ARTICLEVIII JUDICIALDEPARTMENT

Section 1.ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsas
maybeestablishedbylaw.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andto determinewhetherornottherehas
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment.

PhilippineSCbyCJConcepcion(graveabuseofdiscretion+judicialreviewonly)>USSC

(Judicialreviewonly,
MarburyvMadison)

Whatsthereasonbehindgraveabuse?PoliticalquestiondoctrineasusedinMartialLaw.

GraveabuseSinonvCSC(Seebelow)

Judiciaryisnotallowedtogiveadvisoryopinions(seeseparationofpowers)
o

Advisoryopiniondoesnotfallonjudicialreview
o

Declaratoryreliefunderjudicialreview(SeePrimerpage331)

AdvisoryOpinion

DeclaratoryRelief

responsetoalegalissueposedintheabstract
involvesrealpartieswithreal
inadvanceofanyactualcaseinwhichitmaybe conflictinglegalinterests
presented
bindsnoone

finaloneandisforeverbindingonthe
parties

judicialact

notajudicialact

A.

Possessor(Sec.1)

SupremeCourtandsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw


*
In Re Laureta
What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard. The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trialtype" proceeding.
"Investigation" was utterly uncalled for.
All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en
banc or by Division, are arrived at only afterdeliberation.Thefactthatnodissentwasindicated
in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the
Division votedunanimously. Courtpersonnelarenotinapositiontoknowthevotinginanycase
because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them beingpresent.
No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their inability to furnish the information
IlustreandAtty.Lauretadesired.

B.
Definition(Sec.1)

Settleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable

*
Montesclaros v. Comelec (SK)
Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an
actual justiciable controversy
.
A proposed bill is not subjecttojudicial reviewbecauseitisnota
law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A
proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no
power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would beinthe
nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial
review cannot be exercised in vacuo. The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitutionstates
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andto determinewhetherornottherehas
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) There can be no justiciable
controversy involving the constitutionality ofaproposedbill.TheCourtcanexerciseitspowerof
judicialreviewonlyafteralawisenacted,notbefore.
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or
fromsettingintomotionthelegislativemillaccordingtoitsinternalrules.Thus,thefollowingacts
of Congress in the exercise of itslegislative powersarenotsubjecttojudicialrestraint:thefiling
of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the
reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and theeventualapproval intolaw
of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise
its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress. Thejudicial
power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to
Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress by mandamus to
enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to voteandbevotedforintheJuly15,
2002SKelections.Petitioners'remedyislegislation,notjudicialintervention.

*
PACU v. Secretary of Education (license)
The petitionersassertthat,the
Secretary
has issued rules and regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such discretionary power
has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of private schools."
Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those
inspectors to book, in proper administrative or judicial proceedingsnot to invalidate the law.
For it needs no argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a
statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality ofsuchstatute.Howevertheyfailed
to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being
"capricious," or pain "nuisance" and it is one of our decisional practices that unless a
constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted uponand adequatelyargued,thecourtwillnot
consider it. The question is really whether thelawmaybeenactedinthe exerciseoftheState's
constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to supervise and regulate private schools. If that power
amounts to control of private schools, as some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this
connection we do not share the belief that section 5 has added new power to what the State
inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more
extensive than a mereimpliedpower.Ofcourseitisnecessarytoassureherein petitioners,that
when and if, the dangers they apprehend materialize and judicial intervention is suitably
invoked, after all administrative remedies are exhausted, the courts will not shrink from their
duty to delimit constitutional boundaries and protect individual liberties. The petition for
prohibitionisdenied.

Norighttobeviolatedbecausethereisnolegislationonit

Determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthegovernment

*
Villarosa v. HRET (JTV)
"
The requirement of due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present, namely (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding (3) the defendant must be givenanopportunitytobe heardand (4)judgmentmust
be rendered upon the lawfulhearing.Theessenceofdueprocessisthereasonableopportunity
to be heard and submit evidence in support of ones defense. To be heard does notonlymean
verbal arguments in court one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due
process. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capriciousandwhimsicalexerciseof judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passionor personalhostility.Itmustbesopatentandgrossasto
amount toanevasionofpositiveduty ortoavirtualrefusaltoperformthedutyenjoinedorto act
at all in contemplation of law. If the HRET had committed grave abuse of discretionamounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then the aggrieved party may cometous forredress bywayof
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the1997 RulesofCivilProcedure evenifby
the HRET Rules of Procedure the assailed judgment has become final and the prevailingparty

has taken his oath of office or assumed his position. The HRET rule on finality of its judgment
cannot divest the Supreme Court of its power and duty under Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution to determine in a proper case whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of HRET. The HRET was correct in
applyingRule14ofSection211oftheOmnibusElectionCode,whichprovides:
14. Any vote containinginitialsonlyorwhichisillegibleorwhichdoesnotsufficientlyidentifythe
candidate for whom it is intended shallbeconsideredas astrayvotebut shallnotinvalidatethe
wholeballot.
Under this rule three kinds ofvotesareconsideredstray:(1)avote containinginitialsonly,(2)a
vote which is illegible, and (3) a votewhichdoesnotsufficientlyidentifythecandidateforwhom
it is intended. Theonlyerrorof theHRETisitsrulingthatifthevotesareininitialsonly,theyare
to be considered stray votes if they do not sufficientlyidentifythecandidate forwhomthevotes
are intended. The first category of stray votes under this rule is not to be qualified by the third
category in the sensethat votesininitialsonlymaybecountedforacandidateprovidedthatthe
initials would sufficiently identify the candidate voted for. Such construction of the rule fails to
give meaning to the disjunctive conjunction OR separating the first category from the second,
andthesecondfromthethird."

*
PCGG v. Desierto (Westinghouse)
The Office of the Ombudsman is
endowed with wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its
power to pass upon criminal complaints. However, such power is not absolute
it cannot be
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. Verily, when it is gravely abused through a gross
misappreciation of evidence and a whimsical dismissal of a complaint, this Court has the
constitutionaldutytoreversetheombudsman.

PowerofOmbudsmanisnotabsolute(SeeArticle11)
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
casesenumeratedinSection5hereof.

No law passed undermining security oftenure (Sec.2)DeanBauisnotabelieverbecause
he wants people want youtobeasgoodasyourlastperformancetoomanyjudgesdonotgive
goodqualitydecision
Holdofficeduringgoodbehaviouruntil70orbecomeincapacitated
*
Vargas v. Rilloraza (Temporary Justices)
Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the
Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice
and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided
. And the infringement
is enhanced and aggravated where a majorityofthemembersoftheCourtasinthiscase

are replaced by judges of first instance.ItisdistinctlyanotherSupremeCourt inadditiontothis.

AndtheconstitutionprovidesforonlyoneSupremeCourt.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those
already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only
arbitraryandirrationalbutpositivelyviolativeoftheorganiclaw.
Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court
should be appointed by the President with the consent oftheCoA, "Unlessprovidedbylaw"in
Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislationwhichwouldalterthecompositionofthe
SupremeCourt,asdeterminedbytheConstitution.
However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of
PCA, there is no escaping the fact the hewouldbeparticipatinginthedeliberationsandactsof
the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote would count asmuchasthatanyregularJustice
of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a misnomer, as that position is not
contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and
AssociateJusticeswhohavetobethusappointedandconfirmed(Sec5).

Asaresultofdisqualification,majorityofjudgeswerereplaced.However,itwasnotallowed
astherehasbeenanotherSC.
*Dela Llana v. Alba (Abolition)
What is involved in this case is
not the removal or
separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is importantisthevalidityofthe
abolitionoftheiroffices.
Wellsettled is the rule that the abolition of an officedoesnotamounttoanillegalremovalofits
incumbentistheprinciplethat,inordertobevalid,theabolitionmustbemadeingoodfaith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There
can be no tenuretoanonexistentoffice.Aftertheabolition,there isin lawnooccupant.Incase
of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It isinthat
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, thequestionofanyimpairmentofsecurityoftenure
doesnotarise.

If you remove an office, you shall retain the members as they have security of tenure.

(Reassigninsamelevelofposition)

Cantabolishunlessdoneingoodfaith

B.
CongressionalOversight

Congressionalpowertodefine,prescribeandapportionthejurisdictionofvariouscourts
*
Mantruste v. CA (APT or Asset PrivatizationTrust)
Sec31ofProclamationNo.50A does
not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts to
settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on thepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityofthegovernment".(Sec1Art.VIII).The
power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the

legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumeratedinSection5,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution(Sec.2,Art.VIII,1987Constitution).
Courts may not substitute their judgement for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the
discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the
acquisition,saleordispositionofassetstransferredtoit.
Therecanbeno justificationforjudicialinterferenceinthebusinessofanadministrativeagency,
except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion,
oractsinexcessof,orwithoutjurisdiction.

Jurisdictionofjudicialbranchisonlylimitedtolowercourts(RTC)
o

CannotmakeanotherSC
o

CannotquestiondecisionsofSC
o

RTCandMTCcanbenaturalizedborn

*Malaga v. Penachos (PD 1818)

The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentalityasfollows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,endowedwith some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporations.(Sec.2(5)IntroductoryProvisions).
ThesameCodedescribesacharteredinstitutionthus:
Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under aspecialcharter,and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the stateuniversitiesandcolleges, andthemonetaryauthorityofthestate.(Sec.2(12)
IntroductoryProvisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
coveredbyP.D.1818.
There are also indications in itscharterthatISCOF isagovernmentinstrumentality.First,itwas
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the socioeconomic life of the nation. Second, the
Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the exofficio Treasurer of the state
college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are
authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can bespared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been
appropriated out of the funds oftheNationalTreasuryanditwasalsodecreedinitscharterthat
the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General
AppropriationsLaw.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the
said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the
injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of
Datilesvs.Sucaldito).


*Phividec v. Velez (Arbitration)

Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, P.D. No. 242 is not
unconstitutional.
It does not diminish the jurisdiction of courts but only prescribes an
administrative procedure for the settlement of certain types of disputes between or among
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the National Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, so that they need not always repair to
the courts for the settlement of controversies arising from the interpretation and application of
statutes, contracts or agreements
. The procedure is not much different, and no less desirable,
than the arbitration procedures provided in Republic Act No. 876 (Arbitration Law) and in
Section 26, R.A. 6715 (The Labor Code). It is an alternative to, or a substitute for, traditional
litigation in court with the added advantage of avoiding the delays, vexations and expense of
court proceedings. Or, as P.D. No. 242 itself explains,
its purpose is "the elimination of needless
clogging of court dockets to prevent the waste of time and energies not only of the government
lawyers but also of the courts, and eliminates expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of
judicial actions
." (p. 21, Rollo.)

The notion that an administrative procedure such as is provided in P.D. No. 242, for the
settlement of quarrels between two administrative offices, departments, agencies, or government
corporations, would "emasculate" the jurisdiction of courts, is erroneous. In fact, Section 1,
subpar. (a), Rule 20 of the Rules of Court makes a pre-trial mandatory so that the parties to a suit
may meet in conference to consider, among other matters, "the possibility of . . . a submission to
arbitration."
P.D. No. 242 is a valid law prescribing an administrative arbitration procedure for certain
disputes among offices, agencies and instrumentalities under the executive control and
supervision of the President of the Philippines. Since PVAC filed Civil Case No. 11157 against
PHIVIDEC and PIA without first passing through the administrative channel, the judicial action
was premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, hence, dismissible on that
account.

But Congress cannot deprive Supreme Court of jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section5(Sec.2)
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security oftenureof
itsMembers.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval,shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

FiscalAutonomy(Sec.3)


*
Radiowealth v. Agregado (Teletalk)
The distribution of powers is a
fundamental maximofconstitutionallawandessentialtotheseparationofthe threebranchesof
government, separation which, though incomplete, is one of the chief characteristics of our
Constitution. This principle is too well known to require elucidation. It suffices to say that in
accordance with this principle the Supreme Court is independent of executive or legislative
controlastheExecutiveandtheCongressareofthejudiciary.
But it is said that the court's independence is limited to the exercise of Judicial functions and
thatpurchaseofpropertydoes notbelongstothiscategory. Contrarytotherespondents'theory,
the prerogatives of this court which the Constitution secures against interference includes not
only the powers to adjudicate causes but all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice. So, we believe, it is within its power free from encroachment by the
Executive to acquire books and other office equipment reasonably needed to the convenient
transaction of its business. These implied, inherent, or incidentalpowersareasessentialtothe
existence ofthe courtasthepowersspecificallygranted.Without thepowertoprovideitselfwith
appropriate instruments for the performance of its duties, the express powers with which the
Constitution endows it would become useless. The court could not maintain its independence
and dignity astheconstitutionintendsiftheexecutivepersonallyor throughsubordinateofficials
could determine for the court what it should or use in the discharge of its functions, and when
and howitshouldobtainthem.Thecourt'sindependence ofthelegislativebranchwithregardto
the acquisition of fixtures, supplies and equipment is bound up with and subject to its
dependence upon the Congress for appropriation. The interrelation between the court and the
Congress in this regard is not so easy to define. (Fortunately there is no conflict between the
legislature and the court to complicate the issues in this case.) But it is our considered opinion
that this court is supreme and independent of the executive in this sphere.Intherequisitionfor
fixtures, equipment and supplies both the executive and judicial departments are on the same
footing. They derive theirauthorityfromthesamesourceandrepresentthesovereignty inequal
degree. It stands to reason that the Chief Executive has no more authority to encroach on the
Supreme Court in the choice of the instruments needed to carry on its functions than the court
has to dictate to the executive what, when and how to get his. No one denies the powerofthe
Auditor General to audit, in accordance withlawandadministrativeregulations, expendituresof
funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by the government or the provinces or
municipalities thereof. (Section 2, Article XI, Constitution of the Philippines.) Neither does the
court claim exemption from the authority vested in the Auditor General by the Constitution to
examine, audit and settle all accounts of the government or to bring to the attention of the
proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are
irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant. (Section 3, Article XI, Constitution of the
Philippines.)
On the other hand, it can not be pretended that this authority is absolute. The constitutional
provisions herein cited themselves define the limits of the Auditor General's powers, and the
Constitution provides a remedy against his actions when they transcend those bounds. The
Auditor General's decisions in cases affecting anexecutivedepartment,bureau,officeorofficer
are appealable to the President, and in those affecting the rights of private citizens to the
Supreme Court. The Auditor General's authority to audit disapprove this court's expenditures

has to limited to the conditions prescribed by the Constitution, or statute, iftherebeone,which

did not invade the court's independence. Executive and administrative orders and regulations
promulgated by officers who have no jurisdiction under the law or the Constitution over the
court, can give no justification or validity to the Auditor General's decision. In the absence of
express and valid legislation, (and by valid legislation we mean one which does not
unreasonably infringe upon the legitimate prerogatives of the Supreme Court), the Auditor
General may not question the court's expenditures except when they are, in the words of the
organic law, "irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant." Outside of these exceptions
his duty to approve the payments is mandatory and even when the objection is that the
expendituresareirregular,unnecessary,excessiveorextravagant,hisdecisionsarenotfinal.

* Bengzon v.Drilon(Pension)
Facts: On15 Jan1992,someprovisionsofthe
Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were
vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for
retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of
the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members ofthe
ConstitutionalCommission.
Issue:WhetherthePresidentmayvetocertainprovisionsoftheGeneralAppropriatonsAct
Held: The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides
limitations to its exercise. TheExecutivemustvetoabillinitsentiretyornot atall. Heorsheis,
therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for
this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the item vetopowertoavoidinexpedient
riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. What was
donebythePresidentwasthevetoingofaprovisionandnotanitem.
Doctrine:PocketVetoPower

Under the Constitution, the President does not have the socalled pocketveto
power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to
communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof
automatically causes the bill to become a law. This rulecorrectsthePresidentialpracticeunder
the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should haveactedonthebill.It
alsoavoidsuncertaintyastowhatnewlawsareinforce.
Whenisitallowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the
President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill.
Thevetoinsuchcaseshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoesnotobject.
appropriationsnotreducedbelowamountappropriatedforthepreviousyear
appropriationsautomaticallyandregularlyreleased
Section4.

1.
The Supreme Court shall be composedofaChiefJusticeand fourteenAssociateJustices.It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.

Composition
o

ChiefJusticeand14AssociateJustices
2.
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involvingtheconstitutionality,
application,oroperationof presidentialdecrees,proclamations,orders,instructions,ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority oftheMemberswho
actuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedthereon.
3.
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved withtheconcurrenceofa
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When therequirednumberisnotobtained,thecaseshallbedecided enbanc:Provided,thatno
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or indivision
maybemodifiedorreversedexceptbythecourtsittingenbanc

Maysitenbancordivisionsofthree,fiveorsevenmembers

Vacancyfilledwithin90daysfromoccurrence(Sec.4)
Whatsthequorum?For15justices,8justicesisthequorum(50%+1).
Section5.
TheSupremeCourtshallhavethefollowingpowers:
1.
Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

Casesaffectingambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls[Sec.5(1)]

Petitions for certiorari (review of jurisdiction), prohibition, mandamus (temporary restraining
order),quowarranto(showofauthoritywarrant)andhabeascorpus(producethebody)

Review,onappealorcertiorari,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin:

Constitutionalityorvalidityofanytreatyorlaw

Legalityofanytax

Jurisdictionoflowercourtinissue

Criminalcaseinwhichpenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher

Errororquestionoflawinvolved(2)

WritofHabeasData
accesstoinformationproducethedata347ofPrimer

Righttoinformationalprivacy

Pleading,practiceandprocedureinCourts

Velasco v Reyes SC showed fast lane in decision making abuse of judicial power
Marinduquecase
*
FablanvDesierto
(ExpansionofSCJurisdiction)
OMBUDSMANACTSEC27INVALID!
Taking all the foregoing circumstances intheirtruelegalrolesandeffects,therefore,Section27
of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court fromdecisionsofthe
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogentlypresentedto
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First
Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, el al. [23] was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burdentheCourt[24]

PRINCIPLE: If the rule takes away a vested right, it is notprocedural.Iftherulecreatesa

right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter but if it operates
asameansofimplementinganexistingrightthentheruledealsmerelywithprocedure.

CannotexpandSCjurisdiction

*Echegaray Congress cannot amend Rules of Court

PRINCIPLE: Thesuspension
ofsuchadeathsentenceis
undisputablyanexerciseofjudicialpower.Itisnotausurpationof
thepresidentialpowerofreprievethoughitseffectisthesame
the
temporarysuspensionoftheexecutionofthedeathconvict.

CAjustdoublechecksthefacts

Questionoflaw:DirecttoSC

Admissiontothepracticeoflaw

*
IntheCunanan
"UNCONSTITUTIONALITYOFREPUBLICACTNO.972

By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to theBar.Suchadditionaloramendatoryrulesare,asthey
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improveandelevatethepractice oflaw,andthisTribunalshallconsidertheserulesasminimum
norms towards that end in the admission,suspension,disbarmentandreinstatementoflawyers
to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be
admittedandmaycontinueinthepracticeoflawaccordingtoexistingrules."

Below 75 passing rate forthe barcongresspassed 70%newpassingrateSCcontended

itsunconstitutional
TheIntegratedBarnotjudicialpoweranymore
Legalassistancetotheunderprivileged

4.

WritofAmparopage347primer
inherentpowertosuspenditsownrulesinparticular
casesinordertodojustice
(Limv.CA)

Mustpertaintorighttolife,libertyandsecurity
(Canlas2008)

Not a substitute for appeal or certiorari and not interfere with these processes
(Tapuz2008)
2.
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Courtmayprovide,finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin:
a.
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or

executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or

regulationisinquestion.
b.
All casesinvolvingthelegalityofanytax,impost, assessment,ortoll,oranypenalty

imposedinrelationthereto.
c.

Allcasesinwhichthejurisdictionofanylowercourtisinissue.

d.

Allcriminalcasesinwhichthepenaltyimposedisreclusionperpetuaorhigher.
e.

Allcasesinwhichonlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved.
3.
Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.

Assigntemporarily judgestootherstations,suchtemporaryassignmentshallnotexceedsix
monthswithouttheconsentofjudgeconcerned(3)
4.

Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrialtoavoidamiscarriageofjustice.

Orderachangeofvenuetoavoidamiscarriageofjustice
*Jalosjos,MisuariandEcleo
5.
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar,andlegalassistancetotheunderprivileged.Suchrulesshallprovideasimplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition ofcases,shallbeuniformforall courtsof
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
bytheSupremeCourt.

Rules must be simple, inexpensive, speedy,anduniformforcourtsofthesamegradeand

notdiminish,increaseormodifysubstantiverights(5)

Promulgaterulesconcerning
o

ProtectionandenforcementofConstitutionalrights
Issues

Standing(locusstandi)

Elements:
petitionermusthavesufferedinjuryinfactwhichcanbelegal, economic,orenvironmental
injurymustbetraceabletothegovernmentalactchallenged
injurymustberedressablebytheremedybeingsoughtbypetitioner

 Personal and substantial interest such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injuryasaresultofthegovernmentalact
Exceptions are: when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a
governmentalactauthorizingthedisbursementofpublicfunds

Ripenessreadyforadjudication
Requisitesforjudicialreview:Actualandripe

MootandAcademicactualcasefallsmootpainting(cantgetitanymore)

*Joya v. PCGG (Paintings)

PRINCIPLE: Plaintiffs were deemed without
standingtosue
becausetheyneitherownedthepropertiesinvolvednorhad
theybeenpurchasedwithpublicfunds

*Tan v. Macapagal (ConCon)

PRINCIPLE: The doctrine of separation of
powerscallsforthe
otherdepartmentbeingleftalonetodischargetheirdutiesas
theyseefit.Itisaprerequisitethatsomethinghadbythen
beenaccomplishedorperformedbyeitherbranchbeforea
courtmaycomeintothepicture.

PoliticalQuestion

*Marcos v. Manglapus
PRINCIPLE: The free use of the political question
doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on prudence, institutional
difficulties,complexityofissues,momentousnessofconsequenceorafearthatitwas
extravagantly extending judicial powerinthecases whereitrefusedtoexamineandstrikedown
an exercise of authoritarian power. The constitution was accordingly amended. We are now
precludedbyitsmandatefromrefusingtoinvalidateapoliticaluseofpowerthrougha
convenientresorttothepoliticalquestiondoctrine.

*Daza v. Singson
The authority of the House of Representativestochangeits
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time thechangesthatmay
transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that suchchangesmust
be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from
onepoliticalpartytoanother.

*Estradav.Arroyo
ThequestioniswhetherthisCourthasjurisdiction toreview
the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both
Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following
Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an
issue in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x

branch of the government. Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,[103] there is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court
cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressingtheprincipleofseparationofpowers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did notresign,still,hecannotsuccessfullyclaim

that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and thedecisionthatrespondentArroyoisthede
jurePresidentmadebyacoequalbranchofgovernmentcannotbereviewedbythisCourt.

*Liang v. People(DFA)
PRINCIPLE:The immunitygrantedtoofficersandstaff
ofthe
ABDwasnotabsolutebutlimitedtoactsperformedinan
officialcapacityandcouldnotcoverthecommissionofa
crimesuchasslanderororaldefamationinthenameofthe
officialduty
6.

AppointallofficialsandemployeesoftheJudiciaryinaccordancewiththeCivilServiceLaw.

AppointofficialsandemployeesoftheJudiciaryinaccordancewithCivilServiceLaw(6)
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnelthereof.

Administrativesupervisionoverallcourts(Sec.6)

*Maceda /Judge Caoibis (only SC)

this Court ruled that an administrative
complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular
where a judicial remedy exists and is available and if subsequent developments prove the
judge'schallengedacttobecorrect,therewouldbenooccasiontoproceedagainsthimatall.

Whenthejudgeactsingoodfaith,hecannotbeliable.
Mecedav.Vasquez
PRINCIPLE: It is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance
with all laws, and taketheproperadministrativeaction againstthemiftheycommitanyviolation
thereof.
JudgeCaoibesv.Ombudsman
involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises
overapieceofofficefurniture
PRINCIPLE: Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal
complaint against a judge, or court employee involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman cannot dictate, andbindthecourt,toitsfindingsthatacasebeforeitdoesordoes

not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its
administrativeprerogativesandtoarrogateuntoitselfapowernotconstitutionallysanctioned.
*People v. Gacott (Dismissal EnBanc)
Indeed,torequiretheentireCourttodeliberateupon
and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would resultinacongesteddocketandunduedelayintheadjudicationofcasesinthe
Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involvingthepenaltyofreprimand
would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for
the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters
pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the
Courttositenbancorindivisionsofthree,five,orsevenmembers.10

Yet, althoughasthusdemonstrated,
onlycasesinvolvingdismissalofjudgesoflowercourtsare
specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a
thorough and judicious evaluation of seriouschargesagainstmembersofthejudiciary, itisonly
when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of
P10,000.00,orboth,thattheadministrativemattermaybedecidedindivision.

SC said that if the case is not as importmant, pls pls pls dont raiseitto EnBanctoavoid

congestion.

OtherRequisitesforJudicialReview
Peoplev.Vera

GENERALRULE:
Thequestionofconstitutionalitymustberaisedbythepleadings,ordinarily
itmaynotberaisedatthetrial,andifnotraisedinthetrialcourt,itwillnotbeconsideredon
appeal.

EXCEPTION:
Courts,intheexerciseofitsdiscretion,maydeterminethetimewhena
questionaffectingconstitutionalityofastatuteshouldbepresented
Section7.(ReaditasisaccordingtoRC)
1.
No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court
unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the SupremeCourtmustbe
at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower
courtorengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.
2.
The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges oflowercourts,butnopersonmay
be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
PhilippineBar.

3.
A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.
B.Qualifications(Sec.7)

Naturalborncitizen

40

15yearsajudgeorinthepracticeoflaw

Provencompetence,integrity,probityandindependence

Teachinglawisnotregardedasaprofessionbecauseitwasdeliberated
HeirarchyofCourts

JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCIL(JBC)
Section8.
1.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representativeoftheIntegratedBar,a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.

UnderthesupervisionoftheSupremeCourt

A.

Composition

ChiefJusticeasexofficiochairman

SecretaryofJustice(exofficio)

RepresentativeofCongress(exofficio)

RepresentativeoftheIBP

Professoroflaw

RetiredmemberoftheSupremeCourt

Representativeofprivatesector

ClerkofCourtasexofficiosecretary

B.

Term

4yearswithconsentofCommissiononAppointments

C.

Perks

Regular members shall receive such emoluments as determined by the Supreme
Court

D.

Function

RecommendingappointeestotheJudiciary

SuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassign
2.
The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four
yearswiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments.OftheMembersfirstappointed,the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three
years,theretiredJusticefortwoyears,andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear.
C.Appointment

BythePresident

FromalistpreparedbytheJBCofatleast3names

NoCoAconfirmationnecessary(Sec.9)

Vacancyfilledwithin90daysfromoccurrence(Sec.4)
3.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall
keeparecordofitsproceedings.
4.
The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined
by the Supreme Court. TheSupremeCourtshallprovideinitsannualbudgettheappropriations
fortheCouncil.

emolumentsasmaybedeterminedbytheSupremeCourt
5.
The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointeestothejudiciary.It
mayexercisesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesastheSupremeCourtmayassigntoit.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least threenominees preferredbytheJudicialandBarCouncil
foreveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment within ninety days from the
submissionofthelist.

NoCoAconfirmationnecessary(Sec.9)
Vargas v Rillaroza
PRINCIPLE: There can be no doubt that the Chief Justice andAssociate
Justices required by Section 4 of Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution to compose the SC are
regular members of the Court
indeed, a temporary member thereof would be a misnomer,
implyingapositionnotcontemplatedbytheConstitution.
Section 10. The salaryoftheChiefJusticeand oftheAssociateJusticesoftheSupremeCourt,
and of judges of lower courts shall be fixedbylaw.Duringthe continuanceinoffice,theirsalary
shallnotbedecreased.

Salaryfixedbylawandcannotbedecreased(Sec.10)
*Nitafan v. Commissioner (w/Tax)
The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to
the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and
inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of nondiminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and
judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in
government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and allother

employees. The true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to make the salariesof
themembersoftheJudiciarytaxable.

Nontaxablesalaries

Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges ofthelowercourtshall holdoffice
during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members
whoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsontheissuesinthecaseandvotedinthereon.
D.

Removal

Impeachment(Art.11)
CasesdecidedEnBanc

Constitutionalityofatreaty,internationalorexecutiveagreementorlaw

*Marburyv.Madison
judicialreview

AllothercaseswhichundertheRulesofCourtarerequiredtobeheardEnBanc

Powertodisciplinejudgesorordertheirdismissal(Sec.11)
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
notbedesignatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrativefunction.
C.

SeparationofPowers

Justices/Judges cannot be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or
administrativefunctions(Sec.12)

Manzano (RTC Ilocos)

The Constitution prohibits the designation of members
of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,
Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).

Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in
the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the
rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct &
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to

better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence.

IV.

OTHERCOURTS
A.

Coverage

Membersoflowercollegiatecourts(CA,CTA)

Sandiganbyanfunctionsastrialcourtandactsaslowercollegiatecourts

Lowercourts(RTC,MTC,MTCofCity)

B.

Qualifications

Naturalborncitizenornot?ForRTCandbelowcitizenonly

MemberofPhilippineBar

Congresstoprescribeotherqualifications

Provencompetence,integrity,probity,andindependence

C.

Appointment

BythePresident

FromlistpreparedbytheJBC(supervisedbySC)ofatleast3names

Presidenttoissueappointmentswithin90daysfromthesubmissionoflist

Midnight appointment Corona was not considered midnightappointmentbecauseunder

Art7Sec152monthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidenthiswas70+days
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for thedecision
en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case the case assigned to a
Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of thecaseandserved
upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or
resolution muststatethereasontherefor.Thesamerequirementsshallbeobservedbyalllower
collegiatecourt.

F.

CasesdecidedinDivision

Decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority ofMemberswhoactuallytookpartin
thedeliberationsbutinnocasewithouttheconcurrenceofatleastthreeMembers

WhenrequirednumberisnotobtainedinDivision,thecasetobedecidedEnBanc

*
Fortichv.Corona(casesdecidedandmattersresolved)

*
Peoplev.Ebio

no doctrine or principle of law laiddownbytheCourtEnBancorinDivisionmaybemodified
orreversedexceptbytheCourtEnBanc

adecisionbyaDivisionisadecisionoftheentireCourt

*FirestoneCeramicsv.CA(ReferraltoEnBanc)

DecisionsofDivisionsarefinal andnotappealable,sameweightasEnBancexceptwhen

youdidnotreachthequorumofthedivision
H.

Rules

Conclusion inanycaseshallbe reachedinconsultationbeforecaseisassignedtoaMember
forwritingofopinion

Certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice attached to the record of the caseand
servedupontheparties

Memberwhotooknopart,dissentedorabstainedfromadecisionmuststatereason

Samerequirementsobservedbyalllowercollegiatecourts(Sec.13)
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
duecourseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefor.
D.

GeneralRules

Any decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
(Sec.14)

Minuteresolutiondismissingapetitionprovidedalegalbasisisprovided

Memorandum decisions which adopt findings and conclusions of inferior

tribunalsascontainedinanannex
(Solid Homes v. Laserna2008)
The constitutional mandate that, "no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based," does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions," which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals
. In Yao v. Court of Appeals, this Court has sanctioned the use of "memorandum
decisions," a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the
provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality,
convenience and docket status of our courts. This Court likewise declared that "memorandum
decisions" comply with the constitutional mandate. In Permskul,31 this Court laid down the
conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions, to wit:

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision.
For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for
direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement
attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of
the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the
decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper
examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed
statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also
understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII,
Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that
the memorandum decision should be sparingly used
lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity
that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main
accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal
complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection
cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to
dismiss it.
xxxx

Henceforth,
all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both
as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will
summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the
flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience. It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the
case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article
VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the
judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of
executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the requirements under
Section 14, Article VIII. However, it bears observation that
while decisions of the Office of the
President need not comply with the constitutional requirement imposed on courts under Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Rules of Court may still find application, although
suppletory only in character and apply only whenever practicable and convenient. There is no
mandate that requires the application of the Rules of Court in administrative proceedings.

doesnotapplytoadministrativecases
(Prudential Bank1978)

The challenge huried against this Courts decision as violative of the
1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the
opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification requirement refers to decisions in
judicial, not administrative cases.
From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in
administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a
certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be
deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No.
R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba v. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an
oversight.

But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court
in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members
who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam
decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the
Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not
required.

x
no petition for review or motion for reconsideration ofadecision shallberefused
duecourseordeniedwithoutstatingthelegalbasistherefore(Sec.14)

PeriodtoDecideCases(SEC.15)
Section15.
1.
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of thisConstitutionmust bedecidedorresolved
within twentyfour months from date of submission for theSupremeCourt,and,unlessreduced
by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
otherlowercourts.
All cases or matters filed after effectivity of Constitution must be decided or

resolvedfromdateofsubmission(1)

SC24months

lowercollegiatecourts12months

lowercourts3months
2.
A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
lastpleading,brief,ormemorandumrequiredbytheRulesofCourtorbythecourtitself.

Caseormatterdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponfilingoflastpleading,brief
ormemorandum(2)
3.
Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith beissuedandacopythereofattachedtothe
record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a
decisionorresolutionhasnotbeenrenderedorissuedwithinsaidperiod.

Upon expiration of corresponding period, certification by Chief Justice or presiding judge

shallstatewhydecisionorresolutionnotrenderedandattachedtotherecord(3)
4.
Despitetheexpirationoftheapplicablemandatoryperiod,thecourt, withoutprejudicetosuch
Responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the
caseormattersubmittedtheretofordetermination,withoutfurtherdelay.

Despite expiration of period, the court, without prejudice to responsibility incurred, shall

decidethecasewithoutfurtherdelay(4)

*
Problem of Delay in the Sandiganbayan
Decision making is the primordial
and most important duty of the member of the bench.60 Hence, judges are enjoined to decide
cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency61 that warrants
disciplinary sanction, includingfine,62suspension63andevendismissal.64Theruleparticularly

applies to justices of the Sandiganbayan. Delays in the disposition ofcaseserodethefaithand

confidence of our people in the judiciary, lower its standards, and bring it into disrepute.65
Delays cannot be sanctioned or tolerated especially in the antigraft court, the showcaseofthe
nationsdeterminationtosucceedinitswaragainstgraft(underscoringours).

*Court Administrator v. Quanola

The Code of Judicial Conduct requires
judges to decide cases and matters pending before them within the period fixed by law. Their
failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants administrative sanctions. A heavy
case load and a poor health may partially excuse such lapses, only if the judges concerned
request reasonable extensions. In the present case, however, therespondentmadenoeffortto
inform this Court of his reasons for the delay, much less to request any extension. Worse, he
signed certifications that all cases and motions pending before himhadbeenattendedtowithin
theprescribedperiod.
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular
session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the
operationsandactivitiesoftheJudiciary.

Submit annual report on operations and activities of Judiciary to President and
Congresswithin30daysfromopeningofregularsession(Sec.16)
ARTICLEIX CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION
A.COMMONPROVISIONS
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission,theCommissiononElections,andtheCommissiononAudit.
Scope:

CivilServiceCommission,CommissiononElectionsandCommissiononAudit(Sec.1)
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or intheactive
management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affectedbythefunctionsof
his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in
any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.
GeneralProhibitions(Sec.2)

Notholdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtenure

Notengageinthepracticeofanyprofession


Not engage in the active management or control of any business which may be affected by
thefunctionsofhisoffice

Not financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any Government contract, franchise or
privilege

Section 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall
notbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.
GeneralCharacteristics

Independent
Salaryfixedbylawandnotdecreasedduringtenure(Sec.3)
Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in
accordancewithlaw.
GeneralPowers

Appointofficialsandemployeesinaccordancewithlaw(Sec.4)
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annualappropriations
shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

Fiscalautonomy
Appropriationsautomaticallyandregularlyreleased(Sec.5)
*(CSCvDBM(2005)noreport,noreleasepolicy/

appropriations may be reduced)

Issue:is thenoreport, noreleasepolicyvalidlyenforceable
againstofficesvestedwithfiscalautonomy?
Principle: The
no report, no release policy (unconstitutional) cannot be enforcedagainstoffices
possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article 9(A), Section 5 of the Constitution.
Automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petition, a constitutional commission
which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should be construed to mean that no condition to fund
releases to it may be imposed. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or
reduction of funds in the even of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place [CSC] andthe
other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing withallotherswhicharenot granted
the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by theConstitution.

Funds of entities vest with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a
shortfallinrevenuesnotwithstanding.
*CommissionofHumanRightdoesnotenjoyfiscalautonomy
Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rulesconcerningpleadingsand
practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish,increase,
ormodifysubstantiverights.

Promulgaterulesconcerningpleadingsandpractice(Sec.6)
Notdiminish,increaseormodifysubstantiverights
*
Aruelov.CA(conflictwithRulesofCourt)I
ssue:conflictwithrulesofcourt
Principle: Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filingof
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the SC. An election protest does not merely
concern the personal interestsofrivalcandidatesforan office.Overandabovethedesireofthe
candidates to win, is thedeeppublicinteresttodeterminethetruechoiceofthepeople.Forthis
reason, it is a wellestablished principle that laws governing election protests must be liberally
construed to the end that the popular will, expressedintheelection, willnot,bypurelytechnical
reasons,bedefeated.

RulesofCOMELECprevailsaslongasyourewithinthescopeofthecommission,the
rulesofthecommissionsprevail

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthe
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. UnlessotherwiseprovidedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromreceiptofacopythereof.

Decidecases(Sec.7)
byamajorityvoteofallitsMembers
*Cuav.Comelec(21/321)
Issue:21/321votes
Principle: Court holds that the 21 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision
under Article 9A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to
affirm the First Division constituted majority of the 5 members who deliberated and voted
thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited decisions was a valid act
thatentitleshimnowtoassumehisseatintheHOR.

EnBanchappensonlywhenthereisanappeal

asabodyandnotasindividuals
*Orociov.COA

Isssue:notevenacommissionslegalcounselmaymakea
decisionforthecommission
Principle: The COA, both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is a collegial body. It must
resolve cases presented to it as such its general counsel cannot actforthecommissionforhe
is not even a commissioner thereof. He canonlyofferlegal adviceorrenderanopinioninorder
toaidtheCOAintheresolutionofacaseoralegalquestion.
Misonv.COA
Issue:noindividualmembermaymakeadecisionfortheCommission,much
lessmaycasesbedecidedbysubordinatesofthecommission
Principle:theEspiritudecisionbytheActingCOAChairmanwasinconsequental.Ratification
cannotvalidateanactvoidabinitiobecausedoneabsolutelywithoutauthority,Theacthasto
bedoneanewbythepersonorentitydulyendowedwithauthoritytodoso.
within 60 days from date of submission (upon filing of last pleading, brief or memorandum
requiredbytheRules)
appealable to the Supreme Court oncertiorariwithin30days fromreceipthasbeenchanged
toappealtounderRule45CourtofAppealswithin15days(RA7902)
*Mateov.CA
Issue:decisionsappealabletotheSC
Principle: For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties. One of the indispensable elements in order for a tenancy
agreement to take hold over a dispute is that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. It must be noted that the petitionersfailedtoadequatelyproveownershipof
the land. They merely showed tax declarations. As against a transfer certificate of title, tax
declarations or receipts are not adequate proofs of ownership. Hence, it is the MeTC that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter there being no proof of tenancy relationship. ** [not really
sure,IreaditoverandoveragainandIcouldntreallyfindtheprinciple.:\]

CertioraritotheSupremeCourtonlyafter

reconsideration(i.e.,decisionsofCommissionEnBanc)
*
Reyesv.RTC
Issue:regardingreconsiderationsofCOMELECdecisions
Principle: It is now settled that in provding that in decision, orders and rulings of COMELEC
may be brought to theSC oncertioraritheConstitutioninitsArticle9, A,Section7,meansthe
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1. Since a basic condition for bringing
such action is that the petitioner first file a motion for reconsideration, it follow that petitioners
failuretofileamotionforreconsiderationof thedecisionoftheFirstDivisionoftheCOMELECis
fatal to his present action. Also, provisions of the Constitution state that all election cases,
including preproclamation, controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division.

Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he mayfileamotionforreconsiderationbefore

the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, orderorrulingoftheCOMELECenbanc,
that,inaccordancewithArticle9,A,Section7,maybebroughttotheSConcertiorari.
*ABSCBN v. Comelec
Issue:w/nCOMELECactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when itapprovedtheissuanceofarestrainingorderenjoining
ABSCBNfromconductingexitpolls?
Principle: The absolute ban by the COMELEC cannot be justified. It does not leave open any
alternative channel of communication to gather thetypeofinformationobtainedthroughtheexit
polling. On theotherhand,thereareothervalidandreasonablewaysandmeanstoachievethe
COMELEC end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that maybebroughtaboutby
exit surveys. The court holds that the assailed minute resolution no. 981419 issued by the
COMELECenbanconApril21,1998isnullifiedandsetaside.

graveabuseofdiscretion
(
*Reyesv.COA)

Issue:graveabuseofdiscretion
o
Principle: Article 9A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision, orders of
rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the SC on certiorari by the aggrieved
party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgement or finalorderofthe
Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under
Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was fied on June 17, 1996, prior totheeffectivityof
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the
Commission on Audit to this court was only by petition for certiorariunderRule65,asprovided
by the 1987 Constitution. The judgements and final orders of the Commission on Audit arenot
reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this court. Only when the
Commission on Audit acted withoutorinexcessofjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretion
amounting to lack or excessofjurisdiction,maythiscourtentertainapetitionfor certiorari under
Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the SC under Rule
44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised RulesofCourtisnotallowedfromanyorder,rullingordecisionof
theCOA.

exerciseofquasijudicialpower
(
*Garcesv.CA)

Issue:exerciseofquasijudicialpower
o

Principle:Section7,Article9AoftheConstitutionisinapplicableastherewasnocaseor
matterfiledbeforetheCOMELEC.Onthecontrary,itwastheCOMELECsresolutionthat
triggeredthiscontroversy.Thecaseormatterreferredtobytheconstitutionmustbesomething
withinthejurisdictionoftheCOMELEC(itmustpertaintoanelectiondispute.Thesettledruleis
thatthedecision,rulings,orderoftheCOMELECthatmaybebroughttotheSConcertiorari
underSection7,Article9AarethoserelationtotheCOMELECsexerciseofitsadjudicatoryor
quasijudicialpowersinvolvingelectiveregional,provincialandcityofficials.

retirementofCommissionerbeforepromulgation

*Ambilv.Comelec
Issue:retirementofCommissionbeforepromulgation
o
Principle: A final decision or resolution becomes binding onlyafteritispromulgatedand
not before. Accordingly, one who is no longeramemberoftheCommissionatthe timethefinal
decisionorresolutionispromulgatedcannotvalidlytakepartin thatresolution or decision.Much
more could he be the ponente of the resolution of the resolution or decision. The resolution or
decision of the devision must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated.
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement fromofficebut
when he vacated his office without thefinaldecisionorresolutionhavingbeenpromulgated,his
vote was automatically invalidated. Before that resolution or decision is so signed and
promulgated,thereisnovalidresolutionordecisiontospeakof.

*Dumayasv.Comelec
Issue:inviewofretirementofcommissionersGorospeandGuiani
beforethedateofthepromulgationoftheassailedresolutiononMarch2,2000,shouldsaid
resolutionbedeemednullandvoidforbeingviolativeofArticle9ASection7ofthe1987
Constitution?
o
Principle: A decision becomes binding only after its promulgation. If at the time it is
promulgated, a judge or member of the collegiatecourtwhohadearlier signedorregisteredhis
vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision mustautomaticallybewithdrawnorcancelled.
Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be considered as
withdrawn for the reason that theirretirementprecededtheresolutionspromulgation.Theeffect
of the withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signedtheresolutionatall andonly
the votes of the remaining commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose of
deciding the controversy. However, unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect
the result insofar asvotesfororagainstapartyisconcerned,wefindnoreasonfor declaingthe
decisionanullity.

Section8.
EachCommissionshallperformsuchotherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

otherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw(Sec.8)

B.THECIVILSERVICECOMMISSION
Section1.
1.
The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediatelyprecedingtheirappointment.

1.

Composition(Sec.1)

Chairmanand2Commissioners

naturalborncitizens

atleast35atthetimeofappointment

provencapacityforpublicadministration

notcandidateinimmediatelyprecedingelection

2.
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the Presidentwiththeconsent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven yearswithoutreappointment.Ofthose
first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years,
and another Commissioner for threeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.
2.Appointment(Sec.1)

Termof7yearswithoutreappointment

CommonstartingpointofFeb.2,1987(dateof1987Constitutiontookeffect)

*
Galindezv.COA*GamindevCOA

ConsentofCommissiononAppointmentsneeded

Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeforunexpiredterm

NoMemberappointedinatemporaryoractingcapacity
Section2.
1.
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies ofthe
Government,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswithoriginalcharters.

*
PNOCEDC v. NLRC
Civil Service system under thenewConstitutioncovers
only government owned and controlled corporations with original charter. Moreover, even of a
casearoseunderthe1973Constitution,theapplicableruleisthatofthe1987Constitution.

The moment, however, that acorporation ceasestobe governmentcontrolled, forinstance,ifit

isprivatized,itceasestofallundertheCivilService.
DoestheDOLhavearoleovercivilservicemembers?

*Philippine Fisheries v. NLRC (security guards/janitors)

Entities under the civil
service system are not completely beyond the reach of Department of Labor or labor laws.
When a govt entity that is under the Civil Service enters into a contract, e.g. with a security
agency or a janitorial agency, it becomes an indirect employer of the security guards or the
janitors. In such a situation,undertheLaborCode,theliabilities forwagesarejointand solidary
with the contractor. The law on wages in the Labor Code specifically provides employer
includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to
employees.
2.
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policydetermining,
primarilyconfidential,orhighlytechnical,bycompetitiveexamination.
CivilServiceAppointments

According to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, by competitive
examination[Sec.2(2)]

Competitive position according to merit and fitness to be determined, asfar aspracticable,
bycompetitiveexamination

Noncompetitive position Not determined by competitive examination,butmeritandfitness
arerequired.

Careercantfire

Noncareer

career/noncareer/competitive/noncompetitive

DoappointeestotheforeignservicewhodonotbelongtotheCareerCorpsenjoysecurityof
tenureliketheCareerCorp?
*Astraquillo v. Manglapus
No. Political appointees in the Foreign Service possess tenure
coterminouswiththatoftheappointingauthorityorsubjecttohispleasure.

*Achacoso v. Macaraig (POEA)

Administrator of the POEA is not the same
rank as
undersecretary his position is noncareer The respondents assert he is not entitledto
the guaranty because he is not a career official (the petitioner did not possess the necessary

qualifications when he was appointed Administrator of the POEAin1987).Themerefactthata

position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant

technical

except positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly

meritandfitnessrequirement

securityoftenure

*Hernandez v. Villegas
(not removal but expiration of term) Persons occupying
noncompetitive positions are also covered by the guarantee of security of tenure. The
distinction between competitive and noncompetitive is significant only for purposes of
appointment. The termination of the official relation of officials and employees holdingprimarily
confidential positions on the ground of loss of confidence can be justified because in that case
theircessationfromofficeinvolvesnoremovalbutexpirationofthetermofoffice.

*Gloriav.CA
(temporarytransfer)
FACTS
:

Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of QC. DECS

Secretary Ricardo Gloria recommended Icasiano to be reassigned
Superintendent of the
Marikina Institute of Scienceand Technology(MIST)tofillvacantposition.Itwasfoundoutlater
thathisreassignmentwasindefiniteinnatureandappearedmorethantemporary

ISSUE:WNviolatedsecurityoftenure

HELD:

YES. Security of tenure is fundamental andconstitutionallygrantedincivilservice.Extends

not only to employees removed w/o cause but also unconsented transfer w/c tantamount to
illegalremoval.

Temporary transfer is allowed w/o prior consent but not allowed if it is seen to be
preliminarysteptohisremoval.



primary confidential means close intimacy which insures freedom of
intercourse
(*Borresvc.CA
)

*Santiagov.CSC
(nextinrank)
FACTS:

Narcisco Santiago, Customs Collector I, wasappointedbyCustomsCommissionerTanada

as Customs Collector III w/c was approved by CSC. This appointment was questioned by
LeonardoJosebeingthatheisnextinlineasCustomsCollectorII.

ISSUE:W/Nappointingauthorityisboundbytherestrictionsofstatutorynextinrankrule

HELD:

NO. Nothing in the Civil Service Law requires or mandates that persons next in rank are
entitled to preference in appointment. Next in rank merely haspreferentialconsiderationforthe
higher vacancy but dontfollowthattheyaretheonlyonesthatcanbeappointed.Ruledontvest
rightsorministerialdutyonappintingauthoritytopromotesuch
Person.

3.
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
providedbylaw.
4.
No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneeringorpartisanpoliticalcampaign.
Prohibitions

engage,directlyorindirectly,inanyelectioneeringorpartisanpoliticalcampaign[Sec.2(4)]

prohibitiondoesnotapplytodepartmentsecretaries

*Santosv.Yatco
FACTS:

Judge Yatco disallowed Defense Secretary Alejo Santos from campaigning for Governor
TomasMartininBulacan.AtthetimeSantoswasanactingmemberoftheCabinet.

ISSUE:W/Ndepartmentsecretariesareprohibitedfromcampaigningforpoliticalcandidates

HELD:

NO. Prohibition of participation in partisan political activities dont apply to department

secretaries. Department secretaries are not embraced and w/in the terms officers and
employeesintheCivilService.

supported

does not prevent expression of views or mentioning names of candidates

5.

Therighttoselforganizationshallnotbedeniedtogovernmentemployees.
6.
Temporary employees of the Governmentshallbegivensuchprotectionasmaybeprovided
bylaw.
BasicRightsofCivilServants(Sec.2)

cannotberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcauseprovidedbylaw

substantiveandproceduraldueprocess

*DelosSantosv.Mallare
FACTS:

EduardodelosSantoswasappointed city engineer ofBaguio.Afewyearslater,GilMallare

was extended ad interim appointment by the president to Santos position. Santos refused to
vacate his officeafterbeingreassignedtotheBureauofPublicWorks.Hewasbeingignoredby
the mayor and other officials and Mallare was being paid the salary corresponding to his
position.

ISSUE:W/NSantosisentitledtoremaininhispositionascityengineer

HELD:

YES. He can remain in office until her resigns or removed for a just cause. Just cause
means which the law and sound public polity recognized as sufficient warrantforremoval,bya
legal cause.
cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be
restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the
public

Every appointment impliesconfidence,butmuchmorethanordinaryconfidence isreposed

in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only

confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivingsofbetrayalsofpersonaltrustorconfidentialmattersofstate

abolitionofofficeincludingreorganizationisallowedifmade(1)ingoodfaith,(2)
notforpersonalorpoliticalreasonsand(3)notinviolationofthelaw
*Roquev.Ericta
DOCTRINE:

Forabolitionofofficetoescapethetaintofunconstitutionality,itmustbemadewith:

1.Ingoodfaith
2.Notforpoliticalorpersonalreasons
3.Notinviolationofthelaw

reprimand,unlikewarningoradmonition,isadministrativepenalty

*Tobiasv.Veloso
Tomas Lujan was charged withbribery byMayorFranciscoTobias.Lujanwasreprimanded
byNAPOLCOMforthebriberycase.

ISSUE:W/Nareprimandbeequatedwithexoneration?

HELD:

NO. Areprimandisanadministrativepenalty,apublicandformalcensureorseverereproof
administered to a person in faultbyhissuperiorofficer.Awarningisanactofputtingoneonhis
guardandadmonitionisfriendlyreproof.Reprimandismorethanthelattertwo.

righttoselforganization

temporaryemployeestobegivensuchprotectionasprovidedbylaw

temporaryemployeesmayberemovedwithoutcause

*Mendiolav.Tancinco
DOCTRINE:

It is a wellsettled rule that temporary employees maybe terminated at any time even
withoutjustcause.Theyhavenofixedtenure

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agencyoftheGovernment,

shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen themerit
and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and
ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall
submittothePresidentandtheCongressanannualreportonitspersonnelprograms.
4.

FunctionsofCSC(Sec.3)

establishacareerservice

adopt measures to promote moral, efficiency, integrity,responsiveness,progressivenessand
courtesyinthecivilservice

strengthenthemeritandrewardssystem

integrateallhumanresourcesdevelopmentprograms

institutionalizeamanagementclimateconducivetopublicaccountability

submitanannualreportonitspersonnelprograms
Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and
defendthisConstitution.
Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials and employees, including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualificationsrequiredfor,theirpositions.
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within oneyearaftersuchelection,
be appointed to any office in the Government or any Governmentowned or controlled
corporationsorinanyoftheirsubsidiaries.


no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointedtoanyofficeintheGovernmentoranyGOCCoranyoftheirsubsidiaries(Sec.6)
Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible forappointmentordesignationinanycapacityto
anypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure.
Unless otherwise allowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficial
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including Governmentowned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.

no
elective official eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
duringtenure(Sec.7)

no
appointive
officialshallholdanyotherofficeoremploymentinGovernment

exceptifallowedbylaworprimaryfunctionsofposition(Sec.7)

CPLCandPCGGChair
(Elma20

Art.VII,Sec.13
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shallreceiveadditional,double,
or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent
of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government.
Pensionsorgratuitiesshallnotbeconsideredasadditional,double,orindirectcompensation.

no elective or appointive official shall receive additional, double or indirect compensationunless
specificallyauthorizedbylaw
pensionsorgratuitiesnotconsideredadditionalcompensation(Sec.8)
per diem or allowance given as reimbursement for expenses isallowed(
*Peraltav.Mathay
)
*Santosv.CA
(doubleretirement)

noelectiveorappointiveofficial shallacceptanypresent,emolument,officeortitleofanykind
fromanyforeigngovernment(Sec.8)
C.THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS
Section1.

1.
There shall be a Commission on Elections composedofaChairmanandsixCommissioners
who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirtyfive years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar whohavebeenengagedinthe
practiceoflawforatleasttenyears.
Composition(Sec.1)

ChairmanandsixCommissioners

naturalborncitizens

atleast35

notcandidateinimmediatelypreceedingelection

a majority of the Commission, including the Chairman shall be membersofthePhilippineBar
whohavebeenengagedinthepracticeoflawforatleast10years

*Cayetanov.Monsod

o
Principle: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law,legalprocedure,knowledge,trainingandexperience.Toengage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or renderanykindofservice,whichdeviceor
servicerequirestheuseinanydegreeoflegalknowledgeorskill.

2.

Appointment(Sec.1)

7yeartermwithoutreappointment

consentofCommissiononAppointmentsneeded

appointmenttoanyvacancyonlyforunexpiredterm

noMemberappointedinatemporaryoractingcapacity

*Brillantesv.Yorac

o
The constitution provides for many safeguardstotheindependenceoftheCOMELEC,
foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not
available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC by designation of the
President.

2.
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the Presidentwiththeconsent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven yearswithoutreappointment.Ofthose
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for threeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshall
be only fortheunexpiredtermofthepredecessor.InnocaseshallanyMemberbeappointedor
designatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.
Section2.
TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethefollowingpowersandfunctions:
1.
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite,initiative,referendum,andrecall.
2.
Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating totheelections, returns,and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellatejurisdictionover
all contests involving elective municipal officials decidedbytrialcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions,
final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangayofficesshallbefinal,executory,andnotappealable.
3.
Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of pollingplaces,appointmentofelection officialsand
inspectors,andregistrationofvoters.
4.
Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusivepurposeofensuringfree,orderly,honest,peaceful,andcredibleelections.
5.
Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government and
accredit citizens' armsoftheCommissiononElections.Religiousdenominationsandsectsshall
not be registered. Those which seek to achievetheirgoalsthroughviolenceorunlawfulmeans,
or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration. Financial contributions from foreign
governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an

additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to
otherpenaltiesthatmaybeprescribedbylaw.
6.
File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of votersinvestigateand,whereappropriate,prosecutecasesofviolationsofelection
laws,includingactsoromissionsconstitutingelectionfrauds,offenses,andmalpractices.
7.
Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places wherepropagandamaterialsshallbeposted, andtopreventandpenalizeall
formsofelectionfrauds,offenses,malpractices,andnuisancecandidacies.
8.
Recommend to the President the removal of any officer oremployeeithasdeputized,orthe
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its
directive,order,ordecision.
9.
Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election,plebiscite,initiative,referendum,orrecall.
Powers(Sec.2)

enforceandadministerallelectionlaws

includespowertoannulelectionsbecauseofterrorism

(
*Biliwangv.Comelec
)
o
Principle: In order words, in linewiththeplenitudeofitspowersand itsfunctionto
protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must be deemed possessed of
authority to annul elections where thewillofthevotershasbeendefeatedandthe
purity of elections sullied. It would be unreasonable to state that the COMELEC
has a legal duty to perform and at the same time deny it the wherewithal to fulfill
thattask.

callforaspecialelection
(
*Sanchezv.Comelec)

o
Principle:UnderSection5ofBatasPambansaBlg.52,whentheelectionresults in
a failure to elect the COMELEC may call for the holding or continuation of the
election as soon as practicable. Court construes this to include the calling of a
special election in the event of a failure to elect in order to make the COMELEC

truly effective in the discharge of its functions. In fact, Section 8 of the 1978
Election Code, supra, specifically allows the COMELEC to call a special election
for the purpose of filling a vacancy or a newly created position, as the case may
be. There should be no reason, therefore, for not allowing it to call a special
electionwhenthereisafailuretoelect.

decideelectioncases

original jurisdiction over contests relating to the elections, returns and

qualificationsofregional,provincialandcityofficials

appellate jurisdiction over contests involving municipalofficials decided

bytrialcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction

5dayperiodfortakinganappeal(
*1993ComelecRules)

Rule19MotionsforReconsideration

Section 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration A motion to
reconsider adecision,resolution, order,orrulingofaDivisionshallbefiled
within 5 days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion,if notproforma,
suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution,
orderorruling.

concurrentcertiorari,mandamus,quo warranto andhabeascorpuspowerswith

theSC(
*Carlosv.Angeles
)
o
Principle: Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurrisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction (RTC) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The
Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the
case.
appellatejurisdictionovercontestsinvolvingbarangayofficials
decidedbytrialcourtsoflimitedjurisdiction

onlyquestionsoffactquestionsoflawtoSC(
*Floresv.Comelec
)

o
Principle: The provision of Article 9C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that
decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contects
involving elective municipal andbarangayofficesshallbefinal,executoryandnor
appealable applies only to questions of fact and not law. That provision wasnot
intended to divesttheSCofits authoritytoresolvequestionsoflawasinherentin
thejudicialpowerconferreduponitbytheConstitution.

appellatedecisionsshallbefinal,executoryandnotappealable

preproclamationadministrativeprocess

contestjudicialprocess

decideallquestionsaffectingelections(butnottobevotedfor)

excepttherighttovote

onlypopularelections

*Alunanv.Mirasol(SK)
o
Principle: As already states by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, theCOMELECplacedthe
SK elections under the direct control andsupervisionoftheDILG.Contrarytothe
respodents contention, this did not contravene Article 9, C, 2(1) of the
Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall have the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Elections for SK officers are not
subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that, as we have
recently held, contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the
jurisdictionoftheCOMELEC.

*
Taulev.Santos(Barangayfederation)

contemptpoweronlypursuanttoquasijudicialfunction

*Masangcayv.Comelec

deputizelawenforcementagenciesandGovernmentinstrumentalitiestoensureCHOPFE

coverscriminalandadministrativecases

merelyrecommendsdisciplinaryactiontothePresident(
*Tanv.Comelec
)

actofdeputyisactofComelec
(
*Peoplev.Basilia
)

registerpoliticalorganizations

mustpresentplatformorprogramofgovernment

notreligiousdenominationsandsects

antiviolenceandproConstitution

notsupportedbyforeigngovernments(includingfinancial

contributions)

file,onitsownoruponcomplaint,petitionsforinclusionorexclusionofvoters

investigateandprosecutecasesofviolationsofelectionlawsincludingelectionfrauds

RTC has authority to try and decide criminal cases involving elections (
*People v.
Delgado
)

Exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation for purposes of a)
filing information and b) help judge in determining whetherwarrantofarrest
shouldbeissued(
*Kilosbayanv.Comelec)

Prosecution of election offenses is exclusively under Comelec
(
*Peoplev.JudgeInting)

recommendtoCongress

measurestominimizeelectionspending

measurestopreventandpenalizeallformsofelectionfraud

recommendtothePresident

removalofanydeputizedperson

impositionofanydisciplinaryaction

submitcomprehensivereport

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heardanddecidedindivision,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.

promulgaterulesofprocedure(Sec.3)

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportationandother
public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentalitythereof,
including any governmentowned or controlled corporationorits subsidiary.Suchsupervisionor
regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space ,and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaignsandforumsamong
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credibleelections.

supervise or regulate franchises or concessions granted by the Government (e.g.,

media,transportationandpublicutilities)(Sec.4)

equalopportunityintimeandspace

reasonablerates

meetCHOPFEobjectives

*Sanidadv.Comelec(plebiscite)

*PhilippinePressInstitutev.Comelec(print)

*Telebapv.Comelec(broadcast)

Section 5. No pardon,amnesty,parole,orsuspensionofsentenceforviolationofelectionlaws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation
oftheCommission.

recommendpardonforelectionoffenses(Sec.5)

checkonPresidentialPower
.

AdministrativeMatters

maysit
enbanc
orintwodivisions

preproclamation casesshall bedecidedindivisionprovidedthatMRsshallbedecided
enbanc

PARTYMATTERS(6,7,8)
Section 6. A free andopenpartysystemshallbeallowedtoevolveaccording tothefreechoice
ofthepeople,subjecttotheprovisionsofthisArticle.

freeandopenpartysystem(Sec.6)

Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
exceptforthoseregisteredunderthepartylistsystemasprovidedinthisConstitution.

partylistregistration(Sec.7)

Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registeredunderthepartylistsystem,

shall not be represented in the voters' registrationboards,boardsofelectioninspectors,boards
of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers
inaccordancewithlaw.

norepresentationinvoterboards(Sec.8)

mayappointpollwatchers

OTHERMATTERS(9,10,11)
Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed bytheCommissionin specialcases, theelectionperiodshall
commenceninetydaysbeforethedayofelectionandshallendthirtydaysthereafter.

Electionperiod

90daysbeforeelectiondayand30daysthereafter(Sec.9)

Section 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassmentanddiscrimination.

Bonafidecandidatesfreefromharassment(Sec.10)

Section 11. FundscertifiedbytheCommissionasnecessarytodefraytheexpensesforholding

regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls,shallbeprovidedin
the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automaticallyupon
certificationbytheChairmanoftheCommission

Election expenses provided in regular or special appropriations and released
automaticallyuponcertificationbytheCommissionChairman(Sec.11)

Secondplacerrule(
*Loretov.Brion
)
D.THECOMMISSIONONAUDIT
Section1.
1.
There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners,
who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirtyfive years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years, and must not have beencandidatesforanyelectivepositioninthe
elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the
Commissionbelongtothesameprofession.
Composition(Sec.1)

Chairmanand2Commissioners

naturalborncitizens

atleast35

notcandidatesinimmediatelyprecedingelection

CPAorlawyerwith10yearauditingorpracticeoflawexperience

notallMembersbelongtothesameprofession
2.
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the Presidentwiththeconsent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven yearswithoutreappointment.Ofthose
first appointed, the Chairman shallholdofficeforsevenyears,oneCommissionerforfiveyears,
and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of thepredecessor.Inno caseshall
anyMemberbeappointedordesignatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.

Appointment(Sec.1)

7yeartermwithoutreappointment

consentofCommissiononAppointmentsneeded

appointmenttoanyvacancyonlyforunexpiredterm

nomemberappointedinatemporaryoractingcapacity

Section2.
1.
The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures orusesoffunds
and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled
corporationswithoriginalcharters,andonapostauditbasis:
a.
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal

autonomyunderthisConstitution
b.

autonomousstatecollegesanduniversities
c.

othergovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiariesand
d.
suchnongovernmentalentitiesreceivingsubsidyorequity,directlyorindirectly,

from or through the Government, which are required by law or the grantinginstitutionto submit
to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However,wheretheinternalcontrolsystemof
the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including
temporary or special preaudit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It
shall keep the general accounts of the Governmentand,forsuchperiodasmaybeprovidedby
law,preservethevouchersandothersupportingpaperspertainingthereto.
2.
The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionableexpendituresorusesofgovernmentfundsandproperties.

3.

Powers


examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to the revenue, receipts of or uses of
funds

pertainingtotheGovernmentofGOCCswithoriginalcharters(preaudit)

a) Constitutional bodies and offices granted fiscal autonomy, b) autonomous state

colleges and universities, c) other GOCCs and their subsidiaries and d) nonGovernmental
entitiesreceivingsubsidiesfromtheGovernment(postaudit)(Sec.2)

settle accounts means power to settle liquidated accounts which may be

adjustedsimplybyanarithmeticalprocess

lawappropriatingfundsforapurpose

contract entered into by proper officer pursuant to law whether goods or

services covered by contract have been delivered payment has been authorized by proper
officials

(
*Guevarav.Gimenez
)

Section 3. No lawshallbepassedexemptinganyentityoftheGovernmentoritssubsidiariesin
any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission
onAudit.

definescopeofauditandpromulgateaccountingandauditrules

3)

no law passed exemptinganyGovernmentalentityfromCOAjurisdiction(Sec.

Section 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time
fixed by law, an annualreportcoveringthefinancialconditionandoperationoftheGovernment,
its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled
corporations, and nongovernmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures
necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as
mayberequiredbylaw.

submitannualreporttoPresidentandCongress(Sec.4)

Cases

COAhasauthoritytointerpretfailureofpublicbidding

(
*Danvillev.COA
)

COAhasauthoritytopromulgaterulestopreventirregular,unnecessary,excessiveor
extravagantexpenses

(
*Dingdongv.Guingona,Pollosov.Gangan
)

ARTICLEX
LOCALGOVERNMENT

GENERALPROVISIONS
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
MindanaoandtheCordillerasashereinafterprovided.
Scope

territorialandpoliticalsubdivisions(Sec.1)

provinces,cities,municipalitiesandbarangays
Section2.
Theterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsshallenjoylocalautonomy.
localautonomy(Sec.2)

subjecttopowerofcontrolbyCongressandpower
ofgeneralsupervisionbyPresident
(Dadole2002)

autonomousregions

MuslimMindanaoandtheCordilleras

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
thedifferentlocalgovernmentunitstheirpowers,responsibilities,andresources,andprovidefor
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
localunits.
ImplementingLegislation

LocalGovernmentCode(Sec.3)

responsiveandaccountablelocalgovernment

decentralizedstructure

ofpower

decentralizationofadministrationv.decentralization

effectivemechanismofrecall,initiativeandreferendum

allocateamongLGUstheirpowers,responsibilitiesandresources

provideforqualifications,election,appointmentand

removal,term,salaries,powersandfunctions,anddutiesoflocal

officials

othermattersrelatingtotheorganizationandoperationofLGUs

RA7160

Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
componentunitsarewithinthescopeoftheirprescribedpowersandfunctions.
SupervisoryAuthority(Sec.4)

differencewithcontrol

ensurethatactsarewithinscopeofpowersandfunctions

ensurethatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted

PresidentoverLGUs

Provincesovercomponentcitiesandmunicipalities

Citiesandmunicipalitiesovercomponentbarangays
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congressmayprovide, consistent withthebasicpolicyoflocalautonomy.Suchtaxes,fees,and
chargesshallaccrueexclusivelytothelocalgovernments.

Powers(Sec.5)

autonomy
*
Magtajasv.PryceProperties(casino)

Principle: An ordinance cannot prevail against a statue. Municipal

governments are only agents of national governments. Legal Councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred onthembyCongress
as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principalorexercisepowershigherthanthoseofthelatter.
*LLDAv.CA(pollution)

Principle: The charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law, while the
charter of the LGU is a general law. Where there is a conflict between a
general law and a special statute,thespecialstatute should prevailsinceit
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The
special law is to be takenasanexceptiontothegeneral lawintheabsence
of special circumstances forcingacontraryconclusion.Thespecificpower
of the LLDA must prevail over the general powerofthelocalgovernments.
The power given by the Local Government Code tolocalgovernmentswas
arevenuegeneratingpowerandnotaregulatorypower.
*SanJuanv.CSC(recommendationforbudgetofficer)

Principle: The person recommend by the provincial governor did not

posses the qualificationsotheSecretaryof BudgetManagementappointed
someone else on his own. The Secretary should have asked for a new set
of recommendees with the necessary eligibility. The exercise by local
government ofmeaningfulpowerhasbeen anationalgoalbutitseemsthat
legislation cannot seem to let go of centralised powers. There must be an
interplay, abalancingof viewpointsandaharmonizationofproposals from
boththelocalandnationalofficials.

createownsourcesofrevenue

levytaxes,feesandcharges

subjecttoCongressionallimitationsandguidelinesbut
cannotbelimitedbyadministrativeorder

*
PPCv.Pililla

Principle: Limitations imposed merely byadministrativeorderpromulgated

by a provincial government are inconsistent with Section 5 Art. X of the
Constitution.

consistentwithpolicyoflocalautonomy

Section 6. Local governmentunits shallhaveajustshare,asdeterminedbylaw, inthenational

taxeswhichshallbeautomaticallyreleasedtothem.
Rights

justshareinnationaltaxes(Sec.6)

automaticallyreleased

asdeterminedbylaw

*
Pimentelv.AguirreAO372/IRA

Principle: The administrative Order no. 372 was challenged as an

attempt to control the local government and to encroach on their
autonomy. The Court ruled that Section 1 of the Administrative
Order was merely advisory and therefore not an attempt toexercise
control over local governments. But Section 4 was said to violated
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release of the share
ofthelocalgovernmentinnationalrevenue.

Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner
providedbylaw,includingsharingthesamewiththeinhabitantsbywayofdirectbenefits.

equitable share in proceeds of the utilization anddevelopmentofthenationalwealthwithin

theirrespectiveareas(Sec.7)

inthemannerprovidedbylaw

LGUOfficials
(8&9)
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,exceptbarangayofficials,whichshallbe
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three

consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Term(Sec.8)

3years

notmorethan3consecutiveterms

electedandservedthreeconsecutiveterms

*
Borjav.Comelec

Principle: For service to be counted as one term for the purpose of the
threeterm limit, two essential elementsarerequired.First,theofficialmust
have been elected to the position three consecutive times and second, he
must have served three full terms. Conversely, if he is not serving a term
for whichhewaselectedbecauseheissimplycontinuingtheserviceofthe
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term now withstanding hisvoluntaryrenunciationofofficeprior
to its expiration. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
beforethedisqualificationcanapply.

voluntaryrenunciation

Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may
beprescribedbylaw.

SectoralRepresentation(Sec.9)
Cities

Highlyurbanized,asdeterminedbylaw

Componentcitieswhosechartersprohibittheirvotersfromvotingforprovincialofficials
independentofprovince

Residentscannotrunforaprovincialelectiveoffice
*
Abellav.Comelec

Principle: Cities that have charters which prohibit their voters from voting
in the provincial elections are independent of the province. Since they are
independent of the province, residents of such office are not qualified to
runforprovincialpositions.

Componentcitieswhosecharterscontainnoprohibition

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local governmentcodeandsubjecttoapprovalbyamajority ofthevotescast
inaplebisciteinthepoliticalunitsdirectlyaffected.

nonalterationofpoliticalunits(Sec.10)

creation,merger,abolishmentorboundarysubstantiallyaltered

inaccordancewithcriteriaestablishedinLGC

subjecttoapprovalinaplebisciteinthepoliticalunitsdirectlyaffected

plebiscite

all political units affected should participate in the

(
*
Tanv.Comelec
)

Principle: If what is involved is the creation of a barangay, the plebiscite

should be municipalitywide or citywide, and if municipalityorcomponent
city, provincewide or citywide, and if municipality or componentcity,
provincewide and if a portion of a province is to be carved from another
province, the plebiscite should include the mother province. Initial step is
withintheCongress

Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions,
subject to a plebiscite assetforthinSection10hereof.Thecomponentcitiesandmunicipalities
shall retain theirbasic autonomyandshallbeentitledtotheirownlocalexecutiveandlegislative

assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be
limitedtobasicservicesrequiringcoordination.

specialmetropolitansubdivisions(Sec.11)

createdbylaw

subjecttoaplebiscite

componentsretainbasicautonomy

jurisdictionlimitedtobasicservicesrequiringcoordination

MMDAsfunctionareadministrativeinnatureitdoesnotpossesspolicepower
*
MMDAv.BelAir

Principle: MMDA was created by RA7924 to render 7 basic services. The

law did not grant it any general police power nor legislative power. MMDA
was not a municipal government endowed with police power, nor eminent
domain power, and was therefore without authority to order the Village to
yield its property for general public use. It is an administrative agency go
thegovernmentandassuchitmayonlyexercise powersthataregiventoit
bylaw.

Section 12.Citiesthatarehighlyurbanized,asdeterminedbylaw,andcomponentcitieswhose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independentof
the province. The voters of component cities within aprovince,whosecharters containnosuch
prohibition,shallnotbedeprivedoftheirrighttovoteforelectiveprovincialofficials.
Section 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their
efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with
law.

LGUvoluntarygroupings(Sec.13)

consolidateeffortsforpurposescommonlybeneficial

Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar
bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations within the
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units

therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the
region.

RegionalDevelopmentCouncils(Sec.14)

createdbyPresident

strengthenautonomy

accelerateeconomicandsocialgrowth

AUTONOMOUSREGIONS
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereigntyaswellasterritorialintegrityoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
Scope

MuslimMinadanaoandtheCodilleras

provinces,cities,municipalitiesandgeographicalareas

sharingcommoncharacteristics

provinceto

it is possible for a cluster of barangays within one

belongtoanautonomousregion

oneprovincecannotconstituteanautonomousregion
*
Ordillov.Comelec
(Ifugao)

Principle: An Autonomous Region has to consist more than one

province. Hence,ifonlyoneprovinceratifies theOrganicActdrafted
by Congress, the creation of an autonomous region does not
succeed.

Powers

(16,17,20,21)

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensurethatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted.

Presidentexercisesgeneralsupervision(Sec.16)

ensurethatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted

Section 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilitiesnotgrantedbythisConstitutionorby law

totheautonomousregionsshallbevestedintheNationalGovernment.

limitedauthorityconferredbyCongress(Sec.17)
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.
The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions
ofthisConstitutionandnationallaws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
theautonomousregion.
OrganicAct(Sec.18)

Congresswithassistancefromregionalconsultativecommission
Section 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months
from the time of organization of bothHouses,passtheorganicactsfortheautonomousregions
inMuslimMindanaoandtheCordilleras.

within18months(Sec.19)

basicstructureofgovernment

consistentwithConstitutionandnationallaws

creationofautonomousregioneffectivewhenapprovedinplebiscite
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdictionandsubjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionand
nationallaws,theorganicactofautonomousregionsshallprovideforlegislativepowersover:
1.

Administrativeorganization
2.

Creationofsourcesofrevenues
3.

Ancestraldomainandnaturalresources
4.

Personal,family,andpropertyrelations
5.

Regionalurbanandruralplanningdevelopment
6.

Economic,social,andtourismdevelopment
7.

Educationalpolicies
8.

Preservationanddevelopmentoftheculturalheritageand
9.

Suchothermattersasmaybeauthorizedbylawforthepromotionofthegeneralwelfareof
thepeopleoftheregion.

legislativepowersovereconomicandsocialissues(Sec.20)

Section 21. The preservationofpeaceandorderwithin theregionsshallbetheresponsibilityof

the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibilityoftheNationalGovernment.

peaceandorderresponsibilityoflocalpoliceagenciesinaccordancewithlaw(Sec.21)

defenseandsecurity,foreignrelations,foreigntrade,currencyandbankingresponsibility
ofNationalGovernment

ARTICLEXI ACCOUNTABILITYOFPUBLICOFFICERS
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiencyactwithpatriotismandjustice,andleadmodestlives.
1.

Rationale:

Publicofficeisapublictrustmereagentsnotrulersofpeople
Accountable
Serve

justice

with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, patriotism and

 Lead modest lives even if independently wealthy, should not live in a

mannerthatflauntshiswealth
2.

Removal

Forcause

Careerserviceorcoterminous

Impeachment
Section2.ThePresident,theVicePresident,the MembersoftheSupremeCourt,theMembers
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violationoftheConstitution, treason,bribery,graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employeesmayberemovedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

Impeachableofficers(Sec.2)

PresidentandVicePresident,

MembersofSupremeCourt,

MembersofConstitutionalCommissions,

Ombudsman

Impeachableoffenses(Sec.2)

CulpableviolationoftheConstitution,

treason,

bribery,

graftandcorruption,

otherhighcrimes,

betrayalofpublictrust
ImpeachmentProcess

Section3.
1.
The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
2.
A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,afterhearing,andbya
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithintensessiondaysfromreceiptthereof.

Complaint filed by Representative or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by

anyRepresentative(Househasexclusivepowertoinitiatecasesofimpeachment)
3.
AvoteofatleastonethirdofalltheMembersof theHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contraryresolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded.
4.
In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment isfiledbyatleastonethird ofall
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
theSenateshallforthwithproceed.

Complaintfiledby1/3ofHouseconstitutesArticlesofImpeachment
Canthecomplaintbeamended?
Creepingimpeachment
5.
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
withinaperiodofoneyear.
6.
The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. WhenthePresidentof the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.
No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
7.
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishment,accordingtolaw.

8.
The Congress shall promulgate its rulesonimpeachmenttoeffectivelycarryoutthepurpose
ofthissection.

nOrderofBusinesswithin10sessiondaysandreferredtoproperCommitteewithin3sessiondays

referralministerial?

Committee conducts hearing and by majority vote submits its reporttotheHousewithin

60sessiondayswithresolution

form

substance

probablecause

calendaredforconsiderationbyHousewithin10sessiondays

1/3ofallRepresentativesneededtoaffirmoroverrideCommitteeresolution

Senatetriesanddecidescasesofimpeachment

Presidingofficer

SenatePresident

ChiefJustice

Convictionrequiresconcurrenceof2/3ofallSenators

purposeofimpeachmentisnottopunishbutonlytoremove

ImpeachmentSafeguards

voteofeachRepresentativerecorded

Senatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation

no impeachment proceedings initiated against the same official more than once within a

periodof1year(*
Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives)

in case of impeachment shall not extend further than removal and

disqualification to hold other office but party convicted shall still be subject to prosecution
andpunishment

judgment

Congresstopromulgaterulesonimpeachment

Sandiganbayan
Section 4. The present antigraft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue tofunction
andexerciseitsjurisdictionasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw.

a

statutory not a constitutional court created not by the Constitution but by statute,
althoughitscreationismandatedbytheConstitution

Section 5 of Article XIII (1973) gavetothelegislature broaddiscretiontograntjurisdiction

to the Sandiganbayan not only over graft and corrupt practices but also over such
other
offenses committed by public officers and employees
, including those in government
owned or controller corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by
law.(
*Lecarozv.Sandiganbayan)

person may be charged in the Sandiganbayan only if he is a coprincipal,

accompliceoraccessoryofapublicofficer(
*Azarconv.Sandiganbayan)

Private

OfficeoftheOmbudsman
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of
the Ombudsman tobeknownasTanodbayan,oneoverallDeputyandatleastoneDeputyeach
for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may
likewisebeappointed.
Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the
Deputies,shallbeappointedbytheOmbudsman,accordingtotheCivilServiceLaw.

Officials

OmbudsmanorTanodbayan

OverallDeputy

DeputyforLuzon,Visayas,MindanaoandtheMilitary

SpecialProsecutor

 Special prosecutor may investigate and file cases only when so authorized by the
Ombudsman(
*Zaldivarv.Sandiganbayan)
WhatisthepoweroftheOmbudsmanoverhisoffice?

Independent body thathasthepowertoappointallofficialsandemployeesoftheOfficeof

theOmbudsman,excepthisdeputies.

POWER: setting,prescribing, administeringthestandardsfor theofficialsandpersonnelof

theOffice

VestedwiththepowerofadministrativecontrolandsupervisionoftheOffice
o
Authority to organize such directorates for administration and allied services as may be
necessaryfortheeffectivedischarge

CSChasnopoweroverthis
Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines,
and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and
independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must nothavebeencandidatesforany
elective office in the immediately preceding election. TheOmbudsmanmusthave,for tenyears
ormore,beenajudgeorengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
providedforinSection2ofArticle1XAofthisConstitution.

Qualifications(Sec.8)

naturalborncitizen

40

recognizedprobityandindependence

for10years

member of the Philippine Bar who has been a judge or in the practice of law

notacandidateintheimmediatelyprecedingelection

Disqualifications(Sec.8)

notholdanyotherofficeoremployment

notengageinthepracticeofanyprofession

notengageintheactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusiness

whichmaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice

not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any Governmentcontract,

franchiseorprivilege
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistof
at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three
nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All
vacanciesshallbefilledwithinthreemonthsaftertheyoccur.
Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shallhavetherankof Chairmanand Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which
shallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtermofoffice.

Privileges(Sec.10)

rankofChairmanandMembersofConstitutionalCommissions

samesalaryasConComwhichshallnotbedecreasedduringterm

Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeedingtheircessationfromoffice.

notruninelectionimmediatelysucceedingcessationfromoffice(Sec.11)

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shallactpromptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentowned
or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify thecomplainantsoftheaction
takenandtheresultthereof.

PowersandDuties


actpromptlyoncomplaintsfiledagainstpublicofficialsandshall,inappropriate
cases,notifycomplainantsofactiontaken(Sec.12)

investigate on its own or on complaint any act or omission by a public official

whichappearstobeillegal,unjust,improperorinefficient
even if the offense committed by the official is not related to the performance of
hisfunction(
*Delosov.Domingo)

claimofconfidentialitycannotbartheOmbudsmanspowertoinvestigateunless
grounded on military, diplomatic or other national security concerns (
Almonte v.
Vasquez
)
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
1.
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper,orinefficient.
2.
Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
governmentowned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any
act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performanceofduties.

Directonitsownoron complaintanypublicofficialtoperformandexpediteanyactor duty

required by law or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties
3.
Direct the officer concernedtotakeappropriateactionagainstapublicofficialoremployeeat
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensurecompliancetherewith.

Direct officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official at fault and

recommendpunishmentthereofandensurecompliancetherewith
4.
Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subjecttosuchlimitationsasmay
be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and
reportanyirregularitytotheCommissiononAuditforappropriateaction.


Direct officer concerned to furnish it with copies of documents relating todisbursementof

publicfundsandreportanyirregularitytoCOAforappropriateaction
5.
Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge
ofitsresponsibilities,andtoexamine,ifnecessary,pertinentrecordsanddocuments.

Requestanygovernmentagencyforassistanceandinformationnecessary
6.
Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.

Publicizematterscoveredbyitsinvestigation
7.
Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement,fraud,andcorruptioninthe
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standardsofethicsandefficiency.

Determinethecausesofinefficiency,redtape,mismanagement,fraudand

Corruptioningovernmentandmakerecommendations
8.
Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such otherpowersorperformsuchfunctions
ordutiesasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

Promulgaterulesofprocedure(Sec.13)

Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

IndependenceofOffice

fiscalautonomy

appropriationsautomaticallyandregularlyreleased(Sec.14)

Section 15. The right of the Statetorecoverpropertiesunlawfully acquiredbypublic officialsor

employees,fromthemorfromtheirnomineesortransferees,shallnotbebarredbyprescription,
laches,orestoppel.
ProhibitionsonImpeachableOfficers
(16,18)
Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business
purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any governmentowned or controlled bank or
financial institution to the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the

Congress, the Supreme Court, and theConstitutionalCommissions,theOmbudsman, ortoany

firmorentityinwhichtheyhavecontrollinginterest,duringtheirtenure.

no loan, guaranty or other form of financial accommodation, directly or indirectly granted by

governmentfinancialinstitution(Sec.16)

Section17.Apublicofficeroremployeeshall,uponassumptionofofficeandasoftenthereafter
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutionaloffices,
and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to
thepublicinthemannerprovidedbylaw.
StatementofAssetsandLiabilities(Sec.17)

Publicofficeroremployee

Publicofficialsofhigherrank

disclosedtothepublic

Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegianceatall
times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
statusofanimmigrantofanothercountryduringhistenureshallbedealtwithbylaw.

changecitizenshiporacquirestatusofanimmigrant

shall be dealt with by law (Sec. 18) refers to incumbents not to

candidates (
*Caasi v. CA
) *Green card holder and filed a certificate of candidacy, his
disqualification can be rooted from Section 68 or Omnibus Election Code as hes not an
incumbentyet.

ARTICLEXII NATIONALECONOMYANDPATRIMONY
Section 1. The goals ofthenationaleconomyareamoreequitabledistributionofopportunities,
income, and wealth a sustained increase intheamountofgoodsandservices producedbythe
nation for the benefit of the people and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the
qualityoflifeforall,especiallytheunderprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full of efficient use of human

and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.
However, the State shallprotectFilipinoenterprisesagainstunfairforeigncompetitionand trade
practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all region softhe countryshallbe
given optimum opportunity to develop.Privateenterprises,includingcorporations,cooperatives,
and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their
ownership.
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy,fisheries,forestsortimber,wildlife,floraandfauna,andother
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall notbealienated. Theexploration,development,andutilizationofnatural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enterinto coproduction,jointventure,orproductionsharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twentyfive years, renewable for not more than twentyfive years, and under such terms and
conditions as may providedbylaw.Incasesofwaterrightsforirrigation,watersupply,fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the
measureandlimitofthegrant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusiveeconomiczone,andreserveitsuseandenjoymentexclusivelytoFilipinocitizens.
The Congress may, by law, allowsmallscaleutilizationofnaturalresourcesbyFilipinocitizens,
as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in
rivers,lakes,bays,andlagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to theeconomicgrowthandgeneralwelfareofthe
country.Insuchagreements,theStateshall promotethedevelopmentanduseoflocalscientific
andtechnicalresources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision,withinthirtydaysfromitsexecution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
landsandnationalparks.Agriculturallandsofthepublicdomainmaybefurtherclassifiedbylaw
according to the uses to which they may be devoted.Alienablelandsofthepublicdomainshall
be limited to agricultural lands.Privatecorporationsorassociationsmaynotholdsuchalienable

lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twentyfive years,
renewable for not more than twentyfive years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than fivehundredhectares,oracquirenot
morethantwelvehectaresthereof,bypurchase,homestead,orgrant.
Takingintoaccounttherequirementsofconservation,ecology,anddevelopment,andsubjectto
the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of landsof
the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of
forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter,
such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor
diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine,
measurestoprohibitlogginginendangeredforestsandwatershedareas.
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestrallandstoensuretheireconomic,social,andculturalwellbeing.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relationsindeterminingtheownershipandextentofancestraldomain.
Section 6. The use ofpropertybearsasocialfunction,andalleconomicagentsshallcontribute
to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and
similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises, subject to thedutyof theStatetopromotedistributivejusticeandtointervenewhen
thecommongoodsodemands.
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
ofthepublicdomain.
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a naturalborn citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subjecttolimitationsprovidedbylaw.
Section9.TheCongressmayestablishanindependenteconomicandplanningagency headed
by the President, which shall, after consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various
private sectors,andlocalgovernmentunits,recommendtoCongress,andimplementcontinuing
integratedandcoordinatedprogramsandpoliciesfornationaldevelopment.

Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National EconomicandDevelopmentAuthorityshall

functionastheindependentplanningagencyofthegovernment.
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planningagency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations atleastsixtypercentumofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens,or suchhigher
percentage as Congress mayprescribe,certainareasofinvestments.TheCongressshallenact
measures that will encourage theformationandoperationofenterpriseswhose capitaliswholly
ownedbyFilipinos.
In the grantofrights,privileges,andconcessionscoveringthenationaleconomyandpatrimony,
theStateshallgivepreferencetoqualifiedFilipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdictionandinaccordancewithitsnationalgoalsandpriorities.
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.Neithershallanysuchfranchiseor
right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject toamendment,alteration,or
repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shallencourageequity
participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the
governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or associationmust be
citizensofthePhilippines.
Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
andlocallyproducedgoods,andadoptmeasuresthathelpmakethemcompetitive.
Section 13. The State shallpursueatradepolicythatservesthegeneralwelfareandutilizesall
formsandarrangementsofexchangeonthebasisofequalityandreciprocity.
Section 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino
scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, highlevel technical manpower and skilled
workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage
appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the national benefit. The practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by
law.

Section 15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of
cooperativesasinstrumentsforsocialjusticeandeconomicdevelopment.
Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Governmentowned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common
goodandsubjecttothetestofeconomicviability.
Section 17.In times ofnationalemergency,whenthepublicinterestsorequires,theState may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
directtheoperationofanyprivatelyownedpublicutilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest.
Section 18. The State may, in theinterestofnationalwelfareordefense,establishandoperate
vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities
andotherprivateenterprisestobeoperatedbytheGovernment.
Section19.TheStateshallregulateorprohibitmonopolieswhenthepublicinterestsorequires.
Nocombinationsinrestraintoftradeorunfaircompetitionshallbeallowed.
Section 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the
members of whose governing board must be naturalborn Filipino citizens, of known probity,
integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from the private sector. They shall
also be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The
authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have
supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be
provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing
similarfunctions.
Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines operating under
existinglaws,shallfunctionasthecentralmonetaryauthority.
Section 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of
the monetary authority. Informationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbythe Government
shallbemadeavailabletothepublic.
Section 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall be
considered inimical tothenational interestandsubjecttocriminalandcivilsanctions,as maybe
providedbylaw.

*TODO:
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Kats: Add content for Phividec v Velez (Arbitration)

Manzano (RTC Ilocos) (Solid Homes v.
Laserna2008)
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