Domingo vs.

CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been
previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know of the previous marriage
when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Further, when she came home from Saudi
during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another
woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto.
Roberto claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance
is unnecessary and superfluous. Soledad insists on the declaration of the nullity of marriage not
for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution
of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE
WON a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good
faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said
person is freed from being charged with bigamy. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law
states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the
petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. He was married with petitioner Erlinda Ilusorio for 30 years and begot 6
children. They separated from bed and board in 1972.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdosed
Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with
RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending
a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo, instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE
WON a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her
HELD
NO. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto. The case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right
of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he
is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is
empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot
be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
womans free choice.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK v MIGUELA C. DAILO

G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005
FACTS
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage
the spouses purchased a house and lot which, however, was executed only in favor of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. Marcelino executed a SPA
in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners
Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot. Pursuant to the
SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. This took place without the knowledge and
consent of respondent. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial
sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After
the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the
ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of
Absolute Sale. In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. Claiming that she had no knowledge
of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner.
ISSUE
WON the absence of the consent of a spouse renders the entire sale null and void
HELD
Respondent and Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the
property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code
was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its
effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband
and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a
suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on
conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. The basic and
established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of
(court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.

Tumlos vs Fernandez
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma,
Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building, that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos to occupy
the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will
pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not
complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as
they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that
they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.
ISSUE
WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148
HELD
No. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence
presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited
with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot
be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is
under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in
contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who
has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is
not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

De Jesus v Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon

FACTS
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, petitioners, were born, the
former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07
June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992,
leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and
some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed
a complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City. Respondents, the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even
while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

ISSUE
WON the petitioners recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an
authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status

HELD
NO, The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. The rule that the
written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this
instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina

Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. A child so born in such wedlock shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress

Cang v CA
G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998
FACTS
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana
Marie upon learning of her husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal separation with alimony
pendente lite which was approved. Petitioner then left for the US where he sought a divorce
from Ana Marie. He was issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of the children to
Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Private
respondents who were the brother and sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for adoption of
the three minor Cang children. The trial court granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie was
the only parent who gave consent to the adoption of their children. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE
WON petitioner lost parental authority over the children by virtue of the decree of legal
separation
HELD
No. The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of
placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states, In case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court. In awarding custody, the court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (It
should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the exercise of
parental authority.

The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. Deprivation of parental
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of
adoption in this case precisely because the findings of the lower courts on the issue of
abandonment of facts on record. The petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed without
the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.

SAGALA-ESLAO v CA
G.R. No. 116773. January 16, 1997

FACTS
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married, of whom two children were
begotten: Leslie and Angelica Eslao. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria,
while Angelica stayed with the husbands mother, Teresita. When Reynaldo died, Maria intended
to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but Teresita prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of
Angelica to her. Maria got married to certain Dr. James Ouye and migrated to the US. Maria
then returned to the Philippines and informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of
Angelica and explained that her present husband expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and
Angelica and to provide for their support and education. Teresita resisted, explaining that the
child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of having abandoned
Angelica.

ISSUE
WON the mother has the right to the custody of her daughter
RULING
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document,
what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The father
and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled
to keep them in their custody and company. When private respondent entrusted the custody of
her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it
did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.

Sy v CA
G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000

FACTS
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage on Nov 15, 1973 in Quezon City. They had
two children. On Sept 15, 1983, Fernando left the conjugal dwelling. Since then, they lived
separately with the children in the custody of their mother. On Feb 11, 1987, Filipina filed a
petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga which was later
amended to a petition for separation of property. In 1988, she filed a case of attempted parricide
against Fernando. However, the case was lowered to slight physical injuries. Petitioner filed for
a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. It was

denied. On appeal, she raised the issue of their marriage being void ab initio for the lack of
marriage license. Their marriage license was obtained on September 17, 1972 while their
marriage was celebrated on November 15, 1973. Hence, the marriage license was expired
already.
ISSUE
WON the marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the
ceremony
HELD
YES. Pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its
absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the
marriage license, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent
ever resided in Carmona. Marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Issue on
psychological incapacity is hereby mooted.