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Fritz Rohrlichtt
SyracuseUniversity
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spoon (from the EW level) and a silveratom (from the level of quantum
mechanics) both refer to 'silver', but that word has entirely different
meaningsin the two cases. Concepts and termsarisefrom our cognitive
understandingof a given level and are not limited to perception.I shall
thereforeuse the term 'cognitivelevels'.
The above may give the misleading impression that differencesin
levels are necessarily due to the compositeness of objects; however,
both mereologically1and nonmereologicallyrelated theories exist on
different levels. Gravitation, for example, can be understood on the
Newtonian level (described by a force) or on the Einsteinian level
(described by spacetime curvature.)These two theories are not mereologically related, but do belong to entirelydifferentcognitive levels.
Correspondingly,they have differentvaliditylimits:the Newtonian descriptionis limited to energiesmany orders of magnitudesmallerthan
the Einsteinianone.
I conclude this brief explication of 'cognitive levels' with an epistemological issue: it is often stated that a theory on a higher level is
wrong, and that it is to be replacedby the lower level theory to which
it reduces.Thus, Newton's gravitationtheory is sometimesclaimed to
be wrong while Einstein'sgives the correctdescription.In my view, this
1. This termis derivedfrom the Greekword 'meros'meaning'part'and shouldtherefore
(contraryto usage) be 'merological'.
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The claim has been widely made that the vocabularies of two theories on differentlevels are indeed at least in part incommensurable
(for
example, Kuhn 1962, 148 and elsewhere).Whetherthis meansuntranslatability but not incomparability(Sankey 1994) is not relevant here.
Rather, the problem is that incommensurabilitypreventsa logical derivationof theory S (on a higher level) from theory T (on a lower level),
and thus preventsthe reductionistview from being coherent.2
2. That reduction of S to T by definition requires a logical derivation of S from T
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Note that this problem does not exist in the reductionof a law from
a theory because such laws are on the same cognitive level as the corresponding theories (for example:Kepler's laws reduce to Newtonian
gravitation theory). Conflation of laws and theories is quite common
(see, for example, Sklar 1993, 335).
But how do reductionists seem to succeed?Based on earlierwork
by Nagel (1961), reductionists postulate suitable 'bridge laws', and
when these are accepted as auxiliaryto a rational deduction of S from
T, the reductionistclaim carriesthrough.
We shall ignore here the facts that reduction often requiresmodifications in the reducedtheory S as has been noticed long ago by Schaffner (1967), as well as that reduction has often not been completely
successful in view of the very great complexity of the subject matter,
such as in statisticalmechanics(Brush 1976, Sklar 1993).
The bridge law best known to philosophers is probably the identification of heat with kinetic energy as it occurs in the very special case
of ideal gases (which hardly touches on the complexity of statistical
mechanics).But even here one relatestwo termsthat have conceptually
nothing to do with one another. Physicistswere forced to relate them
ad hoc because the comparison of thermodynamicsand statisticalmechanics of gases demands it. But historically it was a struggle (Brush
1976) and incommensurabilityhad much to do with it.
Note that there is no tension between that notion and the existence
of bridge laws: the latter do not constitute a translationof concepts.
Bridge laws are neither empiricaldiscoveriesnor analyticalidentities.
They are postulates necessary in order to relate conceptually incommensurable structures (theories) to one another. In the following, I
shall show that bridge laws are based on the 'cognitive emergence'of
concepts of S arisingin the attemptedderivationof S from T.
4. CognitiveEmergence.Jumping from one perception to a different
one is best known in the 'gestalt switch' encountered in viewing the
same drawingin two differentways. But this switch of perceptiontakes
place without change of cognitive level.
A well-known example of such a switch between differentkinds of
'gestalt'is the seeminglyrandomdistributionof largerand smallerdots
on a piece of paper which, when viewed from a distance suddenlyreveals (causes the emergenceof) the face of Abraham Lincoln.
Examples of a cognitive switch based on scientific knowledge and
involving differentlevels are: the switch from an assemblageof atoms
togetherwith various conditions can be found in many places. See, for example,Suppe
1977, 55.
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its dimensions are very large relative to the size of the spheres, the
bumpiness is barely noticeable. Assume an infinite sequence of such
planes in which the size of a sphere is smaller and smaller relative to
the dimensions of the surface. In the limit, and only in the limit, does
the bumpinessdisappearcompletely, and there emergesthe concept of
an (ideally) smooth plane surface. Thus, by means of this asymptotic
process, one recoversthe familiarmacroscopicconcept of smooth flatness from the atomic level on which it does not exist. Nor can it be
constructed from the atomic level by a finite number of steps. A new
and qualitativelydifferent concept thus emerges from this infinite sequence. Note that this asymptoticprocess is conceptuallynecessaryin
order to reduce crystallographyto atomic crystal structure.
One can call this emergenceasymptoticholism.
Asymptotic emergencedoes not occur for all macroscopic properties: not all concepts in the EW can be reached asymptoticallyfrom
the microscopiclevel. That is a consequenceof the way our sense perceptions function. Examples of such propertiesare 'being wet', 'being
red', or 'being cold'.
Asymptotic emergence can also arise through the mathematical
structureof a theory. Starting with such a structurein theory T, one
makes an expansion of a suitable function in terms of a small dimensionless parameterp. Asymptotically, when higher orders can be ignored, the equations of theory T take on a new form. When this form
triggers a recall of an equation of theory S because 'it looks like it',
one can say that this equation of S 'has emerged'.The mathematical
symbols of the T equation must then be reinterpretedso as to refer to
theory S. In this asymptotic limit, the equations of T then become the
equations of S.
This is the 'cognitiveswitch'from T to S. The emergenceof concepts
of S is triggeredby the similarityof appearanceof the asymptoticform
of an equation of T to a (previously known) equation of S. With it
goes necessarilythe reinterpretationof mathematicalsymbols.
Mathematically,such an expansion is a perturbationexpansion in
a small parameter,p. Two cases must be distinguished.It may be of
the regular type; in that case there exists a limit, p -> 0, in which the
new equations exist. Or, the expansion may be of the singulartype; in
that case there is no limit, but in the approximation in which p is
negligible, new equations result. The implicationsof the differencebetween the two expansions has recently been elaboratedby Batterman
(1995).
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ian gravitationtheory (EGT) (regularperturbationexpansion;see below) and the limit in which the equations of geometricaloptics result
from those of wave optics (singularperturbationexpansion; see Batterman 1995).
The case of EGT leading to NGT is a nonmereologicalcase. These
two theories are cognitively entirely different: EGT provides a geometric interpretation of gravity; masses produce curvaturesin fourdimensionalspacetime.The curvatureproducedby all the massesother
than m then determinesthe trajectoryof m. A test mass would follow
a geodesic for that particularcurvature.On the other hand, in NGT,
massesfind themselvesin a flat spacetimeand attractone anotheralong
a straightline; this attractionis characterizedby a universalforcewhich
is a vector in three-dimensionalEuclidean space acting at a distance
on m. The actual motion of m is determinedby the Newtonian equations of motion with the force being the vector resultantof all the forces
acting on m. Specifically,we concentrateon two fundamentalconcepts
of EGT and NGT, curvatureand force, respectively,which are incommensurable.One notes that, in the pure forms of these theories,'spacetime curvature'is not a concept in NGT (after all, it was developed
long before non-Euclidean geometry), and 'force' is not a concept in
EGT. Of course, one can easily construct 'hybrids';but we want to
examine the fundamentalissues.
The question thereforearises:exactly how is it possible, by starting
from EGT, to derive NGT? How does one bridge the cognitive gap of
incommensurableterms such as curvatureand force (and other differences in their ontologies)? Physicists are able to do this and have no
difficultyjumping back and forth between these two cognitively very
differenttheories as the need arises.
A standardprocedureto 'deduce'NGT from EGT proceeds as follows (see, for example, Rohrlich 1989). EGT has two fundamentalsets
of equations, the field equations (which determinethe spacetimecurvature from the distribution of masses), and the geodesic equation
(whichdeterminesthe motion of a test mass in a given curvature).NGT
also has two fundamentalequations, the equation for the gravitational
potential, mathematicallyknown as a Poisson equation (which determines that potential for a given distributionof masses), and the equation of motion (which determinesthe motion of a mass under a given
gravitational force.) The link between these two equations is a very
simple one: in NGT the gravitationalforce follows from the gravitational potential by differentiation: Fk =
- mdkd.
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of the masses. (That ratio is the small parameterp, here called y.) This
assumptionimplies that curvedspacetimediffersonly slightlyfrom flat
spacetime.y is simplyrelatedto the small differencebetweenthe metric
tensors of curved spacetime and flat spacetime.Mathematicalasymptotics then proceedsby making a perturbationexpansionin y.
When the EGT field equations are thus approximated,they yield a
Poisson equation that reads (we assume here for simplicity a static
source),
V2y = -167Gp.
(1)
(2)
The quantity y in the EGT equation (1) must be identified with four
times the gravitationalpotential b of equation (2), y = 44.
dt2
d2Xk
]Fk =
00(3
(3)
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d2xk
mt dt2 = Fk
(4)
(5)
In differentialform, it reads
dS(E, V) = ()
dE
Ev
dV
T)E
(6)
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dS' =
dE +
dV
(7)
/Si
9E v
/ aS
avJE
(8)
This provides the identification of two more symbols from thermodynamics, T and P, with two from statistical mechanicswith very
different meanings. The absolute temperature,T, and the total pressure, P, are primaryconcepts in thermodynamicsbut not so in statistical mechanics. Obviously, the temperatureof a single molecule has
no meaning. Similarly,the entropy S' is a derivedquantity in thermodynamics,while S is a primaryquantity in statisticalmechanics.
The above is of course only a part of the 'reduction'of thermodynamics to statisticalmechanics. The relationshipbetween the full theories of statisticalmechanicsand thermodynamicsis considerablymore
complex. In fact, a 'reduction'in full generalityhas not been carried
out despite long years of effort by some of the best scientists (Sklar
1993). The simplicityof the above example should not be misleading.
7. Reductive Explanations. Having thus argued that the claim of re-
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two cases. In theory reductionone works up, from a given and known
theory T to an assumedlyunknowntheoryS on a higherlevel. The steps
that lead there are crucial:how much is logical derivation,how much
is 'emergence'?The bridge laws are here under careful scrutiny.
In a reductive explanation, on the other hand, both theory S and
theoryT are givenbut S is useless for the explanationof that particular
"why P?" question asked on the S level. Thereupon one steps down
to the explanatory theory T. One then reveals of T only those laws
(propositions) that are necessary for the purpose of explaining the
"why P?" question, and one explains it using for example a deductivenomological scheme. The bridge laws are not under scrutinyhere, and
are used in the opposite direction:one uses them to state the concepts
of T that correspondto the concepts occurringin P, and one does so
dogmatically.A conception of explanation that goes beyond the covering law reasoning can be useful here (Rohrlich 1994). There are no
flaws in reductiveexplanation,and we do not rejectit the way we reject
theory reduction.
Inspiredby the recentgreat success in explainingpropertiesof composite systems, Shimony (1993, v.2, 191-217) suggested the name
"methodology of synthesis." This name thus becomes a way of characterizingkinds of reductiveexplanations;it does not characterizetheory reduction.
The basic assumptionunderlyingthe presentwork is the claim that
the study of our world leads to a natural separation into cognitive
levels. It is our human intellectuallimitations (cited by Shimony in ?2
above) which makes each level a necessity. The levels thereforeenjoy
a certain autonomy and complementone another (cumulativityof scientific knowledge). In this way, one is led to a pluralisticdescriptionof
nature (Rohrlich 1988).
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