Pakistan

FOREIGN POLICY
Pakistan's foreign policy has been marked by a complex balancing process-the result of its history, religious heritage, and geographic position.
The primary objective of that policy has been to preserve Pakistan's
territorial integrity and security, which have been in jeopardy since the
state's inception. A new era began with the partition of British India in
1947 and the formation of two independent, sovereign states--India
and Pakistan. Both nations searched for their place in the world order
and aspired to leadership roles beyond the subcontinent. India and
Pakistan became adversaries at independence and have so
remained. The two countries fought each other shortly after
partition, in 1965, and in 1971, causing the d i s m e m b e rm e n t o f
Pa k i s t a n a n d t h e c re a t i o n o f s t i l l a n o t h e r n e w s o v e re i g n
e n t i t y - - Bangladesh. India-Pakistan rivalry intensified rather than diminished
after the Cold War, and the Kashmir territorial dispute remains dangerous
and recurrent. Pakistan sought security through outside alliances. The new
nation painstakingly worked on building a relationship with the United
States, in which the obligations of both sides were clearly defined. The
Western-oriented, anticommunist treaties and alliances Pakistan j o i n e d
b e c a m e a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f i t s f o re i g n p o l i c y. Pa k i s t a n a l s o
s a w i t s e l f a s a vanguard of independent Muslim states.
Pakistans relations with the world
India
A major focus in Pakistan's foreign policy is the continuing quest for
security against India, its large, more powerful, and generally hostile
neighbor. Pakistan was created d e s p i t e t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e
m o s t p o w e r f u l p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i n p re p a r t i t i o n I n d i a , t h e Hindudominated Indian National Congress, and the suspicion remains among
Pakistanis that India has never reconciled itself to the existence of an
independent Pakistan. Several e v e n t s f u r t h e r s o u r e d t h e
relationship. One of these was the massive transfer
o f population between the two countries at partition, with its
a t t e n d a n t b l o o d s h e d a s Muslims left India and Hindus and Sikhs left
Pakistan. There was also bitterness over the distribution of financial assets
left by the British, with India initially blocking payments t o P a k i s t a n
from the joint sterling account. An even more complex
i s s u e w a s t h e sovereignty of Kashmir, a concern arising from the
accession of the princely states to India or Pakistan at partition.
Although almost all of these states made the choice quickly, b a s e d o n
g e o g r a p h i c l o c a t i o n a n d t h e re l i g i o u s m a j o r i t y o f t h e i r
p o p u l a t i o n , s e v e r a l delayed. One of these was Hyderabad, with a
predominantly Hindu population and a Muslim ruler who did not want
to accede to India. Hyderabad was a landlocked state in the south of
India, and Indian military intervention was used to incorporate it into India.1

The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (usually referred to as Kashmir),

however, had a Hindu ruler and boundaries with both Pakistan and India.
Although Muslims constituted a majority of the state's population, the HinduSikh community made up the majority in the province of Jammu, and
Buddhists predominated around Ladakh. After a popular uprising
against the Hindu ruler in late 1947, supported by Pakistani tribesmen and
some military units, the ruler panicked and acceded to India. The
subsequent Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48 over control of Kashmir
concluded with a cease-fi re brokered by the United Nations (UN),
which took eff ect on January 1, 1949. Kashmir was divided by a UN
line between the areas held by the two countries, and a 1949 UN
Security Council resolution provided for a plebiscite to be held under
UN auspices to decide the issue of accession. India has refused to hold
the plebiscite, and the dispute has continued. In 1965war broke out again
between the two countries over Kashmir, ending in another ceasefi re in September. The Tashkent Declaration, signed on January 10,
1966, under the auspices of the Soviet Union, provided for restoration of
the India-Pakistan international boundary and the Kashmir cease-fire line but
did not result in a permanent solution to the problem. Relations between
the two countries reached a new low in 1971, when India intervened
militarily in support of secessionist forces in East Pakistan, thus playing an
instrumental role in the creation of independent Bangladesh. Although the
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971was fought over East Pakistan, heavy fighting also
occurred along the Kashmir cease-fire line. Consequently, under the Simla
Agreement of 1972 following the end of that war, the cease-fi re line in
Kashmir was redefi ned (it is now usually referred to as the Line
of Control), and India and Pakistan agreed not to use force in Kashmir. The
agreement also improved relations suffi ciently for India to release
some 90,000 prisoners of war taken when Pakistan's army had
surrendered in East Pakistan (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh , ch. 1).The
circumstances surrounding the conflict over Kashmir changed considerably
over the years, as have the levels of UN involvement in the dispute. The
military balance between India and Pakistan after the latter's defeat in the
1971 war heavily favored India. Another changed circumstance is that
beginning in 1989, India has had to face a virtual "Kashmiri intifada" in its
repressive eff orts to keep a sullen and predominantly Muslim
Kashmiri populace under control. This insurrection, India claimed,
was supported by the "hidden hand" of Pakistan. Furthermore, the
situation became even more complex with a growing movement among
certain factions of Kashmiri militants for an independent Kashmiri
s t a t e , p re c l u d i n g a c c e s s i o n t o e i t h e r I n d i a o r Pa k i s t a n . T h e
volatile and potent ially explosive situation in Kashmir
c o n t i n u e d t o b e m o n i t o re d i n 1 9 9 4 b y a t e a m o f U N observers,
who operated under significant constraints. The Kashmir dispute continues
to be the major deterrent to improved relations between the two countries.
Pakistan's suspicions of Indian intentions were further aroused by

India's entry into the nuclear arena. India's explosion of a nuclear device
in 1974 persuaded Pakistan to initiate i t s o w n n u c l e a r p r o g r a m .
T h e i s s u e h a s s u b s e q u e n t l y i n fl u e n c e d t h e d i r e c t i o n
o f Pakistan's relations with the United States and China. United
States-Pakistan relations over the nuclear issue are particularly
prickly. Pakistan's relations with China on this
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issue, however, have been infl uenced by both countries' suspicions
of India. In 1991China called on India to accept Pakistan's proposal
of a nuclear-free weapons zone in South Asia. In the same year,
Pakistan and China signed a nuclear cooperation treaty reportedly
intended for peaceful purposes. This agreement included provision
by China of a nuclear power plant to Pakistan. An added source of
tension in Indo-Pakistani relations concerned the Soviet Union's
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 (see Other South Asian Countries,
this ch.).I n d i a re f u s e d t o c o n d e m n t h e S o v i e t a c t i o n , w h i l e
Pa k i s t a n p r o v i d e d s a n c t u a r y f o r Afghan refugees and was a conduit
for supplying arms from the United States and others to the Afghan
mujahidin.
During the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan, therefore,
Pakistan felt an increased threat on both its eastern and northwestern
borders. The rise of militant Hinduism in India, and the accompanying
violence against Muslims there, was a further source of uneasiness between
the two countries.
Other South Asian Countries
Pa k i s t a n s e e k s t o ex p a n d i t s re l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r S o u t h
A s i a n s t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y Bangladesh. After an initial period of
understandable coolness following the civil war that created
Bangladesh in 1971, relations between the two countries have
improved c o n s i d e r a b l y. A l t h o u g h Pa k i s t a n i n i t i a l l y re f u s e d t o
re c o g n i z e B a n g l a d e s h , f o r m a l relations between the two countries
were established in 1976. Trade revived between Pakistan and its
former East Wing, and air links were reestablished. The presidents of the t w o
c o u n t r i e s e xc h a n g e d v i s i t s . B o t h c o u n t r i e s o f t e n a g re e d o n
i n t e rn a t i o n a l i s s u e s , s o m e t i m e s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o I n d i a ' s
v i e w s . P a k i s t a n a l s o j o i n e d t h e S o u t h A s i a n Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was founded through the efforts of
Bangladesh's President Ziaur Rahman. SAARC generally avoided
political issues, instead addressing social, economic, technological, and
environmental matters. However, SAARC's annual summit meetings provide
an opportunity for private discussions among the heads of government.
Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan, its Muslim neighbor to the
northwest, have never been easy. When Pakistan was admitted to the UN,
only Afghanistan cast a negative vote, the result of Afghanistan's refusal to

accept the Durand Line as its border with Pakistan. This border,
established in 1893, divides the Pakhtu or Pashto-speaking people of
the region. Afghanistan promoted secessionist movements among
the Pakhtuns in Pakistan, calling for the creation of an independent
Pakhtunistan or, alternatively, for Pakistan's North-West Frontier
Province to join Afghanistan. T h e S o v i e t i n v a s i o n o f Af g h a n i s t a n ,
h o w e v e r , h a d a p r o f o u n d e ff e c t o n Pa k i s t a n ' s geopolitical
situation. Pakistan became a frontline state in the Cold War. Altogether more
t h a n 3 m i l l i o n Af g h a n re f u g e e s fl e d t o Pa k i s t a n , a n d t h e
c o u n t r y b e c a m e a b a s e f o r mujahidin fi ghting against the Soviet
forces and the Afghan communists. Pakistan also became a conduit for
military assistance by the United States and others to the mujahidin.
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