speedily returned to office. As Secretary Baker bluntly put
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it, This junta is illegitimate. Until President Aristides government is restored,

this junta will be treated as a pariah throughout this hemisphere, without
assistance, without friends and without any future. This coup must not and
will not succeed.28 Despite these threats, the junta continued in power, electing puppet presidents and prime ministers while keeping Aristide out of the
country.
Aristides removal gave the Organization of American States its first opportunity to implement its new policy of strengthening democracies in the region.
Secretary-General Joo Clemente Baena Soares immediately condemned the
coup. OAS foreign ministers demanded full restoration of the rule of law and
constitutional order and the immediate reinstatement of President Aristide in
the exercise of his legitimate authority.29 They called for sanctions to suspend
all military, economic, commercial, and financial relations with the junta. Secretary of State James Baker voiced the United States support for the Haitian
people to regain their democracy. A delegation of OAS foreign ministers who
went to Port-au-Prince for further action failed, however, to impress or budge
Cdras and his junta.
On October 4, 1991, the United States once again suspended foreign aid to
Haiti. Washington also prohibited payments by American companies to the
junta and froze the regimes financial assets. On October 8, 1991, the OAS called
for trade embargo against Haiti. But this was a porous embargo. The director
of U.S. naval intelligence reported that enterprising ship captains diverted fuel
using ballast tanks normally filled with water and siphoning off excess diesel
fuel from internal diesel fuel tanks.30 Although U.S. Navy and Coast Guard
and allied operations saw to the embargos enforcement, the military junta
survived. Haitis border with the Dominican Republic gave blockade-runners
plenty of leeway to get around the embargo. Meanwhile, the suffering of the
Haitian people continued.
A Case of Partial Control

After the 1991 coup, Haiti had two governments: one headed by the Cdras
junta and a second one set up in Washington under Aristides command. As
strange as it may seem, this practice of two governments is not altogether new
to Haiti. Three years after Haiti proclaimed independence, Dessalines, a founding father, was assassinated. The country was divided, with Christophe ruling
in the north as a king and Ption in the west and south as president. Even
worse, in 18671869, the country was engulfed in internal strife under Sylvain
Salnave and was split into three governments. The other two leaders were Michel Domingue in the south and Nissage Saget in the north.
Aristide settled in as the constitutionally elected president of Haiti while the
junta ruled the country from Port-au-Prince. Congressman Michael Barnes
of Maryland, a former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
for Latin America, became the chief adviser guiding Aristide through Washingtons political maze. From the very beginning, the OAS recognized Aristides government emissaries as the only representatives of the government
of Haiti to the organs, agencies and entities of the Inter-American system.31
U.S. officials recognized him as the legitimate head of the Haitian government.
After the coup, President Bush invited Jean Casimir, Aristides ambassadordesignate, to the White House to accept his credentials as Haitis legitimate
representative. The U.S. president condemned those whove attacked the legally constitutional, democratically elected government of Haiti and call for an
immediate return to democracy.32
Aristides government in exile survived thanks to the U.S. government freezing Haitian funds in the United States, a total amount of about $30 million.
Aristide used this money for operating costs and to maintain representatives
in major European and Latin American countries in amounts ranging from
$500,000 to $1.1 million a month. A good portion of these funds also went
to pay lobbyists working for his return to power. The Hogan and Harston law
firm, where Barnes worked in Washington, received a reported monthly fee of
$55,000. In this regard, Philippe Girard charges that Aristide had spent dozens of millions of dollars of his starving countrymens money to convince the
Yankee hegemony to invade his own country.33
Nonetheless, Aristide had some powerful enemies in Washington. The junta
launched its own campaign to malign the deposed president. Aristide was portrayed as an evil conspirator. Siding with the Haitian military, the CIA assessed
Aristide as someone with mental problems and implicate[d] him in politically motivated murder as well as gang violence.34 Republicans in Congress
endorsed the CIA report. Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, portrayed Aristide as a psychopath and urged the Clinton
administration to abandon any plan to send U.S. troops to Haiti.
Yet Aristide managed to assemble a powerful lobby that far outweighed the
attacks of his critics. He gained the support of the international community.
For instance, the Mexican government denounced the oppressive military
regime in Haiti and publicly professed its commitment to the promotion of
democracy in the region, maintaining diplomatic relations with Aristides gov-
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ernment in exile.35 The Congressional Black Caucus and liberal members of

Congress expressed support for Aristides return to power. Hollywood stars
also joined the crusade on behalf of the priest-president.
The Perennial Issue of Immigration

After the Cold War, diplomat Anthony Lake identified the prominent issues
dominating foreign policies as aggression by regional bullies, transnational
dangers like overpopulation and refugees, a global economic and information
free-for-all that fear and uncertainty, and terrible ethnic conflicts.36 The Haitian refugee crisis falls into these categories as one of the most salient issues
of Haitian-U.S. relations since the 1970s. It came back in full force during the
1990s. The immigration flow came from the ranks of the poor and disenfranchised Haitians who suffered the most from the political crisis in Haiti. Thousands died violently and needlessly. Amnesty International reported, The days
immediately following the coup were marked by violent repression particularly
in the poor communities, where support for President Aristide had been strongest. Soldiers deliberately and indiscriminately opened fire into crowds, killing
hundreds of people, including children.37
The crisis triggered another exodus of Haitian refugees taking to the seas in
rickety boats. In 1991 and 1992 alone, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted some
41,000 Haitians at sea.38 The U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, housed
as many as 10,000 refugees. The Bush administration continued Reagans policy of interdiction. On May 24, 1992, the president issued an executive order
requiring the U.S. Coast Guard to return all Haitians found at sea to Haiti
without a hearing.
African Americans criticized the Bush policy of handling the Haitian refugee crisis as racist. They joined Haitian Americans in protesting. In 1992 some
2,000 demonstrators appeared in front of the White House to criticize Bushs
policy of Haitian repatriation. Demonstrators were led by NAACP Executive
Director Benjamin Hooks and NAACP Board Chairman William Gibson,
along with Randall Robinson, president of the TransAfrica justice advocacy
organization.39 They protested the U.S. government policy of returning Haitians to a homeland that was overwhelmed by fearsome acts committed by the
thugs in the Haitian army.
In Congress, the Congressional Black Caucus created a special task force
headed by Representative Major Owens of New York to coordinate activities
related to the Haitian crisis. The caucus issued a Statement of Conscience
in Support of Haitian Refugees to proclaim that in light of the grave human rights conditions in Haiti, we can only believe that the real reason these
people are being repatriated without due process is because they are black.
Soviet and Vietnamese refugees have been welcomed with open arms.40 The
caucus called on President Bush to intervene personally and to order a halt to
the harsh repatriation program.
Under the Watch of William Jefferson Clinton

Bill Clinton was no stranger to Haiti. When he got married to Hillary Rodham
in 1975, a friend gave them a trip to Haiti for their honeymoon. The newlyweds
were captivated by what was once called the pearl of the Antilles and others
considered the magic island. The Clintons remained connected with Haiti
throughout his presidency and her years as secretary of state.
Bill Clinton surprisingly had at least one thing in common with Aristide:
they are both masters of duplicity. In handling this issue, Clinton used doubletalk that revealed his character and marked his governing style. During the
presidential campaign, he openly criticized the Bush administrations Haitian
refugee policy as illegal and immoral. In June 1992 in an interview with the
New York Times, Governor Clinton said, We supported, laudably, the OAS
embargo of Haiti but were too quick to characterize the Haitians as economic
rather than political refugees.41 Oppressed Haitians who heard this message
got busy building boats to escape their impoverished homeland, assuming they
would find easier access to America and its better opportunities. Yet before
taking the oath of office, Clinton made a U-turn on this issue. Fearing a flood
of boat people spoiling his inauguration, he broadcast a radio message appealing to Haitians not to flee to American shores. He then endorsed the Bush
policy of forcible repatriation. Accordingly, as president, Clinton sent five Navy
ships to help the Coast Guard to turn Haitian refugee boats back.
Prelude to the Second Occupation

On assuming the presidency, Bill Clintons priorities called him to devote his
full attention to domestic affairs. He dreamed of achieving what eluded his
predecessors, the adoption of universal health insurance. Yet serious foreign
affairs issues got in his way. After the November elections, Bush took some
major foreign policy actions.42 Late in his presidency, Bush sent the Marines
to Somalia to protect American lives and interests. He left the mopping-up op-
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erations to the new president. Bush also passed on other pressing issues, from
arms control talks with Moscow to the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Haitian
crisis was also handed over to Clinton.
President Bush responded early to the military coup with strong albeit
empty warnings. Journalist Thomas Friedman asked whether the Administration has the stomach, the will, the national support or the regional political
support for pushing a multilateral intervention to oust coup leader Brig. Gen.
Raoul Cdras and restore the democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand
Aristideif no other option works.43 Bush did not demonstrate the willpower
he had in the Persian Gulf. But then the Persian Gulf was about oil, and the
Haitian crisis was about an internal military coup. The coup leaders were not
threatened and stayed right where they were. They were encouraged by mixed
signals from the American embassy in Port-au-Prince and the CIA in Washington. Would Bill Clinton succeed where Bush had failed?
In early March 1993 the newly inaugurated president invited Aristide to the
White House and described his Haitian policy in these terms: To those who
block the restoration of democracy, I want to make clear in the strongest terms
that we will not now or ever support the continuation of an illegal government
in Haiti. We will step up the pace of negotiations to restore you under conditions of national reconciliation and mutual respect for human rights, with a
genuine program of genuine economic progress.44 With this supporting statement, Clinton triggered one of the most intriguing dramas in Haitian-U.S.
relations. The crisis putting at odds the first two independent nations in the
Western Hemisphere would drag on some three long years. It was the story of
David and Goliath, although Goliath ended up winning. Would the negotiations Clinton had in mind really suffice to restore American control in Haiti
through the reinstatement of Aristide?
Regardless of Clintons commitment, the task proved to be daunting because
of Congressional lack of interest. The American public didnt care about it either.
Since there was no oil involved, the Haitian crisis was not a headline-grabber.
In 1994 the traditional U.S. policy interests varnished. The long-standing importance of Haitis geographical position no longer carried much weight in the
United States. With the loss of its Soviet ally, Cuba also became insignificant.45
The Governors Island Treaty

In June 1993 Dante Caputo, UN international mediator for Haiti, reported that
the parties were finally ready to talk. Cdras was pressured by a UN-imposed
global oil and arms embargo and a freeze on government financial assets. Aristide was eager to return to Port-au-Prince. Finally, after negotiations reached
a settlement, these two arch-enemies, Cdras and Aristide, signed an accord
described as a satisfactory solution to the long-standing Haitian crisis. The
accord made provisions for the generals exit from power and the return of
President Aristide to his homeland on October 30, 1993. Aristide was to name
a prime minister acceptable to both parties.
The agreement was seen as a diplomatic triumph for Clinton. Members of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs hailed it as the beginning of political change in Haiti. In the view of Representative Robert Menendez of New
Jersey, Haiti is the second republic in the Western Hemisphere to obtain its
liberty, but actually it has truly never been free, and I hope with this agreement, Haiti will be on its way to genuine freedom and independence and an
improved standard of living for its people.46 To alleviate the plight of the
Haitian people worsened by OAS and UN embargoes, President Clinton put
forth an international aid package valued at more than $1 billion. That package was to create some 30,000 jobs in areas like sanitation, road building, and
well-digging.
Following the signing, the general returned to Haiti; however, he reneged on
the agreement. Robert Malval, a business leader and industrialist, was named
prime minister in accord with the agreement, but he could not govern and had
to resign his office. When President Clinton asked Aristide to name another
prime minister, the still-deposed president rebuffed him, arguing that to appoint a prime minister now would be irresponsible.47 He instead called for a
total trade embargo against the junta. Cdras had no reaction to the threats
and intimidations from Washington, and he resisted any step toward returning
Aristide to power.
In October 1993 the USS Harlan County, carrying 200 Canadian and U.S.
military trainers, headed to Port-au-Prince in preparation for Aristides return
as part of the accord. They were part of a planned 1,300-peacekeeper force
from the UN Security Council. The diplomats who came to welcome the party
on board were met by an armed mob called Front for the Advancement and
Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), a revolutionary force led by Emmanuel Constant,
a junta ally. FRAPH committed a number of atrocities and human rights violations. When its members threateningly raised their weapons, the White House
retreated, calling the ship back to Norfolk. Many saw the USS Harlan Countys
retreat as humiliating for America.48 U.S. Senator Bob Graham, who witnessed
the affair while in Haiti, commented that it was a disgrace. A study of the
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incident by the U.S. Army War College concluded, It left the impression that
the United States had cut and run . . . frightened by a few unruly thugs.49
Constant and his mob and their military patrons were also encouraged by
mixed messages coming from the White House and other American agencies.
New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis challenged Clinton: Mean what
you say. He pointed to the disquieting feelings about the presidents foreign
policy as he flip-flopped on Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Lewis underscored
the swelling doubts about his foreign policy leadership. The doubts . . . go to
whether his words carry any conviction.50
A Step Closer to Military Intervention

President Clintons saber-rattling was meant to get the military leaders to abandon the country before a shot was fired. Time magazine defined it as voodoo
diplomacy that somehow the countrys leaders would magically change their
ways or disappear.51 In December 1993 the president gave the junta a deadline
to leave, which Cdras regarded as another empty threat. He even refused to
receive military officials from the United States, France, Canada, and Venezuela. Washington threatened to expand an embargo against the country unless
they stepped aside by January 15 and allowed the exiled president, the Reverend
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to return to power.52 The embargo widened from oil
and arms to include flights to and from Haiti and other commerce not vital to
sustaining the countrys population. Yet saber-rattling and embargos failed to
move the putschists.
As Clinton floundered, the Haitian masses whose plight increasingly worsened by political repressions and economic embargos, took again to the sea.
In February 1994 the bodies of four Haitians, two of them children, washed
onto a Florida beach after smugglers dropped off some sixty refugees along
the Atlantic coast of Florida. Herbert Jefferson, Border Patrol assistant chief,
said the four bodies and twenty-four survivors were discovered near Stuart,
Florida. Thirty-two other Haitians came ashore in Palm Beach and were held
by Border Patrol agents outside the grounds of Mar-a-Lago, a beachfront estate
owned by financier Donald Trump. Cubans were also knocking on the door.
They had begun their newest mass departure from their island. In August 1994
the Coast Guard reported that 2,548 Cuban refugees were picked up at sea.
As refugees poured in from Haiti, activists and human rights groups continued to pressure Clinton to solve the crisis, rejecting his repatriation policy.
On April 6, 1994, President Aristide told the White House he was taking the
necessary steps to cancel the treaty that justified repatriation. Then Randall
Robinson of TransAfrica, an activist who campaigned against South Africas
apartheid laws, went on a twenty-seven-day hunger strike to call attention to
the Haitian crisis. This made headlines around the world and got Clintons attention.
On May 8, 1994, caving under pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus and Robinsons hunger strike, Clinton reversed his position and allowed
admission to the United States of refugees fleeing oppression. This shift immediately attracted more refugees. Time reported that since the policy took
effect on June 16, more than 17,500 refugees have poured from Haiti on frail
and often overloaded boats.53 Once again Clinton shifted by trying to send
the refugees to other countries. This policy sank, too, when Panamanian President Guillermo Endara backed off his promise to welcome 10,000 refugees to
Panama.
When Clinton left the country for a European tour and the G7 economic
summit in Naples, Italy, the Haitian crisis followed him. Newsweek described
how a botched refugee policy has left Clinton in a bind and preparing to invade.54 Yet the president was reluctant to invade Haiti. Clinton also had to deal
with the undemocratic leanings of the CIA, the Pentagon, the State Department, and especially the embassy in Port-au-Prince.55 These agencies pushed
Clinton to side with the junta while applying pressure on Aristide to make
concessions.56 The anti-Clinton Republican Congress resisted any attempt to
invest American resources in Aristide.
At this stage, an invasion became inevitable. The war debate was further fueled by two powerful forces: the United Nations and the Congregational Black
Caucus.
The Will of the Friends of Haiti

The United Nations sided with the OAS from the very beginning. As the situation dragged on, the UNs involvement became more aggressive. The crisis
was managed through the action of four nationsthe United States, France,
Canada, and Venezuelathat called themselves the Friends of Haiti. In 1989
these friends became interested in promoting democracy in Haiti. As the sole
superpower on the world stage, the United States took the lead. Without the
United States, argued Diego Arria, nothing could have been accomplished.57
These Four Friends were the force behind the Governors Island accord, the
deal between Cdras and Aristide to solve the crisis. The collapse of this accord
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brought the group to Paris with the special representative of the secretary-general of the United Nations, Dante Caputo, on December 13 and 14, 1993. They
conferred to assure Haitis return to constitutional legitimacy. They embraced
the Governors Island accord as the only viable framework to emerge from the
crisis, and they sought to establish a state under the rule of law, guaranteeing
freedom, security, and human rights for all.58 The Friends of Haiti committed
themselves to take the matter to the Security Council for additional measures
if the Haitian military failed to comply.
On February 2, 1994, the Four Friends agreed on the need for new comprehensive trade sanctions aimed at the military authorities in Haiti and their
supporters.59 On June 3, 1994, when they met in New York, they added pressure on Cdras, asking the Dominican Republic to take immediate action
to seal its land border with Haiti and [granting] its request for international
technical assistance to this end.60 In response, General John M. Shalikashvili,
chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved the conducting of patrols
with Dominican ships to enforce the embargo.61 On June 6, 1994, the deputy
representative of the United States to the United Nations reported that President Clinton has signed a Presidential Proclamation and two Executive Orders
to assure full implementation of resolution 917 (1994).62 This proclamation
barred entry to the United States of the Haitian military leaders and their immediate families.
Ultimately, when President Clinton finally orchestrated this resolution, the
Friends of Haiti stood by his side. On July 31, 1994, within the context of an
increasingly apparent climate of repression, the UN Security Council voted
to endorse military intervention by a multinational force spearheaded by the
United States (Resolution 940). Though several countries were invited, the operation would remain under direct U.S. military and political control. In the
end, it was a joint venture of the OAS and the UN backed by the resources of
the superpower to the north to place the knockout punch that brought Haitis
military dictatorship to its knees.63
Pressure from African Americans

Haitian-U.S. relations have always been cast in the shadow of race. In this context, the race factor was driven by African Americans in the Congress united
in the Congressional Black Caucus in 1969. Congressman Elijah Cummings
of Maryland affirmed that since its creation, the Congressional Black Caucus
had a Task Force on issues facing the people of Haiti.64 Through the years, the
caucus experienced considerable growth. Just nine members at its founding,

their numbers in Congress rose to forty following the 1992 elections. They
were the new Black Power on Capitol Hill, emerging as power brokers on
various issues.65 In the fierce battle to return Aristide to power, the Congressional Black Caucus played a key role in steering Haiti policy during the Clinton administration. One lawmaker who had followed the process grumbled
that administration officials consult more with key members of the black
caucus about the crisis than they do with the chairman and ranking members
of House and Senate committee with jurisdiction over foreign policy or Caribbean affairs.66
In 1993 the caucus lobbied to freeze the assets of the Haitian military leaders,
to have their visas revoked along with those of their supporters, and to have
an embargo on strategic materials including oil enforced. Members used the
strongest language to demand that the military terrorists and the drug smugglers who impose a savage and inhumane oppression on the people of Haiti
bring an end to these gross violations of human rights.67
In the spring of 1994 the caucus suggested that Clintons indifference to the
Haitian crisis was tainted with racism. To reverse this, the caucus went on the
offensive and introduced legislation to toughen U.S. policy against the Haitian
military and called for the resignation of Ralph Pezzullo, the U.S. special envoy
to Haiti. While most in Congress were dead-set against any U.S. intervention
in Haiti, the caucus demanded an intervention. Representative John Conyers
of Michigan argued, All other alternatives have failed while the repression,
torture and anti-democratic activities have continued.68
The lobbying by TransAfricas Randall Robinson fast combined with pressure from the Black Caucus to force Clinton to dismiss Pezzullo, the principal
architect of the negotiations policy. William Gray replaced Pezzullo as envoy.
He had an impressive resume as former Democratic whip in Congress, Budget
Committee chairman, and Black Caucus leader. He assumed the role of envoy
already promoting a tough new stand against the military thugs. President
Clinton admitted that Grays role was to restore freedom and democracy in
Haiti; Clinton called for the unconditional surrender of the Haitian military
dictatorship.69
Gray condemned the military coup leaders and stopped negotiations. He
told a journalist, Were only open to one negotiation, and the negotiation is:
when are you leaving? What time are you departing? There is no negotiation
about recognizing the illegal de facto government. No negotiation about any
coalition government. Theyve had their chance.70 Gray set forth to implement
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the Black Caucuss calls to assure that Haitian refugees got fair hearings with
legal representation and to restore democracy in Haiti, even with American
military intervention if sanctions failed to restore Aristide.71
Operation Uphold Democracy

In 1987 the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) became a force
that supported special operations throughout the world, participating in all
major combat operations.72 This force was created after the 1980 mission that
failed to rescue fifty-three American hostages from Iran. According to General
Henry H. Shelton, the operations command force sought to provide civilian
leadership with highly trained, rapidly deployable joint forces capable of conducting special operations anywhere in the world.73
In 1989 USSOCOM conducted what was called Operation Just Cause and
invaded Panama to capture Manuel Noriega and establish a democratic government there. In 1990 it marshaled Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm to
dislodge Saddam Husseins Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
USSOCOM were also in charge of the operations leading to the second
American occupation of Haiti. The intervention picked up steam when USSOCOM enforced the embargo ordered by the United Nations on October
15, 1993. It was called Operation Support Democracy. U.S. and allied warships
inspected some six hundred ships during the first five months of the operation.
UN Resolution 940, adopted in July 1994 by the Security Council, did not
impose a deadline for an end to the intervention, leaving room for conflicts
among Clinton officials. Defense Secretary William Perry wanted to give diplomacy another chance, while Strobe Talbott of the State Department favored
an early invasion.74 President Clinton stood in the middle by keeping his options open. He was portrayed as a reluctant warrior.75 The president, who was
guided by opinion polls in making decisions, knew that two-thirds of Americans opposed an invasion. Furthermore, Congress was not ready to support
his war plans. It was an uphill battle for Clinton to show how a relatively insignificant country like Haiti was worth American blood and dollars. Yet the
invasion, in the presidents view, was justified on moral ground, for if left
uncorrected, Haitis slide to dictatorship would bode ill for fledgling democracies elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere.76
A majority of Congress who had misgivings about the presidents leadership on foreign policy opposed an invasion of Haiti. Yet Senator John Kerry of
Massachusetts put everything on the table: We need to pursue an aggressive
diplomatic course, to escalate sanctions and to impose a total naval blockade

if necessary. But if those dont work, we must be willing to seek international
approval to use military force.77 The senator suggested intervention to wrest
the nation from a tiny elite and return it to the majority of Haitians.
After twenty months of diplomatic wrangling, the White House arrived at
the conclusion that the Haitian junta will not be scared into leaving by tough
talk and economic sanctions.78 On September 10, 1994, President Clinton authorized General Shalikashvili to execute Operation Uphold Democracy in ten
days. Navy SEALs gathered intelligence on the northern coast.79 The operation
was carried out by Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, a much-decorated former commander of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions. He led Operation
Endeavor/Joint Guard, a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.
Because of negotiations, the invasion was converted into a peaceful mission. On September 16, President Clinton sent former President Jimmy Carter,
retired General Colin L. Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia to Haiti
in a final diplomatic attempt to have the Haitian military leaders step down
and avert an imminent military-led invasion. Clinton wanted to avoid bloodshed with a peaceful solution. Despite successful diplomatic efforts, U.S. forces
landed on September 19 for a peaceful takeover. The 10th Mountain Division
and later the 25th Infantry Division secured Port-au-Prince, the center of
gravity of the operation. Shelton assigned control of the countryside to Special Operations Forces. Three battalions were deployed, at Aux Cayes, Camp
dApplication, and Gonaves.
The occupation used more than military means. The Joint Psychological
Operations Task Force mounted an active campaign to tame the Haitians.
Their message stressed cooperation with U.S. forces and non violence against
the Haitian military oppressors in return for the reinstatement of the popular
Aristide and the re-establishment of a working democracy.80
The U.S. military venture worked. According to a U.S. embassy spokesman,
power soon passed from the Haitian thugs who had held it for the previous
three years: There is a new sheriff in town.81 The success of the operation
was made possible by actions of the Carter mission in persuading the Haitian
military leaders, who gave in only because a U.S. invasion this time appeared
imminent. In the words of American diplomat Anthony Lake, it was a case of
diplomacy backed by power.82
Congressional opposition to Clintons Haiti policy softened. On September 21, 1994, the Senate commended Clinton for avoiding bloodshed in Haiti.
Senators urged a withdrawal of U.S. forces as soon as possible.83 It wasnt
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until January 1995 that an American soldier was killed during traffic control in
Gonaves. In the end, it turned out that one of the major threats to U.S. troops
in this bloodless invasion was Haitian women. Troops were advised to avoid
contact with Haitian women because of the risk of an AIDS infection. Due
to the lack of the juntas attention to public health, some 70 percent of Haitis
prostitutes were believed to have an HIV infection, as well as 6 percent to 8 percent of healthy-appearing young adults. According to the Wall Street Journal,
Troops were issued a 15-page manual that includes a drawing of the healthy
U.S. soldier who says no to sex.84
In this new, secure climate, President Clinton rescinded Haitis national
emergency. Clinton argued that the unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States posed by the
policies and actions of the de facto regime in Haiti has terminated.85 He justified his action once Aristide was returned to power and UN Security Council
sanctions were ended.
Police Nationale dHaiti, a Legacy of Occupation

On September 19, 1994, American forces entered Haiti for a second time to
reoccupy the country. By order of General Henry F. Shelton, the head of the
expeditionary forces, they began disarming the Haitian military. Now a burning issue facing the occupation force was who would protect the civilian population. U.S. forces refrained from carrying out this task. As in 1915, when the
first American occupation established a constabulary to ensure control over
the country, the new occupiers created a Police Nationale dHaiti (PNH). The
idea of a national police force was a tenet of the Constitution of 1987 calling
for the separation of police from military apparatus. Until reoccupation, this
constitutional provision was tried but never successfully implemented.
American policymakers were concerned with a new police force for Haiti
even before the Marines invaded. In early 1993, Pezzullo and Caputo explored
the possibility to create such an international military/police constabulary
force.86 Philip Heyman, a deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration, provided suggestions for an ideal police force. He saw the need to reinvent the entire organization as a true independent police force without a
political agenda of its own and responsive only to legitimate orders of political
officials.87
According to USSOCOM documents, the invasion had two phases: first,
a 15,000 multinational invasion force would invade, restore public order, and
The Reoccupation of Haiti 109
reinstate Aristide; and next 6,000 UN forces would train a new Haitian police force to maintain order.88 The U.S. Department of Justices International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) established the
Haiti Police Development Program. ICITAP trained 3,200 employees of the
Haitian National Police in the first stage.
The police force was hastily recruited among refugees from Guantanamo
and remnants of the Haitian army. They were put into service after receiving
rudimentary instructions.89 Still the Defense Department was satisfied with
the missions success. Lieutenant General John Sheehan of the Marines pledged
to conclude the multinational phase of the operation and make a transition
when international police monitors will enter Haiti to help us build a civilian and democratic police force.90 In 1996 the House International Relations
Committee released $2.5 million for Haitian police training.
Yet it was premature to shower this police force with praise. They were involved in their own controversy when Aristide added some 1,400 former members of the police and army into the ranks. Republicans in Washington complained that such an action politicized the force. U.S. officials took all available
steps to retain control of the newly created force. In February 1995 Americans
tried to purge Haitis interim security force of those hundreds of men who were
hired without U.S. approval. They saw this hiring as an attempt by Aristide to
wrest control of the military. They made arrangements with the Haitian government to dismiss, even by force, those deemed unacceptable by U.S. military
authorities.91
The issued lingered on. In 2004 Senator Norm Coleman of Minnesota still
charged that Aristide broke and politicized the Haitian police, chose to rely
instead on a paramilitary group of supporters to harass and even kill opponents.92 It did not take long for the National Police to become overwhelmed by
the political uprisings common to Haiti. The international community would
intervene with its own police force.
The Price of Reinstatement

David W. Dent reported on February 22, 1985, that President Reagan called for
the removal, or for the radical changes in the undemocratic structure of the
Sandinistas government in Nicaragua that would in effect require President
Daniel Ortega to cry Uncle.93 In his struggle to regain his own presidency,
Aristide, still a fiery populist orator who had so vividly ranted against the
United States, found himself in a position in which he, too, had to cry uncle.
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He was caught in one of the same pitfalls of Haitian-U.S. relations that dated
to Toussaint Louverture: the dependence of Haitian leaders on Americans to
gain and maintain political power. True, in earlier days, Aristide referred to the
United States as the cold country that pursued imperialism and as a power
that exploited our beloved country.94 He would end up endorsing U.S. policy
to gain back his presidency.
Relations between Aristide and Clinton during this restoration of democracy in Haiti were marked by continuing tensions. Aristide did not willingly
relent to U.S. power. Some observers saw him as a tough client, while others
viewed him as an unreliable and temperamental partner.95 When the U.S.
administration urged Aristide to go to the talks on Governors Island, he resisted, remaining a man with a dual image.96 His relationship with the Clinton
administration soured over the Haitian refugee issue. He did not approve of
Clintons handling of the crisis. He suggested that Washingtons policy violated international law and said he was ready to withdraw from a treaty with
the United States in which the Haitian Government allowed it to turn back
refugees on the high seas.97
Aristide disagreed with Clinton over the nomination of a prime minister
following Robert Malvals resignation. Aristide felt the government should include military, religious, and political leaders. On top of the embargo during
the juntas regime, President Clinton wished to see extensive political activity
within Haiti to force out the military leaders. Aristide rejected such a plan,
arguing that talks could get under way only after his physical return to Haiti.98
Instead, Aristide called for a total trade embargo against the junta: I appointed
a prime minister, but due to the coup regime-supported violence, the cabinet
under his leadership could not govern, nor could the legitimately elected officials resume their offices.99
When an invasion was to be ordered, Aristide asked for swift and definitive
actions from the international community. Initially he refused to endorse an
invasion that would benefit him, on grounds that it would breach the Haitian
constitution. As time was running out, Aristide changed his position, seeking intervention. On July 29, 1994, he wrote to the UN secretary-general that
he believed the time has come for the International Community . . . to take
prompt and decisive action under the authority of the United Nations to allow
for full implementation of the Governors Island accord.100
The price for this intervention proved high in Aristides new economic
policy. Washington influenced him to curb his progressive ideas and reorient
his socioeconomic agenda. In Lima, Peru, in 1989, Aristide condemned the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). While in Washington, however, he endorsed its neoliberal economic policies. Strobe Talbott of the State Department
confirmed this shift: President Aristide has committed his government to farreaching programs of free market reform.101 On October 28, 1993, Aristide
himself confirmed this point in a UN General Assembly address promoting
free markets. He promised that on his return, he would take necessary measures to make it possible for the market to function properly by ensuring that
there is free competition.102
After three full years of arduous effort for his restoration to the presidency
of Haiti, American troops landed for a second occupation of Haiti. It was a
startling scene to picture Aristide, the vitriolic anti-imperialist critic, standing
on the steps of the Pentagon flanked by Secretary William Perry and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili. Aristide thanked
President Clinton and U.S. imperialist forces for invading Haiti to restore his
power.103 Yet even after the invasion, Aristide was reportedly unhappy that the
Carter deal allowed Cdras and company to remain in office until as late as
October 15.
To summarize, then, the reoccupation of Haiti ended a dramatic chapter
in Haitian-U.S. relations. It featured the high stakes involved in establishing
democracy in Haiti. From occupation to reoccupation, the United States remained at the center of Haitian affairs. Americans looked for ways and means
to maintain control without sacrificing their own interests. Through the interim military governments, American control was reaffirmed. It was again
challenged when Jean-Bertrand Aristide came back to power. His short-lived
experiment gave way to the events that led to an American reoccupation. Following the intervention by American forces, Clinton made a special visit to
Port-au-Prince, the first by a U.S. president to visit this city and the first to Haiti
since Franklin Roosevelts visit to Cap-Haitien in 1934. Clintons visit led yet to
another chapter of American control in Haiti.
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6
Under the Watch of the United States and the United Nations
We have, in fact, taken over the management of a small Caribbean nation in
my view, and it is not Florida, but Haiti. We are the power.
Representative Porter J. Goss of Florida, congressional hearing February 24, 1995
The date of October 15, 1994, stands out as a most memorable day in Haitian
history. That was the day Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned in triumph from
three years of exile to regain his rightful post as president of Haiti. Crowds met
him at the airport and people flocked en masse to the National Palace to hear
him speak. American control of Haiti was evident as a U.S. helicopter took him
from the airport to the palace, where a Delta Force unit took over his personal
protection. U.S. troops closed the airport to commercial traffic, patrolled the
streets, and draped the capital in barbed wire, while U.S. sharpshooters positioned themselves on roofstops.1
The rehabilitated president addressed the excited crowds with words reminiscent of his time spent as a priest in Saint Jean Bosco Parish. The speech was
seasoned with ingredients his American backers were pleased to hear. Aristide
spoke of reconciliation, peace, democracy, and justice. With Secretary of State
Warren Christopher in attendance, the returned president praised the restoration of democracy that promised to bring peace for all, reconciliation among
all, respect and justice for every single citizen.2 Aristide painted quite a rosy
picture of the Haiti he pledged to rebuild. The speech, however, was the crystallization of the transformation Aristide underwent under U.S. control during
his exile.
The Man Who Made Possible the Impossible

Having comfortably settled into the National Palace, a few months later Aristide welcomed the man who in his words made possible the impossible: William Jefferson Clinton. On his return to Port-au-Prince, Aristide praised Clinton for bringing him back, claiming that Clintons leadership has helped to
redefine the relationship between Haiti and the United States, offering Haiti the
opportunity to be a state of law and offering the United States an opportunity
to reaffirm the national pledge to uphold democracy in the world.3 The fact
was that the occupation reaffirmed American ongoing control of Haiti.
Prior to his arrival, Le Nouvelliste praised Clinton for a success of his foreign policy.4 Interestingly, the same front page carried a story about insecurity
in Haiti, reporting on a students death during a raid at a currency exchange
office. There was also tension between Aristide and the occupation forces when
the Haitian president tried to integrate several hundred of his supporters into
the new police force.
Then came the assassination of Mireille Durocher Bertin, a lawyer who
counseled the junta. On March 28, a few days before Clintons arrival, armed
men in a taxi fired into her vehicle, killing her and a client, Eugne Baillergeau.
Observers questioned the sure and stable environment as a premise to justify
the transition of control from the United States to the United Nations. The
spokesman for the American embassy, Stanley Schrager, was forced to admit
that Clintons visit would not be taking place in the joyful and peaceful atmosphere they had hoped.5
Nevertheless, Bill Clinton arrived on Haitian soil. Aristide made special
preparations to honor his prominent guest. The National Palace got a new
coat of paint. People got a day off to attend the event. As Haitian commentator
Claude Vixamar noted, the American victory in Haiti gave Clinton a political
boost at home. The president was going through hard times not only due to the
recent defeat in Somalia but also by the midterm loss to Republicans during the
previous electoral contest. The Haitian victory helped improve his standing at
home; it was probably the reason he personally came to savor on the Haitian
stage, under the glare of communication satellites projecting to the four corners of the world his look in exalted triumph.6
In fact, the American president, who had not committed to a long stay in
Haiti by U.S. forces, made the ten-hour stop to end the American occupation.
Along with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Clinton presided
over the transfer of power from U.S. troops to the United Nations. Just as Aristide had done earlier, Clinton cast the bright vision of a new Haiti, forcefully
declaring, We, your neighbors, your allies, and your friends, will support your
efforts to create jobs, to attract investment from beyond your borders, and to
rebuild and repair your injured land.7 Skeptical Haitians saw this visit purely
as a political ploy. An editorial in Le Matin commented, All conscious Haitians, blended in all tendencies, did realize that the Clinton-Aristide Accord
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Contrary Destinies
is signed for a seamless tutelage. [Lets put aside] national illusions, for all is
under the high control of the USA-UN administration.8
Clinton was only the second U.S. president to ever visit Haiti. The first,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, came to end the first occupation with a stop in
Cap-Haitien on July 5, 1934. There was, however, a difference. Roosevelt came
to announce the withdrawal of every U.S. soldier from Haitian territory. Clinton came to initiate a transition from U.S. soldiers to an international force that
still would include many from the United States.
Aristide lavished praise on his American benefactors. On January 13, 1995,
he decorated U.S. General David Meade, commander of the multinational
force, with the mention Honneur et Mrite for his work in Haiti. The ceremony took place at the National Palace before 350 U.S. military servicemen,
who also received badges with the Haitian national colors in recognition of
their participation.9 Following the ceremony, General Meade was replaced by
General George Fisher of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division based in Hawaii. Not
since Elie Lescot had U.S. officials, perhaps, been held in such high esteem in
Haiti.
Yet U.S. relations with Aristide were still filled with tensions. In November
1995 Douglas Farah reported that clashes over security and intelligence issues
. . . have plunged relations between the United States and Haiti to their lowest
levels.10 Disagreements ranged from issues of intelligence to the continuation
of U.S. troops in Haiti and the ongoing roles of former Haitian military troops
and their paramilitary allies.
Transfer of Occupation to the United Nations

Peacekeeping was a part of the late-twentieth-century international landscape.
It was reported that in 1993, the United Nations deployed nearly 75,000 peacekeepers in 18 countries costing over $3.6 billion.11 The United Nations used
this new strategy to restore order in the worlds trouble spots. At a national
security meeting on Haiti in 1993, Anthony Lake, then national security adviser
under President Clinton, highlighted the need for peacekeepers because of so
much internal political division.12
UN involvement in Haiti at the peacekeeping level began after the OAS
sent a three-member delegation to Haiti in accordance with OAS Resolution
537 (February 23, 1990). The provisional government of Ertha Pascal-Trouillot
asked the international body to send observers to verify the presidential election. These observers oversaw both the preparation and the election itself. This
action proved a dress rehearsal of things to come with UN involvement in

Haiti. Following Aristides overthrow seven months later, the United Nations
and OAS deployed an international civilian mission in February 1993. It was
soon followed by the first international peacekeeping operation in the country.
On January 18, 1995, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested that the United Nations take over the multinational force in Haiti since
the situation had greatly improved. In February 1995 this idea was reinforced
when Strobe Talbott provided a glowing report on Operation Uphold Democracy. He emphasized that the force has peacefully ousted Haitis brutal
dictators, restored its legitimate government, established a secure and stable
environment and is now ready to pass the baton to a U.N. force under a United
States commander.13 The report signaled the transition from a short-term role
to a long-term role for the United Nations. The UN force took over in Haiti
under the direction of U.S. Major General Joseph Kinzer on March 31, 1995,
with 6,000 soldiers, among whom were 2,000 American troops.
Acadmie de Police Haitienne

The foreign troops presence gave Aristide much-needed cover to dismantle
the Haitian army. On January 9, 1995, the Haitian defense minister declared
that there was no longer a need for an army. The government, he argued, aimed
at restructuring the armed forces and structuring the police force. By decree,
Aristide ordered all the members of the public force to join the Interim Police
Force under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice.14 Upgrading the force,
the president opened up the Acadmie de Police Haitienne (Haitian Police
Academy) with 375 recruits including three women on February 3, 1995. He
introduced them as the hope of democracy.15
On April 28, 1995, the president officially dismissed the emasculated army,
reduced first from 7,000 to 1,500 and now, ultimately, to zero. He said, The
army no longer exists and there will be no more army of 1,500 men.16 Bernard Aronson, U.S. former assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, recommended that Congress not tilt against what seems to be the trend,
which is the abolition of the army, as was done in Panama.17
The U.S. presence, however, remained. During her stay in Haiti for UNICEF, the protection of American actress Julia Roberts was secured by the U.S.
military on May 11, 1995. As for the acadmie, the U.S. government planned to
give it a more solid foundation. The Clinton administration offered to raise the
number of Haitian police from 3,500 to 7,000. More importantly, Any new re-
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cruit would be trained in the United States beginning June 1, 1995.18 The training included two months in Haiti and a second two months at a military police
base in Alabama. The Aristide government objected, arguing that former army
members who overthrew him received training in the United States.
Yet American influence could not be underestimated. According to Sergeant Major Sandy Mahon of the Canadian police, The training that we have
here is based on the North American model; it is going to reformulate the
mandate of the police and orientate this police force as being part of the community and not as an authority to itself.19 Students at the academy were taught
wisdom and tolerance. In the end, it was clear that America remained in
control. Ambassador Timothy M. Carneys warned that someone, or some
group, is seeking to politicize the police and seize control of the leadership of
the HNP [Haitian National Police] against the interests of the United States.20
Senator Tad Devine of Ohio reinforced American control of Haitis police:
We have made tremendous progress in training the Haitian police . . . We have
done something that has not been done on this magnitude or scale in the history of the world which basically, we took 18, 19, 20 year old kids and turned
them into a police force.21 According to Strobe Talbott, Over 3000 members
of the interim security force, trained and recruited by our multinational security, are now on the streets of Haiti, acting as public servants rather than as official thugs.22 The Haitian police force was under the direction of former New
York Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly.
Even Haitian observers agreed that the building of a police force was done
under American control. According to one Haitian journalist, the spokesman
for the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince Stanley Schrager took charge to organize publicly recruiting, the exams, and all, concerning particularly the training at the police academy. The role of the Department of Justice, in this area, is
altogether secondary.23
The police force came into being in a new political landscape. As Aristides
mandate ended, he maneuvered to extend it to recover the three year he spent
in exile. Under American pressure, he could not maintain himself in power. He
ultimately gave way to his protg Ren Prval, who took office on February
7, 1996. The Prval family was exiled by the Duvaliers. The new president had
studied in Belgium to become an agronomist. He lived for five years in New
York in the 1970s. A close associate of Aristide, he became his prime minister
in 1991.
Prvals challenge was to maintain good relations with the United States,
whose officials in the past viewed him as a dangerous radical, and with the
UN-sponsored military force that had been in Haiti since September 1994.24
He made history by being the first democratically elected president to succeed another.
Uplift
On Aristides return, the Clinton administration had all good intentions of a
program to uplift Haiti. According to a State Department official, The United
States is going to help rebuild Haiti.25 During the occupation, civil affairs teams
from the 96th California reservists assessed Haitis infrastructure. They envisioned a new government paid for by USAID to lift Haiti up from its endemic
chaos and poverty.26 Ambassador Peter Romero, acting assistant secretary for
Western Hemisphere affairs at the State Department, agreed: United States
goals in Haiti remain unchanged: To help Haitians reverse the conditions that
for nearly two centuries have mired the Haitian people in poverty and impeded
the development of democracy.27
U.S. officials felt paternalistic responsibility for Haiti. They looked at the
incredible poverty and Haitis tradition of dictatorship, then arrived at an offer
of help: We cannot retreat from our responsibility to advance prospects for
democracy in Haiti. We must engage in helping Haitians achieve their goals of
strengthening democratic institutions and sustainable economic growth.28
Yet the new interest in nation-building was not universally shared. A huge
question was asked: What is the interest for the U.S. taxpayer and the United
States of America in this Haiti?29 Henry Kissinger, the king of U.S. foreign policy during the Nixon administration, added a dissonant note. In his view, Any
prolonged military occupation must be avoided; another attempt at nationbuilding will trap us in endless enterprise before it ends in fiasco.30 He argued
that a prolonged military occupation of Haiti would guarantee that the hatred
accumulated over the decades would overwhelm American good intentions.
Others considered the enormity of the task. Newsweek suggested that Haiti
needed more than a crutch for its economy. It required new infrastructure, a
new judicial system, new democratic structures and a police force independent
of the army.31
Wary from the recent defeat in Somalia, U.S. officials preferred that the
United Nations take over. Yet the need for nation-building continued. In
2004, following Aristides downfall, the U.S. Congress studied the deplorable conditions in Haiti. Senator Bob Graham of Florida argued, We need
to accept the fact that the United States will have a role in nation building,
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in nation sustaining efforts.32 The senator suggested a force of 50,000 people selected from law enforcement agencies around the world who would be
trained to help in Haiti. The United States ultimately refrained from the task
of rebuilding Haiti.
Seeds of Trouble
The Constitution of 1987, one of twenty-three constitutions written during
Haitis history, was molded after the American and French constitutions. Its
preamble envisions a society built on democratic principles, a nation socially
fair, economically free, and politically independent. It provided for a state
strong enough to protect the values, traditions, sovereignty, and independence
of Haiti. It was a rebuke of three decades of the Duvaliers brutal dictatorships.
Yet despite its noble ideals, this constitution has proven difficult to implement
in the sociopolitical context of Haiti. Organizing elections has perhaps been
one of Haitis most daunting challenges.
A key example of the problems with elections are the presidential and partial legislative elections of 2000. They remain one of the worst electoral fiascos
in Haitis history. During the campaign, political leaders could not agree to
resolve their differences. Jean Dominique, one of Haitis most vocal and respected journalists, was gunned down. His murder has yet to be solved. The
United States threatened to withdraw technical support and channel its assistance to the people of Haiti through private and Non-Government Organizations.33
When the legislative elections finally took place on May 21, 2000, votecounting proved to be a nightmare. The OAS disagreed with official tallies. The
American embassy backed the OAS while inviting the Provisional Electoral
Council to correct identified problems.34 Under pressure, Lon Manus, president of the electoral council, fled to the United States. The U.S. government
and the Organization of American States pledged to follow up on postelection
developments.
The French government also expressed concern. Franois Rivasseau, spokesman of the French Department of Foreign Affairs, declared that France is
particularly concerned by the recent events and deplores threats that forced
the president of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) Lon Manus to leave
Haiti.35 In July 2000 the U.S. Senate condemned the election as fraudulent. It
adopted a resolution calling for the Haitian government to take steps to end
electoral manipulation.36
This contested election brought to light the dependence of the Haitian government on the international community. It also created two problems with
respect to the process of normal governmental operation: it produced a legislature unacceptable to both the local political opposition and the international
community. And it created a hostile climate for the upcoming November presidential election. Aristide ran and won with a comfortable margin. He took office at about the same time as George W. Bush. But the victory was tainted as
Aristide dragged the burden of the legislatures earlier fraudulent elections into
the new term. The new Bush administration used this stalemate as a rationale
to cut financial aid from the Aristide government.
Aristides Second Ouster

Aristide never recovered from the legislative electoral crisis of May 2000. The
opposition built steady pressure that reached a boiling point in early 2004
when armed conflict broke out in Gonaves. The fighting spread out to other
cities. Gradually, insurgents took control of northern Haiti. After just three
years in power, Aristide was forced out of office for a second time. Haiti once
again became unstable.
What was the Bush administrations role in the demise of Aristide? Considering traditional Republican indifference toward the former priest, it is a
relevant question. U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer of California provided this answer: Ten days before, Colin Powell is saying that he [Aristide] is the elected
president, and we stand by him. Were going to do what we can to help him,
and ten days later a signal is being sentand a very clear signalhe[s] got to
get out of the country, obviously calling for his resignation.37
The Congressional Black Caucus was also interested in deciphering this
intractable problem. Caucus members wanted to know the specific steps required for the United States to defend the democratic process. They believed
another coup was carried out against Aristide. In a meeting with President
Bush and members of his National Security Council, the Black Caucus challenged traditional control in Haiti: The people of Haiti must have a final say
in their government. It cannot be a puppet government.38
Though many eyebrows were raised, it was, however, a fact that times had
changed. In 2001 the United States, Haiti, and thirty-two other nation pledged
to respond rapidly and collectively in the defense of democracy.39 Yet neither
the OAS nor the United States tried to save Aristides presidency. The world did
not respond to his call for support. As early as 2002, Ralph Pezzullo, a former
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Clinton adviser on the Haitian crisis, suggested that Aristide consider leaving
office. He arrived at this conclusion due to demonstrations held against the
president. In December 2012, Roger Noriega, U.S. representative in the OAS,
criticized Aristide for failing to apply Resolution 822. The U.S. diplomat also
deplored the violence in Haiti.40 Overwhelmed by the circumstances, Aristide
left the country for Africa.
The Arrival of MINUSTAH

Stepping onto the tarmac at Toussaint Louverture International Airport, the
traveler venturing into Port-au-Prince would be struck by the large crowd
of people at the gate. Some would be there to welcome loved ones, while the
majority are there to beg. As the traveler leaves the parking lot or ventures
around the airport, a truck of the Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti (MINUSTAH) with armed foreign soldiers would be the
next obstacle. Over the years, MINUSTAH has become part of the Haitian
landscape.
Under the MINUSTAH umbrella, the United States and other nations continue to maintain an influence in Haiti with economic and financial control,
military assistance, and political dependence. As the sole superpower in the
New World Order, the United States commands the process. Sokolosky notes,
As peace-keeping has moved closer to peace enforcement and maintenance
of internal order, the UN has had to rely increasingly upon Americas military
capabilities and experience.41
When uprisings forced Aristide out for a second time, the United Nations
responded quickly. On February 29, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1529 authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF)
for a period of not more than three months. The council also established a
stabilization force to support continuation of a peaceful and constitutional
process and maintenance of a secure and stable environment in Haiti.42
This decision was made to comply with a request for assistance from newly
named President Boniface Alexandre. The request included the authorization
of foreign troops to enter the country, following the long-established tradition
of Haitian leaders depending on foreign military help for political survival.
The MIF consisted of 3,000 troops from the United States, Canada, Chile, and
France.
The United Nations considered the political, social, and economic conditions of Haiti as a threat to international peace and security in the region. On
June 1, 2004, the president of the UN Security Council, Kofi Annan, authorized MINUSTAH to replace the MIF with General Augusto Pereira as force
commander.
MINUSTAHs budget was $428.3 million for the period May 1, 2004June
30, 2005. It provided for the deployment of 5,844 military personnel, 872 civilian police, 750 in police units, 482 international staff members, 549 national
staff members, and 153 UN volunteers from thirty countries.43 These resources
were expected to fulfill the mission as defined by the Security Council resolution of April 30, 2004. Many of the troops came from African countries that
had recently gained independence. After two centuries of existence as a nation,
Haitians were now at the mercy of foreign police officers.
Resistance to MINUSTAH
Though MINUSTAH was a peacekeeping mission, Haiti remained unsafe. Kidnappings, rapes, and other violence were prevalent. MINUSTAH agents were
themselves involved in some of these reprehensible crimes. On May 19, 2005,
three Pakistani soldiers were charged in the rape of Nadge Nicolas, a twentyyear-old Haitian woman. Sri Lankan MINUSTAH soldiers were accused of
sexual exploitation of minors. The UN expelled these soldiers. In July 2011,
Johnny Jean, eighteen years old, was sodomized by two Uruguayan agents. According to Major F. Andy Messing Jr. of the National Defense Council Foundation, A lot of these U.N. forces send in poorly trained and poorly disciplined
troops.44 They also came at a hefty salary.
In April 2010 the United Nations increased its peacekeeping budget to
$732.4 million, with two-thirds of that amount designated for salary, perks, and
upkeep of its own personnel, not the residents of Haiti. The world organization
spent the money on an expanded force of some 12,675 soldiers and police,
plus some 479 international staffers, 669 international contract personnel, and
1,300 local workers.45
MINUSTAH is attributed with returning cholera to Haiti. After a half century without a single case of the disease, cholera returned to this devastated
and ravaged country. UN peacekeepers allegedly allowed raw sewage to leach
into one of the nations largest rivers. This cholera epidemic sickened almost
600,000 people and killed more than 7,400. For this reason, too, the UN force
became highly unpopular. An independent panel appointed by Ban Ki-moon
to study the epidemic reported in May 2011 that the United Nations could
not determine conclusively how cholera was introduced into Haiti. But the
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U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found strong evidence
suggesting that UN peacekeepers from Nepal were the source of the disease.
The Haitian people grew impatient with the UN presence on their territory. In September 2011 students of the Facult dEthnologie in Port-au-Prince
demonstrated against MINUSTAH. Similar demonstrations also took place
in New York. Demonstrators sought the restoration of Haitis national sovereignty. Opposition to the occupation persisted in various ways. On October 19,
2011, several organizations in northern Haiti held a symbolic funeral for MINUSTAH at La Crte--Pierrot, a historical site in the war of Haitian independence. After a subsequent march, a coffin was burned at a nearby cemetery. On
May 31, 2013, an international conference took place in Port-au-Prince against
the occupation. It highlighted the following theme: MINUSTAHs mission is
over. It must leave. The time has come for the UN to withdraw its troops from
Haitis sacred soil. Haitis stability must be assured by Haitians themselves.46
In support of this effort, the Haitian Senate unanimously passed a resolution
requiring MINUSTAH to leave the country.
MINUSTAHS presence in Haiti did bring about some beneficial developments. Violence decreased. Mariano Fernandez Amunategui, special representative in Haiti of the UN secretary-general, painted a rosy picture of MINUSTAHs performance. He described, in particular, its crucial assistance during
the devastating earthquake of 2010 and in elections. He justified MINUSTAHs
presence by charging that Haitians were not quite ready to insure the good
administration of those institutions that protect the rights of its citizens and
those requiring it to fulfill its duties.47 He defended the United Nations presence by emphasizing that the unacceptable abuses of a handful should not
tarnish MINUSTAHs overall contributions to Haiti.
Despite widespread Haitian dissatisfaction with MINUSTAH, it continued
to serve as a security force for Haitian political leaders. As a candidate to the
presidential elections of 2005, Ren Prval said he was inclined to maintain the
presence of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since they are
here to help.48 During his second term, Prval tried to involve MINUSTAH
more in development projects. His successor, Michel Martelly, found it necessary to request a one-year extension of MINUSTAH, through October 2012.
Martelly also concurrently pledged to restore Haitis long-disbanded army.49
Ultimately, MINUSTAH remained a necessary evil. Roberson Alphonse sums
it up in these terms: MINUSTAH stabilizes. It provides warranties. Not the
ones an investor is looking for. But rather the one that no coup dtat takes place
on its watch.50
In addition, MINUSTAH remains almost iconic on Haitian soil as the foremost instrument of U.S. control of Haiti. A 2008 document titled Why We
Need Continuing MINUSTAH Presence in Haiti forcefully makes the U.S.
case: The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an indispensable tool in realizing core USG [U.S. government] policy interests in Haiti. Security vulnerabilities and fundamental institutional weaknesses mean that Haiti will require
a continuingalbeit eventually shrinkingMINUSTAH presence for at least
three and more likely five years. Haiti needs the UN presence to fill the security
gap caused by Haitis fledgling police forces lack of numbers and capabilities. It
needs MINUSTAH to partner with USG and other donors in institution-building.51 MINUSTAH helped achieve such American objectives as monitoring
international drug trafficking and especially the exodus of seaborne Haitian
emigrants.
On October 12, 2012, the UN Security Council extended for another year
its peacekeeping force in Haiti. MINUSTAH was cut by about 15 percent in
authorized troops and police from 10,710 to 8,871, as recommended by UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.52 He also recommended a gradual drawdown to be completed by June 2013.
The Case of a Failed State

In 2013 the journal Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace ranked Haiti in the
top ten of failed states in the world. Haiti followed, among other states, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Chad, and Sudan. Among
the qualifying criteria were the following: demographic pressure, economic
decline, delegitimization of the state, insecurity, and lack of public service.53 At
a U.S. Senate hearing in 2004, Senator Mike Dewine of Ohio, in referring to the
Prval administration, argued that the phrase Haitian government is tragically today an oxymoron. The government has virtually ceased to function.54
Haiti remains a dependent country. Foreign control of the political process through the financing and supervision of elections reveals its weakness.
Michael Heiln, co-author of Written in Blood, argued before the U.S. Senate
hearing in 2004 that Haitians of all classes must have a sense of ownership
of the process of rebuilding their country and its institutions.55 The reliance
on foreign troops to regain and maintain power was illustrated in the course
of the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency. In addition to the
above-mentioned socioeconomic indicators linking Haiti to the status of a
failed state, the Foreign PolicyFund for Peace index criteria also included
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external intervention. This last indicator is startlingly evident in the forms

of foreign-controlled elections and foreign voices in the day-to-day affairs of
Haitis government.
Foreign-Controlled Elections
The Haitian electoral process is a rather complicated exercise where many entities come into play, including an electoral council, the candidates, voters, civil
society, and the international community. The organization of elections reveals
to a high degree Haitis increasing loss of sovereignty and political dependence.
The government can hardly come to terms for the timely organization of these
elections. The international community is viewed as omnipresent in the process, from [deciding] the date for these elections till diffusion of the results,
passing through the financing, security, logistics of operations, and [tallying]
of the results.56
The results are always contested because of a Provisional Electoral Council
mired in both corruption and mismanagement. At the head of the international community, the United States intervenes to evaluate the needs of the
various provisional electoral councils, finance the electoral operations and take
charge of all related expenses.57 Conversely, Americans have become the arbitrary authority in ascertaining the winners. Lemoine Bonneau points out
in a Nouvelliste editorial, Most of the diplomatic missions are so present in
all areas of the electoral institution that they could have well designated their
candidates for the next electoral contest.58
The 2010 elections that brought Michel Martelly to power illustrate these
practices. In spite of irregularities and violence that caused two deaths, election officials announced in December that Myrlande Manigat and Jude Celestin would advance to a run-off scheduled for January 11, 2011. Martelly came
in third place until the international community intervened. At the helm of
the American embassy was Kenneth H. Merten, appointed to his position in
2009. He wanted to make a great impact on Haiti during his tenure. Ambassador Merten issued this statement: The Government of the United States
was concerned about the publication of the preliminary results of the national
elections of November 28 by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) that do
not correspond to the published count of the Conseil National dObservation
Electorale (CNO) and with the counting observed throughout the country of
many national and international observers.59
Through Mertens intervention, the United States influenced the final out-
come by insisting that the Electoral Council change the results to drop Jude
Clestin from the final round and add Michel Martelly. Ambassador Merten,
the kingmaker, supported Martelly as an element of change. Paradoxically, he
also pleaded for Haiti to be a sovereign nation capable of coordinating the
international cooperation in the reconstruction area.60 On Martellys electoral
victory, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton congratulated the president and renewed the support of her country to the Haitian government.61
Problems emerged for the appointment of a prime minister. Martellys nominees stalled in the Haitian legislature for six months after the election. The
rumor mills suggested the deadlock was broken only with the intervention of
Bill Clinton, who had either proposed or imposed Gary Conille, his former
cabinet chief, as special envoy to Haiti.62
Kenneth Merten ended his stay as American ambassador with a special
dinner in his honor at the Karibe Hotel. He was acknowledged as a friend of
President Martelly, for whom Merten is credited as being his savior.63
Foreign Voices
When Prosper Avril, president in 19881990 and a trusted member of Duvaliers Presidential Guard, had a state of siege for thirty days resulting in the
arrest and exile of several political leaders, the Nouvelliste of January 22, 1990,
carried front-page statements from the American, Canadian, and French embassies. All three governments sharply criticized the measure. The United
States and France called for the immediate suspension of the state of siege
and for the reestablishment of constitutional guarantees.64 The three were
referred to as Haitis principal partners. There is no doubt of their opportune
intervention on behalf of democracy in Haiti, but did they go beyond their
diplomatic duties?
The same three of the Four Friends of Haiti during Aristides exile remained
involved in Haitian politics. Their financial aid to the operation of the Haitian
government may have helped them delve so deeply into the management of
the country. The role of the United States was always prominent at the political,
economic, and military levels.
Canada, another of the Four Friends of Haiti, was deeply engaged in promoting democracy in Haiti. On April 26, 1995, Aristide showed his gratitude to
former Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney, who helped bring him back
to power. At a special ceremony at the National Palace, he decorated Mulroney
with the honor of Ordre National Honneur et Mrite au Grade de Grand Croix.
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The Haitian president thanked Mulroney for his efforts to return democracy
to Haiti. Aristide also expressed gratitude to Prime Minister Jean Chretien,
Mulroneys successor. He specifically said to Mulroney, You are standing in
Haitian history. You will always remain there.65
Canada continues to be engaged in Haitian affairs. One hundred thousand
Haitians now live in Canada. In 2006, just before he began his second term,
Prval visited Montreal, where he met with the Haitian community. He expressed the wish for Canada to continue its help to Haiti by providing financial support, in military and policemen.66 On the anniversary celebrating the
national day of Canada, its ambassador Henri Paul Normandin proclaimed
that Haitian-Canadian relations were doing well.
Haitian-Canadian relations became even stronger with the visits of two major Canadian figures. In July 2007, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper
was welcomed in Haiti. The visit was hailed as a success by both Haitian and
Canadian representatives. Then in January 2009, Canadian Governor-General Michaelle Jean came to Haiti. She was born in Port-au-Prince. Haitians,
thrilled by her visit, turned out en masse to welcome her home. She had wideranging discussions with Prime Minister Michle Pierre-Louis focusing on
job creation, hurricane reconstruction, judicial and police reform.67 She also
met with President Prval, whom she encouraged to attend the Summit of the
Americas and to convene a donors conference for Haiti.
Canada is an influential voice affecting policy in Haiti. The issue of creating a Haitian army as proposed by President Martelly was tabled upon being
opposed by Canada and other outside influences. In Haiti, the Canadian ambassador said it was instead a sovereign decision to be made by the Haitian
government, but the Canadian government promoted reinforcement of the
police. In Ottawa, John Babcock, spokesman for Canadas Foreign Ministry,
declared that Canada does not intend to financially support the Armed Forces
of Haiti that President Martelly plans to remobilize.68 Canada instead pledged
to focus on the police force because it was already in existence.
France traditionally has played a major role in Haiti and later as a member of
the Four Friends. France still maintains its presence and involvement. During
the 1990 election, French ambassador Jean Raphael Dufour said, The French
Government follows with vigilance the evolution of the Haitian situation.69
Frances voice was heard in a more recent case involving Josu Pierre-Louis,
accused of sexual improprieties. The French ambassador in Port-au-Prince,
Didier Le Bret, argued that Pierre-Louis should resign his position as president
of the electoral council so he could defend himself from the rape accusations.70
The French diplomat felt it was the best way for Pierre-Louis to handle the situation without damaging the institutions reputation.
Dependence through Natural Disasters

Not only did Haiti have political problems; it was also plagued with natural
disasters that destroyed the economy and infrastructure. In 2008 four hurricanesFay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ikebattered the country in just thirty days.
These storms killed nearly eight hundred people, destroyed some 60 percent
of the countrys crops, and caused extensive environmental damage. USAID
Director Henrietta Holsman Fore visited Haiti and offered an increase of $7
million in food assistance and another $2 million for road repairs.71
Then, on January 12, 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck southern
Haiti. The destruction was so extensive that it caused $8 billion to $14 billion in
damage. Approximately 3 million people, roughly one-third of Haitis population, were affected by the earthquake, more than 1.2 million of them displaced.
The government of Haiti reported an estimated 230,000 deaths and 300,000
injured.72
These natural disasters reinforced Haitis reliance on foreign powers. On
January 13, Ambassador Merten declared Haiti in a state of disaster due to
the earthquake. The Obama administration mounted an impressive response,
sending 5,000 U.S. military personnel for relief assistance, and an additional
7,500 were ready to help. President Obama issued an order allowing selected
members of the militarys reserves to be called up to help in Haiti. The Defense
and Homeland Security departments were able to tap reserve medical personnel and a coast guard unit to provide port security.73 Michael Glenn Mullen,
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an executive order (EXORD
2236) on January 13 authorizing U.S. military humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for operations in Haiti. On January 14 the U.S. Southern Command
received approval from the secretary of defense to lead the Department of Defense mission within Haiti.74 The United States took charge of traffic control at
the Port-au-Prince airport. According to observers, The most powerful man
in Haiti was not the President of Haiti Ren Prval. . . . but rather the ambassador of the United States, Mr. Kenneth H. Merten. By looking at the imposing
embassy, Haiti was under the tutelage of Washington.75
The growing Haitian diaspora made a significant response to this unprecedented destruction of their homeland. The minister for Haitians living abroad,
Edwin Paraison, assessed that some 1,200 expatriate Haitian physicians, nurses,
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psychologists, and other technicians were on the ground to provide muchneeded assistance. The Haitian American Diaspora Foundation distributed
food and clothes to earthquake victims. The international community also understood that the Haitian diaspora must be considered an important part of the
reconstruction of their country. Albert Ramdin, vice secretary-general of the
OAS, mobilized diaspora leaders to share in strategic reconstruction planning.
On March 2123, 2010, they organized the Haitian Diaspora Forum: Contribution to Strategic Planning of Reconstruction and Development For Haiti
at the OAS headquarters in Washington in anticipation of the United Nations
upcoming donors meeting. The forum made fifty-three pertinent recommendations incorporating urgent human needs and effective use of foreign aid,
economic and social development, and overall reinforcement of governance
in Haiti.76
American Assistance and Control

American assistance to earthquake-devastated Haiti was divergently interpreted. Some Latin American and European nations applauded the American
action as a relevant humanitarian mission. These included Argentina, Germany, and France. Other countries saw the American action as overreaching.
The Chinese government fell into that category. The China Radio Internationalsponsored newspaper World News Journal commented, The U.S., not
only for humanitarian reasons but also for political considerations, is willing
to send thousands of soldiers to Haiti for the disaster relief effort. Maintaining
stabilities to Haiti meets the U.S.s interests. The United States has been promoting American democracy in Haiti for nearly a hundred years, during which its
policies were not consistent, repeatedly back and forth, and toward the Haiti
government specifically not always favorable.77
Nonetheless, there was an impressive record of American post-earthquake
support. In March 2010, President Obama sent two former U.S. presidents to
Haiti. President Prval was impressed by the unprecedented presence of the
two on Haitian soil. For the Haitian president, it was a bipartisan effort bound
to influence both Republicans and Democrats in Congress to give funds for
the reconstruction of Haiti.78
American assistance included the rebuilding of the Haitian Parliament
building destroyed by the earthquake. For a while, parliamentarians temporarily met in buildings erected by MINUSTAH. USAID provided $1.5 million for
the construction of a new building. On Obamas second inauguration, Ambas-
sador Merten described how well the Obama administration worked in partnership with all branches of the Haitian government including the Parliament
playing a significant role in the construction of a better Haiti.79
American involvement in post-earthquake Haiti was secured by the return
of Bill Clinton to involvement in Haitian-U.S. affairs. In pre-earthquake Haiti,
Clinton embargos destroyed the Haitian economy. Sources at the Institute of
Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) of the University of Florida said, Haitian exports declined from $202 million in 1991 to $57 million in 1994, and total
importations fell from $449 [million] to $141 million.80 After the devastating
earthquake, Barack Obama called on Clinton and George W. Bush to help collect funds for earthquake victims. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at a Washington donors conference saw Haitis disaster as a test. She pledged $1.15 billion
for Haitis long-term recovery and reconstruction and said, This money will
go toward supporting the Government of Haitis plan to strengthen agriculture,
energy, health, security, and governance. We are committed to working with
the people and organizations throughout Haiti, including civil society groups,
private businesses, NGOs, and citizens.81
According to Le Nouvelliste, there was a certain Clinton momentum in
Haiti that began with Hillary Clintons appointment as secretary of state. Her
husband became an ally to Haiti: Nobody can ever truly evaluate the crucial
role played by Bill Clinton, the doors he opened to Haitian authorities and his
own personal skills to sell Haiti and his people.82 Beginning in 2009, he served
as special representative to Haiti of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The
UN secretary-general also appointed the former president to serve as co-chair
with Haitian Prime Minister Max Bellerive to lead the Interim Commission for
the Reconstruction of Haiti. Clinton traveled to the north with investors and
pleaded for the renovation of the Cap-Haitian airport to facilitate the access
of the region to more tourists.83
Bill Clinton was working tirelessly to bring American investors to Haiti. In
2009 and 2010, the Clinton Foundation and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) organized an international conference on investment in Haiti. In
November 2011 the Clinton Foundation organized along the IDB and the Haitian government a second investment forum, gathering a thousand investors at
the Karibe Hotel in Ption-Ville. Clinton was the power behind the construction of the largest industrial park in the northern Haitian town of Caracol. He
sought to help channel the financial assets to special development projects to
show progress. He promoted tourism by visiting Jacmel and Ile--Vache and
other northern Haitian tourist sites.
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The week of July 4, 2011, commemorating the 235th anniversary of American independence, an editorial in Le Nouvelliste praised the positive U.S.
contributions to Haiti. It highlighted the long lines at the U.S. consulate for
prospective emigrants and the robust contributions and immediate response
to the earthquake by Americans. It also focused on the temporary protected
status granted to tens of thousands of Haitian refugees.84 This unusual wave of
goodwill extended through the reelection of Barak Obama in November 2012.
His reelection was cast in the light of the traditional factors that have dominated Haitian-U.S. relations: Haitis geographic position, its growing diaspora,
and its economic dependence on Americans. One of the main questions asked
was Will a new victory of Barak Obama enable Haitians both in Haiti and
in the diaspora to hope for new mechanisms of granting American help to
Haiti?85
Haitians felt connected with Obama. They took pride in knowing that one
of their own, Patrick Gaspard, who studied in Haiti at the cole Nationale des
Arts, became director of the Office of Political Affairs in the Obama White
House. Considering the traditional impact of race on Haitian-U.S. relations, it
is an interesting question to raise about the first black American president on
the worlds first black republic. On the eve of the 2008 election, the Nouvelliste
reported a real interest in Haiti about current political issues in the United
States. In Port-au-Prince, 92 percent of 1,096 people interviewed in a research
poll picked Barak Obama over John McCain.86 Obamas ethnic background
along with his policy proposals and platform explained Haitians choice of him
over McCain. Race continues, thus, to be a meaningful factor in Haitian-U.S.
relations.
Economic Dependence
It is unmistakable that Haitis faltering democracy was intrinsically linked to
its lack of economic development. This is evident when using the UN Development Programmes human development indicator that compares longevity,
quality of life, and education. In the survey, of 175 countries, Haiti ranked in
145th position in 1993 and 156th position in 1994. Haitis public health ministry
reported in 1998 that more than 70 percent of the Haitian population lived
below the absolute poverty level.87 Senator Mike Dewine of Ohio offered this
profile of the country: Haiti is different. Haiti is unique. No other nation in
our hemisphere is as impoverished. Today at least 80 percent of all Haitians
live in dire poverty, with at least 75, 85 percent either unemployed or under-
employed. Per capita annual income is less than 400 dollars.88 The senator
describes Haiti as an ecological disaster, with 98 per cent deforestation and
severe topsoil erosion.
Haitis economic situation remains at the lower end. Between 1991 and
1994, as a result of the economic sanctions imposed by the international community, the Haitian economy suffered a severe contraction in real Gross Domestic Product (GPD) terms. In 1991, the GPD showed a positive growth rate
of 4.9%. But the devastating effect of the embargo was felt with GPD plunging
to negative rates (-13.2% in 1992, -2.4% in 1993, and -8.3% in 1995), resulting in
a reduction of 25%.89 The decline of agricultural production has contributed
to a net increase in the imports of food, deepening the trade deficit and further
devaluating the national currency, the gourde.90
Examples of Haitis dependence on the international community are apparent throughout its fields of activities. Transportation serves as an example
of this prevalence. In 1998, Haiti had 4,545 kilometers of roads with only 580
kilometers paved, mostly asphalted, rarely with concrete and paving blocks.
The remainder were dirt or gravel roads. To improve this network, the country required external assistance. In 1997 the Haitian government spent two
amounts$15 million and $34 millionthat were allocated from external assistance.91 The improvement of national roads connecting Les Cayes to Jacmel
was financed by the Inter-American Development Bank, from Hinche to Portau-Prince by the European Union, and from Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haitien via
Gonaves by the World Bank.
Aristides return to power was possible when he agreed to abandon his
progressive economic stands and embraced the policy of those international
lenders who would finance economic reconstruction plans. In 1994 his advisers Leslie Voltaire and Leslie Delatour embraced a structural adjustment plan
(SAP) that adapts the economic approach favored by the World Bank and
IMF.92
The SAP became a reality on the return of Smarck Michel from Paris. He
was Aristides prime minister and brought good news that nearly $1.2 billion
was pledged to Haiti. The other side of the coin was the privatization of publicly
run enterprises including Electricity of Haiti, Teleco, and Cement of Haiti as
well as two banks, the Banque Nationale de Credit and the Banque Populaire
dHaiti. The essential deal was to go to foreign investors: Americans, Canadians, Chinese, and Haitians were to be treated equally.93 In the process, the
Socit Financire Internationale (SFI), a branch of the World Bank, served as
adviser to the Haitian government.
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Haitis dependence was made worse when its own elite failed to invest in the
country. They made their money with investments outside Haiti. In 1983 the
elite sent $87 million, and in 1988 they sent $56 million to foreign countries.94
The NGOs Republic

Haiti is the home of a high number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
It is difficult to determine their exact number because there are two extremes.
First, the figure provided by the World Bank in 2009 was that there were 10,000
NGOs in Haiti. That would mean the country had the second-highest number
of NGOs per capita in the world, behind India.95
Second, the Ministre de la Planification et de la Cooperation Externe
(PPCE), the Haitian agency that is overseeing these organizations, counted 419
national and international NGOs with legal status. At Cit Soleil, the countrys
largest slum at a population of 400,000, there are 100 NGOs.96 More than 50
percent of these are American, French, Swiss, Spanish, German, and Belgian.
They work in education, health and agriculture. NGOs in Haiti cater particularly to humanitarian aid. But many of these are phantom organizations.
NGOs burgeoned due to an international policy to withdraw funds from
the Haitian government for its bad behavior. This shift stems from the traditional corruption of Haitian officials resulting in misappropriated funds. These
trends were particularly true under Baby Doc Duvalier, who is said to have
pillaged the national treasury for his personal benefit. Under Duvalier, a number of foreign officials have maintained that the governmental bureaucracy in
Haiti siphons off well over half of all foreign aid and development assistance
funds.97 During his exile in France, the Haitian government took legal steps to
recuperate some $120 million from the former dictator. Independent observers
support the thesis that Haiti is a predatory republic, that is, one with a despotic
structure of power that preys on its citizens without giving much in return.98
The Haitian masses and peasants have traditionally been forsaken without getting any services from the government.
With the elections of November 29, 1987, mired in violence, the government
of the United States suspended all military aid with the exception of its antinarcotics cooperation. It then made this marked policy shift that the remaining
$2530 million of economic assistance (of a package of $100 million) would
go to the Haitian people through NGOs and private volunteer organizations
(PVOs).
Reassessing its aid, the U.S. government thenceforth bypassed the Haitian
government. It chose instead to encourage semi-autonomous government

agencies to administer and funnel aid through PVOs. Officials noted that
[US]AID has had relatively few difficulties in PVO projects.99 The United
States provided humanitarian assistance to the Haitian people primarily
though multilateral and private channels. An additional $100,000 of USAID
funds was, however, made available to the U.S. embassy for small pilot projects
for humanitarian assistance.
This policy of direct distribution of funds to NGOs or PVOs definitely weakened the Haitian central government. Under Prval, a fierce struggle continued
in Washington between President Clinton and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms over funding allocations to the Haitian government. Helms remained a strong critic of Clintons Haiti policy. In May 1996
Helms authorized the release of $10 million to Haiti, but most of this money
was channeled through private groups or the United Nations, not the Haitian
government.100 Under American financial control, NGOs had more control,
while the Haitian government had less leverage.
NGOs constituted another channel for American control of reoccupied
Haiti. According to Roger Noriega, assistant secretary of the Department of
State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Between 1995 and the year 2003,
the United States provided $850 million in assistance to Haiti. This was mostly
channeled through non-governmental organizations because of the corruption
thats rampant in the governments system under President Aristide.101 The
Center for Economic and Policy Research reports that most of the $1.5 billion
given to Haiti after the earthquake went to American companies and organizations based in Washington. Only 1 percent of this money was actually given to
Haitian companies.102 The recipients of nearly all the funds included the World
Bank, the United Nations, and Chemonics International, a USAID contractor.
Ren Dpestre, a prominent Haitian poet, charged that after the earthquake,
for the lack of national power capable of coordinating reconstruction initiatives, NGOs placed Haiti under their disparate tutelage.103
NGOs do not have a good image in Haiti. Observers note that they use
funds outside the control of the Haitian government to distribute huge salaries
within their institutions and to acquire [all-terrain vehicles], and they do not
commit to improving the lives of the Haitians.104 Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe called on the international community to channel external aid through
the state institutions.105 He resisted the practice of donors favoring NGOs and
UN agencies over the Haitian government because they saw it as weak, inefficient, and corrupt.
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American action in Haiti regarding the distribution of foreign aid also leaves
a lot to be desired. According to the Center for Economic and Policy Research,
USAID only gave 1 percent, that is, $1.45 million out of $1 billion, to local businesses, while Beltway firms obtained contracts amounting to 75 percent of the
total amount.106 Haitian local institutions are ignored in favor of the outside
NGOs and contractors.
At the UN donors conference of March 2010, Secretary Hillary Clinton solemnly pledged to rectify NGO sins by working with the Haitian government:
We are in the global community; we must also do things differently. It was
tempting to fall back on old habitsto work around the government rather
than to work with them, or to fund an array of well-meaning projects rather
than making the deeper, long-term investments that Haiti needs now. We cannot retreat to failed strategies.107
Along the same lines, Paul Farmer, a Harvard professor and global health
activist, declared that in helping Haiti, resources have to flow to the public sector and not just to nongovernmental organizations.108 Farmer was talking here
as the director of a powerful NGO, Fanmi La Sante, his health organization in
Haiti.
The action proposed for better fund management in coordination with the
Haitian government was not part of the tactics. A Haitian watchdog organization, Observatoire Citoyen dAction des Pouvoirs Publics (OCAP), observed
that NGOs collected some $2 billion following the earthquake. These funds
were disbursed without government supervision by NGOs controlled by foreigners.109 Karl Jean-Louis, OCAPs executive director, called for a policy of
better management of NGOs.
To the end, the United States maintained the control it had established ever
since the first occupation in 1915. One hundred years later, the political and
economic legacies still linger. American domination becomes even stronger
since Haiti, by reason of her ongoing predicaments, remains dependent on the
United States for political and economic survival.
Haiti holds great interest for the United States. This small island nation harbors the fifth-largest U.S. embassy in the world. During the first occupation,
the United States increased exponentially its influence at the cultural level.
As the final chapter demonstrates, it has managed to bring about a growing
Americanization of Haiti.
7
The Americanization of Haiti
Il ne faisait de doute pour personne que lle dHaiti subissait dj
linfluence des Etats-Unis dont elle dpendrait de plus en plus pour
son commerce, ses finances, voire son mode de vie.
Elie Lescot, Avant loubli
The island of Haiti has been a crossroads of various cultures. The nations
heritage begins with its first inhabitants, the Taino people. Their heritage still
permeates daily Haitian life. Michael Botwinick of the Brooklyn Museum describes this legacy: Haiti weaves together indigenous Indians of the Caribbean, slaves from various parts of Africa, Spanish colonialism, and French
plantations, all overlaid with the American hegemony of the twentieth century
and contemporary Caribbean politics.1
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Americanization has emerged
as a new legacy in the cultural make-up of Haiti. The United States and Haiti
evolved side by side over more than two centuries. Despite their resistance
to nineteenth-century American cultural influences, Haitians have nowadays
yielded to the economic, political, and cultural power of the United States. In
2000, for instance, a Radio Mtropole survey revealed that the United States
was considered the Promised Land, the land of opportunity for Haitians. Respondents preferred that country by 57 percent. France and Canada were far
behind, with just 17 percent each of Haitians wishing to emigrate there.2
A number of Haitian officials are also U.S. citizens. In 2008, two Haitian
senators, Roudolph Boulos and Ultimo Compre, were identified as Americans. Senator Kelly Bastien even admitted that 20 percent of the members of
the Haitian Parliament had foreign residency cards.3
A View of Americanization
One can compare the differences of the Americanization of Haiti with a contemporary world dominated by transnationalization and globalization. Every
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country is subject to an invasion of its ways of life by outside cultural influences

from transnational media. Ien Ang, cultural studies professor at the University
of West Sydney, Australia, suggests that in the increasingly integrated world
system there is no such thing as an independent cultural identity; every identity must define and position itself in relation to the cultural frames affirmed by
the world system.4 The current Americanization of Haiti must be understood
and analyzed along these lines.
The New Encyclopedia Britannica defines Americanization as those activities that were designed to prepare foreign-born residents of the United
States for full participation in citizenship. It aims not only at the achievement
of naturalization but also at an understanding of and commitment to principles of American life.5 It has emerged as a real American movement aimed
at shaping and molding foreigners who have migrated to the United States by
the teaching of the English language, American history, and U.S. governmental structure. As America became an empire, Americanization spilled into its
various spheres of influence as well as its protectorates and territories. Alan M.
Klein, sociology-anthropology professor at Northeastern University, asserts,
Americanization is apparent in all aspects of the Caribbean, but particularly
in the Spanish-speaking islands and surrounding nations.6 Using the Monroe Doctrine, Americans intervened in several Latin American and Caribbean
countries and left behind some unmistakable legacies.
Americanization also includes the growing American influence over the
cultures of other countries. It manifests through technology, business practices, and political techniques. The American film and television industry
dominates most of the worlds media markets. It is the chief medium by which
people across the globe see American fashions, customs, scenery and way of
life.7
Americanization does not necessarily imply the physical presence of an
American agency. James T. Campbell, a historian at Stanford University,
demonstrates how a distant country like South Africa was Americanized by
Americanisms. South Africans have actively sought out American goods,
images, and ideas, incorporating them into their own lives to yield new ways
of understanding and acting upon their worlds.8
In Haiti the Americanization process has taken place at the cultural, educational, religious, political, and economic levels. This process is analyzed by first
looking at Haitis historical struggles with those who wish to win control of its
cultural soul.
The Quest for Cultural Hegemony on Haitian Soil

During the nineteenth century, Haiti was a fierce battleground for cultural
supremacy, primarily in a cultural war between France, its former colonizer,
and the United States, which was vying for hemispheric hegemony. In Haitis
declaration of independence, Dessalines, a founding father, bid his countrymen to nurture the creed Eternal hatred of France shall be our cry.9 After
independence, however, French cultural influences returned with the persistence of Haitians using the French language and embracing French educational values. These patterns were all steadily nurtured by a French Roman
Catholic clergy.
The tensions between French and Anglo-Saxon cultures emerged with the
assassination of Dessalines in October 1806. From the northern part of the
country that he ruled as king, Henri Christophe fired the first shot in this cultural war. He originally came from Grenada and had a strong preference for
Anglo-Saxon over French culture. He maintained a close relationship with the
English abolitionists Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce. Christophe
recruited teachers from the United States and England who established a system of Lancastrian schools, modeled after the influences of that English royal
house. Two English artists taught at the Royal Academy in Milot.
In the Republic of the West, Alexandre Ption wholeheartedly embraced
French culture. The French artist Barincourt founded an art school in Port-auPrince. Jean-Pierre Boyer, who subsequently ruled as president for a quarter
century, unified the island. He made peace with France by committing to a
huge indemnity of 150 million francs and gave the French favorable tariffs on
French goods. The French cultural status quo prevailed as well. Yet Boyer also
invited African Americans to come to enjoy the blessings of freedom in Haiti.
African Americans migrated to Haiti, where they established their own cultural institutions such as churches and schools.
French cultural influences definitely took hold with the signing of the concordat between the Geffrard administration and the Holy See in 1860. The
Catholic Church became the official guardian of French culture through longentrenched religious and educational institutions in Haiti. By the turn of
the nineteenth century, some Haitian thinkers, realizing the lack of progress
of the socioeconomic conditions in their society, called for a cultural shift.
Educators like Fleury Fquire, Auguste Magloire, and even the anthropologist Jean Price-Mars felt an Anglo-Saxonization of Haitian culture would
offer better opportunities in economic and industrial development. This back-
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and-forth between French and Anglo-Saxon cultures intensified during the

occupation period.
The First Occupation as a Stepping-Stone

Hoping to squelch any French and German influence in Haiti was one of the
main reasons behind the first American intervention, in 1915. Once the Marines intervened, the cultural war for control of Haiti heated up. The Catholic
Church contested American involvement, citing religious and educational reasons. The French government came to the churchs rescue when Jean Adrien
Antoine Jusserand, the French ambassador in Washington, condemned Americas Haiti educational policy. The ambassador joined the Catholic establishment to protest cancellation of the contract that allocated scholarship money
for Haitian students to pursue higher studies in France. He pointed out to
Secretary Norman Davis, Such measures were obviously aimed to hamper the
maintenance and progress of the French language in Haiti and the intellectual
bonds existing between that country and France.10
Caught in the middle, Haitians played the nationalist card. Poets and novelists embraced their long-neglected African heritage. Circumstances also gave
rise to an ethnic movement stressing ngritude and promoting vodou. As minister of public instruction, Dants Bellegarde resisted American intervention,
and France appeared to gain favor. At the linguistic level, French became Haitis
official language in the Constitution of 1918: French is the official language.
Its use is compulsory in administrative and judiciary matters. This was meant
to be a salvo against the English used by Americans and in official documents
between the two countries.
American culture would not, however, dissipate that easily. U.S. officials
established their own system to rival the French-based educational system.
American Protestant missionaries challenged the well-entrenched Catholic
hierarchy. In January 1929 the Church of God in Christ, an African American
denomination, was established in Haiti as the first Pentecostal movement in
the country. Charles Harrison Mason, the movement founder, visited Haiti to
lend his support. Later on, Frank Charles Laubacha missionary, adult educator, and literacy pioneerintroduced his literacy campaign in Haiti. He and
fellow missionary Ormonde McConnell initiated the grammatical structure of
Haitian Creole. Haitian Creole has since evolved to become today an official
language along with French.
The greatest leap of Americanization took place with President Elie Lescot,
who was a wholehearted supporter of American hegemony in Haiti. Lescot

took steps to erode the influence of the French clergy, the backbone of French
culture. In 1941, when the Diocese of Les Cayes in southern Haiti became vacant, the president sought and secured an American bishop to replace him,
Monseignor Louis Collignon, an American Oblate from Lowell, Massachusetts.11 A number of Oblate missionaries followed him in Haiti.
Paradoxically, it was an American, Dewitt Peters, who brought about a renaissance of Haitian art through painting and sculpture. He was seen as the
single most important person in the development of modern Haitian art.12
In 1944 he launched the Centre dArt, which promoted an artistic movement
wholly anchored in Haitian culture.
Through the first half of the twentieth century, American influence slowly
but surely gained ground in Haitian culture. Nowadays, the communication
industries and corporations under the aegis of American technology hold the
power to control the world. We are witnessing in our times the existence of
communication empires such as those controlled by Rupert Murdoch, an Australian American business magnate, Time-Warner, Comcast, and other large
media conglomerates. They presided over the creation of transnational markets and transnational distributions . . . transgressing established boundaries
and subverting existing territories.13 With satellite and cable capability, CNN
and other American channels are available in Haiti. The Internet also contributes a great deal to increasing interaction with the United States and the wider
world.
The Demise of the French Language

By the end of the twentieth century in Haiti, the French language had seen a
degradation of its former glory. There emerged the widespread use of Creole
in the media and education. In 1979 Joseph C. Bernard, an education minister under Jean-Claude Duvalier, made a push to reform Haitian education by
raising Creole to parity with French. Less than a decade later, Article 5 of the
1987 Constitution made Creole an official language of the country along with
French. Creole thus rebounded from its second-class status to become a tool
commonly used in education and in the media.
Creole was also transformed into a powerful instrument in the political
struggle against the Duvalier dictatorship. The rise of the Creole language
amounts to what Jean-Marie Thodat has called a radical change in the cultural situation of Haiti.14 Creole became the language used by writers and
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journalists, including the famous Haitian author Frank Etienne. Jean-Bertrand

Aristide also embraced the Creole language in his religious and political discourse.
Furthermore, French lost its luster not only in Haiti but also abroad by
the increased use of English in science and as an international language of
business. In January 1990 a colloque organized in Paris denounced the incontestable imperialism of English as the language of science. Alain Dcaux,
the French minister of francophonie, research, and technology, estimated that
the situation of the French language is extremely worrisome in the scientific
and technological fields.15 The issue was that although the United States represented just 5 percent of the world population, its industrial production reached
20 percent and scientific activity about 50 percent. In that sense, the threat of
Americanization extended beyond Haiti. Europeans, too, have shown obsessive concern about the supposed threat of cultural Americanization as a consequence of the transnationalization of the media system.16
The diminishing utility of the French language and culture was further felt
in Haiti in terms of overseas education. New York and Miami replaced Paris
as the destination of most Haitian students abroad. American public universities welcomed more and more Haitians, who were to become the future elites.
Those who returned to the country came back with a predilection for the language of Wall Street and a rejection of French.17 The result was that Haiti made
a sharp turn toward becoming a trilingual country.
A quick look in the Haitian newspaper Haiti Observateur helps to prove this
thesis. Though published in New York, it is widely read in Haiti, featuring news
stories written in French, English, and Creole. Le Matin, published in Port-auPrince, includes news stories in French, Creole, and English. Haitis linguistic
affiliation has changed such that in recent decades massive immigration to
the United States and the availability of cable television from the United States
have helped English replace French as the second language in many sectors.18
NGOs contribute a great deal toward this trend since they are staffed with
primarily English speakers. In advertisements written in English and in the
columns of the Nouvelliste, NGOs have listed such recruitment qualifications
as fluency in English and either French or Creole.
An American Sociocultural Offensive

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Americanization of Haiti has manifested in cultural matters. The United States has always demonstrated a strong
interest in Haiti in light of its own Latin American and Caribbean policies. According to a policy and action paper on Haiti prepared in the 1960s by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs for the Latin American Policy Committee, the
United States established political, economic, and social objectives and lines of
action for Haiti. Its goal was to promote understanding among all segments of
the Haitian public of American culture and institutions.19 Undoubtedly these
objectives were meant to strengthen American cultural hegemony. Matching
words with action, the American embassy actively supported the teaching of
English in Haitian schools, arguing that it promotes American interests in
many ways and leads to a more successful exchange program.20 To this end,
educators designed plans to bring about real change in methodology and promote closer contact with American teachers and American studies.
In October 2010 a Haitian American, Rgine Ren, became the attache culturelle at the American embassy in Port-au-Prince. She was born in Louisiana
of Haitian parents. She promoted programs that reinforced cultural exchanges
between the two nations. This goal was to be achieved through training projects, finance and exchanges between Haitian and American artists.21 The cultural section of the embassy also extended its influence in higher education.
Promotion of American culture continued. Mainstream media carried an
advertisement by the U.S. Embassy Office of Public Diplomacy and the Fulbright Selection Committee seeking applicants for Fulbright scholarship programs. The postgraduate programs objective is to foster academic exchanges
and mutual understanding between Haiti and the United States.22 To be considered, applicants must have advanced English-language skills. A preparatory
program also is offered to promote acceptance in American universities.
In 1990 the Service dInformation et de Relations Culturelles des Etats-Unis
observed the celebration of Black History Month in Haiti. It planned to show
films on African Americans and the civil rights movement, including films
about Booker T. Washington, Louis Armstrong, and Langston Hughes. A special contest was organized about Martin Luther King on the theme Live the
Dream.
Though not orchestrated by the embassy, it is significant to note that American cultural practices were even extended to the happy hour. These events took
place with the Haitian beer Prestige offered for sale in various bars and restaurants throughout the capital.
The Haitian-American Institute played an important role in the Americanization process. The institute was established in 1942 by Haitians and Americans interested in reinforcing friendships and cultural ties between the two
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countries. The institute grew into a prominent linguistic and cultural center
based in Port-au-Prince. Approximately 2,500 students per day attend classes.
To date, over 100,000 students have studied English and successfully pursued
a wide variety of professions, both locally and abroad. The faculty plays a leading role in hosting English teaching seminars. Also, the Institute is the official
Testing Center for the TOEFL and SAT tests, and also offers GRE and PRAXIS
exams.23 Students have used the institute as a stepping-stone to get a visa for
travel to the United States.
A Boost from the Diaspora

The concept of diaspora, or a mass migration, became a term referring to
Haitians living in the various parts of the world. In a narrower interpretation, diaspora more specifically designates a Haitian having one foot in the
United States and the other in Haiti.24 Laguerre explains, Diaspora means
displacement and reattachment. It refers to rerootedness, that is, living in another state, and implies transnationality in its relations with the homeland.25
When it comes to Haiti, statistical figures fluctuate, but Haitian government
officials estimate that as many as four million people make up the Haitian
diaspora. In 1994 President Jean-Bertrand Aristide established a cabinet-level
ministry initially called the Tenth Department to coordinate the assistance received from hometown associations and other diaspora groups.26 This department served as a bridge between Haitians in Haiti and those living abroad. As
Haitian American author Edwidge Danticat explains, It is not a concrete land.
It is not a specific state or place, an idea or idea to which we can belong, where
we can still be outside and be part of the country.27 Leslie Voltaire served as
the first minister of this Tenth Department incorporating diasporic citizens
under Aristide.
Haitians started to leave en masse during the first U.S. occupation in the
1920s. The diaspora grew exponentially during the infernal regime of Franois
Duvalier. Those who left preferred to migrate to the United States. Confined
originally to those in the middle class who used the traditional consular channel, Haitian immigration accelerated. Others who desired access to the American dream bypassed the rigid formalities of the consulate in Port-au-Prince to
face the fierce Caribbean winds and currents. Though many perished, most
made it to Miami and scattered to the major American cities of the Northeast
and New England.
By the second occupation, the diaspora grew to nearly one million. These
men and women have transformed major U.S. cities, among them unquestionably New York, Miami and Boston, and to a great extent many others,
including Newark (New Jersey), Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Fort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach, Chicago and Atlanta.28 The Haitian presence was so
strong in New York that Mayor Michael Bloomberg decreed that Creole would
be added to the list of official languages used to communicate government
services to the immigrant population. Other official languages were Russian,
Spanish, Korean, Chinese, and Italian.
Diasporic Influence
It has been said that the diaspora is the oxygen that enables Haiti to breathe
economically. According to former minister Leslie Voltaire in 2002, of the
400,000 to 500,000 people a year entering Haiti through the Port-au-Prince
International Airport, some 350,000 came from the Haitian diaspora.29 When
these people returned to Haiti on visits, they brought the cultural trends of
their new countries. Port-au-Prince is close to the United States, less than two
hours by air from Miami and four hours from New York. Diasporic citizens going back and forth between Haitian and American cities do not just transport
consumable goods but also a new linguistic and cultural sense. They import
the economic and cultural benefits of their second homelands. A number of
indicators help demonstrate this trend at the linguistic, religious, economic,
and political levels.
The diaspora has made its foremost impact at the linguistic level. Haitian
Americans English-speaking ability has influenced the Creole they bring from
the United States. They speak a Creole that is mixed with English words they
do not translate. For instance, one can hear Creole expressions incorporating
English words such as mind in Sak nan mind-li, implying what is on his or
her mind, and lap enjoy li, meaning the speaker is enjoying himself or herself.
The tendency is more prevalent among second-generation Haitian immigrants.
Released from the traditional stigma associated with the grammatical rigor of
the French language, Haitians are more comfortable in expressing themselves
in English.
Educational Indicator
French culture has continued to hold its own in the Haitian school system.
Several secondary schools offer French-only curricula. Two of these schools
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are Lyce Alexandre Dumas in Port-au-Prince and Centre Alcibiade Pomayrac

in Jacmel. Due to the rapid growth of the diaspora in U.S. cities, there are more
English schools in Haiti based on the American model. It is a common practice among some Haitian parents to send their children to Haiti for cultural
enrichment. While there, those children attend schools with an American curriculum to facilitate their reentry into the U.S. educational system. The American curriculum is also offered in Haiti to middle-class students whose parents
intend to send them to the United States to further their education.
The practice of educational exchange has emerged as one of the strongest indicators of the increasing Americanization of Haiti. Since the 1980s a number
of private schools using an American curriculum have opened in Haiti. This
is a legacy of the American occupation. In 1919 the United States established
the Colony School for the education of the Marines Corps children. When the
Marines left in 1934, the school, renamed the Union School, began providing
an American accredited program of studies in both English and French for
students of all nationalities.30 Nonetheless, it has become the school of choice
for children of diplomats and Haitian elites.
Beyond the Union School, other institutions offer an American curriculum.
In 1995 Le Nouvelliste published this advertisement from the American Academy: The American Academy is proud to announce the opening of registrations for the Academic school Year of 9596 in elementary and Secondary, for
students following an American Curriculum. Openings in the Teaching staff
are also available. Applicants should have a BS, MS degree from an American
or English speaking Canadian University.31 Other schools offering an American curriculum include the Quisqueya Christian School, in operation for the
past fifty years, the Morning Star Christian School, and the New American
School.
Even when the curriculum is not American, the schools adopt English
names. According to Dean Rodega Dorc Dorcil of the Facult de Linguistique Applique, the name of the school can be in English, while its program
is French.32 Many business schools fall into this category, such as Christ the
King Secretarial School and the First School, a business training school. Still
other schools use both English and French as linguistic tools; among these is
the cole Bilingue des Frres.
In higher education, the trend toward Americanization has continued over
the decades. In a December 21, 1990, press release, the American University of
Les Cayes offered diplomas in general studies and bachelors degrees in agriculture, management and business administration, English, and health.33 Notre
Dame University, a Midwestern U.S. Roman Catholic university, has a branch

in Haiti. Led by Father Tom Streit, CSC, the Notre Dame Haiti program is a
world leader in the fight against lymphatic filariasis, a parasitic disease caused
by small worms living in the human lymphatic system. In seeking to eliminate
the disease in Haiti, where more than 26 percent of the population is infected,
Notre Dame and its partners, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Haitian Ministry of Health and Population, and the Hpital Sainte
Croix in Logane, Haiti, are working toward a model for worldwide elimination of the disease as well.34
The Haitian government encourages the trend toward Americanization. In
April 2013 Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe traveled to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to sign a document for using Creole in the teaching
of sciences and mathematics. There is also in operation at MIT a STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) education program aimed
to develop and evaluate technological tools in Kreyol (Creole) for the learning
of sciences and mathematics in Haiti.35 The accord provides for scholarships
to Haitian students.
This program was begun by Haitian American scholar Michel Degraff, a
linguistics professor at MIT. He worked with the Foundation for Knowledge
and Liberty (FOKAL) in Port-au-Prince. According to Professor Degraff, This
program includes mirror sites for Open Course Ware (OCW) as well as faculty
and student training programs . . . In addition to OCW, the MIT Haiti Initiative
also plans to offer Haitian academics language processing tools such as a Lecture Browser that includes automatic translation, transcription and annotation
software to make video lectures more understandable to audiences around the
world.36
There is an effort to help Haitian professionals take advantage of U.S. educational opportunities. Forty-five professionals participated in 2012 in the third
training session program called Train the Trainers at the Wentworth Institute
Technology in Boston; the program was billed as Wentworths contribution to
the reconstruction of Haiti.37 USAID also provides educational help. In May
2011 it launched a four-month training program for sixty high-level staff members at Haitis Ministre de lEducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle. The program objective was to boost transformation of the national
education system in Haiti.
A new generation of Haitian intellectuals chose to follow in the footsteps
of those who were inspired by the American nation-building model instituted
and promoted by officials of the first occupation. Besides establishing a sys-
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tem of technical schools, these officials opened the door to American higher
education. Migration of Haitians to the United States would make a huge
difference. Even during the occupation, many Haitian intellectuals received
scholarships to study at American universities. Franois Duvalier attended the
University of Michigan, and the famous poet Jean Brierre studied at Columbia
in New York.
Maurice Dartigue, considered by many to be one of the most enlightened
ministers of Haitian education, attended the American-instituted school system in Haiti and served the Haitian educational system in various capacities.
He studied at Teachers College of Columbia University. He returned to Haiti
to serve as minister of public instruction in the Lescot regime. He used his
position to promote reform of Haitian education along American educational
principles.
Religious Indicator
On the Boutiliers mountaintop overlooking Port-au-Prince sits lEglise de
Dieu en Christ, Boutiliers #1. This small church established there during the
1950s by the elder Leonard Jerme was divided after his death in 1968 into
two congregations. What is remarkable is the influence of Americanism in
both churches. At Boutiliers Church #1, the birthday song for one of the parishioners was sung in both French and English. At Boutiliers Church #2, the
vibrant youth choir called Boutiliers Gospel Worshippers has a wide repertoire
of American gospel music rendered in English. These two churches are a clear
reflection of the impact of American religious influence in Haiti.
In 1919 Charles A. Brooks published a book titled Christian Americanization: A Task for the Churches. Brooks, the secretary of the City and Foreignspeaking Missions of the American Baptist Home Mission Society, defined
Americanization as the extension of our ideals, of the American spirit, and
of our language to every quarter and every community, until there shall remain
no foreign colonies untouched by the full currents of our American life, or out
of harmony with the rest of America.38 In his book he sought to achieve this
goal through advancing Christian thought and lifestyles.
To use Brookss concept, Christian Americanization was strengthened under American control. According to Universal Peace Foundation SecretaryGeneral Charles Poisset Romain, the years between 1920 and 1930 witnessed
the great take-off or the great Protestant explosion. Additionally, from 1920
to 1940, Protestantism followed a very upward curve.39 Romain further main-
tained that half the Haitian population are Protestant. What is also remarkable
is that a great number of the Protestant denominations came from the United
States. Romain identified thirty-eight denominations in Haiti. Nineteen of
them, more than half, had their headquarters in the United States. Three of the
denominations originated in England.40 It is reported that in Haiti, per capita,
there are more foreign non-governmental organizations and religious missions
(predominantly U.S.-based) than in [any] other country in the world.41
The growth of many denominations is connected with the help Haitians
received from North American missions. According to Dash, Apparently it
is not difficult for independent Protestant missions in Haiti to find financial
sponsorship in parent churches in the United States.42 In post-earthquake
Haiti, the visibility of American evangelical groups has grown rapidly. They
are easily picked out on flights from Miami with their red and yellow T-shirts
inscribed with inspirational messages and their religious affiliations. Many
Haitian ministers are trained and supported by evangelical missions from the
United States.
Claude Noel, director of Partners with Haiti and former executive of Haitis
Council of Evangelical Churches, contended in a 1994 Christianity Today article that Haitians who are tired of seeing things the way they are, are looking
to the United States as the last resort for a return to law and order and that
the evangelical churches are prepared to be good allies to the Americans
because of . . . its 100-year relationship and cohabitation with American missionaries.43
The diasporic process makes its impact on Haitian Protestantism through its
influence on worship style. It also improves the advancement of the churches.
Church construction and reconstruction, fueled by former members who immigrate to the United States, have increased. In March 2010, after the earthquake, the African American Baptist Mission Collaboration gathered fifty Haitian, Haitian American, and African American faith leaders in Washington for
a summit on advocacy for Haiti. They sought to build an advocacy movement
among the Haitian Diaspora and African-American Christians to influence
significantly the reconstruction policies and legislative agenda of the United
States toward a sustainable Haiti.44
Americanization through Mass Media

Print media in Haiti have a limited reach due to the nations low literacy rate.
The two major newspapers in the capital, Le Nouvelliste and Le Matin, have a
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Contrary Destinies
limited readership. They are supplemented by three weeklies printed in the

United States: Haiti Observateur, Haiti Progrs, and Haiti en Marche. In Dashs
words, Since 1986, these papers became very popular in Haiti and captured
much of the local readership from the bland local publications.45 And print
newspaper circulation is down worldwide because of improved digital technologies that make news consumption more convenient.
Americanization manifests through a number of English-language advertisements that reflect the linguistic media change. Haitian newspapers carried
advertisements for Florida real estate: Big Dividends for Your [Real] Estate
Skills, Earn up to $100,000 a Year Selling Florida Homes and Land Skills.46
They also advertise the need for bilingual employees in the United States and
other nations as well. Even dating back to 1995, a Canadian employer sought a
commercial agent through Le Matin; among job requirements, the applicants
needed to be fluent in both French and English.47
There are a number of Haitian businesses with English-language names such
as Electronic Center, Kensington Power Backer Standby, ABC Tours, Speedy
Computer Training, and Big Star Market in Ption-Ville. Likewise in 1995,
Tempo Service Company advertised to hire high school and college graduates
fluent in French, English, and Creole.48
There is also a new phenomenon involving names. Traditional French
names like Pierre and Antoinette have given way to American names like Jackson and Tamara. Names of movie stars and legendary sports figures are also
very popular. At this writing in 2015, President Michel Martelly has the stage
name Sweet Micky.
Haitian radio stations have played a significant role in promoting American
customs and culture. Radio made its appearance during the first American
occupation. It is now a major means of communication to the Haitian population, as most people have access to radios. It is also reliable because only 30
percent of the Haitian population has access to electric power. Creole is the
most popular language spoken on the radio. There are, however, stations with
programs in French and Spanish (Radio Mtropole) and some with French
and English (Radio Lumire). There are Haitian radio stations in Washington,
D.C., Miami, Boston, and New York that broadcast on air and online to Haiti,
just as stations in Haiti broadcast in the same manner to the United States and
Canada. They communicate in French, Creole, and English. Dash notes that
often the language of some presenters is a creative and spontaneous combination of all three languages.49
As for TV stations, French and English languages are favored. According
to Jacques Leclerc, English tends to dominate because most private television

channels present American programs.50 Tl Lumire and Shalom 36 have
English-language programs. Analyzing the Americanization of South Africa,
Campbell has underscored that in the world of music and entertainment, South
Africans, both black and white, developed an apparently insatiable appetite
for American performance styles.51 U.S.-based TV programs are rebroadcast
around the world, provided by American broadcasters and their syndicates.
TV stations in Haiti generally show movies in both French and English. Poet
and singer Jean-Claude Martineau contends, Without translation, without
adaptation, the TV stations relay exactly what the average North American
viewer is watching in his/her living room: the talk shows, the basketball games,
the violent movies.52 Here is a sample of English programming on Tl Haiti
channels (abbreviated Ch.) for March 14, 1990:53
6:00 a.m. Ch. 5 Bodies in Motion (exercise)
9:00 a.m. Ch. 17 Movie, Robin Hood
10:00 a.m. Ch. 21 Movie, Two Women (drama)
11:30 a.m. Ch. 5 Basic Training Workout (exercise)
2:30 p.m. Ch. 19 Documentary, World of Survival
4:00 p.m. Ch. 5 Legends of World-Class Wrestling
5:30 p.m. Ch. 15 Movie, Time Walker (fantasy)
6:30 p.m. Ch. 2 Tl Presse
8:00 p.m. Ch. 6 Unsolved Mysteries
10:00 p.m. Wiseguy (serial)
Economic Indicator
The first occupation took the steps necessary to ensure the prosperity of American investments by removing from the constitution the prohibition of foreign
landownership. Many American multinationals have offices in Port-au-Prince,
among them Citibank, General Electric, First National Bank of Boston, and
Xerox. Haiti depends on the United States and the international community in
general for its immediate economic needs. This is reflected in that more than
60% of Haitis operational budget and nearly 100% of its development budget
come from the international community.54
The Haitian diaspora, nevertheless, remains the backbone of the Haitian
economy since New York, Miami, and Boston have become economic activity
centers that are now more important than Cap-Haitien, once the second commercial center. These American cities have more Haitians than Cap-Haitien
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does. As social anthropologist Michel Laguerre explains, They have become

magnets of economic activities that maintain commercial relations with and
send remittances to Haiti.55
In 2006 the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimated that the
diaspora channeled some $1.65 billion to Haiti. These funds represent the
equivalent of more than a third of the gross national product (GNP) of the
entire country. The IDB reported that $1.17 billion of that amount came from
Haitian expatriates in the United States. Diasporic citizens in Canada remitted
$230 million, those in France $130 million, and $33 million from the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas. Diasporic remittances from these countries
to Haiti increased in 2007 to $1.8 billion. This reflects an increase of 7 percent
in the $66.5 billion sent globally by emigrant workers to their various home
countries.56 More recently, the president of the Haitian Senate, Simon Dieuseul
Desras, estimated at $2 billion the diasporas remittances in boosting the Haitian economy.57
The diaspora undertakes development projects in Haiti as well. In 2002,
lAssociation des Mdecins Haitiens lEtranger (AMHA) financed the renovation of the Maison des Etudiants (Student Hall of the public medical school)
at a cost of $100,000. This hall was closed for thirteen years for lack of renovation funds. The theme of a Port-au-Prince conference confirms the diasporas
strong economic influence: The Haitian Diaspora: An Indispensable Partner
in the Economic Development of Haiti. American Ambassador Brian Curran,
who sponsored the effort, said that the diaspora can play an important role in
the development of the country.58 To take advantage of the economic power of
the diaspora, steps were taken to stimulate Haitians in the diaspora to invest in
the country. In 2009, USAID joined the local business community with Sogebank, a large commercial bank in Haiti, to launch the Diaspora Marketplace,
a two-year pilot program designed to promote direct foreign investment in
Haiti by Haitians in the diaspora. USAID Director Beth Cypser affirmed that
the program constituted a new opportunity to engage diasporic investment in
the Haitian economy.59
Following the devastating earthquake of January 2012, long lines formed in
front of transfer companies such as Western Union and Moneygram to receive
funds from families residing elsewhere. In advance of a UN donors meeting,
the diaspora held a special forum in Washington from March 21 to 23, 2010. On
June 7, 2013, the diasporic organization Haiti Renewal Alliance held in Washington its Fourth Annual Conference, inviting diasporic Haitians to do their
share in the reconstruction of Haiti.
Political Indicator
Politics occupies an important place in globalization. Studebaker asserts, Political globalization consists of the triumph of the nation state as the dominant method of political organization in the world, the similarity of the basic
function of government from state to state, and a global spread of the democratic political system.60 Globalization, though, creates a huge problem for
Haiti, a nation that has always claimed to be democratic though has yet to
fully implement a democratic political system. Thirty years of the Duvalier
dictatorship speaks volume of the travesty of Haitian democratic practices.
The Constitution of 1987, however, inaugurated a new beginning by making
provisions to implant democracy and to affirm the inviolable rights of the
Haitian people. Ever since its adoption, Haiti has been in the transitional
process to democracy.
The diaspora is determined to make a difference at this level as well. From
the United States, there is a push to influence the political process in Haiti.
It stems from the 1960s when political exiles settled in New York City fleeing the Duvalier dictatorship. Former senator Louis Djoie presided over the
Democratic League of Haiti, which was made up of former top personalities in
Haitis politics. In January 1959 the league sent a cable to Duvalier, calling on
him to demonstrate a democratic act of patriotism and courage in resigning
the presidency.61 The cable was predictably ignored.
Later, through its secretary, Camille Lhrisson, the league tried to apply economic pressure to the Duvalier regime by asking the Friends of Haiti to withhold aid until an atmosphere of democracy and human liberty was restored
to the Republic.62 The effort to influence political change reached its summit
during Aristides wilderness journey. From Washington the exiled president
fought to restore the democratic process in his homeland. For three years he
mounted a significant lobbying effort aimed at forcing the Clinton administration to return him to the Haitian presidency. The American president finally
acted by suggesting the implementation of democracy in Haiti.
The struggle to further the democratic process remains alive with the diaspora. Haitian newspapers published in the United States like the Haiti Observateur, Haiti Progrs, Haiti en Marche, and more recently the Haitian Times are
available in Haiti and widely promote democracy. They provide information
about events in the United States and Haiti for Haitian consumption in America,
but they also influence political life in Haiti. Laguerre suggests that the ideas
promulgated by these newspapers are developed on American soil, and they
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project a model of democracy for Haiti based on or influenced by American

ideas and ideals. Through their influence on the Haitian political system, these
newspapers have imbued the local scene with American-bred political ideas.63
The diaspora also translates its economic influence into political power.
During a meeting with Edwin Paraison, Minister of Haitians living abroad,
leaders of the estimated 1.2 million Haitians living in Florida said they wanted
more than to send money. They demanded their own integration into the political life of the country as citizens living abroad.64 In response to these requests, the minister introduced a bill to the Electoral Council providing for
the establishment of polling stations in the Dominican Republic, Miami, New
York, and Montreal, where there are great numbers of Haitians.
The diasporas endeavor is paying off. They were rewarded with participation in the Haitian local political process. In June 2012 the constitution was
amended to accommodate their civic and political rights. Now they can run
for certain political offices other than the legislature and presidency.
In August 2010 Haitian American singer Wyclef Jean appeared on CNN
with Larry King to declare his candidacy for the presidency of Haiti. CNN was
rather an unusual place to announce his candidacy. His decision reflects not
only the era of globalization but also the growing prominence of the diaspora
in Haitian affairs.
African Americans, too, have long engaged in the struggle to build a Haitian
democratic state. The effort of civil rights activist Walter Francis White to influence Magloires autocratic government was a step in that direction. During
the exodus of boat people, the Congressional Black Caucus pursued a similar
policy. When 6,000 Haitians and their supporters marched on Washington to
urge the release of their compatriots from detention camps and federal prisons,
the Reverend Walter Fauntroy blasted the Duvalier regime for its failure in promoting democracy: You have not demonstrated an interest in creating justice
or enhancing political freedom for your own people.65 African American efforts to promote democracy in Haiti include the intervention by Ambassador
Andrew Young during the Carter administration.
Still, outside pressure from diasporic figures and even their presence in the
Haitian government has yet to change the political system. Like the U.S. Congress, the Haitian legislature is often divided by bickering and quarrels that hinder the proper management of the peoples business. It sometimes has difficulty
winning a quorum to conduct business. In 2000, Prime Minister Yvon Neptune
complained of a lack of quorum at the Haitian Senate since too many senators
were traveling to the United States and Italy. Others chose to stay home.66
Haitians clamor to have free, transparent, honest, and democratic elections.

The process is heavily controlled by foreigners with behind-the-scenes maneuvering that prevents this from happening. Elections in Haiti are likened
to the local rural tradition called kombit, a form of communal work involving too many hands. The kombit is carried out by what is commonly called
lInternational, or the joining of hands of foreign powers to make it happen, a sign of the weakness of the Haitian government. In some instances,
Mexico provides the polling equipment. MINUSTAH takes charge of logistics
and transportation. The United States and the European Union offer finances.
Observers invade the country from the OAS, as do Democrat and Republican
representatives from the United States.
Haitians must still face the great challenge of respecting the calendar of
these elections. Since 2011, the legislature has functioned without all of its
members whose terms came to an end. Efforts to pull together an electoral
council seemed to be forever marred by bitter controversy. Though President
Michel Martelly proposed the creation of a permanent council, the legislature
opted for a provisional one. The United States applied pressure for the realization of these elections. On February 7, 2013, Pamela Ann White, the new
American ambassador to Haiti, and Cheryl Mills, former chief of staff for Hillary Clinton and now coordinator of Haitian affairs in the State Department,
visited Haitian Senate President Simon Dieuseul Desras and the speaker of the
Haitian legislature, Tholbert Alexis, to get them to hold elections. The American diplomats made it clear that a credible election is a condition of receiving
financial support for the electoral council. The United States stood ready to
contribute $15 million for these elections.67 Haiti is still far from controlling its
political destiny.
The Haitianization of America

The Americanization of Haiti is not fully studied without considering the Haitianization of the United States. It would be a narrow approach to ignore what
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. called the interrelated structure of reality.68 The
Haitian diaspora made its presence felt when Haitians demonstrated in New
York in April 1990. One million assembled and marched from Grand Army
Plaza in Brooklyn across the Brooklyn Bridge to Wall Street. They protested a
report by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention depicting Haitians
as carrying AIDS.
In Laguerres view, the diasporic process involves the transformation of a
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secondary homeland into a primary homeland.69 This operation took place

with a wave of Haitian immigrants who came to American shores beginning
in the nineteenth century. They made their mark in education, religion, culinary arts, the legal system, and more. They influenced American Catholicism through the creation of biracial congregations and more specifically with
the establishment of the Oblate Sisters of Providence, the worlds first black
Catholic religious community.70 In the antebellum South, the arts were given
a boost when experienced St. Domingan actors, actresses, singers, dancers and
stage entrepreneurs began arriving in Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, and
New Orleans, eager to continue their professions.71 Second-generation Haitian Americans became active in politics after the Civil War. Robert Carlos Delarge and Alonzo J. Ransier served as the first black congressmen following the
war. In Louisiana, the Comit des Citoyens (Ctizens Committee) fought Act 11
of 1890, which established separate accommodations for whites and blacks in
trains. They brought the famous case Plessy v. Ferguson to the courts.
If transnationality was evident during the nineteenth century by the various
influences of the first wave of Haitian emigrants, it is all the more manifest in
our globalized contemporary world.72 Haitianization of America is a natural
result of Haitians who brought their lifestyles along with their worldly goods
when they moved to the United States. As with other ethnic groups, Haitian
culture is visible in the restaurants and churches, the media and artistic activities in Haitian American neighborhoods. Professor Flore Zphir of the
University of MissouriColumbia indicates that Haitians have been able to
transplant a great deal of their homeland traditions in New York City.73
According to Bahamian actor Ron Butler, No other country in the Caribbeannot even the Dominican Republic, with which Haiti shares the island
of Hispaniolahas produced a quality of art that can be compared to that of
Haiti.74 Haitian art is both present and valued in the United States. In 1978
the Brooklyn Museum of New York featured an exhibition of Haitian art with
a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National
Endowment for the Arts.75 The exhibition traveled to the Milwaukee Art Center and the New Orleans Museum of Art. In 2004 Haiti was included in the
Smithsonian Folklore Festival featuring the theme Freedom and Creativity
from the Mountains to the Sea.76 Haitian art is not just exhibited in museums
around America but is hung in countless American living rooms.
The Galerie dArt Nader was established in Haiti in 1966 and soon became
an internationally recognized gallery with the largest selection of Haitian art
in the world. It promoted the presence of Haitian art in America when it es-
tablished a branch in Coral Gables, Florida. The Florida gallery features itself
as a reputable, reliable and resourceful online art gallery specializing in selling
original Haitian paintings and in appraising Haitian art. Haitian art remains
attractive for its originality in reflecting daily life, nature, and the vodou religion. It combines elements of African art with the Haitian landscape. The result
is bright, distinctive colors that render the art unique and distinctly Haitian.
Haitian musicians have made significant contributions to the American pop
culture scene. In 1996 the rap group the Fugees recorded their hit song The
Score, which sold more than twelve million copies in just over a year. One of
the groups stars, Wyclef Jean, won Grammy awards as a musician, composer,
and singer. He became a mega hip-hop star, the most popular Haitian American musician on the scene. According to Flore Zphir, Wyclef s impact on
American society is immeasurable; he is one of the most important treasures
of contemporary American and world music.77 Another Haitian celebrity is
Hollywood star Garcelle Beauvais, considered to be a household name to
many television viewers around the country for her work on the Jamie Fox
Show (19962001).78
The Haitianization of America has produced literary works through the artistic talents of novelist and essayist Edwidge Danticat. She was born in Haiti
and has lived in America since the age of twelve. Danticat has won critical acclaim with her depictions of Haitian immigrants in works like The Farming of
Bones and the memoir Brother, Im Dying. She emerged as a towering figure in
American literature through her critically praised books.
Finally, Haitians are increasingly visible in the political arena. Haitian
Americans are being elected in state legislatures around the country, among
them Marie Lafleur in Massachusetts and Philipp Brutus in Florida. There are
also Haitian American mayors in some U.S. cities.
As the diaspora continues to increase its power both in the United States
and in Haiti, the Americanization process is bound to increase. The immigration of Haitians to the United States is likely to grow. It will certainly bring with
it an increased Haitianization of their adopted land.
155
Epilogue
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States and Haiti, the two
oldest republics in the Western Hemisphere, remain locked in contrary destinies. The two are separated by many differences. This gap was expressed by a
recent comparison of the gross domestic product (GDP) of each. While 10.4
million Haitians living in Haiti have a GDP of $12.9 billion annually, for the
314.2 million Americans, that number is $15.7 trillion. Another example of the
gap between the two countries is shown as desired tourist destinations. Haiti is
one of the worst tourist destinations in the world. Conversely, the United States
is one of the most coveted destinations in the Western Hemisphere.
Since the first occupation in 1915, Haiti has remained virtually under American control. James A. Paul of the Global Policy Forum has raised the question Is Haiti a permanent US colony?1 This is a shocking question. Yet it is
worth asking in light of all the American interventions and ongoing influence
in Haiti.
The nation-states of our current world are becoming increasingly interdependent and caught up with globalization. Haitis destiny is certainly interwoven into that state of interdependence. While there is plenty of room for this,
the challenge for each country is to strike a balance and still maintain and
strengthen its own independence. Haiti must break this long-standing pattern
of dependence.
The direction toward auto-determination must begin at the economic level.
As demonstrated earlier, there is a definite standard expected from a state for
economic and political globalization. The issue for Haitian leaders is to craft
and apply a development plan that meets the basic needs of its citizens with
proper economic power, health and education. The Martelly-Lamothe administration has put the issue of restarting the agricultural sector on the table.
Political independence requires economic self-sufficiency.
Haiti is thought to be an outcast and a failed state. This political failure
Epilogue
is definitely associated with the economic predicament of the country. Now

Haiti requires outside financial aid to function as an independent state. But
elections, a vital instrument for Haitis socioeconomic development, have not
been held since the 1987 Constitution without internal conflicts and foreign
intervention. Political independence calls for leaders to rise above the traditional stagnant, self-serving leadership patterns in which they have long been
engaged.2
Haitis liberation from external control is not yet in sight. In 2013 the UN
Security Council renewed MINUSTAHs mandate until 2016. Susan Rice, then
U.S. representative to the United Nations, justified this measure due to the serious challenges that must still be met in Haiti: the holding of just and credible
elections and the need to establish a Haitian national police force to provide
security for the population.3
Haitis first challenge is reconstruction following the devastating earthquake
of 2010. For this reconstruction, Haiti still remains at the mercy of the international community. The NGOs involved in reconstruction are engaged in an
independent path that does not seek input from the Haitian government.
Now the two key concepts involved in Haitis path to political and economic
autonomy are democracy and development. The historiography ranging from
occupation to reoccupation shows that Haiti and the United States have contrary destinies. While the United States has been pushing for democracy in
Haiti, its officials usually envision a democratic process driven by the political
status quo within the bounds of law and order under American control. At the
centerpiece of American foreign policy stand U.S. interests. Even in the Syrian
civil war that shocked the world by its atrocities and the use of weapons of mass
destruction, President Obama has been perceived as favoring stability over
American values.4
Likewise for American policymakers, economic development take place to
promote the stability of foreign markets. In 1994 Jean-Bertrand Aristide had to
sell his soul before President Clinton used American military might to return
him to power. He rejected his populist platform favoring the masses and accepted a structural adjustment through policies implemented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In the end, Haiti is still defined in
terms of negative superlatives: the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere
with the accompanying indicators in health care, nutrition insecurity, infant
mortality, and so forth.
Yet the Haitian people still manage to defy classification by these world bodies concerned with socioeconomic conditions. Despite being abandoned by
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Contrary Destinies
their government and a morally repugnant elite, they still go about living their
lives with the highest level of hope. Their enterprising efforts still provide a ray
of hope that their lot in life will improve.
Haitians want to maintain their identity. They remain a proud people still
inspired by their heroic independence. As described by the Haitian poet JeanClaude Martineau, The Haitian people cannot be satisfied outside of their
culture, meaning the pride in their history, the respect of their traditions; the
taste of their food.5
The trajectory from occupation to reoccupation demonstrates that the
United States behaves in Haiti in light of U.S. national interests. Haitians have
to rise up to uphold their own national interests in investing in true democracy and the development of their country. The rebirth and reconstruction of
Haiti must begin from within and not without. Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew
Thompson said it well: Haitis destiny is in the hands of Haitians. While the
international community can assist, it cannot assume the burden of governing.6
We chose to repeat the vision cast by the framers of the Constitution of 1987
for a socially just, economically free, and politically independent Haitian Nation. To keep alive the hope of a better Haiti, Haitians must rally around this
vision of an ideal nation.
Notes
Prologue
1. Martelly: Aprs la double nationalit, laffaire dite de la double identit.
Tropiques FM, March 13, 2012, at http://tropiquesfm.net. Translations are the authors
unless otherwise indicated.
2. Arthur and Dash, introduction to Foreign Interventions section, Haiti Anthology, ed. Arthur and Dash, 209.
3. Rosenberg, Bursting Americas Imperial Bubble, 63.
4. Lange, Colonialism and Development.
5. Manigat, Les deux cents ans dhistoire du peuple haitien, 101.
6. In Arthur and Dash, introduction to Foreign Interventions section, Haiti Anthology, ed. Arthur and Dash, 212.
Chapter 1. Two Contrary Destinies

1. The epigraph is from Soukar, Entretiens avec lhistoire, 7071: One cannot define
a foreign policy without considering the USA. In addition, the Caribbean historical
heritage is conditioned by uncertainty. . . . To be placed in the context, it is important
to know the American policy in the region.
2. Garrity and Gray, Columbia History of the World, 692.
3. Logan, Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 6; Plummer, Black
and White in the Caribbean, 1:2.
4. Matthewson, Proslavery Foreign Policy, 44; Montague, Haiti and the United
States, 32.
5. Pezzullo, Plunging into Haiti, 56.
6. Bellegarde, Loccupation amricaine dHaiti, 6. See also Adrien, Forgotten Heroes of Savannah.
7. G. Brown, Toussaints Clause, 4.
8. Abbott, Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy, 17.
9. Matthewson, Proslavery Foreign Policy, 2427; Montague, Haiti and the United
States, 33.
160 Notes to Pages 311
10. Cited in Tyson, Toussaint Louverture, 93.

11. Matthewson, Proslavery Foreign Policy, 49.
12. Jefferson to Governor Morris, in Jefferson, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 49.
13. Cited in Documents, Letters of Toussaint Louverture and of Edward Stevens,
17981800, American Historical Review 16 (19101911): 64.
14. Jerome, Toussaint LOuverture, 1922. See also Korngold, Citizen Toussaint, 125.
15. Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 22426.
16. Edward Stevens to Timothy Pickering, May 3, 1799, in American Historical
Review 16 (19101911): 71.
17. In Documents. Introducing Letters of Toussaint Louverture and of Edward
Stevens, 17981800, American Historical Review 16 (191011): 67.
18. Montague, Haiti and the United States, 14.
19. Toussaint Louverture to John Adams, August 14, 1799, in American Historical
Review 16 (19101911): 82.
20. Stevens to Pickering, June 24, 1799, in American Historical Review 16 (1910
1911): 80.
21. Stevens to Pickering, April 19, 1800, in American Historical Review 16 (1910
1911): 97.
22. Jefferson and Leclerc cited in Matthewson, Proslavery Foreign Policy, 109.
23. Cited in Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 304.
24. Hamilton, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 18:130.
25. Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial, 18032003, pamphlet, http://www.louisiana
purchase2003.com/home.cfm, accessed April 27, 2014.
26. Dunbar-Nelson, People of Color in Louisiana.
27. See Le Gardeur, First New Orleans Theater, and Hunt, Haitis Influence on Antebellum America, 47111.
28. Holly, Vindication of the Capacity of the Negro Race for Self-Government, 22.
29. Steward, Haitian Revolution, ivv.
30. G. Brown, Toussaints Clause, 4.
31. Geggus, introduction to Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic
World, ix.
32. In Pompilus, Manuel illustr dhistoire de la littrature haitienne, 10.
33. Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 347.
34. Cited in Matthewson, Proslavery Foreign Policy, 125.
35. Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 376.
36. Quoted in ibid., 371.
37. Kellogg, NAACP, 1:19.
38. Chase and Collier, Justice Denied, vvi.
39. Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 303.
40. Dash, Status Quo, 45.
41. (Petersburg, VA) Intelligencer, cited in Genius of Universal Emancipation, June
1825.
Notes to Pages 1118
42. Debows review, Early Congressional Discussions upon Slavery Collection, 41.
At Making of America Journals, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moajrnl/.
43. In Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts, 220.
44. Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 304
45. In Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts, 269. See also Dubois, Avengers of
the New World, 305; Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, 212.
46. See Hunt, Haitis Influence on Antebellum America, 56. Hunt relates that James
Pitot, the first mayor of New Orleans, was from Saint-Domingue.
47. In Debien and Le Gardeur, Saint-Domingue Refugees in Cuba, 186.
48. Cited in Montague, Haiti and the United States, 52.
49. Ibid., 53.
50. Ibid., 52.
51. Meinig, Shaping of America, 191.
52. Jefferson to James Monroe, November 24, 1801, in Jefferson, Writings of Jefferson, 41923.
53. Dixon, African America and Haiti, 16.
54. Ibid., 3.
55. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, 281.
56. Plummer, Black and White in the Caribbean, 1:8. For a rationale for American intervention in Haiti see Spector, W. Cameron Forbes and the Hoover Commissions to Haiti, viii. In his view, the United States intervened to stabilize the countrys
politics, protect American investments, and prevent European interference.
58. On the subject of American expansion see Bailey, Diplomatic History of the
American People, and Healy, Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era.
59. In Shepherd, Caribbean Policy of the United States, 185.
60. In Logan, Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 433.
62. Daguillard, Jewel in the Crown, 51.
63. Logan, Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti. See also Montague,
Haiti and the United States, 147ff.
64. Douglass, Haiti and the United States.
66. Ibid., 198200.
67. Nicholls, Economic Dependence and Political Autonomy, 20.
69. See Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control, 2728.
70. In Montague, Haiti and the United States, 173.
71. Ibid., 17879.
72. Ibid., ix.
73. Ibid., vi.
74. In Pompilus, Manuel illustr dhistoire de la littrature haitienne, 209.
161
162
Notes to Pages 1926
75. Marcelin, Au gr du souvenir, 3637.

76. U.S. Senate, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo
Domingo, Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 67th
Congress, 1st and 2nd sessions, 1922, 110. Hereafter this document is cited as Senate
Inquiry into Occupation, 1922.
77. German Influence in the Caribbean, Washington Post, May 13, 1914, 6.
78. Henry Furniss to William J. Bryan, April 30, 1912, State Department File, 838.42.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Nicholls, Economic Dependence and Political Autonomy, 2829.
82. Senate Inquiry into Occupation, 1922, 35.
83. In Logan, Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 328.
84. Brissman, Interpreting American Hegemony, 39.
85. Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 12.
86. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 283330. The authors cover here a whole
chapter titled Plots and Revolutions.
87. Editorial, Washington Post, March 19, 1908, 6.
88. Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 12. See also Plummer, Black and White in the
Caribbean, 7075.
89. Marcelin, Au gr du souvenir, 12425.
90. Langston, From the Virginia Plantation to the National Capitol, 360.
Chapter 2. Legacies of the Occupation

1. For detailed accounts of this and related events see Gaillard, Les blancs dbarquent,
8788, and H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, 16668. The Rippy epigraph is from Shepherd, Caribbean Policy of the United States, 185.
2. In Senate Inquiry into Occupation, 1922, 332.
3. Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control, 3536. See also Nicolas, Loccupation
amricaine dHaiti.
4. Jason Wittenberg, What Is a Historical Legacy?
5. Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control, 49.
6. Ferdinand Mayer to Hull, Central Decimal File, U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA), 838.00/3525, July 22, 1940. Hereafter Central Decimal File.
7. In Bellegarde, Loccupation amricaine dHaiti, 21.
8. Plummer, Black and White in the Caribbean, 2:691.
10. Leyburn, Haitian People, 101.
11. Brissman, Interpreting American Hegemony, 7980.
13. Ibid., 215.
Notes to Pages 2631
14. Marvin, Healthy Haiti. See also Plummer, Black and White in the Caribbean, 488, for a description of Dartiguenaves government as a satellite regime.
16. Ibid., 2.
17. Favors Treaty with Haiti, Washington Post, February 10, 1916, 2.
18. In Bellegarde, Loccupation amricaine dHaiti, 10.
19. Pierre-Louis, Les mensonges de notre dmocratie, 18284. See also Brissman,
Interpreting American Hegemony, 93.
21. Ibid., 229.
22. In Spector, W. Cameron Forbes and the Hoover Commissions to Haiti, 39.
23. Bellegarde, Loccupation amricaine dHaiti, 16.
24. Soukar, Entretiens avec lhistoire, 93.
25. Report of the Presidents Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions
in the Republic of Haiti (Washington, DC: GPO, 1930), hereafter cited as Report of
the Presidents Commission, 6.
26. In Renda, Taking Haiti, 31.
27. Memoir on the Political, Economic, and Financial Conditions Existing in the
Republic of Haiti under the American Occupation, The Nation, May 25, 1921, 754.
28. Report of the Presidents Commission, 7.
29. Spector, W. Cameron Forbes and the Hoover Commissions to Haiti, 7374.
30. Gold, Haiti: Best Nightmare on Earth, 79.
32. Inman, Through Santo Domingo and Haiti, 68.
33. Memoir, The Nation, 757. The source is Document Presented at Hearings by
Delegates of the Union Patriotique: Memoir on the Political, Economic, and Financial Conditions Existing in the Republic of Haiti under the American Occupation to
the United States of the Union Patriotique dHaiti, May 25, 1921.
34. Plummer, Black and White in the Caribbean, 2:46768; Heinl and Heinl,
Written in Blood, 41116.
35. Report of the American High Commissioner at Port-au-Prince, January 1,
1923, 16.
36. Soukar, Entretiens avec lhistoire, 94
38. Ministre de la sant publique et de la population, Analyse de la situation sanitaire Haiti, MSPP-OPS/OMS, Port-au-Prince, June 1998, 67. Hereafter this document is cited as Ministre de la sant publique, Analyse.
40. Knapp to Secretary of the Navy, January 13, 1921, NARA, RC45, WA-7 Box 632.
41. Dr. Booker T. Washington on American Occupation of Haiti, New York Age,
October 21, 1915, 1.
42. Ibid., 5.
163
164
Notes to Pages 3137
43. L. Hollingsworth Wood to William Philips, December 13, 1916, Index Bureau,
Department of State File, 838.4016.
44. Philips to Wood, December 22, 1916, Department of State File, 838.4016.
45. In Plummer, Black and White in the Caribbean, 2:48687. See also Paquin,
Les haitiens: Politique de classe et de couleur, 7778.
46. E. W. Hunter, Jim Crow Situation in Haiti. The issue of racial segregation during the American occupation is extensively treated in Hunters 1921 article and elsewhere. For further references see Schmidt, United States Occupation of Haiti, 13553,
and Balch, Occupied Haiti, 11321.
47. Kelsey, American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
48. Schmidt, United States Occupation of Haiti, 138.
49. Schoenrich, Intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti, 220.
50. In Pierre-Louis, Les mensonges de notre dmocratie, 162.
52. Ibid., 174950.
53. Craige, Black Bagdad, 24041.
54. Balch, Occupied Haiti, 15556. The same arguments were made by the first of
the two Hoover commissions, led by Forbes, in its Report of the Presidents Commission, 6, and by the second, led by Robert Moton, in its Report of the United States
Commission on Education in Haiti, October 1930, 65.
56. Price-Mars, La vocation de lelite, 52.
57. Paquin, The Haitians: Class and Color Politics, 73.
58. Ibid., 78
60. Ibid., 1822.
61. Seligman, Conquest of Haiti.
62. Lejeune, letter, The Nation, July 10, 1920, 101.
63. Pitiless Publicity for Haiti, The Nation, October 6, 1920, 367.
64. McCormick, Our Failure in Haiti, 614.
66. Quoted in Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control, 100. The office of high
commissioner was introduced to fit specifically the Haitian situation. It was quite
unique in American experience and considered one of the biggest things that have
been accomplished in recent times in U.S. history; Chapman, Development of Intervention in Haiti, 315.
67. Report of American High Commissioner at Port-au-Prince, 1923, 2.
68. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 476.
69. In Haiti, Documents diplomatiques, 24.
70. Borno, Problems of Interest to Haiti and the United States. President Bornos
collaboration proved to be invaluable to High Commissioner Russell. As Rotberg
puts it in Haiti: The Politics of Squalor, General Russell was omnipotent, a dictator
Notes to Pages 3743
constrained only by harassed officials in the State Department and the degree to
which he relied for political reasons upon the talents of President Borno.
71. In Report of the American High Commissioner at Port-au-Prince, 1925, 56.
72. Ibid., 45.
73. Le Nouvelliste, January 8, 1924. Also see Bulletin officiel du Dpartement de
linstruction publique, OctoberNovember 1922, 45.
74. Buell, Misrepresenting Haiti.
76. The Press in Haiti, The Nation, August 17, 1927, 167168.
77. In Senate Inquiry into Occupation, 1922, 315. The two presidential contenders,
Bobo and Dartiguenave, were interviewed to establish beforehand their willingness
to cooperate with the occupation forces. See Gaillard, Les blancs dbarquent, 14145,
15360, and McCroklin, Garde dHaiti, 2527.
79. Senate Inquiry into Occupation, 1922, 18. In Hard Problems in Haiti, Inman
observes, The man of most power is the financial advisor, an American who has
practically absolute authority over the various items of expenditure by the national
treasury. On the power of the financial adviser see Munro, United States and the
Caribbean Area, 16364.
80. Trouillot and Trouillot, Encyclopdie biographique dHaiti, 1:14041.
82. Bellegarde, Loccupation amricaine dHaiti, 9.
83. Peter G. Gerry to Frank B. Kellogg, March 14, 1927, State Department File,
838.42/42.
84. In Balch, Occupied Haiti, 150.
86. Weinstein and Segal, Haiti: The Failure of Politics, 29.
87. Schmidt, United States Occupation of Haiti, 182. Nicholls contends, in From
Dessalines to Duvalier (147), The policy of the Occupation was in the first place . . . to
encourage United States investment in Haiti. The technical and vocational schools set
up by the Americans in Haiti were specially designed to train Haitians to fill middle
level posts of a semi-skilled kind, particularly in agriculture.
88. Report of the American High Commissioner at Port-au-Prince, 1925, 67.
89. (Agricultural service director) Freeman to Russell, April 2, 1924, State Department File, 838.42/28.
91. Stabler to Gerry, November 27, 1926, State Department File, 838.42/35.
92. Dartigue, Lenseignement en Haiti, 14.
94. Ibid., 36.
95. Ibid., 38.
96. Price-Mars, La vocation de lelite, 5758.
165
166
Notes to Pages 4350
97. A good study on this subject is that of Garrett, Renaissance of Haitian Poetry.
99. President Names Commission, New York Times, February 8, 1930. Also see
Herbert Hoover: 1930: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of
the President, Office of the Federal Register, at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus
/4731688.1930.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext.
100. Report of the United States Commission on Education in Haiti, October 1,
1930, 66.
Chapter 3. Deoccupation within a Culture of Dependency

2. Haitianization agreement between the United States and Haiti, signed August 5,
1931. The occupation ended on August 1, 1934, and on October 1 the Haitian government assumed control.
3. Bonds That Bind Haiti, The Nation, September 21, 1932, 243.
4. Gruening, Issue in Haiti.
5. H. Herring, Haitis New Deal, The Nation, November 22, 1933, 137.
6. Text of Agreement by the United States and Haiti, New York Times, August
8, 1933.
7. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 16364.
8. Haiti to Control Its Own Finances, New York Times, April 18, 1934.
9. Stnio Vincent to Wilkins, The Crisis, September 25, 1934. The Crisis magazine,
published since 1910, is online at http://www.thecrisismagazine.com/.
10. In La Presse, June 20, 1931.
11. Resolution of Deputy Edouard Piou, La Presse, August 10, 1931, as translated
in General Record of the Department of State 711.30.
12. Memorandum of Ferdinand Mayer to Duggan and Sumner Welles, May 27,
1938, Central Decimal File, 711.18.
13. Liautaud, Les relations haitiano-amricaines, Haiti Journal, January 28, 1937.
14. Gordon to Secretary of State, December 21, 1936, Central Decimal File, 711.38.
15. Welles, March 28, 1939, Central Decimal File, 711.38/300.
16. Mayer to Secretary of State, July 8, 1939, Central Decimal File, 711.38. This and
subsequent 1939 Mayer documents are available at http://images.library.wisc.edu/
FRUS/EFacs/1939v05/reference/frus.frus1939v05.i0024.pdf.
17. In Norman Armour to Secretary of State, March 17, 1935, Central Decimal File,
711.38/611.3831.
18. In Mayer to Hull, March 23, 1939, Central Decimal File, 711.38.
19. Hull to Mayer, March 24, 1939, Central Decimal File, 711.38/811.34538.
20. In Hull to Mayer, July 14, 1939, Central Decimal File, 711.38.
21. Mayer to Hull, March 31, 1939, Central Decimal File, 711.38/1805.
22. Mayer to Hull, July 5, 1939, Central Decimal File, 711.38/305.
Notes to Pages 5056
23. Mayer to Hull, July 11, 1939, Central Decimal File, 711.38.
24. Welles to Secretary of State, Central Decimal File, 711.38/300, March 28, 1939;
also see July 17, 1940, Central Decimal File, 838.00/3522.
26. Ibid.
28. Vincent to Lescot, December 17, 1940, Central Decimal File, 838.00/3547.
29. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 499.
30. Under Secretary of State to John Campbell White, December 31, 1937, in Kellogg, Papers of the NAACP, part 11.
31. Thurston to Scott, January 3, 1931, Central Decimal File, 711.38/265.
32. Monroe to Secretary of State, January 19, 1932, Central Decimal File, 711.38/257.
33. George A. Gordon to Secretary of State, telegram, April 3, 1936, Official Correspondence, American Legation Port-a-Prince, Haiti, vol. 4, 1936.
34. Ibid.
35. In Mayer to Hull, February 3, 1940, Central Decimal File, 838.00/3517.
36. Grard de Catalogne to Sumner Welles, December 4, 1939, Central Decimal
File, 838.00/3545.
37. Le Matin, Pan Americanism and Haitian Interests, June 3, 1940.
38. Smith, Red and Black in Haiti, 2829.
40. Alexander to Du Bois, in Du Bois, Correspondence of W.E.B. Du Bois, 107.
41. Bacon to Hull, December 12, 1940, Central Decimal File, 838.003546.
42. Sparks to Secretary of State, January 31, 1941, Central Decimal File, 838.00/3561.
43. White to Secretary of State, April 8, 1941, Central Decimal File, 838.003592.
44. White to Hull, June 7, 1941, Central Decimal File, 838.00/3608.
45. February 14, 1938, Central Decimal File, 711.38288.
46. Lescot, Mmoire, January 17, 1941, Central Decimal File, 711.38/326. Lescot was
considered a loyal servant of U.S. interests.
47. May 19, 1941, Central Decimal File, 838.00.
48. In Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 510.
49. Intelligence Report, September 27, 1941, Central Decimal File, 838.00/3617.
50. Foreign Service Dispatch, September 24, 1952, Central Decimal File, 738.00/91952.
51. White to Hull, June 6, 1941, Central Decimal File, 838.00/3606.
52. Grew to Embassy in Haiti, June 21, 1945, Central Decimal File, 838.00/6-445.
53. Lescots Panorama of Government Activities, July 5, 1945, Central Decimal File,
838.00/7-245.
54. Memorandum of conversation, October 11, 1945, Central Decimal File,
838.00/10-1145.
55. Lescot, Mmoire, January 17, 1941, Central Decimal File, 711.38/326.
56. Current Problems, January 5, 1946, Central Decimal File, 838.00/1-548.
167
168
Notes to Pages 5663

58. Walter White, Loan to Haiti Asked to Offset U.S. Sins, Washington Post,
March 9, 1947.
60. Jacques C. Antoine to Secretary of State, January 13, 1946, Central Decimal
File, 838.00/1-1346.
61. Memo of conversation, January 24, 1946, Central Decimal File, 838.00/1-2446.
62. Wilson to Secretary of State, March 11, 1946, Central Decimal File, 711.38/31146.
63. C. C. Hauch Jr. to Barber, March 25, 1946, Central Decimal File, 711.38/3-1446.
64. Wilson to Secretary of State, January 29, 1946, Central Decimal File, 838.00/11446.
65. Wilson to Secretary of State, January 22, 1946, Central Decimal File, 838.00/12246.
66. Wilson to Secretary of State, August 18, 1946, Central Decimal File, 711.38/81846.
67. La situation, Haiti Journal, March 8, 1946.
68. Le Nouvelliste, March 14, 1947.
69. Stuart Morrison, Miami Herald, September 17, 1946.
70. McBride to Secretary of State, review of President Estims first year, September 5, 1947, Central Decimal File, 838.00/9-547. See also Diederich and Burt, Papa
Doc, 63.
71. William E. DeCourcy to Secretary of State, January 12, 1949, Central Decimal
File, 838.00/1-1249.
72. Proclamation, May 12, 1950, Central Decimal File, 738.00/5-1250.
73. Burns to Secretary of State, May 12, 1950, Central Decimal File, 738.00/5-1050.
74. DeCourcy to State, May 19, 1950, Central Decimal File, 738.00/5-.
75. Burns to Department of State, May 12, 1950, Central Decimal File, 738.00/51250.
76. DeCourcy to Secretary of State, May 19, 1950, Central Decimal File, 738.0051950.
77. Plummer, Black and White in the Caribbean, 2:415.
78. Memorandum of conversation, February 6, 1956, in Central Decimal File,
738.00/2-856.
79. Sparks to Hull, October 9, 1940, Central Decimal File, 838.00/3535.
80. Magloires inaugural speech, December 15, 1950, Central Decimal File,
738.11/12-1550.
81. Roy Davis, in Foreign Service dispatch, Central Decimal File, 738.11/7-2054.
82. Davis to Secretary of State, December 3, 1956, Central Decimal File, 738.00/12356.
83. J. Edgar Hoover to Lyon, May 5, 1945, Central Decimal File, 838.00/5-545.
Notes to Pages 6470
84. Wilson to Secretary of State, Central Decimal File, 838.00/2-946.

85. Harold H. Tittmann to Secretary of State, March 17, 1947, Central Decimal File,
838.00/3-1747.
86. Tittmann to Secretary of State, June 29, 1948, Central Decimal File, 838.00B/
62948.
87. Burns to Secretary of State, December 31, 1950, Central Decimal File, 738.00/112-3150.
88. Hauch to Miller, January 3, 1951, Central Decimal File, 738.000/1/351.
89. Magloire to Truman, November 7, 1952, Central Decimal File738.11/1-552.
90. April 15, 1952, Central Decimal File, 738.001/4-1552.
91. Confidential Dispatch No. 669, September 5, 1947, Central Decimal File,
838.00/8-1447.
92. Blackiston to Secretary of State, January 13, 1953, Central Decimal File,
738.001/1-1353.
93. Burns on Status of Communist Activity in Haiti, May 11, 1951, Central Decimal
File, 738.001/5-1151.
94. Foreign Service Despatch on Communism in Haiti, June 25, 1952, Central
Decimal File, 738.001/6-2552.
95. DeCourcy to Secretary of State, September 30, 1949, Central Decimal File,
8383.00(W)/9-2949.
96. November 15, 1952, Central Decimal File, 738.11/11/1551.
97. White to Dulles, March 19, 1953, Central Decimal File, 738.11/3-1953.
98. White to Dulles, August 26, 1953, Central Decimal File, 738.1/8-2653.
99. Eisenhower Recalls Haitian Aid, New York Times, January 2, 1954.
100. Murphy to Eisenhower, May 28, 1954, Central Decimal File, 738.11/52854.
101. Burns to Pearson, December 4, 1953, Central Decimal File, 738.11/2-453.
102. Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc, 72.
103. Memorandum of conversation involving Leger, Holland, and Connett, August
11, 1954, Central Decimal File, 738.11/8-1154.
104. Lloyd to Dulles, July 11, 1956, Central Decimal File, 611.384/7-1156.
105. Memorandum of conversation, Zephirin and Montllor, December 11, 1956,
Central Decimal File, 738.0012/1156.
106. Tasco to Fromer, December 17, 1956, Central Decimal File, 738.00/12-1756.
107. Florival, Duvalier: La face cache de Papa Doc, 31.
Chapter 4. In the Throes of the Cold War

1. Maingot, Haitian Crisis, 5.
2. Dash, Status Quo, 48.
4. Thurston to Martin, July 8, 1962, Central Decimal File, M18SS roll 48.
169
170
Notes to Pages 7076
5. Harrison to Abbuhl, May 16, 1961, Central Decimal File, 196063, M18SS.
6. VP Randolph III, Document on Haitian-American Relations 19571959, Central
Decimal File, Despatch No. 83 from Port-au-Prince.
7. Davis to Department of State, March 27, 1958, Central Decimal File, VP Randolph III, Document.
8. Ambassador Drew, President Duvalier Seal Accord, New York Times, August
23, 1958.
9. Randolph to the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 738.00/1-3058.
10. Paquin, The Haitians, 130. Also see Afro-American, May 17, 1958, and December
10, 1957.
11. Louis Lomax, Haiti Seen on verge of National Suicide, Afro-Baltimore, December 10, 1957.
12. Randolph to the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 738.00/1-3058.
13. Ibid.
14. Drew to Department of State, February 20, 1958, Central Decimal File,
611.38/2.2058.
15. Loescher and Scanlan, Human Rights, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Haitian Refugees, 320.
16. VP Randolph III, Document to the Department of State, Central Decimal File,
738.00/1-3058.
17. Intelligence Memorandum, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO]), 196468, 32:792. Publication
hereafter cited as FRUS.
18. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Vol. E-10, Documents on
American Republics, 1969-1972, Document 384: Memorandum of Conversation, June
19, 1969.
19. Thurston to Martin, July 8, 1962, Central Decimal File, 196063, M18SS roll 48.
20. Newbegin to Department of State, February 1, 1961, Central Decimal File,
196063, MS18SS roll 48.
21. Memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee I, June 15, 1965, FRUS, 32:800.
22. Guidelines of U.S Policy toward Haiti, September 18, 1963, Central Decimal
File, 196063, M18SS roll 48.
23. Ibid.
24. CIIR, Haiti: Building Democracy, 6.
25. Harrison to Acting Secretary of Department of State, May 16, 1964, Central
Decimal File, 196063, M18SS roll 48.
26. Memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee, FRUS, 196468, 32:792.
28. Looking and Listening: Haitis Crisis, The Crisis, November 1963, 543.
29. Conversation Duvalier-Timmons, February 13, 1964, FRUS, 196468, 32:766.
30. In President Clintons Mess in Haiti, editorial, Haiti Observateur, July 916,
1997.
Notes to Pages 7681
31. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, March 24,
1964, FRUS, 196468, vol. 32.
32. Intelligence Memorandum, FRUS 196468, 32:792.
33. Timmons to Department of State, June 4, 1965, FRUS, 196468, 32:79.
34. In Harrison to Abbuhl, May 16, 1961, Central Decimal File, 196063, M18SS.
35. Trouillot and Trouillot, Encyclopdie biographique dHaiti, 1:356.
36. Memorandum of conversation, Bonhomme and Eisenhower, August 4, 1958,
Central Decimal File, 811/58/8-405.
38. Plummer, Haiti and the United States, 1.
39. Jean Pierre, U.S. Policy toward Haiti, 19911994, 88.
40. Background for Haitian Contingency Planning, February 1, 1962, Central
Decimal File, 196063, M18SS roll 48.
41. Ibid.
42. Rostow to Johnson, May 21, 1968, FRUS, 196468, vol. 32, document 366.
43. Vaky to Kissinger, April 24, 1970, FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10.
44. Raymond Thurston to Department of State, Guidelines of United States Policy
toward Haiti, March 13, 1962, Central Decimal File, 196063, M18SS.
45. Haiti Contingency Plan, FRUS, April 29, 1966, E10:823.
46. Newbegin, Foreign Policy Dispatch, February 1, 1961, Central Decimal File,
196063, M18SS.
47. Dan Kurzman, Policy on Aid for Tyrants Is Put to the Test in Haiti, Washington Post, January 1, 1963.
48. Knox to Department of State, March 23, 1971, FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10.
49. Crockett to Mann, FRUS, 196468, 32:77982; Harrison to Abbuhl, May 16,
1961, Central Decimal File, 196063, M18SS.
50. Policy paper prepared in the embassy in Haiti and the Office of Caribbean Affairs, Department of State, FRUS 196468, 32:771;. Harrison to Abbuhl, May 16, 1961,
Central Decimal File, 196063, M18SS.
51. Plummer, Haitian Migrants and Backyard Imperialism, 42.
52. Thurston to Department of State, Guidelines of United States Policy towards
Haiti, March 13, 1962, Central Decimal File, M18SS.
53. Stanley Penn, Papa Docs Fiefdom, Wall Street Journal, July 6, 1970.
54. Crockett to Mann, FRUS, 196468, 32:782.
55. Timmons to the Department of State, FRUS, 196468, 32:786.
56. Nicholls, Haitian Predicament, 4.
57. Document of Acting Secretary of State, May 16, 1961, Central Decimal File,
196063 M18SS.
58. Timmons to Department of State, FRUS, 196468, 32:762.
59. Policy and Action Paper for Haiti, January 19, 1966, FRUS, 196468, 32:811.
60. Document to Acting Secretary of State, May 16, 1961, Central Decimal File,
196063, M18SS.
171
172
Notes to Pages 8288
61. William Bowdler to Rostow, September 19, 1966, FRUS, 196468, 32:827.
62. Record of Agreements and Decisions of 18th Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Review Group, July 27, 1967, FRUS, 196468, 32:84344.
63. Rostow to Johnson, May 21, 1968, FRUS, 196468, Document 366.
64. July 1, 1969, FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10.
65. Gordon to Bundy, FRUS, 196468, 32:769. Americans were well aware of Duvaliers health status. In 1959 two U.S. Navy physicians were flown from Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, to Port-au-Prince to treat the president, who had suffered a heart attack.
66. Policy paper prepared in the embassy in Haiti and the Office of Caribbean Affairs, Department of State, April 23, 1964, FRUS, 196468, 32:773.
67. Memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee, FRUS, 196468, 32:792.
68. Knox to Secretary of State, March 23, 1971, FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10. Intelligence Note from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, August 20, 1970, no.
RARN-34, FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10.
69. Kissinger to Nixon, April 22, 1971, FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10.
70. Nicholls, Haitian Predicament, 8.
71. Knox to Department of State, July 20, 1971, FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10.
72. Benjamin Welles, U.S. Cautiously Seeking Better Haitian Relations, New York
Times, August 14, 1971.
73. Memorandum of conversation from the mission to the United Nations to the
Department of State, October 9, 1971, FRUS, 196976.
74. GAO, Assistance to Haiti, 5; see also Wilson, Military Rule and the Hopes for
Democracy in Haiti, 4.
75. Knox to Secretary of State, August 14, 1972, FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10.
76. Rogers to Nixon, November 2, 1971, FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10.
77. Maingot, Haitian Crisis, 1.
78. In Excerpts from Statements on Cuba and the Caribbean by Walter Stoessel,
New York Times, March 26, 1982.
79. Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights in Hearing before the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 2nd session (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1990), 154; hereafter cited as Lawyers Committee Hearing.
80. A Report to Congress: The Haitian Government Violates the Conditions of P.L.
90-473 for U.S. Foreign Aid, prepared by Washington Office on Haiti, February 1985.
81. Lawyers Committee Hearing, 151.
82. Bernard Gwertzman, Haiti Certified for More U.S. Aid Despite Rights Issue,
New York Times, February 5, 1984.
83. In Jean Pierre, U.S. Policy toward Haiti, 9293.
84. Andrew F. Brimmer, The Haitian Exception, Washington Post, May 8, 1980.
85. In Loescher and Scanlan, Human Rights, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Haitian
Refugees.
86. Senator Laxalt statement, Lawyers Committee Hearing, 4.
87. Fauntroy statement, Lawyers Committee Hearing, 53.
Notes to Pages 8893
88. Edward Kennedy, Lawyers Committee Hearing, 2.

89. Victor Palmieri, prepared statement, Lawyers Committee Hearing, 47.
90. Haitian Refugees, editorial, The Crisis, August/September 1980, 233.
91. Amnesty International, Reasonable Fear, 8.
92. Ibid., 2.
Chapter 5. The Reoccupation of Haiti

1. FRUS, 196976, vol. E-10. The Gilman epigraph is from United States Policy and
Activities in Haiti, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House
of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, February 24, 1995, Benjamin Gilman,
chairman, 109. Hereafter the document is cited as House hearing, U.S. Policy and
Activities in Haiti.
2. National Security Directive no. 220, April 2, 1986, Digital National Security Archive. The archive of declassified government documents is online at http://nsarchive.
chadwyck.com/.
3. Fauriol, Hunting for Democracy, in Haitian Challenge, 8. He considers Haitis
two-hundred-year history a catastrophe.
5. Pezzullo, Plunging into Haiti, 81. In Pezullos assessment, the U.S.-trained Haitian
army emerged as a political force and became the kingmaker of Haitian politics.
6. National Security Directive no. 220, April 2, 1986, Digital National Security
Archive Records.
7. Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics Trade, New
York Times, November 14, 1993.
8. Bernard Gwertzan, Jamaica Said to Play a Key Role in Persuading Duvalier to
Leave, New York Times, February 7, 1986; Alexander Cockburn, U.S. Intervention
in Haiti Isntand Wasntthe Answer: Viewpoint, Wall Street Journal, December
3, 1987.
9. Declaration dexils haitiens aux Etats-Unis, Le Nouvelliste, January 31, 1990.
10. Les Etats-Unis ont incit le Gnral Avril demissionner, Le Nouvelliste,
March 13, 1990, 2.
11. Spector, W. Cameron Forbes and the Hoover Commissions to Haiti, xixii.
12. Richard Fletcher, Commentary: The Economic Dilemma, in Haitian Challenge, ed. Fauriol, 17.
13. In Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 23.
14. Fauriol, Hunting for Democracy, 8.
15. U.S. Policy toward Haiti, Congressional Digest 73, nos. 89 (AugustSeptember 1994): 195, 224. The source is U.S. Senate, Hearings before Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
103rd Congress, 2nd session, 1994, hereafter cited as Senate hearing, 1994, U.S. Policy
toward Haiti.
173
174
Notes to Pages 9398
16. In Howard W. French, Populist Priest to the Presidency, New York Times,
December 18, 1990.
17. In House hearing, U.S. Policy and Activities in Haiti, 2.
18. Vice President Dan Quayle, Democracy in Haiti, U.S. State Department Dispatch 2, no. 34, August 26, 1991, 63536.
19. Nina Shea, Human Rights in Haiti, in Haitian Challenge, ed. Fauriol, 20.
20. Aristide, Tout moun se moun/Tout homme est un homme, 216.
21. In Lee Hockstader, Haitians Look for U.S. Hand in Whatever Befalls Their
Nation, Washington Post, June 17, 1992.
22. Arthur and Dash, introduction to Foreign Interventions section, Haiti Anthology, ed. Arthur and Dash, 214.
23. Director of Naval Intelligence, 1994, 1, Digital National Security Archive Records.
24. Ibid., 19.
25. Brook Larmer, Should We Invade Haiti? Newsweek, July 18, 1994, 47.
26. Briefing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
103rd Congress, 1st session, October 20, 1993, 6.
27. House hearing, U.S. Policy and Activities in Haiti, 7.
28. In Thomas L. Friedman, Dilemma on U.S. Doorstep: Haitis Coup, Test Case
for Bushs New World Order, New York Times, October 3, 1991.
29. OAS Support for Democracy in Haiti, State Department Dispatch, October
14, 1991.
30. Director of National Intelligence, 20, Digital National Security Archive Records.
31. OAS Support for Democracy in Haiti, State Department Dispatch, October
14, 1991.
32. In Lee Hockstader and John Goshko, U.S. Calls for Haitians Return to Power,
Washington Post, October 2, 1991, A1.
34. Jeffrey Smith and John Goshko, CIAs Aristide Profile Spurs Hill Concern,
Washington Post, October 22, 1993. See Pezzullo, Plunging into Haiti, 38.
35. Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends, 19922002,
summary of Council on Foreign Relations meeting, January 15, 2003, at Democracy
Coalition Project, http://www.cfr.org.
36. In The Reach of Democracy, Tying Power To Diplomacy, New York Times,
September 23, 1994.
37. In Haiti: The Human Rights TragedyHuman Rights Violations since the
Coup, Congressional Record, Extension Remarks, microfiche 138, part 6:S1114.
38. Simmons, Challenges of Haitis Future, 4.
39. Barbara Crossette, Groups Plan Protest against Haitian Policy, New York
Times, August 23, 1992.
Notes to Pages 99104
40. In Congressional Record, House, February 26, 1992, microfiche 138, part 3, 34,
9596.
41. Bill Clinton, Excerpts from Interview with Clinton on Goals for Presidency,
New York Times, June 28, 1992.
42. Gerald Seib, Late Spurt of Foreign Policy Actions by Bush May Help Chart an
Early Course for Clinton, Wall Street Journal, January 6, 1993.
43. Friedman, Dilemma on U.S. Doorstep, New York Times, October 3, 1991.
44. In Pezzullo, Plunging into Haiti, 14.
45. Jean Pierre, U.S Policy toward Haiti, 9092.
46. Haiti: The Agreement of Governors Island and Its Implementation, hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Congress, 1st session, July 21, 1993.
47. In John Goshko, Rebuffs U.S.: Proposal for Naming Prime Minister Rejected,
Washington Post, February 16, 1994.
48. Hamilton, Bill Clinton: Mastering the Presidency, 19498.
49. A Question of Options: How the Clinton Administration Has Painted Itself
into a Corner on Haiti, U.S. News and World Report, May 23, 1994, 30.
50. Anthony Lewis, Mean What You Say, New York Times, October 15, 1993.
51. Mark Thompson, Haiti: Invasion Target, Time, July 18, 1994, 20.
52. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Gives Haitis Military Rulers a New Deadline, New
York Times, December 23, 1993.
53. Policy at Sea, Time, July 18, 1994, 23.
54. Should We Invade Haiti? Newsweek, July 18, 1994, 40.
55. Amy Wilentz, Aristide, the Comeback Kid, Washington Post, October 2, 1994.
56. Dupuy, Haiti in the New World Order, 156.
57. Diego Arria, Diplomacy and the Four Friends of Haiti, in Haitian Frustrations, ed. Fauriol, 96.
58. Letter dated 93/12/15 from the Permanent Representative of Canada, France,
United States of America and Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Document A/481766, S26881, December 15, 1993. Archive cited
as Permanent Representative, Letter.
59. Permanent Representative, Letter, UN Document S/1994/116, February 3, 1994.
60. Permanent Representative, Letter, UN Document S1994/686, June 9, 1994.
61. In U.S. Special Operations Command, 61, Digital National Security Archive
Records.
62. Permanent Representative, Letter, UN Document S1994/689, June 6, 1994.
63. Berenson, Joint Venture for the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti.
64. In U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs (now Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere and Global Narcotics Affairs), A Fresh Start for Haiti? Charting the
Future of U.S. Haitian Relations, 2004, 13. Hereafter cited as Senate hearing, 2004,
Fresh Start for Haiti?
175
176
65. Steven V. Roberts, New Black Power on Capitol Hill, U.S. News and World
Report, May 23, 1994, 36.
66. In U.S. Senate, S8976, Congressional Record, July 14, 1994.
67. U.S. House of Representatives, H3505, Congressional Record, June 14, 1993.
68. In Katharine Q. Seelye, Few Opinions, Pro or Con, Seem to Change in Congress, New York Times, September 15, 1994.
69. Mark R. Lowry, The Robinson Hoods, U.S. News and World Report, May 9,
1994, 2224.
70. William Gray, interview with Daily News, as reprinted in Haiti Observateur,
July 25, 1994.
71. As Tide of Haitian Refugees Rises, U.S. Uses Cuban Base, New York Times,
June 30, 1994.
72. Tenth Anniversary History, April 16, 1997, U.S. Special Operations Command,
19872007, 00307/00/00, Digital National Security Archive Records. Hereafter cited
as Tenth Anniversary History, U.S. Special Operations Command.
73. Ibid.
74. Elaine Sciolino, Top U.S. Officials Divided in Debate on Invading Haiti, New
York Times, August 4, 1994.
75. Elaine Sciolino, Showdown with Haiti; Clinton Offering Haitian Leaders
Chance to Leave, New York Times, September 15, 1994.
76. Ibid.
77. John Kerry, Make Haitis Thugs Tremble, opinion column, New York Times,
May 16, 1994.
78. E. A. Torriero and William E. Gibson, Clinton Tries to Sell Haiti Attack to
U.S, (South Florida) Sun Sentinel, September 15, 1994.
79. Tenth Anniversary History, U.S. Special Operations Command, 62.
80. Ibid., 51.
81. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Reward for a Job Well Done, New York
Times, October 7, 1994.
82. Ibid.
83. Senate Praises Clinton On Haiti But Urges U.S. Withdrawal Soon, New York
Times, September 22, 1994.
84. Washington Wire, Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1994.
85. Bill Clinton, Termination of National Emergency with Respect to Haiti: Communication from the President of the United States, in U.S. House Document 103
327, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, 1994.
87. Philip Heymann, Reinventing Haitis Police, opinion column, Washington
Post, September 27, 1994.
89. Fauriol, Reforming the Security Apparatus, in Haitian Frustrations, 153.
90. U.S. Policy toward and Presence in Haiti, Hearings and Markup before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, September 13, 27, and 28, 1994.
91. Douglas Farah, U.S. Exercises Its Influence on Aristide, Washington Post,
February 22, 1995.
92. In Senate hearing, 2004, Fresh Start for Haiti? 1.
93. Dent, U.S.Latin American Policy Making, 518.
94. Daniel Williams, U.S. Looks for Moderation in Aristide Mixed Signals,
Washington Post, July 18, 1994.
95. Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Faces Dilemma on Restoring Haitis Leader, as
Americans Wonder If Aristide Is Good or Evil, Wall Street Journal, September 22,
1994.
96. Aristide Refusing to Talk with Military, Washington Post, July 18, 1994.
97. Steven Greenhouse, Clinton-Aristide Ties Worsen amid New Dispute, New
York Times, February 10, 1994.
98. Daniel Williams, Aristide Rejects New U.S. Effort to Jump-Start Talks, Washington Post, December 22, 1993.
99. Cited in Aristide Asks Sanctions, Rebuffs U.S., Washington Post, February
16, 1994.
102. Aristide, UN General Assembly Address, in Haitian Frustrations, ed. Fauriol,
214.
103. Aristide Says Thanks, Washington Post, September 22, 1994.
Chapter 6. Under the Watch of the United States and the United Nations
2. Aristide, Address upon Return to Haiti, October 15, 1994, in Haitian Frustrations, ed. Fauriol, 228.
3. Ibid.
4. Clinton en Haiti pour clbrer un succs de sa politique etrangre, Le Nouvelliste, March 27, 1995.
5. Bill Clinton en Haiti ce vendredi, Le Nouvelliste, March 30April 2, 1995.
6. Claude Vixamar, Roosevelt et Clinton en Haiti ou deux visites dintert, Le
Nouvelliste, April 18, 1995.
7. In Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 132.
8. Michel Oreste Alerte, Le President Clinton est venu. Il a tout vu et a tout compris, Le Matin, April 4, 1995.
9. Le Nouvelliste, January 12, 1995.
10. Douglas Farah, U.S.-Haitian Relations Deteriorate, Washington Post, November 29, 1995.
11. Director of Naval Intelligence, 3, Digital National Security Archive Records.
177
178

14. Restructuration des Forces Armes et structuration de la Force de Police, Le
Nouvelliste, January 9, 1995.
15. Les nouveaux policiers symbolisent lespoir, Le Nouvelliste, February 67, 1995.
16. Aristide pour la dissolution de lArme, Le Nouvelliste, April 26, 1995.
18. Washington propose que leffectif de la police haitienne soit de 7000, Le Nouvelliste, May 7, 1995.
19. Sculpter et modeler limage de futurs policiers, Le Matin, March 31April 3,
1995.
20. Senate hearing, 1994, U.S. Policy toward Haiti, 30.
21. Ibid.
22. In Hearing before a Subcommittee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, September 9, 1999, 28.
23. Raoul Altidor, Haiti et le retour du President Aristide, Le Nouvelliste, April
20, 1995.
24. Larry Rohter, Haitian Taking Office, with Daunting Job Ahead, New York
Times, February 7, 1996.
25. In Thomas Lippman, Dispatch of U.S. Troops to Haiti Called a Certainty,
Washington Post, September 2, 1994.
28. Ibid., 29.
29. Ibid., 24.
30. Henry Kissinger, Out of Haiti Fast, Washington Post, September 25, 1994.
31. Brook Larmer, Should We Invade Haiti? Newsweek, July 18, 1994, 47.
33. WHA Guidances, November 1, 2000, 01927, Digital National Security Archive
Records.
34. Les Etats-Unis approuvent les declarations de lOEA, Radio Mtropole, June
6, 2000. Radio Mtropole archives are at http://www.metropolehaiti.com/metropole/
archive.php.
35. Mise en garde de la France, Radio Mtropole, June 20, 2000.
36. La communaut internationale ne fera pas marche arrire, Radio Mtropole,
July 6, 2000.
38. Ibid., 13.
39. Ibid., 19.
40. Application de la Rsolution 822 par le gouvernement haitien: Dception du
rpresentant amricain lOEA, Radio Mtropole, December 16, 2002.
41. Sokolsky, Americanization of Peacekeeping, 3.
42. Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, S2004/300, UN Security Council,

April 16, 2004.
43. Budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the Period
from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005, A/59/288, UN General Assembly, August 20, 2004.
45. George Russell, U.N.s Ballooning $732 Million Haiti Peacekeeping Budget
Goes Mostly to Its Own Personnel, Fox News, April 20, 2010.
46. Deux jours de mobilisation pour le retrait de la MINUSTAH, Le Nouvelliste,
May 31, 2013.
47. Mariano Fernandez Amunategui, La MINUSTAH et son futur, Le Nouvelliste,
September 30, 2011.
48. Haiti Elections: Prval Meeting with CDA Carney, November 29, 2005, at
Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Plus D), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/05/PORTAUPRINCE2989_a_html.
49. World Affairs: Haiti, Britannica Book of the Year (A Review of 2012) (Chicago:
Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012), 406.
50. Roberson Alphonse, Complotons contre la MINUSTAH, Le Nouvelliste,
March 25, 2013.
51. Why We Need Continuing MINUSTAH Presence in Haiti, October 10, 2008,
at Plus D, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08PORTAUPRINCE1381.html.
52. U.N. Security Council Cuts Size of Haiti Peacekeeping Force, Reuters, October 12, 2012.
53. Foreign Policy, Failed States: An Annual Special Report by FP and the Fund
for Peace, 2013 Edition, June 24, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/
2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_interactive_map, accessed August 8, 2013. For 2012
rankings see Etats en faillite, Haiti dans le peloton de tte, Le Nouvelliste, June 1819,
2012.
54. Senate hearing, 1994, U.S. Policy toward Haiti, 4. The Foreign Policy and Fund
for Peace Failed States index for 2013 is posted at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_interactive_map.
56. Guy-Michel Vincent, Les elections: Un casse-tte haitien, Le Nouvelliste, June
10, 2010.
57. La table de concertation de la honte, Le Nouvelliste, February 45, 2013.
58. Lemoine Bonneau, Enfin les membres du CTCEP entrent en fonction, Le
Nouvelliste, April 2021, 2013.
59. In Les Etats-Unis rclament une rvision des rsultats du Scrutin, Radio
Mtropole, December 8, 2010.
60. Kenneth Merten supporte changement prn par le chef de letat, Radio
Mtropole, May 30, 2011.
61. Hillary Clinton promet son appui au gouvernement Martelly, Radio Mtropole, April 20, 2011.
179
180 Notes to Pages 125130
62. Ericq Pierre, Bill Clinton et nous, Le Nouvelliste, December 26, 2011.
63. Kenneth Merten sen va, Le Nouvelliste, July 1, 2012; Kenneth Merten arriv
en fin de mission, Le Nouvelliste, July 2, 2012.
64. Dclaration du gouvernement des Etats-Unis, Le Nouvelliste, January 22,
1990, 1.
65. Brian Mulroney honor par Aristide, Le Nouvelliste, April 27, 1995.
66. Ren Prval se prononce pour la privatisation des entreprises publiques, Radio Mtropole, May 3, 2006.
67. You Can Go Home Again: Canadian Governor General Shines in Haiti, at
Plus D, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09PORTAUPRINCE73_a.html.
68. Martelly ne doit pas compter sur le Canada pour remobiliser larme, Radio
Mtropole, November 16, 2011.
69. La France proccupe par la situation Port-au-Prince, Le Nouvelliste, July
16, 1990.
70. LAmbassadeur de France est favorable la dmission de Josu Pierre Louis,
Radio Mtropole, December 7, 2012.
71. LUSAID annonce une aide additionnelle, Le Nouvelliste, September 17, 2008.
72. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Response Efforts
to Developments in Haiti: Earthquake Overview, Fact Sheet, http://www.usaid.gov/
haiti/earthquake-overview.
73. Helping Earthquake-Hit Haiti, Lancet, January 2010, 26768.
74. Executive Order 2236, Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal 12, no. 2
(Summer 2010), Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Defense Technical Information Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, VA.
75. Leclerc, Haiti dans amnagement linguistique dans le monde, n.p.
76. 53 recommendations de la diaspora haitienne pour la reconstruction dHaiti,
Radio Mtropole, March 30, 2010.
77. The United States Is Afraid of Chaos in Haiti, World News Journal, in Media
Reaction: Google, Haiti, U.S. Embassy cable, Beijing, at Plus D, http://cables.mrkva.
eu/cable.php?id=244071.
78. Prval qualifie dhistorique la visite des ex-prsidents amricains, Radio
Mtropole, March 23, 2010.
79. Kenneth H. Merten bravo, LEvnement, December 11, 2011.
80. Les investisseurs de Bill Clinton pour une autre Haiti, Le Nouvelliste, October
7, 2009.
81. Allocution douverture de la Secretary dEtat Amricaine Hillary Clinton, Radio Mtropole, March 31, 2010.
82. Bill Clinton et nous, Le Nouvelliste, December 31, 2011 and January 2, 2012.
83. Clinton Milot et Labadie avec une dlgation dentrepreneurs, Le Nouvelliste, October 6, 2009.
84. Amos Cincir, Haiti et les Etats-Unis, une aventure inversement proportionnelle, Le Nouvelliste, July 7, 2011.
85. Quand Barack Obama rcrit lhistoire politique amricaine, Le Nouvelliste,

November 6, 2012.
86. Sondage dopinion autour des elections amricaines 2008, Le Nouvelliste, November 3, 2008.
87. Ministre de la sant publique, Analyse, 8.
89. Ministre de la sant publique, Analyse, 8.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., 3.
92. See Nairn, Aristide Agrees to Austerity, 238.
93. Le Nouvelliste, February 1619, 1995.
94. 56 millions de dollars expatries en 1988, Le Nouvelliste, May 3, 1990.
95. Linda Klarreich and Linda Polman, The NGO Republic of Haiti, Nation,
November 19, 2012.
96. Haiti/ONG, en avons-nous trop? Le Philanthropique Tribune, January 2008, 11.
97. Wilson, Military Rule and the Hopes for Democracy in Haiti, 5.
98. Fatton, Haitis Predatory Republic, 27.
99. GAO, Assistance to Haiti, 28.
100. Defense and Diplomacy, Washington Post, May 8, 1996, A32.
101. Senate hearing, 2004, Fresh Start in Haiti? 22.
102. La part du lion aux Amricains, Le Nouvelliste, April 89, 2013.
103. Ren Dpestre, Il faut ONGiser Haiti, Le Nouvelliste, January 10, 2012.
104. Cyprien L. Gary, interview by Nancy Rock, Le Nouvelliste, June 12, 2012.
105. La croisade de Laurent Lamothe, Le Nouvelliste, June 15, 2012, 3.
106. Washington veut aider Haiti redorer son blason, Le Nouvelliste, June 14,
2012, 32.
107. In Allocution douverture, Radio Mtropole, March 31, 2010.
108. 10 Questions, Time, May 13, 2013, 60.
109. OCAP met en lumire les failles sur le fonctionnement des ONG, Radio
Mtropole, January 5, 2011.
Chapter 7. The Americanization of Haiti

1. Michael Botwinick, foreword to Haitian Art, 5. Authors translation of the Lescot
epigraph: It was clear to everyone that the island of Haiti was already subject to the
influence of the United States, on which it would depend more and more for its business, finances, and even its lifestyle.
2. Haitiscopie: Un 25 fvrier sur un ton de dpart, Radio Mtropole, February
28, 2000.
3. Dbat sur la nationalit lors du Congrs de la Haitian League, Radio Mtropole, October 21, 2008.
4. Ang, Culture and Communication, 248.
181
182
5. Americanization, New Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014, 1:336.

6. Klein, Sport and Culture as Contested Terrain, 80.
7. Americanization, Wikipedia, http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Americanization,
accessed May 24, 2013.
8. Campbell, Americanization of South Africa, 131.
9. In Tonnerre, Declaration of Independence, 1804, 43.
10. Jusserand to Davis, December 28, 1920, State Department File, 838.41/13.
11. Lescot, Avant loubli, 40713. See also Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 508.
12. Stebich, introduction to Haitian Art, 14.
14. Jean-Marie Thodat, Haiti, le franais en hritage, Herms, no. 40 (October
2004): 310.
15. Un colloque denonce le quasi-monopole de langlais dans la communication
scientifique, Le Nouvelliste, January 11, 1990, 5.
17. Thodat, Haiti, le franais en heritage, 311.
18. Ember and Ember, eds., Countries and Their Cultures, 2:967.
19. Bowdler to Bundy, December 17, 1965, FRUS, 196468, vol. 32.
20. Support for English Teaching in Haiti, cable to State Department, January 28,
1975, at Plus D, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975PORTA00196_b.html.
21. Une haitiano-amricaine attache lambassade amricaine Port-au-Prince,
Le Nouvelliste, October 2 and 3, 2010.
22. Fulbright Scholarship Programs, Le Nouvelliste, April 4, 2013.
23. Institut Haitiano-Amricain website, http://www.haitian-americaninstitute.
org/, accessed April 25, 2013.
24. Carlo Adolphe, Un monde haitien dans un monde americain, Le Nouvelliste,
January 10, 1995.
25. Laguerre, Diasporic Citizenship, 8.
26. Jean, Ptition pour lobtention du droite de vote.
27. Edwidge Danticat, Haiti a Bi-Cultural Experience, IDB Cultural Center, no.
12, December 1995, Inter-American Development Bank.
28. Zphir, Haitian Americans, 14647.
29. Le Gouvernement vante les mrites des haitiens vivant lextrieur, Radio
Mtropole, December 11, 2002.
30. Union School Haiti website, http://www.unionschool.edu.ht/, accessed April
25, 2013.
31. The American Academy, Le Nouvelliste, June 1618, 1995.
32. Rodega Dorc Dorcil, dean of the Facult de linguistique applique, conversation with the author, lUniversit dEtat dHati, Port-au-Prince, April 9, 2013.
33. Le Nouvelliste, December 21, 1990.
34. Almost Half of the Population in Endemic Areas of Haiti Suffer from Lym-
phatic Filariasis, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, Haiti Program, Neglected Tropical Diseases Program, http://haiti.nd.edu, accessed April 25, 2013.
35. Haiti et MIT signent pour une ducation mieux adapte, Le Nouvelliste, April
18, 2013.
36. DeGraff, interview, MITs Michel DeGraff on Expanding Access to Education
in Haiti.
37. Ibid.
38. Brooks, Christian Americanization, 89.
39. Romain, Le Protestantisme dans la socit haitienne, 432.
40. Ibid. See also Dash, Culture and Customs of Haiti, affirming that many Protestant denominations gained a foothold after the U.S. occupation; the largest of these
is the Haiti Baptist Mission; 62.
41. Ember and Ember, Countries and Their Cultures, 2:972.
42. Dash, Culture and Customs of Haiti, 62.
43. Kim A. Lawton, Christians in Haiti Seek Help from World Churches,
Christianity Today, November 14, 1994, http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/1994/
november14/4td094.html?start=1, accessed May 12, 2013.
44. Haiti Will Rise, African American Baptist Mission Collaboration, https://
aabmc.org/what-we-do/advocacy, accessed May 13, 2013.
46. Big Dividends for Your Real Estate Skills, Le Nouvelliste, June 1819, 2012.
47. Offre demploi, Le Matin, March 14, 1995.
48. Tempo Services, Le Nouvelliste, January 5, 1995.
50. Leclerc, Haiti dans Amnagement linguistique dans le monde.
51. Campbell, Americanization of South Africa, 139.
52. Martineau, Power of Culture, 244.
53. A ne pas manquer sur TlHaiti, Le Nouvelliste, March 13, 1990.
54. Editorial, Haiti Observateur, July 916, 1997, 15.
55. Laguerre, Diasporic Citizenship, 29
56. Hausse des transferts de fonds de la diaspora en 2008, Radio Mtropole,
March 15, 2008.
57. La diaspora est le principal bnficiare de lamendement constitutionel, Radio
Mtropole, June 20, 2012.
58. Confrence dbat du CLED sur limportance de la diaspora pour Haiti, Radio
Mtropole, June 21, 2002.
59. Coup denvoi dun projet destin encourager les investissements des Haitiens
de la diaspora, Radio Mtropole, August 3, 2009.
60. Studebaker, Pentecostalism and Globalization, 4.
61. The Moody Republic and the Men in Her Life, New York Age, January 10,
1959.
183
184
62. Haitian Government Aims Verbal Barrage at Exile for Shameful Letters to
Friends of Haiti, New York Age, January 31, 1959.
64. Robinson Geffrard, Le 11e dpartement veut son intgration, in Le Nouvelliste, September 13, 2010.
65. In Congressional Record, December 14, 1981, Extension Remarks, vol. 127, part
24, 31237.
66. Problme de quorum au Snat de la Rpublique, Radio Mtropole, November 9, 2000.
67. Cheryl Mills presse les parlementaires de rsoudre la crise prelectorale, Radio Mtropole, February 7, 2013.
68. King, Strength to Love, 89.
70. For details on the religious contributions of former residents of Saint-Domingue
see Pamphile, Haitians and African Americans, 6667.
71. Hunt, Haitis Influence on Antebellum America, 86ff. Alfred Hunt gives a wealth
of details on the contribution of refugees from Saint-Domingue on American culture.
72. Regarding Haitian influence on the United States see Pamphile, Haitians and
African Americans, 816, 96101; Laguerre, Diasporic Citizenship, 3170. See also
Hunt, Haitis Influence on Antebellum America.
74. Ron Butler, Haitian Art: A New Renaissance, Islands, October 1994, 38.
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76. Borden, Smithsonian Folklore Festival.
78. Ibid.
Epilogue
1. Paul, conversation with the author, November 29, 2012, United Nations.
2. Weinstein and Segal, Haiti: Political Failures, Cultural Successes, 131.
3. Le cas Haiti au Conseil de Scurit, la MINUSTAH confirme jusquen 2016 au
moins, Le Nouvelliste, March 21, 2013.
4. Michael Crowley, Across the Red Line, Time, September 9, 2013, 33.
5. Martineau, Power of Culture, 245.
6. Shamsie and Thompson, introduction to Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State, 10.
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Index
Abbott, Elizabeth, 23
Acadmie de Police Haitienne, 11517
Adams, Henry, on U.S., 4, 6
Adams, John Quincy, 4, 12
Affranchis, 3, 10
African Americans: emigration to Haiti,
1314; Knapp on, 31
African Methodist Episcopal Church
(AME), 8, 13
Age of Enlightenment, 1
Alexandre, Boniface, 120
AME. See African Methodist Episcopal
Church
American Colonization Society, 13
American Declaration of Independence, 9
Americanization, of Haiti: Christian,
14647; higher education and, 14446;
through mass media, 14749; occupation and, 13839; as sociocultural offensive, 14042; view of, 13536. See also
United States of America
American Revolution, 23, 89, 11
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, xvii, 151, 157; army
under, 115; Bush and, 119; Clinton and,
100, 1023, 11014; Coleman on, 109;
downfall of, 93, 95; human rights under,
9394; Mexico and, 9798; MINUSTAH
and, 120, 123; OAS on, 97; return of, 112,
131; Washington, D.C., enemies of, 97
Armour, Norman, 46
Arria, Diego, 103
Assemble Nationale, 2627

Auto-determination, 156; dependence and,
7677
Avril, Prosper, 92, 125
Baby Doc. See Duvalier, Jean-Claude
Bailly-Blanchard, Arthur, 27; Borno and, 37
Baker, James, 9596
Barnes, Michael, 97
Bazin, Marc, 93
Beach, Edward L., 25, 38
Bellegarde, Dants, 28, 39, 138
Benson, W. S., 26
Bertin, Mireille Durocher, 113
Black consciousness, upswing in, 5758
Black liberation movements, 11
Blanchet, Albert, 46
Blanchet, Jules, 72
Bobo, Rosalvo, 25, 30, 165n77
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 6
Bonhomme, Ernest, 77
Borno, Joseph Louis, 39, 164n70; accomplishments of, 3637; anti-Americanism
of, 37; Bailly-Blanchard and, 37; on elitism, 33, 37; Russell and, 29, 37, 43
Bosh, Juan, 81
Bourgeois, Lionel, 40
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 113, 115
Bowdler, William, 81
Boxer, Barbara, 119
Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 1213, 137
196
Index
Brutus, Philipp, 155
Bush, George W., Aristide and, 119
Butler, Smedley D., 27, 29; on class division, 33
Cabche, Raymond, 27
Caco band rebellion, 30
Caco War, of 1918-1919, 35
Calixte, Ptrus Dmosthne, exile of, 6162
Canada, Haiti and, 12526
Caperton, William B., 23, 29; on treaty
ratification, 2627
Caputo, Dante, 100, 104, 108
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 85
Carter, Jimmy, 86, 107
Casimir, Jean, 97
Cassy, Nnl, xv
Catalogne, Grard de, 8081
Catholicism, 19, 13738
CBI. See Caribbean Basin Initiative
Cdras, Raoul, 94, 96, 100104, 111
CEP. See Provisional Electoral Council
Charles, Mose Jean, special commission
of, xv
Chase, William, 10
Chauvet, Ernest, 38
Cholera epidemic, 12122
Christophe, Henri, 2, 68, 137
Christopher, Warren, 112
Citadelle Laferrire, 8
Civilian government, 30
Civil War (U.S.), 15
Clinton, William Jefferson: Aristide and,
100, 1023, 11014; diplomatic triumph
of, 100102; in Haiti, 90, 99100, 1058,
117, 129; on immigration, 1023; international aid package of, 101
Coicou, Massillon, 9
Colby, Bainbridge, 36
Cold War, xvii; context of, 68, 7779; as
term, 77
Cole, Eli K., 33
Coleman, Norm, on Aristide, 109

Collier, Peter, 10
Colonization, 13; brutality in, 29; Lange on,
xvixvii; virtues of, xvii
Committee of the Womens International
League for Peace and Freedom, 3940
Communism, 61, 6364; Duvalier, J., and,
8586; Haitian-U.S. relations and, 8586
Congressional Black Caucus, 88, 9899,
1035, 119, 152
Constant, Emmanuel, 1012
Constitution of 1987, xv, 108, 118, 139, 151,
15758
Control: centralization of, 3638; cultural,
attempt at, 4042; education and, 40;
legacies of, 2428; military, 2930;
partial, 9698; race as means of, 3132;
repercussions of, 3436; restructuring,
4344; threats to, 6365; by U.S., 5356,
6365, 8182. See also Financial control
Corve, 35
Council of State, 28
Craige, John Houston, 33
Creole, 138, 13940, 143
Cryptostegia cultivation, 56
Cuba, xvi, 7, 11; U.S. and, 15, 47, 7779,
8286, 88, 98, 100, 102
Cultural hegemony: quest for, 13738; resistance to, 4243; of U.S., 14042
Cumberland, W. W., 39
Cummings, Elijah, 104
Danticat, Edwidge, 142, 155
Dartigue, Maurice, 146
Dartiguenave, Sudre, 165n77; Martin on,
26; as puppet, 2829; as uncooperative,
34; on U.S., 24, 26; Washington, G.,
and, 29
Degraff, Michel, 145
Djoie, Louis, 67, 151
Democracy, 90, 152, 157; OAS on, 96
Democratic League of Haiti, 151
Index
Denis, Lorimer, 69
Dent, David W., 109
Deslondes, Charles, 12
Dsoccupation, xvixvii
Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 67; assassination
of, 21, 96; massacre by, 10
Development, 157
Devine, Tad, 116
Dewine, Mike, 123, 13031
Diaquoi, Louis, 69
Diaspora: as concept, 142; economic indicator of, 14950; educational indicator
of, 14346; growth of, 12728, 14243;
influence of, 143; linguistic effect of, 143;
political indicator of, 15154; religious
indicator of, 14647
Dictatorial practices, 53
Dominique, Jean, 87
Dominique, Philippe, 7172
Dred Scott decision, 13
Drew, Gerald, 72
DuBois, W.E.B., 53
Du Fort, Franois Galbaud, 34
Dupr, Antoine, 8
Duvalier, Franois: army under, 74; as
dictator, 7576; early consensus of, 72;
education of, 146; High Secret Police of
the Palace of, 7374; nationalist spirit of,
77; racism of, 70; terminally ill, 90; U.S.
and, 6869, 71, 73, 7576, 7882
Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 68, 90, 92, 132, 139;
administration of, 8385; collegium
under, 84; communism and, 8586;
exile of, 89, 93; human rights violations
under, 87; transition to, 8283; U.S. and,
8384; vassal relationship with, 8385
Duvalier dynasty, xvii, 90; as infamous
regime, 6972; Nicholls on, 83
Economic dependence: financial control
and, 5153; of Haiti, 5, 25, 52, 7677,
13032
Economic indicators, 14950

Economy. See Plantation economy
Education: French influence on, 14344;
U.S. influence on, 14446
Elitism: Borno on, 33, 37; racism and, 3234
Emancipation, 3, 14
English, prevalence of, xviii
Estim, Dumarsais, 69; ambitions of, 6061;
ascension of, 5859; financial liberation
policy of, 5960; political platform of,
59; resignation of, 61; U.S. and, 5859
Farmer, Paul, on Haiti, 68, 134
Fauntroy, Walter, 88, 152
Financial aid, 157
Financial control, 3840; economic dependence and, 5153; resistance to, 5657.
See also Control
Financial liberation, 5960
Fombrun, Charles, 55
Forbes, W. Cameron, 29, 4345
Forbes Commission, 2930, 40, 4345
Forces Armes dHaiti, 72
Foreign market stability, 157
Fort Dimanche, 73
France, Haiti and, 1819, 12527, 13738
Francophonie, 140
FRAPH. See Front for the Advancement
and Progress of Haiti
Freeman, George F., 4041
French language, in Haiti, 1819, 13940,
14849
French Revolution, 1, 8
Friends of Haiti, 1034, 12526
Front for the Advancement and Progress of
Haiti (FRAPH), 1012
Fugitive Slave Law, 13
Galletin, Albert, on Saint-Domingue, 11
La Garde dHaiti, xvi, 57
GDP. See Gross Domestic Product
Geffrard, Fabre Nicolas, 12
197
198
Index
Gendarmerie, 27, 32; creation of, 91;
Inman on, 2930; Lejeune on, 29; military control through, 2930; Soukar
on, 30; status of, 30; Union Patriotique
on, 30
Germany: Haiti and, 1820; Lescot on, 56;
Mayer on, 5051; Vincent on, 51
Gerry, Peter G., 39
Gherardi, Bancroft, 1516
Gibson, William, 98
Gilman, Benjamin, 90
Globalization, 13536, 151, 156
Gold, Herbert, 29
Good Neighbor policy, of FDR, xvi, 47, 53
Governors Island Treaty, 100102
Graham, Bob, 11718
Gray, William, 1056
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): of Haiti,
131, 156; of U.S., 156
Guilbaud, Tertulien, 9
Haiti, 1112, 16; African American emigration to, 1314; agricultural production
of, 41; banking in, 17; Canada and,
12526; Clinton in, 90, 99100, 1058,
117, 129; communist activity in, 61,
6364; destiny of, 158; earthquake 2010,
12728, 157; economic dependence of,
5, 25, 52, 7677, 13032; as failed state,
12324, 15657; Farmer on, 68, 134;
financial dependence of, xviixviii;
foreign-controlled elections in, 12425;
as foreign invasion target, 90; foreign
voices in, 12527; France and, 1819,
12527, 13738; as Francophone society,
33; French language in, 1819, 13940,
14849; GDP of, 131, 156; Germany and,
1820; Hamilton on, 6; Holly on, 78, 13,
21; independence in, xvi, 1, 68, 18, 21,
23, 27, 48; industrial production of, 41;
Kennedy and, 75, 7778, 81; Langston on, 21; Montague on, 18; multiple
simultaneous governments in, 9698;

Nicholls on, 20; 1915 election, 26; Notre
Dame in, 14445; occupation of, xvi
xvii, 2123, 2627, 29, 36, 38, 43, 9092,
13839, 156; Paul on, 156; political dependence of, xvii, 21, 25, 2829, 6061;
political independence of, 157; postcolonial trajectory of, 79; Reagan administration and, 90; Roosevelt and, 46, 114;
search for protection, 4950; slavery in,
3, 78, 22; transportation issues in, 131;
unemployment in, 130; UN occupation
of, 11415; uplifting, 11718. See also
Americanization, of Haiti; Constitution
of 1987; Friends of Haiti; Haitian-U.S.
relations; Saint-Domingue
Haitian-American Institute, 14142
Haitian Exploration Company, 17
Haitianization, 52; transition to, 4547; of
U.S., 15355
Haitian military, 8, 2930, 115; demise of,
7274. See also Militarism
Haitian pride, 33
Haitian refugee crisis, 8789, 9899, 1023
Haitian Revolution, 2, 69, 57; as inspiration, 1112
Haitian scandal, 36
Haitian-U.S. relations, xvxviii, 1, 22, 52,
12527, 15758; arms shipment and, 16;
within colonial setting, 2; communism
and, 8586; dollar diplomacy, 4647;
failures in, 9092; first embargo in,
910; immigration and, 34; investment, 165n87; Louisiana as link in, 7;
new crisis in, 9596; as protectorate, 28;
race and, 1046; rivalry in, 18; seeds of
conflict in, 24; as strained, 46; trade, 2,
45, 10, 12, 1617
Hamilton, Alexander, on Haiti, 6
Harding, Warren, 2728, 36
Harper, Stephen, 126
Harrison, Benjamin, 16
Index
Hegemony. See Cultural hegemony
Hemispheric forum considerations, 8081
Hemispheric security, 1720, 7980
Heyman, Philip, 108
High commissioner, office of, 164n66
Highway construction, 24
Hispaniola, 1
Holly, James Theodore, on Haiti, 78, 13, 21
Hooks, Benjamin, 98
Hoover administration, 28, 63, 164n54;
commissions of, 40, 4345
Hudicourt, Max, 63, 69
Hudicourt, Pierre, on racism, 33
Human rights, 88; under Aristide, 9394;
under Duvalier, J., 87; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 86
Hyppolite, Florvil, 16
ICITAP. See International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IDB. See Inter-American Development
Bank
Identity, 158
IFAS. See Institute of Food and Agricultural
Science
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
Immigration: Clinton on, 1023; HaitianU.S. relations and, 34; as perennial
issue, 9899
Imperative necessity, 5051; Vincent and,
4849
Independence: in Haiti, xvi, 1, 68, 18, 21,
23, 27, 48; opposition to, 910
Indigenous cultural movement, 4243
Inginac, Joseph Balthazar, 12
Inman, Samuel G., on Gendarmerie, 2930
Institute of Food and Agricultural Science
(IFAS), 129
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),
129, 150
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), 109
International Monetary Fund (IMF), xviii,

111, 157
Izmery, Antoine, 92
Janvier, Louis Joseph, 9
Jean, Michaelle, 126
Jean, Wyclef, 152, 155
Jean-Louis, Karl, 134
Jefferson, Thomas, 4; Merry and, 9; neutrality policy of, 6; as slave owner, 9, 13; on
slave rebellion, 11
Johnson, James Weldon, 8, 34
Joint Psychological Operations Task Force,
107
Jolibois, Joseph, 38
Juste, Felix Dorleans, 64
Kansoferism, 63
Kbreau, Antonio, 7273
Kennedy, John F., Haiti and, 75, 7778, 81;
Alliance for Progress of, 79
Kerry, John, 1067
Khrushchev, Nikita, 7778
Kinzer, Joseph, 115
Kissinger, Henry, 117
Knapp, Harry: on African Americans, 31;
racism of, 31
Knox, Clinton E., 8385
Kock, Bernard, 14
Kombit, 153
Lafleur, Marie, 155
Lake, Anthony, 98, 107, 114
Lamothe, Laurent, 133, 145
Lange, Matthew, on colonization, xvixvii
Langston, John Mercer, on Haiti, 21
Lansing, Robert, 23; on protectorate status,
28
Lavalas, 94
Leclerc, Victor Emmanuel, 6
Legacies, of control, 2428
Lger, Abel Nicolas, 46
199
200 Index
Lgitime, Franois Denis, 16
Lejeune, John A., 35; on Gendarmerie, 29
Lescot, Elie, 53, 135; fall of, 57; on German
Reich, 56; on Mulattoes, 55; Paquin on,
54; U.S. and, 5456, 13839
Levelt, Antoine, 57, 61, 64
Liberia, 13
Liberty, 2, 8
Lincoln, Abraham, 12, 14
Literature revival, 43
Louisiana: Haitian-U.S. relations and, 7;
slave rebellion in, 1112
Louisiana Purchase, 67
Louverture, Toussaint, 3; Rigaud and, 5;
ultimate goal of, 6; U.S. and, 46
Lders affair, 1718
Madison, James, as slave owner, 9
Magloire, Paul Eugne, 152; inaugural address of, 62; student revolt under, 67;
Truman and, 64; in U.S., 6567
Mahon, Sandy, 116
Malval, Robert, 101, 110
Manifest Destiny, 14
Manigat, Leslie, xvii, 92
Manus, Lon, 118
Marcos, Ferdinand, 7879
Margron, Gaston, 60
Marine Corps, investigation into, 35
Mars, Louis, 75
Martelly, Michel, 122, 12426; citizenship
controversy of, xv, xvii; on elections, 153;
nickname of, 148; presidency of, xv
Martelly-Lamothe administration, 156
Martineau, Jean-Claude, 158
Marvin, George, on Dartiguenave, 26
Mayer, Ferdinand, 49; on German influence, 5051
Mayo, Henry T., 35
McKinley, William, 15; Monroe Doctrine
appeals to, 18
Meinig, D. W., 13
Merry, Anthony, Jefferson and, 9

Merten, Kenneth H., as American ambassador in Haiti, xv, 12425, 12729
Mexico, Aristide and, 9798
Michel, Smarck, 131
MIF. See Multinational Interim Force
Militarism, triumph of, 6163. See also
Haitian military
Millspaugh, Arthur, 2425
MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies
pour la Stabilization dHaiti), xvii, 128,
157; arrival of, 12021; resistance to,
12123
Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization dHaiti. See MINUSTAH
Mle-Saint-Nicolas, acquisition of, 1516, 19
Monroe, James, 12
Monroe Doctrine, xvi, 14, 136; appeals to
McKinley, 18; inconsistent application
of, 1718; invocation of, 21; violations
of, 20
Montague, Ludwell Lee, 5; on Haiti, 18; on
progress, 24
MOP. See Movement Ouvrier Paysan
Moravia, Charles, 38
Moton, Robert, 44
Moton Commission, 44
Movement Ouvrier Paysan (MOP), 64
Mulattoes: Lescot on, 55; Paquin on, 34
Mulroney, Brian, 125
Multinational Interim Force (MIF), 120
Munro, Dana G., 4546
Namphy, Henry, 91
National City Bank, 17
Nationalist spirit, 4748; of Duvalier, F., 77
National League on Urban Conditions
among Negroes, 31
Nat Turner cataclysm, 11
Natural disasters, dependence through,
12728, 150
Neoliberal economic policy, xviixviii
Index
NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations
Nicholls, David: on Duvalier dynasty, 83;
on Haiti, 20; on policy of occupation,
165n87
1929 rebellion, 45
Noirists, 5758, 6970
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
13234
Noriega, Manuel, 106
Noriega, Roger, 120, 133
Normandin, Henri Paul, 126
Notre Dame, in Haiti, 14445
OAS. See Organization of American States
Obama, Barack: citizenship controversy
of, xv; earthquake response of, 12730;
reelection of, 130
Observatoire Citoyen dAction des Pouvoirs
Publics (OCAP), 134
OCAP. See Observatoire Citoyen dAction
des Pouvoirs Publics
Operation Just Cause, 106
Operation Uphold Democracy, 1068
Organization of American States (OAS), 81,
90, 118; on Aristide, 97; on democracy,
96; Resolution 537, 11415; UN and,
1034
Panama Canal, 15
Papa Doc. See Duvalier, Franois
Paquin, Lyonel: on Lescot, 54; on Mulattoes, 34
Pasquet, Alix, 7172
Paternalism, 32
Paul, James A., on Haiti, 156
Pentecostal movement, 138
Pralte, Charlemagne, 28, 35
Perpignan, Henri, 7172
Perry, William, 106, 111
Peters, Dewitt, 139
Ption, Alexandre, 2, 67, 137
Pezzullo, Ralph, 105, 108, 11920
Philips, William, 31
Pierre-Louis, Josu, 12627
Pinochet, Augusto, 86
Plantation economy, 23
Plaza, Galo, 81, 90
Plummer, Brenda, 14; on occupation, 25
PNH. See Police Nationale dHaiti
Pointe Coupe insurrection, 12
Point Four Program, 6869
Police Nationale dHaiti (PNH), 1089
Political instability, 21, 90
Popular Socialist Party, 6364
Popular uprising, 3435
Powell, Colin L, 107, 119
Powell, William F., 1618
Prval, Ren, 11617, 122, 12728, 133
Price-Mars, Jean, 34, 4243, 137; political
platform of, 50
Private volunteer organizations (PVOs),
13233
Productivity, 41
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), 118,
124
PVOs. See Private volunteer organizations
Race, 2, 6; Haitian-U.S. relations and,
1046; as means of control, 3132
Racial segregation, 164n46; Schmidt on, 32
Racism: of Duvalier, F., 70; elitism and,
3234; Hudicourt, P., on, 33; of Knapp,
31; movement against, 3334; of Russell,
32, 37; Schoenrich on, 32; in U.S., 10;
Washington, B., on, 31
Ramdin, Albert, 128
Raymond, Adrien, 84
Reagan administration, 8586, 89; Haiti
and, 90
Real estate ownership, foreign, 27
Redpath, James, 12
Refugee Act of 1980, 89
Religion pour la Paix, xv
Religious indicators, 14647
201
202 Index
Ren, Rgine, 141
Revolution, era of, 1. See also American
Revolution; French Revolution; Haitian
Revolution
Rice, Susan, 157
Rigaud, Andr, Louverture and, 5
Rippy, J. Fred, 18; on use of force, 23
Robinson, Donald, on slavery, 9
Robinson, Randall, 103, 105
Roland, Astrel, 62
Romero, Peter, 117
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR): Good
Neighbor policy of, xvi, 47, 53; Haiti
and, 46, 114; Vincent and, 47
Roosevelt, Theodore, 15; on international
police power, 2021
Roude, Nicholas I., 63
Rough Riders, 15
Roumain, Jacques, 63, 69
Roy, Eugene, 45
Roy, Louis, 92
Ruan, Addison, 39
Rusk, Dean, 76
Russell, John H.: Borno and, 29, 37, 43; on
freedom of the press, 3738; as high
commissioner, 36, 4041; racism of, 32,
37; removal of, 45
Saint-Domingue, 1, 4; constitution of, 6;
Galletin on, 11; slavery in, 3; society of,
3; U.S. and, 2, 6; Washington, G., and, 3.
See also Haiti
Salnave, Sylvain, 1516
Sam, Vilbrun Guillaume, assassination of,
23, 25
SAP. See Structural adjustment plan
Schmidt, Hans, on racial segregation, 32
Schoenrich, Otto, on racism, 32
Senate Committee of Inquiry on American Activities in Haiti and SantoDomingo, 36
Service Technique d lAgriculture et de

lEnseignement Professionnel, 4142
SFI. See Socit Financire Internationale
SHADA. See Socit Haitiano-Amricaine
de Dveloppment Agricole
Shalikashvili, John M., 104, 107, 111
Shamsie, Yasmine, 158
Sheehan, John, 109
Shelton, Henry F., 108
Slave rebellion: Jefferson on, 11; in Louisiana, 1112
Slavery, 2; foreign policy and, 9; in Haiti, 3,
78, 22; Robinson, D., on, 9; in SaintDomingue, 3; in U.S., 911, 22
Socit dHistoire et de Gographie
dHaiti, 42
Socit Financire Internationale (SFI),
131
Socit Haitiano-Amricaine de Dveloppment Agricole (SHADA), 5657, 67
Sonthonax, Lger Flicit, 3, 5
Soukar, Michel, 1, 28; on Gendarmerie, 30
Sovereignty, loss of, 28
Spector, Robert, 45
Stevens, Edward, 45
Steward, T. G., 8, 16
Structural adjustment plan (SAP), 131
Sully, Pierre, 23
Sumner, Charles, 12
Sylvain, Georges, 34
Syrian civil war, 157
Taino people, 135
Talamas, Shibley Jean, 71
Talbott, Strobe, 95, 11516
Thoby-Marcelin, Philippe, 43
Thompson, Andrew, 158
Thurston, Raymond, 75
Timmons, Benson E. L., 7677
Tontons Macoutes, 72, 91
Tourist destinations, 156
Index 203
Trade, Haitian-U.S. relations and, 2, 45, 10,
12, 1617
Transnationalization, 13536, 154
Treaty of friendship, 46
Treaty of 1915, 2627, 3739, 42, 48
Treaty of Ryswick, 1
Trouillot, Ertha Pascale, 92
Truman, Harry, Magloire and, 64
UN. See United Nations
Union Patriotique, 28, 34; on Gendarmerie, 30
United Nations (UN), 120, 122; Haitian
occupation by, 11415; OAS and, 1034;
peacekeeping of, 121, 123; Resolution
940, 104, 106
United States of America (U.S.), xvxvi;
Adams, H., on, 4, 6; Civil War, 15; commercial advancement of, 1617; control
by, 5356, 6365, 8182; cool and
correct policy of, 80; Cuba and, 15, 47,
7779, 8286, 88, 98, 100, 102; cultural
hegemony of, 14042; Dartiguenave on,
24, 26; Duvalier, F., and, 6869, 71, 73,
7576, 7882; Duvalier, J., and, 8384;
education influence of, 14446; Estim
and, 5859; expansion of, 1415; foreign
policy, 9, 157; GDP of, 156; Haitianization of, 15355; Lescot and, 5456,
13839; Louverture and, 46; Magloire
in, 6567; military intervention by, 15,
20; nation-building interest of, 11718;
racism in, 10; recognition granted by,
1112; refugee admission to, 8889;
Saint-Domingue and, 2, 6; security
interests of, xvii; slavery in, 911, 22;
Vincent and, 4850. See also Americanization, of Haiti; American Revolution;
Haitian-U.S. relations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 86

U.S. See United States of America
U.S. Agency for International Development,
xvii
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 106, 1089
Vesey, Denmark, 11
Vieux, Antonio, 42
Vilaire, Etzer, 1819
Vincent, Stnio, 45; as dictator, 53; Dominican challenges and, 51; FDR and, 47; on
German involvement, 51; imperative
necessity and, 4849; inauguration of,
47; U.S. and, 4850
Vocational schools, 165n87
Vodou, 155
Volontaires de la Scurit Nationale
(VSN), 74
Voltaire, Leslie, 14243
Voodoo diplomacy, 102
VSN. See Volontaires de la Scurit Nationale
Waller, Littleton W. T., 29
Washington, Booker T., on racism, 31
Washington, George, 2, 26; Dartiguenave
and, 29; Saint-Domingue and, 3; as slave
owner, 9
Weems, George E., 49, 54
White, John Campbell, 55
White, Walter, 6566, 152
White supremacy, 10
Wilson, Woodrow, 17, 23
Wilson administration, 26
Wisner, Frank, 95
Wood, L. Hollingsworth, 31
World Bank, xviii, 131, 157
Zephirin, Louis, 52
Leon D. Pamphile is the founder and executive director of the Functional Literacy Ministry, providing reading materials and instruction in Haiti. He is the
author of La croix et le glaive: Lglise catholique sous loccupation amricaine,
winner of the prize for best book of 1990 from the Historical and Geographical
Society of Haiti, and Haitians and African Americans: A Heritage of Tragedy
and Hope, which was given special recognition by the House of Representatives
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 2007.

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Contrary Destinies

University Press of Florida

University Press of Florida

Copyright 2015 by Leon D. Pamphile

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

This book is dedicated

to access the library. I am thankful to Jelle Sciboz of the UN Research Guides

1492 Columbus lands in Haiti to establish the first Spanish colonial

1803 May 18: The Haitian flag is adopted at Arcahaie.

1949 The Port-au-Prince International Exposition opens.

2010 A catastrophic earthquake destroys Haiti.

societies.4 In the same perspective, it is also assessed that colonial institutions

dominated multilateral donors, the World Bank and International Monetary

History records the end of the eighteenth century as an era of revolution.1

Within the Colonial Setting

Two Contrary Destinies

this conflicting attitude: The freedom-loving American Republic held slaves,

Within the Realms of Adams and Jefferson

Two Contrary Destinies

Louvertures ultimate goal was to establish a sovereign nation controlled

Two Contrary Destinies

perhaps as the greatest achievement of Jeffersons presidency because with it,

The Postcolonial Trajectory

Two Contrary Destinies

forbidding arms trade with the Dessalines administration. On March 3, 1805,

Two Contrary Destinies

In the Quest of Recognition

Two Contrary Destinies

African American Emigration to Haiti

Two Contrary Destinies

American expansion went even further when President William McKinley

American Commercial Advancement

Two Contrary Destinies

Two Contrary Destinies

Two Contrary Destinies

The Legacies of Control

Legacies of the Occupation

Instead, Beach found Sudre Dartiguenave, president of the Haitian Senate, a

Legacies of the Occupation

Legacies of the Occupation

Military Control through the Gendarmerie

Legacies of the Occupation

Race as a Means of Control

The Clash of Racism and Elitism

Legacies of the Occupation

Haiti emerged from colonial times as a Francophone society. After defeating

Jean Price-Mars, a prominent thinker and leader of that generation, recognized

Legacies of the Occupation

the chaotic condition prevailing in Haiti as a result of incessant revolutions.59

The Haitian scandal, as it was described, became an important issue in the

Legacies of the Occupation

minister on three different occasions. He proved to be an aggressive opponent

Legacies of the Occupation

dom expressed skepticism over Washingtons version that Americans were in

Attempt at Cultural Control

Legacies of the Occupation

eliminate the danger from the professional malcontents whose revolutionary

Resistance to Cultural Hegemony

Legacies of the Occupation

taking note of an increased interest in Haitian history, ironically thanked the

As the 1929 rebellion subsided, Haiti appeared to return to normalcy. Eugene

Deoccupation in a Culture of Dependency

Riding the Nationalist Spirit