Transformer Safety Standards

ENA DOC 18-2008
Interim Guideline for the Fire Protection of

Electricity Substations
ENA DOC 18-2008

Interim Guideline for the Fire Protection of
Electricity Substations
May 2008
ENA DOC 18-2008 Interim Guideline for the Fire Protection of Electricity Substations
PREFACE
This Interim Guideline discusses a number of protective measures that reduce the fire
hazards and risks associated with electricity substations. Engineers involved in the design,
construction, operation and maintenance of substations are offered information to assist them
in the development of overall policies on fire protection to suit their particular situations.
Because the hazards and consequences of substation fires vary from one organization to
another, from one location to another, and from one time to another, there is no one set of
rules that can guarantee safety for all, in all places at all times.
This Interim Guideline is intended to apply generally to sub-transmission, zone and
distribution type substations.
Reference is made to the identification and assessment of risk, the design options available to
reduce these risks, the types of fire detection and fire fighting equipment available.
As technological developments are continually causing changes in substations and fire
protection systems, a Guideline such as this can never represent itself as a definitive work.
Rather, this Guideline was prepared to fill the need for a reference on good contemporary
practices, and on desirable future best practices, in the fire protection of electricity
substations. The information contained should serve as a reminder of those factors that
should be considered in the design and operation of substations.
The Interim Guideline has been divided into thirteen (13) sections. Each section deals with a
particular area of concern;
Section No. 1 deals with scope and objectives
Section Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 deal with fires in general terms.
Section No 6 deals with general building requirements
Section Nos. 7 and 8 consider fires in particular types of substations.
Section Nos. 9, 10 and 11 are concerned with fire control techniques
Section Nos. 12 and 13 list relevant regulations and standards.
This Interim Guideline has been issued pending a full review.
It should be noted that AS 2067 1984 High Voltage Installations is also being
reviewed and that AS/NZS 3000 Wiring Rules has recently been reviewed. This
Guideline is intended to complement both of these Standards and to suggest ways of
complying with the intentions of the Building Code of Australia (BCA).
It is intended to fully review this Interim Guideline within 12 months of publication.
Energy Networks Association

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ......................................................................................................................................... 1
1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................... 6
2. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 7
2.1.
General ............................................................................................................................. 7
2.2.
Heat Energy Sources Sources of Ignition...................................................................... 7
2.2.1.
Chemical Heat Energy Sources ................................................................................ 7
2.2.2.
Electrical Heat Energy Sources................................................................................. 7
2.2.3.
Mechanical Heat Energy Sources ............................................................................. 7
2.2.4.
Nuclear Heat Energy ................................................................................................. 8
2.3.
Combustion ....................................................................................................................... 8
2.4.
Explosion........................................................................................................................... 8
2.4.1.
General...................................................................................................................... 8
2.4.2.
Chemical Explosions ................................................................................................. 8
2.4.3.
Pressure Release Explosions ................................................................................... 9
2.4.4.
Explosive Failure of Electrical Equipment ................................................................. 9
2.5.
Extinguishment.................................................................................................................. 9
2.5.1.
Extinguishment by Cooling........................................................................................ 9
2.5.2.
Extinguishment by Oxygen Dilution........................................................................... 9
2.5.3.
Extinguishment by Fuel Removal.............................................................................. 9
2.5.4.
Extinguishment by Chemical Flame Inhibition......................................................... 10
2.6.
Products of Combustion and Their Effects on Life Safety............................................... 10
2.6.1.
General.................................................................................................................... 10
2.6.2.
Fire Gases............................................................................................................... 10
2.6.3.
Smoke ..................................................................................................................... 10
2.6.4.
Heat......................................................................................................................... 10
2.6.5.
Insufficient Oxygen .................................................................................................. 10
2.7.
Fire Resistance Classification ......................................................................................... 11
2.8.
Fire Engineering Certification .......................................................................................... 11
3. FIRE SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT ............................................................................. 12
3.1.
Fire Safety Strategy ........................................................................................................ 12
3.2.
Risk Management Approach........................................................................................... 12
4. THE RISK OF FIRE OCCURRING.......................................................................................... 13
4.1.
General ........................................................................................................................... 13
4.2.
Construction Stage.......................................................................................................... 13
4.3.
Site Considerations ......................................................................................................... 13
4.4.
Substation Equipment and Buildings .............................................................................. 14
4.4.1.
General.................................................................................................................... 14
4.4.2.
Oil Filled Equipment ................................................................................................ 14
4.5.
Substation Operating Life................................................................................................ 14
4.6.
Cables ............................................................................................................................. 14
4.7.
Defective Equipment ....................................................................................................... 14
4.8.
Other Causes of Fire....................................................................................................... 14
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FIRE ........................................................ 16
5.1.
Direct Effects ................................................................................................................... 16
5.2.
Indirect Effects ................................................................................................................ 16
5.3.
Adjacent Property............................................................................................................ 16
5.4.
Cost of Restoration ......................................................................................................... 16
5.5.
Personnel Safety............................................................................................................. 16
6. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTATION BUILDINGS ............................................. 17
6.1.
General ........................................................................................................................... 17
6.2.
Permanent Buildings ....................................................................................................... 17
6.3.
Prefabricated Buildings ................................................................................................... 17
7. FIRE PRECAUTIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATIONS................................................. 18
7.1.
Pole Mounted, Kiosk and Padmounted Substations ....................................................... 18
7.1.1.
General.................................................................................................................... 18
7.1.2.
Personnel Safety ..................................................................................................... 18
7.1.3.
Siting ....................................................................................................................... 18
7.1.4.
Equipment Design ................................................................................................... 18
7.1.5.
Adjacent Property.................................................................................................... 18
7.1.6.
Public Safety ........................................................................................................... 18
7.2.
Surface Free-standing, Outdoor and Metal Enclosed Substations ................................. 18
7.2.1.
General.................................................................................................................... 19
7.2.2.
7.2.3.
Building Requirements ............................................................................................ 19
7.2.4.
Limitation of Damage .............................................................................................. 19
7.3.
Surface Building Substation ............................................................................................ 19
7.3.1.
General Comment ................................................................................................... 19
7.3.2.
7.3.3.
7.3.4.
7.4.
Basement, Vault or Underground Substations ................................................................ 21
7.4.1.
General Comment ................................................................................................... 21
7.4.2.
7.4.3.
7.4.4.
7.5.
High Level Substations ................................................................................................... 22
7.5.1.
General Comments ................................................................................................. 22
7.5.2.
7.5.3.
7.5.4.
7.6.
Substation Overpressure ................................................................................................ 23
8. FIRE PRECAUTIONS FOR TRANSMISSION, BULK SUPPLY AND ZONE SUBSTATIONS . 25
8.1.
General Comments ......................................................................................................... 25
8.2.
Transformers ................................................................................................................... 25
8.2.1.
General.................................................................................................................... 26
8.2.2.
External Fires .......................................................................................................... 26
8.2.3.
Internal Faults.......................................................................................................... 26
8.2.4.
Transformer Replacement....................................................................................... 26
8.2.5.
Spacing.................................................................................................................... 26
8.2.6.
Barrier Walls ............................................................................................................ 27
8.2.7.
Enclosed Transformers ........................................................................................... 32
8.2.8.
Spilt Oil .................................................................................................................... 33
8.2.9.
Cabling to Transformers .......................................................................................... 34
8.3.
Outdoor HV Switchyards ................................................................................................. 34
8.3.1.
General Comments ................................................................................................. 34
8.3.2.
Spacing of Equipment ............................................................................................. 35
8.3.3.
Provisions for Fire Fighting...................................................................................... 35
8.3.4.
Control Cable Trenches........................................................................................... 36
8.3.5.
Housekeeping ......................................................................................................... 37
8.4.
Buildings.......................................................................................................................... 37
8.4.1.
General Remarks .................................................................................................... 37
8.4.2.
Buildings Adjacent to Transformers......................................................................... 38
8.4.3.
Emergency Exits ..................................................................................................... 38
8.4.4.
Segregation of Rooms............................................................................................. 38
8.4.5.
Housekeeping ......................................................................................................... 38
8.4.6.
Fire Detection and Alarm Systems .......................................................................... 38
8.4.7.
Fire Fighting Systems.............................................................................................. 39
8.5.
Indoor Switchgear ........................................................................................................... 39

8.5.1.
General Remarks .................................................................................................... 39
8.5.2.
8.5.3.
8.6.
Battery Rooms and Enclosures....................................................................................... 40
8.7.
Control Rooms ................................................................................................................ 41
8.8.
Cables ............................................................................................................................. 41
8.8.1.
General.................................................................................................................... 41
8.8.2.
Control Cables......................................................................................................... 41
8.8.3.
Power Cables .......................................................................................................... 42
8.9.
Hydrants and Water Storage Tanks ................................................................................ 42
8.10. Portable Fire Fighting Equipment.................................................................................... 43
8.11. Fire Break........................................................................................................................ 43
8.12. First Aid ........................................................................................................................... 44
8.12.1. Basic Equipment ..................................................................................................... 44
8.12.2. Additional Facilities which may be considered include:........................................... 44
9. FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM SYSTEMS ........................................................................... 45
9.1.
General ........................................................................................................................... 45
9.2.
Heat Detectors ................................................................................................................ 45
9.2.1.
Fixed Temperature Types ........................................................................................ 45
9.2.2.
Rate of Rise Detectors ............................................................................................ 45
9.3.
Smoke Detectors............................................................................................................. 46
9.4.
Flame Detectors.............................................................................................................. 46
9.5.
Aspirating Smoke Detectors............................................................................................ 46
9.6.
Precautions ..................................................................................................................... 47
10. FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS .................................................................................................... 48
10.1. Fire Classifications .......................................................................................................... 48
10.2. Portable Fire Extinguishers ............................................................................................. 48
10.3. Fire Hose Reels .............................................................................................................. 48
10.4. Fixed Fire Fighting Systems............................................................................................ 49
10.4.1. Water Based Systems ............................................................................................. 49
10.4.2. Fire Fighting Foams ................................................................................................ 49
10.4.3. Carbon Dioxide Systems......................................................................................... 51
10.4.4. Other Gaseous Systems ......................................................................................... 52
10.4.5. Dry Chemical Extinguishing Agents......................................................................... 52
11. ORGANISATION OF FIRE CONTROL.................................................................................... 53
11.1. Fire Control Program....................................................................................................... 53
11.2. Training ........................................................................................................................... 53
12. STATUTORY REGULATIONS ................................................................................................. 54
12.1. General ........................................................................................................................... 54
12.2. Federal Regualtions (all States) ...................................................................................... 54
12.2.1. Building Code of Australia (BCA) ............................................................................ 54
12.2.2. Dangerous Goods Act ............................................................................................. 54
12.2.3. AS 1940-2004 ......................................................................................................... 54
12.2.4. AS/NZS 3000 .......................................................................................................... 54
12.3. Statutory Regulations in NSW......................................................................................... 55
12.4. Statutory Regulations in Queensland.............................................................................. 55
12.5. Statutory Regulations in ACT .......................................................................................... 55
12.6. Statutory Regulations in Victoria ..................................................................................... 55
12.7. Statutory Regulations in Tasmania ................................................................................. 55
12.8. Statutory Regulations in South Austalia .......................................................................... 55
12.9. Statutory Regulations in Western Australia..................................................................... 55
12.10.
Statutory Regulations in Northern Territory................................................................. 55
13. SELECTED AUSTRALIAN and AMERICAN STANDARDS RELATED TO FIRE PROTECTION
56
13.1. Building Design ............................................................................................................... 56
13.2.
13.3.
13.4.
13.5.
13.6.
13.7.
13.8.
Detection and Suppression ............................................................................................. 57

Extinguishing Equipment................................................................................................. 59
Maintenance.................................................................................................................... 59
Other Australian Standards Related to Fire Protection ................................................... 59
Emergency-Lighting-In-Buildings .................................................................................... 60
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards ................................................. 60
Summary of Australian Practices .................................................................................... 61
1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

The overall scope of the Guideline is to be outlined including relevance to new and existing
substations.
Some of the objectives are;
compliance with all relevant legislation

meeting functional & performance objectives
compliance with the Building Code of Australia (BCA)
The relevance of the BCA and likely method of design is to be established in the final
revision.
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1.
General
Within the framework of the safety precautions applied to electricity substations, fire protection
is one of the essential features. While experience has shown that substation fires are rare,
(typically 1/1000 AEP) it must be recognised that the consequences of a substation fire can be
very serious.
The philosophy of "Loss Control" applied to substation fires, requires an overall appreciation
of the problem with conscious decisions being taken regarding the location, design and
operation and maintenance of the equipment.
The chemistry and physics of fire is amply covered in texts and references such as the NFPA
Fire Protection Handbook. It is sufficient here to remind readers of some of the basics.
2.2.
Heat Energy Sources Sources of Ignition
Since fire prevention and extinguishment are dependent on the control of heat energy, it is
important to consider the more common ways in which heat can be produced. There are four
sources of heat energy: (1) Chemical (2) Electrical (3) Mechanical (4) Nuclear.
2.2.1. Chemical Heat Energy Sources
Heat of Combustion - ie complete or partial oxidisation.
Spontaneous .Heating - ie the process of increase in temperature of a material without

drawing heat from its surroundings.
Heat of Decomposition - ie heat released by the decomposition of compounds which

required the addition of heat for their formation. Once decomposition has been started by
heating above a critical temperature, these compounds continue to decompose with the
liberation of heat.
2.2.2. Electrical Heat Energy Sources
Resistance Heating
Induction Heating
Dielectric Heating - (eg thermal runaway in bushings or cables)
Heat from Arcing the main cause of transformer fires
Static Electricity Heating - Static arcs are ordinarily of very short duration, and do not
produce sufficient heat to ignite ordinarily combustible materials such as paper. Some
however, are capable of igniting flammable vapours and gases. Fuel flowing from a pipe
can generate static discharges of sufficient energy to ignite a flammable vapour.
Heat Generated by Lightning.
2.2.3. Mechanical Heat Energy Sources
Frictional Heat - The mechanical energy used in overcoming the resistance of motion
when two solids are rubbed together is known as a frictional heat. This is responsible for

most fires caused by mechanical heating. One example is the heat caused by a slipping
belt against a pulley.
Friction Sparks - resulting from the impact of two hard surfaces. Friction sparks are
formed in the following manner - heat, generated by impact or friction, initially heats the
particle; then, depending on the ease of oxidisation and the heat of combustion of the
metal particle, the freshly exposed surface of the particle may oxidise at the elevated
temperature with the heat of oxidisation increasing the temperature of the particle until it
is incandescent.
Overheating of Machinery.
2.2.4. Nuclear Heat Energy

This would not concern substation designers.
2.3.
Combustion
"Combustion" is a chemical reaction which is a combination of a fuel (reducing agent) with

certain elements, prominent among which is oxygen. Combustion is always exothermic
converting matter and giving off heat. Combustion can be broken up into two modes:
The flaming type (including explosion)
The flameless surface type (including glow and deep seated glowing embers).
The flaming type is associated with relatively high burning rates. Approximately 2/3 of heat
release is conducted or convected away in burning and about 1/3 is radiated away. In
combustion if more heat is generated than lost to the surrounding environment the fire will
grow and conversely if less heat is generated than that lost the fire will diminish. Simplifying Fires require fuel, heat and oxygen.
2.4.
Explosion
2.4.1. General
The word "explosion" has assumed so many shades of meaning that it cannot be used with
any degree of precision. For example, if a flammable gas-air mixture within a vessel were
ignited, and the resultant pressure increase ruptured the vessel, then this would be termed an
explosion. However, if the same vessel were stressed beyond its limits by steam pressure,
then it could just as easily rupture and the incident would also be termed an explosion. In the
widest sense, an explosion is an effect produced by the sudden violent expansion of gases
and may result from:
Chemical changes - as in the detonation of an explosive gas-air mixture.
Physical changes - such as the bursting of a boiler.
2.4.2. Chemical Explosions

These events may be classed as either:
(a)
(b)
Detonation - which is characterised by the presence of a shock wave. The pressure of

a shock wave cannot be relieved by blow-out panels or rupture discs.
Deflagration - where the reaction propagates through the material at a rate less than
the velocity of sound.
Generally, deflagration is the more relevant process for transformer (oil) type fires. Detonation
is not generally associated with substation failures.
2.4.3. Pressure Release Explosions
During normal use, boilers, gas cylinders and other pressure containers are designed to
withstand expected pressures with a reasonable factor of safety. Rupture of these containers
may occur due to a number of factors, such as;
the absence, improper installation, or malfunction of a pressure release device;
some defect in the container itself;
localized heating etc.
Some items of electrical plant are enclosed in sealed compartments which can rupture
violently when an internal arcing fault creates a massive build-up of pressure, cable end
boxes for example. Such equipment should not be fabricated from a brittle material such as
cast iron which will, upon failure, project fragments of the material at dangerous speeds.
Rather, such equipment should be fabricated from sheet steel or similar materials which will
tear apart instead of shattering. This will significantly reduce, but not entirely eliminate, the risk
of developing projectiles during such an event.
2.4.4. Explosive Failure of Electrical Equipment
The probability of severe structural damage to substation buildings by explosion resulting from
the disruption of oil-filled switchgear, cable box failure etc. is very low but incidents have
occurred. In some cases, the losses have been catastrophic while in others, severe damage
has been caused to associated equipment.
Adequate ventilation may help to reduce the damage to the substation building by relieving
the build-up of pressure following equipment failure. Some authorities provide specially
designed blow-out panels for this reason. The roof and walls should be securely tied to
prevent collapse of the structure under such conditions.
2.5.
Extinguishment
2.5.1. Extinguishment by Cooling

Water is the most commonly used coolant applied as a stream or a spray to remove heat from
ordinary combustible materials. The extinguishing mechanism depends upon cooling the fuel
and slowing the release of combustible vapours and gases. The cooling action also results in
the formation of steam which tends to starve the fire of oxygen. However, the use of water
may not be effective with large oil fires.
2.5.2. Extinguishment by Oxygen Dilution
Almost all fires require oxygen to allow the chemical reaction called combustion to occur. By
denying a fire oxygen it is extinguished. However, this will only be effective in enclosed
spaces and there may be a re-ignition risk with hot surfaces.
An example of this displacement of oxygen from the environment is the use of carbon dioxide
as a fire suppressant although this may introduce other hazards for the safety of personnel
which will require careful management.
2.5.3. Extinguishment by Fuel Removal

Fuel removal can be accomplished literally by removing the fuel; eg by shutting off the fuel
valves or by pumping the contents of a burning storage tank to another tank.
2.5.4. Extinguishment by Chemical Flame Inhibition
This method can only be used to fight flaming type combustion.
The outstanding effect of the method is the extreme rapidity and the high relative efficiency
with which flames can be extinguished.
These virtues can be more fully appreciated when it is realised that this method, when
properly executed, is the only means by which an explosion can be prevented in a flammable
gas/air mixture after ignition has occurred.
Application methods vary from the very simple to the very sophisticated which utilise highly
responsive fire detection apparatus.
2.6.
Products of Combustion and Their Effects on Life Safety
2.6.1. General
The products of combustion can be divided into four categories:
(1) fire gases, (2) flame, (3) heat, and (4) smoke. These products have a variety of
physiological effects on humans, the most important being burns and the toxic effects which
result from the inhalation of heated air and gases.
2.6.2. Fire Gases
Most combustible materials contain carbon which burns to carbon dioxide when the air supply
is ample but forms dangerous carbon monoxide when the air supply is poor. Fire gases are
the major cause of fatalities in most fires.
2.6.3. Smoke
Smoke is matter consisting of very fine solid particles and condensed vapour. Smoke
obscures the passage of light thus restricting vision to exits and of exit signs. In many fires,
smoke reaches untenable levels before temperature does. Smoke particles can be irritating
when inhaled and may cause damage to the respiratory system. Smoke particles lodged in
the eyes induce tears which may impair vision; when lodged in the nostrils and throat, they
can cause sneezing and coughing at times when the persons so affected "need their normal
faculties.
2.6.4. Heat
Heat can cause physical dehydration and heat exhaustion. A person exposed to heat may die
if the heat is conducted to the lungs rapidly enough to cause a serious decline in blood
pressure and failure of circulation due mainly to capillary blood vessel collapse. Burns, of
course, caused by contact with flame or from radiant heat will result in physical shock and
possible death. High levels of radiant heat exposure can cause instant death.
2.6.5. Insufficient Oxygen
When the concentration of oxygen in the air drops from the normal 21% to about 15%
muscular skills are diminished (anoxia). With a further reduction to between 14% and 10%,
although a person will remain conscious, fatigue quickly sets in and judgment becomes faulty.
In the range of 10% to 6% complete collapse occurs but revival may be effected by fresh air
or oxygen. During periods of physical exertion, increased oxygen demands may result in
10
oxygen deficiency symptoms becoming apparent at higher percentages than those given
above.
2.7.
Fire Resistance Classification
The fire resistance of a substation structure and its constituent material, including the
substation building, is normally indicated by code letters and numbers as defined by the
Building Code of Australia (BCA). The Fire-Resistance Level (FRL) assigns a Fire Rating (FR)
grading period in minutes to three distinct criteria, namely;
Structural Adequacy the ability to maintain stability and adequate load bearing
capacity.
Integrity the ability to resist the passage of flames and hot gases.
Insulation the ability to maintain a temperature on the surface not exposed at below
the limits specified.
The FRL requirements are expressed in the order given above with a dash indicating that
there is no requirement for that criterion. For example, 120/-/- means that there is no
requirement for and FRL for integrity and insulation, and -/-/- means that there is no
requirement for an FRL.
Internationally the code letters are designated R, E and I so that FRL 120/60/60 is equivalent
to REI 120/60/60.
In this Guideline, a reference to a fire resistance rating or FRL shall apply to at least the level
of the Integrity criteria noted above. Hence, a 2 hour fire resistance requirement stated in
this Guideline shall be equivalent to an FRL of 120/120/-.
2.8.
Fire Engineering Certification
Further material is to be included in the final revision
11
3. FIRE SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT

3.1.
Fire Safety Strategy
The overall strategy of management of fire risks is to be defined.

For buildings, the following fire safety strategy may be appropriate:
3.2.
Utilise fire resistant construction to contain the fire within the building, and prevent
spread of fire outside the building.
Utilise all building exits as the primary means of escape from the building
Utilise the fire extinguishers for occupant intervention
Utilise the emergency lighting and exit signage to aid occupant evacuation
Risk Management Approach
The Guideline will outline a risk management approach to fire in substations, including
identification of all fire related risks, consequences, overall risk & mitigation strategies.
12
4. THE RISK OF FIRE OCCURRING

4.1.
General
At the substation design stage full consideration should be given to the fact that fire hazard
and fire risk of electrical equipment is separated into two categories, namely, fire victim and
fire origin. Precautions for each category should be taken into account in the substation
requirements as follows;
a) Precautions for fire victim:
(i) Space separation from origin of fire
(ii) Flame propagation prevention;
Grading
Liquid containment
Fire barriers
Extinguishing systems
b) Precautions for fire origin:
(i) Electrical protection
(ii) Thermal protection
(iii) Pressure protection
(iv) Fire resistant materials
4.2.
Construction Stage
The first fire risk occurs as soon as work commences on a site to develop it for a substation.
During the construction stage an adequate number of portable fire extinguishers should be
provided including those for fires in any temporary electrical installation and for oil or petrol
fires in mobile construction vehicles. As soon as possible after construction work begins at a
substation the ultimate water supply together with any hydrant installation should be
commissioned so that these can be used in case of fire.
For existing brownfield sites the adequacy of existing fire fighting facilities should be verified
and augmented where necessary to cater for the new facilities.
Burning off of any material on the site should not be permitted unless adequate safety
precautions are taken and the provisions of clean air, bush fire legislation and local fire control
regulations are observed. Storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids shall
comply with A.S. 1940, or relevant State regulations.
4.3.
Site Considerations
When selecting the site for a proposed substation, consideration should be given to:
1. The possibility that a substation fire could endanger neighbouring buildings or
vegetation.
2. The risk of a fire on neighbouring property damaging the substation.
3. The supply of water for fire fighting requirements (or the provision of water storage
facilities).
4. The availability of Fire Brigade Services in the event of a fire.
5. The requirements of the Rural Bushfire Service (RFS), if applicable, including any Hazard
Reduction Zone
13
4.4.
Substation Equipment and Buildings
4.4.1. General
In the general terms any electrical equipment containing flammable materials and not having
a flameproof enclosure, and any building constructed from flammable materials is a potential
fire risk. As well as being at risk the above equipment can possibly cause a fire in adjacent
structures or equipment in the event of an explosion or an oil pool fire.
4.4.2. Oil Filled Equipment
The intimate contact between a heat source and combustible liquid, as exists in oil filled
electrical plant, is potentially hazardous. Switching arcs, over-loading and insulation failure
can all initiate a fire. However, the incidence of such fires is very low due to high quality
engineering and effective mitigation measures. Despite the infrequency of such fires, their
possibility must be acknowledged. The fuel content of an oil filled transformer is sufficient to
create a major blaze.
Consideration must also be given to the possibility of a tank rupture. Spilt oil may spread a fire
beyond the immediate area and the oil may enter the public drainage system and water-ways
unless suitable precautions are taken. Furthermore, burning oil may be projected beyond the
immediate area and into public spaces although this is very rare.
Refer to Australian Standard 1940 for definitions of Flammable and Combustible Liquids.
4.5.
Substation Operating Life
The age of the substation equipment and its loading patterns are factors which influence the
equipment's vulnerability to fire. Most insulating materials deteriorate with time and with heat.
The operating life and load pattern of a substation should be taken into account when a
substation's fire risk is being considered.
4.6.
Cables
HV power cables are possible fire risks, especially the oil filled type. It is prudent to keep oil
tanks associated with cables remote from electrical equipment.
When polyvinyl-chloride insulation is involved in a fire, one of the by-products of combustion is
hydrogen chloride gas. This, in turn, reacts with the water content of the air to form aqueous
hydrochloric acid which is both toxic and corrosive. Sensitive relays, instruments, control
apparatus, copper busbars and base metals - iron, brass, aluminium, zinc and their alloys exposed to the fumes are subject to corrosion damage. Also, in reinforced-concrete
structures, chlorine contamination forms hygroscopic calcium chloride in the cement content
and attacks reinforcing bars. Concrete may spall off due to the build-up of corrosion products
on the reinforcing bars, months or even years after a fire.
The use of low halogen and halogen-free plastic insulating materials is recommended,
including non-halogenated flame retardant thermoplastic for PVC and XLPE type of plastic.
4.7.
Defective Equipment
4.8.
Other Causes of Fire
Other causes of fire that need to be considered are:
Intentionally lit fires
14
Welding in existing buildings
Vehicle fires/overheating
15
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FIRE

Should a fire occur in a substation, the consequences can be severe. Listed below are some
of the possible effects.
5.1.
Direct Effects
Equipment directly concerned in a fire will be damaged and can be put out of service for a
considerable period while repairs are carried out. Frequently it is necessary to replace
damaged equipment and this can result in even longer delays particularly when there is a long
lead time on the delivery of equipment. In either case, disruption to the system can be
considerable.
For example, it may be necessary to overload other equipment to maintain supply to
customers causing increased electrical losses and reduction in equipment life. It may be
necessary to restrict supply to business and domestic customers and this will result in
measurable losses and costs to the community. In the CBD of large cities such disruption to
the system cannot generally be tolerated for significant periods of time.
5.2.
Indirect Effects
Equipment not involved in a fire may be indirectly affected by the fire by-products, smoke and
heat, or by the fire fighting materials. The consequences are largely the same as in 7.1 above
but usually less severe.
5.3.
Adjacent Property
A fire in a substation could subsequently involve adjacent property. This raises the issue of
public safety. There is potential for court action against the Supply Authority, particularly if
negligence is suspected.
5.4.
Cost of Restoration
The cost of restoring a substation building or equipment to full working order can be
considerable. Even where only a section of the substation is damaged and some equipment is
still in good working order, the cost of repair can be considerably increased by the need to
maintain safe working conditions for the repair while maintaining other equipment in service.
5.5.
Personnel Safety
If a fire occurs in a substation then there is a potential danger to the safety of employees
working within the substation. This is particularly so when an explosion occurs and/or when
flammable liquids are involved. Where a substation is close to public places, then
consideration must be given to public safety. A potential danger from live electrical equipment
also exists for non-skilled persons who may attempt to render assistance in the event of a fire
in a substation.
16
6. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTATION BUILDINGS

6.1.
General
6.2.
Permanent Buildings
An outline will be provided of the structural design requirements for substation buildings including;
Building Requirements
Design Requirements
Damage Limitation
Safety
For building requirements several standards need to be complied with relating to collapse of
structures, eg. AS 3850 Tilt-up concrete Construction.
6.3.
Prefabricated Buildings
Requirements will be outlined for transportable/prefabricated substation buildings, reference AS

61330. A separate section is warranted for these buildings as existing provisions relate to
permanent structures.
Details will be provided of cable basements, pedestal type foundations, sealing of entry points and
confined space issues.
17
7. FIRE PRECAUTIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATIONS

7.1.
Pole Mounted, Kiosk and Padmounted Substations
7.1.1. General
A fire in any of these types of substations will frequently involve all equipment to some extent.
Therefore fire precautions are normally concerned with confining the damage to the substation or in
protecting the substation from external fire sources.
In terms of the requirements of the BCA, where applicable, these small facilities can be classified as
Class 10a under the current effective ruling of the Australian Building Codes Board (May 2007). It is
anticipated, however, that a separate and dedicated classification class that applies uniformly to all
electricity infrastructure structures will become available in the future.
7.1.2. Personnel Safety
For pole mounted substations the usual safety precautions for personnel working aloft should be
observed. Kiosk and padmounted substations are operated from outside the enclosure, hence
personnel should not be trapped by a fire in such a substation.
7.1.3. Siting
Sites for these substations should be selected to minimise hazard exposure to neighbours and
provide reasonable separation from adjoining fire hazards including areas of bushland. Vehicle
impact is a constant danger which can be reduced by careful site selection or provision of guard
rails.
7.1.4. Equipment Design
Expulsion fuses possibly represent the greatest risk of ignition and the use of "sparkless" fuse links
should be considered. In kiosk and padmounted substations the use of flammable materials should
be kept to a minimum. Even the so called "flame retardant" or "self extinguishing" grades of
insulating materials will often burn vigorously if sufficient heat is present.
Most modern kiosk and padmounted substations often contain an integrated oil containment system
as part of the facility. A separate oil containment system is not usually provided for these
substations.
7.1.5. Adjacent Property
Pole mounted, kiosk and padmount or modular type substations can be classified as Class 10a
buildings in relation to the BCA and its requirements for adjacent properties. In particular, the
requirements of BCA Part 3.7 Fire Safety in respect of Class 10a facilities, should apply.
7.1.6. Public Safety
Pole mounted, kiosk, and padmount or modular type substations should comply with the
requirements of AS/NZ 3000:2000 with respect to public safety and the safety of authorised persons
who may access such facilities.
Choosing the appropriate measures to ensure public and authorised person safety should be based
on risk assessment and mitigation to a residual negligible level. This should be in accordance with a
qualitative and/or quantitative risk analysis to AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk management, and to
AS/NZS 3931:1998 Risk analysis of technological systems Application Guide
7.2.
Surface Free-standing, Outdoor and Metal Enclosed Substations

18
7.2.1. General
In these distribution substations the transformers are usually outdoor and the switchgear is either of
the outdoor type or of the indoor type provided with individual housings. Fire precautions are
normally concerned with confining damage to the substation or in protecting the substation from
external fire sources.
Adequate exit facilities should be provided. Usually two (2) exits placed towards opposite ends of
the substation and arranged for easy exit from normal operating positions.
7.2.3. Building Requirements
Either physical separation, of say 3 to 5 metres should be provided from adjacent buildings or areas
where flammable materials might be stored, or a masonry wall should enclose the substation to
provide effective fire segregation. Where a masonry wall is provided for fire segregation then the
gates should be of a fire resistant construction.
As these substations are often built on small parcels of land, or within the boundaries of an
industrial complex, there is always the risk that, in time, the open space originally surrounding the
substation will be lost. There are numerous examples where such space has been used to store
flammable materials, to dump refuse and to extend nearby buildings. In rural or bushland settings
the requirements of the Rural Fire Service should be considered to enable an adequate fire break to
be maintained.
Spilt oil should be contained within the substation either by bund walls, within cable pits, or by other
means within the substation yard for recovery and disposal in a proper manner. Environmental
requirements associated with the collection and treatment of oil and oil contaminated water should
be considered in the substation design process.
7.2.4. Limitation of Damage
A properly graded protection system with remote back-up protection will limit the fault energy
released and will substantially reduce the chance of a fire being sustained. A portable fire
extinguisher of the CO2 type should be provided close to the substation entrance - preferably
outside any switchgear housings.
7.3.
Surface Building Substation
7.3.1. General Comment

A fire in this type of substation will usually result in all equipment being damaged to some extent
either by combustion, heat, smoke or water. Therefore, there is little point in attempting to design
such substations to confine a fire to a single item of equipment, unless there are particularly
onerous conditions (eg repairs or alternative supply arrangements cannot be provided within a
reasonable time). Rather, the main objective is to prevent a fire within the substation from spreading
to adjoining properties, or from external fires damaging the substation equipment.
Adequate exit facilities should be provided, usually 2 doors placed towards opposite ends of the
substation and arranged for easy exit from normal operating locations (eg from HV and LV.
switchboards). To facilitate escape in an emergency, doors are usually arranged to open outwards.
However, because substation doors often open onto a public footpath, or because the escape door
may be obstructed, some authorities prefer to open them into the substation. In this case it is good
practice for both doors to be kept open when the substation is occupied.
19

For security reasons it may not practical to leave both doors open in urban areas where doors open
into public areas. In this case, it is more desirable to design a recessed door inside the main
security fence.
The substation should comply with the relevant Building Code of Australia (BCA) requirements
which may include fire segregation from adjoining property by fire rated construction or physical
separation. For BCA Type C construction, applicable to single and double storey construction under
Class 8, the use of combustible materials is allowed and, hence, it may be necessary to ignore
presence certain building elements when conducting a fire risk analysis.
The performance requirements for the building structure itself may need to be considered especially
where substations are located in commercial buildings and the main load resisting structure is
inside the substation.
In this case, the structural designer should consider the risk of a potential progressive collapse of
entire structure due to fire and/or explosion. Where necessary, suitable mitigation measures should
be employed including additional redundancy of key structural members.
The Wiring Rules (AS/NZS 3000) calls for 2 hour fire rated enclosure of substations within buildings,
for containment of spilt oil and for sealing of busbar openings. For surface building substations other
standards (e.g. NFPA 850, Chapter 3) require a higher fire resistance due to the potential risk of
collapse of the entire building.
Where fire protection involves intumescent paint systems, consideration shall be given to its
performance where an explosion may occur. In this case, a blast/abrasion may remove paint and
hence the effectiveness of protection is seriously compromised.
(Figure to be revised and updated in the Final Document to reflect current practice)
A substation chamber within a customer's building will require ventilation. This is often provided in
the form of louvered access doors which, due to the possibility of deflagration venting through the
louvres, should generally be directed away from public areas.
Fire segregation of such ventilation from other openings in external walls is covered by the Building
Code of Australia. The arrangement in Figure 1 is suggested as a possible solution.
20
released and will substantially reduce the chance of a fire being sustained.
At substations where the consequences of a fire may be particularly severe, consideration should
be given to:
1. Reduction of the fuel available eg by using dry type transformers and oil-free switchgear, or
2. The installation of a fire alarm system and/or an automatic gaseous fire extinguishing system.
Portable extinguishers of the carbon dioxide type should be located in readily accessible locations.
Recently constructed chamber substations located in CBD areas may utilise dry type or SF6
transformers and/or switchgear based on a risk assessment of the facility. A smoke detection and
automatic fire suppression system is normally provided together with other systems designed to
prevent the spread of fire.
Older substations will have oil filled transformers and switchgear. A fire detection and /or
extinguishing system may not have been installed.
7.4.
Basement, Vault or Underground Substations
7.4.1. General Comment

A fire in this type of substation will usually result in all equipment being damaged to some extent
either by combustion, heat, smoke or water. Therefore, there is little point in attempting to design
such substations to confine a fire to a single item of equipment, unless there are particularly
onerous conditions (eg repairs or alternative supply arrangements cannot be provided within a
reasonable time). Rather, the main objective is to prevent a fire within the substation from spreading
to adjoining properties or from external fires damaging the substation equipment.
Deflagration can typically be critical for these facilities when provision for overpressure venting is
limited. This has the potential for development of high compartment pressures in a deflagration
incident. Any fire dampers, walls, slabs and the like must be designed to resist these higher
pressures.
Adequate exit facilities should be provided, usually two (2) doors placed towards opposite ends of
the substation and arranged for easy exit from normal operating locations (eg from HV and LV
switchboards). Exits should lead, through self closing fire doors, to vestibules at the foot of the
access stairs or ladders. Any passage-way should lead directly to the exterior of the building.
Where a CO2 system is provided, the gas should not be injected while personnel are in the
substation. With automatic gaseous systems it is mandatory to provide an audible and visual
warning to personnel with a time delay before injection commences. However, a risk still remains if
personnel are injured or physically incapacitated and are unable to evacuate when required.
Provision may also be made for automatic systems to be deactivated while the substation is
occupied. When CO2 has been injected into a substation, the gas should be exhausted by the fire
brigade before the substation is re-entered.
A build up of other gases, such as ozone, may also occur as a result of an electrical fault. Adequate
ventilation should be provided for the substation and suitable precautions taken when entering the
enclosure following a significant electrical fault.
The substation should comply with BCA requirements which include requirements for fire
segregation from adjoining property and protection of structural elements of the building.
21

where substations are located in commercial building basements and the main load resisting
structure is inside the substation.
for containment of spilt oil and for sealing of busbar openings. For indoor / basement substations
other standards (e.g. NFPA 850, Chapter 3) require a higher fire resistance due to the potential risk
of collapse of the entire building.
Automatic fire dampers should be provided on any ducted ventilation system where the ducts enter
the substation chamber. External ventilation louvres, not provided with dampers, will require
protection from other openings in the face of the building as required by regulation. Wall, floor or
ceiling penetrations for, busbars, cables etc., must be sealed to maintain the integrity of the fire
rated construction and to prevent smoke or water from being conveyed to or from other parts of the
building
Basement, vault or sub-surface substations are difficult for the fire brigade to approach,
consequently it is usually necessary to provide some means of fighting the fire remotely. Installed
automatic CO2 gaseous systems are suitable. In some major cities the fire brigade have available
mobile CO2 tenders. Hence, a relatively simple system of pipes and nozzles leading from a roadlevel connection point can provide an economical solution. Such installations are usually arranged
to trigger dampers over the ventilation ducts in case they have not been released previously. Also,
where both entrances to the substation are not visible from the injection point, it is usual to provide
a warning to the fire brigade to check that personnel are not in the substation before they inject the
CO2.
A fire alarm system may be installed to provide early notice of a fire. Portable extinguishers of the
CO2 type should be provided in the entrance vestibules. Extinguishers should be on site prior to
commencement of equipping.
7.5.
High Level Substations
7.5.1. General Comments

In high rise commercial developments it is frequently economical to develop a substation at an
upper-level plant room. Special conditions apply to the fire rating, sprinklers, fire exits etc., in high
rise buildings, the prime objectives being to safeguard life and to protect the structural integrity of
the building in the event of a fire. Consequently, the prime fire precautions for high rise substations
is to reduce flammable materials to a minimum.
Adequate exit facilities, usually two (2) doors placed towards opposite ends of the substation and
arranged for easy exit from normal operating locations. Exits should lead, through self closing fire
doors, to a safe area with ready access to the building fire stairs.
22
The substation should comply with BCA requirements which include requirements for fire
segregation and protection of structural elements of the building.
where substations are located in commercial buildings and the main load resisting structure is
inside the substation.
for containment of spilt oil (although oil filled equipment are generally prohibited in Upper Level
Substations) and for sealing of busbar openings. For upper / high level substations other standards
(e.g. NFPA 850, Chapter 3) require a higher fire resistance due to the potential risk of collapse of
the entire building.
Automatic fire dampers should be provided on any ducted ventilation system where the ducts enter
the substation chamber. External ventilation louvres, not provided with dampers, will require
protection from other openings in the face of the building as required by regulation. Wall, floor or
ceiling penetrations for, busbars, cables etc., must be sealed to maintain the integrity of the fire
rated construction and to prevent smoke or water from being conveyed to or from other parts of the
building.
There are differing opinions regarding the provision of sprinklers in high level electricity substations.
On one hand the incorrect operation of a sprinkler could damage the electrical equipment and
create a fault. On the other hand, the sprinklers afford the best protection for personnel and the
structure of the building in the event of a serious fire. There is no clear resolution of these conflicting
views.
Cable risers should be sealed at each floor level by grouting or other proven fire stop system. The
access doors at each level should be of fire rated construction that is equivalent to the Fire
Resistance Level (FRL) of the building or that of the substation compartment, whichever is the
highest.
It is sound practice to exclude from high level substations all equipment containing insulating oil.
The most popular solution is to use dry type transformers and oil free switchgear. Portable
extinguishers of the CO2 type should be provided near the entrance.
7.6.
Substation Overpressure
High voltage electrical equipment has the potential to cause overpressures under failure conditions.
Where this occurs indoors there is a risk of damaging the building and any associated fir rated
components.
Generally, arc fault overpressures are dependent on room volume, fault level, time of the electrical
fault and type of equipment. The effect of arc fault overpressures reduce as the room volume
increases as the energy released is more uniform and not subject to as many variables.
Oil fuelled deflagrations increase in effect with room volume increase. Peak pressures are much
greater for any given volume and occur over a shorter duration, but are subject to many variables.
23

Venting for both arc fault induced overpressures and deflagrations may reduce the risk of damage
to buildings and persons in the vicinity.
The structural elements and fire rated components within a building should be designed to resist the
potential overpressures resulting from arc fault or deflagration as appropriate
Where electrical equipment is located outdoors, the risk of damage to elements other than the
electrical apparatus from overpressure is minimal. The failure, however, may result in a fire and the
recommended separation distances to protect against fire spread should be adopted.
24
8. FIRE PRECAUTIONS FOR TRANSMISSION, BULK SUPPLY

AND ZONE SUBSTATIONS
8.1.
General Comments
This section covers the range from large transmission and bulk supply substations down to the
smaller zone substations. The format adopted is to deal with general principles and
recommendations which apply to all such substations then to follow on with additional comments
and recommendations related to the larger or more critical installations.
In terms of the requirements of the BCA, where applicable, these facilities can be classified as
Class 8 under the current effective ruling of the Australian Building Codes Board (May 2007). It is
anticipated, however, that a separate and dedicated classification class that applies uniformly to all
electricity infrastructure structures will become available in the future.
It is the responsibility of the substation Owner to assess each project on its merits and to adopt
appropriate levels of fire protection measures. Distribution substations supply a relatively small load
and utilize commonly available equipment in a manner which usually permits emergency restoration
of supply to be achieved within a few hours after a fire. However, the loss of a large substation
affects many more customers and may require weeks or months for restoration.
The impact of fire on a large substation may be even more significant if the building structure has
not been designed to remain functional after a catastrophic event such as overpressure and/or fire.
The appropriate building design criteria to meet these special requirements are likely to exceed
those of the statutory building regulations.
Consequently, after factors concerning the prevention of a fire starting and personnel safety have
been considered, then the focus of attention for a zone substation designer should be to minimize
the effects of a fire. More explicitly, the designer should be concerned with confining the fire to one
item or group of equipment; controlling the spread of smoke and restricting the damage caused by
extinguishing procedures.
The prevention of fires in zone and larger substations dictates that all equipment be correctly
selected and installed for the duty to be performed. Fire protection measures fall into three (3)
categories:
a) Elimination which aims at reducing or removing the cause of fires at substations.
Measures such as a sound electrical protection system with appropriate back-up protection
will markedly reduce the incidence of fires associated with electrical faults. Good
housekeeping and maintenance will avoid many of the external fire hazards.
b) Containment - which aims at restricting the damage to one item of equipment or area of the
substation. Such precautions are usually passive. The use of non-flammable materials,
physical spacing, segregation walls, sealing of wall and floor opening, ducts, fire retardant
coatings etc. are all examples of passive systems which are dealt with in this section. With
the exception of oil pool fires, fire fighting in these circumstances would normally be tackled
firstly by any employees present, and later by regular fire brigade personnel.
c) Extinguishment - which aims at reducing the damage to the burning equipment and to
reduce (or eliminate) any fire or smoke damage to other equipment. Active systems with
automatic detection and release of an extinguishing medium are usually required to achieve
these objectives. The cost of installation and maintenance of such systems, plus the
possibility of damage caused by the fire fighting medium must, in each case, be weighed
against the risk of and potential loss resulting from a fire. Sprinkler, high velocity water spray,
CO2 and foam injection systems are all examples of such active systems. They are dealt
with in some detail in Section 10 of this Guideline.
8.2.
Transformers
25

8.2.1. General
Zone transformers are normally oil filled and hence they contain a large quantity of fuel. While
insulating oil is a relatively safe liquid (with a flash point of about 140C) once ignited it burns
fiercely with billowing clouds of smoke and vapour. The flames can extend 10m or more above a
burning transformer.
8.2.2. External Fires
The great mass of a transformer provides a substantial heat sink which can absorb heat from a
nearby fire for some considerable time before the surface of the oil reaches flash point. However, it
is not uncommon for a bushing to crack or a gasket to fail thus permitting a flow of oil to the fire, this
may then accelerate into a major conflagration. Ancillary items attached to transformers such as
control equipment, cables and small pipe work are vulnerable to external fires.
8.2.3. Internal Faults
An effective protection system is necessary to isolate a faulty transformer quickly in order to reduce
the energy released at the fault and thereby reduce the possibility of a fire starting. Modern
transformers are normally fitted with explosion vents or pressure relief diaphragms to reduce the
risk of tank rupture and a major oil spill in the event of an internal failure. However, despite these
features, it is still possible to rupture the tank.
Explosion vents should be directed so that discharged oil will not be sprayed over adjacent
electrical plant. Preferably, the oil should be directed against a barrier wall, otherwise the oil should
be directed over the transformer but, if possible, not over cable end boxes. Environmental
considerations should be taken into account in the design and positioning of explosion vents in
order to minimise the impacts of any discharged oil.
Cable end boxes, tapchanger tanks, isolation link compartments, etc. do not have explosion vents
and are more likely to rupture in the event of an internal fault. These compartments are often
connected to the oil conservator thus providing a substantial source of fuel to a potential fire.
8.2.4. Transformer Replacement
The complete destruction of a transformer by fire is always possible and in planning for such an
eventuality it is necessary to consider the possibilities for transferring load, the time required to
obtain and install a replacement transformer and the total cost involved.
However, if the fire damage were to extend to adjoining transformers, switchgear or control
buildings; then the provision of emergency supply, the time and the cost of repairs, all assume much
greater dimensions. The substation designer must consider these factors and determine the
appropriate trade-off for the project, between initial costs and the cost of a potential fire.
In practice, several trade-offs may need to be made, especially with bund walls, blast/fire walls,
acoustic/noise walls. Minimum operational requirements also need to be considered including
access for maintenance and equipment access requirements for transformer removal.
8.2.5. Spacing
The separation required between adjoining transformers or between transformers and other
equipment or buildings is determined by consideration of:
The heat energy radiated from a potential fire.
The vulnerability of adjacent equipment or buildings to that radiation.
The space available on the site. This will often be in conflict with the first two factors and some
trade-off will be needed in most cases.
Full scale tests have demonstrated that within the vicinity of a transformer fire:
Steel structures sagged.

26
Porcelain insulators cracked and lost skirts.
Cable insulation melted or burnt.
Copper fittings melted.
Observations from these tests include:
Even where transformers have 7m clear space between them, they are not safe from fire in an
adjacent transformer if the wind is from that direction. A down wind heat pattern up to 800C
can carry for say 10 metres in a moderate wind.
Bushings and porcelains can be readily cracked by brief flashes of heat from 9m away.
Radiation barriers (even of sheet metal) can reduce the likelihood of spreading fire from one
transformer to another. However, need to also consider the duration of the fire as sheet metal
barriers will collapse for other than short duration fires.
Lattice girders and towers located above or near transformers are vulnerable to a transformer
fire.
In addition, damage may occur to CT/VTs, nearby auxiliary equipment, overhead feeder conductors
and gantry structures. If a gantry structure sags/fails, the overhead feeder lines/conductors may be
too low outside the substation boundary and introduce new hazards to the nearby public.
The attached graphs Figures 2, 3 and 4 provide some indication of the possible temperatures in the
vicinity of a major transformer fire. Actual spacings adopted by various supply authorities within
Australia vary widely, ranging from the minimum space required for erection and maintenance, up to
25m in some major situations.
The following table indicates some typical clearances for substations using oil filled transformers
without barrier walls or installed fire fighting systems.
Minimum Clearance to
Minimum Clearance to
Liquid Volume (l)
Other TX or Non-combustible
Building Surface (m)
Combustible Building
Surface (m)
1,000 < 2,000
7.5
2,001 < 20,000
10
20,001 < 45,000
10
20
45,001 < 60,000
15
30
> 60,000
23
30
Transformer
Greater separation should be considered for the lower voltage substations in locations where full
scale fire brigade services are not readily available. Reduced separation may be adequate where
barrier walls and/or installed automatic extinguishing systems are installed. Where bund walls are
provided for oil containment, some of these separations may need to be increased and suitable
provisions should be made for containment of fire fighting water.
The distances for terminal yards may be insufficient for blast related damage to insulators etc.
CIGRE SC A2 recommends that oil filled transformers within 50m of each other or to adjacent
buildings, or to the public, be assessed for blast damage.
8.2.6. Barrier Walls

Where adequate separation cannot be achieved between adjacent transformers, from buildings, or
from steel structures, it is necessary to consider the erection of barrier walls that are designed
27

based on fire engineering principles including radiant heat flux levels and various flame
characteristics. Barrier walls are normally of masonry construction with adequate returns or columns
to provide stability. Other materials may also be used to achieve the required rating. They should be
at least as high as the conservator (the UK Code specifies conservator plus 1m) or bushings.
Note - Only addresses the burning of oil on the surface of the TX tank (top and leeward). Does not
consider a pool fire scenario where the flames can be 10 to 15m high.
28
29
1. Reference to Area could be pad or bund area.

2. Timber ignites at much lower temperatures than shown in this Figure.
3. Vertical scale should also indicate incident radiant heat levels in kW/m2
30
Note - Timber ignites at much lower temperatures than shown in this Figure.
31
The performance requirements for a barrier walls are to be outlined in the final revision.
Typically, several trade-offs may need to be made, especially with bund walls, blast/fire walls,
acoustic/noise walls. Noise walls cannot be constructed of flammable materials. Design
parameters should include - Width, Height, FRL, impact and pressure requirements [or
reference a standard].
Where adequate separation cannot be achieved between a transformer and a building (eg
where the switchroom wall forms part of a transformer bay):
1.
There should be no windows facing the transformer.
2.
The wall and any doors should be of a minimum two (2) hour fire rated construction.
An higher fire rating may be justified depending on the outcome of a risk assessment
which would consider;
3.
Likely response time of the Fire Brigade
Access / ease of extinguishing fire
Post fire performance of structure
The roof and eaves construction should be either of fire resistant construction or be
shielded from radiated heat by the wall. However, a fire analysis may determine that
the roof and eaves also need to be fire rated depending on the incident radiant heat
flux. This will be dependant on the height of the fire and the height of the wall/roof.
Figure. 5
8.2.7. Enclosed Transformers
An increasing number of large transformers are being enclosed for noise suppression or as
part of a multi-level substation. Transformer fires under such circumstances pose particular
problems including difficult access to fight a fire, and the effects of heat and overpressure on
the structural integrity of the building. Where fire rated enclosures are used, it is imperative
that they have sufficient strength to resist the estimated overpressure levels (arc fault or
deflagration as appropriate) in order to remain effective as fire rated elements.
Open roofed noise enclosures force the fire to be attacked from above. Under these
conditions foam may contain a major blaze at the top of the transformer or of spilt oil, however
32
any sheltered flames (eg below an end box) will be difficult to extinguish. Incidents have
occurred where totally enclosed transformers have been completely destroyed after burning
for some days because there were no means available for attacking the seat of the fire.
When totally enclosing a transformer, which is not to be protected by an automatic fire
installation, consideration should be given to providing pipe work to a suitable location for the
fire brigade to inject foam or other media. As such a fire may burn for some time before
injection is possible, the effect of temperature on the pipework, its supports and fittings must
be considered. Low melting point fittings such as brass nozzles should be avoided.
Where a transformer bay forms the lower part of a multi-level building the following
precautions should be considered:
1.
Installation of an automatic fire fighting system (High Velocity water spray or Aqueous
Film Forming Foam (AFFF).
2.
Two (2) hour minimum fire resistance rating of all structural members adjoining the
transformer bay and of all walls, floor, ceiling and air ducts to the bay. A higher fire
rating may be justified depending on the outcome of a risk assessment which would
consider;
3.
Design of the structural elements and fire rated components to resist the potential
overpressures resulting from arc fault or deflagration as appropriate.
4.
Special drainage, with an oil interception tank and the capacity to cope with the water
from the automatic system.
5.
Containment of smoke during a fire and provision for exhausting the smoke when the
fire is extinguished.
8.2.8. Spilt Oil

A major spillage of oil from a transformer creates the following possible problems:
Ground fires.
Spread of fire along drains, cable chases, conduits etc.
Escalation of the fire intensity due to the greater area of oil exposed and free to burn.
Pollution due to oil escaping into gutters, roadway, storm-water drains, creeks etc.
Various laws on pollution control define the responsibility for containment and recovery of
pollutants. In addition, AS 1940 also provides specific requirements for spill containment and
drainage associated with transformers.
If a piece of equipment contains a minor amount of oil or is located in a designated low risk
area, then oil containment requirements may be reduced subject to the requirements of AS
1940.
A number of solutions to the problems associated with oil spillage have been adopted by
Australian Supply Authorities as indicated below.
33

1.
Crushed gravel covering the area around transformers to a depth of 75 mm to 150

mm has been used in the past as a simple and effective solution. Pits or ditches filled
with gravel may be used to increase the capacity to hold spilt oil. In the event of a
substantial oil spill, prompt action may be required to prevent the oil from reaching
public streets or water ways. Personnel should be trained and contingency plans
prepared to cope with a major oil spillage.
Various state laws on pollution control define the responsibilities for containing
pollutants.
2.
Concrete drainage aprons adjacent to the transformer base, arranged to catch any
major spillage and drain it to an oil interception tank has been used by some Supply
Authorities.
Such drainage aprons can have a bed of large river pebbles or large crushed gravel
to cool the oil before it enters the drainage system. The pebble beds will require
periodic cleaning to remove accumulated dirt which could impede free drainage. If a
pebble bed is not provided the drain should be provided with a flame trap.
Details of a suitable flame trap and oil interception tank are shown in Figures 6 and 7
below.
3.
Bund walls surrounding a large transformer are frequently used to contain a major oil
spillage. The spill containment provided by the bund walls and associated elements
should comply with the requirements of AS 1940 and will generally have a capacity
not less than that of the largest single unit draining to it and be equipped with an
underflow discharge.
Where a compound is provided with continuous gravity drainage, draining should be
via a flame trap or traps to an oil spill containment facility. This will typically be an oil
interception tank (Figure. 7) of sufficient capacity to retain the envisaged quantity of
spilt oil. Where several bunds use a common oil interception/storage location,
consideration should be given to preventing oil/water back-flowing into the adjacent
unaffected transformer bunds.
Where oil is to be retained within the bund area, a pipe and valve system should be
provided to allow spilt oil to be drawn from the bund for treatment and/or disposal in
an approved facility.
Oil containment systems should include suitable provision for fire fighting water and
be provided with a shut-off valve at the outlet to exclude fire fighting water when
necessary. Any overflow from the oil containment system can be directed to a
secondary storage area or dealt with by an emergency response process.
(This Section is to be updated in the final revision to reflect contemporary oil containment
practices)
8.2.9. Cabling to Transformers
All conduits, cable trenches or tunnels in the vicinity of transformers should be sealed to
reduce the risk of either burning oil or burning cable insulation from spreading the fire.
Some Authorities direct bury both power and control cables within the vicinity of large
transformers.
8.3.
Outdoor HV Switchyards
8.3.1. General Comments

The provision of safety clearances and space for equipment handling in outdoor switchyards
goes a long way towards providing adequate separation to prevent a fire from spreading to
other equipment. Additional consideration should, however, be given to:
34
Transformer locations and separation (see Clause 8.2)
The possible violent failure of VT's, CT's etc.
The location of gantry structures
Overhead lines / feeder conductors
Access for fire fighting
Control of spilt oil
Possible propagation of fire along cable trenches
Good housekeeping
8.3.2. Spacing of Equipment

Clause 8.2 provides information on transformer fires including some estimates of
temperatures associated with major transformer fires. The effects of such temperatures on
nearby equipment should be considered. Special consideration should be given to equipment
that is especially costly or difficult to repair such as circuit breakers or 132kV cable
terminations.
8.3.3. Provisions for Fire Fighting
The switchyard layout should provide a reasonable approach for the fire brigade, preferably
from two (2) directions for larger substations. Water supply should be checked and a hydrant
provided at the perimeter of the yard if existing hydrants in public roads are inadequate or not
sufficiently close.
Where no town water is available, consideration should be given to the installation of a water
storage tank (see Clause 8.9).
Portable extinguishers should be provided in a location readily accessible but protected from
the weather.
Secure weather protected storage should be provided for portable extinguishers and any
other fire protection equipment or materials kept on site. The location of the storage room or
kiosk should permit ready access during a fire.
35
(Figures to be revised and updated in the Final Document to reflect current practice for
various oil containment options)
8.3.4. Control Cable Trenches
Control cable trenches should be covered, provided with fire stops at critical locations and arranged
to drain spilt oil back towards its source. In the vicinity of large transformers, some authorities prefer
36
to obtain greater fire protection of control cables by direct burial of cables or use of buried ducts, or
by providing a layer of gravel over the cable chase as shown below (Figure 8).
8.3.5. Housekeeping
Switchyards should be kept free from accumulated rubbish, weed growth, etc., drains should be
kept clear and flammable materials should not be stored in switchyards or on transformer roadways.
8.4.
Buildings
8.4.1. General Remarks

Buildings should comply with the Building Code of Australia (BCA) requirements. The fire protection
section of BCA adopts the general approach of prescribing requirements on the following criteria:
(a)
The USE to which the building is put (ie the "Class" of Building)
(b)
The HEIGHT of the building above ground (ie the "rise in storeys")
(c)
The LOCATION of the building (ie whether inside or outside a designated "fire zone")
Fire zones are established by local authorities and generally relate to areas of sizeable commercial
or business development. It is usual for a higher degree of inbuilt fire protection to be required in
such zones.
The BCA requirements also incorporate the concepts of a "fire source feature" and an "effective
distance".
A "fire source feature" represents a theoretical burning building emitting heat radiation. Major factors
involved with the spread of fire are the intensity of heat radiation, the geometrical relationship and
the distance apart of buildings.
The "effective distance" between a fire-source feature and a proposed new building determines
what precautions are required to guard against the spread of fire and the undue heating of structural
members by radiation.
The BCA does not address the specific problems of electricity substations. However, the broad
principles are applicable and local authorities are likely to press for the most stringent interpretation
for substations in highly developed locations.
37

Substation buildings can be deemed as Class 8 buildings if they are not pole mounted, kiosk,
padmount or modular type substations and should comply with the BCA, Section C generally and, in
particular, clause C2.13 Electricity Supply System.
8.4.2. Buildings Adjacent to Transformers
Where buildings are not adequately spaced from transformers and barrier walls have not been
constructed, then the following precautions are recommended:
There should be no windows facing the transformer
The wall and any doors should be a minimum two (2) hour fire rated construction. A higher fire
rating may be justified depending on the outcome of a risk assessment which would consider;
The roof and eaves construction should be either of fire resistant construction or be shielded from
radiated heat by the wall (see Figure 5). However, a fire analysis may determine that the roof and
eaves also need to be fire rated depending on the incident radiant heat flux. This will be dependant
on the height of the fire and the height of the wall/roof.
8.4.3. Emergency Exits
Each switchroom, cable basement etc. should be arranged to provide safe exit for personnel should
any item of plant fail violently, or ignite.
This would usually be achieved by providing two (2) exits towards opposite ends of each room.
The disabling effects of smoke and fumes should be considered.
The provision of adequate ventilation and illuminated EXIT signs and emergency lighting can help
under such circumstances.
8.4.4. Segregation of Rooms
The extent of fire segregation within a substation building will depend largely on:
The size of the building
The importance of the substation to the network or the consequences of a major fire
The type of equipment housed
In general, larger substations will be divided into a number of separate rooms which can fairly easily
be fire-segregated by the use of appropriate building methods.
It should be remembered that roof spaces should also be segregated to control the spread of fire or
the collapse of the roof onto otherwise undamaged equipment.
Cable basements should be segregated from switch and control rooms. All cable penetrations of
walls or floors should be sealed to prevent the spread of fire, smoke and corrosive fumes liberated
by burning PVC. The fire stop should be at least 100 mm thick.
8.4.5. Housekeeping
Good housekeeping is an important factor in preventing fires. Particularly during equipping stages,
all rubbish, off-cuts of insulation etc. should be regularly cleaned-up.
Flammable materials such as oil, jointing compound, cleaning fluids, paint etc., should be stored in
a safe manner preferably remote from electrical plant.
8.4.6. Fire Detection and Alarm Systems
38
The objective of a fire detection and alarm system is to provide early notice of a fire so that prompt
action may be instigated to minimize the damage.
Fire alarm systems are now generally installed at zone substations and also in larger bulk supply
and transmission substations. The coverage provided may be limited to special hazard areas
(control panels, switchrooms, cable basements etc.) or may cover the whole substation building.
The application of detection and alarm systems to outdoor substation equipment is quite rare. The
considerations which may lead to their installation in any type of substation would include:
BCA regulation (eg if substation is combined with another building which requires alarms).
Particular hazards (eg at an industrial site).
Remoteness (ie where there are no neighbours to raise the alarm or where alarms would avoid
an undue delay in attendance of a fire brigade).
Supply reliability (ie where the consequences of a substation fire would justify the cost of
installation and maintenance of an alarm system).
Fire alarm signals, where provided, are normally sent direct to the System Control Room and need
to be separated from other substation alarms so that fire brigade and electrical operation staff can
be alerted at the same time. Alternatively, a parallel alarm can be provided direct to the fire brigade.
Details of various types of detection and alarm systems are given in Section 9 of this Guideline.
8.4.7. Fire Fighting Systems
As with detection and alarm systems, fixed fire fighting systems are only installed in selected
locations, in determining if a system should be installed, similar considerations would apply, plus:
the consequences of a fire spreading from unit to unit, or its effect on the building.
the lack of adequate access to fight a fire with mobile equipment.
Details of various types of fire fighting systems are given in Section 10 of this Guideline.
8.5.
Indoor Switchgear
8.5.1. General Remarks

The degree of a hazard represented by indoor switchgear will vary significantly depending on a
number of factors including:
The interrupting system
e.g. bulk oil, minimum oil,

air break, vacuum, SF6.
The form of switchgear
metal clad, metal enclosed, open.
The fault duty
maximum current.
The protection systems
maximum clearing time, I2T.
The busbar system
compound filled, air insulated, gas insulated, the

degree of segregation
Cable terminations
compound filled, air insulated.
These matters relate primarily to the proper selection and use of equipment. The precautions which
may be taken in the design of switchrooms to mitigate the effects of fire relate to the layout and
construction methods used.
39

Adequate exit facilities should be provided, usually two (2) doors placed towards opposite ends of
the switchroom. Attention is drawn AS 2067 High Voltage Installations (refers to IEC document
61936-1:2002) which deals with Personnel Safety aspects of electrical installations including metal
clad switchgear.
After complying with the requirements of the BCA it will be necessary to consider any further
desirable precautions. Supply Authorities tend to take more fire precautions when using bulk oil
circuit breakers than with other types of switchgear. These precautions include:
Fire resistance construction of the switchroom.
Automatically closing fire doors to other rooms.
Possibly the segregation of large switchboards into several rooms.
Either no windows or the use of wired glass in metal frames (to avoid the danger of flying glass
in the event of an explosion).
Sealing of cable penetrations through the switchroom floor to prevent spilt burning oil from
entering the cable basement and to prevent smoke from a cable fire entering the switchroom.
Some authorities provide pressure relief venting to minimise damage to the building in the
event of an explosion.
In some critical locations gaseous systems are installed.
Where switchgear other than the bulk oil type is installed, concern is more related to end box,
busbar and similar failures rather than the possibility of an oil fire.
8.6.
Battery Rooms and Enclosures
Hydrogen produced when wet cell batteries are recharged can give rise to the risk of an explosion if
it is allowed to accumulate sufficiently. Alternative battery types evolve far less hydrogen and
therefore present a much smaller risk.
Dispersing the hydrogen by providing effective ventilation throughout the room is an essential
precaution. Hydrogen is lighter than air and will tend to concentrate at ceiling level so that
ventilation must be provided in the ceiling or high up on the outside walls. Unventilated structural
pockets in the ceiling should be avoided. The AS/NZS Wiring Rules (AS/NZS 3000) require that a
battery shall be installed only in a room or enclosure which is adequately ventilated. Where
ventilation is required it should be provided through high and low vents.
The BCA Deemed to Satisfy provisions require that batteries must be separated from the
remainder of the building with construction that has a fire rating of not less than 2 hours. However,
the BCA also allows for Alternative Solutions for battery accommodation provided that compliance
with the Performance Requirements can be demonstrated.
Other relevant Australian Standards, including AS 2676.2 and AS 3011.2, do not mandate the
provision of separate battery rooms for substation batteries.
The critical concentration of hydrogen in air which will create an explosive mixture lies between the
range of 4% to 75%. To be safe it is necessary to limit the concentration of hydrogen in a battery
room to a maximum of 2%. The process of water electrolysis in a fully charged lead-acid, nickeliron, or nickel-cadmium battery will evolve a volume of 0.43 m3 hydrogen per cell for every 1000 Ah
of charging current. The maximum charging current should be considered.
Under ideal conditions of ventilation the rate of air intake to prevent the concentration of hydrogen
going above 2% would be at least 50 times the rate of hydrogen evolution. Pockets of slow moving
air will be unavoidable and for this reason a safety factor of 4 for enclosures and 10 for battery
rooms is advisable. Thus for complete safety the rate of air intake should be from 200 times the rate
of hydrogen evolution for enclosures and 500 times for battery rooms.
40
In rooms containing large banks of batteries, the provision of natural ventilation would require very
large openings. Forced ventilation with a flameproof fan should be considered for such installations
and should comply with AS 1668 and AS 1076. Smoking should be prohibited inside battery rooms.
Provided adequate ventilation exists at all times a battery room will not be a "hazardous location" as
defined by AS/NZS 3000 - Wiring Rules. For mechanically ventilated battery rooms the possibility of
fan failure must be considered and, accordingly flameproof light and power fittings should be
installed. It is prudent for such items as links, fuses, light and power switches or other equipment
which can cause an electric arc to be excluded from battery rooms.
8.7.
Control Rooms
The minimum fire requirements for a control room are that it should be readily accessible in an
emergency and that it be segregated from any major fire risk area. Many authorities provide fire
resistant construction and self closing fire doors to control rooms. Control cable routes should be
sealed.
Additional fire protection in control rooms may be justified to ensure people cannot be trapped
inside. Most utilities require that staff call their operational centres from this location and hence, in a
fire, people will be in this room momentarily. Suitable measures may include fire rated segregation
from adjacent rooms and / or provision of a direct exterior exit.
For larger or more critical substations, consideration may be given to providing fire alarms in control
rooms or within control panels and cabling areas. It is usual for these installations to employ very
early smoke detection aspirated systems sensitive to smoke from overheated insulation so that an
incipient fire may be controlled early in its life. It should be remembered that smoke from PVC, and
other common insulating plastics, is very corrosive and can cause considerable damage to control
equipment.
Some major installations are provided with automatic fire fighting systems in control rooms. Usually
they will be Inergen gas systems which may discharge directly into control panels or cabling areas;
or the whole room may be flooded with gas. Dual detection systems are often provided to guard
against incorrect operation and manual over-ride facilities are available. Any forced ventilation or air
conditioning system should be shut down when a fire is detected to reduce the spread of smoke.
Smoke exhaust facilities may also be provided. Smoke from bush fires has been known to activate
such systems incorrectly.
8.8.
Cables
8.8.1. General
To reduce the impact of potential fires, the use of low halogen and halogen-free plastic insulating
materials is recommended, including non-halogenated flame retardant thermoplastic for PVC and
XLPE type of plastic.
Further material will be included in the final revision including a discussion on the use of cable
coating as appropriate to reduce fire propagation risk.
8.8.2. Control Cables
It is common practice to use PVC insulated and sheathed control cables in substations. As
mentioned elsewhere, burning PVC liberates a large volume of smoke which:
is toxic
obscures vision and,
is highly corrosive to both metal and concrete.
Where a substantial number of such cables are congregated on supporting trays or at floor or wall
penetrations there is always the risk of fire. The precautions usually taken to minimize this risk are:
(i)
to ensure that cables are properly rated and not overloaded

41

(ii) to avoid undue congestion
(iii) to seal all penetrations of walls or floors
(iv) to maintain good housekeeping.
Further precautions which may be warranted in larger or more vital substations include:
(v)
the use of low-smoke or flame retardant type PVC These materials have additives to improve
their fire performance under specified test conditions. The tests vary considerably and the
actual improvement in practical applications may be only marginal. Such cables cost
approximately 10% more than conventional PVC/PVC
(vi) the use of alternative insulating materials such as EPR*. These materials have substantially
better fire resistant properties than PVC However they are much bulkier, are sensitive to
transformer oil, are only available in limited colours and cost approximately twice the price of
conventional PVC/PVC cables.
(*EPR = Ethylene Propylene Rubber, low smoke, toxicity and acid vapour grade).
Teflon and similar materials are tough, chemically insensitive and suitable for reasonably high
temperature operation.
(vii) spacing of cable trays, say 450 to 600 mm apart, the segregation of control from power cables
and the use of enclosed trays can all reduce the fire hazard,
(viii) the application of commercially available, inert, flame retardant coating products which may
be brushed or sprayed onto existing cables.
(ix) the installation of an automatic sprinkler or gaseous system.
8.8.3. Power Cables
The basic fire precautions to be taken in all high voltage cable installations are:
(i)
to avoid undue congestion
(ii)
to space and support cables properly - particularly where they cross one another
(iii) to apply fire retardant coating within the building

(iv) to provide physical protection around any cable joints if necessary.
Further precautions which may be required in critical locations or at large substations include:
the application of non-absorbent fire resistant tapes to cables
the provision of separate chases for important circuits (eg 132kV or higher voltage cables, bustie or transformer cables crossing outgoing feeder cables). These chases should be covered or
be filled with sand.
higher voltage (132kV and above) cable sealing ends should be separated as far as possible
to reduce the chance of fragments from a faulted unit from damaging a sealing end which may
take weeks to repair. Alternatively, barriers or walls can be used to provide suitable protection.
Note that the use of fibreglass reinforced polymeric sealing ends will significantly reduce the
risk of fragments.
the provision of an automatic extinguishing system.
Consideration needs to be given to the flame propagation rates of vertical cables and groups of
cables.
8.9.
Hydrants and Water Storage Tanks
Early in the design of a substation the location of local fire hydrants should be determined and the
pressure and flow rates ascertained. For zone substations, the presence of a hydrant within say 50
meters of the substation may suffice. However, if there is any doubt about the adequacy or
accessibility of the public hydrant, the mains should be extended to a hydrant on the site located
close to the main entrance. Larger bulk supply and transmission substations should have a network
42
of hydrants strategically placed so that two hydrants may be used on each transformer. Hydrants
should be outside any safety enclosures and in cold climates should be protected from freezing.
Where no mains water supply is available, or where the flow rate may drop below 15 litre/sec,
during excess demand periods, then water storage should be provided. At zone substations a
14,000 litre tank should be adequate for the generation of foam. It should be arranged to facilitate
use by the fire brigade either by their suction hose or by providing pipework and a coupling which
matches their hose fittings. Domestic services should be taken off above mid height to ensure that a
reasonable quantity of water is available for an emergency.
Large bulk supply and transmission substations will require greater storage and special
consideration should be given to storage requirements for automatic high velocity water spray or
foam systems. In this regard foam systems require very much less water than high velocity water
spray systems. If it is intended that water be used from a tank supply independently of the fire
brigade, then a suitable pump would be required.
8.10. Portable Fire Fighting Equipment

All zone and larger substations should be equipped with a suitable range of portable fire
extinguishers and other fire fighting equipment. The following list is intended as a guide to the
equipment that may be provided.
1.
Zone Substations up to 132kV
30 litre mobile AFFF extinguisher
9 litre AFFF extinguisher
5 kg CO2 extinguishers in each control and switchroom.

Additional equipment as required by site location:
Hydrant and/or Fire Hose Reel
Water Storage (14 000 litre) and pump if necessary
10 x 20 litre drums of AFFF solution if remote from major fire brigade, to provide additional
foam making capacity as the supplies carried by a fire appliance may be inadequate for a large
oil fire.
2.
Bulk Supply and Transmission Substations
30 litre mobile AFFF extinguisher
9 litre AFFF extinguishers with recharges
5 kg CO2 extinguishers in equipment rooms
Hydrants to serve each transformer bay
Canvas hose; standard, diffuser and foam branch pipes with spanners etc.
10 to 20 x 20 litre drums of AFFF solution.

Additional equipment, depending on site conditions:
Water storage (28 000 litres plus any requirement for high velocity water systems) and pump if
required.
8.11. Fire Break

Where there is danger of damage from bush fires due to burning grass or trees, a fire break at least
5 m wide should be provided around the substation site. The exact width would be governed by site
conditions and the requirements of the local Rural Bushfire Services (RFS). Precautions should also
be taken to prevent burning materials being drawn into buildings by fans or air conditioning units.
43
8.12. First Aid

8.12.1. Basic Equipment
Adequate first aid equipment should be available at all large substations, either as a permanent
fixture or carried by all work teams.
A first aid kit should contain the following items:
Lint
Cotton Wool
Bandages
Wound dressings
Burn dressings
Mild antiseptic fluid
Eye drops
Salvolatile
Bi-carbonate of soda
Scissors
Tweezers
Splinter probe
8.12.2. Additional Facilities which may be considered include:

(i)
A stretcher
(ii)
Personnel eye wash and shower facilities to quickly douse burning clothing. These should be
installed and located close to locations where employees may be sprayed with burning or
corrosive liquid. A reliable water supply is required.
(iii) Water-Jel fire blankets, are designed to smother the flames of a person on fire and reduce
shock. A blanket is simply wrapped around the victim. The blankets are of specially woven
wool fully immersed in a gel and supplied in sealed unit containers. The gel as well as assisting
in extinguishing any fire also cools the burn victim, and acts as a dressing. A water-jel blanket
container should be located adjacent to the perceived risk area. They require periodic
inspection and replacement.
44
9. FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM SYSTEMS

9.1.
General
For the design, installation and commissioning of automatic fire alarm systems, refer to
Australian Standard AS 1670-2004. Signalling back to the System Control Room needs to be
separated from other substation alarms so that both the fire brigade and electrical operator
can be alerted at the same time.
Substation buildings can be deemed as Class 8 buildings if they are not pole mounted, kiosk,
padmount, or modular type substations and should comply with the BCA, Part E2 Smoke
Hazard Management generally and, in particular, with clause E2.2 and E2.3 regarding airhandling, smoke detection and alarm, and special hazards of substation fire risk.
There are various types of detectors and their designs vary with the manufacturer, but they fall
into the following general types:
9.2.
Heat Detectors
Heat detectors depend for their action on heat from the fire. Heat detecting devices fall into
two general categories:
(i)
Those that respond when the sensing elements reach a predetermined

temperature, ie fixed temperature (static) elements (9.2.1).
(ii)
Those that respond to an increase in temperature at a rate greater than some

predetermined value ie rate-of-rise temperature elements (9.2.2.).
Heat detectors generally provide slower response to smouldering or common smoke

generating electrical fires. Thermal detectors provide lower false alarm rate than smoke
detectors and provide a benefit where the environment is not suitable for smoke detectors.
9.2.1. Fixed Temperature Types
Bi-metal Strip - a bi-metal strip bends to close a set of contacts when the predetermined
operating temperature is reached.
Bi-metal Disc - At normal ambient temperatures the disc is concave but when the
predetermined operating temperature is reached the disc snaps over to a convex shape
and closes a set of contacts.
Fusible Link - a link which normally holds an alarm switch in the open position but when
the design temperature is reached the link melts thus closing the switch.
Thermostatic Cable - A two core cable whose core insulation is heat sensitive. When
the design temperature is reached the insulation melts causing the cores to touch thus
completing an initiating circuit.
Quartoid Bulb - When the temperature surrounding the bulb reaches the predetermined
level the bulb fractures, releasing the internal pressure thus commencing the fire control.
9.2.2. Rate of Rise Detectors

Pneumatic Tubing - In this system a length of tubing passes through the area to be protected.
Any expansion of air in the tubing escapes through a small vent. If the tubing is heated at an
abnormally high rate insufficient air escapes through the vent and a diaphragm is expanded
thus triggering the alarm circuit.
45

Thermo-Couple - Two sets of thermocouples are mounted in a common housing, one set is
exposed to the area to be protected while the other is shielded. A fire will produce a voltage in
the circuit due to the difference in temperature of the thermocouple junctions. This voltage
initiates an alarm circuit.
Line Detector - A four core cable having two cores of high thermal resistivity and two cores of
low thermal resistivity. One core of each type is exposed to any heat in the vicinity of the cable
more than its mate. By suitable connection in a bridge circuit, the difference in resistance of
the pairs is detected and when this reaches a prescribed amount an alarm circuit is closed.
9.3.
Smoke Detectors
There are essentially two basic types of smoke detectors:

Ionization Point Type Detectors - These detect very small particles which are invisible to the
naked eye. A radio-active source is used to ionize the air in a chamber. A current flows
between two electrodes in the chamber. When smoke enters the chamber it reduces the
current flow which is sensed and initiates an alarm.
Photo-Optical Point Type Detectors - These detect larger smoke particles by either obscuring
the path of a light beam, or by deflecting a light beam into a photoelectric cell.
The photo optical smoke detectors detect visible particles of combustion and operate on a
light scattering principle. The detectors have a symmetrical lens and a protective cover that
allows ready entry of smoke while providing high immunity to air movement and dust
accumulation.
Photo optical detectors measure the density of smoke particles in the 0.01 to 10 micron range
and provide an active output proportional to the amount of smoke present in the chamber.
They are responsive to both visible and invisible products of combustion with response to fires
in the incipient stage.
The detector continuously samples the air in the area and signals an alarm when the smoke
density in the area exceeds the threshold and automatically resets itself when the smoke falls
below the threshold.
9.4.
Flame Detectors
A flame detector determines the presence of a fire by the appearance of radiant energy. There
are three basic types of flame detectors and a further combination type:
1.
Ultraviolet - This device has a sensing element responsive to radiant energy in the
ultraviolet range. These detectors may be activated by switching arcs.
2.
Photoelectric - Utilises a photoelectric cell which either changes its electrical

conductivity or produces a voltage when exposed to radiant energy.
3.
Flame Flicker Infra-Red - Uses a photoelectric cell and produces an output voltage
when the observed light is modulated at the frequency characteristic of the flicker of a
flame.
4.
Ultraviolet / Infra-Red - These detectors contain two sensors and give an alarm only
when both ultraviolet and infra-red are detected. This eliminates many of the causes
of false alarms.
9.5.
Aspirating Smoke Detectors
Aspirating smoke detection systems differ from point type smoke detectors in that they
operate in the high to very high sensitivity range. Aspirating systems are designed to detect a
slowly developing fire where there is perhaps minimal smoke.
46
Aspirating type smoke detectors continually draw air into a piping network attached to the
detector unit where the air is passed through a filter to remove any dust. The air sample then
passes through a laser chamber where the light scatter caused by any smoke contained in the
air is measured, processed and the results compared to a reference level.
In an aspirating type system the sampling pipework is the only part that needs to be on the
ceiling or in the area to be monitored, the equipment requiring maintenance is mounted at eye
level on the wall.
The main advantage of an aspirating type smoke detection system is that the detector unit
can be located remote from the area being monitored and can be located outside the fire
zone. The ability to locate the detector unit remote from the area being monitored is an
advantage in electrically hazardous areas inside substations because of the need to gain
access to the detector unit for servicing and maintenance thus avoiding the need to arrange
for de-energisation of equipment.
However, deactivation of aspiration type smoke detection systems in a work area is normally
required to avoid spurious alarms.
The sensitivity of the aspirating type smoke detector system can be adjusted as required for
reliable performance without triggering nuisance false alarms.
9.6.
Precautions
When selecting fire detectors for a substation alarm system, care should be taken to ensure
that the detectors are compatible with the proposed installation. For example, if the substation
rooms could experience rapid rises in temperatures then the Rate of Rise detectors may
cause problems.
47
10. FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS

10.1. Fire Classifications
Substation buildings can be deemed Class 8 buildings if they are not pole mounted, kiosk,
padmount, or modular type substations and should comply with the BCA, Part E1 Fire
Fighting Equipment regarding substation fire risk.
Fires are classified as per Australian Standard AS 2444-2001 as follows:
Class "A": Fires involve carbonaceous solids, which generally have a vegetable origin.
Class "B": Fires involve flammable liquids.
Class "C": Fires involve flammable gases. Specialist advice should be sought for this type of
risk.
Class "D": Fires involving combustible metals. These should not be applicable to substations.
Class E: Fires involving energized electrical equipment. Where a fire including an electrical
hazard can be anticipated, the extinguishment must be electrically non-conductive
in addition to having the relevant classification. The marking of 'E' on the fire
extinguisher indicates the agent as discharged is electrically non-conductive.
10.2. Portable Fire Extinguishers

The following table lists the types of portable fire extinguishers available and the classes of
fire for which they are intended. They must be used only in the classes of fire so designated.
Type of Extinguisher
Class of Fire
A
Solids
Australian
Standards
Colour of
Container
Supplementary
Colour
B
Liquids
Water (Soda Acid)
AS1841.2-1997
Red
Water (Gas Container)
AS1841.2-1997
Red
Water (Stored Pressure)
AS1841.2-1997
Red
Foam (Chemical)
AS1841.4-1997
Blue
Foam (Gas Container)
AS1841.4-1997
Blue
Foam (Stored Pressure)
AS1841.4-1997
Blue
Dry Chemical
X E*
AS1841.5-1997
Red
White
Carbon Dioxide
X E*
AS1841.6-1997
Red
Black
For installation and maintenance procedures for portable fire extinguishers refer Australian
Standards AS 1851-2005 and AS 2444-2001.
*The letter 'E' on an extinguisher indicates that the agent as discharged is electrically nonconductive.
10.3. Fire Hose Reels

Fire hose reels consisting of a length of 25 mm diameter rubber hose coiled onto a metal reel
is an effective appliance for initial containment of Class "A" fires. The hose is permanently
connected to the water service and the "shut off" type nozzle is clamped into the stop valve
48
mechanism such that the stop valve must be open before the nozzle is released. Fire hose
reels should not be used on liquid or electrical fires.
10.4. Fixed Fire Fighting Systems

The following fixed types of fixed fire fighting systems are commercially available.
10.4.1. Water Based Systems
As a general statement water should not be used on live electrical equipment. Water
extinguishes a fire mainly by cooling the point where combustion is taking place. Also, when
water is converted from liquid to vapour its volume at ordinary pressure increases about 1700
times. This large volume of steam displaces an equal volume of air (oxygen) surrounding a
fire thus reducing the oxygen available to sustain combustion.
10.4.1.1.
Water Sprinkler - Refer AS 2118-2006
There are several types of water sprinkler systems which may be classified as follows:
Wet Pipe Systems - These systems employ automatic sprinklers attached to a piping system
containing water under pressure at all times. When a fire is detected individual sprinklers are
actuated by the heat, and water flows through these sprinklers immediately.
Dry Pipe Systems - In these systems automatic sprinklers are attached to piping which
contains air or nitrogen under pressure. When a sprinkler is opened by the heat from a fire,
the pressure is reduced. A "dry pipe valve" is opened by water pressure, and water flows out
of any opened sprinkler.
Pre-action Systems - A variation on the dry pipe system in which the air in the piping may or
may not be under pressure. When a fire occurs, a supplementary fire detecting device in the
protected area is actuated; this opens a valve which permits water to flow into the piping
system and be discharged by any of the automatic sprinklers that have been opened by the
heat of the fire.
Deluge System - These systems are similar to pre-action systems, except that all sprinklers
are open at all times. When heat from the fire actuates the fire detecting device, water flows
too and is discharged from all the sprinklers on the piping system, thus "deluging" the
protected areas.
10.4.1.2.
High Velocity Wafer Spray System (Refer NFPA 15)
High velocity water spray systems are frequently used to extinguish fires involving oil or
similar flammable liquids. The systems usually involve heat actuated detectors operating an
automatic mechanical flooding valve to supply water to deluge projectors arranged both over
and around the unit being protected. The projectors are designed to provide an expanding
cone of fine but broken streams of water, with high velocity and momentum, evenly distributed
over the area covered by the projector. In addition to the normal extinguishing action of water
on a fire, the impact of water in this form onto an oil surface creates an emulsion which will not
burn. It is essential that the water supply to a high velocity system have an adequate pressure
and flow-rate. While the mains supply may suffice in some cases, most installations are
provided with an automatic pump.
10.4.2. Fire Fighting Foams
10.4.2.1.
General Remarks
Foams should not be used to fight fires in live electrical equipment. Fire fighting foam is a
mass of gas-filled bubbles formed by various methods from aqueous solutions of especially
formulated foaming agents. Since foam is lighter than the aqueous solutions from which it is
49

formed and lighter than flammable liquids, it floats on all flammable or combustible liquids,
producing an air-excluding, cooling, continuous layer of vapour sealing, water bearing material
for purposes of halting or preventing combustion.
Fire fighting foams are formulated in several ways, some are thick and viscous forming tough
heat-resistant blankets over burning liquid surfaces and vertical areas. Some foams are
thinner and spread more rapidly, some are capable of producing a vapour-sealing film of
surface-active water solution on liquid surfaces. Some are meant to be used as large volumes
of wet gas cells for inundating surfaces and filling cavities. Foam breaks down and vapourises
its water content under attack by heat and flame. It therefore must be applied to a burning
surface in sufficient volume and rate to compensate for this loss, and to provide an additional
amount to guarantee a residual foam layer over the hot surface. Certain chemical vapours or
fluids may quickly destroy foam and turbulent air or violently uprising combustion gases from
fires may divert light foam from the burning area.
10.4.2.2.
Protein Foaming Agents
Protein type foam concentrates are available for proportioning to a final concentration of from
3% to 6% using fresh or sea water. In general these concentrates produce dense, viscous
foams of high stability and high heat resistance. They are non-toxic and biodegradable after
dilution. They are suitable for use in ambient temperatures from -7C to 49C. They have a
limited shelf life and old stocks should be replaced on a routine basis.
10.4.2.3.
Aqueous Film Forming Foam: (AFFF)
These are synthetically produced materials that form air foams similar to those produced by
the protein-based materials. In addition these foaming agents are capable of forming water
solution films on the surface of flammable liquids. AFFF concentrates are available for
proportioning to a final concentration from 3% to 6% by volume using either fresh or sea
water.
AFFF foam would generally be more effective for substation fires than protein foam. The air
foams generated from AFFF solutions possess low viscosity, have fast spreading and levelling
characteristics, and act as surface barriers to exclude air and halt fuel vapourisation just as
other foams do. These foams also develop a continuous aqueous layer of solution under the
foam with surface activity which maintains a floating film on hydrocarbon fuel surface to help
suppress combustible vapours and cool the fuel substrate. This film which can also spread
over fuel surfaces not fully covered by foam is self healing following mechanical disruption
and continues as long as there remains a reservoir of nearby foam for its production.
However, to ensure fire extinction an AFFF blanket, as with other types of foam, should
entirely cover the fuel surface.
AFFF is non-toxicc and biodegradable after dilution. It has a long shelf life. AFFF foam is
widely used by fire brigades, however only a limited stock is carried on each vehicle.
Consideration should be given to storing a quantity of AFFF foam at substations remote from
a major fire station, 10 to 20 drums (20 litre) should be adequate for most substations.
10.4.2.4.
High Expansion Foam
High expansion foam is used to control and extinguish fires involving ordinary combustibles
(wood, paper, etc.) and flammable liquids and is particularly suitable as a flooding agent when
the supply of water in relatively large volumes is a problem. Foams of expansion from 100 to 1
up to 1000 to 1 can be generated. High expansion foam is excellent for the displacement of
vapour, heat and smoke from an area. It is particularly suited for indoor fires but its use
outdoors may be limited because of the effects of weather. Automatic injection system should
be switched out of service while personnel are in the protected zone, since visibility, breathing
and movement are all severely hampered in the foam.
50
10.4.2.5.
Fixed Foam Installations
Fixed installations with pipework and detectors similar to sprinkler systems, but with foam
storage and mixing facilities, are commercially available. AFFF foam is particularly suitable
requiring only a relatively low pressure and quantity of water. The long shelf life of the foam
concentrate and the simple mixing equipment allow for an economical installation with low
maintenance costs.
10.4.3. Carbon Dioxide Systems
10.4.3.1.
General
Carbon dioxide gas is non-combustible and does not react with most substances. As a gas it
can penetrate and spread to all parts of a fire, it will not conduct electricity and can therefore
be used on energized electrical equipment. It is about 11/2 times as heavy as air.
Although carbon dioxide is only mildly toxic, it can produce unconsciousness and death when
present in fire extinguishing concentrations. The action in this case is more related to
suffocation than to any toxic effect of the carbon dioxide itself. A concentration of 9% is about
the maximum the average human can withstand without losing consciousness within a few
minutes. A higher concentration could bring about helplessness almost immediately. In most
small enclosures protected by CO2 any person present when the discharge starts would
probably have little difficulty escaping before a critical concentration is reached. However, the
cloud produced by the CO2gas may obscure vision and panic or obstacles could prevent a
successful escape. Accordingly, alarms are fitted to automatic systems to alert personnel prior
to the release of CO2.
10.4.3.2.
Limitations as an Extinguishing Agent
Because CO2 may not cool hot surfaces below their ignition point, fires apparently
extinguished by CO2 may reignite after the smothering atmosphere has dispersed. In such
cases it may be necessary to reduce the oxygen content to about 6% and to maintain this
concentration long enough for the embers and hot surfaces to cool to below the ignition
temperature of the fuel. Often, long periods of time are required for sufficient cooling.
10.4.3.3.
Carbon Dioxide Gas Installations
The area to be protected is fitted with open nozzles connected by pipework to either storage
tank(s) or to a remote cartoon dioxide injection point. When detectors in the protected area
sense the presence of a fire, a sequence of events is initiated with appropriate time delays:
An alarm notifies the fire control centre that the detectors have operated and also alerts
personnel in the protected area that it is about to be flooded with carbon dioxide.
The ventilation is turned off.
Fire dampers and doors are closed.
Where the carbon dioxide is stored in tank(s) on site then the control valve is opened
either automatically or manually and the protected area is flooded with carbon dioxide.
Where only an injection point is provided then it is necessary to bring a carbon dioxide
tanker to site and connect it to the injection point.
A carbon dioxide system may be used in the following situations:

(i)
Where a clean extinguishing agent is considered important.
(ii)
For the protection of electrical equipment.
(iii) For flammable liquids or solids.

(iv) To protect equipment of high value.
51

10.4.4. Other Gaseous Systems
Further material will be included in the final revision regarding Argonite (Gaseous system) and
Pyrogen systems (oxygen starving system)
10.4.5. Dry Chemical Extinguishing Agents
Dry chemical is a powder mixture which is used as a fire extinguishing agent. It is suitable for
fighting fires involving flammable liquids and live electrical equipment. The ingredients used in
dry chemical are non-toxic. However, the discharge of large quantities may cause temporary
breathing difficulty and may seriously interfere with visibility.
52
11. ORGANISATION OF FIRE CONTROL

11.1. Fire Control Program
Every Electricity Authority should have a Fire Control Program. The Program should include:
Regular inspection of substations to ensure that correct fire control practices and good
housekeeping are maintained. This also applies during the construction of the substation.
Maintenance of a register of all fire fighting equipment.
Testing and servicing of all fire fighting equipment.
Regular testing of all fire alarms.
Liaison with local fire brigade and bushfire groups, with particular reference to the
electrical hazards in substations.
Established procedures with local fire brigade officers for an electrical operator to be in
attendance before they enter a live substation or commence to fight a substation fire.
Training of Authorities' personnel in fire fighting procedures. Refer to 11.2 below.
Depending upon the size of the Electricity Authority, the Fire Control Program may only
require a part time appointment or may have several staff to carry out the above duties.
11.2. Training
The Fire Control Program should ensure that all appropriate employees are trained in the
following:
Correct use of portable extinguishers for various classes of fires.
Special precautions to be taken with electrical fires.
Procedures to be taken in the event of a fire.
First aid to fire associated injuries.
Handling of fixed fire fighting appliances.
53
12. STATUTORY REGULATIONS

12.1. General
In each state there exists a network of State, Federal and Local Regulations, by-laws etc.
which control various aspects of buildings and fire protection. These regulations are dynamic
and they differ from State to State. The following list indicates the range of statutory
regulations that are applicable at the time of writing and which have a direct impact on
substation design with regard to fire protection.
It is the designer's responsibility to determine which regulation applies to a particular project.
12.2. Federal Regualtions (all States)

12.2.1. Building Code of Australia (BCA)
Produced and updated by the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB). Contains a uniform
set of technical provisions for the design and construction of buildings and other structures
throughout Australia.
12.2.2. Dangerous Goods Act
Administered by the Dept. of Industrial Relations. This act uses AS 1940 - Rules For The
Storage And Handling Of Flammable and Combustible Liquids as its guide. The act governs
such matters as the control of electrical equipment and its proximity to the above liquids.
12.2.3. AS 1940-2004
Rules for the storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids (known as the
SAA Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code).
Provides rules for the planning, design and construction, and safe operation of all installations
in which flammable or combustible liquids are stored or handled. In separate sections it deals
with minor storage, package storage and handling, storage in tanks, fuel dispensing, piping
and tank auxiliaries, heating of liquids, operations and fire protection facilities. Appendices
deal with tank venting and combustion characteristics, and show a typical work permit.
12.2.4. AS/NZS 3000
Rules for the electrical equipment of buildings, structures and premises.
Part 1 - 2000 Wiring methods (known as the SAA Wiring Rules). Establish the requirements
for ensuring safety from fire and shock for all electrical installations in or on buildings,
structures, and premises, other than for installations in a supply authority's premises, and for
equipment installed in a consumer's premises and belonging to a supply authority.
Sections deal with definitions and nomenclature; general requirements; general
arrangements, control and protection; installation of wiring; installation of equipment; earthling;
special situations; extra-low voltage installations; high voltage installations; and hazardous
locations. Appendices provide additional data, and include an introduction to Part 2 of the
rules. Included with the Rules is Supplement No. 1, Cable and Conductor Tables - Imperial
Units which reproduces the essential requirements of Appendix B of superseded AS CC1,
Part 1 - 1969, for the purpose of providing ratings of imperial cables. For Notes see Doc.
3000N.
54
12.3. Statutory Regulations in NSW

(Request that State jurisdictions supply current details for inclusion in the final Revision)
.
12.4. Statutory Regulations in Queensland

12.5. Statutory Regulations in ACT

12.6. Statutory Regulations in Victoria

12.7. Statutory Regulations in Tasmania

12.8. Statutory Regulations in South Austalia

12.9. Statutory Regulations in Western Australia

Worksafe (2004)
Code of Practice - Tilt-up construction
Fire collapse requirements
Department of Consumer and Employment Protection
12.10. Statutory Regulations in Northern Territory

55
13. SELECTED AUSTRALIAN and AMERICAN STANDARDS

RELATED TO FIRE PROTECTION
13.1.
Building Design
AS 1530 Methods for Fire Tests on Building Materials Components and Structures
Part 1 - 1994 Combustibility test for materials. Describes a combustibility test for classifying
building material, either coated or uncoated. Apparatus, test procedures and
classification criteria are given.
Part 2 - 1993 Test for Flammability of materials (Incorporating Corrig.) Describes procedure
for preparing and determining flammability index of thin sheet or woven materials of
pliable nature which are combustible and do not melt readily or shrink away from an
igniting flame. The index is determined according to a speed factor, heat factor. See
also A30.
Part 3 - 1999 Test for early fire hazard properties of materials. Describes a test .for graded
building material on the basis of ignition tendency, heat development, flame spread
and tendency to produce smoke. Apparatus, test procedure and indexes for grading
are given.
Part 4 - 1975 Fire-resistance test of structures. Describes a fire-resistance test for grading
elements of building structures. Apparatus, test procedures and methods of grading
are given.
AS 1668 Rules for the use of mechanical ventilation and air conditioning in buildings
(Known as the SAA Mechanical Ventilation and Air Conditioning Code)
Part 1 - 1998 Fire precautions in buildings with air-handing systems. Applies to the design,
construction, installation and operation of air-handling systems, in relation to
preventing the spread of fire through a building by way of the air-handling system.
Mandatory safety requirements, intended for incorporation by reference in building
regulations and the like, are specified.
AS 1682 - 1990 Fire dampers
Deals with materials, design and manufacture, rating, testing and marking
requirements for fire dampers of rectangular and circular face of single and multiblade construction. An appendix provides information on installation.
AS 1890 - 1999 Thermally-released links.
Applies to links for general fire protection services in buildings but not to links
incorporated in sprinkler heads. It provides for identification, construction
requirements and performance requirements in terms of strength, operating
temperature, operation, corrosion resistance and coating tests. An appendix deals
with the fatigue test for links for use in high temperature industrial environments.
AS 1905 Rules for the construction and installation of fire resistant doors, fire windows and
fire shutters (known as the SAA Fire Door Code)
Part 1 - 2005 Fire-Resistant Doorsets. Gives basic design data (except method of
construction) for fire-resistant doorsets other than lift-landing doors, which are
intended to protect trafficable openings in fire-rated walls: it covers required modes of
exposure to standard fire tests, and lists permissible variations which may be made to
doors without resubmission for prototype testing. Installation, adjustment, inspection
and certification and labelling are specified. Appendices include requirements for fireresistant doorsets for particular applications, notes on the selection of door closers,
56
and some suggestions on fixing of fire-door frames which are not built-in at the time
of wall construction.
AS 2427 - 2004 Smoke/heat release vents.
Specifies construction and performance details for vents intended to be fitted in a
building and to automatically open, on the outbreak of fire, to allow escape of smoke
and hot gases.
AS 2428 Methods of testing smoke/heat release vents.
AS 2428.1 - 2004. Determination of resistance to leakage during rain.
AS 2428.2 - 2004. Determination of ability to operate under wind loading.
AS 2428.3 - 2004. Determination of operating characteristics.
AS 2428.4 - 2004. Determination of effect of flame contact.
AS 2428.5 - 2004. Determination of coefficient of discharge and effective aerodynamic area.
AS 2428.6 - 2004. Determination of ability to operate under snow loading.
AS 2430 - Classification of hazardous areas.
Part 1 - 1981. Explosive gas atmospheres. Provides a classification of areas according to the
likely existence of an explosive gas/air mixture, including areas in which the mixture
is continuously present or present for long periods (Zone 0), areas in which the
mixture is likely to occur in normal operation (Zone 1), and areas in which the mixture
is not likely to occur or will exist only for a short time (Zone 2). Factors to be
considered in the classification of areas are outlined and appendices deal with
specific occupancies, and with basic principles of hazardous atmospheres.
Part 2 - 1981. Dusts (including inherently-explosive dusts). Provides a classification of areas
according to the likely existence of an inherently explosive dust or explosive dust/air
mixture. Dusts are grouped according to their physical properties and three zones (3,
4 and 5) are determined according to the area where a particular dust is present.
Appendices cover basic principles of dust hazards, experimental data, groupings of
typical hazardous dusts, and illustrations of zones.
13.2. Detection and Suppression

AS 1603 - 1997 Heat detectors for fire alarm installations.
Covers the design, construction, marking, performance and testing of five types of
detector for "rate of rise" and "fixed temperature" applications. Performance is
prescribed in relation to insulation resistance tests and thermal tests (22C/min.,
6C/min., 2C/min. and 0.5C/min.), together with an instantaneous rise of 20"C or
30"C according to type. Tests for resistance to corrosion, shock, crushing, low
temperature, voltage excursion and transient voltage are also included together with
test strength of screw threads and fixings. Recommendations on the selection of the
type of heat detector arid on the application of fixed capacitors are given.
AS 1670 - 2004 Rules for automatic fire alarm installations (known as the SAA Code for
Automatic Fire Alarm Installations)
Applies to the design, installation and maintenance of thermal detectors and smoke
detectors and systems using detectors responsive to flame and any other automatic
fire alarm system, including the method of connecting manual call-points to such
systems. Definitions, general requirements applicable to ail systems and specific
requirements for heat detection, smoke detection and flame detection systems are
given. Appendices set out recommendations on the selection of types of thermal
57
detector and on the application of smoke and flame detectors, together with a
standard form of installer's statement for a fire alarm system, and fire alarm symbols.
AS 2362.23 - 1990 Automatic Fire Detection and Alarm Systems Method of Test for
Actuating Devices Weathering Test.
Sets out the requirements and tests for manually operated call points for use in
conjunction with automatic fire alarm installations. It includes tests for corrosion,
frangibility of covers, and impact. A weathering test is included for call points intended
for mounting in positions exposed to weather.
AS 2118.1 - 2006 Rules for automatic fire sprinkler systems (known as the SAA Code for
Automatic Fire Sprinkler Systems)
The first eight sections deal with general requirements and include information
relating to classification of occupancies, water supplies, piping etc. The following
three sections deal with the specific requirements for extra light, ordinary, and extra
high hazard class system. Appendices cover the determination of orifice plate sizes,
hydraulic requirements for extra high hazard systems and a specimen completion
certificate.
AS 7240 series on Fire detection and alarm systems, and in particular its Part 1: General and
definitions, is a core fire protection standard (along with AS 1670) in respect of
system design approach refer to its Figure 1 and the unifying definition of terms it
contains. The series currently comprises:
AS 7240.1-2007
Fire detection and alarm systemsGeneral and definitions
AS 7240.2-2004
Fire detection and alarm systems Control and indicating equipment
(ISO 7240-2:2003, MOD)
AS 7240.4-2004
Fire detection and alarm systems Power supply equipment (ISO 72404:2003, MOD)
AS 7240.5-2004
Fire detection and alarm systems Point type heat detectors (ISO 72405:2003, MOD)
AS 7240.6-2006
Fire detection and alarm systems Carbon monoxide fire detectors using
electro-chemical cells
AS 7240.7-2004
Fire detection and alarm systems Point-type smoke detectors using
scattered light, transmitted light or
ionization (ISO 7240-7:2003, MOD)
AS 7240.8-2007
Fire detection and alarm systems Carbon monoxide fire detectors using
an
electro-chemical
cell
in
combination with a heat sensor
AS 7240.10-2007
Fire detection and alarm systems Point-type flame detectors
AS 7240.12-2007
Fire detection and alarm systems Line type smoke detectors using a
transmitted optical beam
AS 7240.13-2006
Fire detection and alarm systems Compatibility assessment of system
components
AS 7240.15-2004
Fire detection and alarm systems Multisensor fire detectors (ISO 724015:2004,MOD)
AS 7240.21-2006
Fire detection and alarm systems Routing equipment
58
13.3. Extinguishing Equipment

AS 1221 - 1997 Fire hose reels
Specifies design, materials, construction and performance requirements of fire hose
reels permanently connected to a water supply.
AS 1687 - 1991 Knapsack spray pumps for fire fighting.
Applies to a hand-operated knapsack spray pump of the rigid water-container type. It
specifies materials and construction of containers of metal and plastics with a
capacity of up to 22 litres. Requirements for carrying straps, hose and pump are
given, together with tests for the nozzle in the jet position and the spray position and
a drop test for plastics containers.
AS-1841.1 - 1997 Portable fire extinguishers General Requirements.
AS 1841.2 - 1997 Water Type Portable Fire Extinguishers.
AS 1841.3 - 1997 Wet Chemical Type Portable Fire Extinguishers.
AS 1841.4 - 1997 Foam Type Portable Fire Extinguishers.
AS 1841.5 - 1997 Powder Type Portable Fire Extinguishers.
AS 1841.6 - 1997 Carbon Dioxide Type Portable Fire Extinguishers.
AS 1841.7 - 1997 Vaporising Liquid Type Fire Extinguishers
AS 1841.8 - 1997 Non-rechargeable Type Fire Extinguishers.
AS 1850 - 1997 Portable Fire Extinguishers, Classification, Rating & Fire Testing. Sets out the
classification, fire testing and rating of fire extinguishers used in attacking fires.
AS 2419 - 2005 Installation of fire hydrants.
Sets out the requirements for fire hydrant installation in properties, including location,
spacing and water supplies. Covers hydrants both in buildings and in open areas.
Although primarily installed for use by occupants, such hydrant systems may also be
used by fire brigades.
AS 2441 - 2005 installation of fire hose reels
Specifies requirements for connection to water supply, location and mounting, and
includes commissioning tests.
AS 2444 - 2001 Portable Fire Extinguishers and Fire Blankets Selection & Location
Sets out guidelines for the selection and location of portable fire extinguishers to
provide minimum protection. It provides recommendations for extinguishers for
industrial, commercial and domestic premises and vehicles, including caravans and
boats.
13.4. Maintenance
AS 1851 - 2005 Rules for the maintenance of fire protection systems and equipment.
Sets out requirements for the inspection, test, preventative maintenance and survey
of fire protection systems and equipment.
13.5. Other Australian Standards Related to Fire Protection

AS 1674 - 2007 Rules for fire precautions in arc or flame cutting, flame heating and arc or gas
welding operations (known as the SAA Cutting and Voiding Safety Code)
59
Relates to protection of persons and property from injury by fire or explosion arising
out of cutting, heating or welding operations. Preliminary precautions include the
appointment of the responsible officer, inspection of site and issue of work permit.
General precautions include reference to cutting, heating or welding in or near
hazardous locations and in other locations, and set out essential safety measures to
be taken before, during and on completion of the work. Cutting, heating and welding
permit is illustrated in an appendix and a second appendix provides a recommended
procedure for cutting, heating or welding containers used for flammable or explosive
substances.
AS 1875 - 1976 Domestic incinerators.
Applies to up draught and downdraught types used for the burning of readily
combustible domestic and garden rubbish and specified requirements aimed at
reducing risk of spread of fire. It refers to top, flue, spark arrester, baffle plate,
openings, screen and guards, and external apertures, but does not specify overall
dimensions.
AS 1940 - 2004 - The storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids
Provides rules for the planning, design and construction, and safe operation of all
installations in which flammable or combustible liquids are stored or handled. In
separate sections it deals with minor storage, package storage and handling, storage
in tanks, fuel dispensing, piping and tank auxiliaries, heating of liquids, operations
and fire protection facilities. Appendices deal with tank venting and combustion
characteristics, and show a typical work permit.
MP24 (1972) Use of lifts in emergencies (An examination by the SAA Committee on Lift
Installations)
13.6. Emergency-Lighting-In-Buildings
Substation buildings can be deemed Class 8 buildings if they are not pole mounted, kiosk,
padmount, or modular type substations and should comply with the BCA, Part E4 Emergency
Lighting, Exit Signs and Warning Systems regarding substation evacuation provisions.
The standards below are mainly intended for buildings used by the public - but can be used
for guidance in substations.
AS 2293 Emergency escape lighting and exit signs in buildings.
AS 2293, Part 1 - 2005 System design, installation and operation requirements.
Requirements for the equipment used and practices adopted in the installation of
emergency evacuation lighting in buildings. Includes a system for classifying
emergency luminaries according to their light output distribution, together with
associated requirements controlling the maximum spacing which may be used. Does
not specify the types of buildings which should be provided with emergency
evacuation lighting.
AS2293 Part 2 - 1995 Inspection and Maintenance procedures.
Specifies periodic inspection and maintenance checks which should be carried out to
ensure that emergency evacuation lighting systems will be ready ' for operation at all
times.
AS2293 Part 3 - 2005 Emergency Escape Luminaries and Exit Signs.
13.7. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards

NFPA. No. 12 - Carbon Dioxide extinguishing systems.
60
NFPA. No. 15 - Water spray fixed systems for fire protection.
This standard deals with water spray protection from fixed nozzle systems only. It
does not cover water spray protection from portable nozzles or sprinkler systems.
NFPA, No. 850
13.8. Summary of Australian Practices

The Insurance Council of Australia
The above Council is concerned with the interests of Insurance Corporations and when a
certain aspect of fire protection is not covered by the SAA it is prudent to require that it meet
the standards set by this Council.
Board of Fire Commissioners of NSW
In New South Wales this is an advisory body until a fire takes place and then it has ultimate
responsibility and authority.
Similar authorities exist in other states.
61
Energy Networks Assocation

Level 3, 40 Blackall Street
Barton ACT 2600
Ph
+61 2 6272 1555
Fax
+61 2 6272 1566
Web www.ena.asn.au

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Transformer Safety Standards

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ENA DOC 18-2008

Interim Guideline for the Fire Protection of

ENA DOC 18-2008

This Interim Guideline has been issued pending a full review.

It is intended to fully review this Interim Guideline within 12 months of publication.

Energy Networks Association

Energy Networks Association

Detection and Suppression ............................................................................................. 57

Energy Networks Association

1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

compliance with all relevant legislation

Heat Energy Sources Sources of Ignition

Heat of Combustion - ie complete or partial oxidisation.

Spontaneous .Heating - ie the process of increase in temperature of a material without

Heat of Decomposition - ie heat released by the decomposition of compounds which

2.2.2. Electrical Heat Energy Sources

Dielectric Heating - (eg thermal runaway in bushings or cables)

Heat from Arcing the main cause of transformer fires

Heat Generated by Lightning.

2.2.3. Mechanical Heat Energy Sources

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2.2.4. Nuclear Heat Energy

"Combustion" is a chemical reaction which is a combination of a fuel (reducing agent) with

The flaming type (including explosion)

Chemical changes - as in the detonation of an explosive gas-air mixture.

Physical changes - such as the bursting of a boiler.

2.4.2. Chemical Explosions

Detonation - which is characterised by the presence of a shock wave. The pressure of

the absence, improper installation, or malfunction of a pressure release device;

some defect in the container itself;

localized heating etc.

2.5.1. Extinguishment by Cooling

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Products of Combustion and Their Effects on Life Safety

Fire Resistance Classification

Fire Engineering Certification

Further material is to be included in the final revision

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3. FIRE SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT

Fire Safety Strategy

The overall strategy of management of fire risks is to be defined.

Risk Management Approach

4. THE RISK OF FIRE OCCURRING

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Substation Equipment and Buildings

Substation Operating Life

Further material is to be included in the final revision

Other Causes of Fire

Other causes of fire that need to be considered are:

Intentionally lit fires

Welding in existing buildings

Further material is to be included in the final revision

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5. ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FIRE

6. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTATION BUILDINGS

Further material is to be included in the final revision

Requirements will be outlined for transportable/prefabricated substation buildings, reference AS

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7. FIRE PRECAUTIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATIONS

Pole Mounted, Kiosk and Padmounted Substations

Surface Free-standing, Outdoor and Metal Enclosed Substations

Surface Building Substation

7.3.1. General Comment

Energy Networks Association