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FINAL REPORT
Requested by:
American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
Standing Committee on Highways
Prepared by:
Kathleen Almand
Fire Protection Research Foundation
Quincy, Massachusetts
March 2008
The information contained in this report was prepared as part of NCHRP Project 20-7, Task 230,
National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Transportation Research Board.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SPONSORSHIP
This work was sponsored by one or more of the following as noted:
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, in cooperation
with the Federal Highway Administration, and was conducted in the National
Cooperative Highway Research Program,
Federal Transit Administration and was conducted in the Transit Cooperative
Research Program,
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, in cooperation
with the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration, and was conducted in the
Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program,
Federal Aviation Administration and was conducted in the Airport Cooperative
Research Program,
which is administered by the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies.
DISCLAIMER
This is an uncorrected draft as submitted by the research agency. The opinions and
conclusions expressed or implied in the report are those of the research agency. They are
not necessarily those of the Transportation Research Board, the National Academies, or
the program sponsors.
BACKGROUND
The AASHTO Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures created the Technical Committee
on Tunnels (T-20) to address increased concerns for safety and security in the U.S. tunnel
inventory. In support of the activities of the T-20 Technical Committee, an FHWAAASHTO sponsored scanning trip was undertaken in late 2005(ref). The focus of the
scan was on equipment, systems, and procedures incorporated into modern underground
and underwater tunnels by leading international engineers and designers. Team members
identified a number of underground transportation system initiatives and practices that
varied from those in the U.S. in some respect. The team recommended that nine of these
initiatives or practices be considered for further study in the United States.
As a next step, the Technical Committee on Tunnels requested and received approval
through the Transportation Research Boards National Cooperative Highway Research
Program to conduct a workshop on research needs for safety and security in roadway
tunnels. Project 20-7 Task 230 was approved in May of 2007. A project panel was
formed to oversee the project and plan the workshop. The Panel met by teleconference
three times in 2007 to develop the agenda, recommend speakers and invited participants.
Panel membership roster is located in Appendix A.
SCOPE
The goal of the workshop was to review the state of the art and develop recommendations
on research needs for improving safety and security in roadway tunnels for consideration
by the Technical Committee on Tunnels.
WORKSHOP
The workshop was held on November 29 and 30, 2007 at the National Academies
Beckman Center in Irvine, CA. There were approximately 65 participants in the
workshop including members of AASHTO T-20 and T-1 Committees, highway agency
representatives and a broad spectrum of members of the highway and fire protection
engineering communities. The NCHRP project panel selected five international speakers
to address the key research areas identified in the AASHTO scan. Three additional
domestic speakers were invited to address the scan, NCHRP Report 525 / TCRP Report
86, Vol. 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure, and a review of world wide
standards for fire safety in roadway tunnels. Significant opportunity for participant input
was provided for in the agenda. The workshop agenda, biographies of the speakers,
speaker presentations and the workshop participant list are found in Appendix A.
RESEARCH NEEDS
Each invited participant was asked to identify research needs from their perspective. In
addition, invited workshop participants were invited to submit research needs ideas prior
to the workshop. Two panel sessions during the workshop generated a great deal of
discussion amongst workshop participants and further generation of suggested research
needs. A list of research needs identified at the workshop by these methods are found in
Appendix A.
The project Panel reviewed and synthesized the information from the workshop and
identified ten key research needs statements for consideration by the AASHTO T-20
Technical Committee on Tunnels. These statements can be found in below. Statements
were developed in the following areas: their order in this list reflects the interest
expressed by participants in the workshop:
1. Effective Fire Suppression
2. Design Fires
3. Develop Requirements for Egress and Emergency Signage
4. Tunnel Operations and First Responders
5. Benchmarking Tunnel Incidents
6. Training and Education
7. Design Basis for Egress Systems
8. Effective Incident Detection
9. Fire and Smoke Ventilation System Design Methods
10. Performance of Structural Materials in Tunnels in Fire Incidents
11. Guidelines for Tunnel Geometric Design for Fire Safety
12. Application of ITS to Emergency Operations in Tunnels
RESEARCH PROBLEMS
RP1. Design Fires for Roadway Tunnels
I.
RESEARCH PROBLEM
Understanding and characterizing the range of fire scenarios that can occur in
roadway tunnels is an important first step in developing design guidance for this
application.
II.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
Develop an appropriate basis for the design of fire protection strategies for
tunnels. The project should include the following components:
Research on the effects of different ignition sources on incipient times for fires in
modern vehicles
A risk based approach that provides a design basis for both large and small
incidents and considers the potential for alternatively fueled vehicles
Development of appropriate design parameters that can serve as the basis for the
design of suppression, detection, emergency egress and other systems.
III
III
BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $350,000, sensor
manufacturers
I
RESEARCH PROBLEM
The behavior of truck and passenger vehicle drivers can have a major impact on the
consequence of a fire event in a tunnel
II
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
Develop targeted training materials for safe behaviors for car and truck drivers. This
should include a formal assessment of the impact of leaflet type education; research on
new education and training methods; and formal training programs for truck drivers,
enforced as a condition of license renewal.
III
Appendix A
Workshop Materials
8:00
9:00
Welcome/Introductions/Workshop Charge
Harry Capers, Chair, NCHRP Panel 20-7 Task 230
AASHTO/FHWA International Scan on Underground Transportation Systems Safety and
Security Summary and Critical Issues
Steve Ernst, Federal Highway Administration
NCHRP Report 525, Vol. 12 / Transit Cooperative Research Program Report 86, Vol. 12:
Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure Research Needs
Chris Hawkins, PB Americas, Inc.
10:00 Break
10:30 Way Finding, Signage and Human Behavior
Gunnar Jenssen, SINTEF, Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory
Fire Growth and Heat Release in Tunnel Incidents
Haukur Ingason, SP, Swedish National Testing and Research Institute
500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
7:30
8:30
9:30
10:30 Break
11:00 Summary of Research Needs
Kathleen Almand, Fire Protection Research Foundation
11:30 Concluding Comments, Next Steps for AASHTO Technical Committees
Harry Capers, Chair, NCHRP Panel 20-7 Task 230
12:00 Lunch Buffet (provided to all participants)
13:00 Adjourn
NCHRP Workshop on Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels, November 28, 29, 2007
Attendees
Kathleen Almand
Moe Amini
Randy Anderson
Melissa Avila
Alexander Bardow
Mikael Braestrup
Harry Capers
Robert Carasitti
Hugh Caspe
Sean Cassady
Nick Chen
Sunghoon Choi
William Connell
Rhonda Cruz
William Davis
Robert DiAngelo
Rachel Diaz
Arnold Dix
Donald Dwyer
Gary English
Steven Ernst
Helmut Ernst
Jason Gamache
Enzo Gardin
Daniel Gemeny
Hossein Ghara
Daniel Gottuk
kalmand@nfpa.org
moe_amini@dot.ca.gov
randy_anderson@dot.ca.gov
Melissa.Avila@tycofp.com
alexander.bardow@mhd.state.ma.us
mwb@ramboll.dk
hcapers@arorapc.com
bob_carasitti@schirmereng.com
hcaspe@hntb.com
scassady@hntb.com
nick.chen@jacobs.com
chois@pbworld.com
connellw@pbworld.com
rcruz@coronado.ca.us
william.davis@nist.gov
robert.m.diangelo@usace.army.mil
rdiaz@nas.edu
counsel@arnolddix.com
ddwyer@dot.state.ny.us
gary.english@seattle.gov
steve.ernst@fhwa.dot.gov
helmut.ernst@masspike.com
jgamache@nfpa.org
enzo.gardin@nrc.gc.ca
dgemeny@rjagroup.com
hosseinghara@dotd.la.gov
dgottuk@haifire.com
NCHRP Workshop on Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels, November 28, 29, 2007
Attendees
Chris Hawkins
Jeremy Hung
Haukur Ingason
Alex Izett
Jon Jensen
Gunnar Jenssen
Bruce Johnson
Jugesh Kapur
Ahmed Kashef
Paul Liles
Adrian Lloyd
Igor Maevski
Stephen Maher
James Murphy
Prasad Nallapaneni
David Newman
Barton Newton
Thomas Ostrom
Dharam Pal
Shyan-Yung Pan
Stephan Parker
Brian Pearson
Mary Lou Ralls
Kelley Rehm
Jesus Rohena
PB Americas Inc.
PB Americas Inc.
SP Swedish National Testing & Research Institute
Kicking Horse Canyon Project
Kicking Horse Canyon Project
SINTEF
Oregon Department of Transportation
Washington State Department of Transportation
National Research Council of Canada
Georgia Department of Transportation
MicroPack Detection (Americas) LLC
Jacobs Engineering
The National Academy of Sciences
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
Virginia Department of Transportation
Hatch Mott MacDonald
Caltrans
Caltrans
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Federal Highway Administration
National Cooperative Highway Research Program
hawkins@pbworld.com
hung@pbworld.com
haukur.ingason@sp.se
alex.izett@uma.aecom.com
starla.weigel@gov.bc.ca
gunnar.d.jenssen@sintef.no
bruce.v.johnson@odot.state.or.us
kapurju@wsdot.wa.gov
ahmed.kashef@nrc.gc.ca
paul.liles@dot.state.ga.us
AdrianLloyd@micropackamericas.com
igor.maevski@jacobs.com
SMAHER@nas.edu
james.murphy@masspike.com
David.Newman@hatchmott.com
barton_newton@dot.ca.gov
tom.ostrom@dot.ca.gov
dpal@panynj.gov
shyanyung@yahoo.com
saparker@nas.edu
ralls-newman@sbcglobal.net
krehm@aashto.org
Jesus.Rohena@fhwa.dot.gov
Prasad.Nallapaneni@VDOT.Virginia.gov
NCHRP Workshop on Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels , November 28, 29, 2007
Attendees
Blake Rothfuss
Henry Russell
Louis Ruzzi
Michael Salamon
Albert Samano
Peter-Johann Sturm
Kevin Thompson
Ed Walton
Nate Wittasek
Brian Zelenko
Daniel Zerga
Jacobs Associates
Parsons Brinkerhoff Quade & Douglas Inc
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
Colorado Department of Transportation
TRC Corporation
Graz University of Technology
Caltrans
rothfuss@jacobssf.com
russell@pbworld.com
lruzzi@state.pa.us
michael.salamon@dot.state.co.us
asamano@trcsolutions.com
sturm@vkmb.tugraz.at
kevin.thompson@dot.ca.gov
ArupFire
URS Corporation
ILF Consultants Inc.
nate.wittasek@arup.com
brian_zelenko@urscorp.com
dzerga@ilfoak.com
Research Needs
Identified by Presenters and Participants
Bold type:
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Ahmed Kashef
Senior Research Officer, National Research Council of Canada
Ahmed.Kashef@nrc.gc.ca
Title:
Research Objective:
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Blake Rothfuss
Associate/Jacobs Associates
rothfuss@jacombsssf.com
Title:
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Title:
Research Objective: Improve the understanding of very large fires in tunnels so that
performance expectations and design criteria can be established
for water based suppression systems in tunnels.
Brief Description of Proposed Research:
Recent fire catastrophes in highway tunnels in Europe have increased pressure on
tunnel agencies to improve fire safety in tunnels. Active fire suppression systems
involving water sprays have been shown to drastically reduce temperatures, limit the
thermal damage to the tunnel, and prevent fire propagation beyond the vehicles of origin.
Improved thermal conditions and reduced fire spread have major benefits for both life
safety and property protection. Full-scale fire testing is used to confirm performance and
establish design criteria for suppression systems. The fire test programs involve large
heavy goods vehicle (HGV) fires. The experience of the fire testing community,
however, is largely based on moderate scale fire tests. Even for moderate scale fires (e.g.
5 to 10 MW) it is difficult to obtain a high degree of repeatability. For very large fires of
the scale used in testing tunnel fire suppression systems, e.g. 50 to 100MW, the
variability of the fires is significantly greater than with smaller scale fires. It is a
challenge to define fire performance measures that realistically evaluate the benefit of the
suppression system in terms that can be measured with any repeatability. Performance
criteria may be set by authorities who assume the fire behaves in a repeatable and logical
manner. The reality of the highly turbulent conditions of a tunnel fire is such that
unanticipated conditions arise that are, it seems, not logical. The apparent illogic may be
explained easily, however, when the dynamics of the turbulent fire are better understood.
Research is needed to analyze existing fire test data, combined with computational fluid
dynamics (CFD) modeling, to assist in understanding the complex dynamics of very large
fires in tunnels. The challenge is to develop and validate FDS to simulate the heat release
rate, flame spread rate, flame height or length, and the heat flux per unit area of very
large fires in tunnels while interacting with finely atomized water sprays. A validated
FDS HGV model will assist in developing global performance criteria for suppression
systems that are not tied to single point measurements of temperature and inappropriate
assumptions about conditions in around the fire. Validated tunnel fire models will also
permit study of the probable performance of suppression systems in tunnels of different
shape, height, width and ventilation features than the limited number of tunnels used for
fire testing. A validated tunnel fire model will also benefit the design of tunnel ventilation
systems for extreme conditions.
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Andrzej S. Nowak
Professor, University of Nebraska
anowak2@unl.edu
Title:
Research Objective: Development of risk analysis procedures for tunnels and selection
criteria for the target reliability levels for tunnels, including structural components and
systems.
Brief Description of Proposed Research:
The research plan will include:
Development of efficient risk analysis procedures that can be used for the assessment of
the actual risk in tunnel structures. The focus will be on the approach at the system level,
using system reliability methods. The work will involve the formulation of limit state
functions, identification of basic parameters, and, in many cases, the development of
advanced procedures for non-linear analysis of structural behavior. A statistical database
will be established for the parameters that determine the performance of the considered
structures. The needs for additional statistical data will be formulated. The procedures
will allow for the development of lifetime reliability profiles, and methodology for
prediction of the remaining life for the considered tunnel structures.
Development of procedures for the selection of rational acceptability criteria for risk, or
the target reliability levels. The approach will be based on the analysis of consequences
of failure to perform as expected and economic analysis (costs). This will be a very
important contribution of the proposed research effort as this is where there is a great
need. The acceptable risk, or target reliability level, can be different depending on
exposure of human life and importance of the tunnel, and the acceptable risk will affect
the structural considerations (selection of the structural systems, components, and
materials).
Development of implementation strategy for risk control to keep risk within acceptable
levels. The format will be consistent with the LRFD
AASHTO Code. The developed reliability analysis procedures will be applied to assess
the risk associated with the selected tunnel systems designed according to the current
AASHTO. The computations will require a statistical database. The results will be
compared with the selected target reliability levels to determine if the current situation
requires changes. The risk control procedures will e developed to ensure that the risk is
at an acceptable level. Sensitivity analysis will be carried out relating the reliability and
various design and other parameters. The sensitivity analysis can require the
development and use of advanced non-linear structural analysis methods.
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Sean Cassady
Senior Engineer HNTB Corporation
scassady@hntb.com
Title:
Research Objective: Develop data set of hazard conditions. Identify FFS design
elements and criteria that are most effective at reducing fire
hazards for exposed and shielded fires.
Brief Description of Proposed Research:
Full scale testing of several different fire configurations within tunnels, liquid fuel
pool, HGV, shielded pool, shielded HGV.
Temperature, humidity and radiation measurements of air. Temperature
measurements at wall (energy flux also), smoke layer observations.
Air velocity measurements.
Fixed fire suppression systems would include overhead std. drop (OSD) water
sprinklers, OSD low exp. foam, oscillating monitor.
Investigate ventilation system operation to degrade effectiveness of suppression
system.
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Igor Maevski
Jacobs Fellow, Tunnel Ventilation Principal
igor.maevski@jacobs.com
Title:
Research Objective: To find out the efficiency of the fixed fire suppression system
when ventilation system activated.
Brief Description of Proposed Research:
Most of the long road tunnels are equipped with tunnel ventilation systems that
should operate in fire emergency to control smoke. The longitudinal airflow, created by
fans, will interfere and blow away water particles from the fixed fire suppression system.
The research should focus on recommendations for the design of the fixed fire
suppression system to make it efficient for fire fighting.
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Ian Ong
Senior Project Engineer
ian.ong@hatchmott.com
Title:
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Robert Carasitti
Schirmer Engineering Massachusetts Stem to Stern Review
Team
bob_carasitti@schirmereng.com
Title:
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Title:
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Title:
Research Objective: Identify the programmatic linkages between tunnel safety and
security systems and emergency preparedness elements such as
plans, procedures, training and exercises.
Brief Description of Proposed Research:
Research and tunnel emergency preparedness programs in the US and overseas
that addresses both the tunnel safety and security systems and the emergency
preparedness programs that result in an integrated solution involving security and safety
systems along with the emergency operations plans, procedures, public info, training and
exercises for tunnel operations personnel and emergency responders.
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Thomas Zimmie
Professor and Acting Head, Civil and Env. Engineering Dept., RPI
zimmit@rpi.edu
Title:
Research Objective: To improve the safety and security of tunnels by validating and
calibrating procedures, retrofitting schemes, damage, etc.
Brief Description of Proposed Research:
Utilize geotechnical centrifuge modeling (physical modeling) to investigate
various aspects of tunnel safety and security. The physical models allow one to
investigate conditions that cannot be tested full scale. For example, blast damage,
retrofitting schemes, damage assessment, total failure, etc. The models allow the
calibration and validation of computer models, which can also be utilized for design
purposes. Utilizing RPIs geotechnical centrifuge, we have done and are doing this type
of research now for governmental agencies. (I would be happy to do a presentation at the
workshop on centrifuge modeling.)
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Alex Izett
Project Manger, Kicking Horse Canyon Project
alex.izett@uma.aecom.com
Title:
Name:
Title/Affiliation:
Email:
Melissa Avila
Project Engineer/Tyco Fire and Building Products
Melissa.Avila@tycofp.com
Title:
Research Objective: Develop performance standards for fixed fire suppression systems
in tunnels
Brief Description of Proposed Research:
Over the past four years, there has been a global interest in the value of fitting
fixed fire suppression systems in tunnels and several research programs have been
conducted to develop baseline data regarding the level of performance that is possible.
However, the lack of a performance standard establishing minimum life safety and asset
protection requirements for these systems has limited the ability of engineers to
incorporate these systems into the overall tunnel design in a manner that accounts for the
benefits these systems provide. Preliminary data suggests that significant potential exists
for cost reducing design tradeoffs when these systems are included, along with significant
potential for cost reductions of the suppression systems themselves if/when a competitive
environment is established. The goal of the proposed research would be to develop
minimum performance standards for tunnel fire suppression systems which could be
included in AASHTO standards, permitting independent product verification bodies (i.e.
Underwriters Laboratories) to develop system test standards and issue certifications for
systems that meet these performance requirements.
Speakers Biographies
Steve Ernst, Senior Bridge Engineer, Safety and Security
Federal Highway Administration, Highway Infrastructure, Office of Bridge
Technology
Steve Ernst is a registered professional engineer in Virginia with a BSCE from the
University of Arkansas and a BS in English from Arkansas State University. He has
worked with the Federal Highway Administration for 23 years, including 9 years as a
bridge designer with Eastern Federal Lands Highway Division and 10 years as a
structural engineer in Federal Highways Office of Bridge Technology. He is currently
responsible for bridge technology programs, including policies, procedures, standards and
practices related to safety and security in bridge structures engineering.
Christopher Hawkins, P.E., Senior Supervising Engineer, PB Americas, Inc.
Chris Hawkins, working as project manager and engineer, he has gained broad
experience in the design and installation of underground life safety systems and
mechanical/electrical support systems. The scope of his work includes highway tunnels,
metropolitan subway systems, railroad tunnels, and water/sewage tunnels. He has
worked on-site for major underground transportation projects in Asia, Europe and the
USA. This experience encompasses new facility work as well as the often challenging
task of rehabilitating existing tunnel facilities. He has held key positions of responsibility
during all phases of underground construction and mining, from conceptual design to
project commissioning. Chris is a graduate of West Virginia University with degrees in
Mining Engineering and a Masters in Business Administration.
Gunnar D. Jenssen, Senior Research Scientist, SINTEF Transport Safety and
Informatics
Mr. Gunnar Deinboll Jenssen obtained his M.Sc. in Psychology 1986, The University of
Trondheim (UNIT). Until 1989 Mr. Jenssen was a Research Fellow at the Institute of
Psychology (UNIT), with research on perception, hormones and learning disabilities. Mr.
Jenssen is presently a Senior Research Scientist at SINTEF Transport Safety and
Informatics and has completed the first part of his PhD on Safety effects of driver support
systems. His main field of competence is: Traffic safety, Tunnel safety human factors
analysis, road-user behaviour and driving simulation.
Haukur Ingason, Senior Research Scientist, SP Swedish National Testing and
Research Institute
Haukur Ingason has nearly twenty years of international experience in fire safety research
and engineering. He is a senior research scientist at SP Fire Technology and part time
Prof. at the Malardalen University in Sweden. He was the initiator and project leader of
the Large Scale Tests performed in Runehamar tunnel 2003.
SCAN COUNTRIES
Countries visited:
Norway
Denmark
Sweden
France
Switzerland
FHWA:
Steve Ernst, CoCo-Chair
Jesus Rohena
Gary Jakovich
Bay Area Rapid Transit
District (BART):
Tom Margro,
Margro, General
Manager, CA
Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority (MTA):
Mike Swanson, Chief
Operating Officer, MA
(rep: IBTTA)
State DOTs:
M.G. Patel, CoCo-Chair, PA
Harry Capers, NJ
Don Dwyer, NY
Wayne Lupton,
Lupton, CO
Industry:
Chris Hawkins, Consultant
Tunnel Design Engineer,
NY
Mary Lou Ralls,
Report Facilitator, TX
Contractor: John ONeill, ATI
The Netherlands
Germany
Italy
Austria
September 23 October 9, 2005
Rome
Focus
Tunnel Systems and Designs
Modes
Highway tunnels
Passenger rail tunnels
Arrangements of Components
Focus, contd.
Focus, contd.
Tunnel Operations
Planning approaches
Findings
Standards
Manpower roles and responsibilities
Communication techniques
StateState-ofof-thethe-art products and equipment
Education for users
34 technologies of interest
9 for further consideration
Key:
Innovative design and emergency
management
Used for both natural and manman-made
disasters
Findings - 1
Visual
Audible
Tactile
Escape Route
and Signage
Universal and
Consistent Signs
in Mont Blanc Tunnel
Universal and Consistent Signs
Findings - 2
Guidelines for Existing and New Tunnels
Need AASHTO tunnel guidelines
Planning, design, construction, maintenance,
inspection, and operations
Findings - 3
Tunnel Emergency Management Guidelines
- Human Factors
Behavior hard to predict during emergency.
People are their own first rescuers.
People must react correctly and quickly.
Guidelines must account for this human behavior.
Guidelines should be included in tunnel planning,
Issues to consider: Refuge room requirements
Tunnel Ventilation
Findings - 4
Education for Motorist Response to Tunnel
Incidents
SelfSelf-rescue is best first response in tunnel
incident.
It is important to react quickly and correctly.
Motorists are not clear on needed action.
Findings - 5
Automatic Incident Detection Systems
& Intelligent Video
Automatically detects, tracks, and records
incidents.*
Tells operator to observe event in question.
Allows operator to take appropriate action.
*
Findings - 6
Design Criteria to Promote Optimal
Driver/ User Performance and Response
to Incidents
Designers - be aware of ways to minimize
fire and traffic safety hazards
Evaluate materials and design details
A86 East
Tunnel
Uniform &
Consistent Signs
Emergency
alcoves &
shelters
every
656 feet
One-way
Traffic
on Each
Level
Independent
Ventilation
at each level
Findings - 7
OneOne-Button Emergency Response &
Automated Sensor Systems
To Take action immediately!
immediately! the operator
must initiate several actions simultaneously.
Press one button
button
Initiates several critical actions
Eliminates operator chance to omit important step
or perform action out of order
Findings - 8
Findings - 9
Thank You
NCHRP
International Technology
Scanning Program
Making Transportation
Tunnels Safe and Secure
1.
2.
Provides a countermeasures.
Estimated
Schedule
(months)
Estimated
Cost
($1,000)
Priority
Rank
14
15
35
60
60
Estimated
Schedule
(months)
Estimated
Cost
($1,000)
12
160
12
120
60
60
16
12
200
17
18
360
60
18
18
200
12
120
19
60
12
120
20
12
120
12
120
21
12
120
10
120
22
12
120
24
200
23
48
2,000+
systems2
11
12
12
150
24
12
200
13
90
25
24
400
26
Design Target
Model Tunnel
Model Tunnel
Vs.
Our Tunnel
Model Tunnel
Model Tunnel
Tunnel Designer and Inspectors
Perspective:
Then
Compare with our Our Tunnel,
be it existing or in design
stage. (The ROI)
Model Tunnel
Tunnel Structure
Weighting: 14 percent
Weighting: 16 percent
Communication
Weighting: 11 percent
Weighting: 13 percent
Weighting: 8 percent
Fire protection
Weighting: 18 percent
Ventilation
Weighting: 11 percent
Emergency management
Weighting: 8 percent
Add Security Systems. Although these often double for safety systems.
Note: Same descriptions used in NFPA 502
http://www.eurotestmobility.net/eurotap.php
Tunnel system
Weighting: 14 percent
* Number of tubes
* Brightness of tunnel walls
* Width and layout of traffic lanes
* Geometry and layout of emergency lanes / lay-bys and emergency walkways
* Additional measures: Portal design, road surface, tunnel route
Lighting and power supply
Weighting: 8 percent
* Lighting throughout and adaptation zones
* Power and emergency power supply
Traffic and traffic surveillance
Weighting: 17 percent
* Congestion in the tunnel
* Restrictions on and/or registration of vehicles carrying hazardous goods
* Measures to close the tunnel: traffic lights, barriers, information displays
* Traffic signs
* Traffic management and control: traffic lights, variable traffic signs, signs
* Visual guidance equipment
* Video surveillance
* Automatic traffic recording and detection of congestion and incidents
* Tunnel control centre
* Additional measures: for instance for heavy goods vehicles and automatic recognition of hazardous goods transports, height checks, speed
limits, monitoring the distance between vehicles and speed
Communication
Weighting: 11 percent
* Traffic radio
* Loudspeakers
* Emergency phones: distance, marking, insulation against traffic noise, functions
* Tunnel radio
Escape and rescue routes
Weighting: 13 percent
* Evacuation lighting and escape route signs in the tunnel
* Preventing smoke from penetrating external escape routes, fire resistant doors
* Distance between emergency exits and marking
* External access and access for rescue services
* Additional measures: special lighting for emergency exits, signs showing what to do, barrier-free emergency exits
Fire protection
Weighting: 18 percent
* Fire protection on the tunnel structure
* Fire resistance of cables
* Drainage system for draining flammable and toxic liquids
* Fire alarm systems: automatic/manual
* Extinguishing systems: arrangement, signs, function
* Time to reach the tunnel, fire brigade training and equipment
* Capacity and efficiency of automatic extinguishing systems
Ventilation
Weighting: 11 percent
* Normal mode to thin out vehicle emissions
* Control of the longitudinal flow in the tunnel and consideration of this in ventilation control
* Temperature stability of facilities and equipment
* Special fire programmes
* Proof of correct functioning in fire trials and by flow measurements
*Longitudinal ventilation: airflow speed, length of the ventilation section, airflow in the direction of traffic, reversible fans.
* Transverse / semi-transverse ventilation: extraction volume flow, longitudinal flow control, opening / closing the exhaust air outlets can be
controlled
Emergency management
Weighting: 8 percent
* Regular training for tunnel control centre staff
* Maintenance plan
* Emergency response plans
* Automatic linking of emergency systems
* Measures in the case of accident or fire
* Regular emergency drills
Model Tunnel
Back to the Report:
Making Transportation Tunnels
Safe and Secure
Secure Research
Recommendations.
Report Related
Tunnel Structural
Fire Protection
Fire Protection
Develop a program to encourage
Tunnel Design
Emergency Management
Develop advanced coordinated
control schemes for ventilation
systems
General
Conclusion
Simply Put:
1. Today - Assessment of Need
Gunnar D. Jenssen
Senior Research Scientist
SINTEF Transport Safety and Informatics
NCHRP Workshop on
Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels
Irvine California 2828-29 November 2007
Outline
Introduction
StateState-ofof-thethe-art
Evacuation strategies NPRA
UPTUN
Human behavior in tunnel fires
Human Response
Lessons Learnt
Misconceptions
Important Safety Factors
Signage
Minimum requirements
Research Needs
Type of tunnel:
Single tube, twoway traffic, evacuation rooms
Accident cause
Result:
39 fatalities
2 in evac.
evac. room, all on French side
4 of 10 tried to turn, but failed
29 dead were found in their cars, 7 outside
4 rescue vehicles met the smoke, escaped through
a ventilation pipe, 1 died
36 vehicles were destroyed
Accident cause:
Work in the tunnel created queue
Lorry loaded with paint smashed into the queue
Red light at tunnel entrances neglected
Result:
Cause of accident
Collision between two heavy vehicles
Long cue of vehicles, seriousness not realized
Motorists hesitate to leave their vehicles
Result:
11 died,
23 vehicles destroyed,
Roof fell down
Monotony
Absence of daylight
Bad air quality
Unpleasant
associations in sub sea
tunnels
Suveys Conclusion
Long road tunnels and sub sea tunnels
Safety, comfort
and
special lighting design
Improved Design
Increaced safety & comfort.
Visible at 2 km distance
Rock caverns
Scandinavian lighting
award 2002
Alt 2:
Water
Alt 3:
Rock Crystals
Alt 4:
Outdoor experiences
Cavern 1
Cavern 2
Cavern 3
Courtesy IPORY
Xian
Borehole 1
Borehole 2
Ankang
Results
Evacuation study
Results
Evacuation study
Clearly relevant, audible and visible information
that reduces both the time in car
car and the
hesitation time
time
Most people react and step out of their cars after
an announcement is made
People reacting after the announcement also
spend less time hesitating than those reacting
before the announcement is made
It is clear that the information provided fastens
the evacuation process and provides a guiding
that is needed.
Way finding by
sound and vision
Sound beacon study (TNO, RWS)
Figure 1: Examples
on escapeon
route
signs (Worm,
E., 2005)
Examples
escape
route signs
(Worm, E., 2005)
Misconceptions
Panic Theory
Misconceptions
Misconceptions
Information may scare people
and lead to panic
Misconceptions
Minimum required Tunnel
Closing Equipment is
sufficient to stop drivers and
avoid secondary accidents?
Lessons learnt
Visibility measures in smoke
(Laser versus Humans)
2 m = disorientation
10 m = poor visibility
20 m = moderate visibility
50 m = good visibility
Misconceptions
Herd effects are purely
negative for evacuation
Misconceptions
EU directive
Minimum Required Signage
Signage
EU directive
Minimum Required Signage
Escape routes
Two nearest
emergency exits
shall be signed on
the sidewalls at
distances no more
than 25m
at a height 1.0 to
1.5m above escape
route level, with an
indication of
distances to the exits
Emergency exits
If local conditions show that the above mentioned
provisions are insufficient, short perpendicular escape
gallery or a parallel safety gallery with cross connections
at maximum intervals of 500 m allowing people to escape
on their own should, be constructed.
No shelters unlinked to escape routes shall be built.
kkkkkkkkkkk
kkkkkkkkkkk
kkkkkkkkkkk
kkkkkkkkkkk
2.
3.
Surveys
Tunnel experience/fear
Recall & use of safety information / installations
4.
5.
6.
Innovative solutions
Chatastrophes
Accidents
Phase 1:
Bus driver tried to extinguish, unsuccessful
Luggage was brought forward
Walked out of the tunnel with their luggage
Passengers got lift by passing vehicles
Phase 2:
Some passengers stayed with driver
Control center alarmed (by mobile phone)
Phase 3:
Safe Travel
10
Car-to-infrastructure
CarCar-toto-car
Communication
Communication +
Com. systems
Frequency
Protocol
Services
Responsability
Cost sharing
Stockholm ring
11
NV
Etot
HRRmax
tmax
td
V
10 HGV
2200 GJ
370 MW
1h
2.5 h
Ventilation controlled
NV
Etot
HRRmax
tmax
td
F
16 HGV
4000 4500 GJ
300 - 400 MW
2-3 h
7 10 h
Fuel controlled
Accident, year
Vehicle type
Tunnel cross
-section
(m2)
Estimated
Etot
Estimated peak
HRR
(GJ)
(MW)
Estimated
time to peak
HRR
Estimated
fire duration
17:48:24
Number of
fatalities
Road tunnels
Channel
tunnel, 1996
10 HGV
45
2200
370
1h
2.5 (3.4) h
Mont Blanc,
1999
15 HGV, 9
cars *
50
5000-7000
300-380
2-3 h
9-13 h
39
Tauern, 1999
16 HGV, 24
cars
45
4000-4500
300-400
2-3 h
7-10 h
12
St Gotthard,
2001
13 HGV, 10
cars
41
>200
3-4
11
Frejus tunnel,
2005
4 HGV, 3 fire
fighting
vehicles
50
>200
<6
17:48:30
17:49:18
17:53:55
17:52:42
18:05:00
Tests performed by SP
250
17:50:55
200
150
100
50
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Time (min)
250
q"max (kW/m )
200
150
100
50
0
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
uc (m/s)
Wood crib A
Wood crib B
Free burn
140
1400
1200
100
80
Gastemperatur [ C]
60
1000
Q/ t (kW/min)
120
40
20
0
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
800
TISO 834
THydrocarbon
600
TRWS
400
uc (m/s)
200
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Tid [min]
Ceilingtemperature
(o C)
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0
T = 900(1 e
5Q
)
uA
Medium severity:
T = 1100(1 e
5Q
)
uA
Memorial
Zwenberg
Other liquid fires
HGV
Model tests SP 2002
Model tests SP 2005
Modeltests FOI SP
Runehamar T1
Runehamar T2
Runehamar T3
Runehamar T4
low
medium
high
High severity:
T = 1350(1 e
5Q
)
uA
Conclusions
Why L-surF?
What is L-surF?
L-surF Services
L-surF Services
Fire can spread over 100 m creating fires over 300 MWs
Fire growth rate influenced by ventilation
Ventilation assists in fighting fires
Water spray systems prevent fire spread
A unique expertise
thanks to the diversity and complementarity of the partner organisations
SP Report 2007:08
Content
Ventilation
Systems
Design
guidelines
Control
Incident detection
Manual
Automatic
Interaction
Ventilation systems
Aim of ventilation
Longitudinal Ventilation
provide
guidelines (recommendations)
guidelines (obligations)
national
Source: PIARC 07
Institute for Internal Combustion Engines and Thermodynamics
Photo: W. Stroppa
Institute for Internal Combustion Engines and Thermodynamics
Ventilation systems
Ventilation systems
Source: PIARC 07
Source: PIARC 07
Ventilation systems
Ventilation systems
Source: PIARC 07
System selection
Criteria
Source: PIARC 07
Traffic volume
Tunnel length
Risk (share of heavy goods vehicles, hazardous goods, congestions)
Selection has to be confirmed by a risk assessment
EU guideline
Jet fans
Temperature: 400 C over 2 hours (A), in Germany
only in cases of tunnels with high risk
Material: Stainless steel with very high quality
Cables: Fire resistant 90 min
Ventilation control
Ventilation control
g
Tunnel
Ventilation
Ventilation philosophy
Sensors (detection and control)
Normal operation
Monitoring of carbon monoxide (tracer for health
concerns)
Control of visibility or light extinction (accident
prevention)
Control of NOx (NO2) in case of portal or shaft
locations in critical regions (environmental
concerns)
Fire case
Support of self rescue possibilities (phase 1)
Support of external rescue forces (phase 2)
Drnsteintunnel Wachau;
transverse ventilation 1958
Control scheme
Comparison with
target value
Action
No
{ Control of fans
ok?
T. Waltl
Institute for Internal Combustion Engines and Thermodynamics
incident ventilation
Ventilation control
Fire case
FIRE
localization of the fire
allocation to the right fire control section
freezing the current ventilator status
turning off the ventilator with priority 0
true
true
actual value
CO < 25 ppm
actual value
visibility
< 3,5x10-3 m-1
true
selection of the
flow sensor
sensor OK
actual value
air volicity
< 10 m/s
false
true
false
false
true
CO < 90 ppm
with decreasing
tendency
true
controller
defines the amount of
jet fans to reach
k ~ 3,5x10-3 m-1
false
controller
defines the amount of
jet fans in the
opposite direction
controller
defines the amount
of necessary
jet fans
tunnel is
closed
false
false
false
controller
defines the amount of
jet fans to reach
CO ~ 30 ppm
true
false
CO 150 ppm
as 1 minute
average
true
false
k 12x10-3 m-1
as 10 minute
average
false
CO 100 ppm
as 10 minute
average
prevailing flow in
direction Villavicencio
depending on the
determined
flow direction
g
g
prevailing flow in
direction Bogot
keep status
false
true
true
true
Bidirectional traffic
Transverse ventilation
Required information
Ab l u f t k a n a l 4
Ab l u f t k a n a l 3
Street Tunnel
Normal operation
Fire case
1,2 km
3,8 km
1,2 km
T. Waltl
Required information
g
y
en c
er g n
m
E of utto
No exact description
b
the incident location
Problem
Manual detection
g
Ph
on
e
Automatic detection
Smoke detection
e.g. visibility meters (RABT (D) requires
opacimeters every 300 m)
problem: smoke moves with the air, capturing of
source not easy
in most cases no automatic start of emergency
procedures
manual confirmation by operator required
Automatic detection
g
Ventilation control
Tunnel
Ventilation system
Methodology (philosophy)
Detection
Software (controller)
Controller
g
g
g
Velocity
6.0
3.00
5.5
5.0
Actual velocity
No. of activated fans
2.00
4.5
4.0
1.00
BOG
3.0
0.00
10:06:58
2.5
10:09:50
10:12:43
10:15:36
10:18:29
10:21:22
10:24:14
2.0
-1.00
1.5
Target
value
m/s
Geschwindigkeit [m/s]
3.5
1.0
-2.00
0.5
0.0
-3.00
-0.5
-1.0
-4.00
-1.5
Alarm off
V/CIO
Alarm on
-2.0
-5.00
-2.5
-3.0
17:20
-6.00
17:25
17:30
17:35
17:40
17:45
17:50
17:55
18:0
activation of
fans too quick
m/s
0.00
14:15:22
14:16:48
14:18:14
14:19:41
14:21:07
14:22:34
14:24:00
14:25:26
14:26:53
Ruine Gsting
455 m
14:28:19
RAACH
Lftungsabschnitt
Lftungsabschnitt
Lftungsabschnitt
ABLUFT
WEST-Rhre
Neubau
3,8 k m
1,2 k m
3,8 km
Lftungsabschnitt
Lftungsabschnitt
-2.00
Alarm off
NORD
763 m
640 m
Lfterstation Raach
Frstenstand
Notausfahrt Sd
Schacht Sd 90m
Fire location
Velocity sensor
SD
BOG
2.00
Kaverne Sd
VELAIRE PROMEDIO
No. of activated fans
upper target velocity
lower targer velocity
4.00
TUNNELZENTRALE
Tunnelmeisterei Webling
6.00
Notausfahrt Nord
Kaverne Nord
Schacht Nord 240m
1
ZULUFT
1,2 km
-4.00
V/CIO
-6.00
-8.00
ZULUFT
Alarm on
OST-Rhre
Bestand
G A JW 1
ABLUFT
G AJW 1
Problem analysis
g
Betriebstation
RAACH
KARVERNE NORD
KARVERNE SD
Longitudinal
ventilated tunnel
A7 - UFT Bindermichl
Traffic signs
Fans
16
10
12
10
12
14
LG_2
LG_NP
14
Exit Muldenstrae
Fire
location
18
LG_1
LG_SP
North portal
Exit
Ramps Muldenstrae
Muldenstrae
South portal
Extreme width
16
I
G
Driving direction
Anemometer
Jet fan
18
Fire test
~4%
~1%
SL15_1
SL13_1
B C
SL11_1
A1 (Wien/Salzburg)
Auffahrt
SL17_2
Ausfahrt
SL17_2
SL15_2
SL9_1
LGSP
Fire location
Muldenstrae
SL17_1
SL7_1
SL11_2
SL3_1
SL9_2
LGNP
SL7_2
SL5_2
SL3_2
SL1_2
Velocity in fire
zone
Control value
Ventilator
SL1_1
LGBG2
LGBG1
SL13_2
SL5_1
LGBG2
LGNP
Istwert
bergeordnete
Brandzone
Fire location
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Brandbeginn .
Brandtasse
Prag
Strmungsgeschwindigkeit [m/s]
LGBG2 Strmungsmessgert4.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
Flow reversal
16:40
16:39
16:38
16:37
16:36
16:35
16:34
16:33
16:32
16:31
16:30
16:29
16:28
16:27
16:26
16:25
16:24
16:23
16:22
16:21
16:20
16:19
16:18
16:17
16:16
16:15
-2.0
Zeit [hh:mm]
Conclusions
Conclusions
Detection
Reliable and quick smoke detection
Detection of moving fire sources
CCTV (problem of position and distance between
cameras)
Emergency lighting
Human behavior
City tunnels
10
Fire test
Velocity sensors
Istwert fr Regelung
U im Abschnitt A
Control value
LGO
5.0
Strmungsgeschwindigkeit [m/s]
Fire location
Brandbeginn/fire
4.5
4.0
Detektion/detection
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
18:30
18:29
18:28
18:27
18:26
18:25
18:24
18:23
18:22
18:21
18:20
18:19
18:18
0.0
Fire test
Fire test
Influence of ribs
11
Introduction
Danish Strait Crossings
The resund Link Tunnel
- Contracting
- Risk Analysis
- Safety Features
- Construction
- Operation
Location Map
Slide 2
Location Map
Denmark
5.5 million
43000 km2
Slide 3
Denmark
Slide 4
Transport Infrastructure
Sweden
Denmark
Copenhagen
Jutland
Funen
Germany
Zealand
Slide 5
Slide 6
Transport Infrastructure
Transport Infrastructure
Slide 7
Transport Infrastructure
Slide 8
Transport Infrastructure
Slide 9
Transport Infrastructure
Slide 10
Railway Bridges
Madsnedssund 1884
Vildsund 1874
Slide 11
Slide 12
Railway Bridges
North Sea
Madsnedssund 1884
Kattegat
Jutland
resund
Copenhagen
Lilleblt
Storeblt
(Great Belt)
Baltic Sea
Slide 13
Slide 14
Slide 15
Slide 16
Skagerak
North Sea
Skagerak
North Sea
Kattegat
Kattegat
Jutland
Lilleblt
Elsinore
Storeblt
(Great Belt)
resund
resund
Copenhagen
Copenhagen
Lilleblt
Baltic Sea
Slide 17
Storeblt
(Great Belt)
Baltic Sea
Slide 18
Skagerak
North Sea
Kattegat
1775
resund
Copenhagen
Lilleblt
Storeblt
(Great Belt)
Baltic Sea
Slide 19
Slide 20
18 km (Coast-Coast)
EUR 4000 Million
Slide 21
Slide 22
Slide 23
Slide 24
Aalborg
Limfjorden 1969
Guldborgsund 1988
Limfjorden 1969
Slide 25
Slide 26
resund 2000
Limfjorden 1969
Four Lane
Motorway
Guldborgsund 1988
Slide 27
Slide 28
Castle Elsinore
Slide 29
Slide 30
Castle Elsinore
Dual Track
Railway
3 trains/hr
Four Lane
Motorway
AADT
19000
resund Region
16000
commuters
3.5 million people
5 universities
High tech enterprises
International airport
Slide 31
Slide 32
Toll Funding
Toll Funding
Danish Landworks
Coast Coast
Swedish Landworks
Slide 33
Slide 34
resund Tunnel
Slide 36
resund Tunnel
resund Tunnel
Slide 38
Contract Philosophy
Contract Philosophy
1992:
1992:
June 1993:
June 1993:
Owner resundskonsortiet:
Design & Construct Contracts
Owner resundskonsortiet:
Design & Construct Contracts
House Consultants:
Functional Tender Designs
Slide 39
Slide 40
Compensation Dredging
Slide 41
Slide 42
Compensation Dredging
Compensation Dredging
Storeblt
Leonardo da Vinci
Storeblt
Leonardo da Vinci
resund
Trial dredging
Slide 43
Compensation Dredging
Slide 44
Contracting
No blockage
Max 5 %
sediment spill
March 1991:
Intergovernmental Treaty
Summer 1991:
Ratification
Storeblt
Leonardo da Vinci
June 2004:
Construction Permit
July 1995: Contracts:
D & R (EUR 300 Million)
Tunnel (EUR 700 Million)
November 1995: Contract:
Bridges (EUR 1000 Million)
resund
Trial dredging
Slide 45
Design Documents
Slide 46
Design Documents
Slide 47
Slide 48
Risk Management
Risk Management
Slide 49
Slide 50
ALARP
Slide 51
Risk Mitigation
Slide 52
Risk Mitigation
Design Event
Slide 54
Design demands
KKSUR
(advisory group)
Safety Concept
KKSURR Report
Safety Requirements
Slide 56
Safety Features:
Escape Route
Fire Protection
Fire Fighting
Ventilation
Drainage
Power Supply
SCADA
Kastrup Peninsula
Slide 58
Peberholm
Slide 59
Slide 60
10
Tunnel
Immersed Length
3510 m
20 Elements
175 m
Element
Size
56000 t
175 m
Slide 61
Slide 62
Slide 63
Slide 64
Number of vehicles/day
30.000
25.000
20.000
Great Belt
15.000
resund
resund Budget
10.000
Ferries,
Great Belt
5.000
0
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
Production Rate:
Year
Slide 65
11
20.000
18.000
6000 by car
14.000
+ 18%
+ 16%
16.000
Nos/vehicle km x 10x8
+ 15%
+ 14%
12.000
10000 by train
+ 16%
10.000
+ 10%
8.000
6.000
4,9
4.000
2.000
3,8
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
3,6
2007
3,2
3
2001
Holidays
11%
Holidays
19%
Business
29%
2006
Business
25%
Short-breaks
12%
Short-breaks
10%
Holidays
7%
2,8
2,5
2015
Business
22%
2,4
2
1,7
1,6
1
Short-breaks
19%
Leisure
19%
Commuting
5%
Leisure
22%
1998
Commuting
30%
Leisure
28%
Commuting
42%
1999
2000
2001
resund Link
0
2002
0
2003
Great Belt
2004
0
2005
0,9
0
2006
One incident in
2000, 2001,2004
(and 2007), none in
the tunnel
Slide 67
Slide 68
Escape Route
Nos/vehicle km x 10x8
6
4,9
3,8
3,6
3,2
2,8
2,5
2,4
2
1,7
1,6
0
1998
1999
2000
resund Link
2001
0
2002
Great Belt
0
2003
2004
0
2005
No emergency lane
Escape doors at 88 m
Escape doors never locked
Escape gallery not used
0,9
0
2006
Slide 69
Slide 70
Traffic Management
Escape Route
Evacuation Strategy
Swing Boom
North motorway
South motorway
Stop Boom
South rail track
Slide 71
Slide 72
12
Traffic Management
Traffic Management
DK
Tunnel
SE
Stop boom A5.2
Motorway north
Swing boom B3.2
Tunnel
Motorway south
Tunnel
Slide 73
Slide 74
Traffic Management
Speed Regulations
Warning signs
Information signs
High Control
Tunnel
SE
Stop boom A5.2
DK
Motorway north
Ventilation
Slide 76
Ventilation Concept
Safety Management
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
53
54
55
56
57
67
68
69
70
71
74
75
76
77
78
90
91
92
93
95
North Railway NR
South Railway SR
Starter panel
North Motorway NM
Escape Gallery/
Escape door no.
South Motorway SM
DK
SE
Trafficdirection
Slide 77
Slide 78
13
Safety Management
Escape Doors
Dangerous Goods
on Road
Dangerous
Goods
Application:
Transport of dangerous goods is allowed between 11pm
and 6 am 7 days a week.
Vehicles that do not require marking in accordance with
ADR regulations are not considered to be hazardous goods
and are therefore not subject to restrictions.
Transports of class 1.1 and 1.5 explosives are restricted to
a freight load at 1 ton per vehicle and trailer.
Slide 79
Fire Protection
Slide 80
Fire Fighting
No sprinklers
Automatic Fire Alarm and Fire Fighting Systems in technical rooms
(Gas extinguishing, Water Spray and Foam ext.)
Pressurised Fire Hydrants
Fire Push Buttons in
Emergency Panels
Powder extinguishers
Slide 81
Emergency Panels
Slide 82
Slide 83
Slide 84
14
PAPRIKA
Tunnel
- Motorway
Full scale
Exercises
16 May, 2000
OREGANO
Bridge - Railway
22 May, 2000
CHILI
Tunnel Railway
29 May, 2000
ROSMARIN
Bridge Motorway
78 February, 2001
LAVENDEL
Tunnel - Motorway
6 October, 2004
Slide 85
Slide 86
Slide 87
Slide 88
resund Bridge
Slide 89
Slide 90
15
Bill Connell
Presentation Outline
Parsons
Parsons Brinckerhoff
Brinckerhoff
Problem Statement
Document Definition
Issuing Entities
Key Documents
A Comparison
Conclusions
Irvine, California
Document Definition
Issuing Entities
European Union
Commission
Inland Transport
Division
Recommendations of the
Group of Experts on
Safety in Road Tunnels
Final Report 2001
Directive 2004/54/EC -
Minimum Safety
Requirements for Tunnels
in the TransTrans-European
Road Network - 2004
NFPA 502
Standard for Road
Tunnels, Bridges and
Other Limited Access
Highways - 2008
Operational
Human Factors of Safety
Pollution, Ventilation, Environment
Communication Systems
Dangerous Goods Transport
Fire and Smoke Control -1999
International Tunneling
Association
ASHRAE
Technical
Committee TC 5.09
Applications Handbook
Chapter 13 - Enclosed
Vehicular Facilities
Maintenance and
Repair (WG6) Guidelines for Structural
Fire Resistance for Road
Tunnels - 2004
Individual Nations
Comparison of Documents
Regulation
Regulation (EU Directive)
SUMMARY
SUMMARY OF
OF MINIMUM
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENTS
Traffic
Traffic
22 000
000 Traffic
Traffic >
> 22 000
000
vehicles
vehicles per
per lane
lane vehicles
vehicles per
per lane
lane Additional
Additional conditions
conditions for
for implementation
implementation to
to be
be mandatory,
mandatory,
500
500--11 000
000m>
m>11 000
000 500
500 -- 11 000
000 11 000
000 -- 33 000
000 m
m
>
> 33 000
000 m
m
NFPA 502
Standard for
Road Tunnels, Bridges,
and Other Limited
Access Highways
2008 Edition
Comparison of Requirements
EU Directive
Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 500 meters
NFPA 502
Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 90 meters
Application Criteria
Required in all tunnels longer than 500 meters
and
Tunnel Traffic is greater than 2,000 vpl (vehicles per lane)
Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 300 meters
Required Spacing
Spacing shall not exceed 300 meters. Cross-passageways spaced at
200m permitted in lieu of emergency exits
PIARC 1999
Application Criterion
Recommended
Recommended Spacing
Spacing should be 100 meters to 200 meters
PIARC 1999
Application Criterion
Recommended
EU Directive
Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 500 meters.
Incident detection may be used in place.
NFPA 502
Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 300 meters
Two means required one must be manual.
PIARC 1999
Application Criterion
Recommends either automatic detection or
surveillance
Recommended Capacity
1,000 L/min at 0.5 mPa
Required Spacing
Spacing shall not exceed 500 meters
NFPA 502
Required Capacity
I hour at 1,920 L/min
EU Directive
Required Capacity
Not Addressed
EU Directive
Emergency ventilation required when:
Tunnel length is 1,000 meters or greater
and
Tunnel Traffic is greater than 2,000 vehicles/lane/day
* 240 m when the maximum distance from any point within the tunnel
to a point of safety exceeds 120 m
Application Criterion
Required Spacing
Spacing shall not exceed 250 meters
NFPA 502
Emergency ventilation required
Tunnel length is 300 meters* or greater
PIARC 1999
Emergency ventilation recommended
No specific application criteria specified
EU Directive
NFPA 502
Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 90 meters
Required Spacing
Spacing shall not exceed 85 meters*
PIARC 1999
Application Criterion
Recommended
Recommended Spacing
Spacing should be 100 meters to 200 meters
*No location on the protected roadway shall be more than 45 m from the hydrant
EU Directive
Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 500 meters
Required Spacing
Existing tunnels - spacing shall not exceed 250 meters
New tunnels - spacing shall not exceed 150 meters
Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer that 300 meters*
Required Spacing
Spacing shall not exceed 90 meters
Application Criterion
Recommended
Recommended Spacing
Spacing should be 100 meters to 200 meters
Not addressed
NFPA 502
Application Criterion
PIARC 1999
EU Directive
Application Criterion
NFPA 502
PIARC 1999
Application Criterion
Optional
SUMMARY STATEMENT
Reference Table
A tabular reference
to the fire
protection and life
safety system
requirements
contained in each
of the three
documents
compared.
Comparison Table
Do not uniformly recognize nor address the same fire and life safety
safety
hazards, issues and concerns unique to road tunnels.
A tabular
comparison of the
fire and life safety
system
requirements of
the three different
documents
examined.
Thank you
for your
Kind Attention
National Regulations
Austria
Australia
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
International Organizations
NFPA
PIARC
European Union
United Nations
Impact on tunnel ventilation from alternate field vehicles such as hydrogen fueled cars.
Detection system (still not reliable)
Effect of fire protection system on tunnel ventilation (still not
not clear about it)
Human factor in evacuation.
Integration of BCR with tunnel ventilation
Possible implementing one hour fire rating for cargo containers
Background
Research Needs
Presenters
Participants
Panel Sessions
General workshop discussion
Design Fires
Explore fire growth rate as an appropriate
design basis
Ventilation Effects
Design fires cargo types and associated heat
release
Ventilation effects on fire size
Toxic gas production and associated ventilation
design
Design fires for todays vehicles in tunnels,
effects of ventilation and geometry
Realistic design fires for todays vehicles set in a
probabilistic framework
FHWA/AASHTO Scan
AASHTO T-20 Committee
Foundation/NFPA Involvement
NCHRP 20-7 Task 230 Project
Panel Planning
Design Fires
Fire and Incident Detection
Fire Suppression
Ventilation Systems
Structural Performance
Blast Effects
General Design Issues
Egress and Human Factors
Operation Protocols/First Response
Training and Education
Other
Fire Suppression
Evaluate the effectiveness of current
tunnel fire suppression systems
Develop a program to encourage
development of more effective fire
suppression systems
Tunnel hazard management with fixed
fire suppression systems hazards,
design criteria, including shielded fires
Performance standards for fixed fire
suppression in tunnels
Ventilation Systems
Structural Performance
Blast Effects
Evacuation
Egress symbols for tunnels
Effective alarm notification to vehicle
occupants
Exit spacing in tunnels related to design
fires
Human reaction time relative to
notification
Emergency egress signage in tunnels
Other
Other, at wkshp
Next Steps