Espionage and Counterespionage

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE
Books by Arch Whitehouse.
Wings
of Adventure
Hell in the Heavens

Hell in Helmets
Crime on a Convoy Carrier
The Real Book of Airplanes
Fighters in the Sky
Years of the Sky Kings
TANK History of Armored Warfare
Bombers in the Sky
Years of the War Birds
Combat in the Sky
Subs and Submariners

Adventure in the Sky
Billy Mitchell
Squadrons of the Sea

John J. Pershing
Action in the Sky
Legion of the Lafayette
Decisive Air Battles of the First
Heroic War Pigeons
World War
Heroes and Legends of World War I

The Fledgling (An Autobiography)
Espionage and Counterespionage
ESPIONAGE
AND
.COUNTERESPIONAGE
Adventures in Military Intelligence
by Arch Whitehouse
nrliniY
G-eev^ ^Joseph
DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.

GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK
I964
p-jretu/*
LOUiicUousr^
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 64-IQ221

Copyright
1Q64 by Arch Whitehouse
All Rights Reserved
Printed in the United States of America
First Edition
DEDICATED
to
77ifl
bold invisible
army which
served sans honor, decorations, or

recognition.
CONTENTS
Foreword
Chapter
IX
Espionage at Pearl Harbor

.
The
New Weapon
of
War
Spies of the Revolution.
Chapter
29
II
Civil
War
Secret Service
The Early Operatives
Confederate Secret Service.

Chapter III
The Progress
MacLeod
49
of Intelligence
.
Problems
of
The Legend of Mrs.

Wartime Intelligence
.
Spies in the Skies.
Chapter IV
76
Naval Intelligence
m
The Goeben-Breslau Fiasco
Fighting Blind at Jutland
Chapter
Air Intelligence.
103
between Wars
How Britain Coped
America Aroused
The Camera Doesn't Lie.
Chapter VI
Intelligence
Planning in the Dark
Operation Sea Lion
125
The
Flame Barrage.
Chapter VII
140
and Con
The Coral Conflict
The Broken Code
Battle of Midway.
Intelligence, Pro
.
Admiral Crace's Dilemma
Stage Fright or Buck Fever
Moving
in the
Dark
The
Chapter VIII
164
The Search for the Buzz Bomb

They Swiped a Buzz Bomb
... A Musical Interlude
Was
.
It
The Flying Bomb

It Didn't Go Bang!
Worth
the
Money?
CONTENTS
Vlll
Chapter IX
190
The Whys and Wherefores

The Impatient Americans
The Element of Surprise
Mark Clark's Memorable Mission
The Husky
Movement
The Course of Events.
Preludes to Invasion
Chapter
Enter the Frogmen

Operation Overlord
Chapter XI
211
.
The Great Chariot Race
On
Cherbourg.
to
235
The Intelligence of Ferdinand

How It Began
The Enemy Strikes
The Heroic Mr. Page
The
Mission of Keith McCarthy
Negative Intelligence
The Luck of a War
Action in the Solomons
The Angels of Guadalcanal
Aid for Henderson Field
The Fight to the Finish
Evans of Kolombangara
The Ordeal of Reg Evans.
.
Conclusion
279
Bibliography
289
Index
292
FOREWORD
This
is
the story of military intelligence told from the point
of view of the
fog of war."
men and women
It is
trained to penetrate "the
not a record of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, or any peace-
time security organization, but the everyday operations of

agents
who have
contributed to their country's military cam-
all parts of the world. Some gained high awards

and public acclaim, some never lived to relate their adventures. All too often many of them were victims of the circumstances they tried to forestall. Most were valorous, or
consumed with inexhaustible energy. Others were more
dedicated than adept, and some were not cut out for the
work and soon went down to tragic defeat. The case of
paigns in
Mata Hari
No
is
typical of this group.
phase of military activity
is
more shrouded
in
pseudo
mystery, or burdened with contrived situations than the

science of intelligence. Military intelligence, in particular,
has been the subject of thousands of books, plays, and motion pictures, but
seldom has been presented objectively;
yet the profession
is
as clear
and defined
as the facets of
FOREWORD
The people involved
a fine gem.
are not mental geniuses
or physical marvels, they are simply adults blessed with

logical minds.
made
teur
Most are trained
may be employed
who have
professionals
a career of the work, though
now and
then an ama-
temporarily in certain active assign-
all fit a standard pattern and have

marked characteristics that enable them to compete in a
war of wits; among which are courage, percipience, enterprise, judgment,
and determination. Most professional
ments. But one and
agents are
men
or
women
of erudition with a
keen sense
and geography. They are thoughtful and articulate and usually have a philosophical turn of mind, but with
all this no agent can lack technical competence, discretion,
of history
or political consciousness.
The
professional intelligence agent
seldom a romantic
is
adventurer; certainly never a spy in the general acceptance

of the term.
Very few
staff
members
interpret information that
comes to
upon to
and
are called
undertake a secret mission, for their job
is
to acquire
their desks
through rou-
most important journeys are made to

some center of information, such as the Library of Congress
tine channels. Their
in
Washington, or the British
of this information
is
card. Their personal stories
The most
Museum
in London but most

anyone with a library
available to
are
as
dull as
are usually the lot of the zealous amateurs,
who
find themselves in critical or
chological
ditch water.
intriguing adventures in military intelligence
men
key positions
at
moment. They are inexplicably drawn
or
women
some psyin to
make
one simple contribution, and then find themselves inexorably caught in a military maelstrom from which they cannot escape. Those who do, become the heroes of the profession, but to all intents and purposes they are spies,
outcasts of the organization and are never considered on
the social or professional level of the authorized agents of
any military service. If caught, spies are almost always

disavowed by their employers whereas agents are fully covered by the laws of organized society. For good or evil, it
of
FOREWORD
is
the spy
sults,
and
How
XI
who
it is
provides the drama, the action, and the re-
he
who moves
through most of these pages.
great a part the intelligence agent played in the
eventful outcome of any campaign will always be debated,
but
it is
hoped
that in this collection of intelligence adven-
tures the reader will find
judgment of
his
some pleasure
in arriving at a
own.
Arch Whitehouse
Montvale,
New
January
Jersey
6,
1964
CHAPTER

,
The
New Weapon
of
War
Spies of the Revolution.
The Japanese attack against the United States' military

and naval installations at Pearl Harbor remains in the memory of millions of Americans.
Few
will ever forget that
Sunday afternoon when their radio sets crackled with

the perfidy of the Japanese war lords and the realization
that America had been hurled into a second global carnage.
For months we all asked how such an attack had been
possible. What sort of a military command had invited such
a situation? Who was to blame? By what means had the
Japanese been able to strike with such precision and ghastly
tragic
results?
The answer
Military
weapon
is
shocking but
startlingly simple.
espionage, that hazardous but most valuable
modern warfare, had provided the Japanese with

full details of the strength and weakness, the disposition of
ships and air bases, and more important weeks previously
a complete timetable of the United States Army and Navy
movements over the entire Pacific Ocean area. Japanese authorities had known the strength, routine fleet movements,
and of the American predilection for goofing off over their
peacetime weekends. Added to this was the unbelievable
of
tragic-comic efforts of a young, inexperienced radar opera-
ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE:

tor
who had
tried for hours to
warn
his superior officer that
"a number of unidentified aircraft formations were moving

toward Honolulu." Because he was a ranker and because
radar was incomprehensible to most members of the United
States forces, his warning was considered to be nothing
more than routine for a young enlisted man who was buck-
ing for rank.
and a beauty parlor operator in

Ruth Kuehn, a young German siren who
tled out of Berlin to hush up an affair she
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels.
The tragedy of Pearl Harbor began with
in 1935 by Herr Goebbels who, to celebrate
All that
as
Hawaii known
had been bushad had with
a party staged
his continuing
success in the Nazi hierarchy, invited his office personnel

in for
an evening of recreation. His private secretary, Leosister Ruth, and Herr
pold Kuehn, brought along his young
Goebbels was so fascinated by the newcomer he stayed

well into the early morning hours drinking in her charm and
Kuehn knew when she was

and made the most of her affair with the famed
propaganda minister, and before Herr Goebbels knew what
had happened the relationship had gotten completely out
of hand. As he was supposed to be a happily married man,
and the propaganda minister, it was soon apparent that
Ruth would have to leave Germany. (We do know that later
on Goebbels killed his wife, quite possibly because she had
guzzling champagne. Fraulein
well
off
threatened to reveal her husband's peccadilloes.)
No
question about
Germany, but
it,
few
to leave
after a sober contemplation of the situation,
Herr Goebbels wondered

of his
Ruth Kuehn would have
how
friends of that era
this
could be arranged.
One
was Dr. Karl Haushofer, who
with his father was in charge of the Geopolitical Department of Berlin University. Students of geopolitics usually
went
into the foreign service chiefly to act as espionage
agents for Foreign Secretary Joachim von Ribbentrop.
was
Karl's father,
General Haushofer,
who had
first
It
realized
ADVENTURES IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
the importance of a military alliance between
Germany and
Japan.
So General Haushofer admitted that he could use a young

lady with Ruth Kuehn's
possibilities.
He
explained that
Japanese acquaintances in Tokyo had indicated a need for

white men and women who could be fitted into their undercover operations. General Haushofer said that he not only
had an opening for Fraulein Kuehn, but also for her brothers and parents but of course they would all have to be
carefully trained for these Oriental operations. Thus, the
whole Kuehn brood could be accommodated and shunted

off halfway around the world, and Propaganda Minister
Goebbels would have no more fears from that family.
Ruth's father, a true Berliner, was Dr. Bernard Julius
Otto Kuehn, who had served as a midshipman in the German
Navy in World War I. When his ship was sunk in 1915 he
was picked up and taken to England as a prisoner where
he soon acquired a command of the English language.
After his release at the end of the war, he entered the
Weimar Republic's naval service, but after six months when
that German fleet was disbanded, he was booked for the
reserve and had to adjust to civilian life. His naval service,
however, stood him in good stead when he took up sailing
in the waters of Pearl Harbor.
The ex-Navy Oberleutnant studied medicine and became interested in several nationalistic officer organizations
which led him into the Nazi regime. Like a good Nazi
father he soon indoctrinated his daughter Ruth with Adolf
Hitler's creed and code. This activity occupied much of
his time and interfered with his medical studies, and it is
on record that he failed to gain his physician's certificate.
In desperation he finally accepted a position in the Gestapo
under Heinrich Himmler, a personal friend. It was while
serving under this infamous man that his daughter's indiscretion brought about his banishment to Hawaii.
Kuehn's exile became America's Pearl Harbor tragedy.
The German family arrived in Hawaii on August 15, 1935,
and appeared to be a cut or two above the usual international tourists. The father was a trim, gray-haired scientist, and with him were Frau Professor Friedel Kuehn, his
six-year-old son Hans Joachim and his daughter Ruth.
Leopold had been permitted to remain in Berlin as Goebbels* secretary. Ruth and Leopold actually were not Dr.
Kuehn's children, but his wife's by a previous marriage.
Their cover was simple. The good doctor was interested
in the Japanese language, and he and his daughter delved
into the early history of the Hawaiian Islands. They traveled widely, visiting ancient villages, mountaintops, and
interviewing the early
settlers.
In a short time they
knew
have ever known it.

Frau Kuehn seemed to be a quiet, affectionate mother, but
could be most helpful when necessary. She would listen, absorb, and then put down in precise handwriting all that
had been observed on a day's journey. She was especially
good at translating details of military significance, and twice
between the years of 193641 she was sent as a courier to
the history of Hawaii as
few
tourists
Japan, journeys of which neither the U.

gence nor the FBI were aware.
S.
Navy
Intelli-
Ruth, the family beauty, blossomed and was welcome at
many
social functions.
She danced well and was a regular
guest at the naval and yachting clubs where she attracted
the attention of
politics
came
many young
up, Ruth
longer Germans.
We
officers.
would
When
protest:
the question of
"But
never liked the Nazis.
we
We
are
no
never ex-
pect to go back there."

Dr. Kuehn, spent considerable time writing travel-booklet
articles on the Hawaiian Islands, and particularly
about the early German settlers there. When references to
style
home, art, silver, and other evidences of culand wealth were made, it was explained that Dr.
Kuehn had invested wisely in Holland and Germany. On
other occasions the Kuehns hinted that their income came
from several family inheritances. Whatever the source, it
was later disclosed that more than $70,000 had been transtheir fine
ture
Kuehn through a Honolulu bank by the

Rotterdam Bank Association. Also, on one of her visits to
Tokyo, Frau Kuehn, or Frau Friedel as she was known
now, returned with $16,000 (Japanese money) in cash. In
mitted to Dr.
the final totting up,
it
was discovered
that the family
had
re-
ceived more that $100,000 between their arrival in 1935

and December 1941 when they were all gathered up, bag
and baggage.
During the years they lived in Hawaii new demands were
made of them, and their continued desire for the high life
they led, produced more dangerous procedures. They required much money, and were working for both Japan and
Germany. As a result of this, Dr. Kuehn explained that he
needed a quiet place to continue his studies and moved from
Honolulu to Pearl Harbor early in 1939. Ruth, who was
greatly admired for her personal grooming, decided to accommodate the many U. S. Navy wives by opening a beauty
parlor, complete with the latest equipment from the United
States. This new salon was a gold mine of service information. Every young woman on the islands heard of Ruth
Kuehn's new beauty emporium, for she gave the best permanents, and her staff, imported from Stateside, compared with
"anything available along Fifth Avenue or Wilshire Boulevard. Hundreds of young American women spent hours
relaxing and gossiping in the luxurious atmosphere of Miss
Kuehn's beauty parlor.
Navy wives discussed
ship arrivals
not to
let
who was in town, who was leaving,

and departures, and each seemed determined
the patron in the next chair outdo her in dispens-
modern espionage agent sops up.

was doomed in that suave atmosphere of perfume, shampoo, lotions, rinses, and feminine prattle.
One day the Japanese vice-consul at Honolulu, Atojiro
Okuda, arranged a secret meeting with Ruth and her father,
at which time they were given an immediate and definite
ing information that the
Pearl Harbor
assignment a request for full details on the United States

Naval forces in the Pacific. He wanted exact dates and lo-
and flotillas, and acknowledged

would be ready to pay handsomely for this
of all squadrons
cations
that Japan
information.
Ruth asked
for $40,000, but her father
qualified
that
demand and
they received $14,000 as an advance; the rest

was to be paid on delivery of the information.
The
was aghast at what they had agreed to do,

off, and had herself engaged to a likely
who was stationed in Pearl Harbor at
that time. Ruth was now in charge of the whole operation;
her father just did the necessary research and kept their
secret records. As matters turned out, they made a very
professor
but Ruth laughed it

young naval officer
efficient
team.
Miss Kuehn worked on her fiance by night and operated

her beauty parlor by day. Vital information began to
up and form the hoped-for pattern. Ruth then ordered

Kuehn to take young Hans Joachim, now ten years
of age, to the ship wharves daily. The German lad was
suitably dressed in a juvenile United States Navy suit and
encouraged to take an interest in all the warships that were
to be seen in the harbor. As was to be expected, this schoolboy interest was noted by friendly American seamen who
invited the lad aboard ship and proudly pointed out the
pile
Dr.
features of the fabulous plaything.
Dr. Kuehn,
still
German
national,
was too
astute to step
aboard, but was most appreciative when his son was allowed
up the gangplank. The boy could not be expected to pick
up details of importance, but he had his place in the scheme
of things, and later that same night Ruth would manage
to meet a number of officers from the same vessel. What
young Hans Joachim had missed was cheerfully supplied by
Ruth's new circle of friends. The next morning Miss Kuehn
would give an interesting report to a man named Takeo
Yoshikawa, and the information was immediately transmitted to Tokyo and Berlin.
With the spread of their effort, it became necessary for
the Kuehns to obtain a second house, a small cottage in
Kalama not too far from Pearl Harbor. Once established

there, Ruth contrived a secret signal system for flashing information on to the Japanese Consul General's ofBce. Part
of this required the use of a pair of eighteen-power binoculars, that
were purchased openly
beauty shop operator wanted with
was never asked by any member
in Honolulu.
this
of the
What
unusual instrument
United States Naval
Intelligence.
The Kuehn team then went
into high gear.
series of
were flashed from the dormer window of their

Kalama home, signals that were easily intercepted and
light signals
read in the
office
of the Japanese consulate.
In fact, in
December
1941, Ruth
transmitted a full tabulation of the number, type, and exact
their first "dry-run" try out early in
anchorage location of
all
U.
S.
Navy
ships in
Hawaiian
waters.
Interestingly enough, the previous night the entrancing
espionage agent was not seen at her

fiance admitted later that she
home
at
had spent the
all,
and her
entire evening
with him. Miss Kuehn had evidently decided to make the
most of the time left to her and her sweetheart, but it must
bp admitted that during the next few days she performed a
treacherous piece of
work on the
rest of the
United States
military forces in Hawaii.
In postwar memoirs Japanese intelligence
found
it
officials
have
expedient to ignore the efforts of the Kuehns, and
several of
them have made no mention
of the family.
Takeo
Yoshikawa (alias Tadasi Morimura), a graduate of the

Japanese Naval Academy in 1933 who later received a medical discharge because of a stomach ailment, was not too
disabled to serve in the Imperial Navy's Intelligence Service. By April 1941 he had settled in Pearl Harbor to keep
a watch on the movements of the United States Navy. He
worked from a desk

his
own
in the vice-consul's office,
and was,
in
words, "in sole charge of espionage for the Im-
O
perial Japanese
Navy
at Pearl
Harbor
for the eight
months
previous to the attack."
In the early evening of
December
1941 (Hawaiian
time) Yoshikawa sent the following radiogram:
6,
NO BARRAGE BALLOONS SIGHTED. BATTLESHIPS ARE

WITHOUT CRINOLINES. NO INDICATIONS OF Am OR SEA
ALERT WIRED TO NEARBY ISLANDS. ENTERPRISE AND
LEXINGTON HAVE SADLED FROM PEARL HARBOR.
In Tokyo the Foreign Ministry immediately passed
this
message to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in his flagship

Nagato at Kure Naval Base. Admiral Yamamoto's intelligence staff surveyed Yoshikawa's full file of recent reports
final
and radioed an intelligence summary to the Japanese attack

force which was even then closing in on Pearl Harbor.
Vice-Admiral Tadaichi Nagumo, commander of the Japanese
task force that was racing toward Hawaii, then received
coded message from Admiral Yamamoto that

climb mount niitaka.
This was the signal that the Imperial Council had finally
decided on war, and the alert that the attack on Pearl
Harbor, over a year in the detailed planning stage, was at
last to be executed.
But who provided all the information that Takeo Yoshikawa had gathered and coded for transmission to Kure?
his
final
read,
Certainly not the medically unfit ex-ensign of the Imperial
Japanese Navy. Certainly not the Consul General Nagao
who
was credited with being the brains of

name was
on the coded radiograms and all transmissions were directed
Kita
for years
the Japanese espionage system in Hawaii. Kita's
to the consul general,
but the bulk of the
vital
information
on the comings and goings of the United States Navy was

gathered and handed over to Takeo Yoshikawa.
Not all Dr. Kuehn's time was spent escorting little Hans
Joachim to the U. S. Navy wharves. He took up sailing in
the harbor in a little boat with a star on its sail. He would
around the various mooring areas and mentally tuck

away important items of interest. No one noticed that the
little star on his sail would change almost hourly; sometimes the star would by unadorned, sometimes it would
have an Arabic numeral in the center. When he tacked out
to a certain section of the bay he could be seen by the
cruise
secretary of the Japanese consulate,
the signal and add
new
who would
quickly read
evidence to his secret chart. This
information was immediately sent on to Tokyo via short-
wave radio.
By December 6, 1941, the Japanese Naval Intelligence
Office knew all that was needed to be known concerning
the disposition of the United States Navy's Pacific Fleet.
Although negotiations were still being conducted in Washington in the blind hope of continuing some semblance of
peace, the Japanese
and
made
their final
Kuehn
dormer window
move
as Dr.
charming daughter Ruth sat in the

Kalama cottage and with a signal torch according
to all accounts guided the Japanese Naval Aviation airplanes to their most important targets. It was this final
contribution to the debacle at Pearl Harbor that betrayed
the Kuehns. Their signal flashes were seen, not only by
Japanese formation leaders, but by two United States Inhis
of their
telligence officers.
As debris and flame gushed up from the docks and

Hawaii, a small curl of smoke was rising from
the back yard of the Japanese consulate in Honolulu. It
came from a small fire that was being fed by Consul General Nagao Kita and his Vice-Consul Okuda who were attempting to destroy the evidence of the Kuehns' operations
together with the consulate's secret code books and important messages that had passed between the Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo and Mr. Kita.
As is known, paper in bulk blocks burns slowly, and the
operation was halted by members of the Honolulu Police
Department before all the evidence had been destroyed.
Within an hour or so American officials moved in on the
airfields of
10
Kuehn home
Kalama, and none too soon. The Japanese

consul had arranged to have a submarine stand by to take
off the Kuehn family. They had tucked wads of crisp American dollars in their clothing, and not one of them had bothered about a change of linen or even a toothbrush; all that
would be taken care of when they arrived in Tokyo and
picked up the balance of the $40,000 that they felt was due
them.
Then, just when the pinnacle of success seemed to have
been reached, a small corps of American authorities burst
through the front door.
Ruth and Frau Kuehn displayed righteous wrath, and Dr.
Kuehn took a stand of blank denial, but within minutes the
complete signal system was discovered along with a wad
of abandoned Japanese money. The binoculars added to the
at
pile of evidence
which included a stack
of reports written
German.
in
Once
all
the pieces
attempted to take the
into place, each of the
fell
full
blame
Kuehns
Ruth
for their operations.
was the brains and leader of the family,

while Dr. Kuehn argued that he alone was responsible, and
Frau Friedel maintained that she had bought the binoculars and devised the whole plan.
Dr. Kuehn was quickly sentenced to be shot, a court
insisted that she
decision that reduced
when
him
daughter was on
to
trembling coward, but
life he did everyand bargain, offering

his services to the United States in the hope of gaining a
pardon for Ruth. But the United States government wanted
no part of a Nazi spy in its intelligence organization.
Dr. Kuehn then begged mercy, promising to tell Naval
Intelligence all he knew of German-Japanese operations in
the Pacific, repeating that his daughter was innocent and
his
thing to save her.
his
He
trial for
her
tried to dicker
wife a dull Hausfrau. The United States authorities

tell all he knew, and then reduced his
permitted him to
sentence to
fifty
years of hard labor at Alcatraz. Ruth and
Frau Friedel were interned, and are now said to be
in Ger-
11
many. The brother Leopold who had remained in the service of Goebbels was tainted with the same stain of ill fortune; he died in Russia whereupon Frau Friedel tried to
commit suicide, but failed.

The civilian intelligence man, Takeo Yoshikawa, was
rounded up, along with the rest of the Japanese consulate
staff, by 8:30 of that fateful morning, and according to the
ex-ensign, nothing incriminating, but a half-finished sketch
of Pearl
Harbor found
the F.B.I, agents
who
in a wastebasket,
was uncovered by
raided the consulate. After ten days
whole staff
was taken to San Diego, California, aboard a U. S. Coast
Guard vessel, and was eventually repatriated to Japan via
the S.S. Gripsholm in August 1942. Yoshikawa returned to
duty with the Japanese Naval General Staff in Tokyo and
finished the war as a staff intelligence officer. He is now a
of confinement in the Japanese building, the
businessman in Japan.
The
New Weapon
of
War
Field Marshal Viscount
Montgomery
of
Alamein once
was Moses,
stated that the greatest general of all times
hero of the Bible: "He trained his soldiers for forty years
and he trained his

we find: "The Lord
spoke unto Moses saying: 'Send thou men, that they may
search the land of Canaan/"
Twelve agents were selected, one from every tribe of
the Children of Israel, to do reconnaissance work in Canaan.
These men were led by the famed Joshua, and their mission
took forty days. On their return they reported what they
had seen in the land "where milk and honey flows." As is
known, they recommended Canaan as the land that God
had allotted to Abraham and his seed. Had these agents disagreed, modern Israel would have been set up in another
land and the history of the Middle East might have been
in the desert;
spies." If
we
he trained
his people
consult the Old Testament
totally different.
12
To
continue the Biblical reference: Rahab, the attractive
harlot of Jericho,
must be considered the
first
of the female
columnists, for her career started in the year 1451 B.C.
fifth
In the Book of Joshua we may read:

"And Joshua the son of Nun sent out of Shittim two
men
view the land, even Jericho/

And they went and came into an harlot's house, named Rahab, and lodged there/'
All went well until some alert counterintelligence agent
of Jericho noted the Israelite operators and reported their
activities to their king. Obviously the king was aware of
this woman who lived in a house on the city walls because
he remonstrated with her saying, "Behold, there came men
to spy secretly, saying, 'Go
... to search out the country. Deliver

them unto my guards!"
But this woman of loose virtue ignored the king. She
was fascinated by the tales of the two Israeli spies. There
was the story of the crossing of the Red Sea and the mirin hither tonight
manna provided
acle
in the wilderness. Obviously, these
people were remarkable.
To
but
came men unto me,

whence they were," which was Biblical talk
the king she explained: "There

wist not
"Oh
drop in, but they

didn't stay any longer than necessary and were soon on their
way/' Meanwhile she had hidden the two Israeli spies under
some flax that she was drying on the roof. When the general
search and excitement had died down Rahab made a deal,
but added that she expected some small reward in return.
"Now therefore, I pray you," she said, "swear unto me by
the Lord, since I have shewed you kindness, that ye will
also shew kindness unto my father's house and give me a
true token. And ye will save alive my father and my mother,
and my brethren, and my sisters, and all they have, and
deliver our lives from death."
The spies agreed to all this, and gathered important information to take back to Joshua. Rahab then let the men
down to freedom outside the wall on a scarlet rope.
for,
yes, a couple of customers did
13
The important information they had gained was

walls of Jericho
were vulnerable
to the blast of
the concerted shoutings of a multitude.
that the
trumpets and
Joshua did
When
employed the power of viBut Joshua spared Raand her father's household and all that
attack the city of Jericho he
bration and the city rapidly
hab, the harlot,
fell.
they had, and she lived safely in Israel the rest of her days.
In this tale are the basic ingredients of the standard spy
Whether modem intelligence operations are as neatly

contrived, or stamped out from such an accepted mold, is
a question. Whether prostitution is a necessary ingredient
for successful intelligence is debatable. The famous Mata
Hari was more successful in the pages of romance and on
the screen than she ever was as an enemy agent. Although
she had been a dancer, specializing in Malayan movements,
she was gross, portly, and not too intelligent when she tried
to make a few extra francs by spying for the Germans in
World War I. The Mata Hari of the movies was a complete
story.
fable of the screen writer's imagination.
In contrast, the little-known Constance Babington-Smith,

the British girl
who
served with the Photo Intelligence Di-
vision of the Royal Air Force in
World War
II,
probably
contributed more to the defeat of Adolf Hitler's "secret"
weapons, the V-i and V-2
pilotless flying
other individual. It was this alert
tracked
down
bombs, than any
young woman who

Her work was
these dreadful V-bombs.
first
car-
ried out through long hours of intense study of stacks of
photographs not by employing her personal qualifications. Her chief weapon was the stereoscope with which
she examined photographs of enemy harbors, strong points,
railheads, and any new construction projects.
When Julius Caesar decided to invade Britain in 55 B.C., a
aerial
military-political move designed to strengthen his hand in

Rome, he realized that he knew very little of that misty
isle, and like the good general he was desired reliable intelligence on which to base his invasion plans. He selected
one of
his officers, Caius Volusenus, to
make a study
of the
14
commissioning him to "judiciously examine all

matters and then return as soon as possible." Caesar, himself, continued on to Morinos ( Artois ) with his main forces.
situation,
While Volusenus was carried to Britain aboard a galley to

inspect the island and to interview traders, Celtic princes,
and renegade Britons, Caesar ordered ships from all parts
of the neighboring countries, along with his naval galleys
had fought the Veneti, to assemble at a place between

and Boulogne probably at the mouth of the Somme.
This fleet was composed of mercantile vessels that were to
transport men, horses, and the heavier engines of war, such
as catapults, rams, and a Roman version of the mangonel.
However, news of Julius Caesar's plan soon reached the
Britons and the more sage among them decided to negotiate, or even make some gesture of appeasement. One such
group, chiefly merchants, assumed ambassadorial status,
and after being received in audience with Caesar agreed to
furnish hostages and submit to Roman government. With
that
Calais
dictatorial guile, Caesar
made
liberal promises,
encouraged
them
Commius by
the visiting Britons to continue in this vein, and sent
back to their own country. A deputy consul,

name, accompanied them and was instructed to visit other
British states to persuade the tribes to embrace the protection of the
Roman
people.
Meanwhile, after four or five days, Volusenus returned

to Caesar with the information that at best the Britons were
more barbaric than the

tered north of the Alps.
knew how
tribes the
He
Romans had encoun-
explained that a few of them
sow and grow corn, but most appeared to live

on milk and flesh, and clothed themselves in animal skins.
This report was true to some extent as there was a great
to
difference in the
way
the people lived north or south of a
line of
demarcation that ran between Bath to be known as
Aquae
Solis and Lincoln
which the Romans called Lindum.

North of this line agriculture was but a small part of the
British economy; the tribesmen pursued ranching and had
15
gathered considerable wealth from great herds of cattle
and sheep. For years these people
ate
little
grain.
Volusenus also concluded that these island people were

life of common domeswhereas those along the coasts were Belgic invaders
who had come to plunder and made a profession of war.
Nearly all these nomads retained the names of the tribes
from which they had originated and only a few of them had
settled down to make a living from the soil.
strong and healthy, well settled in a
ticity,
Caesar's intelligence agent
was amazed
to find that the
population was exceedingly large and the country replete
with cottages, homesteads, and shelters not unlike those

he had encountered in Gaul. The Britons used either bronze
money, and in many instances iron ingots

and value. Tin was to be found inland, and
or gold coins for

of fixed weight
small quantities of iron near the coast.
What copper
they
used had been imported.

"By far the most civilized inhabitants," he reported, "are
those living in a purely maritime district (Kent), for their
way of fife differs little from that of the Gauls. All Britons
dye their bodies with woad which produces a blue color
and gives them a terrifying appearance in battle. They
wear their hair long and shave the whole of their bodies
except the head and upper lip. Wives are shared between
groups of ten or twelve men, especially between brothers
and between fathers and sons, but the offspring of these
unions are counted as the children of the man with whom
a particular
woman
cohabited
first."
may have been interesting, but was

Caesar. What he should have known was
All this information
of
little
service to
when
Deal early one morning, the full strength of the islanders were drawn up in
arms on all the hills. This proved to be a double shock for
Caesar, because he had no idea the British shoreline was so
lofty, or that the white cliffs were so close to the shore. It
was soon evident that if he attempted a landing there the
enemy tribesmen would massacre his troops by tossing darts
that
his invasion forces arrived off
l6
and spears from the headland. He remained offshore at ansix hours and used that delay to assemble
chor for about

his ships.
Volusenus was far from the ideal intelligence agent. He

failed to warn Caesar that the Britons were accomplished horsemen, or that the waters of the invasion beaches
had
were not ideal for such an attack. When Caesar moved to a

point off what is now Walmer and attempted to move inshore over an open and level beach, the British barbarians
charged down the cliffs, and with squadrons of clanking
chariots and prancing horsemen boldly deployed to prevent
the Roman invaders from landing.
Because of their size and draft, the Roman transport
ships could not move in close over the shallow shore, and
when the soldiers of the legion, burdened with armor and
heavy weapons, tried to disembark they floundered helplessly in the unchartered waters and many of them drowned.
The Britons who were acquainted with the area, first stood
shoulder to shoulder, a human blue-hued wall, and then seeing their enemies in distress, charged in, swinging their
heavy spears. Since they were half-naked they were not hindered in any way, and they fought like demons while
screaming their tribal rage. Those with spears rammed the
Romans to the silt and forced their weapons between the
plates of armor and gouged out deep wounds.
Then wild horsemen,

and handling
riding without saddles or stirrups,
mounts with a single snaffle rein, tore

into the debacle and either speared their enemies or trampled them into the surf. As the carnage continued, chariottheir
eers joined the riotous scene, threatening to drive the in-
vaders back to their ships.
The
British chariot of the time
was a crude vehicle with a high-fronted ungainly body that

was mounted on small wooden wheels. On the outside of
each wheel were two sharp knives, somewhat like shortened
scythes that, when carried forward by the movement of the
chariot, hacked and disabled the enemy. The charioteers
raced up and down the tidal waters, cutting their foe to
\"J
bloody carcasses, and overrunning the wounded and helpless. The few Romans who reached high ground were soon
cut down by the savage defense of the tribesmen, and dismayed by these unexpected conditions, failed to display
their usual vigor
Not
and dash.
shiploads
until
of
archers
and
engine-fire
were
brought to bear were the woad-stained Britons driven from

the beachhead. The Romans would have followed them, but
their own cavalry had not yet reached the invasion area,
and there were no mobile forces to put the Britons to rout.
This first invasion attempt ended in a veritable defeat for
the Romans, and, in order to gain time, the defenders decided to negotiate. New ambassadors were sent to Caesar to
sue for peace.
Caesar pointed out that the Britons had committed a

great wrong, but the islanders retorted that
all
the
wrong
of the "common" people, an inpardoned considering the circumstances. To show their good faith they promised to deliver
some hostages at once; more would arrive within a few days.
And to complete the deal, they explained that they would
order their warriors to return to their homes and work, and
that all chiefs would surrender formally to Caesar.
On the strength of this, peace settled over Kent, but the
had been done by a group

discretion that should be
Romans returned again. This time they

planned more wisely and had full intelligence. The Roman
conquest of Britain was foredoomed.
next year the
widened in scope and importance,

was learned was often soon forgotten, largely
because mapmaking had not been fully exploited. Thus,
shore and inland conditions could not be recorded and retained for future reference. It must be remembered also that
these ancients believed that their world ended in the west
with the Altantic Ocean and that all areas and activities
beyond the Pillars of Hercules and other shore points were
"out of bounds." Thus, soldiers from the time of Alexander
Military intelligence
but
much
that
l8
the Great frequently mutinied
when
sent off to fight
War beyond
the last familiar outposts.
beyond
these basic points
There were no maps to disperse

this fear and ignorance of unknown lands and seas. Today,
maps permit and encourage modern invasions, and once the
was out
of the question.
cartographer's
art
was
forwarded,
military
intelligence
greatly improved.
When
the early Vandals began to build up their sea

and raid the length and breadth of the Mediterranean the Roman Empire faced a new problem, for no superior naval leadership was forthcoming. Skilled on the
land and adept in the tactical movement of troops, the Romans somehow failed to prove themselves great seamen. The
Vandals, who in a period of twenty years worked their way
from the Elbe to the Atlas Mountains in North Africa, found
suitable timber and naval stores there with which to build
a tremendous sea power. They made their bid for command of the Middle Sea from the littoral of North Africa
between Tangier and Tripoli. Specializing in systematic riforces
fling rather than destruction, they returned laden down with

wealth and loot and set the plan for the destruction of the
Roman Empire.
When
at last
an
we
note
Majorian,
Italian fleet
the
last
strength. In fact, Majorian
was
built
rebirth
of
went abroad
by the Emperor
ancient
Roman
in disguise to Car-
thage to inspect the locality before landing on or near the

city, thus performing the service of a military or naval attache.
But the counterintelligence service
Genseric enabled the barbarian
of the
fleet to
Vandal leader
destroy the Italian
by the time it had reached Cartagena. The

had taken three years to build and
assemble was too much for the Romans and Majorian was
invasion fleet
loss of this force that
forced to abdicate.
Eastern
Rome
next tried to end the Vandal power with
two long-distance overseas

tinople to Carthage. The
operations, ranging from Constan-
first was a total loss and almost

bankrupted the Eastern Empire. In the second an expedi-
was landed on the coast
tionary force
19
which
of Tripoli
sur-
prised and conquered the towns of that Vandal-occupied

province.
From
beachhead the plan called
that
for this smallish
expeditionary force to march through the desert to meet

the main force of 1113 ships and 100,000 soldiers that was to
be reinforced by an Italian fleet anchored off the walls
of Carthage.
moved
and Emperor of
Seeing that he was in a tight corner Genseric
Roman
negotiation and the
general
East, Basiliscus, unwisely consented to a truce.
armistice the
wind changed, favoring

fire
Roman
vessels of the attackers
The
Genseric's
the
this
original
ships against the carelessly anchored
plan to send out

fleet.
During
for
burned and dispersed, and
Basiliscus
were in large part

was forced to with-
draw with
less than half of his ships, retracing a tragic

path back to Constantinople. This left the Middle Sea again
open to the Vandal maritime rovers.
Rome produced an expert in amphibious operaGeneral Belisarius, who immediately discarded the
negative attitude that relied on coastal fortifications. He also
enlarged the manufacture of Greek fire to provide mass-fire
employment. He gathered a force of 5000 horse and 10,000
foot for this final struggle between Rome and Carthage.
Twenty thousand mariners manned 500 transports. By rare
At
last
tions,
Vandal king Gelimer whose counterintelligence was almost useless, first raided Sardinia with 5000
soldiers and 120 galleys, a force that greatly outweighed
Belisarius's ships and fighting power. Learning that his soldiers held fears of long seaborne travel, Belisarius decided
to land them ashore at Caput Vada, several days' march
from Carthage, and make the most of their confidence on
luck, too, the
land.
Once
ashore, Belisarius gave orders for his soldiers to gain
non-Vandal inhabitants, and the

troops took care to spare their gardens and homes from looting. In return the villagers donated baskets of fresh provi-
the
confidence
of
the
20
and the Roman Army was thus well fed and ready
for action. When at last they met the Vandal forces at the
tenth milestone outside Carthage, victory was assured and
the city fell to Belisarius. A second, more stubbornly fought
battle between Vandals, recently arrived from Sardinia, and
Roman mounted troops decided the fate of the Vandals'
land and sea power; Roman control was once more extended
over the Mediterranean and its southern shore.
General Belisarius was not only a great exponent of amphibious operations, but in his subsequent campaigns
against the Goths in Italy and Sicily he showed his detersions,
mination to use every facet of military intelligence at his

disposal. In particular, he always employed weapons and
battlefields
most suitable to him, and which could not be
countered by his enemies.

In his great work on the Greco-Persian wars, Herodotus
of one of the earliest
tells
of history.
Around 500
and
b.c.
still
most original spy
tricks
Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus
under the Persian King Darius, wanted to overthrow

king,
and
his
in order to get the plan to his brother-in-law
who was
acting as regent, he had to devise a

message through. At the time Histiaeus was
being carefully watched at the court of King Darius. However, when all plans were complete, Histiaeus took one of
his trusted slaves and had all the hair shaved from his head,
and the revolt message tattooed on his bare scalp. The slave
was hidden until his hair had grown out, and then sent to
Miletus. He carried no orders or messages, but was told that
on reaching the town he was to ask Aristagoras to shave his
head and inspect his bare skull.
Aristagoras
way
to send the
Needless to state, Aristagoras got the message.

Alexander the Great devised a postal espionage system
who had
Macedonians army to
learn the secrets of his generalship and to discover any of
his weaknesses so that he, Phidias, might one day overthrow Alexander and free Athens.
to trap Phidias
joined the
21
Alexander learned that someone in his force was agitating

against him, and during the winter of 334 B.C. the Persians
stubbornly defied his siege and the war came to a temporary
Someone among his generals was untrustworthy

but who? Calling his high-ranking officers together, Alexander informed them that he had become homesick for his
people and had decided to send a mounted courier service
to Macedon, Thrace, and Athens with a number of dispatches. "Any of you who may wish to send a message home
may do so by these couriers."
The officers were delighted with this unusual gesture, and
standstill.
returned to their tents to prepare messages for their loved

ones.
Two
days later the couriers
messages that told of
left
Helicarnassus with the
battles, the soldiers'
own
experiences,
and of the great war they were fighting for Alexander.

The couriers did not gallop far, but turned back after
an hour or two and delivered all the messages to Alexander
who had set up a secret headquarters for just this purpose.
There the young general studied each letter. Several that
were written by Phidias were filled with contempt, invective, and ill-will against Alexander. The traitor was executed
without learning how his treachery had been discovered.
JThe Macedonian leader had originated postal espionage, or
communicated information, and from that beginning we
now have methods of opening envelopes without disclosing that fact, ultraray devices, X-ray processes, secret inks,
scientific
codes,
and today's diplomatic pouch.
Spies of the Revolution
The infamous Benedict Arnold who conspired
to surren-
der his American troops at West Point in 1780, was one of

the world's unfortunates whose spirit of defiance, yearnings
for glory,
his life,
and lack
perhaps destined him for treason. Born in Norwich,
Connecticut,
hoped
of patience with the routine progress of
his
in 1741 to respectable parents, his father

son would become the greatest soldier the Colo-
22
had yet had. But the
nies
the moral fortitude to

finish his education,
He
ture.
enlisted in
young man did not have

potential. Too impatient to
ill-fated
fulfill
his
he left home at fifteen to seek advenan expedition against the French, but
did not have the stamina to see the campaign to its close.
He returned home and engaged in trade with the West In-
and by the time he was twenty-one had made a
dies,
success of
fair
it.
With the outbreak of the Revolution, Arnold was caught

up in the fortunes of the war and made rapid progress. He
signed on as a captain, rose to colonel, and was eventually
made
a brigadier general. Successful military exploits in
Canada and New England brought immediate fame, and

General Washington made him a major general and placed
him
in
command
of the Philadelphia area. In that pious
city his personal conduct often offended the Quakers. He

appeared in public under the influence of liquor, gambled
with extravagance, and attempted improper behavior with
the wives and daughters of respectable Philadelphians.
By 1778 four charges were brought against him, and although Arnold demanded a quick court-martial and was
practically cleared, two other cases of lesser importance
were brought to Washington's attention. No doubt goaded
by what he regarded as rank injustice when Congress ordered General Washington to rebuke him publicly for
"having abused his military authority and for favoring
Tories" although the court-martial had acquitted him of
wrongdoing Arnold conspired to surrender the

important fortress of West Point to the British for the sum
of 20,000.
intentional
He
used a liaison man, Joseph Stansbury, to conspire with

Clinton, the British Commander-in-Chief. Arnold then met Major John Andre, chosen by Sir Henry as
an intermediary, and together they worked out plans for
Sir
Henry
the betrayal of the American troops at
West
Point.
At the time, General Arnold was the sole commander at

West Point and in a position to weaken the garrison on
any
23
he had named his price Arnold waited

weeks to learn whether Sir Henry would
pretext. After
in suspense for
accept his proposal.
By
the time Clinton
had agreed
included the surrender of
to Arnold's plan that
3000 men and many
valuable
West Point, the renegade general was

It was agreed eventually that West
Point, key to the Hudson Valley and often referred to as the
American Gibraltar, was to be given up after a mock British
and supplies
stores
at
almost at his wit's end.
But while returning
attack.
to Clinton's headquarters with
the final plans hidden in one of his boots, the intermediary,
Major Andre, was captured and the incriminating maps and

papers found on him.
The officer in charge of the patrol that had apprehended
Clinton's adjutant did not realize the full impact of the plot
and innocently sent warning of the proposed attack to
Arnold. Thus warned, he had ample time to escape aboard
the British battleship Vulture. Although the West Point plot
was forestalled and the renegade American general forfeited his 20,000, he was commissioned a brigadier in the
Army and awarded 6315 for his property losses in

"enemy zone." As a British officer, he headed an expedition to Virginia, and ordered the burning of Richmond,
and in 1781 led an attack against American troops in New
British
the
London.
He
finally
returned to
London with the
feated British forces where he was consulted
on American
rest of the de-
by government
but was never completely

accepted in British society. Treason may seem profitable,
but traitors are universally despised and it was impossible
authorities
affairs,
Arnold to settle down in the British Isles. He returned

North America and lived the next ten years of his life in
St. John, New Brunswick, from where he again carried on
trade with the West Indies. When war broke out between
Britain and France in 1791 he went back to London and
compiled a large fortune by outfitting privateers.
But with all his money, which is supposed to buy social
for
to
24
standing, Benedict Arnold died in London, June 14, 1801,

of "dropsy and a disease of the lungs," alone, friendless,
and without obituaries.
Major Andre proved to be a more reputable gentleman,
and during his confinement and trial, at which he was sentenced to be hanged, he exhibited the proud and elevated
sensibilities which designate greatness and dignity of mind.
General William Heath, who was a witness of the hanging,
wrote in his war memoirs:
"Not a murmur or a sigh escaped him, and the

and attentions bestowed on him were politely acknowledged.
"The principal guard officer who was constantly
in the room with the prisoner relates that when the
hour of his execution was announced to him in the
morning, he received it without emotion, and while
all present were affected with silent gloom, he retained a firm countenance, with calmness and composure of mind. Observing his servant enter the
room in tears, he exclaimed, 'Leave me till you can
civilities
show yourself more manly.'

"The fatal hour having arrived
Major Andre
walked from the stone house, in which he had been
confined, between two of our subaltern officers,
arm in arm; he betrayed no want of fortitude, but
.
retained a complacent smile on his countenance
and politely bowed to several gentlemen whom he

knew, which was respectfully returned. It was his
earnest desire to be shot, as being the mode of
death most fitting to the feelings of a military man,
and he had indulged the hope that his request
would be granted.
"At the moment, therefore, when suddenly he
came in view of the gallows, he involuntarily
started backwards, and made a pause. 'Why this
emotion, sir?' said an officer at his side. Instantly
recovering his composure, he said, 1 am reconciled
to my death, but I detest the mode/
25
"So soon, however, as he perceived that things

were in readiness, he stepped quickly into the
wagon, and at this moment he appeared to shrink,
but instantly elevating his head with firmness, he
said, It will be but a momentary pang,' and he
took from his pocket two white handkerchiefs; the
provost marshal with one loosely pinioned his arms,
and with the other, the victim, after taking off his
hat and stock, bandaged his own eyes with perfect
firmness, which melted the hearts and moistened
the cheeks, not only of his servant, but the throng
of spectators.
"When the rope was appended to the gallows,

he slipped the noose over his head and adjusted it
to his neck without the assistance of the awkward
Scammel now informed him
had an opportunity to speak if he desired
it; he raised the handkerchief from his eyes and
said, 'I pray you bear me witness that I meet fate
executioner. Colonel
that he
like a
brave
man/
"The wagon now being moved from under him,

he was suspended and instantly expired; it proved
'but a momentary pang.' He was dressed in his
royal regimentals and boots, and his remains, in
the same dress, were placed in an ordinary coffin,
and interred at the foot of the gallows; and the
spot was consecrated by the tears of the thousands."
A monument
was erected there later on by Cyrus W.

been partly destroyed several times and then
restored. A tablet to Major Andre's memory was placed in
Westminster Abbey early in the nineteenth century, and in
1821 his body was disinterred at Tappan, New York, and
conveyed to Westminster Abbey.
Field. It has
An
young
a spy,
regret
associated
story
is
who died on
and who according
officer
that
of
Nathan Hale, another
the gibbet for his activities as

to tradition said that his only
was that he had but one
life
to lose for his country.
26
Nathan Hale was born in 1755 at Coventry, Connecticut,

was educated at Yale, and became a schoolteacher. At the
outbreak of war he joined a Connecticut regiment, served in
the siege of Boston, and was commissioned a captain in
1776. When General William Heath's brigade was ordered
to New York, Captain Hale went with them, and the legendary tale is that he was one of a small band of patriots
who
stole a provision ship
from under the very guns of a

he volunteered to enter the
British man-of-war. Later on,
British lines to obtain information, while dressed
in
the
Dutch schoolteacher. He was captured Sep1776, and hanged the next day. Like Andre, he
disguise of a
tember
21,
has always been glorified as a martyr.
When
Major Andre was trapped, he was placed under
and during
a trip down the Hudson aboard a barge that took them
toward Tappan, Major Tallmadge sat next to the British
officer. Andre inquired as to the light in which he would be
viewed by General Washington and a military tribunal, if
the responsibility of Major Benjamin Tallmadge,
one should be ordered.
Major Tallmadge tried to avoid giving an answer, but

brought up the subject of Nathan Hale who had
been Tallmadge's classmate at Yale College. "Do you remember the sequel to that story?" Tallmadge asked.
"Yes," Andre said. "He was hanged as a spy, but surely
you do not consider his case and mine alike."
"Precisely," replied Major Tallmadge, "and similar will
be your fate."
But a question arises at this point in which the finefinally
drawn
must be considered.
Major Andre had gone ashore from the British warship
Vulture, then moored off Teller's Point. He was wearing his
full regimentals and had joined General Arnold near Haverstraw. With daylight the British officer was hidden in the
house of Joshua Hett Smith at King's Ferry, near Stony
Point. Smith believed that Andre was an American agent
line of intrepretation
disguised in a British uniform.
V]
That day the Americans bombarded the Vulture offshore

and she was forced to move farther down the river, and
with this new situation to cope with, Benedict Arnold decided that Andre should return by land in disguise, and
provided a claret-colored coat and a civilian beaver hat.
Andre apparently retained his military breeches and boots,
and a pass sighed by General Arnold which was believed
sufficient to get him through to White Plains.
Joshua Smith accompanied Andre as far as Crompound,
where they were advised not to travel at night because of
bands of freebooters who preyed on travelers of both sides.
Smith left the man he knew as "J onn Anderson," and Andre
planned to ride the remaining distance alone.
At a point near Tarrytown, three militiamen, John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Van Wart, who hoped to
supplement their soldier's pay, stopped Andre. When this
well-dressed gentleman argued that he had no money on
him, they searched him to make certain and came upon the
maps and plans in his boot.

The question arises, was John Andre a spy in the full
sense of the word? He had entered American territory in
full regimentals and had only discarded part of them on
the insistence of an American general, and later on had
given a short but complete account of himself and his mission in a letter to General Washington.
who quoted from the findings of

Board of General Officers, concluded that Major Andre
ought to be considered to be a spy ... to suffer death, and
General Washington,
his
directed the execution of the sentence "in the usual

this
way
afternoon at five o'clock precisely."
On
the afternoon of the October

throng trudged into a field on the
tavern in
1,
enormous
behind Maybie's
1780, an
hill
Tappan where Andre had been held, to witness

was ordered. In a des-
the execution, but a last-minute stay
perate effort to save his adjutant general and friend, General
Clinton
requested
hinted that further facts
meeting between officers: he

bearing on Andre's conduct might
a
28
be revealed.
ing
new
to
It
turned out, however, that Clinton had nothhis representative pleaded elo-
add although
quently for Andre's
life,
even going so
far as to offer
any
The only
Washington was inter-
prisoner in their possession in exchange for him.
man
then in British territory
whom
ested in was Benedict Arnold, and under the circumstances,
General Clinton could not consider surrendering him. So

the execution was set for noon the next day and carried
out as detailed above.
CHAPTER
Civil
War
Secret Service
II
Confederate Secret Service.
War
Civil
Secret Service
Although the science of military intelligence had not

reached an impressive status by the time the guns had
pounded Fort Sumter in the spring of 1861, both the Federal and Confederate governments soon saw the necessity
of gathering available information for use in the progress
of military operations.
was
It
ties
also quickly evident that
had held the Union
alone that
vious
it
had not been
political
together; during the pre-
seventy years financial, commercial, and
domestic
had been strung from the North to the South, binding

a social organism that was difficult to dissolve. As a result,
a state of public confusion and consternation raged during
the early months of the war.
Possibly the most startling factor of the secession was
links
that the Confederacy could immediately organize a military
force so superior in
United
ment
of the capital
opinions and
marched
numbers
to the standing
army
of the
Further confusion developed in every depart-
States.
ties
off to
when hundreds
bound them
to
whose
the South, defected, and
of employees,
serve in the Confederacy. Legislators in both
houses, cabinet officers,
and contributed
and judges relinquished
their posts
their services to the defense of this
new
30
Army and Navy
nation.
ministers
resigned their commissions,
officers
and consuls turned
in
their portfolios
and
left
foreign posts to enter the councils of the South. In one inci-
dence the Episcopal bishop of Louisiana forsook his clericals and, wearing military gray, rode at the head of an
Army
corps.
But these opinions and sentiments were divided along

geographic lines. Thousands of people in the North believed
in the justification of the Southern cause. Also, New England businessmen who had dealt with the South knew that
this war would soon bankrupt them. Northerners who were
established in Southern territory learned that they
be expected to sign a new oath

in turn
would mean the
of allegiance, a
dissolution of all family
would
move
that
ties, confis-
and end all their hopes for the

and splinter political groups scatsections of the Union were found
cation of their property,

future. Secret societies
tered through the loyal
be supporting the new government. Certain individuals,

were providing men, money, materials of war, and other supplies to the Confederacy.
So considering all these links, ties and bonds, it was
evident that the Federal government had quickly to organize a secret service to contend with these conditions. No one
had anticipated such a situation and no provisions had
been made to provide for it, but the Constitution gave the
President definite powers to suppress insurrection, and these
were used at once.
Almost overnight the name of Allan Pinkerton became a
legend because of his secret-service work on behalf of the
Federal government. This brawny, bearded detective was
born in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1819 and emigrated to Chicago in 1841, finally settling in Dundee, Kane County. He
had been instrumental in running down a band of counterfeiters, on the strength of which he was appointed deputy
sheriff of Kane County. Officials of Cook County employed him next and by 1852 he had organized his National Detective Agency that was most successful in appreto
for personal expediency,
hending thieves
who preyed on
31
railroad property.
One
of
most successful coups was the capture in

1866 of the principals in the theft of $700,000 from the
Adams Express Company. Pinkerton also uncovered a plot
his organizations
when he
to assassinate President-elect Lincoln
arrived in
Baltimore en route to his inauguration in Washington.

One of Pinkertons chief detectives, James McParlan, had
a major role in breaking up the "Molly Maguires" in coal
disorders in Pennsylvania.
Early in the war General George B. McClellan appointed

Pinkerton chief detective in the Department of the Ohio,
and he was transferred to Washington

the
first
mac
later
secret-service operations of the
on to organize
Army
of the Poto-
while also carrying out extensive detective work for
the provost marshal.
When
mand
in
General McClellan was removed from his com1862, Pinkerton refused to continue in
November
employed in cotton claims in New

Orleans, and other detective work until the close of the war
when he returned to his agency in Chicago.
the service.
He was
later
Shortly after the First Battle of Bull Run, Allan Pinkerton
Washington with his entire force and began investigating people who were suspected of assisting the
arrived in
enemy
cause.
He made
number
Washington and Baltimore
of important arrests in
of people
of sending information secretly to
who were
Richmond, the
the Confederacy, or to Southern generals in the

eral of his
most
skilled operators,
traveled constantly between
both
suspected
capital of
field.
Sev-
men and women,
Richmond and Washington
to
bring important intelligence concerning the plans of Confederate President Jefferson Davis
chief advisers, military
Many
of Pinkerton's
and had not
and
and the movements
men were new
as yet learned to
to this military
work
approximate the numbers
or categories of large masses of troops,
and from
their
teurish reports Pinkerton overestimated the size of the

of
of his
civil.
ama-
Army
Northern Virginia, and General McClellan acted as
32
though dealing with an overwhelming opponent. Had he

known that his forces outnumbered the Confederates, the
war in the East might have been brought to a close by
early July of 1862 or so the second-guessers have stated.
How much
Allan Pinkerton contributed personally to the
intelligence division of the Federal
Army may be open
debate, but he must have built
up
and put
He was
it
long-term
risks,
to
basic organization
fortunate to have
willing
were
young men who
to take the
one of whom was John C. Babcock, a dash-
on a workable footing.
several colorful
its
ing and daring scout
who
served as a secret-service
man
from 1861 to 1865.

Babcock had enlisted originally in the Sturges Rifle Corps
of Chicago, but he was soon attached to General McClelland secret-service corps under Pinkerton where he remained after the latter had departed. He did considerable
scouting and news-gathering under General Ambrose E.
Burnside who succeeded General McClellan. When the
bureau was reorganized under Colonel George H. Sharpe,
he continued with it until the end of the war. Babcock
explained that his success was due to his horse Gimlet
which carried him for the full length of Iris service.
The scouts and agents who were selected by "Major
Allan," as Pinkerton was known, were gathered, in many
instances, for service on the Peninsula, some of whom were
Pamunkey Indians. They were descendants of a small Virginia tribe that had intermarried with Negroes and were
most loyal to the Union. Their services were invaluable to
General McClellan during the spring and summer of 1862.
After Pinkerton left the Army, the whole secret-service
department was reorganized by Colonel Sharpe who drew
largely from the ranks for the personnel of his force. Colonel
Sharpe inherited an organization that suffered from neglect,
for by the time General Joseph Hooker succeeded General
Burnside, there was scarcely a record or document available
that gave an indication of what the Confederates were
doing, and one historian has stated that General Hooker
33
was as ignorant of what was going on just across the Rappahannock as though his opponents had been in China.
Colonel Sharpe, who was of the 120th New York regiment,
headed what came to be known as the Bureau of Military
Information, and was appointed deputy provost marshal
general. From March 30, 1863, until the close of the war
the Bureau of Military Information, Army of the Potomac,
had no other head.
That June the Confederate advance into Pennsylvania
strained the limited resources of Sharpe's bureau, and his
scouts
and
special agents as well as a corps of signalmen
were kept incessantly covering the detachments of the invading force. Despite the flood of messages and maps, it
was difficult to estimate exactly what Confederate General
Robert E. Lee was trying to do, but when the general returned to Virginia, the move brought some relief to the
secret-service men.
At the same time the Federal government lacked any
organized bureau of investigation. The departments of the
Navy, War, and State each made early attempts to define
the line between loyalty and treason to the Union cause.
Secretary of State William H. Seward engaged a force of
agents that was sent to Canada and frontier points to intercept all communications between the British dominion and
the enemy to the south. Other agents were assigned to specific tasks, such as stopping the sale of shoes to the Confederate Army. Police chiefs in Northern cities were ordered
to watch and arrest any persons suspected of communicating with the enemy, and any newspaper that printed
articles considered to be disloyal to the Union cause was
quickly suppressed. The prisons at Forts Warren, Lafayette,
and McHenry were soon crowded with prisoners of state
and war until the President, feeling that the situation was
well in hand and that the controls were understood, issued
an order for the release on parole of all political and state
prisoners with the exception of those detained as spies.
And
34
from that point on, important
arrests
were made under the
direction of the military authorities alone.
Colonel Sharped businesslike approach to his task was

immediately felt, and his organization plans were soon effective through all routine channels. This early secret service
required no complicated machinery because the commanding officer in every department appointed a chief detective
who
in turn selected a force of soldiers
and
civilians
to
handle the work of investigation and espionage. These

operators were responsible to the heads of the military departments. At a higher level, the War Department employed
a special force of investigators
their secretary,
Edwin M.
who
reported directly to
Stanton.
The men and women who were selected for this military
work seldom approached the model or pattern of spies of
fiction. Their chief qualification was a natural aptitude for
the work that, in general, lay along three lines. Initially, all
persons suspected of being hostile to the Union had to be
found, their sentiments investigated, and their plans ascertained. This demanded slow, slogging routine that took time
and patient deliberation. Many members of the military
secret service obtained access to important homes, clubs,
and places where people gathered in numbers. Sometimes

appeared as guests, but more often as domestic
workers. Their most difficult tasks were in gaining memberthey
ships in hostile secret societies to determine the plans of
the Southern leaders.
The most dangerous roles involved

enemy regiments
the strength of defense and number
entering the Confederate lines and joining

to gain information of
of troops.
On
the other hand, considerable vigilance
maintained to counter the work

erate spies. All
ugees,
enemy
of,
and
had
to intercept,
be
Confedto
agents, "contrabands," deserters, ref-
and prisoners-of-war found
in, or
brought into Fed-

eral territory
35
were subjected to a searching examination,
and the reports of
lopvarêd^to the responjLK*
their testimony
sible authorities.
wlrf
be expected in this fratricidal war, women were

often willing operators. Miss Pauline Cushman was one of
the most successful, being a consummate actress, an art that
As was
fitted
Miss
to
her well for the role of a spy.
Cushman had
spent
and was so devoted

in
its
much
to the
native of
New
Orleans,
North
Union that she risked her life
of her girlhood in the
secret service.
She was first employed by the Federal government in

a hunt for Southern sympathizers and spies in Louisville,
Kentucky, and the discovery of how they passed their information and supplies to the Confederacy. She carried out
the
same work
in Nashville, Tennessee,
when General William
S.
and
in
May
1863,
Rosecrans was planning to drive
General Braxton Bragg across the Tennessee River, Pauline
Cushman was
sent into the Confederate lines to gather in-
formation as to the strength and location of the
Army
of
Tennessee. She was captured, tried by court-martial and
sentenced to be hanged, but in the precipitous evacuation
was overUnion lines. Thus,

the attractive spy whom everyone in the North believed to
be dead was once more in the midst of the Union soldiers
who promptly promoted her to the rank of "Major," and
she wore the insignia of that rank until the end of the war.
Her detailed knowledge of the roads of Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi was of immense value to the
commander of the Army of the Cumberland.
Miss Cushman's opposite number was Miss Nancy Hart,
a Confederate guide and spy. A woman of the mountain
districts of Virginia, she was willing to do scout work for
the South. Miss Hart was especially famous for her daring and expert knowledge of the critical regions. She was
so valuable as a guide and had so often led General Thomas
of Shelbyville during the last days of June, she
looked and found her
J.
way back
to the
"Stonewall" Jackson's cavalry against Federal outposts in
36
West
Virginia, that the
Union government offered a
large
reward for her capture.
Lieutenant Colonel Starr of the gth West Virginia
Regiment
finally trapped her at Summersville in July 1862,

but Colonel Starr was to regret this transient success.
While being held in a temporary prison, Nancy Hart
was photographed for the first time in her life, an experi-
ence that seemed to give her more alarm than a firing squad
of Federal riflemen. It may have been a sly affectation,
however, for when an itinerant photographer was passing

through her jailers finally induced Nancy to pose while
wearing a military plume in her hat. "It'll make you look
like
a real lady," they taunted, and as this ungallant diver-
was being enjoyed, Nancy suddenly snatched a guard's

musket, shot the sentry dead, and escaped on Colonel
sion
She galloped to the nearest Confederate delater, July 25, under a Major
Bailey, led two hundred troopers back to Summersville.
They reached the town at four in the morning, completely
surprised two companies of the 9th West Virginia, set fire
to three houses, captured Colonel Starr, a Lieutenant Stivers
and a large number of men, then disappeared over the
Sutton road in the darkness.
Starr's horse.
tachment, and a few days
As the war proceeded, the baser elements of society gave

men new problems. Smuggling was a
standard practice, as was horse stealing, and an illicit
trade in liquor with members of the armed forces created
a serious situation. Government employees and various con-
the secret-service
tractors
conspired
to
defraud
the
government.
Among
men drafted for service, bounty-jumping became a

tremendous fraud, and soldiers' discharges were often forged
and sold for large sums.
The capital at Washington attracted many of these malefactors, some of whom were to be found in the higher social
those
circles of the town, and by late 1861 the capital was filled
with persons suspected of supplying information to the Con-
Much
37
was understandable, as
the Southerners there could not ignore the cause for which
their relatives and friends were fighting. Leaders in higher
social circles entertained men in prominent government positions, and once good food and wine had loosened tongues
and resolutions, many military secrets were inadvertently
imparted. But fine homes were only part of the espionage
federate authorities.
of this
pattern; secret agents listened at office doors in the de-
partment buildings; military plans, maps, and columns of

vital figures were often missing after the call of a visitor.
An interesting operative was Lieutenant H. B. Smith,
who, under Colonel Sharpe, was made chief detective of
the Middle Department, which comprised Maryland, Delaware, and part of Virginia. Smith's headquarters were in
Baltimore, one of the hotbeds of the undercover group that
was assigned to aid the cause of the South. Smith recruited
a staff of some forty soldiers and civilians that gathered
a remarkable
amount
many
of high social standing, that
of
them
of information
on suspect
was
citizens,
in turn laid
on the provost marshal's desk. From this evidence many

were arrested and their plans interrupted.
The many indentations, bays, and backwaters of the
Chesapeake afforded snug harbors for contraband-loaded
vessels, and on one occasion while scouring this area Smith
and two of his aides came upon a fleet of a dozen schooners
anchored in a secluded spot. Fortunately, the crews were
unarmed and the three secret-service men captured the
whole lot, including their valuable cargoes.
Military spies and so-called mail-carriers were frequently
apprehended and put out of action. Deserters were rounded
up and suffered various penalties.
plotters
One
of Lieutenant
Smith's
captives,
sullen,
simple-
witted man, Lewis Payne, was arrested in Baltimore in
March 1865 on a criminal charge. Smith was positive that

Payne was a spy, but could not pin anything incriminating
on him. But to keep this defiant man under some form of
restraint, Smith demanded that Payne take an oath of alle-
38
giance to the Union, and released
him on
the condition
that he stay at a designated point north of Philadelphia
and remain there
On
April
5,
to the street
until the
end
of the war.
Seward was thrown

and seriously injured. After
jaw was encased in a metal
1865, Secretary of State
from
his carriage
where his
surgical framework, he was moved to his home to recuperate. Nine days later, on the night that President Lincoln
was shot at Ford's Theatre, Seward was attacked in his bed
by a man named Lewis Powell, alias Payne, who was a
fellow conspirator with John Wilkes Booth. The Secretary
of State was saved from more serious injury by the metal
protection he was wearing, but his son Frederick and three
other persons who went to his assistance were slashed by
the assailant. Mrs. Seward, who was an invalid, suffered a
shock during the attack and died within two months, and
hospital attention
Seward's only daughter who witnessed the assault never recovered from the experience and died within a year. Mr.
Seward eventually regained his health and remained in the
cabinet of President
Andrew Johnson
until the expiration
of Johnson's term in 1869.
Booth was trapped and shot by Sergeant Boston Corbett

leading a detachment of Company L, 16th New
York Cavalry. Payne was among the other conspirators who
were hanged.
Lieutenant Smith's duties were many and diverse. During the 1864 presidential campaign, party powers in Albany, New York, took aggressive measures to assure victory,
and political agents were dispatched to various voting centers, set up for the convenience of New York troops, with
instructions to forge the officers' affidavits that accompanied the votes, and transfer the ballots to their own candidates. Noting an unfamilar abbreviation for the word "cavalry" on one of these signatures, Smith became suspicious,
which led to the exposure of the plot and arrest of the agents
who was
involved.
Other assignments took Smith well beyond the boimd-

aries
39
He performed yeoman work in

Maryland and West Virginia in tracking down
of his department.
western
members
of
John
S.
Mosby's Rangers, an independent cav-
was a continual source of concern to the FedWearing

Army.
eral
the guise of a New York merchant,
Lieutenant Smith trapped a Confederate agent in Washington who was trying to convert bonds and scrip into cash.
He made many undercover visits to New York and Philadelphia in connection with cases of bounty-jumping and
alry unit that
Smith arrested an agent of the

Confederacy in New York who was an important figure
in the smuggling of a large consignment of tobacco. Although somewhat at odds with the picture of the presentday military intelligence man, this activity indicates that
the work of a private detective during the Civil War was
one of ceaseless activity, and if successful, contributed
other recruiting frauds.
much
to the cause.
The maintenance
of the Federal Secret Service
a large item in the conduct and cost of the war.
penses of the provost marshal's

in
office in
became
The ex-
Washington alone
a period of about three years ran close to $175,000
and incidental expenses. This figure,

was only a mere segment of the total outlay.
It will be noted that in this resume of secret service in
the Civil War the terms "scouts" and "spies" are frequently
used. It is difficult at times to differentiate between the two,
although many agents charged as spies would, today, be
considered nothing more than military scouts. A "spy" usually was an agent who was located permanently within
the lines or territory of the opposition and assumed the risk
of gathering any information that would be of value to his
military commander. In most instances, the commander
kept in touch with his spies by means of scouts who carried
the messages from one to the other. The actual spies seldom
for detective service
of course,
left their
operational area, but the scouts accepted a
ber of assignments from a chief
who
num-
directed their move-
ments. They carried dispatches, located the enemy, and
40
gathered vital information about roads, bridges, and fordable streams. It will be seen that many opportunities for
work came
actual spy
was
often
to the scout,
decide
difficult to
if
and,
if
captured,
it
he (or she) was a scout or
a spy.
According to today's laws of war, an individual can be

if, when acting secretly or on false
considered a spy only

pretenses, he
or attempts
obtains
obtain information
to
of belligerent operations with the intention of
communicat-
ing the information to the hostile party. Thus, soldiers not

in disguise
who have
infiltrated a hostile
formation are not considered
army
to obtain in-
spies.
Similarly, the following are not spies: soldiers or civilians
carrying out their mission openly or charged with the delivery of dispatches.
prisoner of war.
trial.
When
spy cannot claim treatment as a
spy cannot be punished without prior
a spy rejoins his
own army and
is
subsequently
recaptured by the enemy, he must be treated as an honorable prisoner of war.
Whether nationalism
is
a prime cause of
may have
question, but nationalism
war
is
ameliorated
a
its
moot
vio-
and losses by subjecting it to the discipline

of law. Whether or not these laws are recognized and
obeyed has been shown in the behavior of the aggressor
nations in the past two global conflicts.
lence, injuries,
Confederate Secret Service
The South had nothing in the way of a secret-service orwas organized by the Federal government, but paradoxically the Confederacy was much better
served in its intelligence and information requirements than
was the North. This may be explained with the reminder
ganization, such as
that the Secessionist states did not encounter the same

problems that harassed the Federal government. For instance, Washington had to face the problem of separating
citizens of loyal standing
from those who were disloyal
to
41
the idea that the Union could not be divided. As mentioned before, there were thousands of people in the North
not only denied the right of the North to invade and

coerce the South, but stood ready to aid the Southern cause.
who
The Confederacy was practically free from

kind. The Southern states produced little
situations of this
or nothing that
the North required to carry on the war, but, in contrast,
had much
would have been of great value

to General Robert E. Lee. The Confederacy did require
military information provided by spies and agents in the
enemy lines, but she needed none to maintain civilian
discipline. She had no problems with bounty- jumpers,
the Union
fraudulent
frauds.
On
that
discharges,
trade
in
contraband,
or
contract
the other hand, Southern citizens readily volun-
teered, not only for general service, but for secret-service
work
inside Federal territory. So well
was
their military in-
few of their agents were

work was ever known. It
is a notable fact that the Confederate Army was never surprised in any important engagement of the war.
telligence
work
caught, and
carried out that
little
Clever, devoted
of their actual
women were
important operators in
work; Belle Boyd, an ardent West Virginia
this
socialite, risked
on many occasions. As a resident of Martinsburg,

she shuttled back and forth through the Federal lines
while Generals Nathaniel P. Banks, John Charles Fremont,
and James Shields were vainly attempting to stop "Stonewall" Jackson, and thus relieve the capital of the possibility
her
life
of a Confederate attack.
Prior to the action at Front Royal, Belle provided General
Jackson with valuable information of Union movements in
Shenandoah Valley. From this point on her history

and features of a modern-day headliner; romance, multiple marriages, and the lesser highlights of the social columns marked her life. Although not a
particularly beautiful woman, she had an attractive personthe
takes on the twists
ality.
She was twice arrested, but released both times; possibly
42
because her captors thought she was of doubtful value to

In 1864, however, she went to England,
their enemies.
presumably carrying secret dispatches from President
Jef-
ferson Davis to Confederate agents in London. In the British

capital she
made
the most of her military experiences do-
ing the lecture-circuit tour, and trying the
During
this interlude
she married the
bands, a Union officer
London
stage.
of her three hus-
who had once been her captor and

He died shortly after,
who had
followed her to England.
in
and Belle returned to the
1866,
first
enough dramatic presence
to
make
stage,
and obtained
wide tour of the
She also wrote Belle Boyd in Camp and

Prison which was published in 1865. She died in 1900 at
age fifty-seven.
Mrs. Rose O'Neal Greenhow, another zealous and trusted
United
States.
supporter of the Confederacy, was living in Washington at

the outbreak of the war, and
it
was she who, on July
16,
1861, sent a famous cipher message to General P. G. T.
when decoded read, "Order issued for

McDowell (General Irvin) to move on Manassas tonight."
Beauregard, which
Acting on
deployed
this information,
his forces for the
General Beauregard promptly

expected attack while Generals
Joseph E. Johnston and "Stonewall" Jackson hurried from

the Shenandoah Valley to assist in halting the Federal advance.
Mrs. Greenhow's secret-service work was brought to a
on August 26 when Allan Pinkerton trapped her and

had her put under military guard at her home in Washington.
She was transferred later to the Old Capitol Prison where
she remained until April 1862. A few weeks later, after
pledging her word not to appear north of the Potomac
until the war was over, she was escorted beyond the Union
Army lines and set at liberty. Interestingly enough, it was
established later that while in prison Mrs. Greenhow had
halt
corresponded extensively with Colonel Thomas Jordan of

General Beauregard's staff.
The Confederate
State
Department
and Maryland, and
at
who
tained a regular corps of couriers

their capital
43
Richmond main-
operated between
in that
close contact with every phase of the
way kept
war
in
fairly
Washington
and the North. One means of obtaining such information

was through agents in New York, Baltimore, and Washington who used a secret cipher and inserted personal messages
in Northern newspapers. These periodicals were sent to
Richmond, the message decoded and the information transferred to the areas or military officers concerned. On one
occasion,
Union
July
soldier
4,
who
Confederate pickets captured a

was carrying on his person the detailed
1861,
returns of McDowell's army.
This full statement of the
strength and composition of that force enabled General
Beauregard to judge the full capability of this hostile force.

Later on, on the evening of July 16, Mrs. Greenhow's timely
message reached him shortly after eight o'clock, and before midnight General Beauregard had notified his outpost
commanders to fall back to the positions assigned for such
an emergency.
Southerners who were natural outdoorsmen, fond of hunting, and seemingly born astride a horse, were most adaptable
for military scouting, and, more important, most of those
worked over a countryside that was familiar to

the other hand, few Northerners, sons of industrial areas, had enjoyed such outdoor activity, and it was
months before skilled scouts and dispatch riders could be
trained for such exacting tasks. Practically any Southern
cavalryman could be assigned scout and spy duty, and it
was the information supplied by such volunteers that
selected,
them.
On
brought defeat to the Federal forces
month while
one
pitted against an
fifth of their total in
army
five
times within a
that aggregated only
numbers.
The North had also to contend with the enthusiasms of

the war correspondents in the field. The reporter representing
important
New
York
or
incurred most of the dangers
Washington
that faced
newspapers
the front-line
44
soldier,
and the more enterprising he became, the
ingratiated himself with the
commanding
generals
less
he
whose
conduct he criticized, and whose plans he predicted in his

widely read newspaper articles. Apparently there was little
press censorship, at least as it was enforced in World Wars
I and II. During the Civil War the field correspondent
assumed that it was necessary that the people at home who
were paying for the armies in the field, should be kept informed how those armies fared, and it was in the popular
vein to contend that a great debt was due these military
reporters. Unquestionably, on occasions, they were a source
of information to the South, but they also were active
allies of the Federal government in persuading the people
back home to submit to the heavy taxation so necessaiy
to support the large and costly armies required to carry the
conflict to its final conclusion.
Early in 1864 the South attempted to make a Fifth Column

had some hopes for high success, but the
thrust, a plan that
setup
became too
when
secret-service
involved,
men
and eventually ran aground

North tracked down the
of the
chief conspirators.
In April of that year President Davis encouraged Jacob

Thompson, a Mississippian, to accept the leadership of this
movement. Thompson was a wealthy lawyer who had served

in Congress and later was Secretary of the Interior under
President James Buchanan, but had resigned to serve in the
Confederate Army. Clement C. Clay, Jr., of Alabama was
designated Thompson's chief lieutenant. President Davis
desired to link up several hostile movements in the North,
and it was hoped that under Thompson's guidance a complete body would have great influence in bringing the war
to a quick close. In fact, certain negotiations suggesting
peace were secretly opened with men like Horace Greeley,
the publisher of the New York Tribune, and Judge Jeremiah
Sullivan.
One
of the hostile organizations in the North,
known
as
45
Knights of the Golden Circle, was a secret order of Southern

sympathizers that had been formed by Dr. George W. L.
who had moved
Bickley, a Virginian
was
to Ohio.
His
first
up in Cincinnati as early as
were formed in the South.
groups
1854, and additional
In its original form it had planned a force to colonize the
northern portion of Mexico and Texas so as to extend the
South's pro-slavery interests. Later, it was obvious that this
"castle/* or branch,
order could best serve

in the North,
and
its
set
purpose among the South's friends

were organized in Kentucky,
"castles"
Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, and Missouri. In these states its

membership was composed largely of Peace Democrats,
men who were convinced that the Civil War was a folly
and that the increased power of the Federal government
could lead only to tyranny. The Knights did not conduct
any treasonable activity until 1863 when the name was
changed to the Order of the American Knights, and later
the Order of the Sons of Liberty, thereby reviving an old
title from the Revolutionary War.
The Sons of Liberty, now known as Copperheads, elected
Clement L. Vallandigham as their commander, who by 1864
was head of some 300,000 members. A noisy minority of this
group first discouraged enlistments, resisted the draft, and
helped to shield many deserters. A few extremists, backed
by Southern money, planned a revolt of the Old Northwest.
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio harbored about 175,000 of these
malcontents, and Vallandigham, who was operating out of
Windsor, Ontario, Canada, planned to have these three
states secede from the Union, thus, perhaps forcing Kentucky and Missouri, states that were only lukewarm to the
Southern cause, to take a more determined stand.
Southern newspapers eagerly reported stories of widespread dissatisfaction in the Northwest and a number of
Confederate officers were distributed through several key
cities
to direct the
movement. The general uprising was
eventually planned for August 16, 1864.
Thompson furnished
the necessary funds, and arms were purchased in
New
York
46
and hidden in Chicago. Previous to this, peace meetings

were announced in various cities, the first staged in Peoria,
Illinois, was a resounding success, but when Horace Greeley
the correspondence concerning the proposed
peace negotiations, all hope for a successful uprising subsided. Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana and General
Henry B. Carrington so effectively curbed the Sons of Liberty that the plot was doomed. The Peace Party in the
published
North was quickly won over to the idea of letting the voting public decide in the coming presidential election
whether the war should be continued. Dozens of ranking
officers in the Copperhead organization were arrested and
cast into prison.
The Confederate members quickly scram-
bled across the border into Canada.
Undaunted by the failure of their work in the NorthThompson, across the border, maintained a cadre of Southern officers. Then Captain Charles H. Cole,
a cavalryman who had been captured and confined on
Johnsons Island in Sandusky Bay, Lake Erie, made his
escape and reported to Thompson in Canada. Cole prowest, Jacob
posed a plan to seize the United States gunboat Michigan

that was guarding Johnson's Island, and once in possession,
to release all the Southern prisoners. Captain John Y. Beall
of the Confederate Army was brought into the scheme.
Captain Cole, who by some stratagem had become
friendly with several of the Michigan s officers, planned to
have himself invited aboard, and on a signal to Captain
Beall, a boatload of Confederates was to approach and
surprise the Union crew. In the meantime, Captain Beall
had seized a steamboat, Philo Parsons, and with about
twenty Southerners began his move, but seventeen of his
men suddenly mutinied, and Beall had to turn back. The
suspicious movements of the Philo Parsons aroused the crew
of the Michigan, and Cole was placed under arrest. A few
days later Beall was picked up at the Suspension Bridge
railroad station while working on a plot to release several captured Confederate generals as they were being
47
transferred from Johnson's Island to Fort Lafayette.
He
and hanged in February 1865, by order of a military court for the seizure of the steamer Philo Parsons.
Northern secret-service men ran into a new problem
caused by the Sons of Liberty commissioners who were
still active. This was a smart economic policy whereby
Southern sympathizers in the North converted all available
paper money into gold. This, of course, took the valuable
specie out of circulation and the price of gold went up to
290, which naturally caused a change of policy. When
gold had fallen as low as 180 John Porterfield, a Nashville
banker, moved his temporary residence from Montreal to
was
tried
New
York and began purchasing and exporting it, selling

exchange and reconverting these into
gold. The amount lost in transshipment was met out of the
funds placed at his disposal by the Southern commissioners.
Almost $2,000,000 was thus exported, but before these transactions had any perceptible effect on Northern finances,
General Benjamin F. Butler, in New York, arrested a former
partner of Porterfield, and the Nashville banker quickly
it
for sterling bills of
returned to Montreal.
men
were sent to bolster the flagging

fortunes of the Sons of Liberty, and plans were made to
touch off a revolution in New York on the day of the presidential election, November 8, 1864. But again the plot was
uncovered and the city reinforced with 10,000 extra troops
before any active steps could be taken. When General William Tecumseh Sherman put the torch to Atlanta on November 15, the Sons of Liberty drew up plans to set fire
Other
to
of influence
New York.
A number of
Confederate
officers in civilian clothes reg-
and
inflammable materials hidden in
istered at important hotels
set delayed-action fuses to
their rooms.
One,
set at the
Astor House, failed to ignite after the conspirators had
left,
were started at the United States Hotel, City Hotel,

Everett House, Hoffman House, Fifth Avenue Hotel, and
but
fires
48
the
was
St.
Denis. Nineteen
large
enough
fires in all
were
started,
but none
to cause a citywide conflagration.
Captain T. H. Hines, a daring cavalryman from General

George Washington Morgans command, tried to burn Chicago on election night. Many escaped prisoners of war
turned up to assist him with orders to cut telegraph wires,
release eight thousand prisoners from Camp Douglas, seize
and appropriate much

arms and ammunition within the city. However, the Federal secret service intercepted all these plans and 106 of the
conspirators were arrested on November 7, most of whom
were sent to penitentiaries for terms ranging from three
several banks, burn railroad stations,
years to
life.
This was the last of the Confederate operations directed
from Canada, although an abortive attempt to kidnap the

Vice-President-elect, Andrew Johnson, was made while he
was on his way to the inauguration. When this failed, the
conspirators stole some horses and made their way back to
their homeland, and were in Lynchburg when General Lee
surrendered at Appomattox, only eighteen miles away.
CHAPTER
The
Progress
MacLeod
of
Intelligence
The
Legend
Problems of Wartime Intelligence
of
Mrs.
Spies
III
in the Skies.
The Progress
To meet
of
Mars'
of Intelligence
the
demands created by the rapid development
new weapons,
military
intelligence,
espionage,
and sabotage had to step up their pace. Until well

into the middle of the Civil War the collection, interpretation, and evaluation of such information had been a haphazard affair, all too often left in the hands of venturesome individualists, persons who in most instances were ill-trained
lor the work. Most of them undertook these assignments
for the extra pay, in the spirit of daring, or to break the monotony of routine civilian or military life. Theirs was ususpying,
ally a one-job contract carried out over
an area familiar to
them or where the language and customs were at their command. Some were officers of responsible rank, others the
ragtag of the lower social orders, and a few were drawn
from the hordes of camp followers.
During a war, responsible officers of the intelligence services usually divided their opponents into two particular
classes; the first consisting of neutrals
who
preferred to help
one belligerent for financial remuneration and for such

fools there
is
little
sympathy should they meet with mis-
fortune because they are interfering in affairs with which
50
they have no concern in order to swell their bank balances;

the second group may be composed of men (or women)
who, abandoning the opportunity and security of their own
careers, enter the hazardous work, play a lone hand and run
the risk of enemy law. There can be nothing but respect
for such as these and compassion if the gage goes against
them.
As stated before, until the Civil War there were no real

organized-intelligence departments in any army. True, a
number of selected personnel were detailed to keep some
record of information on foreign services, to devise codes
and ciphers, and, whenever possible, to provide the general staff with pertinent details on the general makeup of
any potential enemy. But there were no distinct offices of
military or naval information. There were no co-ordinate
sections of the general staff in any war office, and what
agents were sent abroad were commonly called military
attaches.
The modern development of the Intelligence Service in

the United States began around 1885 when the Secretary
of
War
requested information concerning the military es-
tablishment of a foreign power, and for this a small section

of the office of the Adjutant General
pertinent military information.
was
set apart to collect
The personnel
consisted of
and one clerk. In 1889 Congress authorized the

War Department to send officers abroad to obtain military
information. Whether this was to enlighten the United
States Army on the progress of European forces, or to collect
secret data on their strength, weapons, and training policies, has never been clearly defined, but in looking back
it would seem to be the beginning of the military attache
system which has since been an important part of military
one
officer
intelligence work.
Over the next few years the importance of gathering information of a military nature was recognized and the personnel of the Adjutant General's bureau increased, indicating
it
was
to
be a permanent feature of the
War
Department.
51
When
the General Staff was created in 1903, this bureau

became the Second (Military Information) Division of that
By 1908
body.
this organization
with
map
collections, files
and personnel was

College
building
in Washington to
moved into the old War
facilitate the use of the intelligence material by the students
and instructors of the school. Within a short time, however,
the division was consolidated with the Third (War
College) Division to form a new Second Division of the
General Staff. Its commissioned personnel was divided
and
records, photographic gallery, library,
among
the various committees of the
new
division, its cleri-
was dispersed and the library was attached to that

College. In fact, most of the records and photographs of the original Military Information bureau were
consolidated and merged with those of the War College.
Thus, by 1910 the Military Intelligence Service consisted
cal force
War
of the
of merely a
Staff,
committee of the
only two
members
of
War
College Division, General
which were employed on any-
thing even remotely connected with military intelligence.
May
month after the United States entered

move was made to set up such a
service. A Military Intelligence section was created as part
o the War College Division of the General Staff, to which
two officers and two clerks were assigned. From this nucleus
an efficient organization was built up, but not until August
26, 1918, was the United States Military Intelligence Division created and designated a separate and a co-ordinate
In
1917, one
World War
I,
the
first
division of the General Staff.
With
War
nage.
I,
its political,
as well as military ramifications,
new
could not help but incubate the
The development
of
new weapons,
World
art of espio-
the airplane, and
the submarine, to say nothing of the threat of amphibious

operations,
demanded
greater interest in
phases of military intelligence.
To many
and study of all

it was the
people,
decisive factor in warfare. It was such intelligence that

urged Winston Churchill to keep the Grand Fleet on station
52
in the
North Sea, ramming
up
German High
the
in the cork that
was
to bottle
Seas Fleet until the Battle of Jutland.
was military intelligence that enabled the German warGoeben and Breslau to escape from the coast of Algeria at the start of the war, cross the Mediterranean, and
It
ships,
scurry into the Dardanelles to seek sanctuary in Constantinople
(now
Istanbul).
Intelligence data gathered in peacetime naturally form
the basis of any future plan of campaign, but this data must
be supplemented with intelligence concerning the enemy's
and order of battle. Since the

powerful and widely destructive weapons
mobilization, concentration,
development of
that can be put into immediate use without a formal declaration of war,
any supplemental information must be available
before such offensive action begins. Obviously in times of
must be ever
on the alert to counter any surprise move by a potential
enemy. Today, this demands immediate availability of offensive and defensive aircraft, the alerting of missile bases,
adequate warning networks, and efficient planning for the
defense of vital industry and strategic strong points. Only
a nation that maintains these and other intelligence weapons in peacetime can hope to prove its readiness for war.
Combat intelligence is military intelligence that is used
in the planning and conduct of tactical and administrative operations. It is the knowledge the commander requires concerning his area of operations and the enemy's
capabilities and vulnerabilities so as to evaluate the possible ways in which he can carry out his assignment.
Strategic intelligence is used by the national planners
and high-level military commanders to organize and
carry out peacetime national security measures and warinternational tension, the intelligence agencies
time military operations.

tional objectives
and
is
It aids in
determining
a basis for planning the
realistic na-
means
of ac-
complishing these objectives. Strategic intelligence covers

the capabilities, vulnerabilities,
actions of nations.
and probable courses and

National intelligence
telligence developed
by
53
integrated product of in-
is
the
all
government departments which
covers the broad aspect of national policy and security. It

is
more than one department or agency, and

cannot be produced by a single department or
of concern to
ordinarily
is used to coordinate the acgovernment departments in developing and executing integrated national policies, plans, and programs.
Agents of the espionage service supply information regarding matters behind the enemy's front line and in his
agency. National intelligence
tivities of
home
territory.
All too
much
of
a fictional nature has
been written of this phase of intelligence, writings that

have great appeal for the general public, and much of it has
been romanticized and glorified to meet editorial policy or
the demands of the motion picture screen.
members of the espionage service

peace and war, but war, of course, increases the danger of the work. In general practice, however, the most dangerous and efficient spy is the least
Actually, the duties of
are
similar
in
sensational in his operations.
While not
intelligence
.nullifies,
truly intelligence as outlined above, counter-
inseparable from intelligence operations. It
is
breaks up, or deceives the enemy's intelligence
service. It also includes protecting information
from
spies,
personnel against subversion, and installations and materiel

against sabotage.
The
chief duties of the counterespionage
system are to prevent leakage of important military informa-
The methods used vary when carried out in allied,

enemy, or home territory. A surveillance is usually maintion.
armed
about impending
tained over secrecy discipline within the
forces with
a view to stifling loose talk
operations,
indiscreet conversation, the spread of rumor, careless han-
dling of confidential papers
and
reports, the taking of un-
authorized articles into the front
lines,
on
patrol,
and on
reconnaissance.
All this
is
the background for the hundreds of personal
accounts that
make up
the fascinating history of military
54
Good combat
intelligence.
intelligence
and
its
proper ap-
and invade
Lack of it defeated Napoleon at Waterloo and General Lee at Gettysburg. General Karl R. G. von Rundstedt
made the most of his available information to gain his temporary success at the Battle of the Bulge, and by the same
token General George S. Patton, Jr., employed counterintelligence in his classic move that allowed him to change
the direction of an entire field army without disclosing a
serious weakening of the line in another area.
But like many other factors in warfare the human element plays the greatest part. The history of military intelligence is in many instances made by fools, females,
fanatics, freebooters, and a handful of dedicated patriots.
plication enabled Hannibal to cross the Alps
Italy.
The Legend
of Mrs.
MacLeod
The most overrated espionage agent was Margarete

Zelle, daughter of Adam and Antze Zelle, a
couple of sturdy Hollanders who lived in Leeuwarden in
Gertrud
the
latter
part
of
the
nineteenth
century.
Margarete
Gertrud must have broken their stout Dutch hearts, for

she bore none of the dikeland reserve of her playmates,
and absorbed little of value at the religious school to

which they sent her. By the time she was eighteen this
roistering tomboy of the Netherlands had met and soon
married a forty-year-old soldier of fortune, one Campbell
MacLeod, who was serving as a captain in the colonial
forces of Holland.
In contrast to
many
soldiers of his clan, this
MacLeod
was a detestable roue who drank to excess, loved in the

manner of a wanton, and ate like a glutton. Oddly enough,
this old scoundrel had no difficulty in winning the affection of this cloister-sheltered Dutch girl. After they were
married in 1895 he took her to Java where he commanded
a colonial regiment. Two children, a boy and a girl, were
born to them; the boy died later in Bali. But these early
55
married years seemed to bring out the worst in this hateful man. He became more cantankerous, beat his wife unmercifully,
and
at
inhuman
Dutch East Indies and returned
six
After
times threatened to shoot her.

treatment, Margarete
years of this
left
the
to the quiet of a Fries-
land village, taking her daughter with her.
But the change from life at a military post on a tropical

island proved a dull contrast, and after a few weeks Mrs.
MacLeod left her daughter with relatives and started a
new life in Paris. For a time she appeared as a dancer on
the French stage, but certain members of the dignified
MacLeod
clan protested that she
Highland
tribe.
was disgracing the famed
Resigning herself to the family opposition, Mrs. Mac-
Leod decided
new name and personality. Her

had acquainted her with the dances
postures of the Javanese bayas, and
to adopt a
years in the Far East
and ceremonial
armed with this
inspiration
she next
course in Buddhist literature and

night,
Mrs. Margarete Gertrud
its
quick
obtained a
altar
MacLeod
Over-
rituals.
created a
personality background from this superficial research
new
and
became Mata Hari (The Eye of Dawn) and in her program notices claimed to have been born in southern India
to a family of a most sacred Brahmin caste. If you read
on, you would learn that her mother, a former Hindu
dancing girl, had died giving her birth, and the temple
priests of Kanda Swandy had dedicated her to Siva
(third deity of the Hindu triad), and schooled her in
temple dances to replace her mother. With little explanation of how she had come to Paris, Mata Hari proclaimed
herself to
be a
skilled
exponent of
rituals
never before
disclosed to the Occidental world.

It
must not be assumed that
this
Dutch imposter had
also transformed herself into a delicate lotus blossom.
was now twenty-nine years
ommend
of age
and had
little
She
to rec-
her but her eyes and expressive arms; one ex-
pert has stated that
Mata Hari had the most
beautiful
56
arms in the world. But the rest of her left much to be

desired; her lower jaw was aggressive, her brow simian,
and her breasts flabby, but this portion of her body was
the only part of her person she never exposed during
performances.
The Guimet Museum
in Paris,
which featured some
of
the world's most valued Oriental collections, was selected

for
Mata
Hari's
circumscribed
To
veiling.
debut, where
version
of
the
she
strip
appeared wearing a
teaser's diaphanous
the wails of seductive island music, she dis-
posed of veil after veil until she was left in a grotesque

pose wearing nothing but her breast plates.
Needless to state, the former Mrs. MacLeod was a sensation
and was soon ensconced
rooms
in
in an expensive suite of
with a platoon of wellheeled lovers to pick up the bills. Eager millionaires
flocked to her salon and bestowed jewels, costly furs, and
provided a spanking turnout to enliven the fashionable
the
Champs
Elysees
boulevards.
had milked Paris for

two years, she moved to Berlin where the Crown Prince
was her first conquest. Once he had seen the secrets of
Kanda Swandy exposed and heard the seductive wails of
the Bali flutes, he took Mata Hari on an official inspection tour of the German military maneuvers in Silesia.
The Prussian Guard might have goose-stepped itself into
the Baltic and the Uhlans could have galloped clear into
Warsaw for all Little Willie cared; he was too busy
After this fake dancer-courtesan
blocking off the Duke of Brunswick, and Gottlieb von

Jagow, the Kaiser's foreign minister. In fact, Von Jagow,
who became Prussian secretary of state in 1914, was her
avowed
lover.
Leaving a tattered trail of broken hearts, the Friesian

belly dancer wriggled into Vienna, gave exhibitions in
Rome and Madrid. London was on her list but she did
not get to Britain until some time later; she was too busy
making easy money. For a time her routine remained
57
on the geographic triangle of Paris, Berlin, and Madrid.

She traveled in high style, backed by top-flight publicity,
and moved in the best circles everywhere. Here and
there are vague references to an assertion that she had
attended the German espionage school in Lorrach, but
it is probably part of her legend.
When World War I broke out, Mata Hari assumed a
neutrality
safety-first
clared to those
who
role.
"I
am
not French,"
she
de-
expected some gesture of patriotism
from her, considering how well Paris had treated her.

"After all, I have friends everywhere, even in the
countries that are at war with France. So, I have deter-
mined to be neutral in this conflict." Of course, it would

have been dangerous for her to have admitted that she
was nothing more than a Holland butterball.
Unfortunately, her neutrality showed a decided leaning toward her friends in Germany where she had accepted
the
attentions
of
From
officials.
government bureaucrats and military

she demanded and received the
these
It was disclosed later that the

had come from secret funds earmarked
undercover work. Since she was thus ensnared with
highest prices for her favors.
money paid
for
to her
these Prussian operators, she eventually found herself (not
unwillingly) an agent of Germany's spy ring. It

as that.
On
the surface,
it
was simple
was
as easy
to continue plying her
profession and channeling the product into the books of the
spy masters. Because she
moved
in such lofty circles, her
information was considered to be top-drawer, bearing the
stamp of officialdom.
How
important she was to the
German
intelligence serv-
could have meant
The conflict
was living high, traveling far and wide,
and her income was assured. There is no evidence that
she had any role as a spy during 1914, but early the
ice
is
little
a question.
itself
to her; she
next year the Italian Secret Service, while examining the
passenger
list
of a Japanese vessel at Naples, discovered
58
Mata Hari had renounced her claim

and had accepted German citizenship.
that one
birth,
to Indian
Copies of this information were telegraphed to intelligence headquarters of all Allied countries, and Mata
Hari was docketed as an enemy spy. She was allowed to
move about freely for a time, but a number of French
agents were always on her trail and at last they believed
that the belly dancer was sending espionage messages into
Germany with
the help of diplomatic authorities of neutral
For instance, attaches of the Spanish, Dutch, and

Swedish legations were permitting her to slip letters into
their diplomatic pouches, messages that would evade the
French censors.
Ignoring the niceties of diplomatic conduct, the French
intelligence agents broke into the Dutch and Swedish
pouches and removed Mata Hari's messages. On examination they proved to be quite harmless, and it was found
that she was not using any secret code. However, when
she was brought to trial later on these letters proved her
countries.
undoing.
Dutch woman was of little imporenemy espionage organization, she was almove about freely. On one occasion she applied
Realizing that the
tance to any
lowed to
for and received permission to visit Vittel, a resort in
northeastern France where the Aviation Service was
building a
new
military aerodrome.
explained that she wished to
visit
Mata Hari
tearfully
a former Russian lover
who had been blinded in the war, and agents who trailed
her had to admit that this errand of mercy was just that,
for she devoted every minute to the Russian and returned
no marks against her.
However, when it became obvious that this questionable character had dropped her original code of behavior,
her deportation was decided on, and had she accepted it,
she might have lived to a ripe old age, but, seemingly
outraged at the charges and disclosures that she had actually worked for Germany, Mata Hari brazenly insisted
to Paris with
59
and devotion to France. Desperately she

pointed out that she was still on intimate terms with many
Germany military leaders, and volunteered to work for
the French intelligence service.
Again we see the pathetic pattern of the trapped spy,
and the hopelessness of these dreaded situations. Like the
Kuehn family in Honolulu, Mata Hari had tasted high
living, handled large sums of money, and luxuriated with
men of social and political importance. She could not
give up these standards and return to the dull routine of
on her love
for
the ordinary citizen.
Her offer was accepted, and she was ordered to go to

occupied Belgium to milk the German General, Baron
Moritz Ferdinand von Bissing, but instead she betrayed
Belgian agents
six
one
of
who had been made known
whom was
executed
to
by the Germans.
her,
British
counterspies confirmed this, but before this situation could

be dealt with, the Dutch woman went to Holland and
from there sailed for Spain, passing through England en
On
her arrival in London she was taken to Scotland

Yard and interrogated by Sir Basil Home Thomson, Direcroute.
tor of Intelligence, to
was a spy but

After
whom
she readily admitted that she
for France, Great Britain's ally.
examination,
brief
Sir
Basil
sensed he was
dealing with a rank amateur, and advised her to give
espionage and return to her family.

Spain, however,
own
He
up
sent her on to
where she completed the
details
of her
destruction.
the
Mata Hari renewed old acquaintances with

German Naval attaches, Captain Canaris and Captain
von
Kalle, as well as the military attache,
In Madrid,
all
three used espionage funds to
By
this
pay
Major von Kron;

for her
services.
German Intelligence Division had decided that too much money was being spent on loose
women and high living with little to show for it. The available funds were cut drastically, and Mata Hari, who had
been of little value as an espionage agent, was among the
time the
60
to be cut adrift. Captain Canaris, who became chief of

German espionage during World War II, received specific orders, and "H.21," as Mata Hari was known, was or-
first
all
dered to return to Paris and given a check for fifteen thousand pesetas "for services rendered in Spain," a tragic piece
of paper that marched her before a firing squad. The check
was payable through a neutral legation, and before it could
be cashed, the treacherous agent was picked up at the Hotel
Plaza-Athenee and removed to the prison of Saint-Lazare.
"Eye of Dawn" role to the bitwas given cell number 12, a spacious room with
two windows and two beds, that had been occupied previously by three other noted female criminals. Public
opinion and pointless sentiment that is aroused by these
court-martial dramas, inflamed great throngs that were
convinced of the spy's innocence. The proceedings were
held in secret, and the crowds hung about for hours
Mata
Hari, playing her
ter end,
awaiting the verdict.
Mata Hari had little to offer in her own defense; what

moneys she had received had been paid for her personal
favors, not for her skill in espionage, and she amused
when she explained that

Von Jagow, had given her
the court
the Prussian secretary
of state,
thirty
and added, "My
lovers never offered
me
How
thousand marks
anything less."
They were
Wasn't the
court aware that she had spied only for France? When
Letters in diplomatic pouches?
only
affectionate
letters
to
her
silly!
daughter.
she was asked for the names of the six Allied agents in occupied Belgium with whom she was to have worked, she
could not remember one of them, an admission that proved
she had
made no attempt
to contact
them while "spying
for
France."
The members of the court retired to consider their

and within ten minutes were back with the decision. Mrs. MacLeod, the Javanese dancer known as Mata
Hari, was to be shot as a spy. Whether she was worth
verdict,
the rounds
of
ammunition necessary
to
dispatch her
is
6l
had proved time and time again that she

common sense, and the German
spy masters abandoned and betrayed her when this was
a question. She
lacked the rudiments of
self-evident.
As usually happens when a well-known character
is
involved in international entanglements, the law of legend
was soon applied. After receiving her sentence with calm,

stubborn courage, Mata Hari then screamed her wrath
at those men of influence who might have saved her life.
But gradually the temperamental outbursts were subdued
by the ministrations of two nuns, and she accepted her
fate.
The legend went
into
high gear
when
Pierre
de
Morrisac, the roue son of a respectable French family,
who had
loved the exotic dancer, conceived a
He
mock
ex-
have planned to have the firing

squad use blank cartridges, a la Tosca, a plot that was
supposed to have been worked out in such detail that
Mata Hari took on a new air of composure. There was
plenty of time for this planning for the decision reached in
her trial was not to be carried out for some time; October 15, 1917, to be exact.
The execution itself has afforded a dozen weird stories;
one to the effect that she died bravely, dressed in her best
clothes and with a pair of long white gloves which she
drew on calmly as she awaited the fatal command. Another
was that she walked to the execution point wearing nothing
but a black velvet robe; she refused the eye bandage, but
accepted a glass of champagne, and when the firing squad
raised its rifles, she boldly threw off the robe, and standing
before the riflemen stark naked, screamed, "Would you
destroy one as beautiful as I?" The lumpy figure before them
was forty-one years old and the good life had added to her
pounds. The rifles of the firing squad answered her question
ecution.
is
said to
without hesitation.
What may be
that
closer
Mata Hari wrote
to
the
actual
ending
explains
three letters, one to her daughter;
62
accepted a glass of rum, made a final adjustment to her

gown and walked with a priest and two nuns from her
waiting car. The execution was set up on a rifle
Troops were drawn on three sides of
Vincennes.
range at
a hollow square; a lone tree, leafless and drear stood on
cell to a
the fourth.
death warrant was read and a Major Massard ordered

the firing squad to readiness. The Dutch woman was tied
to the tree, but refused to have her eyes bandaged. The
nuns and priest withdrew, there was a volley of fire and
Mata Hari slumped
in
her bonds the bullets were
all
too real.
Problems of Wartime Intelligence
and French military officials faced a stiff task

competing with the Germans, once Belgium and northeastern France had been invaded in 1914. The war had
come quickly and there had been little opportunity to set
British
in
up
intelligence
corps. Captain
organizations
or
compose an espionage
Henry Landau, who
is
credited with estab-
network behind the enemy

lines, has explained many of his basic problems in his book,
All's Fair, published in 1934, possibly one of the most enlightening volumes on military intelligence as it was praclishing a British secret-service
World War I.
Henry Landau was born
ticed in
Much
in South Africa of Boer-English
was received in Germany, and later he attended Cambridge University and

so was especially fitted, through his knowledge of languages
and countries, for many phases of espionage work. As his
father was a British subject, Landau had little trouble in
becoming an Englishman, and at the start of the war threw
in his lot with the British Army and saw much of the debacle and defeat of the first few weeks of fighting.
During his first leave from the front, he became acparents.
of his early education
quainted with the
sister of his adjutant,
a highly
intelli-
63
gent girl who was working in the Censor's Department.

She sensed immediately that Captain Landaus talent was
being wasted at the front, and insisted that a man who
spoke English, French, German, and Dutch with such
more important position.

A short time later Landau was ordered to report to the
War Office where he was given a short language test. The
following day he was interviewed by a Colonel Browning
who informed him that he had been transferred to what
was then known as the Intelligence Corps and attached
fluency should be in a
duty to the British Secret Service. Eventually,

he was posted to a British official who was working out
for special
of Rotterdam.
On his arrival in Holland, Landau learned

man he was to work under had devised and
that
the
operated
what was known as a train-watching service, an organization that was made up of civilian volunteers who kept
close watch on all military rail movement in Belgium
and northeastern France. His superior, whose name was
never mentioned, explained that his group, built up of
more than forty train-watching posts, had broken down
and nearly all of his agents had been arrested. One operator in Maastricht, named Frankignoul, had been working hard to rebuild the network, but so far very
little
information was coming through.
Landau's
chief
in
Rotterdam was possibly a retired
Navy man, but he spoke scarcely a word of Dutch and

knew no French or German. Furthermore, he had no
idea how the train-watching network was mounted in occupied territory, and when it broke down, could not sugany remedy. When Landau, who spoke good Dutch,
some Flemish, German, and French, appeared he must
have seemed a godsend. His chiefs value seemed to be
in his ability as a shrewd executive, one who could keep
the various branches of the service in close co-operation. He also had the knack of keeping the neutral Dutch
gest
64
authorities well in
generous funds
hand by
made
his judicious
handling of the
available to him.
may seem
simple chore until one

breadth
of the problem.
realizes the full significance and
By the time Landau was given the assignment, the Germans had built up an almost impregnable barrier along
Train-watching
the Belgian-Dutch frontier. High-voltage electric wire and

series of sentinel posts made it almost immove from one side to the other without involvhuge risks. By this time, too, Holland swarmed with
an unbroken
possible to
ing
hundreds of Belgian refugees who had settled there, and

some of them had formed personal systems of getting
information out of their old homeland, and were offering
it
to Allied secret services. In
tion
was valuable, but most
some
of
it
instances, the informa-
was
of
little
military
importance.
Captain Landau did his best to sort out some of these

self-appointed agents and attract the best to his system.
Agents had to be trustworthy, willing to submit to strict

discipline, and learn to keep their mouths shut. Patriotism,
not financial reward, was to govern their actions. He
was most fortunate in making the acquaintance of a man
called Moreau who had once held a high official post on
the Belgian railways, and who suggested that his son be
named
to select a
number
of ex-railroad
men
to volunteer
for this work.
Gradually, the network was built up. Three channels
through the German frontier defense were selected and

who could move back and forth through
daring passeurs
the electric barriers night after night, were provided with
heavy rubber gloves and

allowed to
man
socks.
Boatmen who were still

Antwerp and
the barges that ran between
Rotterdam were recruited into the system, and finally a

of farm laborers working areas along the frontier
were selected to toss messages across the wire when enemy
sentries were not looking.
number
Landau played
it
safe
from every angle. Each agent
65
was given a number no names were ever used. Moreau's

son, who was known only as "Oram," was placed in charge
of the six different lines of communication, and this network was maintained for more than two years with comparatively few losses.
Once the means of communication were established,
the next problem was to post hundreds of agents throughout occupied Belgium and France, and in many instances
these nationals, already safe in Holland, were induced to
return to their old working areas and carry out instructions.
Once they had been passed through the wire, they were
expected to recruit two or three more trusted workers to
take up the cause.
It was at that point that Captain Landau encountered
many difficulties. The Germans had an identity card system that not only registered the owner of the card, but
restricted his movements; no one could travel more than
thirty miles from the address on his card. So a Landau
agent was hamstrung in several ways, as the German secret police paid especial attention to newcomers and all
people traveling by road or by any routine conveyance.
But the British agent had in due course a workable
organization at his command, while he maintained his
office in Rotterdam. The chief of each trainwatching group beyond the frontier received the daily
reports of his agents and deposited these in a "letter box"
principal
in
Antwerp, Liege, or Brussels.
special courier carried
these "letter-box" reports to the passage at the frontier
where they were passed into Holland into Oram's charge

and eventually relayed on to Landau and his staff. Each spy
chief in charge of agents in a certain sector had his own independent letter box, frontier courier, and passage through
the frontier, but he did not know the name of even one
member
of his force, neither did the
the letter box have any idea
who
man who maintained

who
the couriers were
brought the reports to him. All this duplication and secrecy

was necessary, and Captain Landau's main concern was to
66
build
of small groups, each isolated from the

one worker were caught, he would involve
up a number
other, so that
if
but four or five others at most.

Few people outside of such an intelligence complex can
have any idea how much information can be gained
from a continual study of train movements. At any rate,

in World War I, with its peculiar geographical background, train-watching was a most valued asset to the
Allies.
by the Germans meant

and the movement of
mass attack. The Allied hope
In most cases, the use of trains

the
movement
of
their
troops,
troops usually indicated a

of preparing to
defend a front or
salient, or halt
a surprise
depended on Landau's information.

As history relates, the Germans never did have enough
troops to open an offensive on both fronts at the same time,
so each push was always marked by a large transfer of
troops from one front to the other. The British secretservice agent at the Hague, a Colonel Oppenheim, to whom
Landau channeled all his reports, was a genius at analyzing the information presented. He sifted every scrap from
them, and was an expert at gauging the exact volume of
troop movements.
attack in force, often
Colonel Oppenheim provided Landau with handbooks
on the German Army, which made the Rotterdam agent

completely conversant with enemy uniforms, distinguishing
marks, and organization. Interestingly, it was a German deserter
who
furnished Captain
Landau with one
of the big-
gest scoops of the war.
From time
to time
German
deserters
made
their
way
from the rear areas and crossed the frontier into Holland.
While hurrying along a street one day, Captain Landau
came upon two of these fear-stricken men and sensed that
they might be willing to offer valuable information for a
price, so he invited them to his office. For the cost of a suit
of clothes apiece and a few gulden for a square meal, they
gave him
full details of their
67
regiment, division, the place
which they had deserted, and marked a large

map with battery emplacements, regimental and divisional
headquarters, and other targets for Allied artillery and aircraft. So satisfactory was this new field, that Captain
Landau offered a reward to these two Germans for every
deserter they brought in to him. Most of these soldiers deserted from leave trains that were slogging their way back
and date
at
to the front, for the Liege-Herbesthal tracks passed within
and the temptation was too

much for many war-weary men.
One morning as Captain Landau reached his office the
doorman told him that there was another German deserter
waiting to see him. Inside he found a bleak, frightened
youth who was nervously clutching a fairly large package.
Before Landau could question him, the deserter unwrapped
a large book and said, "What is this worth to you?"
"I don't know. What is it?"
."
"The latest edition of the German Field Post Directory
"Oh? Where did you get that?"
"I remove it from the Diisseldorf Post Office two days
ago. I was working there."
*
Landau could hardly believe his ears, and for a minute
was afraid that this might be a hoax. He took the volume,
thumbed through its pages, and immediately saw that here
was a complete list of every unit in the German Army, a
book of vital importance to the Allies, for it disclosed where
every regiment, battery, airplane squadron, and other units
some still in formation were located. With this book any
sight of the
intelligence
Dutch
man
frontier,
make an exact estimate of the

German Army. The book included
could
strength of the whole
both East and West fronts, and gave the location of each
field post.
Landau made a quick check with his Brown Book an

incomplete study of the enemy's military status but it was
enough to assure the authenticity of the man's offering. He
checked the location of those regiments whose position in
68
the front line had already been established through the in-
The
German directory contained more information than Landau's Brown Book that had taken more than three years to
compile. One page of this report was worth a fabulous sum,
but the frightened deserter accepted 100 (about $480 in
those days), the first offer Captain Landau made for the
terrogation of captured prisoners. Every item tallied.
bonanza.
Encouraged by Colonel Oppenheim, Landau strove to

build up a train-watching system that covered every important line in Belgium and northeastern France. The time and
makeup of each troop train was carefully checked, and at
each junction Landau agents followed its movement, which
usually allowed them to trace each division from its point
of entrainment to its eventual off-loading. For instance,
troops being transferred from the Russian front to the Western theatre were reported as they passed Herbesthal. Next,
the post at Liege would report whether the fifty-odd cars
carrying the division had been switched off to Namur or to
Brussels. At either of these cities they were traced again,
and watchers checked them through various junctions until
they detrained. Errors were avoided by a system of duplicate watching posts, and special agents, covering the detraining centers, finally identified the various regiments as
they arrived.
It
was
also disclosed that
German
divisions that
had
trav-
eled a great distance usually went into a rest area before
being put into the front
was
line.
Where
the proposed offensive
were usually gathered

Although combat intelligence concerning
enemy movement in the front line could be gathered from
captured prisoners, taking their personal letters and service
documents, the strategic espionage, could only be carried
out with any degree of detail by the train watchers.
As the months rolled on, these train-watching posts began
to collect east-to-west and west-to-east movements, and
to involve several divisions, they
in the rear areas.
69
though under certain circumstances there might be delays

of several days before such reports could reach Captain
Landau, there was no great loss because it usually took

weeks for the Germans to set up a major offensive. As an
example, the transfer of a division might take two days to
pass a given point, and in many instances the time lag was
four or five days. Not only men, weapons, and horse transport had to be moved, but extra trains for their food supplies and forage had to follow. It can thus be seen that while
the number of divisions required to stage an offensive might
take many days to move, the information concerning the
movement could be gathered and forwarded in much less
time.
Landaus
secret force
was able
variety of reports concerning
later to gather in a
enemy
wide
plans for launching
makeup and formation of new divisions

and brigades, any change in equipment, new weapons and
their employment, the arrival of reinforcements to replace
casualties, and special targets for aerial bombardment. But
the greatest achievement of Landau's effort was the continual check on the movements of the enemy and the cortheir offensives; the
rect identification of the units involved.
Spying on enemy railroad movement was no sinecure,

despite the success of this venture. It took brave
risk the voltage of the frontier wire,
died a horrible death
when they
men
to
and many volunteers
tried to pass
out help from the skilled passeurs. Those
through withcaught
who were
by German sentries usually ended up before a firing squad.

A few who had tried to escape into Holland risked long
terms of imprisonment or hard labor in concentration camps.
There was
also the risk of the inquiry of well-intentioned
Once a man had escaped into Holland, his work

mates and associates knew about it. Then, if he returned,
it was assumed that he had come back to act as a spy, and
neighbors.
even though they were genuinely sympathetic and might

try to be helpful, their careless talk could lead to disaster.
JO
among
traitors who
Also,
all civil
populations there were always a few
willingly took
pay
to trap these returned citi-
zens.
movement
of trains at some
like
simple task, but
seem
a
nearby railroad crossing may
to keep a continued watch on every train clicking over any
given point, to note the time and what it contained was
more than that. The watching had to be done from a house
or some such shelter near the line, as the work had to car-
To
stand and check the
ried out twenty-four hours a day. Needless to state the Ger-
man Secret Police kept a strict eye on any building that

might harbor a train watcher.
In most instances the watch had to be carried out in two
shifts. Usually a man and his wife would undertake the
task, but they had to make sure that no lights gleamed at
night, nor could they arouse suspicion by being seen too
often at windows that overlooked the railroad tracks. The
work was often monotonous as every train had to be checked
whether it carried troops and weapons or everyday freight.
Every item about a train and its rolling stock had some
significance. Leave trains were different from trains that
were moving a division to or from any front. When leave
trains stopped moving away from any front, the watchers
knew that an offensive was in the offing. Trains carrying
newly drafted men were usually an indication that the enemy had suffered heavy losses.
For a time, identifying actual regiments was comparatively simple; carriages often were chalked with some details of the organization being moved. Also, in the early
days of the war German soldiers wore shoulder straps of
varying colors that indicated whether they were infantry,
cavalry, artillery, or engineers. Later on these markings
were covered over in transit, and a new type of watcher,
known
promeneur, an agent with a roving commission,

soldiers in conversation on any pretext at
stopover railroad stations, or as they detrained in rest areas.
The promeneurs walked from town to town and covered as
as a
would engage
J\
much ground as possible without coming under the

cion of the German military police. Fixed rest areas
suspi-
could
always be watched, but the promeneurs had to beware of
who soon had a complete list of

and any newcomer was quickly spotted
the permanent police staff

all local
residents,
and clapped in jail.

It was the promeneurs who eventually compiled Captain
Landau's Brown Book, as, with experience, they went systematically about their work, keeping at
it
until every
enemy
was accounted for, and they had covered the

whole of Belgium and most of occupied France. It was the
work of this particular corps that first reported the concenunit in the area
tration of
German
troops prior to the big offensive of
March
1918.
Portions of the Belgian-Dutch frontier were guarded
enemy Landsturm
troops,
active service at the front.
were expected to
arrest
soldiers
who were
by
too old for
They had no heavy
duty, but
anyone caught passing anything over
Dutch territory. One of these characters became known

as Old Fritz to a number of Landau's frontier agents in
Zeeland. He was a typical villager with a wife and several
children at home, who never thought that he would ever
be called up for service in a real war, but here he was doing
into
frontier
duty
in the
Belgian village of Selzaete.
kindly man, he often watched the local children
who
and would warn them about the highvoltage wire, but in no way restricted their play. He particularly noticed one young girl, called Marie, who he
said reminded him of a daughter he had not seen for
more than a year.
One of Landau's agents, who was also a native of Selzaete but had escaped across the border and was living
in a Dutch village, knew Marie very well. It was simple
for him to attract the girl's attention and by means of
signs get her to ask permission from Old Fritz to talk
played in
to him.
his area,
j2
Such communication was forbidden, of course, but the

old Landsturm soldier saw no wrong in it, and when
Marie was given a delicious rasher of ham which she
shared with him, the German guard was most appreciative. He never became suspicious when the man on the
other side of the wire appeared at least twice a week
when there were no German Secret Police in sight. There
could be no harm in permitting a young girl to talk to
an old Belgian friend, especially when there was always a
bar of chocolate, a piece of cheese, or a hunk of bacon
to share.
Landau's organization soon put

use.
this
contact to good
Marie was encouraged to see another agent in the
nearby village of Wachtebeke, an operator
who was
able
weekly report of enemy regiments encamped

in the Wachtebeke-Moerbeke-Lokeren area where there
always was a German division at rest.
Marie played her part well, and this link was maintained for nearly two years, but the best schemes often
come apart, and Marie eventually was caught. She was
then sixteen, and although cunning and successful in the
to supply a
many wiles she used, the girl did not know that the German Secret Policeman covering Selzaete had been given an
assistant, and that when the known agent had passed on
beyond Old Fritz's beat, there was still another one left
to watch the proceedings. Marie had just received a wad
of reports, and before she could pass them through the
wire, or get rid of them, she was seized and later tried
by court-martial. Although condemned to be shot as a
spy, the
German
authorities
commuted
the sentence be-
cause of her youth, and she was imprisoned for the duration of the war, actually three
months before the Armiwas signed. When Captain Landau looked her up
afterward and asked whether she had been treated badly
stice
in prison, she said proudly, "I could endure
the Allies
would soon
release me."
it.
knew
73
Spies in the Skies
Through the opening months

war, intelligence concerning the
the big
March push
of 1918
High Command believed
was
of the
last
German
year of the
plans prior to
all-important.
that such an offensive
The Allied
was being
initial artillery barrage opened up,

had no assurance where the main attack would
break out. What was known was that while lateral movements and concentration of troops were fairly clear, reserves would have to be positioned some distance behind
the line in an area from where they could be rapidly
brought up to the planned point of attack.
The two chief regions in France were well covered, but
little information could be gained concerning the Luxembourg area. Although the residents of the little Grand
Duchy had some Belgian and French sympathy, they were
German in origin, in fact enough to prevent the Allies
from setting up any espionage points. The Luxembourg
area was always a doubtful factor, and finally the British
planned, but until the
they
decided to take steps to clarify this situation.

It was arranged that Captain Landau should select a
b
agent who would be dropped inside the enemy
with a basket of homing pigeons. He would have to
skilled
lines
be a native of Luxembourg and speak the Low German

dialect of the Grand Duchy; he would have to know the
country well and have friends who would be willing to
hide him
necessary.
if
man, known only
Major Steffen, was selected for

Luxembourg, Major Steffen had
spent some time in the Belgian Congo as a mining engineer. As the war progressed his many friends left one by
one to go home and join the Belgian Army. Steffen volunteered also, but was rejected because of his Luxembourg
the
task.
citizenship.
as
native of
He
next offered his services to the British
saw how useful he might
be.
He was
who
given a commission
74
and attached
posed
to their intelligence service.
When
the pro-
Grand Duchy was proposed, Lieu(who was promoted to major after his exploit)
into the
flight
tenant Steffen
accepted willingly.
His training had prepared him for the
the para-
flight,
chuting, and the handling of homing pigeons. A pilot who

had flown on several such trips was chosen, and it was
arranged that Steffen would be dropped as close to Ettel-
bruck, his birthplace, as possible.
On
a moonless night the
airplane took off from a field near Albert, France,
and
after
a 150-mile flight at good altitude, the pilot gave Steffen a
was time to go. With him went a basket of

pigeons that was strapped to his chest.
He was fortunate to land unhurt in a quiet field.
Crawling to a nearby hedge, he disposed of his parachute
and hid the basket of pigeons. He then followed a road
for half a mile until he came to a crossroad and the usual
signpost. To his great relief he discovered that he was
only twenty miles from Ettelbruck. He knew exactly
where he was and that he would have no trouble in finding his father's home. He retraced his steps to where he
had hidden the pigeons, slung the basket from his shoulders and started out on the hazardous journey to Ettelsignal that
it
bruck.
The time was 10:30

cover
the
twenty
p.m.,
and he knew that he had
before
miles
daylight,
although
to
he
would have
cart
ward
or
to leave the road and take cover every time a

motorcar approached. Major Steffen said after-
walk was the most terrifying

he had been caught with the
basket of homing pigeons in his possession he would
have been given short shrift.
that the twenty-mile
part of his mission, for
With
father's
his
nerves
house
remembered
if
rubbed raw, he
at three o'clock in the
that
he
had
not
Steffen in months. Perhaps he
the house taken over by
reached his
morning, and then
finally
heard
from
the
elder
had been turned out and
German
troops.
Facing
this pos-
75
Major Steffen again hid the basket of pigeons,

took out his revolver and knocked on the window of what
used to be his father's bedroom. To his great relief, a
familiar face appeared in a few minutes, and with a cry
of astonishment, the father soon opened the door to his
sibility,
son.
Explanations were in order and Father Steffen was
all
mother
was
outnumbered,
had some reservations. She
however;
the pigeons were brought in and two of them released
instantly to explain Steffen's safe arrival. The son was
for aiding his son in the espionage work, but his
made comfortable
The agent knew that
that there were many
then
in the attic.
there
was some danger
home
persons in his
in the fact
district
who
Congo, or had heard that he

had joined the Allied forces. He, therefore, persuaded his
father to cover the local scene, while he, lying low in the
attic all day, would go out at night and cover the outer
thought he was
still
in the
areas in the shelter of darkness.

Steffen covered the
Grand Duchy within a week and
discovered that three divisions were at
number
GHQ
bourg,
generally found in this area.
that there
and
was no concentration
information,
this
priceless value.
He
To ensure
rest,
the normal
thus advised his
of troops in
although negative,
Luxemwas of
that the report reached
GHQ,
same message, two

then went into hiding in
three pigeons were sent aloft with the

of
which arrived
the city of
When
safely. Steffen
Luxembourg where he stayed
he rejoined the British
the Distinguished Service Order.
until the Armistice.
Army he was awarded
CHAPTER
Naval
Intelligence
The
Goeben-Breslau
Fiasco
IV
Air Intelligence.
Naval Intelligence
The
science
and the interpretation of
intelligence
of
available information as practiced in naval operations
than
vastly different
that
is
employed by the landborne
The sea area of the earth greatly outspans that

and in that factor alone the problems are intensified. Distances are greater, climate and surface conditions are more complex. The submarine must be conmilitary.
of the land,
sidered, and all in all, the naval intelligence man must

have a broader concept of intelligence requirements.
Then, too, because most naval forces have had to adopt
the convenience of the air arm, they have
had
to accept
the problems of the three-dimensional force.
Cryptography, the secret language of intelligence, was,

perhaps,
first
appreciated by the American colonial forces
and during the
as early as 1776,
it
was brought
British
Navy
Civil
War from
1861-65
But
was the
to a fairly high standard.
in
World War
it
that developed naval in-
telligence to such a major science, particularly in the field
of cryptography. America's participation in that
war was
too short to permit a complete development of a system

of
her own,
and,
Zacharias, a noted
according to Rear Admiral Ellis M.

American intelligence officer, the United

States
Navy was provided with much
and methods
J7
of Britain's information
of handling these problems.
Navy had broken all the

complete naval code had been re-
Early in the war, the Royal
codes of the enemy.
dead German officer by members of the Russian Navy and turned over to the British
for authoritative handling. It was the British who broke
the code of the infamous telegram that had an important
part in America's decision to declare war on Germany in
1917. Throughout that war the British gave American
authorities decoded transcripts of all intercepted enemy
trieved from the arms of a
messages.
With the Armistice this military alliance was dissolved,

and this co-operation brought to an end. American intelligence was left to create a completely new service of
its own, and added to this was the postwar retrenchment
and lack of funds that hobbled the development of this
important weapon. Cryptography, so valuable in wartime,
was no longer considered to be a tool of the military,
but was handled as a factor of diplomacy and what
money was made available for its development was given
to the State Department. A small staff was pieced together
tvith these limited funds, and given the difficult task of
competing with the skilled cryptographers of foreign diplo-
matic
offices.
Fortunately, the small staff selected proved to be ex-
became a valued asset to Washington, and provided useful data in the development of American foreign
cellent,
policy.
The tremendous improvement in the field of radio

made necessary a more efficient development
of cryptography in its positive and negative aspects. Intricate codes and ciphers had to be devised, and keys
found to "read" the latest codes of the opposition. Over
the postwar years American cryptographers made tremendous strides in this field and at one time perhaps
telegraphy
led the world, but this advance brought on a period of
78
complacency with the
that
result
United
Navy
States
completely missed, or ignored, the strides being

by the Japanese. Thus, many of the steps taken by
officials
made
Tokyo
officials prior to
Pearl Harbor might have been in-
tercepted or more fully analyzed. America's chief failure

in the
between-wars period was to be found in the
all-
too-infrequent changes in her diplomatic codes.
But cryptography
intelligence.
strength of
not
is
the
Knowledge must be
enemy naval
forces,
only problem
at
naval
in
hand concerning the
the disposition of those
power of the equipment

concerned. Before hostilities commence, both sides should
have taken all steps to learn what each has in hand to
forces,
fight
and the gunnery and
a sea war.
How many
fire
battleships
does each side
have; what guns and gunnery control are available, and
how
is
well have the gunnery teams been trained?
What
the speed of the capital ships in both favorable
unfavorable
weather?
What
is
the
actual
thickness
and
of
armor plate over vital sections of the hulls and superstructures? Are important turrets efficient during heavy weather,
and how do the destroyers behave during violent maneuvers? Knowing the quick turnover in crews nowadays, how
well have the present crews been trained for any particular
type of engagement? What is the morale of the enemy force?
Then, at the critical period of the battle, will the cryptographers be able to decode the enemy's radioed battle orders?
This is only a portion of the problem of naval intelligence. To appreciate fully the warp and woof of this
fabric, one must sit in the Combat Information Center of
the modem aircraft carrier in action and see the complete
program these responsible officers must carry out in
order to bring the action to a successful conclusion. But
once gathered, all of this must in turn be relayed immediately to one intelligence center which usually means
by message using a code to deprive the enemy of knowing that this information is in fact in the hands of the
opposition.
79
Knowing what your enemy knows is one thing; knowing what he doesn't know is equally important, which
brings us back to the significance
how
of
cryptography.
No
be broken
and used against the side possessing it. So, frequent changes
of codes and ciphers are most necessary if any intelligence
division's cryptography is to be maintained at the required
matter
intricate a code,
it
will eventually
level of efficiency.
An
be found in two
early engagements fought during World War I. Although
the German High Seas Fleet had been bottled up early
by the Royal Navy, the German Asiatic Fleet was still a
force to be considered, and eventually destroyed to keep
the high seas free to Allied trade and sea communications. This fleet was under Admiral Maximilian von Spee,
and was being sailed through the southern Pacific and
off the coast of South America, carrying out a plan of
interesting illustration of this can
naval destruction.
On November
Admiral von Spee trapped a

Coronel close to the coast of
Chile. The German admiral had the famous Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau which must not be confused with two
lighter
1,
1914,
British flotilla
off
the same names that made history in

Using his radio codes, which at the time
could not be read, he gathered in a number of innocentlooking traders that he used most efficiently as his colliers
and supply ships. Thus, when he went into action against
Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock's small squadron, Admiral von Spee's fleet was composed of five cruisers and
other vessels
World War
of
II.
their attendant supply ships.
The British force consisted of Good Hope Admiral

Cradock's flagship a larger cruiser, Monmouth, which was
armed with nothing heavier than 6-inch guns,
as
was
named Glasgow. Although capable of twenty-five

Good Hope carried only two 9.2-inch weapons of
another
knots,
an ancient type. Otranto, a so-called armed liner, served

as a supply ship, while Canopus, bearing four 12-inch
80
guns was on her
way
to join this
puny
force, a point
Ad-
miral von Spee must have known, and realized that she
could not join Admiral Cradock in time to be of vital

assistance.
is shown with Admiral Cradock sailCape Horn when he unexpectedly ran into
Admiral von Spee off the coast of Chile. Whether or not
he realized the Germans full strength is a question, but
he did know that he had no choice of battleground. He
had to attack in weather that provided an angry gale,
conditions making accurate gunnery almost impossible
from turrets aboard vessels such as his. Admiral von
Spee had all the good cards in the deck. He could fight
The
picture, then,
ing north from
or
withdraw
allel
as
he pleased, but for a time he ran a par-
course to Admiral Cradock until he had the Brit-
isher's
ships silhouetted against the
betraying sunset.
Von
Spee's
last
level
rays of a
were hardly visible

and with that he opened
ships
against the vague coastal outline,
the fight.
came quickly; after the third enemy

Monmouth was staggering about, rudderless and
Good Hope received a wicked battering, went out
Success and defeat
broadside
in flames.
and was soon on fire. Glasgow, an unarmored

was bravely exchanging broadsides that weighed
no more than 760 pounds, with the mighty Gneisenau whose
big guns could lob a series of shells that weighed 3300
pounds. At last realizing the hopelessness of the situation,
Glasgow withdrew, lucky to escape, and headed south hopof control
vessel,
ing to join Canopus.
Not one man of the 1600 aboard Good Hope and

Monmouth was ever found, and no attempt at rescue seems
to have been made by either side.
This was Germany's last victory on the sea against her
hated enemy, but Admiral von Spee was glad to steam
out of that vicinity, head for his colliers, and plan to set
up a fixed supply base in the Falklands. It was this unwise move that brought on his end.
On
8l
receiving the dreadful
news
of Admiral Cradock's
defeat, the British Admiralty
made
a swift
tunate decision.
By December
7,
and most foran

avenger
squadron
1914,
under Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee arrived off the Falklands with the intention of first coaling there and then
searching for Von Spee. Sturdee had the battle cruisers
Invincible and Inflexible, backed up by five other well-
armed warships.
Admiral von Spee must have been moving blindly for
days, because on the morning of Admiral Sturdee's arrival
in the Falklands who should turn up completely ignorant
of the situation, but the
it
was the
quietly coaling
closer.
range,
German
Asiatic Fleet. This time
who were in the shelter of the land

when the unsuspecting Von Spee drew
British
When
Canopus
Gneisenau and Nurnberg blundered into

fired a couple of shots over the projecting
harbor. Bewildered by this unexpected

welcome, and ignorant of what vessel had fired on
them, the two German cruisers moved off and waited for
the rest of the squadron to join them.
Unaware of the situation, and having no aircraft to spot
for him, Von Spee possibly may have believed that some
heights
of
the
small force of British ships had taken refuge in the harbor. Instead of sending in a light vessel to scout out the
circumstances, he risked all and continued on. Not until

he had reached the opening of the harbor did he realize
that he had been tricked. Then, rather than running for
it,
he circled, attempting to analyze conditions until
Glasgow, now patched up after her battering off Coronel,
steamed out of the Falklands shelter, followed by Kent.
Behind them, making the most of a carefully laid smoke
screen, came the British battle cruisers. By that time, and
much too late, Von Spee decided that only speed and
retirement could save him.
In contrast to the Coronel battle, this Falklands engage-
ment was fought in bright sunshine on

only a mere breeze to stir the smoke of
a glassy sea with

action.
When
the
82
chase began, the British made no haste to warm their

all hands were piped to dinner as usual and some
guns;
time was allowed for smoking. Once the noonday meal

was finished and cleared away, the bugles rang out
"Action Stations!" and every
man
took his post.
was leading the enemy pack when the

British opened fire. The German fight cruisers broke away
from the line and appeared to be dropping mines. They
were followed by Glasgow, Kent, and Cornwall; Bristol
had already been sent to destroy the enemy colliers. This
left the main battle to be fought by the four large vessels
Scharnhorst
of both flotillas.
and Scharnhorst changed course to the

and by three o'clock in the afternoon Inflexible and Invincible engaged them. This time the Germans were outranged. Both cruisers received a severe beating and were unable to reply. Shell after shell pierced
the armor of Scharnhorst, fire leaped out through the
jagged gaps and by four o'clock she rolled over helplessly
and sank, taking her entire crew with her.
Gneisenau
southeast,
Gneisenau held out a little longer, but the concentrated

of both British battle cruisers soon finished her, and
fire
she too rolled over.
A number
of
men were
seen clamber-
ing over the greasy hull, and in this instance the British
could pick up and rescue nearly two hundred of Gneisenau
crew.
Glasgow pursued Leipsig and finished her by nine

Kent and Nurnberg engaged in furious
combat until 7:26 p.m. During that time the British ship
was hit thirty-five times but hung on and eventually sank
o'clock that night.
her adversary before
armed
it
escaped. Prinz Eitel Friedrich, the
and Dresden, a light cruiser,

was finally trapped and captured
Glasgow near Juan Fernandez Islands off
Chile. The armed finer managed to reach
port where she was interned.
liner,
the latter
escaped, but
by Kent and
the
coast
of
an American

If
one
83
one studies the early maneuvers of World War I,

at Great Britain's audacity in accept-
may be amazed
Her Army was little better

than a token force. Military aviation was scarcely more
than a phrase, for in August 1914 she had just enough
airplanes and pilots to organize three eighteen-plane
squadrons. Only the Royal Navy was prepared for war,
or at any assigned war station. Why this was so was due
ing the
German
challenge.
to a fantastic twist of intelligence,
an almost legendary
story that clearly indicates the value of such knowledge.
Winston Churchill had been First Lord of the Admiralty for three years when he set up one of the most decisive moves of the war's history. It may be remembered
that the British Grand Fleet had been mobilized for its
annual summer maneuvers in 1914, the program of which
was carried out and about 200 fighting ships and 70,000
men were eventually returned to their port anchorages.
Then suddenly,
for
reason
best
known
to
himself,
man and ship back to battle

North Sea. This was done one week before
Great Britain declared war on Germany. Thus, any surprise attack was forestalled, and the safe transport of the
British Expeditionary Force to France was assured.
But what had transpired to trigger this decision? Why,
after a routine test mobilization had been completed, and
when most of the reservists were being paid off before
returning home, did Mr. Churchill send the world's greatest navy at that time back to the North Sea?
The First Lord of the Admiralty had attended a banquet in London on July 24, 1914. One of the guests was
Albert Ballin, a director- general of the Hamburg- American Steamship Line and a close friend of Kaiser Wilhelm.
He was placed beside Churchill who took the opportunity
of questioning the German shipping man on the internaChurchill
ordered every
stations in the
tional situation.
Albert
added
Ballin
agreed
reflectively, "I
that
matters
remember
were
grave,
old Bismarck telling
and
me
84
the year before he died, that one day the great Euro-
pean
War would
in the Balkans."
the
as
various
German steamship
possibilities,
"Suppose
France,
result from some damned foolish thing

Winston Churchill sat deep in thought
director
continued to outline
and closed with some earnestness:
we (Germany) had to go to war with Russia and

and suppose we defeated France and yet took
nothing from her in Europe not one inch of territory,

only some colonies to indemnify us.
difference in England's
Would that make a

we gave such
attitude? Suppose
a guarantee beforehand?"
When
supposition was
was promptly rejected. With that, Churchill knew that war was uppermost in Germany's mind, and he ordered the Grand Fleet
back into the North Sea to stand off all important German
harbors. That instantaneous move bottled up the German
High Seas Fleet. Without this precaution the world's second
largest navy could have steamed from its shelter and
wrought tremendous havoc on ports and shipping of Great
Britain and France, spreading a destruction that might
a
proposal
based
on
Ballin's
telegraphed from Berlin to London,
have evened the
it
scales of sea power.
Whether the Admiralty would have demobilized the

fleet after Austria's ultimatum which Germany fully supportedis of course debatable, but the fact remains that
Great Britain's immediate blockade of German ports had
a major role in the winning of the war. True, the U-boat
phase was dramatic and menacing, but the British blockade
that cleared the oceans of practically all German ships,
naval and merchant alike, held the Kaiser's empire in a
from the beginning of the war to the end. If

German population did not actually starve, a considerable number of people suffered from hunger, and the Ger-
relentless grip
the
man
military
machine was handicapped by the lack
of
necessary materials from the outside world. But great as
was the physical and material
imposed by the
was even more deadly.
restriction
British fleet, the morale blockade
Germany was
isolated
85
from the outside world while the
products of America's farms, mines, and factories flowed

Allied
into
ports.
Hamburg and Bremen were
literally
deserted.
The Goeben-Breslau Fiasco
A
the
prime instance of the lack of naval intelligence, or

failure
to
use what
intelligence
was
sulted in the famous Goeben-Breslau fiasco
was but a few hours
On
little
available,
when
the
re-
war
old.
the outbreak of hostilities, Turkey,
who had had
luck in earlier wars with the Balkan states, took the
opportunity to snatch from the Bulgarians areas that pre-
had been taken from her. She ignored the warnEuropean powers to stay out of this
new fray, but by now Turkey had small regard for any
European coalition, and decided to improve her position
and increase her power. Opportunists ruled the country;
the Sultan was a mere figurehead. Enver Pasha, a young
officer who had led the Turkish Army in revolutions in
1908 and early in 1914, had been made minister of war,
and in that post was the only real power in Turkey.
Enver, who greatly admired Germany, had obtained a
number of German officers to train his troops, and finally
placed the whole Army under the command of General
Otto Liman von Sanders. In no time Turkey was a vassal
of Germany. The Kaiser and his staff made the most
of this situation, and with the German Ambassador Baron
viously
ings of the major
von
Wangenheim
acting
as
official
adviser
to
Talaat
Pasha, the leader of the Young Turks party, this political

complex took on serious implications.
Against this background, the German cruiser Goeben
and the light cruiser Breslau were in the Mediterranean
on the eve of war, and the capture or destruction of these
two warships was added to Admiral John R. Jellicoe's
immediate problems. Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Berke-
86
in the Mediterranean, had

what happened, a circumstance over
which he had little to say or do. The truth is that British
naval intelligence failed to present a complete and imme-
ley Milne, British
commander
to bear the onus for
diate picture of the unfortunate situation.

It
should also be explained that because of the
differ-
ence in dates marking Great Britain's and France's entry
ended in a naval
nightmare. In all fairness, it perhaps was unavoidable,
but it left all Britain seething with outrage and the Royal
into the war, a
program
of confusion
Navy completely frustrated.

Goeben and Breslau, under
man Admiral von

position,
hope
the
command
of the Ger-
Souchon, found themselves in a
and Admiral von Souchon,
of getting out, decided to
realizing
make
period of freedom by creating as
critical
he had
little
the most of his short
much damage
as
pos-
Goeben, a fine up-to-date cruiser, had just underan overhaul in the Austrian dockyard at Pola.
Breslau was also a first-class, speedy cruiser, and Admiral von Souchon, who was particularly adept in handling his colliers, was not likely to be caught without fuel.
Moving out of the Adriatic, Admiral von Souchon first
sailed west to bombard a number of Algerian ports, hoping to delay the movement of French troop transports.
Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, the French officer responsible for such convoy work, had no intention of moving any
transports until he had a full convoy assembled. None of
this information was conveyed to the British Admiral
sible.
gone
Milne,
who
also
had some
responsibility for the safe con-
duct of the Allied transports.
While Admirals Milne and Boue de Lapeyrere fretted

and fumed as to the whereabouts of the German warships, Admiral von Souchon was ordered by secret radio
code to head for Constantinople. Had this message been
intercepted and decoded the outcome might have been
more satisfactory, the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign might
87
not have been fought, and the tremendous losses of Allied

naval
strength
and military
casualties
might not have
occurred.
On
von Souchon, instead

on to Bone and
Philippeville to conduct his bombardment plan, which
meant he would have to sail all night of August 3, 1914.
As a result of this plan, the German admiral was banging
away at North Africa, but doing little damage. Britain
declared war on August 4, and it will be seen that Admiral von Souchon had the time brackets well in his favor. He knew that whereas France and Germany were
already at war which justified his bombardment of
French ports, Britain's war move did not go into effect
until midnight of that particular day, and from a legal
point of view the British Navy had no right to molest
the Germans.
In the meantime, Captain Howard Kelly, skipper of the
British cruiser Gloucester, had started to track Goeben
with considerable skill and daring, and he continued to
follow his quarry, hoping to score while the German war
vessels were heading for the Aegean Sea. But during this
tracking time, the German ambassador in Turkey had
made a hurried deal with Talaat Pasha to have both
receipt of his orders, Admiral
of turning back immediately, continued
German warships turned over
to the Turkish government.
who had been
two enemy
vessels and waiting for the clock to give him the right
to open fire, was to learn that the two German ships had
been changed into Turkish warships, and renamed Selin
and Medilli. One can imagine his frustration when Admiral von Souchon hoisted the Turkish flag and steamed
Thus, Captain Kelly,
stalking
safely into the Dardanelles.
The
best that can be said
is
that at this time British
shipyards had just completed two dreadnoughts for Turkey,
both of which had been paid
but the British government

commandeered them for the Royal Navy when war broke
for,
88
considered a questionable move, but was

Germany's selling two battleships to Turkey to
avoid having them sunk by the British.
out. This
may be
as legal as
The
Battle of Jutland
than decision,
is
which afforded more controversy
another prize example of the hopeless-
ness of accepting battle without the support of naval in-
What
how
both sides
knew of each other's capability, although for years they
telligence.
had been but
is
also remarkable
few nautical miles apart. Obviously, the

on both sides had not per-
formed a creditable
great
sea
job.
fight,
that
was
miles west of the Danish coast on
the
little
naval attaches
diplomatic
This
is
number
of ships engaged,
staged
May
31, 1916, was, in
about equal to Trafalgar,
the greatest naval battle in past centuries.
however, Jutland was about
seventy-five
In tonnage,
fifteen times as great as Tra-
and the number of men involved twice as many.

Of modern battles between later-day ironclads, as compared to the old "wooden walls" of Nelson's day, the
nearest in size to Jutland was that fought by Japan and
Russia in the Tsushima Strait in 1905. Here, however, the
Russians had little more than a worn-out fleet, and Japan
had only to choose her firing range and batter the enemy
falgar,
At Jutland both
and with almost equal skill.
to sinking hulks.
Owing
to
the
lack
of
sides
intelligence,
fought manfully
the
British
Grand
Fleet closed the action battered, somewhat bewildered,

and steaming about an empty sea. It began as the result
of a huge mistake, and ended with the side that had lost
the most remaining on station, complete victor. Jutland,
the last of the great battleship engagements, saw the hussar fleets of darting destroyers scoring the most dramatic
victories. The British lost fourteen naval vessels, the Germans eleven. The Royal Navy suffered 6274 casualties,

while their
enemy
lost
89
killed,
wounded, or taken
would appear
that Admiral Rein-
but 2545
prisoner.
On
the face of this
it
hard Scheer had everything in his favor, but since his

was driven back to its haven and never came out
again to fight, but eventually surrendered to the British
at Scapa Flow after the Armistice, it might just as well
have been sent to the bottom at the time.
As explained before, the British Admiralty knew that
the maintenance of sea supremacy was more vital than
meeting and defeating the German fleet. Germany's
strategy was to avoid any decisive action until the British
fleet was so weakened, an all-out encounter could be
risked. She used the weapons of attrition; U-boat torpedoes and underwater mines to achieve a preliminary weakening. Admiral Jellicoe recognized this intent and early
in the war declared that if a chance of battle came up,
he would regard the turning away of the enemy battle
fleet as a sign it was setting a trap where submarines and
mines lay in wait. It was this over-all situation that prevented an earlier engagement, but by early 1916 Admiral
fleet
had failed to entice the German High Seas Fleet

out, and Admiral Scheer, impatient with the failure of
his submarine flotillas to do little more than sink unarmed
merchantmen, saw that the British blockade was taking
its toll and his sailors losing their varied skills, and most
Jellicoe
certainly their morale.
were slim for he knew that Jellicoe had

and that British dreadnought turrets outgunned him. But what he did not know was that when
the German light cruiser Magdeburg was sunk in the
Baltic, Russian seamen obtained a signal-code case that
was clasped in the arms of a drowned UnterofBzier. The
case also contained cipher and signal books of the German Navy as well as their squared charts of the North
Sea. These had all been sent to London and for many
months the Admiralty intelligence staff intercepted and
Scheer's hopes
a larger
fleet
90
deciphered enemy radio messages and obtained advance

information of his movements.
Through
this intelligence British
naval authorities were
enemy submarine activity, and

they knew that the High Seas Fleet was gathering at the
mouth of the Jade River (Jade Roads). With this knowl-
fairly
edge
well aware of
all
in hand, Jellicoe dispersed the three flotillas of his
Scapa Flow, and (3) Invergordon in Moray Firth. So when Admiral Scheer sent Admiral Franz von Hipper with a scouting force to "demonstrate" off the southwest coast of Norway, Admiral Jellicoe
moved to strike, but he was plagued with uncertainty.
Having no air reconnaissance to guide him he had no idea
fleet to
(1) Rosyth,
(2)
what strength Von Hipper's force represented. At the depths

of his doubt, a telegram from the Admiralty misled him into
believing that the whole German fleet was still off the
Jade River, and that there was great need for swift movement.
Thus, despite the possession
of
German naval codes
and signals, Admiral Jellicoe was hampered by the lack

of immediate or combat intelligence, although he realized
that the Germans could employ their naval Zeppelins to
spot for Admiral Scheer. In this can be found some explanation of Admiral Jellicoe's failure to inflict more damage
on the German fleet.
The Royal Navy had been experimenting for some time

with a mother ship for the accommodation of naval aircraft
and after several attempts to devise a seaplane carrier,
the old twenty-two-knots Cunarder Campania was converted into a
trials
and
Campania put two-seater Short
sea-
fleet aircraft carrier.
exercises with the fleet,
planes overboard and recovered
not
too
high.
At any
Campania was a
rate,
by
In her early
them if the seas were

early summer of 1916
fairly reliable vessel for
naval operations.
She carried eight reconnaissance seaplanes and four Sopwith "Baby" single-seaters. A balloon well was set up at
91
the stern of the vessel and the kite and
its
winch were
by a canvas screen. This balloon could be inand used for limited-range observation, just
balloons were being employed on the Western
sheltered
flated, raised,
as
kite
Front.
Fully equipped in this manner and ready for action,

Campania joined the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow on April
12, 1916, where exercises were carried out and her flying
personnel gained much reconnaissance experience. It is on
record that a few "Baby" single-seaters were actually flown
flight
deck, using wheeled
trolleys as jettisonable undercarriages
while the old liner
off the
was
one-hundred-twenty-foot
hitting twenty knots.
Campania was not destined for

became an innocent figure in
glory at Jutland, but instead
an unfortunate fleet foul-up.

On the morning of May 30, this experimental seaplane carrier returned from one of her regular flight exercises in which both airplanes and the balloon engaged
in a naval-gunfire operation with commendable results.
She dropped anchor five miles from the main fleet and
received
Grand
steam
preparatory
signal
alerting
all
ships
of
the
About 7:00 p.m. she was ordered to raise

for full speed, and by 9:30 Campania was ready
to proceed to sea. However, her skipper, Captain Oliver
Swann, did not receive the executive order that was sent
out at 10:45 an d for some hours was not aware that the
fleet had sailed. When he learned the reason for the general departure, he weighed anchor and passed the outer
boom about an hour after the last ship of the flotilla had
Fleet.
left.
Campania's absence from the battle
line
was not de-
tected until about midnight, and Admiral Jellicoe did not
know
until 2:00 a.m. that she had even left Scapa Flow.
Then, at 4:37 a.m., mindful of the thirteen enemy submarines known to be in the vicinity and the fact that
no destroyer escort could be provided for the seaplane
carrier, the
admiral ordered Captain
Swann
to return
to
92
harbor which Campania reached safely at 9:15 a.m. And

with that, the Grand Fleet went into the Battle of Jutland
without any aerial reconnaissance. (Today, such a situation would be unthinkable.) Admiral Jellicoe's concern for
the old liner
cum
carrier unquestionably deprived
him
of
the full victory in the Skagerrak.
At 2:30 p.m. of that same day, Galatea, one of the

screen ships, sighted a stray merchantman and
steamed off to examine her. Meanwhile the rest of the
battle cruiser flotilla had turned west to join Jellicoe's
fleet out of the Orkneys. At the same time a German
light cruiser spotted the same merchantman, and in a few
minutes both men-of-war had sighted each other and
sent out warning signals.
It was this trick of fate that opened the Battle of Jutland before Admiral Jellicoe had wished, and deprived
the British of a complete victory. Had one of the seaplanes
from Campania been available, Jellicoe or Beatty would
have known better than to make the first move against
the enemy; they would have waited until the German
battle cruiser flotilla had steamed farther north, a greater
distance from the shelter of Scheer's High Seas Fleet.
When Admiral Beatty turned southeastward to cut off
the retreat of the enemy cruisers, his signal to turn made
by flags was not received or read because of low-lying
smoke, and Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, commandBritish
ing the Fifth Battle Squadron, did not turn until nearly
him ten miles behind

Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. Whether this signal should
have been made by lamp or even via wireless, has long been
argued. Why Admiral Evan-Thomas did not turn immediately on his own initiative when he saw Admiral Beatty's
Lion turning, has also been discussed by armchair strategists;
and why Admiral Beatty did not wait for the Fifth Battle
Squadron to rejoin him has consumed gallons of controverten minutes later, a delay that left
sial ink.
93
But this was typical of the Battle of Jutland at least

from the British point of view. Very few moves were
carried out as intended, and the most unbelievable hits
and misses were recorded. One lone shell hit the midship turret of Lion, and had it not been for the gallantry of Major F. J. W. Harvey of the Royal Marine Light
Infantry, the whole vessel might have blown up. With
both legs shattered, and the only man left alive in the
turret, Major Harvey managed to crawl to a voice tube
and have the magazine flooded. He died shortly afterward.
Indefatigable,
hit
by
three
shells
from
the
German
Von der Tann, dropped out of the line, but was

and sank with her more than one thousand men.
When Admiral Evan-Thomas did come up to join the
battle, his gunners put on a brilliant display of accuracy,
battleship
hit again
exploded before piercing the enemy armor.

hit by a salvo, and carried her crew
of twelve hundred to the bottom. This left Admiral Beatty
but their
shells
Queen Mary was
enemy, and
went down next,
fighting with four ships against five of the
when
Princess Royal, a battle cruiser,
Admiral Beatty remarked to his flag captain, "Chatfield,

there seems to be something wrong with our damned
ships today. However, turn two points to port." And with
that the gallant admiral moved closer to his enemy.
Actually, the crisis had passed. Admiral Scheer's trap
was eluded, and the German admiral had to turn and
go to Admiral von Hipper's aid. By 4:40 Admiral Beatty
took his battle squadron north to join Jellicoe who was
coming up with the Grand Fleet. Again, Admiral EvanThomas was misled, owing to a signal that was not received; he was sailing south while Admiral Beatty was
heading north, and only by a series of amazing stands
made by the British destroyers was Admiral Scheer held
off.
During this new period of indecision, Admiral Scheer

was blindly heading for the combined Jellicoe-Beatty
94
but neither of the British admirals had any real

knowledge of this unique opportunity. Here, again, Cam-
fleets,
pania might have saved the day, and set up the annihilation
Admiral S cheer's force. Admiral Evan-Thomas was in

touch with the enemy, but failed to send out any advisory
reports. Admiral Beatty's wireless equipment had been shot
away, and his messages were going out second- or third-hand
from other British vessels.
of
The climax of this was that no flotilla was where it

was supposed or assumed to be when the enemy was
sighted. The whole British fleet found itself in a compact mass and unable to deliver its maximum fire. (Only
when
broadsides are brought into action from in-line for-
mations, can the full power of gunnery be employed.)
Appealing for some information on the position of the

enemy fleet, Admiral Jellicoe next lost Admiral Beatty
who was some seven miles out of position, and it was
commander of the Grand

had any idea where Admiral Scheer was, or in what
direction he was steering. In contrast, British reports
not until 6:10 p.m. that the
Fleet
state
that at least one Zeppelin provided
sance for the enemy, although some
air
German
reconnaisreports are
vague on this point.

Although much larger than the opposition, the British
fleet could never bring its full gunnery power to bear at
one time. Also, Admiral Jellicoe's force was designed for
attack, whereas Admiral Scheer's was a defensive fleet,
meaning that the British had bigger guns and greater
speed, but the Germans heavier armor. The Royal Navy
did its best to destroy the High Seas Fleet, and failing
in that, had to be satisfied with driving it back to Wilhelmshaven where it huddled for the rest of the war.
It is apparent today that neither Admiral von Hipper
nor Admiral Scheer could have been successfully trapped,
although many wild risks were taken. Von Hipper lost his
light cruiser Wiesbaden, but before he made his escape, he
sank Invincible, while an armored cruiser and a third vessel
were left
rounded
in a sinking condition. Eventually, the

itself
up
for
Frauenlob, a
Royal Navy
some concerted action and made
big-gun contribution to the

fleet.
95
its
efforts of the British destroyer
German
light cruiser,
was sunk by a
torpedo from the badly battered Southampton. The Elbing

was rammed by the German battleship Posen which became
confused by the antics of the British destroyers, and to continue matters at this freakish level, the British destroyer
Spitfire
rammed
the
enemy
battleship Nassau, bringing back
a long sheet of Nassau's plating to prove this impertinence.
For more than an hour a flotilla of British destroyers

buzzed about like hornets, sacrificing four, but undoubtedly starting the German fleet back to its harbor shelter.
Unfortunately, none bothered to tell their superiors what
it was up to, and Jellicoe and Beatty were in the dark
what was going on and where.
as to
Before the evening was over, and before Scheer could
make his escape, the German battleship Pommern went

down before a torpedo delivered by a destroyer. And
thus ended the Battle of Jutland with the British fleet
steaming impotently up and down searching for the High
JSeas
Fleet,
touch,
and Admirals
Jellicoe
and Beatty
so
out of
they had to await word from the Admiralty
learn that the
German
fleet
to
was near Horn Reef and ob-
viously steaming for home.
might be added that on August 19, the German fleet,

covered by an airship patrol, moved out once more toIt
ward England from Heligoland Bight, but a Zeppelin

commander warned that the British fleet was advancing to meet it, whereupon Admiral Scheer again turned
and raced back to his home base. In November 1918,
Scheer, in final desperation, ordered his High Seas Fleet
out to break the British blockade, but the
German crews
refused to weigh anchor, a mutinous outbreak that was

to
widen the
cause.
fissure that
was
splitting the
whole German
96
Air Intelligence
made up of a
gathered by many people in
Intelligence in the military sense
amount
of information
ious ways.
In wartime
is
vast
var-
spreads from reports obtained
it
through both open and secret channels of the enemy's

activities to the
information supplied by scouts and recon-
naissance patrols.
Prior to
World War
I,
except for a few novel ascents
no scout had
ever attempted to observe consistently from the air the
activities of the enemy. It was this science that became
the main duty of early war aviation squadrons which
had been hastily trained shortly before the outbreak of
via man-carrying kites or captive balloons,
the war.
The
airplane of 1913-14
thing of the sporting
set,
was
little
more than
a play-
a novel vehicle designed chiefly
to entertain patrons of outdoor gatherings or country fairs.
few models had been
built to
win
city-to-city air races,
maHere and there
or take prizes for endurance, or perform spectacular
neuvers
before
astounded groundlings.
some military-minded aeronaut predicted that the airplane one day might play a part in military operations,
but
only
weapon
In
as
an adjunct to cavalry scouting not
as
of offense.
prewar period gave

promise as a war machine, for they were generally
limited in performance, weight-carrying, and maneuverability. After all, only eleven years had passed since the
Wright brothers had first flown a heavier-than-air machine from the sand dunes of Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. Engines were unreliable and seldom produced onehundred horsepower. Structure still relied on varnished
linen, piano wire, bamboo and spruce framework. There
were few lightweight alloys to encourage all-metal construction, and design had not progressed far beyond the
little
all
truth,
the
aircraft
of
the
97
problems of mounting an engine, a pilot, and a few primary accessories. Comfort or convenience for pilot and
passenger had not as yet been considered seriously. The
fighting
far
away
and the long-range bomber seemed
aircraft
in 1914 as a
moon
as
vehicle appears today.
Fortunately, the aircraft that were available were ideal

military
for
observation;
they were not required to
fly
at great speed, nor at great heights. Aerial cameras, de-
signed for use high above the target areas, had not yet
was carried out

itself was
good weather and airmen who had any
been foreseen, and
by the Mark
stable in
fairly
reconnaissance
all
eyeball visually. The machine
knowledge of military or naval assemblies could fly over

the enemy areas and gather considerable information.
Some were adept with the pencil and returned with detailed
tillery
areas,
enemy strong points, locations of armaps showing some particular of back
sketches of
batteries,
and hurried
precise anchorages.
silhouettes of naval vessels
Compared
and
their
to the limited range of the
cavalry patrol, and the not-too-reliable information gath-
ered by anxious troopers moving about in

intelligence supplied
to
by these
enemy
early airmen
was
areas, the
far superior
anything available to military planners in previous cam-
paigns.
Reconnaissance
made by airmen of the Royal FlyMons and the following
flights
ing Corps during the retreat from

battles along the
Marne and
Aisne, according to the British
Sir John French, were "of incalculable value in the

conduct of operations." These reports were made by pilots
General
and observers using their eyes and basic military training,

and assessing the value of what they saw. Not everything
was spotted, and some items may have been forgotten by the
time the patrol had ended, but the intelligence was most
important. However, it was not until the first air camera
with its unfailing lens was produced that full details of the
enemy's layout could be obtained and studied carefully by
men
trained in this
new
art of reconnaissance.
espionage and counterespionage:
98
was of course new. Although

Wilbur Wright and a photographer took motion pictures of Centocelle, near Rome, and at about the
same time M. Meurisse, a Frenchman, took some remarkable aerial prints in December 1909, it was the British who
first applied the camera to actual war reconnaissance when,
on August 19, 1914, Captain Joubert de la Ferte and Lieutenant G. W. Mapplebeck are said to have used a camera
Picture taking from aircraft
in April 1909,
in the air for such a purpose.
George Saunders, noted histoNumber 3 Squadthe old Royal Flying Corps, then commanded by
According to Hilary
rian
and expert
ron of
Captain
(later
St.
in British military aviation,
Air
Chief
Marshal)
Moore Brooke-Popham, had the
Sir
Henry Robert
foresight to incorporate
photography into their patrol work. Captain Brooke-Popham

realized that a precise camera would record everything
within its scope, and an examination of its prints with a
microscope would reveal many important features that might
escape the naked eye.
There was little or no money for such a fad and the flying officers had to purchase available standard cameras out
of their own pockets. The famed Captain Joubert de la
Ferte, who also became an air chief marshal, was one of the
most active in this new enthusiasm, and after weeks of trial
and error it reached some stage of acceptability. In fact,
this photo section of Number 3 Squadron had produced a
complete set of photographs detailing the defenses mounted
on the Isle of Wight and along the Solent. When they flew
to France, in late August 1914, these experimenters tried
to take this new science with them. Although they made a
grand effort during the Battle of the Aisne, their prints were
blurred and of little value.
The French were more advanced in photography, and it
was soon perceived
that they could teach the British a great
Major W. G. H. Salmond was ordered to make a study

French photographic organization, which resulted in
the formation of an experimental photographic section, con-
deal.
of the

sisting of Lieutenants
J.
99
T. C. Moore-Brabazon, C. D.
M.
Campbell, Sergeant F. C. V. Laws, and Air Mechanic W.

D. Corse. These four men were given the task of designing
an air camera, a work they completed in less than two
months. While this rush job was under way, another RFC
squadron had carried out the first successful photographic
patrol in January 1915
when
brickyard layout south of the
pictures
were taken
La Bassee
Canal.
of the
When
the
were studied under a stereoscope they revealed a new

German trench system, the existence of which had not been
known or suspected. This brought about a modification of
the plans for attack, and when the assault was made it was
prints
most successful.
General Joseph
saw the
asked that
made
The
commander
new form
French Armies,
and
copies of photographs taken by the RFC be
Joffre,
possibilities of this
all
of the
of reconnaissance,
available to him.
cameras were the pocket, folding type with

and used glass plates. They were difficult
to handle in the air because of the small gadgets, clips,
original
leather bellows,
and spring releases, and intense cold jammed their shutters.

Working with a British camera manufacturer, Moore-Brab*azon and Campbell produced a new type of an early form
of the box camera. It was conical in shape and had the
lens set at a fixed distance from the five-by-four-inch plate.
The airman observer held the instrument by means of straps
or brass handles, leaned out over the side of his cockpit, and
aimed the camera at the area below. Some idea of the intricacy of this instrument can be understood when it is explained that eleven separate operations were necessary
first plate. Ten
more were needed for each succeeding picture. But despite
this handicap, some fairly satisfactory prints were obtained
and much use made of them by the British staff.
Various forms of this hand-operated camera were used
before the airman observer could expose the
through 1916-17, but later on semiautomatic plate cameras

were designed in which the observer released the shutter
100
moment
mechanism operated the

changing of the plates. Through 1918 air cameras were made
of considerable size and weight, and some carried as many
while at the same
as
fifty
plates
the
of eighteen-by-twenty-four-centimeter size.
Eventually, film cameras were furnished that were capable
one hundred exand before the Armistice was signed, fully automatic cameras were in use; instruments that were run by
electric motor or by a generator that was driven by a small
propeller twirled by the wind. Automatic film cameras are
of carrying rolls of film that contained
posures,
now used
almost exclusively.
By mid- 19 15 the Allies and Germany had adopted aerial

photography on a large scale, and both sides realized that
steps would have to be taken to prevent the enemy from
recording military secrets in this manner. It was then, and
not until then, that ideas for the development of aerial
fighting
with
its
were
seriously considered. It
was the
aerial camera,
probing eye, that inspired the long and
history of fighting in the
thrilling
air.
The British used aerial photography with good results in

Egypt and Palestine, chiefly for mapping, because the charts
available were of little use. About this time Lieutenant Hugh
Hamshaw Thomas became interested in making a scientific
study of these aerial prints. He accumulated a large fund of
valuable knowledge in interpreting military installations as
seen from the air, and it was from the studies of this young
officer that General Edmund H. H. Allenby planned his
many
By
successful attacks.
1918 photographic reconnaissance had become an
tegral part of military intelligence, in fact
in-
photography had
brought about something of a revolution in this field.

Although the original methods of gathering information were
not superseded, they were supplemented in
much
the same
many
instances,
manner in which traditional methods of

communication had been supplemented by the telephone
and radio telegraphy. By the Armistice photographic intelligence had more than proved itself and was accepted on
in
101
both sides as the indispensable eye of the modern military

machine. Because of the technical limitations of the equipment and the performance of the aircraft, however, it had
been accepted only as a tactical weapon, a concept that
marked the stodgy thinking
of
the
postwar
staffs
and
Colonel Blimps of the military colleges.

Little did they
know
that in the next global conflict, the
side with the best photographic reconnaissance and pho-
tographic interpretation would win that war.
John French had few victories or military

him through the early months of the
war. His army was under strength, there were few shells for
his artillery, and he had little idea how to cope with the
war of stalemate, barbed wire, and machine guns. He
hung on and built up where he could and awaited the
spring of 1915, and then at last discovered that the Germans were holding the village of Neuve-Chapelle, tucked
into a salient that could be assaulted from two sides.
General Sir Douglas Haig submitted a plan for an assault
as early as February 1915, a plan based on a map that had
been made solely from photographic reconnaissance. Airmen
*of Numbers 2 and 3 Squadrons, RFC, had watched the
Neuve-Chapelle area constantly, and by February 20 had
devised a complete picture of the village, covering from 1500
to 700 yards in depth, which took in the whole enemy
trench system faced by Britain s First Army. The all-seeing
eye of the camera had provided a detailed map that showed
every point of importance. Hundreds of copies were given
to the infantry and artillery, and for the first time in histoiy,
an army went into action with a complete picture of the
hidden features of the enemy defenses before it.
General
Sir
successes to encourage
After
front
bombardment delivered over

from the Moated Grange southward
preliminary
stretching
a
to
Richebourg l'Avoue, the infantry attacked with determination, and before noon the village and the roads leading northward and southward had been captured. However, one fault
102
mapping, the airmen had failed to notice certain strong points behind the German positions, and
none of these had been photographed ( or perhaps the interpreters had failed to spot the screened earthworks) and it
was from one of these strong points that the enemy estabcropped up;
in the
lished his counterattack.
Neuve-Chapelle provided other

ices.
The
first
"firsts" for
the flying serv-
counterbattery work was carried out by
air-
working with Number 1 Artillery Group, and the Royal

Naval Air Service stood by with their Number 2 Armored
Car Squadron, ready to dash through and exploit a complete
craft
which,
breakthrough,
unfortunately,
never
materialized.
Royal Flying Corps bombers performed a new task, flying

a prearranged plan of air attack against the Courtrai
railroad station
and the Menin
junction, while others hit hard
Douai, and Don, delaying

moving toward Neuve-Chapelle
at the railroad stations at Lille,
for a time all
enemy
reserves
from the Courtrai-Menin-Lille district.

Captain G. I. Carmichael, who flew a Martinsyde
Scout, delivered a one-hundred-pound bomb on a railroad
fork north of Menin. This missile, dropped from a height
of 120 feet, destroyed the rails, and also buffeted the Scout
so that for a moment it rocketed skyward completely out of
control. It was the first time that a bomb of such weight had
been dropped from so low an altitude. During all this, three
aircraft of Number 4 Squadron were ordered to bomb the
Lille station.
One
of these machines, carrying Lieutenants
M. Warrand and G. W. Mapplebeck was shot down;

Warrand was badly wounded and died later, but Mapplebeck escaped into Lille where kindly inhabitants sheltered
him for several days. He then slipped into Holland and
finally returned to rejoin his squadron by the middle of
April. He was killed a year later in an air accident.
The battle for Neuve-Chapelle lasted about three days,
and although not wholly successful, the Allied High Command was so satisfied that the plan was regarded as a
pattern on which all future attacks should be modeled.
A.
CHAPTER V
How Britain Coped

between Wars
The Camera Doesn't Lie.
America Aroused
Intelligence
Intelligence
between Wars
The Armistice
of 1918
marked
trie
beginning of a long
period of half-hearted national defense, and moral decay in
was argued that The Great War had

consumed more than four years of comfortable living, and
the general public was willing and ready to resume the
happy-go-lucky manner of life that had prevailed before the
fateful summer of 1914. Freedom, democracy, the solemnity
of treaties, and the sovereignty of borders won with heroes'
blood were accepted like tawdry prizes and soon forgotten. The armies that had won the battles were quickly disbanded and returned to their recruiting areas for demothe free countries. It
No
one considered guarding the hard-earned

achievements, or erecting new defense machinery that
would make another such outbreak impossible.
bilization.
The political giants who had guided the Allies to their

triumph were rapidly deposed, and men of limited capacity
were handed the reins. Realizing how much they had sacrificed to the cause, returning
servicemen were resentful of

had gathered
the large financial rewards the stay-at-homes
during their absence. They demanded their share of the

spoils, and when good jobs and high salaries were not forthcoming, they laid down their tools, declared strikes, and relaxed; determined to
make up
for lost leisure.
Men who had
104
been taught to take life with no sense of culpability continued in that vein, and the peacetime ( ? ) world opened many
new avenues to them. Prohibition created a national thirst,
and a profitable area of illicit operation was opened up.
Bootleggers supplied the speakeasies, and the corruption
was a foregone conclusion. Men

war were easily recruited
were adept with the maThey
ventures.
highjacking
into the
chine gun, and staged gang wars for a price. Perhaps more
than any other factor, the Volstead Act contributed to the
multimillionaire booze barons, wholesale murder, mass
assassinations, and the national breakdown of morals and
of the police
who had
and
judiciary
actually fought in the
manners.
An
attempt was
made
to enforce the
law when Congress
appropriated funds to recruit 1500 prohibition agents
who
were paid an average of little more than $2000 a year to

keep 125,000,000 people from manufacturing or drinking
anything stronger than near-beer.
This attitude was typical of several countries that
had fought and died
for.
In the United States,
it
men
provided
the $500 automobile, and almost total inertia in government.
The 1920s saw the Golden Age of Sport when prizefights

drew $1,000,000 gates, but no one considered an improvement in national defense. Airplanes were designed for endurance, transoceanic hops, and the money prizes, but
Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, who was trying to prove
the worth of the bomber against the battleship, had to make
his point with cast-off aircraft from the 1917-18 war raids.
Fighting tanks that had been brought to a remarkable standard of efficiency in 1918 were now used as war memorials
on the front lawns of American Legion posts, and no attempt was made to continue their development until World
War II threatened. The free world's navies were allowed
to slumber and decay while the available shipyards concentrated on luxury liners, or dismantled earlier models that
were towed to Japan for scrap metal. The Washington Naval
Conference of 1921 put the stopper on any progress by the
former
Allies,
105
but paradoxically contributed to the develop-
ment of the German pocket battleship. Only Germany

showed an interest in rearmament, and was in no way
deterred by her conquerors.
Against a background of national economy, there was
small hope of continuing the development of military intelligence. The pacifist governments saw no necessity for such
an unreasonable expense. The war to end wars had been
fought and brought to a successful conclusion. Where was
the need for further snooping?
The intelligence services worked as hard as the combat
branches to maintain some semblance of an efficient organization. Trained men, equipment, and leadership are the
prime requisites of success in war, yet all these factors are
of little value without the knowledge to handle them in action. Foreknowledge is always required to wage war, to set
up its strategy and maneuvers, avoid enemy pitfalls, and
score victories.
During World War I the belligerents simply tried to outgun each other, but during World War II they maneuvered
to outsmart each other, and as far as possible wage a war of
wits. Thus, intelligence becomes a major operation that is
waged
it is
as relentlessly in
peacetime as in war. In other words,
not enough to consider war as an isolated technique in
which the armies are engaged in isolated combat, but as a

national effort in which not only the admirals and generals
create the strategy and policy, but the statesmen and civilian public are expected to assume important roles in military
science, diplomacy, strategy, and the nation's economy. In
fact, the "intellectual war" may be carried on without resort
to conventional arms, but waged with the intangible weapons of
its
own
design.
Brainpower has come into
its
own and
taken
its
place
beside landpower, seapower, and airpower, the traditional

forces of combat.
By
the same token, with the acceptance
106
of the "cold war," intelligence
improvement
in the art of
may have brought about an
war by a
emphasis from
man-and-weapon
shift in
the material to the intellectual aspects of

conflict.
To
word
the
man on
the street, intelligence
a fashionable
is
for the romantic spy story, secret missions, cloak-and-
dagger engagements, and every factor of undercover operations contrived by the fictioneer. In fact, the word, as such,
has been accepted in our modern vocabulary, a prize example of our age of organized confusion.
The word actually refers to the capacity to understand

and manage ideas. Another interpretation is the mutual conveyance
which
of
information,
in turn points
communication,
up the contest
or
between nations; information

commodity by men who specialize in
of relations
that
it.
function, intelligence
mation, appraise
til it
it
is
intercourse,
of wits in the conduct

is
In
handled as
its
military
the organized effort to collect infor-
piece
by piece and gather
it
together un-
forms a large and clear pattern that permits one to see
the shape of things to come. This
is
no haphazard
or impro-
vised function, but a clearly defined effort, for intelligence
can only be effective if it is conducted along scientific lines,

and shows where causes and effects are unquestionably
linked.
In this work
we
are dealing with
ligence, not the cold-war
modern
military intel-
maneuverings of the Central
Intel-
ligence Agency, or the conventional activities of the Federal
Bureau
is
of Investigation.
The
science of military intelligence
the organized gathering of data concerning military theo-
ries,
strength of
enemy
countries, doctrines of their
armed
and their war plans in general. Data on weapon

development from the small-arms category to the atomic
weapon is very important, as well as information on military aircraft and their fighting equipment. Equally important are details on the health, morale, and esprit de corps
forces,
of the individual units.
10J
modern military intelligence can be

found in the preparation and maintenance of maps and
charts. The recent history of the U-2 flights confirms this.
Maps provide important support for all intelligence, and
their making is a task that never ceases. The general who
goes to war with inadequate maps is destined for defeat.
After all, man is continually making changes in the surface
of his world; he builds new roads and destroys old ones, he
lays down railroads and rail systems that are extended and
The
true basis of
improved year
Any
after year.
military
map
or chart that
many commanders have been pitifully misled by the information contained on such sheets.
is
not up-to-date
is
a dangerous weapon, and
Maps are not easy

when many countries
to
make
or acquire, especially today
are not accessible to mapmakers,
and
can only be made from information
details of these areas
supplied by intelligence agents.
Under such circumstances,
map
the average 1/25,000-scale military

of about fifty-six square miles
may
cost
that covers an area
up
to $150,000,
and
could take two years to make.
Today, the United States Navy keeps some 7000 nautical

charts up-to-date, and produces about 1000 new charts every
year, a task that costs nearly $10,000,000 a year. In
War
II the
United States
Army
World
spent a yearly average of
$80,000,000 on topographical maps, military surveys, and
such geodetic data. The current average

$40,000,000 and the
work
requires
is
still
around
more than 8000 highly
skilled specialists.
But mapmaking
of military
alone
is
is
not the chief product of this branch
intelligence,
seldom
as
the
topographical knowledge
sufficient; the aerial
modern surveys make,
photographs by which
or correct, military maps, also fur-
nish important data that can be obtained in no other way.
Photo interpretation that was born late in World War I, is

today one of the most important skills in the hands of the
military intelligence officer.
108
How
Britain
Coped
Once World War I came to a

suffered much the same neglect
the
of
steady development in the
departments
as did other
Fortunately,
services.
British
close, military intelligence
there
had been
civil applications of aerial
photog-
raphy, but the manners and means of the 1914-18 war

still
marked the
activity of the military.
In Germany, where the Nazis had boldy begun to create

Goering's Luftwaffe in defiance of the Versailles Treaty,
considerable effort was
made
to provide for photographic
for the new German Army.

So well was this science pushed that General Werner von
Fritsch, then Chief of Staff, forecast that the side with the
intelligence
and
aerial
mapping
would win the next war.

September 1939 and was thus
prophecy fulfilled.
best photographic reconnaissance
He was
killed in action in
prevented from seeing his
Frederick Winterbotham, a
Staff Intelligence,
member
was a frequent
of the
visitor to
British Air
Germany where
he diligently collected considerable information on Nazi

activities,
but after the signing of the Munich pact in Sep-
tember 1938, German security was strengthened and Winterbotham's travels were less fruitful. He then recalled his
old Royal Flying Corps days when he had served as a fighter
pilot and had often escorted British photographic aircraft
over the line, and what valuable information had been obtained in that manner. It was one thing to come up with
the idea, and another to carry it out, but luckily, an exRoyal Naval Air Service airman, Frederick Sidney Cotton,
who was a native of Australia, happened to be in England
in the
summer
of 1938
on business involving color photog-
raphy.
Sid Cotton
was a
mechanic and
an imaginative inventor. It was he who had produced in
World War I the airman's Sidcot suit, a one-piece, windproof, electrically heated garment for which every flier of
true adventurer, a skillful
lOQ
that time yearned. After demobilization, Cotton continued

to fly
on various ventures.
He
established airmail
and
trans-
port services in Newfoundland, and on the side tried aerial
photography, mapping, and survey work. His experiments
with the aerial camera brought up certain
possibilities for
color prints, and Cotton was in London to establish contacts

with a color-film company in Germany.
Winterbotham saw immediately that Cotton was the man

who could carry out his scheme, and he induced the Australian to join him. The British Air Staff was advised of the
idea, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril L. N. Newall backed
them to the limit. Cotton first obtained a Lockheed 12-A, a
compact little airliner that could operate at a very high
ceiling. This was secretly rebuilt to carry three aerial cameras that were hidden under the passenger seats; one was
fitted to photograph directly downward, and the other two
were set to take oblique pictures on either side. Thus, with
a reasonable amount of overlap, long strips of country could
be photographed. Panels were so arranged that when they
were closed the cameras were practically invisible. Cotton
then completed this deception by having the Lockheed
painted a dull duck-egg green, a color that
*
plane almost invisible at altitude.
To
made
all intents
the air-
and pur-
was the private transport of the AeronautiCompany which would require many
business trips abroad, especially to several capitals in Europe
and particularly to Berlin where the color-film company
was located.
Robert Niven, a young Canadian who had just finished a
short service with the Royal Air Force, was engaged as pilot, and he and Sid Cotton took the duck-egg green Lockheed to Heston Airport and set up shop. From that day on
officials of the Aeronautical Research and Sales Company
flew about Europe at twenty thousand feet, working out the
poses, this plane
cal
Research and Sales
many problems
of high-altitude photography, the
first
of
which was to furnish heat that would prevent the shutters

and lenses from freezing in such extreme temperatures. They
110
next installed extra fuel tanks to extend the Lockheed's

range, and to test out the whole system, Cotton and Niven
conceived a Mediterranean tour from Heston to Malta, during which time they took roll after roll of film that recorded
important scenes over Libya, Eritrea, Sardinia, and the
Dodecanese
Islands.
The cameras, the aircraft, and the piand the Mediterranean ven-
loting responded wonderfully,
produced hundreds of remarkably clear pictures, but

the time no one had an idea how to harvest the wealth
ture
at
of information the pictures contained.
Although a rudimentary form of photo interpretation had

been developed in World War I, by the summer of 1939,
more than twenty years after the signing of the Armistice,
there was only one experienced interpreter available to the
RAF. He was Flight Lieutenant Walter Heath, who found
himself saddled with the project of training a corps of
intelli-
gence interpreters within a few weeks. This was the actual

beginning of true aerial intelligence.
In
the
meantime Cotton's duck-egg green Lockheed
turned up by "strange chance" at a special
air rally
staged
by Goering's Luftwaffe at Frankfurt. Dozens of other aircraft also turned up, some of them the latest fighters and
bombers built for the new German Air Force. The business
agent of the Berlin color-film company, a Heir Schone who
claimed to have flown with Baron von Richthofen in World
War I, was on hand to greet the British party; in fact Heir
Schone made certain that the British party was introduced
everyone of importance including General (later Air
Field Marshal) Erhard Milch of the Luftwaffe. The natty
to
Lockheed intrigued the German
officials
and several
of
indicated that they would like to be taken on a
them
flight.
Sid Cotton was
more than delighted to oblige, and to

more interesting he offhandedly
suggested that he take them on a picture-postcard trip along
the Rhine, but added that perhaps such flights were a
make
the proposed flight
breach of security. General Milch soon took care of that
111
thoughtful reservation, and over the next few days the Lockheed, with
its
three cameras hidden below the luxurious
passenger compartment, was flown over dozens of defenses,
such as
feet
airfields, factories,
ammunition
and several
two thousand
centers,
At
some very revealing footage was obtained
noted
a cruising level of
fortifications.
casually flipped a
little
as
Cotton
switch fitted to the side of his seat.
Nearly every general and colonel in the
German
Air Force
requested a ride in the Lockheed, and with each take-off
Cotton had reloaded
his
cameras, and was prepared for
close-up shots of the countryside.
Cotton and
companions invented all sorts of excuses

to return to Germany, and by the third week of August
1939, when the infamous Russian-German pact was signed,
he was in Berlin, and for a time it looked as though Cotton
and his Lockheed would be detained there until it was believed that Great Britain would make no hostile move. He
finally
his
received a clearance, a permit that insisted that
would take him on a direct course to the

Dutch frontier with no casual sightseeing over any sensitive areas. His flight took him close to Wilhelmshaven
where he visually spotted a number of Nazi warships, all
looking like little gray darts. It was a great temptation to
veer off a few miles and take aerial photographs, but Cotton
resisted, and flew on to London where he gave his visual
his flight plan
account of the scene to Frederick Winterbotham.
A week
later Hitler
invaded Poland, and appreciating the
seriousness of the situation, the British Admiralty

to
know
exactly
haven. Royal
which Nazi warships were
Navy
intelligence officers
wanted
Wilhelmsin
got
touch with
in
Winterbotham who called Sid Cotton.
By this time the Aeronautical Research and Sales Company had acquired a Beechcraft, and Bob Niven, accompanied by a service photographer, took off aboard it to
"tootle about" at high altitude above the German naval base.
They were back within a short time with a set of photographs that enabled the interpreters to identify every ship
H2
in the flotilla.
On
the following day, Winston Churchill, then
Lord of the Admiralty, could answer numerous quesconcerning the status and whereabouts of the German
First
tions
Fleet.
But the Germans were not idle. In the spring of 1939

flown the Graf Zeppelin up the east coast
of Britain. On board was a General Martini, Director Gen-
Hugo Eckener had
eral of Signals for the Luftwaffe,
who had
arranged for the
big dirigible to carry special tracking equipment to uncover

British radar transmissions. Apparently, this attempt failed,
although experts are unable to explain

could not be obtained,
why
this
for, in fact, British
information
radar not only
detected the presence of the Graf Zeppelin, but traced her
According to Winston Churchill in his wartime

memoirs, the Germans should not have been surprised to
pick up Britain's radar impulses, but they would have been
intentions.
astonished at the extent to which the electronic equipment
had been put
into practical effect
and incorporated
in the
air-defense system. In July 1939, twenty radar stations
operating between Portsmouth and Scapa Flow;
all
were
could
detect aircraft flying above ten thousand feet, with ranges
varying from
fifty to
one hundred and twenty miles. In ad-
dition a satisfactoiy anti-jamming device
method
of
IFF
duction. Also flight
ment
lots
and a simplified
Friend or Foe ) were in prowere being staged for the develop-
Identification,
trails
radar equipment designed to enable

to "home" on enemy aircraft by radar beams.
of aircraft
pi-
To continue with the importance of aerial photography

and photo interpretation in the science of military intelligence, it is on record that within an hour after the official
declaration of war, a British Bristol Blenheim of the RAF
Bomber Command, took off on the war's first official photoreconnaissance patrol to again photograph the
at
German
Fleet
Wilhelmshaven. The pilot of the Blenheim was Flying

Andrew McPherson, whose photographs and written
Officer
113
number of enemy vessels had begun

and when a second reconnaissance was flown
the next morning he photographed a number of vessels in
report indicated that a
moving
out,
the Schillig Roads.
He
obtained seventy-five photographs
from an altitude of 24,000

as to justify a
was the
a
first
follow-up
bomber
RAF
feet that furnished
aircraft to cross the
reconnaissance
Leipzig was standing
such detail
attack on these Nazi warships. This
off
German
disclosed
frontier,
that
the
and
cruiser
the entrance to Wilhelmshaven,
four destroyers were anchored in Jade Bay, and two important-looking warships were at Brunsbuttelkoog at the west-
ern end of the Kiel Canal.
Following
this
reconnaissance twenty-nine Blenheims and
Wellingtons took
off to
attack these units.
The weather was
not good; heavy rain and low cloud lay over that section
of Germany and many of the attacking aircraft went astray.
One lone bomber reached Brunsbuttelkoog and bombed a
warship with no discernible result. Five Blenheims, carrying five-hundred-pound bombs that were fused for a delayed detonation of eleven seconds, roared up the Schillig
Roads in open formation approximately five hundred feet

above the water. Two aircraft in the rear lost touch with
their leader, but the three others held formation until they
sighted, between the rain squalls, a German pocket battleship, identified as the Admiral Scheer. The man-of-war was
to port of the flying formation, and the Number 2 plane,
starboard and abreast of the leader, turned sharply, putting
it in a position to attack first. It went in, but the first bomb
missed, and the second failed to leave the aircraft.
Meanwhile, the leader turned to attack. He went down
almost to the surface of the water.
tender alongside the
some temporary cover, but the

leader skimmed over this and pulled up just high
stern of the warship afforded

British
enough to clear the mast of the Admiral Scheer. His observer saw men leaning against the rails of the vessel and
a line of laundry
and pieces
hung out
to dry.
The
British
bombs
fell
of the warship's catapult gear flew skyward.
114
The third Blenheim attacked a second later, but its crew

was uncertain whether they had scored or missed.
The attack was a complete surprise, and this formation
of Blenheims was followed by five more planes that attacked
from low level. Only one of these returned, and it was feared
that the others had gone in so low they had been brought
down by the deck explosions of their own bombs. The RAF
lost five Blenheims and two Wellingtons in this initial foray,
but the skill, resourcefulness, and resolution shown by their
crews indicated that they were worthy of their fathers the
airmen who had fought the Germans some twenty-one years
before.
Winterbotham and Cotton were soon called
in
by mem-
bers of the British Air Staff to discuss wartime aerial photog-
seemed that the
RAF
crews were having the

same problems that Cotton had experienced earlier; their
cameras froze up at high altitudes, and there was a great
raphy.
It
air
need for more detailed photographs. In

was anxious to obtain a complete set
fact, the Air Staff
of
two particular
targets.
After outlining their earlier experiences and suggesting

possible remedies, Cotton said that
available to
photographs.
if
a Blenheim was
made
him he would go out and shoot the required
He
first
requested the use of a
these were in such short supply, he
had
Spitfire,
but
to settle for a twin-
engined machine. Although he was still a civilian, arrangements were made eventually whereby any plane registered
name would be considered
his, and he would be peranywhere.

After making an inquiry as to the weather over Holland
and arranging with Winterbotham to have a number of
photographs processed later in the day, Cotton took off with
in his
mitted to
fly it
Bob Niven. By
full of
early next
morning Cotton had an album
glossy prints that he took to the Air Staff office.
"Are these the sort of pictures you want?" he inquired

with a grin.
An RAF
115
agreed that these were exactly what he

wanted, but that he would not expect pictures of such qualofficial
under war conditions.

"By the way," someone asked, "when were these taken?"
ity
"Yesterday afternoon," Cotton replied.
Within a few hours
officials
of the
RAF made
a pointed
bid to have the Cotton organization work for them.
The
rest of the story
is
fairly routine.
Cotton made the
most of the opportunity and requested Spitfires as his

camera ships, although for a time he had to be content
with the old Bristol Blenheims. He was induced to take an
RAF commission as a squadron leader, but acting as a wing
commander. A small group of RAF pilots and administration
men were added to his Heston group, and the work went
ahead. When Spitfires were available, they were modified
to carry cameras and extra tanks; all guns and radios were
eliminated to allow for high-altitude flying and speed.
Nothing that the German Air Force could put in the sky
could
reach
or
catch
planes. They, too,
these
single-seater
photographic
were painted duck-egg green.
All through the period of the so-called
Phony Warphony
who were not taking part the Heston group

made hundreds of sorties and photographed most of the
to the critics
critical areas.
the French
They
who had
degree of efficiency.
put on
film, as
also co-operated wholeheartedly with
developed the aerial camera to a high

Large areas of the Siegfried fine were
were many important
airfields
then in
German
hands.
time Cotton learned of a new Swiss photogrammetric machine, a large mechanical optical device with
which aerial photographs were enlarged in three-dimensional form to allow the operator to make important measurements of buildings, equipment, fortifications, and ammunition dumps. One of these novel devices was brought to
London, and Michael Spender, brother of Stephen Spender
About
this
the poet, became highly skilled in the use of this machine.

With Cotton and Niven flying the photoreconnaissance
Il6
planes,
and Spender making thorough analyses of their

Naval Intelligence Division was soon provided
prints, the
with complete details of
all
available ships in the
German
Navy.
After France fell, leaving Great Britain to fight on her
own, the special overseas flights of the Heston Group were
ordered back to England, then the long, anxious watch was
begun on the German-held European coastline, and Cotton's
complete photographic unit was turned over to the RAF's
Coastal Command. On June 17, 1940, the Air Council took
over the unit and placed it under Wing Commander Geoffrey Tuttle. Sid Cotton received a very nice letter of explanation, and later on was awarded the Order of the British
Empire, but this decision and such cavalier treatment must
have cut him to the quick. Officially, little was heard of him
after this.
America Aroused
America's concern for Great Britain and her probable
hands of the Nazi warmongers was warm and

sincere all through the harrowing year of 1940, although
there were not many on that side of the Atlantic who believed that there would always be an England. Lend Lease
was a timely and generous gesture, and as the grim months
rolled on, and it looked as though, with the RAF's help,
Britain was going to survive, some farsighted members of
the United States government began to realize that history was repeating itself, and that eventually America
would have to take a more aggressive role. Very few people
thought seriously of a Japanese menace, but some minds
went back to the period of 1916-17 when German submarines had been a definite threat. It was reasoned that if Hitler was denied an invasion of Britain, he might still win by
devoting more time and planning to another all-out U-boat
campaign to starve the British Isles out of the war.
Any such move could bring about a repetition of the situation in 1917 when President Wilson was forced to take
fate at the
117
a hand to defend America's commercial freedom on the high

seas. And with this in mind, it was determined to make a
more thorough examination
of Britain's
her defense measures, and, above
all,
various
services,
her amazing photo-
interpretation organization.
Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, United States mili-
tary
and naval
forces
had carried out many programs
of
aerial photography. Excellent cameras for both day and
night operations had been developed, and aircraft had been
designed or modified for
this
exacting work, but in the
was not one photo

interpreter in the United States Navy, and from all accounts
no one in the United States Army Air Corps had any idea
what modern photographic intelligence meant. Aerial photography was used mainly for mapping, an art that had been
admirably exploited by both the Air Corps and the Corps
years before the Japanese struck there
of Engineers.
Fortunately, the American naval attache in London, Vice-
Admiral Robert Lee Ghormley, was impressed by the work

done by the RAF's photo interpreters then located at Wembley and Medmenham, and asked that someone competent
be sent over to observe how it was done. Lieutenant Com*mander Robert S. Quackenbush, head of the United States
Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics photographic division, together with two United States Marine officers, Captains
Charles Cox and Gooderham McCormick, were sent over to
study British photo interpretation. For three months, these
American officers were given full opportunity to see the
RAF
section in action,
and learned much
Commander Quackenbush
of this
new
science.
then returned to Washington to
suggest creating a school for photographic interpretation, and
within a month after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, such a

school was organized at Anacostia with Quackenbush, Cox,
and McCormick taking over the teaching

esting to note that
Commander
(later
duties. It
is
inter-
Captain) Quack-
enbush had much the same trouble selling his ideas, obtaining equipment, men, and some practical encouragement.
Il8
Thanks to Sid Cotton and Fred Winterbotham, Great

had somewhat of a lead in the organization of photo
interpretation as they had begun before the outbreak of war,
but Quakenbush was in a full-scale conflict before he could
Britain
plan his
training course.
first
The Army Air Corps made no serious move to take up

this slack until the summer of 1941 when Captain Harvey
C. Brown, Jr., was sent to England to take the RAF photographic-study course. At first Brown thought that he had
been sent over
advances in camera
to investigate Britain's
techniques, but soon discovered that cameras were of no
importance compared to the ability to read information from

the photographs they
menham
just
when
had
taken.
Brown
arrived at
Med-
the British interpreters were making a
careful study of Germany's troop-carrying gliders from

photographs taken at an altitude of 35,000 feet over Maleme,
Crete.
He
also learned that the
WAAF
(Women's
Auxiliary
Air Force) examiners could compute to the inch the wingspan, chord, and length of these
from
their appraisals the
RAF
new
attack aircraft,
and
aeronautical engineers could
and compute their man-carrying

were being assembled for a planned
airborne attack on Malta. It was never attempted.)
When Captain Brown returned to Washington full of enthusiasm, he received little encouragement; only some of his
figure their wing-loadings
(The
capacity.
gliders
superiors in intelligence, including Lieutenant Colonel ( later

General) Lauris Norstad, showed discernible interest. But
as the
war
in the Pacific
recorded defeat after defeat, the
"new" branch of intelligence was recognized. While the Japs were hammering their way southward
in the Pacific, Captain Brown saw his idea of a photointelligence school take form with the Army Air Force Inimportance of
telligence
this
School at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. This
organization was placed under the
Egmont
F. Koenig,
direction
of
new
Colonel
and Captain Brown was assigned the
section for training civilians in the art of photo interpretation.
Major F. Martin Brown and Captain Samuel L. Batch-

elder were
added
11Q
to the original staff,
whom went
both of
on to important operational assignments.

As is usually the case, an attempt was made to inject
some form of mass production into the process and in a
short time classes of literally hundreds of men (but no
women) were herded through Brown's school. Few of the
students
and
had much
interest in this
their eventual value
was
demanding technique,
negligible.
But the
first
grad-
uates from Brown's classes were soon sent overseas and
attached to the United States Eighth Air Force, then being
formed
in
many of
new RAF
Great Britain, and
postgraduate courses at a
located at
Nuneham
these interpreters took

interpretations school
Courtenay, Oxfordshire.
From
that
point on American enthusiasm and volume of equipment
transformed the British photo-intelligence bases into mush-
rooming Allied organizations.

With this added manpower, the wealth of equipment, and
the new enthusiasm contributed by America, more and more
work was piled on the photo-intelligence people. By now
Hitler's proposed Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Britain, had been abandoned and it was the Allies' turn to
make an offensive move. After convincing his new American
^partners that an invasion of Europe was out of the question
until 1943-44, Churchill next proposed Operation Torch,
the North Africa landing.
The preliminary work
fell
to the staff of the
Medmenham
group which was expected to provide not only the aerial

mapping for the initial planning, but the many ground de-
would help the paratroopers. This was all very

new; old-time soldiers were more familiar with regulation
maps drawn to scale and offering only roads and routine
tails
that
conventional signs to indicate bridges, ditches, railroads,

special buildings, and contour lines. To many of them the
new photographic map was bewildering and too detailed,
but with this clear photographic evidence and their new
interpretative
the
Medmenham
girls could furnish the

height of a hedge around a house, the position and thickskills,
120
ness of a barbed-wire defense barrier,
water
and the hour by hour
line of a creek or river.
the Operation Torch intelligence program,

was quickly organized that was comteam
an
posed of Americans, Canadians, British Army, Navy and
Air Force officers, and two commissioned officers in the
WAAF, Sarah Churchill, daughter of the Prime Minister,
and Dorothy Garrod, who was a professor of archaeology
at Cambridge University. It was second nature to Miss
Garrod to search patiently every item that not only was obvious, but also those that might provide keys to the whole
To complete
inter-Allied
problem.
As a matter of
interest,
Minister of Great Britain
while a daughter of the Prime
was working on problems
of
interpretation, the son of the President of the
United
Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, was in
command
map
States,
of a
Lockheed Lightning group assigned to photoreconnaissance

missions. Colonel Roosevelt had been involved in aerial
photography for more than two years, but mostly on mapping and survey projects. He had had some experience in
searching sites for North Atlantic air bases, and in 1942 was
sent to West Africa where he mapped certain areas that
were important to the Vichy French regime. In Britain
young Roosevelt took over command of the 3rd Reconnaissance Group located at Steeple Morden in Cambridgeshire,
and it eventually joined General James H. Doolittle's
Twelfth Air Force in Africa.
A complete book could be written about American photo
interpreters in North Africa; some of their experiences
were
as hair-raising as those of the fighter groups. In
had
one
not been for a careful study of the French

battleship Jean Bart which was tied up at the Mole du
instance,
Commerce
it
United States Navy cruiser

Augusta might have sunk as she approached the African
coast. The Jean Bart lay at anchor in an uncompleted condition. Her rear turrets had not as yet been built in, and one
of the forward turrets was not finished.
in Casablanca, the
121
Two days after the North African landings had been

made, the U.S.S. Ranger was standing off and providing
aerial photographic reconnaissance. Believing that the guns
of Jean Bart had been silenced in earlier attacks by carrierbased dive bombers, Admiral Henry K. Hewitt's flagship
Augusta was moving in to smother any harbor resistance.
At the last minute, however, a photo interpreter aboard
Ranger took a final glance at the recent photographs and
saw to his dismay that there were still four undamaged
guns aboard the French battleship, pointing seaward. They
were fifteen-inch weapons of remarkable range. He raced
to the bridge, and explained the situation as Augusta's
bridge staff saw two shells from Jean Bart plop into the water ahead of them.
Advised that he was outranged by the Vichy French ship,
the skipper of Augusta wisely withdrew until effective measure could be applied. It is difficult at this point to decide
whether dive bombers from Ranger or guns of U.S.S. Massachusetts that had been completely missed by Jean Bart
lookouts until she was well within range of her own guns,
finally put the French battleship out of commission. That
decision may be left to more authoritative opinion.
Once the landing had been successfully carried out,
British and American photoreconnaissance groups operated
from a North African base and supplied the armies concerned with
first-class
information.
British
Spitfires
per-
formed wonders in taking important photographs, but the

American Lockheed Lightnings, although fast and maneuverable at low altitudes, could not outdistance the enemy
Me. 109s above 15,000 feet, and many gallant photoreconnaissance pilots were lost on these missions. Also, hurriedly
trained photo interpreters from Harrisburg were bewildered
by problems posed by desert conditions, and on one occasion reported a convoy of resting camels as a squadron
of German tanks. They had not learned as yet that tanks
moving over such terrain leave unmistakable tracks. But
they learned the hard way, and by the time the Allied ar-
122
mies were moving on Tunis, a sound organization was in

being. By this time, too, United States Army and Navy
agreed that photoreconnaissance was as important
complete air cover.
officials
as
The Camera Doesnt Lie

Aerial reconnaissance, with
all
its
revelations
and
re-
wards, must at times speak with shocking truth. While the
camera can be most reliable in revealing the enemy's

strength and weakness, it often portrays the failures and
mistakes of the side relying on its veracity.
On the night of March 19, 1940, about six months after
war had been declared, the Royal Air Force made its first
bombing assault against an enemy target on German soil.
Forty-nine bombers, Whitleys, Wellingtons, and Hampdens
took off from an RAF station in Lincolnshire and headed
for an important seaplane base located at Hornum on the
Island of Sylt from where German aircraft flew to plant
mines in the North Sea.
By midnight a cryptic signal had been received from the
air
Number 5 Bomber Group formation indicating

had been highly successful. The House of Commons was in late session and when Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain made a formal announcement of the raid and
added that it was a just retribution for a recent German
attack on Scapa Flow, the weary members sent up a resounding cheer. The news that British airmen had at last
struck and obliterated the enemy base on the Island of Sylt
was wildly acclaimed as "an event probably without precleader of the
that the raid
edent in the history of warfare." The newspapers joined

the national gloating with bold headlines;
TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED

HOURS ATTACK ON SYLT
LAND TARGET AT LAST FOR RAF
HANGARS AND OIL TANKS ABLAZE
ADMIRATION IN USA
SIX
ADVENTUBES IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
123
But while the British bombers were making their return

over the four-hundred-mile trip across the North Sea, two
intelligence officers, Squadron Leader Browne and Flight
Lieutenant Hamshaw Thomas, who had previously briefed
the crews, sat waiting for their return and planning their
interrogation. Both men realized the importance of this raid
and its influence on many more to follow, and they intended
to milk every item of information from every crew member
before allowing him to crawl
By
off to
bed.
the time the chill silence of daybreak
about the Hemswell
airfield in
had
settled
Lincolnshire the two intel-
had put their last question and made out

Group headquarters, feeling reasonably sure
that the raid had been profitable. The pilots, navigators,
gunners, and bombardiers had all stuck to their stories proclaiming the raid to have been a wonderful success.
The British public drank deep of this dramatic reprisal
for twelve hours, although the Germans ignored any deligence officers
their reports for
mention of an attack on Sylt, but charged instead that

had violated Danish neutrality, and attempted to
explain that the main British raid was not on the German
island, but on Denmark.
1 Elated with the rewarding success after six weary months
of ill fortune, RAF officials felt that the tide was beginning
to turn. They could hardly wait until aerial photographs
would be available to indicate how much damage had been
done. Two Bristol Blenheims went off to put the evidence
on film. The newspapers were begging for pictures of the
tailed
the
RAF
great raid.
When
the
first
pack was delivered and distributed among
a team of photo interpreters, there was a long
moment
of
The pictures were not of the best, but they

were clear enough to indicate without any doubt that the
Hornum base was still standing; the hangars were still erect
and undamaged, a number of Heinkel floatplanes stood on
the concrete ramps and slipways, the oil tanks looked pertotal silence.
fectly intact.
124
For a
faint
second or so the interpreters thought that
these photos were a set taken to
show the condition
of the
base before the raid, but on glancing down at the imprinted

date strip, there it was as plain as could be: March 20. De-
whole photo section as the intersome evidence of a hit, some indication

that the RAF boys had actually struck at Hornum. After
several hours of checking it was disclosed that but one small
bomb had pierced the roof of one unimportant hangar, and
there were a few craters out along the sand dunes, yards
from any important feature of the base.
In the meantime the German commandant of the Sylt base
invited a number of journalists from neutral nations to visit
the seaplane base, and, of course, the truth came out. On
spond
settled over the
preters searched for
the evening of
March
22, 1940, the Air Ministry issued
explanation to the press.
It in
an
RAF
no way endeared the
to the British public. It read:
The Royal Air Force
carried out a reconnaissance
on the island of Sylt on Wednesday morning with

a view to confirming the previous night's attack.
The photographs taken have proved to be of no
value in indicating the extent of the material damage inflicted in the course of the heavy attack.
For months the subject of photoreconnaissance was a

painful one at Bomber Command.
CHAPTER
Operation Sea Lion
VI
The
Flame Barrage.
France in 1940, Hitler was master of much

war he had hoped he could evade,
and commander of a military machine with nowhere to go.
To maintain his blustering role he was forced to threaten an
invasion of the British Isles, a plan he dreaded. But because
With the
fall of
of Europe, victor in a
the hated British
would not
listen to
reason and capitulate,
he had no choice but to declare that he intended to cross

the Channel and force Perfidious Albion to her knees. A
master plan, to be known as Operation Sea Lion, was the
result.
Although he believed that he had the men and equipfor such a venture, Hitler, amazingly enough, knew
nothing of Great Britain or its people. He had never visited the island empire and could not understand this strange
race of men points that were to bring about his undoing.
German intelligence concerning the British Isles was practically nil. A few high-ranking officials of the Imperial
German Navy had deep respect for the Royal Navy, its
strength and traditions, but they were never able to convey
this knowledge to their Fuhrer who was incapable of comprehending anything pertaining to the sea.
Great Britain was equally witless concerning the mad
ment
Austrian
whom they never understood;
nor could they appre-
126
ciate or believe in his insane ambitions.
To
the average
Englishman Hitler was a comic, third-rate, political posturer who could not be taken seriously. One has only to
glance through the newspapers and illustrated weeklies of
the time to sense that a mere handful of people in Britain
realized what a threat Hitler and his gutter rabble were
to Europe's future. Instead, he was the cartoonists' godsend. His antics provided hundreds of hilarious situations
for them to caricature, but it was beyond their ken to appreciate that this clown could topple their whole world.
Mussolini earned deeper respect for he was a soldier, a
military airman who could pilot an airplane. His strutting
and grandiose attitude were accepted as part of his role, but
that man Hitler was nothing more than an ex-Austrian corporal whose war record could be summed up in one wordzero; an out-of-work paperhanger who had dabbled in dreadful watercolors, a pathetic political figure
attract
an audience
could take a
man
in
global
some back-street beer garden.
its
was not encouraged
enjoyed success in that
war might not have been
When
of
Had he
the
BEF
equipment
in
could only
Who
like that seriously?
It is tragic that Hitler
art career.
who
to pursue his
field,
a second
fought.
scrambled out of Dunkirk, leaving most

Belgium, British intelligence
still
concept of the force that Hitler had at his command.
had no
On
June
Dunkirk evacuation, Great Britain's 52nd Scottish Lowland Division was ordered to France,
and embarked at Southampton on June 9; this in the face
of statements made by officers who had escaped from the
Continent that the French Army was finished and would
fight no longer. The British felt that there was still a lot of
room between Paris and the Pyrenees to make a stand and
establish a new line of defense. Major General James Drew
believed that the rampaging German Army could be stopped
that is, he did until he had taken the 52nd Division into
Cherbourg and moved out to make such a stand.
The division landed at Cherbourg on the morning of
4,
1940, the last
day
of the
127
Le Mans for assembling.

On arrival there they learned that the enemy was reported
to be in Rouen, and some forces had crossed the Seine
between Louviers and Vernon. The 51st Highland Division
had moved previously into the Le Havre peninsula, a grim
mistake, as it was captured eventually when no naval vessels or transports could by moved in to take it off.
June
11,
and was then ordered
to
However, the British 157th Infantry Brigade, the first to

be assembled, was ordered to take a position on the right of
the French Army at Conches, and an anti-tank battery was
sent along to support it. By June 12, the Germans were advancing southwest on Evreux, and the British then discovered that there was a gap twenty miles wide in the French
line directly opposite their front, but it was still impossible
for intelligence to determine whether the Germans would
continue their advance southwest, or wheel left and encircle Paris.
Hoping to hold the German thrust, French General Maxime Weygand a short time later ordered the 52nd Division
to move into this gap by brigades as they arrived, an order
that was resented by the British who wished to keep the
division intact. This hopeless situation continued until June
6 when, after days and nights of trying to
move up
against
the frantic streams of civilian refugees and straggling military units that cluttered the roads, the
able,
by abandoning
their
52nd Division was
ammunition, pontoons, and other
equipment, to move their troops back over the 160 miles

to Cherbourg. Luckily, the Germans had decided to wheel
and the withdrawal was not hindered in any way,

air attacks. The whole British
force was safely embarked and returned to Britain.
But such was the level of intelligence after the war had
been on for some nine months.
on
Paris,
except by two half-hearted
Operation Sea Lion
While all preparations for the invasion of Great Britain

were well under way, Hitler continued to complain that
128
his intelligence service
tive, its
could
tell
planning for defense, or
him nothing
its
people.
able was meager and not very reliable.
of his objec-
What was
The
avail-
situation
was
same on the opposite side of the Channel.

For example, the Germans had to know the British order
exactly the
of battle; the identities, composition,
and the
The
the field troops waiting to repel them.
location of
intelligence
them was that by late August the British had 34%

22 of which were fully operational. The actual
strength of the British at this time was less than 29 divisions
and six armored brigades, all well below establishment in
personnel and weapons. Later on intelligence, supplied by
supplied
divisions,
German
agents
British strength
were
who used
up
to
secret radio sets, reported the

divisions,
37
but only
five of these
were
identified in their correct locations, ten
listed as
ten miles from where they actually were, nine were fisted
in
wrong
areas,
and eight
divisions identified
were not even
in existence.
On the
other hand, relying on hit-and-run
aerial photographs,
and radio
commando raids,
reports from their agents, the
had no idea how many troops the enemy had available for an invasion, whether it came by sea or air. They
did know that any seaborne landing would have to be made
just before dawn and at high tide, and that these high
British
waters occurred at different times on different sectors of

the British shore. Conditions for a landing on the Norfolk
(east) coast
would be
five
days later than the suitable conany invasion
ditions along the Sussex (south) coast. Also,
would have to be accompanied by strong fighter cover, and

with this mind the area threatened was narrowed down to
the limited range of such aircraft.
Without any actual or reliable knowledge of Hitler's airborne infantry strength, a fantastic estimate was made concerning this form of attack, and with each new assessment,
enemy paratroopers were seen everywhere. With only
twenty-eight under-strength divisions, and little hope of high
mobility because of the lack of troop-carrying vehicles,
it
129
was of great importance for the British to know exactly

where the main landings would be made. Out of an evenmoney situation, they decided that Hitler's forces would
strike at the east coast, whereas the German planning body
had early decided on the south.
Any attack at either area relied to a great extent on Gerbut Goering, who constantly
claimed that his bombers could cut road and rail communications so badly that it would take four days for British
reserves to move into any attack area, persistently ignored
many's strength in the
air,
such plans and sent his aircraft instead against targets of no

great military importance, or tried to blast out the airfields
were being used by the RAF Fighter Command. In so

ways, then, he managed to lose the Battle of Britain,
and thus robbed his Fiihrer of the one great advantage
that he might have had in an invasion of the British Isles.
It should be inserted here that Prime Minister Churchill had
planned for swift deployment of his available troops, an
art that had been sadly lacking in France, once Hitler's blitzkrieg columns started their moves out of the Siegfried line.
While Hitler vacillated in his threat to invade Great Britthat
many
ain, his
plan to attack Russia led him to toy with the idea
occupying Ireland as a means of keeping Churchill busy

and eliminating any possibility of his setting up a second
front. This plan was never fully outlined, but it did involve
some comic-opera efforts by German intelligence.
An elderly Luftwaffe reserve officer who had once been
of
jailed for
espionage in Britain before the outbreak of the
war was dropped out over County Meath, Ireland, in May

1940, some seventy miles from his planned rendezvous. He
wore a heavy fur-lined flying suit, jack boots, full uniform,
and, for sentimental reasons, all of his World War I medals.
He made his way over the roads until he was picked up
by the Irish police. By that time he had lost his portable
radio, his invisible ink, and most of his money. He had no
idea that the Irish would accept British currency and he almost starved to death until he was clapped in pleasant con-
130
finement.
When he was
ordered to be repatriated to Germany
in 1947 this pathetic figure took poison. His story reflects
the substandards to which
when
the absolute best
As the plans and
German
intelligence
had sunk
was not too good.
threats of Operation Sea Lion continued,
intelligence agents were dumped on

them were captured immediately by
alert Home Guard veterans. Few of these agents had been
properly trained and were obviously rushed into this temporary breach in the hope that one or two might afford some
valuable information over the few weeks that remained before the Nazis marched up the British beaches. One small
boatload that had embarked at Le Touquet arrived blind
planeloads of
England, but
German
all
of
drunk, having overcelebrated their hoped-for success with
French champagne before they set sail. Another small group

in a light dinghy arrived near Hythe and walked straight
into a battalion of the Somersetshire Light Infantry.
They
were carrying a radio set and a book of elementary ciphers.

They proved to be Dutchmen who had only a smattering of
English, and it was thought that they had committed some
breach of military rule and were blackmailed into this ridiculous venture.
Another espionage party of four, including a German and

a Dutchman, enjoyed what might be considered a hilarious
time. The Dutchman spoke English well, but the German
was only proficient in his own language and French. They
were given a royal send-off on the night before they started
out, and they arrived off Dungeness with a terrible thirst.
The man who spoke English decided to walk into the town
of Lydd to buy some bottles of beer. He did not know that
British pubs have regulatory licensing hours, and one landlady explained that nothing could be bought until midmorning.
"While you wait around, sir," she said pleasantly, "I sugyou have a look at our old church nearby." He
did, and when he returned, the thirsty man was arrested.
gest that
The landlady had
sensibly notified the police.
13
Meanwhile the German had rigged an aerial in a small

tree and had begun to send his espionage reports in French
to his controllers across the Channel. In one statement he
said that he was "at the exact position where three Messerschmitts had fired machine guns at a water reservoir painted
red," information that was calculated to facilitate a possible
bridgehead in Kent.
All four
men were
captured and tried under the Treason
The Dutchman was acquitted but the other three were

hanged in Pentonville Prison.
In another instance two men and a woman were landed
by dinghy on the coast of Banffshire, Scotland, after being
flown across the North Sea by seaplane. Their actions over
the next few hours quickly attracted Scottish suspicion; the
men spoke with a distinct foreign accent, and their identity
cards were so crudely forged that any auxiliary policeman
would have immediately picked them up. When they were
searched one man was found to have a loaded Mauser pistol, a flashlight marked, Made in Bohemia, and a radio set.
Another had a list of bomber stations in East Anglia, and
around one thousand dollars in British currency and the
musical-comedy prop, a length of German sausage. The two
man were hanged. This happened in September 1940 when,
for all practical purposes, Operation Sea Lion had been canAct.
celed.
Meanwhile in Great Britain service authorities were still

making incorrect forecasts of the enemy's intent. They still
planned to halt an assault on the east coast, and argued that
from the military point of view conditions were better on the
gently terraced beaches than the narrow southern beaches
that were flanked by or overlooked by cliffs or escarpments
of the Downs. They pointed out that the East Anglian plain
offered greater areas for mechanized warfare than the agricultural patterns of Sussex and Kent. When it was learned
later that the Germans had decided to attack along the
southern coast, Prime Minister Churchill resolutely main-
I32
ing rightly
mean
were thinkand we wrongly." He had decided that it would
tained that this decision "does not
that they
be prudent to block off all likely sections of the beaches

with a good defense and to make secure all creeks and harbors on the east coast; the south coast, he believed was less
immediately dangerous.
Paradoxically,
all
the
enemy
ports that threatened the
south coast were covered continually by camera aircraft,
and day
after
day the report was the same no invasion
shipping was being accumulated, and no
ment
or supplies
were
to
dumps
of equip-
On
the other
be found anywhere.
hand, the Baltic ports that could threaten the east coast
were an unknown quantity as far as photo coverage was

concerned, and British intelligence had to rely on two different books of negative information.
The
dilemma was compounded on the accepted

had long considered an invasion of their
country, whereas he had not. But if he had held this view
since his attack on Poland, his plan must by now be at a
very elaborate and complete stage, whereas their own was
being pieced together with what had been salvaged from
Dunkirk. They had boasted for years that the Royal Navy
was capable of keeping their shores inviolate, but a new factor had entered the picture. The airplane, the military, or
naval bomber had piped a new tune, and no first-class
naval power would risk moving capital ships into an area
where the enemy air arm could strike. In other words,
could the Royal Navy actually stop an enemy invasion from
British
fact that Hitler
the sea?
But would
the
come by sea or by air?

Imperial German Navy contribute to
it
How much
could
the assault? Here
again, British intelligence failed to provide a complete an-
swer because no one in Britain had a correct summation of

the strength of the enemy's surface fleet. In most instances
it was greatly exaggerated. As an example, the Admiralty
in the summer of 1940 did not know that the enemy's two
modern battle cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, had
133
been severely damaged by naval torpedoes, and air bombs

of the RAF, and were out of action. In addition, the Germans were credited with having six light or heavy cruisers
in effective service,
Much
From
the
when
they had only two.
same could be
said of Goering's
Luftwaffe.
the beginning of the war, self-appointed experts in
neutral countries filled the newspapers and aviation maga-
and superiwas downgraded
zines with highly colored reports of the strength,

ority of the
German
Air Service.
The
RAF
from eveiy angle particularly in the United States. One

of the air experts of the day was Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh,
who had been an
aviation cadet in the U. S.
Army
Air Force and passed his tests for a second lieutenant's
commission. After his memorable solo
flight across the At-
May 1927 he was hoisted to the rank of colonel

although he had bolted the service and gone into commer-
lantic in
cial
aviation
shortly
after
being commissioned.
He had
never seen any form of aerial action; he had never been an

observer in any war, or chalked up one hour of active service
with any fighting squadron. However, he spoke glibly
of air
power and knew the answers concerning the
relative
But when a Senate investigating committee put such questions to him he had a
sudden reversal of opinion, and admitted that he did not
^values of this plane or that plane.
know how many
planes
Germany
or Russia had, or
how
strong the British and French were, but he was quite certain that the United States was far behind certain European powers in the matter of aeronautical research. Prior
to this, he had stated openly that Germany's air arm could
win any European war within a few weeks.
Captain Al Williams, well-known Navy speed flier and
a respected spokesman for aviation, steadfastly praised the
German Messerschmitt and implied that if war ever came,
it would bat every British Spitfire out of the sky. He forgot
to explain that the particular Messerschmitt to
ferred
had been modified
which he
re-
to set a speed record over a closed
134
kilometer course;
it
was
in
no respect a standard operational
fighter.
war in 1939, the advertised

Air Force ranged from 10,000 to
Prior to the outbreak of the
strength of the
German
100,000 aircraft, but after the attack on Poland these figures
were reduced to 3500-5000 first-line planes. When Russia

was invaded in June 1941, the Luftwaffe was said to have
between 22,000 and 25,000 bombers and fighters. After the
Russian offensive the experts cut the Nazi strength to 4000
planes.
When
Hitler
was planning
his invasion of Britain in
summer of 1940, American aviation experts who had

been in Germany stoutly declared that Hitler had more than
10,000 first-line planes ready to hurl at the Royal Navy and
the RAF. One such expert persistently stated that Germany
the
was
all
set
to deliver 20,000 paratroopers
whenever the
Fiihrer so desired.
and accepting the worst, the British aswould have at least 10,000 operational
aircraft available whenever he so desired, and they planned
accordingly. However, Adolf Galland, one-time commander
of the Luftwaffe Fighter Arm, has stated that Germany had
but 2500 first-line machines to send against Britain that
memorable summer, whereas Britain had about 3000, though
only 300 of these were first-class fighters. With Hitler's hedging and vacillating, Great Britain built this number up to
750 in July and August. The Spitfires and Hurricanes of that
day were far more maneuverable than the Heinkels and
Messerschmitts, as was proven in the Battle of Britain.
So, for more than three months, from mid-May until
the beginning of September, British intelligence pondered
on Germany's intentions. They maintained the view that any
attack would have to be restricted to the radius of fighter
cover, and they were correct in this. They also believed
that any attack would, once ashore, head for London, but
Playing
sumed
it
safe,
that Hitler
they could not, in their pride of naval heritage, admit that

the
German Navy was
attacks,
large enough to support two separate

and they hard-headedly refused to think that any
135
such attack would come on the south coast. Interestingly

enough, Hitler's Sea Lion plan was based on that one area.
Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, concluded in a paper
prepared by the Naval Staff that it was quite probable that
an enemy force of some 100,000 men might reach Britain's

shores without being intercepted by naval forces, but added,
with very little justification, that their subsequent maintenance would be virtually impossible. He, too, gave little attention to the possibility of a landing on the south coast.
Prime Minister Churchill contributed the opinion that it
would be very difficult for the enemy to place large bodies
of troops on the east coast, and it was even more unlikely
that the south coast would be attacked. In looking over the
defense plans, the chiefs of staff stated that they were
slightly overinsured along the south coast,
Hitler
had made
his threatened
when
in fact
if
move, they would have been
heavily underinsured. Only five divisions with three availa-
from Dover to North Cornwall,

two more in reserve
15%
were allotted to the east coast between Cromarty and
ble reserves held the coast
divisions with
while a total of
Dover.
Fortunately, photoreconnaissance in early September
showed large barge concentrations in the Channel ports
which indicated that any thrust would be made at the
southern shore.
hurried regrouping of the
was made, and by September 15
Home
sixteen divisions
Forces
were
in
position for the defense of southern England. Bewildering

reports
came
in
from every point
of the compass.
military attache in Ankara, Turkey,
A German
had given some de-
Lion to a senior Turkish staff officer,

most of which filtered through enemy security and wound
up in London. It was intimated in this information that
the attack might come across the Channel, and Churchill
finally conceded that it might be well if the chiefs of staff
tails
of Operation Sea
took this into consideration.
The
British
ambassador in Bucharest forwarded a report

and naval minefields would be used
that long-range artillery
136
an invasion "across the Channel," and once more the

it might be wise to
and
minefields.
guns
By the end of
keep a lookout for these
in
"east coast" die-hards admitted that
August photoreconnaissance was providing evidence that was

almost impossible to misinterpret. Aerial views of
German
showed that there were forty to fifty merchant vessels

and 350 large motor launches docked at Emden,
but the Invasion Warning Sub-Committee still applied unports
at Kiel
reasonable explanations for these concentrations.
In early September photoreconnaissance showed that there
were large numbers of barges at Ostend, Terneuzen, and at

the south end of the Beveland Canal, and by September
5,
intelligence
reported
Army had been

failed to stir the
that
leave
all
for
the
German
canceled. All these items of information
composure
explanations for every
of the committee, as they
enemy move.
found
Fortunately, the Inva-
Warning Sub-Committee was not the only organization

activities. The War Office's M.I. 14
section of the Military Intelligence Directorate began to
show some concern and their conclusions finally reached
sion
watching the enemy's
the desk of the Prime Minister
who
gave a speech on
September 11 in which he seemed "remarkably well

formed" on the German planning.
If
in-
the British were being dense in the matter of intelligence
and vital information pertaining to their enemy, the Germans

were equally inert in tracking down the situation across the
Channel. They had no idea that immediately after Dunkirk the British were quite incapable of repelling an enemy attack once it had eluded the Royal Navy. Britain's
chief force of half -trained
men
with
less
than ten rounds of
ammunition apiece could not have met and driven off any
What fully trained men were available had no arms or equipment with which to fight, the
bulk of it having been left in France or Belgium. General
Archibald P. Wavell's Middle East force had to be supplied,
well-equipped army.
had the armed
as
India, Singapore,
137
stations at Gibraltar, Malta,
Burma, and West
Africa.
Apparently the Germans had no idea that

three weeks to re-form
Hong Kong,
it
would take
what had been the BEF,
or that the
was under
11,000 men, or about half the regulation establishment. Of
the sixteen divisions still available, two had had no divisional
training, five had done very little, and nine could be considered only "fair." Available to these stalwarts were 54 twopounder anti-tank guns, 2300 Bren guns, very few mortars
or mortar ammunition. There were 37 armored cars, 395
average strength of the British infantry divisions
72 infantry tanks, 33 cruiser tanks, 420 field

guns with about 200 rounds per gun, and about 160 medium
and heavy guns. There were small reserves of equipment
stocked in ordnance depots, but these could not be placed
in the hands of experienced troops for several weeks.
light tanks,
German
some one
had joined the Home Guard, who for the
time being were being armed with outdated rifles, sporting
shotguns, and even small-caliber target rifles. When firearms were not available, kukris (the traditional knife of the
intelligence did learn, however, that
million Britishers
Gurkha),
assegais, (Berber spears), theatrical sabers, axes,
and many
variants of the bludgeon
one
Home Guard
were
carried.
There was
group in Essex known as the Cutlass
Platoon because they were armed with these old nautical
weapons
for
want
of anything better.
German propaganda made loud protestations against the

threat, and its members were reviled as an unscrupulous franc tireur, a murder band whose recruitment
constituted a wanton breach of international law. The ancients who listened to these radio broadcasts from Hamburg
and Bremen were highly flattered and strutted about the lo-
Home Guard
pubs proclaiming what they would do if old Hitler ever

sent his paratroopers over. And with that said they went
back to their broomstick drilling. When the Home Guard
had been equipped with submachine guns, rifles, grenades,
and a few anti-tank guns by September 1941, they were
cal
ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPION AGE
I38
annoyed when the enemy refused to invade and

them something to shoot at.
Although the Home Guard never won a battle honor, it
naturally
give
did have the dubious distinction of taking prisoner the
Deputy
Fiihrer of the Third Reich, Rudolf Hess,
bailed out from a Messerschmitt over Eaglesham
Renfrewshire on the night of
May
when he
Moor in
10, 1941.
The Flame Barrage
With the
cryptic reports that the British
flame barrage equipment
all
were erecting
along their coast,
German
in-
went into high gear with a program of dire

warnings of what could happen to any invasion force that
attempted to assault the British beaches. It was this dread
that may have caused Hitler to abandon his plan.
Only one small section of this device was actually erected
and discharged, an experiment made in August 1940 along
telligence
the northern shores of the Solent that separates the Isle
Wight from Hampshire. Ten pipes were mounted on

cliff and were carried down to the
water. These were supplied by ten tanker wagons that deof
the top of a thirty-foot
livered twelve tons of oil per hour. Several ignition devices
were used
few seconds a wall of

flame raged up from the water, and the heat generated
to fire the fuel; within a
caused the sea to
was
boil.
battery of these flame barrages
to be erected along the critical shores to hold off the
invaders.
Once
this
defense measure was heard
agandists put
their
printing presses
of,
into
German propThe
overtime.
stories, in turn, led to a crop of wild legends in which

hundreds of burned German corpses were washed up along
the British south coast.
The German public spread the
story
and wilder rumors indicated that hundreds of their troops

were being sacrificed daily against this inhuman barrier. An
American correspondent in Germany claimed to have seen
a trainload of burned soldiers being rushed from the Ger-
man
invasion ports; but this
was explained
139
later as
having
been men who had been testing flameproof asbestos suits.

All these tales led to the inevitable climax. A motion picture was made in 1954 in which it was implied that Admiral
Canaris, Germany's super spy, had managed to steal a
British official film of the Solent experiment. When this was
exhibited to the German General Staff it was so frightening
(according to the scenario) that it brought about the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion.
Of course, nothing of the sort had happened. Operation
Sea Lion was not attempted because Hitler never really
wanted to raid Britain, and he was unable to understand
the requirements of amphibious operations. His naval experts knew that they could not outmaneuver the Royal
Navy, and Goering's Luftwaffe had not been able to outfight the
RAF.
All in
ened the resolve
all,
the threat of invasion only strength-
of these islanders to fight to the finish.
Such
a tonic was worth a hundred divisions to Great Britain.
CHAPTER
Admiral Craces Dilemma

Pro and Con
The Coral Conflict
Moving in the Dark
The
The Broken Code
Battle of Midway.
Intelligence,
.
VII
Intelligence, Pro
and Con
While a close scrutiny of enemy movements was being

made from pastoral country estates in Great Britain, halfway around the world the navies of the United States and
Japan were preparing for a grim showdown. Flushed with
the saki of victory, the Japanese enjoyed this false security
few weeks. No sooner had they scaled the heights

advance than they had to sip the cup of retribution with two naval defeats.
for only a
of their
In early
first
May
1942,
the
Imperial
Navy
initiated
the
stage of a three-pronged operation intended to extend
the perimeter of victory to envelop northern and eastern
The Japanese had occupied the eastern Solomons

and begun the construction of a major airfield on Guadal-
Australia.
canal.
that
strong naval force sailed to support a troop convoy
was headed
of eastern
strength
for Port
Moresby on the southern shore
New Guinea. A United States force
was
of almost equal
in the Coral Sea to challenge them,
and on
May
4 there ensued the first naval action fought entirely

in the air in which the opposing fleets never came within
sight or gunshot range of each other. This beginning of the
American
offensive in the Pacific
became known
as
the
141
and had considerable influence

the planning and outcome of the Battle of Midway that
Battle of the Coral Sea,

in
followed.
It
should be explained that General James Doolittle's raid
on Tokyo in April 1942, and President Roosevelt's cryptic

reference to Shangri-la as the origin of the raid, helped
to initiate the Midway engagement. That the Army aircraft
involved had actually flown off a United States Navy
carrier did not occur to officers of the Imperial General
and when they pored over their charts, they at first

strike had possibly come from an airstrip
in the Aleutians. But since their intelligence had no knowledge of an air base in that inhospitable territory, it was
simpler for them to assume that Midway Island, about 2250
miles east of Tokyo, was the only other possibility.
It can be seen that if enemy intelligence agents could
have provided reliable information concerning the take-off
base of the Doolittle raid, the Battle of Midway might never
have been fought, and the Japanese would have saved four
aircraft carriers, two cruisers, and avoided serious damage
to their destroyer and supply escort, not to mention the loss
of 275 airplanes, and thousands of sailors and airmen.
Staff,
decided that the
On
the other hand, the Battle of the Coral Sea turned
out to be a toss-up, depending on one's point of view or

fealty, for this
engagement was the
result of a long-planned
invasion of Allied holdings in the southwest Pacific. Luck,
ignorance, and
many
mistakes on both sides marked this
conflict, since reliable intelligence
was
practically nonexist-
ent.
To begin from the beginning. Vice-Admiral Shigeyoshi

commanding from aboard the light cruiser Kashima,
Inouye,
had two
and two heavy cruisers, a whole

and at least 134 land-based
aircraft available on fields in the Carolines and Solomons.
Admiral Inouye planned to invade Tulagi in the Solomons
with this force, and eventually capture Port Moresby. He
flotilla
aircraft carriers
of invasion auxiliaries,
142
had no trouble taking Tulagi for there wasn't an American

force within five hundred miles, and the Japanese admiral
was further aided by the fact that United States Naval intelligence had not been able to cope with enemy movements
in this area. Most of the task force commanders were moving blindly in this dangerous region.
Fletcher's Task Force 17 had been
J.
by another commanded by Rear Admiral Aubrey W.
Fitch in Lexington that at the time was leisurely conducting refueling operations some distance off Espiritu Santo in
Rear Admiral Frank
joined
the
New
to the
Hebrides. When the Japanese started their movecomplete surprise of United States Naval intelligence
Admiral Fletcher had

Admiral Fitch's force to
to intercept
by May
4.
move fast, and

join him as soon as
to
after ordering
possible, sailed
Actually, Admiral Fletcher did not
expect to intercept anything especially offensive until he
reached the Solomons-New Guinea sector, but by that time

Admiral Inouye, moving with his big carriers well screened
north of Bougainville and well out of air-search range-
no trouble and planned

to enter the Coral Sea from the eastward that same day.
Admiral Fletcher continued on his northerly course, and
learning of the Japanese move, decided to steam straight
into the center of the Coral Sea from where he hoped to
trace the enemy naval force by air-search planes off Yorkcarried out his Tulagi landing with
town.
When
became evident
enemy was dead
set on
hundred miles
from Tulagi, decided to steam on farther, and sent his oiler
Neosho, escorted by the destroyer Russell, back to meet Admiral Fitch's force that by then would be about one hundred miles away. Admiral Fitch was ordered to meet the
Yoi'ktown force at a point three hundred miles south of
Guadalcanal by daybreak May 5. What happened from this
time on is difficult to decide, but in the end Admiral
it
that the
a full-out invasion, Admiral Fletcher,
Fletcher's force
moved
still
five
in to stage air strikes against Tulagi,
while Admiral Fitch suddenly turned
off
on a southwesterly

course, thus increasing the distance
143
between the two
carrier
forces.
Meanwhile Admiral Fletcher had steamed Yorktown into

was reported
to be fine and clear. At 6:30 a.m., May 4, twelve Devastators
and twenty-eight Dauntless dive bombers were launched.
Six Wildcat fighters also went aloft to fly combat cover for
the carrier, and antisubmarine sweeps were made by float
planes off the cruisers presumably New Orleans and Minnefoul weather, while the air space over Tulagi
apolis.
This carrierborne air attack on Tulagi read well in the
were reminiscent of the RAF's strike

against the seaplane base at Sylt, but calm post-action study
showed that the air-crew claims were somewhat exaggerated. But this was very new to the American airmen, and
a minelayer often looked like a light cruiser, and an ordinary
transport might be identified as a seaplane tender. Landing
barges were often blown up to gunboats, and near misses
usually went down an enemy funnel.
In the final analysis, the scout bombers delivered thirteen
1000-pound bombs and damaged the destroyer Kikuzuki so
seriously she had to be beached. Two small minesweepers
were sunk. Five minutes after the SBDs pulled out, a torpedo-plane flight, under Lieutenant Commander Joseph
Taylor, delivered eleven "fish," but succeeded in sinking
only the minesweeper Tama Maru. At 8:30 shipboard
bombers dropped fifteen more 1000-pounders, but inflicted
only minor damage on a couple of vessels. All these planes
returned safely and were sent streaming off the decks again
for a second attack before the pilots had time to break into
the Navy's round-the-clock coffee ritual. Twenty-seven
SBDs with 1000-pounders, and eleven torpedo bombers
were launched in the second strike and this time damaged
a patrol craft and destroyed two seaplanes. The torpedo
bombers all delivered their contributions, but one aircraft
failed to return, presumably a victim of heavy antiaircraft
fire. A third attack against Tulagi was sent off at 2 p.m.
early reports
that
144
when twenty SBDs dropped
half-ton
bombs, but sank only
four landing barges.
So enthusiastic were the air crews with their performance,

however, it was believed that most of the Japanese fleet had
been destroyed. In fact, some consideration was given to
sending two heavy cruisers, Astoria and Chester, into Savo
Island to
mop up what was
left.
This idea was fortunately
abandoned, for both would probably have met Admiral

Inouye's carrier planes and never returned to explain what
had happened.
The whole Yorktown force played in luck. The Japanese
carrier group was too far away to respond to the Tulagi
base commander's appeal for aid because it was refueling
north of Bougainville, and although Vice-Admiral Takeo
Takagi put on a turn of speed southeastward he could not
make the interception. This was fortunate for by then Admiral Fletcher could have expected no help from Admiral
Fitch's Lexington group as they were miles away. After recovering all his aircraft, Admiral Fletcher turned south to
meet Admiral Fitch at their rendezvous, and Admiral
Inouye launched most of his planes for a bombing attack
against Port Moresby.
With what seemed
like
a very successful attack
effort,
Task Force 17 felt proud of itself, and everyone in it looked

forward to some well-earned liberty in Australia. May 5 was
spent refueling from Neosho, and at 7:30 that evening Admiral Fletcher decided to head northwest, assuming that
some of the enemy vessels would be moving out of Rabaul.
At the same time a Japanese Port Moresby invasion group,
and its support, were steaming on a southerly course for the
Jomard Passage that cuts through the Louisiade Archipelago.
Admiral Takagi's striking force was churning along the outer
fringes of the Solomons, and by May 6 this carrier group
was well inside the Coral Sea.
This was a tense, anxious day, for everyone in authority
felt that something historic was in the air. Admiral Fletcher
145
assignment of harassing ships and aircraft at favorable opportunities, and then decided that if
the enemy put out anything worth a full task force's atten-
resumed
his original
tion, he would delegate the command of air operations to

Admiral Fitch who was an experienced carrier commander,
but, unfortunately, this honor and order were not forwarded to Fitch until a few minutes before the critical action
May 8 had started.

Over the next few hours a plethora of "hot" information
emanated from Pearl Harbor and naval bases in Australia,
all to the general effect that innumerable enemy ships were
converging on waters south of the Solomons. All this intelligence came in large doses, but no accurate interpretation
was included and in the busy program of moving, little
sense could be made of it. Air search was inadequate, the
photographs available provided only a nubbin of knowledge,
and the disposition of the enemy forces was unknown. As
a result, Yorktown and Lexington plodded blindly northward unaware that the Takagi-carrier force was moving on
Admiral Fletcher's line of advance. Both groups were but
seventy miles from each other, both were refueling, not realizing that the other was in the vicinity. Had Admiral
Fletcher or Admiral Takagi made one successful air search
either might have caught the other as a sitting duck, but
such is the irrevocable law of intelligence.
As it was, a Japanese plane out of Rabaul actually did
spot Admiral Fletcher's force at 11 a.m. on May 6, but
Admiral Takagi was not advised. Thus, the Battle of the
Coral Sea should have been fought on May 6, and might
have been had Admiral Fletcher or Admiral Takagi known
the other was near. Ironically, it was on this day that General Jonathan M. Wainwright had to surrender his forces
in the Philippines. But happier days were to begin with
the morrow. For one thing, at nine o'clock on the morning
of May 7, Admiral Inouye postponed the advance of his
Port Moresby invasion group because by then he "suspected
of
the presence" of the Allied task force.
I46
Admiral Crace's Dilemma
support group,
known
as
TG17.3, composed of two
Australian cruisers Australia and Hobart, and the
USS
Chi-
cago with a two-ship destroyer screen Per kins and Walke
was commanded by Rear Admiral John
G. Crace of the
Royal Navy, and assigned to Admiral Fletcher's task force.

On May 7 Admiral Fletcher, who was then heading north
toward the island
of Rossel in the Louisiades, ordered
miral Crace to take his cruiser force
end
off
Ad-
toward the southern
Jomard Passage. Some United States Naval intelhad indicated that the enemy's Port Moresby group
of the
ligence
might be trapped in that region. Admiral Fletcher explained

afterward that he wanted to make sure that, in case of an
air battle
be nipped
with enemy
off,
carriers, the
no matter how
Japanese invasion would
the carrier-versus-carrier battle
went.
It
should be added that Admirals Fletcher and Crace had
become
firm friends and got on well together, and their

Task Force 17 association proved once more that ships and
men of two powers could be welded into an excellent tactical unit, and that co-operation could be expected, notwithstanding the "unexpected developments" that in this case
strained international relations.
Forming
his
force
into
diamond-shape,
antiaircraft
group, Admiral Crace put on twenty knots and steamed for

action.
short time later a lookout aboard Chicago spot-
ted a twin-float monoplane that was snooping about just
A few minutes later a number of

United States Army reconnaissance planes out of Australia
hove into sight, flew away, and returned two hours later.
beyond gunnery range.
From
all
accounts, they decided on their
that Admiral Crace's force

price intelligence?
On
their
first
appearance
was an enemy group. What

second
flight over,
they took
another look and were positive that they were scouting a
Japanese naval force!
When
147
Admiral Crace had reached a point south and west
Jomard Passage at 1:58 p.m. his force was attacked by

eleven single-engined land-based bombers. TG17.3 put up
a remarkable display of antiaircraft fire and the visitors
of
were driven
off.
short time later radar aboard the Aus-
Hobart and Australia picked up twelve JapMitsubishi 97 Army bombers ) when they were
some seventy-five miles away. With this information
tralian cruisers
anese Sally
still
Admiral Crace ordered violent evasive measures

and had every vessel in his command ready to open lire
when the enemy planes came in low. Eight torpedos were
dropped, but not one found a target, and five torpedo bombers were shot down.
In an effort to retaliate for this ill fortune, nineteen
more Sally bombers attacked from a high level with convenat hand,
bombs. Again, Crace's force dodged and darted to

evade the missiles when suddenly the destroyer Farragut,
which had been detached from Admiral Fletcher's screen
and lent to Admiral Crace, was attacked by three United
States Army bombers. Fortunately, their aim was as poor
as their ship identification, but a photographer aboard
one of the B-17S unwittingly provided the evidence that
proved that a formation of United States bombers from
tional
Townsville, Australia,
had made the
attack.
Admiral Crace was understandably annoyed and made a

formal complaint to Admiral Herbert F. Leary, Commanderin-Chief of the Anzac Force. Admiral Leary replied that he
hoped to set up plans whereby the Army would improve
its
identification
of naval vessels.
The
AAF commander
and to this day insists that

his bombers had not attacked Admiral Crace's ships.
Admiral Crace's effort will be the more appreciated when
it is explained that he brought his whole force through an
attack of the same type and strength that sank the Prince
of Wales and Repulse several months before. His support
group went through without a single hit. The Japanese, however, were positive that they had racked up another great
concerned, declined the
offer,
148
victory,
and claimed
Chicago and
to
have sunk an Augusta
class cruiser
a California class battleship Australia and
put torpedos into another battleship resembling
HMS
War-
spite.
The Coral
It
Conflict
may be
pointless to dwell
on the lack of
reliable re-
connaissance or trustworthy intelligence, but the fact re-
mains that the American naval forces in the Pacific at this

time were fighting practically blindfolded. For instance,
once Admiral Fletcher had reorganized his command, he
next sent Admiral Crace to the northward, and then
launched an air-search mission. Shortly after, a plane crew
from Yorktown mistakenly reported two enemy
carriers
and
four cruisers at a position 175 miles to the northwest, well

on the other side of the Louisiades. This report stirred up
considerable excitement and concern, so Admiral Fletcher

sent off a strong air-attack force to deal with these vessels.
When
formation arrived on the scene the two enemy

and four heavy cruisers were only two heavy cruisers and two destroyers, part of Admiral Kuniori Marumo's
command, a support group of the Japanese Port Moresby
invasion force. In other words, due to faulty reconnaissance,
the two main fleets were unwittingly closing on each other,
while Admiral Fletcher's all-out air strike had been sent
out against two ancient cruisers that were being screened
by modified gunboats. However, at this point Providence
took the helm. Admiral Inouye had turned his attention to
Admiral Crace's group, and was ordering his Port Moresby
invasion fleet to turn back at the Jomard Passage.
The air group off Lexington, under Commander William
B. Ault, was some distance ahead of the planes from Yorktown and passed over Tagula Island around 11 a.m. Lieutenant Commander Weldon L. Hamilton who was flying
one of the scout planes was the first to spot a single carrier,
Shoho, some heavy cruisers, and several Japanese destroyers. The commander of the covering group, Rear Admiral
this
carriers
149
Aritomo Goto, went into evasive tactics just as Commander

Ault, with two wing planes, began the attack. Ninety-three
worked over this lone carrier.

The United States Navy planes had started down from
16,000 feet and nosed into their final dive from about 12,000
feet. A 1000-pounder from Hamilton's plane smacked into
the middle of Shoho's flight deck, and by the time the pilot
aircraft finally
flight deck
and a great column of smoke was gathering.
There were some enemy Zekes (later called Zeros) in the
could look back the entire after section of the
was
ablaze,
but they did not reach the Navy scouts in time, or until
they were well into their attack dives. A few Zekes followed,
air
but because the Americans were using their air brakes, the
Jap fighters roared past them at terrific speed.
The American dive bombers concentrated on the carrier

and the unfortunate Shoho was caught cold. It was following this heavy attack on Shoho that Commander Robert
Dixon of Lexington made his famous quip: "Scratch one
flat-top! Dixon to Carrier. Scratch one flat-top!" It was the
first attack by an American carrier aircraft on an enemy
carrier. No vessel could have survived that assault. After
the first two direct hits, she burst into flames and stalled
dead in the water. More bombs and torpedoes were delivered, and after the abandon-ship order at 11:31 a.m., she
sank within
five minutes.
All but three of the attacking
planes were back aboard at 1:38 p.m.
Both Yorktown and Lexington were ready
to
launch
again by 2:50, but Admiral Fletcher decided that the sunken
was not worth the risk. Also, he had

not as yet learned where Admiral Takagi's big carriers
Shokaku and Zuikaku were, although from monitoring
enemy radio messages he was positive that Admiral Takagi
knew where he was. Leaving further search to shore-based
carrier's escort force
of greater range, Admiral Fletcher continued to

steam west during the night of May 7-8, hoping to intercept
the Port Moresby group on his side of the Jomard Passage.
He did not know that Admiral Inouye had recalled them,
aircraft
150
and in the meantime Admiral Takagi had launched twelve

bombers and fifteen torpedo planes from Shokaku and
Zuikaku to search for Admiral Fletcher's force. But bad luck
and inclement weather conspired against them and they
found nothing. Instead, they were intercepted by fighters
from the two United States carriers, and nine Japanese
bombers were shot down for a loss of two Navy Wildcats.
The Japs that escaped were completely bewildered and laid
a course for home that took them directly over the American
carriers they had been searching for. Here another was
shot down and Rear Admiral Tadaichi Hara of the Japanese Carrier Division 5 had to turn on his searchlights so
that his planes could find their way back, and in the ensuing night-recovery eleven more planes went into the sea,
and seven were not recovered until 9 p.m.
This foul-up alerted the United States forces to the fact
that the Japanese
were only
thirty miles
away; intelligence
that Admiral Fitch tried to send on to Admiral Fletcher,
but a communications breakdown kept the advice from the

commander until eleven o'clock that night. But even when
he was told, Admiral Fletcher put little stock in the report
saying that his flagship's radar disclosed no such
intelli-
Lexingtons radar was correct

the Japanese carriers would be miles away by midnight. In
fact, at 10 p.m. that night the enemy carriers were actually
ninety-five miles to the eastward. Admiral Fletcher decided
to keep his force concentrated and alert for a daylight battle the next morning. By that time both forces were 170
miles apart, and the Japanese had the better of the deal as
they moved under a front of low clouds and a long belt of
gence, but conceded that
if
inclement weather. In contrast Yorktown and Lexington,

along with their consorts, were in
sunny
full
view beneath a
clear,
sky.
With the
first
light
tions to locate their
both sides had flown scouting formaenemy, and by 9 a.m. of May 8 the
151
were launched. There were eighty-two planes from

the American decks and about seventy-two from those of
the Japanese. The attacking groups passed each other without making contact, and both groups were over their targets
by eleven o'clock. All the Yorktown aircraft were in position
by 10:57 a.m., and the pilots could see Zuikaku and
Shokaku, escorted by several destroyers, steaming southwesterly about eight miles apart. Yorktown 's Torpedo Squadron 5, led by Lieutenant Commander Joseph Taylor, went
for Shokaku which had moved out into the open to launch
an air-combat patrol. Whether these torpedo boys had a
touch of stage fright or buck fever is not certain, but their
attack left much to be desired; the torpedoes either went
astray or failed to explode. Only two bomb hits were registered, although the Yorktown pilots claimed six bomb
and three torpedo hits. The two bomb hits ignited gasoline
stores well forward on Shokaku and the flight deck was so
attacks
damaged
that although she could recover aircraft, she could
not launch any. In fact, one of the
bombs pierced
the deck
and exploded in an aircraft-engine repair shop.

The Lexington formations ran into hard luck. Taking off
ten minutes after the Yorktown force was airborne, they first
lost their Wildcat escort in a cloud level, and their torpedo
squadron went into an area incorrectly designated. So they
put on a box-search until they found the enemy. In the
meantime their dive bombers flew into a thick overcast and
never found the Japanese force and had to return when their
fuel was low. The rest of Lexingtons air-striking force, now
composed of only eleven torpedo bombers, four dive bombers, and six Wildcats caught up with the enemy at 11:40
a.m. The torpedo attack was made through a small hole in
the cloud layer, and the approach had to be made in a
spiraling glide. Once the torpedo planes were out of the
way, the dive bombers went hurtling through the same small
opening. During all this the Zekes attacked the Wildcats,
shooting
down
three of them. This tragic diversion enabled
the bombers to
make
their attacks unmolested.
152
Unmolested or not, the attack added little to what small

measure of success the Yorktown fliers had. The torpedoes
were released at too long a range and moved so slowly the
Japanese helmsmen had no difficulty in avoiding them. The
dive bombers put just one hit on Shokaku, which by then
was reported to be burning furiously and sinking fast. This
was something of an exaggeration, for although she had
lost 148 men killed or wounded, she was not holed below
the water line. All fires were doused finally, many of her
aircraft were ordered to land on Zuikaku, and by one o'clock
Shokaku was steaming for Japan, and lived to fight another
day.
The scene now
shifts
to the other side of the conflict
where returning American air crews found both Yorktown

and Lexington had been hit. The seventy-odd planes from
Shokaku and Zuikaku had been giving the American carriers
much the same treatment that their own were suffering from
the United States Navy fliers. In this weird transposition
luck had brought the greater measure of success to the Japanese, chiefly because their planes were sent direct to the
targets, and their strike groups were better balanced in
composition.
The full force of this attack broke at 11:18 when the

enemy approached from the northeast, down wind and
down sun, making the most of the perfect visibility. Torpedo
bombers aimed for both port and starboard bows of Lexingfrom well over half a mile
away. Captain Frederick C. Sherman tried to maneuver so
as to steam parallel with the "tin fish" but Lexington was
not designed for such nimble exploits and needed between
ton, launching their missiles
hundred and two thousand yards to make a tactical

turn and there were just too many torpedoes. They came
in from every angle, porpoising and diving. The first one
smacked home at 11:20 and the whole ship staggered with
the impact. The next bored into the port bow and sent up
a gusher of flame on which was poised a great block of
fifteen

greenish white sea water. As the
bile
watching
this
fantastic
153
men on deck
display,
stood immo-
lookout
forward
screamed, "Dive bombers!"
long black missile smashed on the port forward gun
and the three five-inch weapons were ripped from

their mounts and tossed like jackstraws; the Marine gun
teams were never seen again. Another torpedo struck home
on the port side amidships, and more were carving foamy
wakes to set up disaster. A light bomb bounced off the funnel, hit the catwalk and killed several sailors. A second
bomb plunged through the space between the funnel and
the control island, and in its course bent a metal tube
through which ran a cable that operated the ship's bull
horn. The cable was tightened and a bellow and moan continued as Japanese fighters darted back and forth machinegunning the decks. A near miss fell into the water near
Yorktown but caused no damage. Later on, about 11:24, a
formation of dive bombers came down and one of them put
an 800-pounder on her deck that went on through to the
fourth deck killing or wounding sixty-six men. Some fires
were started but were soon put out
The action closed down at 11-45, and Lexington made a
*game effort to stay afloat and enable her aircraft to land
back on, but at 12:45 a "sleeper" bomb detonated. This
triggered a series of explosions and fires that could not be
controlled and she had to be abandoned by 4:30 that afternoon. Torpedoes from the destroyer Phelps finished her, and
she went down with the bodies of 216 men and what was
left of 36 aircraft 19 had been flown off and landed on
Yorktoton. However, 2735 officers and men were rescued.
The Battle of the Coral Sea was greatly exaggerated both
in Washington and Tokyo. United States reports stated
that between seventeen and twenty-two Japanese vessels
had been sunk, while in Japan, American battleships that
had not yet been launched were reported sunk, and all of
Admiral Crace's force was said to be wallowing on the bottom of the Pacific. In Tokyo newspapers both Lexington
gallery
154
and Yorktown had been sent to Davy Jones's locker, but

Yorktown turned up again to be sunk in the Battle of Midway.
On
the
enemy
side,
Shokaku was severely damaged and
could not be repaired for months. Zuikaku
lost so
many
airmen and planes she was not ready for action until the
diversionary raid on the Aleutians on June 12. But the Coral
Sea action opened a
new
chapter in naval warfare, one in
made by both sides. The intelwhich many

ligence was almost nonexistent, communications were haphazard and at times tragic. Port Moresby had been saved
which meant that the whole Australian continent was safe,
but more important, the factors that were to make up both
sides in the Battle of Midway were determined, the success
of which was possibly the most important victory in the
whole Pacific campaign.
mistakes were
The Broken Code
The
Midway was accomplished through seem-
victory at
ingly unrelated events. It could have been a bitter defeat
and United
States forces could
have spent the next five years

For instance,
in driving the Japanese troops out of Hawaii.

if
a certain Japanese scout pilot had been a
termined in his
task, if
little
an American dive bomber
more depilot off
Enterprise had been lucky enough to have guessed wrong,

if
had reached a certain

a young American cryptog-
the signal for an emergency turn
Japanese admiral in time, or if

rapher had been less dedicated,
Midway might have been
a tragic setback instead of the all-important victory
it
be-
came.
United States Navy had a fair idea that

move eastward to hold
some strategic point midway across the Pacific, but it was
Officials of the
the Japanese were planning a critical
just where. Certainly they wanted no

on Tokyo, and the toss-up was between
Oahu and Midway. Admiral Ernest J. King leaned toward
difficult to
more
determine
air attacks
155
but Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

thought Midway was the enemy's objective. Midway was
halfway across the Pacific and was strategically invaluable.
Geographically, the Midway Islands make up a circular
the Hawaiian island at
atoll
about
until 1903
six
miles in diameter.
when
them
over,
there.
The two
first,
They were
little
known
a small force of United States Marines took
chiefly
to
guard a transpacific cable station
Sand and Eastern, were first claimed

in 1859, and ten years later $50,000
islands,
by the United States

was appropriated to dredge a channel into the lagoon, an
operation that was discontinued after seven months of effort
and expense.
Pan American Airways established an air service to the
Philippines in 1936, using Midway, Wake, and Guam as refueling stations. An inn was built at Midway for overnight
accommodation, and by 1940 the base was considered to
be an important military outpost, particularly when the
civilian population rose to 437.
tance
first
Navy held
became evident
Midway's
in 1935
when
strategic impor-
the United States
maneuvers around the sandy atoll on which

practice landings, and aircraft flew simulated attacks against the dunes. By 1939 the Hepburn Board
Report described Midway as second in importance to Pearl
Harbor and suggested that the facilities for two patrol
squadrons be constructed and some channel piers built. Late
in 1940 a Navy dock was added, and gradually a respectable defense force was formed that included consideration
of an airstrip on Eastern Island to supplement the seaplane
fleet
the Marines
made
facilities originally
planned.
At the height of the concern, Admiral Nimitz made a personal inspection of the Midway facilities early in May, and
was convinced that it would be Japan's next objective. He
promised Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Shannon, commanding the 6th Marine Defense Battalion, and Com-
mander
Cyril T. Simard,
commanding the naval
air station,
would be attended to, and after inquiring what they thought they would need to withstand
that the defense needs
I56
a large-scale attack, he agreed to supply as
much
as possi-
promised material was deMarine pilots, seven

twenty-two
May
livered, but by
26
Wildcat aircraft, and sixteen Helldivers were delivered by
Kitty Hawk. By the end of May the airfield, spread over
one end of Eastern Island, was cluttered with four B-26S
ble. Actually,
veiy
little
of the
and eighteen B-17S belonging to the Army Air Force; six

Navy torpedo bombers, and about sixty planes of various
categories belonging to the United States Marines.
Fuel consumption for continued training and routine pa-
gobbled up 65,000 gallons of aviation gasoline per day,

and by May 22 the situation became critical when a sailor
trols
yanked the wrong switch during a demolition drill and

burned up 400,000 gallons of fuel. From that time on all
aircraft were fueled from fifty-five-gallon drums, which is
comparable to servicing a Cadillac with an eyedropper.
How did Admiral Nimitz make certain that Midway was
the chief point of reference? A very alert young cryptographer,
Commander Joseph
J.
Rochefort, assigned to
Com-
bat Intelligence at Pearl Harbor, had suggested that the
CO at Midway send an uncoded message from Midway

announcing a breakdown in their distillation plant. Midway
did as requested, and the Japanese monitors picked up the
routine message. Later on in one of their coded messages
to Admiral Yamamoto's headquarters they mentioned that
Midway was short of fresh water. United States Navy cryptographers had recently broken the Japanese naval code and
so caught this pointed reference to Midway. With that
knotty problem solved, the fate of the Japanese at Midway
was almost a foregone conclusion. In this instance intelligence played an important role for the American forces,
whereas the Japanese could not learn anything of importance concerning the disposition of the United States Navy.
Considering all this, it is now difficult to understand why
Admiral Yamamoto persisted in the Midway venture, particularly after his losses in the Coral Sea. His intelligence
157
organization wasn't worth the rations
space
it
was eating or the
occupied.
it
American cryptographers
also
learned that D-day for
Midway had been postponed from late May to June 3, and

by that time the forces on Midway had been raised to 2138
Marines and 1494
ices.
The
and
fliers
service troops of the three serv-
and shore were strewn with mines, and
surf
every position was fairly well armed. Eleven torpedo boats

circled the lagoon continously to
ground forces and
add
their antiaircraft fire
up ditched fliers.
The Japanese still believed that Yorktown had been sunk
and that Enterprise and Hornet were back at Pearl Harbor,
but they had no idea as to the whereabouts of Wasp. They
thought that Ranger was in the Atlantic and they were certain that Saratoga was still at San Diego, California, undergoing repairs from torpedo damage. Thus, with the Japanese
still having Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu to provide their
air striking force, the Japanese Naval General Staff which
had opposed the Midway attack, was now confident of a
to that of the
to pick
successful outcome.
Moving
in the
Dark
May Admiral
*In late
ary force
to
take
Isoroku
two
Yamamoto
islands
in
the
sent a diversion-
Aleutians.
Foggy
weather aided them in their moves and there was no real

opposition to bar
them
entry.
Admiral Tadaichi Nagumo's force sailed away and by the
May
27 was well out in the Pacific. The Midway

landing forces, escorted by Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka's
night of
fight cruiser flagship,
twelve destroyers and the seaplane
and other units, ranged out of Saipan that

same evening. The last to move out were the main body of
the Midway Invasion Force under Vice- Admiral Nobutake
Kondo, and the Main Force under the direct command of
Admiral Yamamoto aboard Yamato, the largest battleship
afloat. On the way a code message sent from a United
carrier Chitose
158
States
Navy submarine was picked
could decode it, it had

was being warned of
winds made navigation
up, but because no one
be presumed that the U. S. Fleet

approach. Rain and strong
difficult, and their speed had to be
to
their
cut to fourteen knots.
From this point on many of Admiral Yamamoto's plans

went awry. Two submarines that were assigned to refuel
two flying boats off French Frigate Shoals about five hundred miles northwest of Oahu, instead found two U. S. Navy
seaplane tenders at the rendezvous, and the contact had to
be called off. The Japanese flying boats were to have made
an important reconnaissance over Hawaii, and when this
plan had to be abandoned, it was impossible to know just
what United States naval forces were still in, or had left
Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yamamoto had to rely on cordons
of submarines that skulked between Midway and Hawaii,
and what information they could gather would have to be
available by June 2 to be of any value. The weather was
still heavy by June 1, and the Yamamoto force could not
find its tanker train to refuel. Aircraft were launched from
Hosho but even they could not round up the oilers, and
radio messages had to be risked before this contact could be
made.
All this was grist to the United States Navy intelligence
mill, and by now they were fully cognizant of Admiral
Yamamoto's intentions. A Japanese flying boat encountered
an American flying boat about five hundred miles northwest
of Wotje, indicating that Midway had extended its patrol
range to seven hundred miles. News of contacts with more
American submarines continued to seep in, which when analyzed indicated that a United States
Navy submarine
patrol
was out six hundred miles southwest of Midway.

Thousands of Japanese airmen and sailors had a rendezvous with death.
line
carrier Hornet left Pearl Harbor May 28, and her

group that had been stationed ashore while she was in
The
air

port, flew out
159
and went aboard shortly

Within minutes
clear of the harbor.
planes, her skipper, Captain
Marc
after the carrier
was
down
the
of
tying
A. Mitscher,
bull horn to explain the situation: "This
is
went on the
the captain.
We
are going to intercept a Jap attack at Midway!"

By 2 p.m. of June 2, Hornet's force joined Yorktown north-
Midway. It had been estimated that repairs to Yorktown would take ninety days, but they were completed in
less than two. She went into drydock in the early afternoon
of May 27, and on arrival 1400 technicians swarmed aboard
and went to work. On May 29, the drydock was flooded and
east of
she
moved
out into the stream with hundreds of shipfitters,
shipwrights, machinists, welders,
and
electricians
ing on her. She fueled on the afternoon of
still
May
work-
29, took
on her replacement planes and sailed for the Midway engagement the following day. Her new air group, a composite
from three different carriers, first operated as a unit in the
forthcoming battle.
On June 1 Captain Mitscher scrawled another message
which he had Commander Henderson read out: "The enemy
are approaching for an attempt to seize Midway. This attack
will probably be accompanied by a feint at western Alaska.
We are going to prevent them from taking Midway if possi%
ble. Be ready and keep on the alert. Let's get a few more
,
yellowtails.'
At 2 p.m. the next day, when Hornet's force joined Yorktown northeast of Midway, Admiral Fletcher assumed tactical command of the entire American defensive force, but
back at Pearl Harbor Admiral Nimitz still maintained
command
of the strategic planning. Admiral William F.

Halsey was indisposed, and Rear Admiral Raymond A.
Spruance was given command of Task Force 16, of which
Hornet was a part.
It must be noted that the United States Pacific Fleet
could not put one battleship into the Midway action. Vice-
Admiral William
S.
Pye's battleship force that
had been
carrying out important duties over routes between
West
l60
Coast ports and Hawaii, was anchored in San Francisco Bay
where battleship sailors on liberty were treated unpleasantly

by civilians in that area. Admiral Pye wished to get into
more dramatic action, but Admiral Nimitz refused, explaining that he could not furnish air cover for the slower battle-
and that the Midway planning offered small opportuthem to tangle with the enemy.
Admiral Nimitz had, therefore, to face a Japanese force,
composed of battleships, carriers, heavy cruisers, and a full
complement of support vessels, with a much smaller collection. He also had to decide whether to confine his efforts
ships,
nity for
to the
Midway
situation, leaving the Aleutians to
themselves, or to
far-flung islands.
May when
fend for
make some token effort to protect

The "token" effort had been decided
those
early
composed of the heavy

and Louisville, the light cruisers
Honolulu, St. Louis, and Nashville, and ten destroyers was
put under command of Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald.
Admiral Nimitz did have one strategic advantage over Admiral Yamamoto a shorter distance from his base to the
scene of action. Midway itself accommodated more aircraft
than any carrier and Midway could not be sunk. Also, by
now Admiral Nimitz had the benefit of search radar, not
only from a fixed base on the island, but Enterprise, Hornet,
Yorktown, and several cruisers were so equipped.
It was thought that the Japanese would make a full-scale
attack on Midway with the idea of immediate occupation,
and in opposition Admirals Spruance and Fletcher were to
inflict maximum damage on anything that flew the Japanese
Imperial Navy ensign. The over-all command was with Adin
cruisers
a North Pacific Force,
Indianapolis
miral Nimitz at his headquarters in Pearl Harbor.
The
Battle of
Midway
Early on June 3 a PBY patrol plane spotted the enemy

flotilla some seven hundred miles west of Midway, and by
that afternoon a squadron of Flying Fortresses attacked the
l6l
Japanese landing ships. The enemy retaliated with a heavy

bombing attack on Midway the next day, severely damaging
shore installations, but inflicting
little
destruction on the
air-
The Marine Corps dive bombers then attacked, during

which Major Lofton R. Henderson is said to have flown
fields.
his blazing plane into the superstructure of the carrier Soryu.
By
the time the main United States Fleet
had reached
swarms of planes, including the famous Torpedo-8 off Hornet, began the historic
battle, and as Lieutenant Commander Sesu Mitoya, comstriking distance of the Japanese,
munications
"We
officer
aboard the carrier Kaga, stated
later,
underestimated our adversaries and were blind with
and overweening confidence. Thenceforth the fatal

war drove us inevitably on to final calamity. They
were waiting for us, for by an incredible feat of military
intelligence they had broken our code while we dismally
conceit
tide of
failed to locate their forces
The following
is
when we should have
a summation of the
damage
done."
inflicted
on
the enemy:
Four Japanese aircraft carriers, Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, and

Hiryu were sunk. Three battleships were damaged by bomb
and torpedo hits. The heavy cruiser Mikuma was sunk and
the heavy cruiser Mogami was so badly damaged she had to
limp home, and was out of action for many months. One
light cruiser was damaged, and at least two destroyers were
sunk and several others damaged by bombs. An estimated
250 Japanese aircraft were destroyed or lost at sea through
lack of flight decks on which to land. Approximately 3800
Japanese were killed or drowned.
Only the U.S. aircraft carrier Yorktown was lost during
the main action. She was hit by a bomb that struck her
flight deck and exploded below, starting several fires, and
she had to be brought to a standstill. Admiral Fletcher
moved his flag from Yorktown to the cruiser Astoria, but
less than an hour later damage-control parties aboard the
carrier had her moving again and making eighteen knots.
l62
In fact, she prepared to take on and launch her aircraft
once more.
Meanwhile, the Japanese
that this particular carrier
her
all
who were
was
astonished to learn
in action against
them, gave
the attention they could muster, and Yorktown re-
ceived two torpedoes in her port side that ruptured gasoline
and
oil
tanks and then
jammed her rudder
her power sharply cut, she took on a
list
controls.
With
of seventeen de-
and then went over to more than twenty-six degrees.

There was no hope of counterflooding to level her off,
so by the middle of the afternoon of June 4, Captain Elliott
Buckmaster gave orders to abandon ship, and four destroyers moved in to take off the crew or pick up men from rafts.
Luckily the sea was smooth and the water fairly warm.
After being abandoned for twenty-four hours, Yorktown
somehow righted herself, and it was agreed generally that
had a fleet tug been available the valiant carrier might have
been saved. Some critics state that she could have been
towed to a friendly berth by a cruiser, but Admiral Nimitz
did actually order the fleet tug Navajo, then off French
Frigate Shoals, the minesweeper Vireo, and the destroyer
Gwin to join Admiral Spruance's force. Vireo arrived about
noon of June 5 and put a towline aboard but she could not
make much headway.
Then the Japanese submarine I-i68, under Lieutenant
Commander Yahachi Tanabe, broke through the United
States destroyer screen. At the same time the destroyer
Hammann was secured to the damaged carrier's side to provide power, food, and water for the salvage crew.
At 1:30 p.m. Commander Tanabe fired four torpedoes.
The first missed, the next went under Hammann s keel and
grees,
exploded against Yorktown. The fourth hit the destroyer

amidships, breaking her in two. There was considerable
loss of fife,
and
in the general
escaped. Nine out of thirteen
and seventy-two out

seamen were killed outright aboard Hammann. Most
these were probably killed by pre-set depth charges
of 228
of
excitement the submarine
officers,
163
aboard the destroyer that exploded while many men were in

the water. Vireo cut her towline and the salvage party was
transferred to the destroyer Benham. Captain Buckmaster
intended to continue operations the next morning, but durlist continued, and by daylight
was evident that there was no hope of saving her. At
6 a.m. she rolled over and sank in a two-thousand-fathom
ing the night the carrier's

it
depth.
The
had been responsible for

Sea action, but a complete reversal of form enabled the United States Navy to
inflict the first great defeat on the Japanese. Midway was a
staggering blow to the Tokyo planners and it made them
many
lack of reliable intelligence
of the misfortunes in the Coral
cancel their hopes for the conquest of
and
New
Zealand. For the
fensive.
Knowledge
is
power.
first
Fiji,
New
Caledonia,
time they were on the de-
CHAPTER
The Search for the Buzz Bomb

.
Musical Interlude
The Search
for the
Was
VIII
The Flying Bomb
Go Bang!
It
Didn't
It
Worth the Money?
Buzz Bomb
Unquestionably the most dramatic weapon of World War

was Hitler's V-i (buzz bomb), the pilotless aircraft that
for a few weeks threatened to eliminate the British Isles as
II
the Allied base of attack. Although V-2, the rocket-powered
was more effective as a weapon, not enough were

launched and delivered to make any great impression, but
the smaller, jet-propelled device created havoc with the British home-defense authorities until its string of launching
sites could be bombed out or captured.
Since the end of the war the story of this remarkable
weapon has been told and retold by historians, or those who
were engaged in its production. In turn, several Allied
agents, the photo interpreters, and newspaper correspondents have tried to explain how the Vergeltungswaffen (revenge weapons ) were first suspected, traced, and eventually
brought to book. Actually, half a hundred men, women, and
children working with the British Intelligence carried out a
never-ending scheme to uncover Hitler's secret weapon.
How it was tracked down and fought is one of the most
missile,
intriguing stories of the war.
In this chapter we shall concentrate on the history of the

V-i weapon, that from a general point of view was a perfect
165
counterpart of the naval torpedo, for once launched,
its
course could no longer be controlled by the launching team.
was kept on course at a predetermined altitude by a builtand like the naval torpedo was self-propelled. The only difference is that the torpedo is held at a
predetermined depth on its way to the target.
The V-i was in fact a pilotless bomber aircraft, although
it was large enough to carry a pilot. Willy Ley, in his invaluable book, Rockets, Missiles, and Space Travel, states
that they occasionally carried a pilot during the testing and
development period. Propulsion was provided by a form of
the present-day jet-propulsion engine, and the first successful launching was made from a multi-engined aircraft on
It
in automatic pilot,
October
1942.
3,
have begun back in 1930 when a retired

von Baumgarten, wrote a novel, WeltnungiQ3? (Vengeance 293P), in which a group of German patriots made rocket weapons secretly, and in a single attack
obliterated Paris. Worldwide peace was the result, since
France was considered to be the instigator of all wars.
It was a ridiculous story and badly written, but for some
strange reason the German government bought up every
All this seems to
general, Artur
^copy of the book, a

intelligence
men
all
move
that attracted the attention of
over Europe, and someone learned
German Army had already adopted the idea of the

rocket weapon and that experiments had been carried
out on some North Sea islands. But later on, when early
models of the V-i began to show some promise, the development was transferred to the Baltic coast to a place known
that the
as
Peenemunde.
An
insignificant little fishing village,
most unknown
until the first
RAF
raid,
Peenemunde was
but
its
history
al-
makes
interesting reading.
The Bay
of Stettin, about one
hundred miles north
of Ber-
separated from the Baltic Sea by two large islands,

both roughly triangular in shape. The island to the west is
lin, is
l66
named Usedom,
the one to the east Wolin, and the three
passages dividing these two islands from west to east are
known
Peene
as
Where the
many years a
Peene, Swine, and Dievenow.
joins the sea there existed for
and captains
fishing village,
plied the waters during the
River
small
of the pleasure steamers that
summer
seasons called this un-
mouth of the Peene.

They seldom stopped there, although the villagers did their
best to attract the summer trade. However, when several
German groups began to develop rockets that promised to
be of military value, it was realized that a remote testing
ground would be needed, and Peenemiinde was selected befashionable hamlet Peenemiinde, the
cause of
its
relationship to the Baltic Sea
and comparative
convenience to Berlin. About one hundred million dollars
was put
into the
development between 1936 and the day
RAF leveled the complex.

Wemher von Braun, a civilian
the
scientist
who
at the time
had been looking for such a

and during the Christmas holidays of 1935 he visited relatives near Anklam on
the right bank of the Peene River, and his attention was
drawn to Peenemiinde. In addition to the Baltic Sea to the
north, there was an extensive forest area in the northern part
was working
for his doctorate,
spot since early in
of the island of
December
Usedom
1935,
that could be used to conceal the
all-important installations,
and the
site
presented a range of
more than 250 miles eastward along the Pomeranian coast.

As the development grew it gradually took on two faces:
Peenemiinde East, controlled by the German Army, and
Peenemiinde West, built for Luftwaffe operations. To divert
the interest of enemy intelligence men, the whole plant was
known
for a time as
HAP
Heeres-Anstalt-Peenemiinde )
and the first two words meant Army Establishment. When

it became apparent what was going on there, about 1943,
the name Peenemiinde was dropped, that of the nearby village, Karlshagen, was substituted and the letters HAP were
interpreted as
Home
Artillery Park.
To complete
this dis-

guise, the post office
167
used the cancellation stamp "Karls-
hagen."
At the outbreak of World
War
II,
Peenemunde became
a research engineer's paradise where high priority and large
sums were always available. Once Poland was conquered,

Adolf Hitler curtailed Peenemunde's activity, and by the
time France had been beaten out of the war, the site was
list. A month later Goering began
on Great Britain, and when that was swatted
down by "the few" of the RAF, Peenemunde was given all
taken
off
the high priority
his air assault
When
Germans attacked Russia,

the German War Office demanded that the Peenemunde
scientists be aided and encouraged by every means possible.
its
old high priorities.
the
The Flying Bomb
The V-i "Flying Bomb," a jet-propelled, winged bomb,

had been the responsibility of Peenemunde West, the
Luftwaffe layout, and of course variants of the device were
being continually checked out. Practical
many
when
and the weapon was
modifications,
was decided
model was designed
it
to
put
it
tests
suggested
from perfect
far
into production. In fact, one
to carry a "suicide" pilot
guide the amatol-loaded weapon direct to
its
who would
target and
According to some authorities, two hundred

volunteers were actually being trained for this Germanic
form of the kamikaze, but they were never used.
perish with
As soon
it.
began boasting about his secret weapons, British intelligence went to work to track down the
threat. One report has it that two London agents had long
been at work at the HAP plant, and had maintained a wellorganized line of communications with their home base.
How much
as Hitler
real information they secreted out
is
a question,
but more important is the fact that, in May 1942, Flight

Lieutenant D. W. Steventon was flying a camera-carrying
Spitfire high above the western shores of the Baltic on his
way
to
Swinemunde
after
photographing
Kiel.
Noticing what
l68
looked like a
of
new
airfield at the
northern tip of the island
Usedom, he switched on his cameras

When this length of film was processed
a special section of the
Medmenham
for a short run.
for examination,
interpreters
was puz-
zled by a number of massive ringlike workings set in the

woodlands near the airfield, but since they fitted no routine
category of the photo-interpretation group, they were not
given the full treatment. In fact they were put away for future reference and forgotten for nearly seven months.
By December
1942,
new
reports of secret-weapon testing
were filtering into London from various sources, in particular from a reliable agent in Oslo, and Allied intelligence
machinery began to pick up speed. Although the available
photographs had provided no definite clue to what was
going on at Peenemunde, the RAF photoreconnaissance
teams continued to work over the area, but so as to mislead
the German intelligence, these camera flights took in the
whole Baltic coast from Kiel to Rostock, and the RAF
Bomber Command contributed
to the stratagem
carrying out mine-laying flights until
all this
by
regularly
RAF
activity
was accepted as routine, not simply a concentration on the

Peenemunde layout. Then one day an RAF camera plane
came back with a photograph showing something that
looked very much like a small plane mounted on a special
launching ramp. It was an early model of the V-i Flying
Bomb.
In the early part of 1943 the British War Office picked
that some form of "longe-range projectors,"
up new warnings
capable of firing on Britain from the French coast, were in

production. This revived interest in the earlier photographs
of
Peenemunde which had shown
certain
heavy construc-
with a War Office suggestion that a rocket capable of reaching London from the
French coast would have to be launched from a "sharply intion work, but this in
no way
clined projector" about one
By
tallied
hundred yards
long.
April 1943, the chiefs of staff and Prime Minister

Churchill were taking the secret-weapon threat seriously,
l6g
and Duncan Sandys, then Joint Parliamentary Secretary to

the Ministry of Supply, was appointed as a new investigatorin-chief. With Mr. Sandys' appointment, the Air Ministry
established a secret-weapon investigation on the highest
priority. Several very skilled interpreters were put to work
on this new scheme, and a special flying program was
drawn up. Their
chief concern lay in their search for three
(1) a long-range gun, (2) a remotely controlled rocket aircraft, and (3) a tube hidden in a minespecial items:
from which a rocket could be launched. Every square

mile of the French coastal area from Cherbourg to the Belgian frontier was placed under close photographic scrutiny.
Peenemiinde received an even closer inspection until at
last it was clear that the construction work indicated a massive observation tower, a circling slope of earthwork that
might be taken for an athletic stadium, and a fan-shaped
stretch of concrete on the foreshore of the waterfront. Two
large rockets were found lying horizontally on special road
vehicles within the confines of the strange earthwork. These
were early versions of the V-2 rocket-propelled missile.
Late in June of that same year, Constance BabingtonSmith, the skilled photo interpreter at Medmenham, came
upon what looked like a small tailless aircraft resting on a
concrete ramp, but more important, her stereoscope revealed
a strange streak, apparently ejected from the tail of one of
these mystery planes, which in time was identified as a
burned area created by some form of jet engine. This was
shaft
first such mark she had seen.

Understandably enough, these jet streaks were accepted
as evidence that the Germans had finally developed a jet-
the
propelled aircraft, a fact that the British
War
Office
had
pre-
dicted a short time before; but no one at Medmenham realized that Miss Babington-Smith's find had anything to do
with
Hitler's secret weapon, the V-i Flying Bomb.

The hunt went into full cry, and northern France was
given even more attention. British agents, prowling the Calais area, next reported some unusual activity in the area
170
and Army photo interpreters remembered noting a clearing in the woods in that
area. A new set of aerial photographs revealed mysterious,
but most formidable concrete structures, and nearby other
puzzling preliminaries were being carried out. It was also
seen that these sites were connected by brand-new rail lines
that in turn were connected to the main lines. This railroad
activity led the British to conclude that the work could
only mean that the Germans were planning to use fortyor fifty-ton missiles that could only be moved over railroad
tracks. A few ponderers, however, thought anything that
large was out of the question, and they leaned more to a
ground report of smaller pilotless aircraft; a flying bomb
would be more in line with Hitler's vague threats. As may
be imagined, these two theories were not conducive to coof Watten, a village near Calais,
operative thinking.
Meanwhile, more direct action was taken on the night of

August 17, 1943, when the RAF Bomber Command made
a memorable raid on Peenemunde by dropping 1400 tons
of bombs from three hundred planes. Forty- two bombers
failed to return, but the raid practically wiped out the famous test base, and more than one thousand workers were
killed. Also lost was the noted scientist Dr. Thiel, who
had been in charge of motor development. This raid did not
stop the production of the V-i flying bomb, or the further
development of the V-2 rocket missile, but it prevented the
full development of other smaller rockets, such as the Taifun
and the Wasserfall.
Ten days later, August 27, the United States Eighth Air
Force attacked Watten, which was a launching shelter for
V-2S. The raid proved to be beautifully timed, for a huge
mass of concrete was in the process of hardening when the
American bombs screamed down, and this expensive, complex layout was hammered to a jumble of steel framework,
wooden forms, and battered concrete.
Still
went
the search for the secret of these concrete layouts
on.
New
activities
were noted almost every day.
New

railroad spurs
were
laid, tunnels
171
were cut through
hills,
and
fake haystacks that could shield vertical shafts or other

workings were to be found everywhere. It is not surprising
that the main sites were so difficult to interpret, as they
were in no way related to a single launching complex. For
instance, four were intended as launching shelters for V-2S,
two others were built as launching sites for V-is, and at

the town of Mimoyecques a shelter was discovered for a
long-range gun that was never brought into action.
Just as the search
began
to turn to the possibility of real
rocket danger, another British agent in France reported that
the firm he worked for was
building eight
mysterious
bases not far from Abbeville in the Pas-de-Calais area.
had no idea what they were
He
but suspected they could

be used for secret-weapon launching. These sites were carefully photographed, and after long and concentrated
for,
study, the photo interpreters agreed that they looked like
long concrete
ings,
skis, laid
the layouts were
down on
all
their sides. Built in clear-
identical as
far
as
they had
much was certain, but none of the investigators

could imagine what they had to do with a secret weapon
gone. That
was
be launched by rocket. But if they were not to

be used for such a weapon, what were they for?
that
One
to
school of thought clung to the rocket theory, the
One group was positive that Peenemiinde was a red herring, and that the rockets noted there
were only dummies. Once more Prime Minister Churchill
other to a flying bomb.
had
to step in, and this time he selected Sir Stafford Cripps,

then Minister of Aircraft Production, to examine all the evidence at hand and decide whether any German secret
weapons actually existed.

A meeting of the Cripps group, early
in
November
1943,
brought out the fact that the photo interpreters had by then
discovered no less than nineteen of the "ski" sites, all in the
Pas-de-Calais area. It was also explained that each and
every one had a firing point aimed at London. Sir Stafford
172
adjourned the meeting, and ordered it reconvened two days

by which time a total of twenty-six ski sites had been
later,
this, Sir Stafford reported to the War Cabhe believed Hitler's secret weapon was a pilotless
that was to be launched from a series of concrete
uncovered. With
inet that
aircraft
set up in northern France.

Weeks were devoted to intense study
ramps
of the strange ski
Every building was measured and evaluated. The

ramps were taken as the pattern for models, and the degree
of curves in roads, railroads, and narrow-gauge tracks found
in the assembly were carefully computed. All these facts and
figures were applied to the movement of a forty-foot rocket,
but still no one could account for the strange ski ramps until Constance Babington-Smith came up with evidence that
a set of launching rails had been set up at Peenemunde
long before the RAF raid. She continued this personal
search until she was positive that these early rails had been
laid down to test some sort of a self-propelled bomb or a
flying bomb. When she took her findings to her section head,
he too saw the connection and reported the fact to the
authorities in London. A short time later when another ramp
complex was found at Zinnowitz, also on the island of
Usedom, where pilotless aircraft could be fired out to sea,
the British were positive they had to contend with a flying
sites.
bomb not
a rocket missile.
Now they were sure

for this
that the ski sites
new menace. They
ski sites
were launching areas
figured that the buildings at the
would hold twenty
of the "tailless aircraft" that
had found, and, considernumber of sites, it was evident that Hitler could fire
nearly two thousand flying bombs every twenty-four hours.
But thanks to the program of site-bombings made by the
RAF and USAAF, the number launched at the height of
the British girl photo interpreter
ing the
the flying-bomb offensive in 1944 was one hundred every

twenty-four hours. The ski-site bombing began at the end
of
1943, and each succeeding month these conwere battered and flattened as fast as they were
December
structions
erected.
173
it was generally believed that a pilotless airwould be Hitler's first secret weapon, no one in Great
Britain knew what one looked like, how it worked, or what
explosive power it would deliver. That is another story.
Although
craft

In late February 1943, the Germans had fought and lost
the Battle of Stalingrad, their situation in North Africa was
and American attacks threatened

up Tunis, and Hitler's shrewdest generals knew
cause was lost.
deteriorating as British
to gobble
that their
At a German
Staff
conference in Berlin, the Chief of Staff
of the Luftwaffe, General
Hans Jeschonek, reported
that al-
though his air raids on Britain were still causing heavy damage and some confusion, the Allied raids on Germany were
more
severe.
"This
we know,"
the chairman of the conference broke
in,
"but have you anything to report on our V-weapons progress?"
"The work progresses well. The experimental work is

ahead of schedule and some components are in mass production."
"Good! The Fuhrer
most interested in the Vergeltungswaffen and he insists that the campaign against London
begin not later than the end of 1943 with annihilating
is
effect!"
"That can be done," General Jeschonek said. "I have

placed General von Chamier-Glisczinski in direct charge of
production."
"Don't
it is
fail.
vital that
In view of our reverses in Africa and Russia
we
prevent any Allied landings on the Con-
We can't face a second front just now. The Fuhrer

wants the 'V campaign to open at the rate of one thousand
tinent.
of these missiles a day."
"A thousand a day?" General Jeschonek gasped.

least. Five thousand a day is the ultimate objective."
"At
174
Such was Great Britain's future when two nondescript

Poles were snatched from their homes one spring afternoon
of that same year. Since they are both still alive and reside
on the outskirts of Warsaw, they will be known here only as
Stefan and Tadeusz; the first was a schoolmaster, the second
a factory worker. Hitler, who had realized the military
value of the flying bomb, was not so astute when it came to
conscripting thousands
of
unfriendly foreigners
into
his
Reich. Hordes of French, Czechs, and Poles were sent into
Germany
were basically friends
came valuable
On
man
and most of these unfortunates

the Allies, and some of them be-
for forced labor,
of
recruits for espionage networks.
the face of things, opportunities were very limited.

in a labor
Council
files,
camp has few chances
of ransacking
War
but he can keep his eyes and ears open, for
espionage depends on collecting bits and pieces of information.
Then
intelligence crews try to
gether, just as they
fit
all
the pieces to-
would reassemble the scattered
parts
some delicate but important mechanism.

During the anxious, harrowing minutes before Stefan and
Tadeusz were hauled from their homes and put aboard a
truck that was to take them to Germany, they were contacted by a man named Stanislaw Obrebski, whom they
knew to be a leading member of the Polish Home Army
which was fighting a valiant underground battle with the
of
German occupation
"Listen,"
forces.
Stanislaw whispered
as
the
German guards
banged on Stefan's door, "wherever you go, keep your eyes

open. Anything unusual, military or otherwise, make a note
of it. Even trifles can be of great importance."
"But to
whom should we give these items?" Stefan asked.

me carefully," Stanislaw whispered. "If anyone
"Listen to
uses the sentence, 'knock the head off the bottle,' you accept
him
as
"How
your news courier."

will he contact me?"
"That's important. If
you have something
special,
put the

'Aunt Katie wouldn't
line
like this
175
weather' somewhere in
home. Is that clear?"

and Tadeusz nodded dumbly, but wondered
what information they could gather in some far-off labor
camp, digging ditches or mining coal.
Along with fifty other "volunteers" Stefan and Tadeusz
your
letters
Stefan
journeyed throughout that night in a locked cattle

After two nights and two days they were taken
off
train.
the train
and marched to a labor camp, put behind barbed wire and

given rude quarters in wooden barracks where chicken-wire
frames afforded three-tier-high sleeping accommodations.
Two
were all the bedding provided, so most

of the men curled up in their clothes. They had no idea
where they were, but from the salty tang in the air and the
fact that they had traveled north most of the time, it was
possible that they were somewhere on the Baltic coast.
They were immediately put to work building roads, or
pouring concrete for some strange-shaped emplacements.
The schoolmaster Stefan was physically unsuited for this
work; the sand and cement tore his soft hands to raw meat,
and at night he usually was too tired to crawl to the cookhouse for his meager ration of potato soup. Tadeusz did not
jmind hard work, but the concrete was rough on his fingers.
"Look at them," he complained. "I shall never be able to
thin blankets
play the violin again."
few days
guard with a distorted sense

of humor called out, "I have a special job, one that requires
skill and intelligence." He walked over to the two Warsaw
pals. "Let's see, you are a schoolteacher, eh? And you
you said you are a skilled mechanic? Good! You two fit the
later a fat, jovial
bill perfectly."
After
that
encouraging buildup
Stefan
and Tadeusz
learned that they had been selected for a routine latrine

job.
The
latrine
was on Post
71; not in the labor
camp but
up the road. Neither

the big building housed the V-i
in a mysterious factory area a mile
man had any
idea that
experimental station of Peenemiinde.
It
wasn't until one
176
day when they inadvertently walked past a partly opened

door that they realized they had stumbled on something unusual.
Tadeusz gave his friend a knowing look. "Did you see

what I think I saw?" he muttered quietly.
"It
looked
like
airplane/' Stefan replied, "but
little
didn't have a place
In his next letter
where
home
it
the pilot could sit."
Stefan casually mentioned that
the climate was severe and that "Aunt Katie wouldn't like
this
weather."
Some nights later as Stefan and Tadeusz were doing some

laundry in a camp shed, they whispered about the strange
device they had seen up at Post 71.
"How long since you wrote about Aunt Katie?" Tadeusz
inquired.
"About a week or
so."
somewhere above them.

knocked the head off the bottle."
"That's right," a voice muttered

"It
must be a week since
Stefan stared at Tadeusz.
"Who
said that?"
"I'm just above you, but don't look up.
came from
Stanislaw Obrebski."
When
man about the little

the man seemed unim-
Stefan explained to the unseen
plane that had no place for a
pilot,
it seems unimportant
drag me all this distance. I'm a locomotive driver and
my run brings me to Stettin at the mouth of the Oder River."
The news was soon conveyed to Stanislaw, however, but
it was beyond his comprehension, so he turned it over to a
Polish scientist in the Underground who used the name
of Rafal. He decided it was worth passing on to the Polish
General Staff in London.
Within a short time other forced-labor contacts began to
look about for other evidence of a secret weapon. A number
of French girls who had volunteered to work for the Ger-
pressed. "Well,
I'll tell
Stanislaw, but
to
mans in Hamburg, set up their own intelligence cell and

watched the movements of trains. It was from these girls
that the name Peenemunde first came up, but no one in
177
what went on there

until Constance Babington-Smith first noticed what looked
like a small tailless airplane mounted on a crude launching
Britain
knew what Peenemunde was
or
ramp.
The next item on the program had Stanislaw contacting

Stefan and Tadeusz to request a detailed plan of the
Peenemunde layout.
"You know," Tadeusz muttered, "this sounds like they're
going to
bomb
the place."
why all the concern about where the

and where the forced-labor men are bar-
"Probably, but
scientists
live
racked?"
The required map took weeks of anxious, whispered intwo latrine workers gathered enough
details to justify another reference to Aunt Katie's concern
quiry, but in time the
over inclement weather. Before the bottle-busting engineer
responded, a
the
woman
Peenemunde
news that
by October.
factory worker provided the
project might be completed
After that, anything might happen.
The map and other general information were transferred

and put into the underground line for
London. Captain Jan Nowak, a relentless worker for the
cause, was given the task of getting the microfilm on its
way to Britain. He managed this by faking a German railroad guard's uniform, and using the German railroad system
to get to Danzig. Once there he stowed away on a ship
to sheets of microfilm
carrying coal to Gotland, an island in the Baltic Sea belong-
ing to Sweden.
The
roll of
microfilm was hidden in the han-
dle of his shaving brush. After his arrival in Sweden, the
conveyance of the film to London was fairly easy.

Prime Minister Churchill did not decide to bomb Peenemunde with a lightness of heart. He knew that hundreds
of
men
of the forced-labor
camps would be
in that area,
but he did not dare to risk the chance that the mysterious
base would begin offensive operations.
also
had
Bomber Command
to think twice about this unusual target. For one
I78
thing,
it
was deep
in the loss of
many
in
enemy
territory,
and
it
would result
The tar-
valuable aircraft and air crews.
was a difficult one, a long narrow strip along the

coast, and the normal practice of night bombers to use the
"area-bombing" format would waste a lot of high explosive.
Yet it was realized that Peenemunde would have to be wiped
out in one mass attack. The air crews were told that they
were attacking an enemy base where a new and specialized
radar apparatus was being manufactured. The subject of
secret weapons was never brought up, mainly to ehminate
get itself
any loose talk that might cause public alarm.

So, as related before, Peenemunde was "well and truly
pranged," to use RAF slang of the day. Because of the map
provided by Stefan and Tadeusz, and the pre-raid training of the air crews taking part, all that was left of the
base was the barracks where the forced-labor men were
housed. The area was strewn with the bodies of technicians
and scientists, the blueprint sheds went up in flames, and
in some reports General von Chamier-Glisczinski, who was
in command of the complete operation, was said to have been
killed also, but no mention of this is made in General Walter
R. Dornberger's book, V-2 The Nazi Rocket Weapon. It is
on record, however, that General Jeschonek committed suicide a short time later.
No
one in Great Britain believed that the destruction of

the Peenemunde layout had ended the secret-weapon threat,
for the practical German mind would soon resort to continued work in "shadow" factories, and Hitler insisted on some
sort of flying-bomb attack before the Allies could open a
second front to take the pressure off Russia. Some effort
was made to rebuild Peenemunde, as evidenced by day-byday photographing. London took no chances, believing that
the enemy still had something that could cause considerable
trouble once the launching sites were completed.
Shortly after the Peenemunde raid Stanislaw Obrebski received an urgent order from London, one that justified a
personal visit to Peenemunde and Stefan. He found the for-
179
mer wispy schoolmaster a changed man. He was bright, alert,

and enthusiastic about what he and Tadeusz had accomplished. Stanislaw complimented them, but warned that the
Germans would not take the setback lying down.
Stefan agreed: "After all, Peenemunde was not a factory.
It was an experimental station, and while some assembly
work was carried out, we can't consider it a real production
plant."
"Right.
The
British
now
think that the parts are being
made, or will be made in small towns

but where?"
"If
we
find out, will the
RAF
all
over
take care of
Germany
them
in the
same way?"
"Exactly!"
"We
shall
have to see what
we can
do," Stefan said
thoughtfully.
latrine orderlies began to make new
They sensed that the forced-labor men probably would
be sent to some of these new camps. Some could watch and
check the movements of large trucks, a few could make
friends with some of the drivers. Stefan's organization could
be broadened, and his watching operations might be rearranged to cope with this more extensive problem.
In late October 1943, Leipzig, Ludwigshafen, and Dusseldorf were severely hit by the RAF. This was strange be-
That night the two
plans.
cause Leipzig hadn't been molested since 1940. Obviously,

Stefan and Tadeusz were
tunities.
making the most
of their oppor-
In a short time they were able to advise London
of fourteen subsidiary factories
where
parts for the
new
RAF-
weapon were being made, and during the subsequent

USAAF air raids, the Polish underground was playing hob
with the aid of a new set of highly illegal radio communi-
Many of these underground stations were in the

around Warsaw, and Stanislaw Obrebski was in
charge of one of them. During transmissions one night footsteps were heard on the fringe of the thicket.
cations.
forests
l8o
"Hold everything," Stanislaw snapped. "Don't destroy the

may be a man. If so, I'll deal with him."
A moment later a pretty girl swept into their circle. In
contrast to the others, she was gaily dressed for a dinner
radio. It
or cocktail party.
"Molda!" they
all
gasped, for they
knew her from happier
days.
"Hello, Stanislaw. I have a message for you."
"God! You're a sight for sore eyes."
Molda's message stated that the Germans had established
a large work camp at Blizna-Pustow on the great Polish plain.
There were many small farms in the area, all cultivated in
a very primitive manner. When special underground agents
filtered through, they could learn little, but one factor did
stand out when it v/as discovered that trucks of unusual
length entered the work camp, and one British agent stayed
long enough to photograph one of these vehicles that had
been driven from Breslau ( now Wroclaw ) according to the
labels on the crates and markings on the truck body. Other
agents in Breslau insisted that such trucks had never been
seen in that town, and said they must have come from
another part of Germany.
few
Blizna-Pustow agreed to gather any

smidgin of information that came out of the camp, and luck
villagers of
was with one man who was washing up outside his house.
He was the first to see a small airplane with a flaming pipe at
its tail fly
over his farm, heading east-northeast.
appeared,
made one
It
simply
big swish, and disappeared!
London convinced British intelGermans had transferred their experimental

plant from Peenemunde to the Polish plain. Now if intelligence had one of these strange swishing airplanes to look
hurried radio report to
ligence that the
over, they
It
Didn't
might figure out a way
it.
Go Bang!
now switches to Sarnaki, a village on

Bug near Wyszkow which was near the end of
This narrative
River
to stop
the
the
new
flying-bomb
test path.
this fascinating display for
and hurried home

"Father, another
small
some
l8l
boy who had watched
new
time, noted a
routine
to report to his father.

little
plane went over."

,>
"Oh, in the same direction, Sigismund?

"Yes, but this time it was different. I found
over near
it
the river/'
"You mean where it exploded?"

"No. That's what I wanted to tell you. It didn't go bang!"
Sigismund's father leaped from his chair. "You are sure?"
That was enough for Sigismund's father; within half an
hour a small group of underground watchers had hauled this
undamaged buzz bomb out of some reeds and shoved it out
into the center of the river.
had
A Polish farmer, named
Andreas,
driven a small herd of cattle up for water.
just
"Drive them out in the middle, Andreas," Sigismund's

father said.
case
As
"Let them churn up the
mud
just
in
."
.
this
was going
on, a large
a screech of brakes and three
Mercedes car drove up with
German
officers
leaped out.
"Did you see a small aircraft pass over this way?" one
of them demanded.
Êveryone had seen it, but every Pole in the group was
certain that it had passed over in a different direction. Otto
was positive it had headed toward Sokolow due east. Andreas ridiculed Otto and said it had almost clipped the
church over there going due south. Sigismund's father took
the German officers aside and explained that these rustics
were so fascinated with the little airplane the one with
the light on its tail they had no idea where it was going.
"To be perfectly frank, Hauptmann," he confided, "it passed
very close over those trees."
"But, you imbecile, that
is
almost north," an
officer raged.
Sigismund's father shrugged his shoulders, and the Ger-
mans climbed back
into their
Mercedes positive that most
Poles were slightly demented.
The next morning,
Rafal, the technician,
was sent
to the
l82
Home Army Intelligence section. Within

an hour he had the undamaged missile out of the water and
up on the bank, where it was swabbed off and photographed
from every angle. The pictures were taken in case the device should blow up while it was being dismantled for shipment. A local engineer spent another hour in immunizing
the charge, and by nightfall the captured buzz bomb had
been taken apart, wrapped in several packages, and placed
on a farm cart.
In Belgium, another underground worker broke into a German military office and brazenly removed a wall map on
which all the buzz-bomb ramps in Europe were plotted, and
once more the RAF and U. S. Eighth Air Force bombed new
and more mysterious targets on the Continent.
Rafal was told to get his capture to London; never mind
how get it there, and equally important he was to accompany the secret weapon.
"Oh, fine," he groaned. "What do they expect me to do
fly the damn thing over?" But the Polish Home Army was
scene by the Polish
equal to the occasion. Someone remembered a deserted

airstrip
near a forest two hundred miles south where the
Dunajec
joins the Vistula.
During the fighting
in
Poland in
1939 the Germans had used it as an emergency landing

ground. "The British will have an aircraft there the minute
you
let
them know you have
all
your packages available."
Musical Interlude
Two days later a German army

hidden laboratory. The driver and
and met Rafal who was dressed in
with a scrub-brush haircut. RafaFs
truck arrived at Rafal's
another soldier entered

infantry gear, complete
"packages" were loaded
on the vehicle, and after checking their papers that were

complete with forms and stamps purloined from a nearby
Pioneer Regiment supply office, they took off.
Rafal,
who
spoke
German
like a
Munich bartender, took
complete charge when they were stopped by sentries or
at
183
military police checkpoints. An ex-Polish air officer, working

under the name of Wlodek, crept out of a hedge and guided
them to their airstrip rendezvous. All of this took effrontery

and consummate nerve, as there was a German military camp
within a mile of the clearing, but luckily it was occupied
by soldiers who were resting after a terrific mauling by the
Russians.
The
tage,
focal point at the airstrip
and
few
villagers
was
a woodchopper's cot-
who had communal
firewood in the forest, helped unload the
without attracting any particular attention.
rights to cut
German
Wlodek
lished radio contact with the Polish General Staff in
and that night the
BBC
in
London permitted
few bars
truck
estab-
London,
a Polish pian-
Nocturne Op. 15.

When these dulcet notes came through Wlodek's little
speaker, he smiled, and said, "There's our signal. They'll be
here tomorrow."
Rafal went out to the airstrip and walked up and down.
It had rained hard the night before and he wanted to be
sure the turf would support a heavy cargo plane.
"Don't worry," Wlodek assured him. "Those people know
what they are doing. You'd better get some sleep. You won't
êt much tomorrow."
Another message came through early the next morning,
explaining that the aircraft, a British Dakota ( DC-3 ) would
arrive shortly after midnight. That meant that Rafal would
not have to move his packages out of the woodchopper's shed
ist
to tinkle off a
of Chopin's
until well after dark.
During midmoming
was rewrapping most
of the
packages, a forest worker broke into the woodshed.
"Two
German
aircraft
as Rafal
have landed here," he
cried.
"That reams it," Rafal muttered. He went to the window.

Sure enough, there were two German fighters ticking over
in the middle of the airstrip.
"Does this happen often?"
but not for some months."
"What usually happens?"
"It has,
184
"The
last
time three aircraft landed here and hung about
for three hours or so."
Rafal and
Wlodek decided
that
it
could be a routine
in-
field, but they could take no chances.

day was spent in contacting the Polish Home
Army and coming to a general decision that this was
just a routine training exercise. But they rounded up enough
underground fighters to stand by, should the planes and
pilots remain overnight. The wire garrote and the silent
knife would be used. However, both planes left before
spection of the landing
The
rest of the
nightfall.
The long weary hours passed, and then a new furor broke
The Germans in the rest camp were suddenly flushed
out, put aboard trucks and rushed westward for the BritishAmerican invasion of Normandy. As soon as that flurry died
down, three small green lights were put down to mark the
airstrip. To their great relief they saw the Dakota circle
overhead, slip down through the darkness and make a perfect landing. The daring crew consisted of Flight Lieutenout.
ant
Culliford
of
267
Squadron,
pilot;
Flying
Officer
Szajer of 1536 Polish Flight, co-pilot; Flying Officer Williams,
and Flight Sergeant Appleby, radio operator.

flying bomb and three high-ranking Polish
underground officers who suddenly appeared from nowhere
were taken aboard, and the British pilot attempted to turn
around for the take-off. When the engines were put into
full boost for the getaway, nothing happened. The old DC-3
had bogged down in the mud, and for minutes it looked as
though all their efforts were for naught.
navigator;
The captured
Wlodek ordered
their shovels
the
and spades.
forest
workers to turn out with
Culliford, the pilot, climbed
down
and took one look. "We'll never get her out of this bog. I
think we'd better destroy the old kite."
But the Poles had other ideas. The big parcels, crew, and
passengers were off-loaded, and the plane's documents
placed where they could be quickly destroyed. Cans of gas-
were held
oline
in readiness to
185
drench the Dakota should
enemy appear.
"Come on. Let's
the
try once more," Wlodek pleaded.

Everyone worked like a madman. Those without shovels
dug with their bare hands. Planks were found to form a
ramp up out of the muck, and then at the height of the
activity a sentry crept in with the dread news. "There's a
German patrol on the way!" But gradually the DC-3 was
hauled out of the morass and the pilot found higher and
drier ground. The packages and passengers were stowed
away once more, and she skimmed off like a bird.
Their first landing was in Brindisi, Italy, from where the
Dakota had come. The British officials there tried to look
over the captured buzz bomb, but Rafal refused to move off
his pile of packages. "Nothing doing," he growled. "I was
ordered to deliver these to the Polish Staff in London. No
one touches anything until I get there." There was no further
argument and Rafal sat it out until he and his prize were
dropped in London. Today, the Polish patriot is said to be
in the United States.
would be gratifying to report that this complete German

weapon was delivered before Hitler launched his first
ones against Great Britain, but such was not the case. The
first four hit southern England in the early hours of June
It
sjecret
13, 1944, but the real all-out attack did not begin until the
night of June 16. Within twenty-four hours more than
two hundred flying bombs were launched, seventy-five exploded in Greater London, and thirty-three were brought
down, twenty-five by antiaircraft gunfire. These V-weapons
all
exploded, of course, and the British had
little
idea
what
they were contending with. But by late July Rafal's packages arrived, and properly assembled, the secret of the jet
engine was revealed.
Once they had some idea what the
missile
and general behavior in flight,

experts redesigned their gun mountings
was
like, its
rate of speed,
British artil-
lery
to provide a
l86
higher rate of traverse against low-flying (2000-3000 feet)

targets. Also, they
soon trained their Typhoon fighter
craft pilots for this
emergency. The Typhoon was quite ca-
air-
pable of intercepting the flying bombs and destroying them,

either
by gunfire
or
by "tipping them
over"; getting their
wingtips under the short stub wings of the missiles and forcing them into the sea or open agricultural areas where
life would not be so great.
At the same time the London defense-barrage balloons
were fitted out to handle the buzz bombs by being equipped
with a new type of cable, one that had a double parachute
link set in the top of the strand just under the balloon rigging. When a buzz bomb hit the cable the double link
disengaged and small parachutes quickly opened, fell, and
became entangled with the missile. This caused it to stall
and fall clear of the city. Later on, a rearrangement of the
antiaircraft guns along the coastal areas resulted in a bag
of at least 75 per cent of all V-is sent over by the enemy.
Long before Allied troops had overrun the main launching
sites in western Europe, the Germans admitted that the
British had found a countermeasure to the first of Hitler's
revenge weapons. He still had the V-2, but as a result of
the battering the required launch sites took from the British
and American bombers, it came too late to have an impor-
the loss of
tant role.
Was
It
Worth
the
Figures on the
Money?
number
of flying
bombs launched
against
must be admitted that at least 10,000 were fired, and 7488 were aimed at
the British capital. Of these, 3957 were brought down; 1847
by fighter planes, 1878 by antiaircraft gunfire, and 232 by
balloon cables. In other words, more than 50 per cent of the
missiles were destroyed. Yet the cost was heavy. Although
many of the bombs fell in open country, about 2400 hit
London or some other important target area, and 6214 peoBritain are incomplete, or unreliable, but
it
187
them in London, and 18,037

were seriously injured. In the countermeasures taken, involving the delivery of more than 100,000 tons of bombs,
2900 air-crew members were lost and 450 aircraft destroyed.
More than 23,000 houses were totally destroyed, and over
1,000,000 damaged. One can only imagine what might have
happened, had Hitler begun his launchings in January
1944 instead of June and July, and had he been able to deliver 1000 a day as he had planned.
But was the flying bomb worth the money? Each was
supposed to cost about $15,000 each, and if 10,000 were
fired at British targets, and killed more than 9000 civilian
and service personnel, the price would be about $10,000 per
fatal casualty, which is close to the average cost of killing
a man in modern warfare. Large numbers of V-is were later
launched at Liege, Antwerp, and other Continental targets,
and we must presume that more than 20,000 flying bombs
were manufactured.
pie were killed, 92 per cent of
German Reichminister for production, said

later that the money spent on V-is would have been better
employed in turning out 3000 fighters that might have made
Albert Speer,
more difficult. For instance,

one
underground factory at Nordhausen, employing 30,000
%
workers with a vast inventory of machine tools, could turn
Allied progress across France
out only thirty flying
bombs
a day. Speer also declared that
the V-2 rockets that cost about $45,000 apiece were far too
expensive; a fighter could have been produced for that
money.
Hitler was of no help either. He insisted on making London the prime target, hoping to break British morale, instead
of concentrating on the invasion ports, a decision that might
have been profitable. If the attack had been centered on the
Portsmouth-Southampton area, the invasion plan of Operation of Overlord might have been delayed for many months.
In a second instance, Hitler failed to call on his reputed

genius.
When
Normandy,
the Allies
his first
made
their successful landing in
concern was for the launching
sites,
l88
since
he
still
hoped
to break the British
spirit.
Once the
Allies started their breakout, instead of ordering a general
and making a stand along the

German frontier, he might have held the Americans and
British at bay long enough to create a stalemate and command a negotiated peace. But no, he tried to defend his
concrete redoubts from where his V-is were being fired,
throwing in his reserves piecemeal to defend the French
coast, and lost all.
Hitler's early tactics were based on the premise that the
general with the most men and guns would win the day,
but he also knew the value of civilian morale, and there is
no doubt that his flying bombs were a terrific blow to the
British. They had withstood bombardment from the air for
years and the invasion of Normandy aroused high hopes of
retreat to the Siegfried line,
victory. Then, within a week of the invasion, this new terror

was sent against them, and we who were there noticed the
depressing effect, not only on the public at home, but on
the soldiers serving on the new front. Many of them worried
more about their families at home than they did their own
fortunes.
Bombs
delivered
bore some
aircraft
human
by
piloted aircraft
were one thing they

be affected by anti-
association that could
guns or opposition fighters but a weapon that relied
no way on human control produced an uncanny effect on

morale. A new stricture of impotency takes over when one
is faced with a bloodless and nerveless mechanism of death.
Thus, although the effects of the flying bomb were bad
enough, they were greatly magnified by the evacuees, and
passed on to people in other sectors who had not seen or
heard a flying bomb. There were fantastic stories afield.
One said that a quarter of a million people had been killed
in London alone. Prime Minister Churchill had been buried,
and a stand-in was taking his place. Such stories seemed
endless, and seemingly were seldom refuted.
Britain's Ministry of Information finally coped with this,
and the newspapers collaborated loyally to work out a plan
in
l8g
denying information to the

enemy, who, because the V-is were still experimental,
wanted to know when and where they struck. In fact, Herbert Morrison, Minister of Home Security, probably helped
to allay apprehension while
to
remove the
still
fear of the missile
by
calling
it
a flying
bomb,
thereby suggesting a familiar weapon that had a novel
method
ing
sites
But all of us shared in the general

was announced that the main launch-
of propulsion.
sigh of relief
when
it
had been overrun.
Perhaps the greatest price paid for the V-weapons is to

be found in the fact that a General Koller, last chief of
staff for the Luftwaffe, believed that the flying bomb and
the V-2 rocket would entirely replace the bomber of the
Luftwaffe. Hitler agreed with him, and the strength of the
German Air Force was allowed to go into its decline.
CHAPTER
IX

The Element of Surprise
The Husky Movement
Mark Clark's Memorable Mission
The Course of Events.
Any
success attained in an invasion of
enemy
territory
depends much on achieving complete surprise, but prior

to Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, the Allies
experienced some anxious moments before the assault got
under way, and for a time it seemed that full details of the
action were obtainable for the asking. Every effort to keep
the operation a secret seemed to be jinxed.
A courier aircraft was shot down en route to Gibraltar,
and a naval officer, who was carrying a letter from General
Walter Bedell Smith to General Sir Frank N. M. MacFarlane,
Governor of Gibraltar, was killed. Had the contents of the
letter fallen into enemy hands it would have revealed the
North African plans.
The naval officer's body was washed ashore near Cadiz,

Spain, and was handed over by the Spanish authorities.
When the body was examined the letter was found in the
unbuttoned pocket with the envelope still sealed. The question then arose: Had the Spaniards, who seemed to be playing both ends to the middle, allowed the Germans to extract
and photograph the letter, or had it been missed? After a
thorough examination Allied intelligence
men decided
that
191
had not been touched; sand that was

in the buttonhole of the pocket was considered concluevidence that the document had not been tampered
the pocket and letter

still
sive
with.
Some months
later this incident
was revised and reversed
known for a time as Operation

Mincemeat. The body of a British Royal Marines officer,
into a planned deception,
carrying false letters and instructions in his briefcase, was
put into the sea from a British submarine and was washed
The letters and instructions

German hands, and they immediately revised
ashore on the coast of Spain.
were put
into
their plans so as to thwart
had
an invasion of Greece, and thus

from the impending invasion
their attention diverted
of Sicily.
an actor, Clifton James, donned British battle

and a black beret to impersonate General Bernard
Montgomery, and with as much publicity as was necessary,
was flown to Gibraltar shortly before D-day, 1944, to stay
with the Governor there. From there he went on to North
Africa, leaving enemy agents confused and the German General Staff wondering whether a landing in northern France
was contemplated. It was the Allied intent to give the
impression that an invasion would take place in the Mediterranean. At the same time it was "reliably reported" that
General Eisenhower was to make a routine trip to Washington, a decision that bewildered American war correspondents, but all this was of value to the Allied counterintelStill later,
dress
ligence program.
One
most disturbing incidents that occurred beNorth Africa was the loss of Page 117
from the diaiy of General Eisenhower's activities that was
being kept by his naval aide, Captain Harry C. Butcher.
This particular sheet presented a Torch directive to General
Ike in which he was ordered to "clean up the North African
coast." If an enemy agent had come in possession of it, all
hope of attaining a surprise would have gone out the window.
of the
fore the invasion of
ig2
Apparently the sheet was
lost
while the complete month's
was on its way to the Army's film laboratory

The loss was discovered on September 7,
is known, was never found.
and,
as
far
1942,
Then on September 19 it was reported that the London
news editor of the United Press had sent a message to his
bureau manager in New York that in plain language warned
file
of pages
for microfilming.
the United Press to prepare for a coverage
of,
not Dakar,
but Casablanca and elsewhere in French Morocco, "as
this
where the American forces are striking."

No one seemed to know whether the message had been
sent by cable or by radio. If by cable, it was fairly secure,
but if it had been transmitted over the air it was reasonable
to assume that the Germans would have monitored the
message and by now would have many pertinent details
of the Torch landing. Fortunately, even this prize foulup
did not give the game away, and the North Africa assault
was a complete surprise.
This upset had hardly died down when General George
Patton's G-2 officer warned that the Moslem religion of the
Arabs prohibited fighting during the eleventh and twelfth
months of the year. If the attack started before the eleventh
month was half over, all would be well, and he recommended November 9 as the final date to open the campaign
tvithout offending the Moslems. The intelligence man also
believed that the Axis would propagandize any violation of
Moslem customs if the attack came during their prohibited
is
months.
Operation Torch kicked
off
on Sunday, November
8,
1942.

Operation Torch, the British-American invasion of North
was not just a co-operative effort designed to support's Great Britain's long, drawn-out war against General
Africa
Erwin Rommel
in the western desert, nor a preliminary to
1Q3
the invasion of Sicily or the Italian peninsula;
had been
it
mind of Prime Minister Churchill for many months.

Premier Joseph Stalin had called for a second front for
two years, and with some justification as Soviet troops had
in the
received a severe beating since June 22, 1941, when Hitler

treacherously reversed his field and turned his manpower
and weapons on his previous ally. Much of this misfortune

had been due to the bewilderment of Soviet intelligence, as
the Communists, in their stolid Slavic ignorance, had permitted the Nazi leader to place himself in a commanding
where he could strike when and where he

had even ignored a timely and significant
warning from Winston Churchill that reached the Russian
leader April 19, 1941, two months before the Nazis struck.
Although Russian intelligence must have noted the vast
German deployment to the east, they apparently did nothing
about it, and as far as strategy, military policy, foresight,
and leadership were concerned, the Russian Bear was the
position from
pleased. Stalin
prize bungler of the campaign.
Because
Hitler's attack
on Russia influenced British-Amer-
ican thinking to some extent,
When
it
deserves
some review.
the Fuhrer found himself doing a tap-dance before
the historic railroad car in the forest of

tor over France,
Compiegne
he must have had a second thought con-
cerning this quick and unexpected success. After
was playing a doubtful

ain
still
as vic-
role as
an
ally,
all,
Italy
and with Great
Brit-
resisting his threats or oily wiles for cessation of
became confused and had no idea in which

move next. He held most of Europe in chains,
operations, he
direction to
but had no notion
mare
how
of all dictators,
to keep her there. This
is
and further proof that war
the nightis
a cata-
logue of blunders.
The Nazi leader was
in a
quandary
as early as July 1940.
His generals had advised against attempting an invasion

Britain. The RAF had scattered General Goering's
vaunted Luftwaffe, and the Royal Navy was intact. Against
all this he faced the prospect of exhausting his people, his
of
194
and
industry,
what he had
he knew he had to make an
military forces in holding on to
so ruthlessly confiscated. Yet,
aggressive gesture in
He might have
some
direction.
continued to march through the Mediter-
ranean and pushed on into the Middle East, but Vichy

France was an uncertain quantity, and he couldn't trust
Franco of Spain. On the other hand, Russia had gobbled
up the
and Basarabia and Bukovina, and

Russian agents had been caught conniving with untrustworthy characters in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria moves that
would have put Stalin's armies in a formidable position
should
Baltic
states,
Germany attempt
to
move
into Britain or the
Med-
iterranean in force.
In other words, the European

solving into a Continental clash
unworthy
War
appeared to be rebetween two great and
political ideologies.
few of his generals that he must strike

became too strong, but, remembering the
problems that Hindenburg had faced during the 1914-18
war, several of these military men wanted no part of a Russian campaign most of his divisional leaders did not know
that such a move was in the making until they were ordered
Hitler confided to a
before Russia
into the attack.
In 1941 Hitler reasoned that Great Britain was not strong

to risk a return to the Continent, even if Germany
enough
did attack Russia. But with the rising success of British-
American Lend-Lease, the Nazi leader knew that if he

hoped for any success against Russia, his initial thrust would
have to be made before the war-supply alliance could create a serious diversion. In addition, there was one other
point that seldom has been presented. Hitler undoubtedly
thought that by switching his war of conquest to a crusade
against Communism he could confuse, and perhaps win some
support from democratic opinion in Great Britain and the
United States. For months he deluded himself that the capitalistic
countries shared his psychological fears of
nism, but in this his intelligence failed
Commu-
him completely.
1Q5
man named Winston

world that: "We have but
Unfortunately for Adolf, a
Spencer
one aim
Churchill reminded the

and one irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy
Hitler and every vestige of his Nazi regime; from this nothing will turn us nothing. We will never parley. We will
never negotiate with Hitler or any of his men. We shall
fight him on the land, by sea and in the air, until, with
God's help, we shall have rid the earth of his shadow and
liberated its peoples from his yoke."
In the United States, Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles
made America's
position equally clear, but Hitler
and
conquered states he could muster a formidable military machine. He not only had the resources of Germany, the most
risked this test of strength since with his allied, vassal,
highly industrialized nation on the Continent, but those of
most
of
Europe from the Arctic
to the Mediterranean,
from
With no serious contention

he could hurl against Russia's 190 millions,
a larger initial force and a better-equipped one.
the Atlantic to the Black Sea.
in the west,
With all this

as had another
%
in
hand
Hitler took the road to
Moscow,
dictator called Napoleon.
The Germans launched a three-way
offensive with three
massive army groups, totaling 180 divisions, thousands of

airplanes, tanks,
and armored
vehicles. All three thrusts en-
for the Nazis seemed to go

through the Russian defense "like a hot knife through butter." The blitz through France in 1940 was nothing compared to this. At the close of the Bialystok-Minsk battle the
Nazis claimed to have taken 342,000 prisoners. But the Soviets did not know when they were licked, and after two
joyed spectacular success at
first,
weeks of fighting Hitler discovered that his original blitzkrieg tactics no longer worked, as Stalin had adopted the
defense-in-depth system. Every time the Germans slashed
through Russian defenses they were attacked by new Soviet
regiments from the rear.
The Nazi invaders were next checked at Smolensk in a
196
September
that lasted from July 20 to
bitter stand
27.
Then came the memorable Battle of Moscow, October 2 to

December 4, followed by Leningrad and Rostov, and by
December 6 the Russians opened their midwinter countercampaign that might have gained greater
armada of Japanese carrierborne planes
that struck at Pearl Harbor and precipitated the United
States into the war. For a time the world's interest swung
offensive, a savage
publicity but for an
to the Pacific.
Sevastopol was temporarily relieved by January

shortly after
Germany had
to face a
new
7,
and
variant of guerrilla
warfare and a wholesale scorched-earth policy. The Nazis
hacked away
won
battles,
through the spring and summer of 1942,

captured vast blocks of territory, but could not
all
bring the Soviets to surrender.
The losses on both sides were

and the front a great bloody
incalculable, the clashes savage,

scar.
The Nazis opened
they crossed the

fields in
new
Don and
the Caucasus,
offensive in
May
1942
when
penetrated into the Grozny
and from
that time
oil
on the Soviet
Union had no choice but to keep on fighting

on expensively wide fronts, hoping to hang on
costly battles
until general
winter could come again to their aid.
With
Alamein early in November, the invasion of Algeria and Morocco timed to the
American repulse of the Japanese invasion fleet at Guadalcanal, it was natural that Stalin should seek surcease and
inquire when the British and Americans would take some
of the stress in the European theatre by opening a second
British successes following El
front in Continental Europe.

Although the British had long yearned to return to Europe and drive the Nazis back to their Berlin bunkers, they
were logical enough to know that any such assault would

be costly and demand long and expensive preparation. When
one has suffered a Dunkirk, been driven out of Norway, and

is
still
197
smarting from a series of tragic reverses in North
Africa, one does not clamor for
more
of the
same treatment
without deep consideration and high-materiel buildup.
The situation was different for the Americans. They were

and eager to move. Although they had had several
setbacks in the Pacific they still believed that a solid blow
at Hitler's Europe was possible and the quicker, the better.
Until April 1942, United States forces had gained all their
experience in the Pacific. The U. S. Marines had made a
gallant stand at Wake Island, and Luzon had been invaded
by the Japanese. General MacArthur had retreated from the
Bataan Peninsula. Tokyo had been bombed by Jimmy Doo-
fresh
little's
land planes to raise our hopes, but the Battles of the
Midway were weeks away. American forces

to cheer about until July 4 when a
small formation of six Flying Fortresses attacked an enemy
field in Holland. Two planes were lost, but much was made
Coral Sea and
in Britain
had nothing
and Captain Charles S. Kegelman, pilot of one

was awarded the Distinguished Service
Cross and his crew received Distinguished Flying Crosses.
Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Mark W. Clark
had been sent over by General George C. Marshall to organize a temporary headquarters and to gather recommendations for continued development of America's European
headquarters. They arrived about the middle of May, some
five months after America's entry in the conflict. After ten
days of inspection General Eisenhower returned home to
make his report and explain that in his opinion someone
who was thoroughly indoctrinated in the plans of the
United States government, with a knowledge of American
capabilities in the mobilizing of land, sea, and air units
and the materiel to support them in offensive operations,
should be selected to command United States European
forces. Eisenhower recommended General Joseph T. McNarney for the post.
General McNarney had served several months in London
and was familiar with the workings of the British military
of the effort,
of
the bombers
198
more important, he was personally acBritish officers. However, McNarney had just been appointed Deputy Chief of Staff to the
War Department, and there was no one to fill his shoes.
In the meantime Eisenhower had submitted a "Directive for
the Commanding General, European Theatre of Operations."
Three days later General Ike was named commander of
United States European theatre. He returned to London
in June of that year, took up quarters in Grosvenor Square,
and assumed command of ETOUSA (European Theatre of
Operations, United States Army).
Later that month the newspapers of Great Britain and
the United States were echoing the Russian appeal for a
second front. It was thought in many quarters that unless
the Soviets were strengthened with greater convoys of military supplies, and unless some military relief could be devised to take some of the strain off Stalin's armies, the
Germans would win the campaign in the East. Apparently
only Winston Churchill believed in the tenacity of the Russians; he was positive they would never give in, no matter
organization, but
quainted with
how
many key
great the pressure.
war this popular cry

was not especially strident, but it then increased in tenor
and for a time threatened to split the British Cabinet and
divide the Allies. Looking back it is surprising how many
people in Great Britain and the United States held great
compassion and admiration for the Russians during that
memorable year of 1942, and ignored the total indifference
Stalin had shown for the fate of the Western powers when
Hitler was riding roughshod over the free peoples of Europe.
Winston Churchill did agree that all possible war equipment of Great Britain and the United States, tanks, guns,
aircraft, ammunition, and certain raw materials should be
diverted to Russia, but most American supporters and many
British Communists said that in addition a second front
should be set up at once "in northern Europe" where the
enemy could offer less resistance because of his enormous
Until the United States entered the
199
battle front against Russia, a front that ran
from the Baltic
to the Black Sea.
This "second front" was the war's biggest political and

military issue.
The
British public openly disliked anything
that reflected prudence or caution, but this civilian
did not have to clamber in and out of landing
on
this
craft.
enthusiasm was quenched by the tragic Dieppe
body
Later
raid.
President Roosevelt and his Joint Chiefs of Staff joined

in
the "second-front" clamor, and
gave out the impres-
American troops would soon be swarming up

enemy beachheads "somewhere in Europe." Taking their
cue from Russia's continued appeals, and inspired by some
vague idea that the British were hopefully considering a
sion that
summer of 1943 to risk

known as Operation Sledge-
return to the continent during the

a temporary toe-hold project
hammer, they announced that plans were to be rushed for

an invasion of Europe a year earlier in 1942 to be exact.
As was to be expected, the press and noncombatants on both
were delighted and loud in their praise
and support of this proposed venture.
When General Eisenhower returned to London, burdened
with his new command, he arranged many talks with members of the British chiefs of staff and soon realized that
they held little hope for a major invasion that year. British
intelligence had given Winston Churchill enough information to make him cautious and realistic. Intelligence, and
ranking officers of British combined operations, pointed out
that they had only enough landing craft to launch one
division, and more important did not care to risk the psychological reaction to another failure so close to home.
True, there had been some veiled references to Sledgehammer which might go ashore in France some time in
1943, but more openly they suggested that America's first
military move might be staged in North Africa, an attack
that would "get on Rommel's tail." General Eisenhower was
none too keen about this at the time, and indicated a
sides of the Atlantic
200
strong preference to cross the
Channel a move
that
would
materially aid the Russians.

Actually,
the United States
mobilization and training of
its
was
the 34th Infantry Division, the 1st
small detachments of the
just
approaching the
three military services. Only
Armored
USAAF had
Division,
and
arrived in northern
and these were only partly trained. The bulk of

air, and ground, needed for
a major invasion had not yet reached the blueprint stage.
Production problems also ruled out any possibility of a fullscale invasion in 1942 or even 1943. However, as some compensation for his disappointment and thwarted enthusiasm
Dwight D. Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander
for Torch, the North African operation, and he was most
gratified to learn that the British had insisted that the expedition be spearheaded by United States troops and the
top commander an American general.
Ireland,
the fighting equipment, naval,
The Element
The
of Surprise
success of Operation Torch, like
depended on the shock
all
such assaults,
of complete surprise,
and consider-
ing the elaborate preparations, not only in the British Isles
and the United States but also at Gibraltar which had become the nodal point of the venture, it is surprising that
the Axis did not become aware of the planned assault weeks
before it jumped off. The Rock was a mere stone's throw
from La Linea, Spain, presumed to be infested with spies.
But despite
all this,
German intelligence apparently uncovmove until the landings were under
ered no evidence of this
way.
Nevertheless, British intelligence suffered
when
many
anxious
seemed that their moves and plans might just

as well have been presented in bold-faced type on London's
billboards. Besides the naval courier whose body was
found on the Spanish shore after the PBY flying boat had
been shot down, a confidential secretary added to the conhours
it
when he broke
fusion
all
201
regulations
by taking home with
memorandum from
the Prime
was suggested
that an additional landing should be made at Bone, some
two hundred miles east of Algiers.
By an astonishing coincidence, this document, only one
of several he had taken with him, fell out of his pocket
as he was boarding a bus to go home. Luckily, it was picked
up by a scrubwoman who took it home and turned it over
to a young airman who had been billeted with her. This
serviceman had sense enough to go directly to the Air Ministry and demand to see the Chief of the Air Staff to whom
him a copy
of a top-secret
Minister to the chiefs of
he turned
it
staff,
in
which
it
over.
Here again the question arose as to whether the memorandum had been seen by enemy eyes, but on following
through, intelligence officers learned that rain had started
to fall just as the secretary had boarded the bus and that
the paper was quite diy when recovered. From this it was
deduced that it had been on the ground for a matter of
seconds, and that no leakage could have taken place. But
British intelligence did not breathe regularly for
days,
and we do not know what happened
several
to the careless
secretary.
This matter had scarcely settled
down when
new and
equally disturbing incident occurred to the embarassment

of all concerned. In order to carry out a military invasion
maps have
and printed in great numhad to be exercised in this matter,

and the maps were printed by a small press in a provincial
town well away from London. They were to be distributed
to the various military officials by the printer's delivery
truck, and during one trip the covering of one of the packages broke loose and scattered maps all over the road.
The local police, making a routine patrol of the area,
found the maps and noting that they presented pertinent
details of North Africa, called up the Free French Headquarters in London to learn whether the maps were theirs.
special
to be prepared
bers. Considerable care
202
Considering that the de Gaulle force in London had been

deliberately kept in ignorance of the impending invasion,
would have been embarrassing had the officer taking the

message asked to see a copy of the map. But he suspected
nothing, and said that whatever they were his office had no
interest in them. The Allied Chiefs of Staff once more were
it
greatly relieved.
Mark
Clark's
Memorable Mission
How much German
Intelligence
pected of the planning of Torch
really
is difficult
knew
or
sus-
to ascertain, as
credence can be given to most memoirs written by

Nazi authorities after the war. In many instances these doc-
little
uments attempt to whitewash their defeats or to cover up

their mistakes. Some have been written in a conciliatory
vein to win Allied favor, which is understandable. A few
brazenly state how much they knew, what they accomplished, and how unfortunate they were to have fought
on the wrong side. In poring over these autobiographies the
historian of today is bewildered by the many and varied
opinions, statements, charges, and explanations of what actually happened in any given circumstance.
For instance, the Vichy French government claimed that
it knew all about the Allied plan to assault Dakar or Casablanca. They told Robert Murphy, United States special
representative, who worked under the cover name of Colonel McGowan and was in close relationship with the French
in Morocco, that this information had been turned over to
them by German and Japanese sources. This seems hard to
believe considering that Nazi agents operating near Gibraltar knew nothing of the plan. The suggestion may have
been one of several dozen invented to keep Admiral Jean
Darlan and General Henri Giraud within the Axis fold.
After considerable reflection, Robert Murphy decided that
it was quite possible that the Vichy government would resist the proposed Allied assault and might even invite German or Italian troops to aid in the defense of French Mo-
He
203
and learned that Admiral

Darlan was now willing to join the Allies and bring in what
he had left of the French fleet, providing he would be
named commander-in-chief of the French forces in North
Africa, and be assured of large-scale United States materiel
and financial aid. Murphy recommended that Darlan be
encouraged on the basis of his securing the co-operation of
General Giraud. At this time General Charles Mast, then
rocco.
pursued
this possibility
Chief of Staff to General Louis M. Koeltz

the French corps near Algiers,
who commanded
recommended dealing with
General Giraud rather than Admiral Darlan, explaining that

the Navy would go along with anything General Giraud de-
manded.
ended with the degroup of American officers to rendezvous with General Mast at a point west of Algiers. Mark
Clark was to go first to Gibraltar where details and timing
of the rendezvous would be arranged with the French. The
plan was to make General Giraud governor of all French
North Africa, and he in turn would be responsible for all
French civil and military affairs under the protection of
the Allied forces. Darlan was to be accepted by Giraud as
deputy commander-in-chief in relief of General Clark when
he took over command of the U. S. Fifth Army.
All this undercover negotiation finally
cision to send a small
On October 19, 1942, the British submarine Seraph embarked General Mark Clark, Colonel Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Captain Jerauld Wright, USN, who later rose to become a
Supreme Allied Commander ( Atlantic ) under NATO; ColoHamblen and Holmes, and three British commando
officers. Seraph moved out of Gibraltar and headed for the
rendezvous point near Algeria. The next day the whole passenger party had a short course in disembarking from the
submarine in collapsible boats, and once they were fairly
proficient the submarine continued on her course and
nels
reached her destination, Cherchel Light, shortly after midOn a signal from shore she withdrew seaward and
spent several hours on the bottom.
night.
204
The next night Seraph approached the beach
again,
and
on a predetermined signal General Clark and his party

manned their folbots, (folding kayaks), and proceeded
shoreward. The submarine commander, Lieutenant N. L.
A. Jewell, then backed off and returned to the cover of the
deep.
At the height of the conference police
officials
made an
inquiry and the Clark group was rushed to a wine cellar
which turned out to be empty. Then, while the owner of

the house was assuring the gendarmes that all was well,
the men in the wine cellar made their way to the beach
and tried to return to the submarine. General Clark disrobed
with the idea of keeping his clothes dry but the folbot
left with only a car-
turned over in the surf and he was
bine, his overseas cap and his pair of "lucky" dice. Shivering
with the cold, General Clark returned to the house, but
the owner was no longer hospitable, so the American general borrowed a pair of trousers and a silk tablecloth with
which he draped himself and returned to the rest of his
group who had scurried into a nearby wood.
They spent a whole day there awaiting a more favorable
surf, and when conditions were suitable launched the three
boats and set off for the submarine, now about a quarter
of a mile offshore. The boat bearing Colonel Holmes overturned and he lost a batch of important papers, but they
were in a weighted bag. The documents concerning coastal
batteries, airfields, and other defenses were saved. On arriving at Gibraltar, General Clark arranged to have 2000 rifles
sent over to General Mast, and then he continued on to
London where he had to repeat over and over the story
of his adventure in North Africa. At the time no one could
estimate the value of the trip, but the proof came a few
weeks later.
The Husky Movement
How much
vade
Sicily,
Allied intelligence
Operation Husky,
had
may
in the decision to in-
never be fully appreci-

ated, but the
Germans opened
205
their long expected eastern
offensive against the Russians on July 5, 1943. They struck

with more than thirty divisions, seventeen of them armored,
against both sides of the Russian salient near Kursk. They
again tried their blitzkrieg formula and again Stalin
made
and a second front on the Continent.

Two days later, July 7, more than two thousand British
and American ships, supported by more than four thousand
aircraft began to converge on Sicily from every suitable port
in North Africa. By daylight of July 9 the slow moving
convoys were approaching both sides of Malta the American Seventh Army to the west and the British Eighth Army
to the east. Again surprise was the important element for
the British deception of "The Man Who Never Was," led
the Germans to believe that a landing was to be made in
Greece. It is on record that Hitler was taken in by the ruse
and not only moved many divisions into the Greek area,
but ordered a number of motor-torpedo boats from Sicily
into the Aegean Sea.
Good fortune also took a part when during the day the
wind rose steadily, eventually reached gale force and rolled
gigantic breakers along the Sicilian beaches. The weather
was so rough that German and Italian sentries did not think
an enemy invasion was possible, and the whole island dozed
with the assurance that no hostile move could possibly be
made.
Meanwhile the convoy ships continued across the Mediterranean despite the prospects, and the British admiral,
Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, dared the weather, feeling he had no other choice. General Eisenhower supported
him to the hilt for his moral courage, and in reward the
wind gradually dropped during the night so that by the
time the landing craft were approaching the beaches there
was nothing more than a heavy swell. The enemy was
caught flatfooted, and further success came with the first
use of the American DUKW amphibious load-carrier; the
buildup on the beaches was carried out at an amazingly
his old ciy for support
206
The only failure occurred when the British airborne brigade, making its first glider-landing attack in
enemy territory, encountered dishearteningly bad luck. The
rapid pace.
who were
tow-plane pilots
the gliders
much
powerless aircraft
too soon,
fell into
inadequately trained released
and many
of the
man-packed
the sea and the infantrymen were
drowned. Only twelve of 137 gliders landed anywhere near

their objective the bridge on the road to Syracuse but
later on eight officers and sixty-five men held this post for
twelve hours, until the nineteen survivors were finally
driven off. However the advance guard from the nearest
beachhead was close enough

it could be destroyed.
It is of interest to
to recapture the bridge before
note that American paratroopers
had been blown far from their

it and roamed about setting up
have contributed
if
as
much
objectives
made
who
the best of
areas of confusion
and must
to the success of the landing as
they had hit their original objectives.

Syracuse, the
first
important port, was in Allied hands
Over the next four days the Americans captured

and west, while the British
Eighth Army was fighting its way north over the Catanian
plain where the Herman Goering Division resisted fiercely.
More than one thousand enemy aircraft were destroyed, captured, or left damaged on twelve Sicilian airfields.
that night.
several airfields in the center
With the
Allied success in Sicily,
and the overthrow
of
Benito Mussolini, intelligence reported that peace feelers
were emanating from
Italy.
General G. Castellano, travel-
ing in civilian clothes under an assumed name, arrived in
Madrid August 17 seeking an interview with the British ambassador. General Castellano had a false passport made out
to Raimond Imas who claimed to be a member of an Italian
mission en route to Lisbon to meet the Italian ambassador
to Chile who was returning from his South American post.
General Castellano explained to the British ambassador that
deception was necessary; if the Germans suspected his
this
207
would in all likelihood be shot. He planned to

return by August 20, the date on which the Italian ambassador was due to land in Lisbon.
The general had a letter of introduction from the British
Minister to the Holy See, and added that he had come
intent he
direct
from Marshal Pietro Badoglio with
make
a specific and urgent proposal.
full
He
authority to
explained that
everyone in Italy desired peace, and said that more German

troops were streaming through the Brenner Pass and by way
of the Riviera and that his country was powerless to stop
them. General Badoglio was ready to resist the Germans
if the Allies would promise determined landings on the
Italian mainland. He closed his report with the statement
that the Germans had more than thirteen divisions in Italy
and were preparing to hold the line over the Apennines and
at Ravenna, well up near the back of the knee of the Italian
boot.
This message was to play an important part in the Italian

campaign, and had it been acted on rapidly and with
sagacity,
many
lives
might have been saved and the cam-
paign brought to an earlier conclusion. However, General
Eisenhower
first
consulted Brigadier General Kenneth
W. D.
Strong of G-2 and Harold MacMillan, then Minister Resident of North Africa, after which he sent a message to the
War Department
Washington and a copy to the Combined Chiefs of Staff then in session in Quebec, explaining
that he wished to send one or more staff officers to deal
directly with General Castellano in Lisbon. He explained
that he planned to propose general instructions to the effect
in
much information as possible be obtained; that the

make no promises in advance, but if the Italian Army
was really anxious to speed up Allied landings in Italy, it
that as
Allies
should immediately engage in widespread sabotage, particularly against

utilities
transportation,
airfields,
and any public
valuable to the Germans.
In due course General Eisenhower received approval and

instructions to send
two
staff officers to
meet with General
208
Unconditional surrender was
Castellano.
in the
document already
drafted,
insisted
on
and the negotiations
in-
still
cluded the terms of the general surrender, but did not ex-
pand on the
active assistance of Italian troops in fighting
the Germans, but did state that wherever the Italians fought
the Germans, destroyed
man movements,
German
the Allies
property, or
would give
General Eisenhower was to
fix
all
hampered Ger-
possible support.
the date and the hour of
would proclaim
was announced by the Allied com-
cessation of hostilities, while the Italians
when
the armistice
it
mander.
danger of capture by German

troops would have to be
The Italian fleet and merchant shipping would put to sea immediately and head for
All Allied prisoners
in
released.
all Italian aircraft would be flown to

was further suggested that prior to the announcement of the armistice, General Badoglio could do a
great deal to hinder the Germans, without open resistance.
The Allied emissaries were flown to Gibraltar where they
donned civilian clothes and then flew to Lisbon in a civil
Allied ports, while

Allied bases. It
airliner.
The Course
of Events
General Bedell Smith was recalled from Sicily to join Genthe Lisbon contact, and it was General
eral Strong for
Smith
who
Castellano.
carried out most of the planning with General
The aims
of the
meeting went well, and
it
was
evident that this officer of the Italian General Staff had

a real hatred of the
Italian
Army
Germans and was anxious
to have the
co-operate with the Allies and regain some
enemy out of his country.

became known that after Mussolini had been overthrown, Dino Grandi, Minister of Justice, had been led to
believe that he would be given command, but Italian honor
was singularly forgotten. Marshal Badoglio was given the
post, and the Fascist party was dissolved.
"honor" by helping to drive the
But
it
Why
209
these peace feelers and conferences did not produce
is a question, but, as is known now, the

campaign that was carried into Italy had heartbreaking setbacks and a long list of casualties. While all the endless
discussions were being held, Germany was building up her
strength everywhere on the Italian peninsula, and intelligence reported that there were at least fifteen Nazi divisions
valuable results
waiting for the expected landings of the Allied forces.
It
Germans had every intent of

defending their Festung Europa as far from Germany as
possible, and had no compunction in making Italy a battlewas quite apparent
that the
ground, regardless of the opinions of the Italian people or

the Holy See in the Vatican.
Later on the emissaries of the Italian government arrived
where negotiations were continued, and,

1943, General Eisenhower learned that the
Allied terms for Italian surrender and co-operation had
been accepted in Rome, but more time was wasted in checkin captured Sicily
by September
2,
By now General
Montgomery had made his landing near the toe of the
boot, and D-day for the frightful Salerno landing was set
for September 9, after which it was hoped that we could
ing the authenticity of the acceptance.
lake Naples.
It was then explained that a General Zanessa, totally unaware of General Castellano's negotiations, had arrived in
Sicily
by way
of Spain to begin a
Allied intelligence
men
new
series of talks.
The
permitted him to carry out his mis-
him about the negotiations with Castelit was thought that Zanessa was a spy
for the Nazis whose main goal was to find out the extent
of the previous Italian- American talks. After more delay,
General Zanessa was found to be a bone-fide representative,
but all this ate up valuable time. The actual armistice
agreement demanding unconditional surrender for the Italians was not ready for signing until September 6, nearly
three weeks after General Castellano appeared in Madrid
sion without telling
lano,
and
with
his
for a time
peace
offer.
Some
authorities
have argued that the
210
have taken immediate armistice steps when

Mussolini was thrown out in the middle of July. ) These delays were picked up and made the most of by American
newspapers that pointed out that so much time had been
lost, the delay in making the attack against Italy proper
had given the Axis troops a much-needed breathing spell.
The fact that there still was a grave shortage of landing
craft was not mentioned, or that regular transports could not
be used until the harbor of Naples was in Allied hands.
But with the announcement of the armistice and the
Italians should
surrender of the Italian
fleet to
the Allies
off
Malta, Italians
United States went into a frenzy of happiness, and

England held her breath for a day of prayer. But after seeing what was happening at Salerno, Allied officials now
in the
was just a "piece of paper," and

would go on until well into the
Rome was not taken until a few days before
realized that the armistice
that the fighting in Italy

winter. In fact,
the Allied forces set
sail for
the Overlord beaches of Nor-
mandy, almost a year later. Aggressive intelligence might

have set up a more favorable situation months previously
and cut the casualties by a large percentage.
However, from the British point of view the Dunkirk
nightmare had been erased. Once more British Tommies
were ashore on Continental Europe to stay.
CHAPTER X
Enter
the
Frogmen
The
Operation Overlord
Great
.
On
to
Chariot
Race
Cherbourg.
Enter the Frogmen

Planning for the North African operations introduced a
new problem
for military intelligence at least as far as the
which underwater operators,

now popularly known as frogmen, had an important part.
This new factor in military and naval activities had been
originated by the Italian Navy a few years before and it
perhaps was poetic justice that the British were the first
to turn the tables on these redoubtable foemen.
When the British Eighth Army was approaching Tripoli,
a special group of these recently formed underwater operators were asked to investigate and, if possible, immobilize
two blockships that the Germans were known to be preparAllies
were
concerned in
On the night of January 18-19,

teams moved in from the Royal Navy
ing for the harbor entrance.

1943, two
of these
submarine Thunderbolt, and after some hair-raising experiences one of the blockships was put out of action.
The
sec-
ond team of frogmen encountered several difficulties and

had to be content with going ashore and risking capture
by the enemy, without having caused any damage.
All of this began back in 1935 when two Italian Navy
Sub-Lieutenants T. Tesei and E. Toschi devised a longrange "torpedo" that was to be manned by two men and
212
directed against
enemy
were carried out
in the harbor of
successful the Italian
shipping.
Their
first
experiments
La Spezia, and were so

government financed new research,
development, and training.

By the time Italy entered World War II in 1940 these
man-directed torpedoes were being incorporated into her
submarine fleet and three were carried on the deck of the
six-hundred-ton submarine Iride. In their first venture
against the British
Navy
in Alexandria harbor, they
spotted by a Royal Air Force airplane patrolling
were
Bomba Bay
near Tobruk, and were quickly sunk. This incident occurred
August 1940, and a month later two of these submarines,

Scire and Gondar, started out, one heading for Alexandria,
the other for Gibraltar, but neither harbor offered any worthy targets and both subs were recalled. On the way back
Gondar was spotted, attacked, and sunk with its entire crew
which included Toschi who was now a lieutenant commander.
The Italian underwater device was twenty-two feet long,
cigar-shaped, and had a crew of two men who sat astride
the body. Its warhead was detachable and carried five hundred pounds of high explosive. Two propellers, driven
by batteries, gave it a speed of three knots, and compressed-air tanks regulated its depth. The frogmen usually
approached the target with their heads just above water,
but submerged when they began moving on a compass
course for the final approach. Once under the target ship,
the pilot, or number one man who sat in front, turned off
the propulsion power and blew the diving tanks until the
vessel rose against the bottom of the target ship.
The crew then felt for the bilge keel, the wide vane-like
ledge that is built along both sides of most large vessels.
The number two man fixed a line to this with a clamp, and
together both men worked their way under the ship and
fastened the line to the bilge keel on the other side. When
this line was drawn tight the crew then hooked on the warhead and left it dangling beneath the ship. In most inin
213
warhead was fused to detonate within two hours,

and after it had been placed in position the crew returned
to their mother ship or rendezvous aboard the "torpedo''
stances the
craft.
1940 the Italians had little luck

with these devices. Usually some factor of the setup broke
Throughout the
down
rest of
before the warhead could be placed in position.
Some
crew members were captured, and several of their

"torpedo" craft were recovered for examination. In September 1941, however, the British Navy tanker Denbydale was
destroyed in Gibraltar harbor, and a few minutes later the
cargo vessel Durham and the tanker Fiona Shell were
severely damaged by warheads that had been attached by
of the
daring Italian crews.
There had been various rumors of such underwater activbut nothing definite could be uncovered. Then, with the
ity,
destruction of valuable shipping right in Gibraltar's
Grand
Harbor, British Naval intelligence realized that something
had
to be done.
The problem was
first
turned over to Lieu-
tenant William Bailey, an electrical expert
who was
attached
Minesweeper Fleet. He was also a skilled

(Render Mines Safe Officer). He was joined later by
to the British
RMSO
*
Lieutenant Lionel K. P. Crabb, who in 1956 as a commander

gained some still-remembered publicity when he made an
underwater inspection of a Soviet warship anchored in Brit-
and was lost in the venture.

and Crabb organized Britain's original underwater working party with three NCOs, and drew up a program that was aimed at a defense against the human torpedoes. They also developed a means of halting limpet-bomb
attacks, tracing bilge bombs, and even undertook the removal of depth charges from sunken aircraft.
Their important duty, of course, was to prevent underwater attacks, and, in addition to the two-man torpedoes,
they discovered that they had to find and render safe any
limpet (clinging) mines that had been secretly attached to
Allied ships while they were docked in neutral ports. These
ish waters,
Bailey
214
by members
an Italian swimming society who, acting as merchant seamen during the

day, became enemy agents at night. Working from boats
hidden among the wharf piles, they donned rubber suits
and swam out, carrying small but very powerful limpet
limpets usually were affixed
bombs
of
that they fastened to the bottoms of the ships with
magnets. In a few instances they used metal clamps.
These mines were timed to explode when the vessel had

cleared the neutral port, and some of the fuses were set
by
rotating vanes that
ter.
were turned by the flow
of the
wa-
Thus, every ship that reached any Allied port had to be
examined carefully by one of Lieutenant Bailey's underwaworking parties to see if a limpet bomb was still in
ter
position. In
tar
from
one instance the
Seville, Spain,
S.S.
Imber, arriving
at Gibral-
loaded with iron ore, was found to
be carrying a bilge bomb and the ship had to be backed

out to shallow water of the bay. When the bomb was
brought to the surface, it was seen to have been fitted with
four detonating clocks and a vane mechanism. After being
rendered safe, it was discovered that the clocks had but a
few hours to run before firing the charge.
In the meantime the Italians had shifted their two-man
torpedo activities to Alexandria harbor where the battleships
Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were anchored. There
frogmen aboard three torpedo craft attached heavy

that crippled both of these mighty vessels. The
attacks were made with remarkable determination, efforts
that won respect and commendation for the Italian Navy.
In May 1942, the Italians heard rumors that the British
were training a corps of frogmen aboard a merchant ship
in Alexandria harbor, and they attempted a mass attack on
that vessel and the Queen Elizabeth which was under repair in a floating dry dock. This time their enemy was alert,
and the Italians had to abandon their craft after a heavy
barrage of depth charges were dumped in their working
six
bombs
area.
By midsummer
215
of 1942 the Italians switched their activ-
back to Gibraltar, and were now attacking with a mine

that was strung in the center of an inflated auto tire tube.
The two-man crews, working under the target vessel, inflated the tubes, which then rose until they came to rest
against the bottoms of the ships. Warned of this new activity, Lieutenant Bailey and a Seaman Bell put on breathing
equipment and went down to make an examination. When
they came upon the inner tubes, they slashed them with
knives, and the mines went to the bottom where they exploded harmlessly.
It was learned later that the bomb-tube devices had been
placed in position by one of the Italian swimming groups,
twelve of whom had set out from nearby Spain. They had
planned to attack no less than thirty ships then in the harbor with five-pound charges that were capable of blowing
a four-foot hole in any ship's plates.
All this enemy success needled the British into developing an underwater force of their own, especially when Naval
intelligence learned that the Italians had planned originally
to train about two thousand frogmen who would attack both
the British and French fleets, and thereby set up a campaign of mass destruction. The retaliatory task proved to
be stupendous as the Royal Navy had to catch up with the
Italian progress of more than seven years, and try to create
a workable underwater force in a few months. Actually, all
they had to work with were a few sets of submarine-escape
gear and several damaged two-man submarines. Then, after
the Admiralty had allotted funds for this operation, they
demanded that the crews be trained for work at great
depths not just under the bottoms of ships.
Crews were selected from volunteers, men who first of
all were strong swimmers. After what amounted to outright
Commando training in all types of weapons, explosives, and
hand-to-hand fighting, they were put next through a stiff
course of underwater experience in a submarine diving-tank
at one of the Royal Navy establishments. It was continually
ities
2l6
impressed on them that the gathering of information would

be one of their chief duties. This point intrigued many of
the volunteers, and perhaps helped them to complete the
At the submarine school they became acquainted with submarine escape apparatus, and portable
oxygen breathing gear. Gradually they were accustomed
to working at unusual depths and moving about while encumbered with what we now know as skin-diving gear.
A British version of the two-man torpedo had to be produced, and much of the credit for this goes to Lieutenant
Colonel Quentin Reeves who once admitted that he could
difficult course.
get seasick
vessel
had
by
just looking at a
yacht race. His
little
attack
a simple airplane-type control stick that actu-
came from an
motor through a three-speed gear. Top speed was
about three and one-half knots. Flotation was controlled by
two pump levers, one pumped water into or out of the two
small ballast tanks one forward and one aft while the other
transferred water from the forward tank to the stern tank,
and vice versa. Other controls included a lever for opening
or closing the main ballast tank amidships, and a valve for
releasing the compressed air that blew out the water. In orated the rudder and dive hydroplanes. Power
electric
der to shield the mission of their organization, the British

called these
little
vessels "chariots."
After training and practice, the operator learned to put
the chariot into perfect trim so that
it
could be steered by
the rudder or hydroplanes at any depth, or remain stationary.
The crew,
sat astride the
also
known
as
torpedo body.
number one and number two,
Number one
number two
sat
forward and
was little
more than a passenger until the target was reached. Because
the device was nothing more than a submarine in miniature,
it had all the built-in peculiarities of the full-sized vessel.
In many instances, when moving under perfect trim in salt
water, it would suddenly go berserk, warning the operators
that they were passing through a fresh-water stream often
encountered in sea inlets or harbors. In most cases the vescontrolled the vessel while
astern

sel
went
Still,
and wound up mired inexo-
into a headlong dive
rably in a
mud
217
bank.
the training
and development went
on.
The crews
learned to negotiate antisubmarine and antitorpedo nets.

Dummy runs were made on merchant ships, when for the
first
time the
men saw what
vessel looked like.

their
the underside of a full-sized
They learned how
warheads to the
hulls with
to
move
in
and secure
powerful magnets or metal
when they had learned

do everything assigned them at night, as well as by day.
This last was the real test of the two-man submarine frogmen.
Many months were absorbed in training numerous classes
of men in this arduous work, but eventually they were ready
for full-scale operations. The two-man submarines, developed originally by the Italians, were ready to "return the
compliment." One of the first intelligence jobs was to reconnoiter the coast of Sicily prior to Operation Husky.
clamps. Their training only ended
to
The Great Chariot Race
The chariots were seaborne in special racks mounted on

he stern sections of U-class submarines, and the plan was
for the attack vessel to be released about three miles from
the shore. The chariot was set free from the chocks and the
sub submerged, allowing the chariot to float off. An auxiliary
team in folbot kayaks then led the chariot to within half
a mile of the beach to be surveyed.
From
that point
on
and proceeded inshore

touched bottom. The number two man climbed
down and walked to the shore which he surveyed for obstacles, mines, or enemy defense workings. He took soundings, sand samples, and other pertinent information before
the chariot dived to fifteen feet
until she
returning to his craft.
Once the
the chariot returned, surfaced,

kayaks' crews
who
patrol
had been completed,
and made contact with the
contacted the mother-ship submarine by
the use of infrared gear.
The
chariot
was then secured
to
2l8
the deck, and the party returned to
its
operating base.
As the assault on Sicily progressed, the port of Palermo

on the north shore became of vital interest, and several chariot crews were sent in to carry out an important mission.
Intelligence had learned that an Italian cruiser was anchored in Palermo harbor, as well as an important merchantman, S.S. Vimina. A Lieutenant Greenland with a Signaler
Ferrier as his number two moved into the harbor unseen
and made a perfect attack on the cruiser which eventually
sank. A Lieutenant Cook and a Seaman Worthy encountered serious trouble when their warhead came adrift, but
it was resecured, during which time Lieutenant Cook lost
his life. So Seaman Worthy had to drive their chariot ashore
and destroy it. About the same time a Sub-Lieutenant Dove
and a Seaman Freel carried out a daring attack and placed
their warhead on the stern of the Vimina. The merchant
ship was seriously damaged, and while being towed out of
the harbor later on was torpedoed by a British submarine.
This was the first time the Italians had an idea that the
British had developed the two-man submarine attack.
As was to be expected, the Germans refused to take this
threat sitting down, and countered with worthy precautions against attacks by British frogmen and limpeteers. At
first they built and floated wooden platforms around their
ships along which guards patrolled while carrying automatic weapons, grenades, and small depth charges. To offset this, the charioteers would watch a ship being towed up
a harbor mouth, move in ahead of it and wait until the vessel was warped alongside the pier. Then, while the enemy
was rigging the guard platform, the frogmen would attach
limpet mines with delayed-action fuses.
All these precautions, evasions,
and experiences eventu-
turned operational attention from the chariot to the

kayak which gradually became more adaptable for harbor
ally
raiding, particularly
up harbor booms,
when
nets,
the
enemy made
use of radar, set
and organized surface
patrols.
The
kayak, which was more like a commercially produced canoe,
2ig
was substituted for the chariot, but the two-man torpedo

was not discarded completely. It went through modifications and may have become the basic pattern for the British
four-man midget submarine. It will be recalled that two of
these midget X-type submarines caught up with and seriously damaged the famous Tirpitz in her protected anchorage in Kaaffiord, North Norway, on September 22, 1943;
exploits for which their commanders, Lieutenant Basil C.
G. Place and Lieutenant Donald Cameron, were honored
with the Victoria Cross.
In order to reach Tirpitz's anchorage, the midgets had to
penetrate an enemy minefield and a fifty-mile passage up
a fiord known to be patrolled closely by the enemy. She was
guarded by nets, gun defenses, and listening posts. All

had to be negotiated after a cruise of nearly one thousand miles from a British naval base.
Eluding all these hazards, Lieutenants Place and Cameron worked their little craft past a system of antisubmarine
and torpedo nets that surrounded the Tirpitz, and from a
hazardous position inside these nets, carried out a cool and
also
this
determined attack.
While they were still inside the nets, a fierce enemy
counterattack with guns and depth charges made a safe
withdrawal impossible, so both young commanders decided
to scuttle their crafts, but took every measure to insure the
safety of their crews, the majority of whom, along with themselves, were taken prisoner. Most of them were aboard the
German battleship when the charges exploded and put her
main turbines out of action. The Tirpitz was finally sunk
by RAF bombs in November 1944.

The midget X-submarines had an important
war.
An
Australian, Lieutenant
Max
role in the
Shean, sank the Bar en-
and Lieutenant H. P. Westmacott sent a floating dock

the bottom. Nothing was sacred from the young raiders
fels,
to
aboard these toylike vessels. Targets, one thousand miles

away, and tucked into the shelter of Norwegian fiords, were
their regular objectives. But these doughty vessels were sim-
220
ply enlarged variants of the Italian two-man submarines

that
were designed to take frogmen from
their base to their
targets.
Operation Overlord
The Allied amphibious attack on the coast of Normandy

was the largest military assault in all history. Crossing the
English Channel with an invasion force hadn't been accomplished since the days of William the Conqueror in 1066,
although Philip of Spain, Louis XIV, Napoleon, and Hitler
had tried it. But in the ensuing eight centuries the world's
armament barons had improved the defense equipment. In
this big league of military conflict nearly two hundred
thousand civilian-soldiers had to complete the initial assault
in a specified time. In just a few hours they had to cross
the hellish tidal waters of that same English Channel in the
face of U-boats, E-boats, and Goering's vaunted Luftwaffe
for the right to
wade onto
a fifty-mile stretch of
Normandy
beachhead that huddled under Hitler's Atlantic Wall. Those

who reached the other side were expected to negotiate a
complex network of undersea obstacles, to immobilize shore
defenses of unbelievable strength and haul twenty thousand mechanical vehicles with them.
There were days when no one believed the Allies would

make it; in fact on the eve of D-day General Eisenhower,
moment
in a
of despondency, wrote a
communique which
read:
Our
landings in the Cherbourg-Le Havre area have
and I have
withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this
time and place was based on the best information
available. The troops, the Air, and the Navy did all
that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any
blame or fault attaches to the attempt, it is mine
failed to gain a satisfactoiy foothold
alone.
221
had to release the message, and he only revealed it many months later to Captain
Harry C. Butcher, his naval aide and staff officer. General
Eisenhower's then Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General WalFortunately, the general never
ter Bedell Smith, also said that the
chances of holding the
bridgehead were no better than fifty-fifty, and in his diary

wrote, "Will the Channel run red with blood?"
Much
of the initial success
was due
in
no small part to
the intelligence procured by the underwater crews
were called
who
weeks before the assault ships started across

of these men were geologists and specialists in traction problems. Every night, for some time before
D-day, they were ashore testing the sand and beach basis
in
the Channel.
make
to
Some
certain tracked vehicles could negotiate the beach-
head. Others checked the
made maps
of the
enemy
enemy gun emplacements and
defenses. All the planning for the
removal of beach obstructions was made days before the

assault force sailed. Then during the height of the attack
these underwater crews performed amazing feats in rescuing
landing craft that came afoul of hidden obstacles, or in retrieving important equipment from the sea. Once the foothold had been secured, they were called on to clear the
captured ports and harbors of mines and booby traps so that
the forces ashore could be supplied with rations, ammunition, and other military equipment.
The many
specialist tasks that
were faced long before the
amphibious forces could be sent out from the various British

ports, demanded varied equipment to cope with the different depths to be worked. The simple diving gear was good
enough for work along the fringe of the enemy shore, but
others were needed for inspecting the hulls of ships in
enemy-occupied harbors. All types of swim suits had to be
devised and put into production in a few short weeks, but
were tackled by experts, and by D-day

a large corps of divers was equipped for this broad cata-
all
these problems
logue of operations.
222
As an example, the armored forces had been developing

a so-called amphibious tank for use in the initial invasion,
work that had been carried out in strictest secrecy.
These swimming tanks, as they were called, were the continued development of an idea that had been originated
long before the start of World War II, but the present type
was the invention of Nicholas Strussler, an imaginative inventor of Hungarian origin. He devised an auxiliary flotation gear that consisted of an accordion-pleated canvas bag
fitted to the tank's hull and clamped to the edge of the deck.
Compressed air was used to inflate this bag which was sufficient to keep the tank afloat.
A simple
propeller system gave
the vehicle forward motion, and once ashore the flotation
gear could be dropped with the touch of a lever, allowing

the tank to go into action immediately.
vas flotation device was that

of a small
open boat, and
the enemy's
it
as
feature of the can-
gave the tank the appearance

such did not quickly attract
fire.
Another version, the Buffalo or LVT (Landing Vehicle

Tracked ) was a completely amphibious vehicle developed by
the United States Marine Corps, and was known originally as
the Alligator. However, these were not available for D-day,
but had an important role in clearing the west bank of the
Scheldt in September 1944, and later on in the attack on
Walcheren Island, and finally led the assault on the Rhine
in March 1945. This vehicle was truly amphibious and quite
self-supporting, but the swimming tank employed against
Normandy was a venture of questionable improvisation. Too
many were unable to make the beachhead from where they
were put into the water, and the diving teams had to work
under most difficult conditions to rescue the unfortunate
crews. In some instances the crews had been fitted with an
escape apparatus contrived by the Royal Navy's Diving
Committee, and these devices saved many a tank man.
Forty-eight hours before the actual landings, two X-type
midget submarines and their special crews were working to
prepare the way. Starting out on the night of June 2-3,

they were towed for part of the
trip.
223
Then
mornhad been
early in the
ing of June 5 they were advised that the assault

postponed for twenty-four hours, and they had to maintain
their course-marker positions until the invasion actually be-
gan. It
was
their job to stay partly
a series of colored lights seaward to
submerged and flash

guide the oncoming
assault craft.
They were located about
French coast
for nearly twenty-four hours
three miles off the
attention to the vessels that carried the
and gave especial
swimming
tanks.
Once it had been guided into the assault area, no vessel

had any trouble making for its proper beach area.
The first Allied men ashore were the 120 frogmen whose
task it was to remove all landing-craft obstructions and the
mines, so that the landing craft could get up to the beach.
Most of these men were led by a group of young naval lieutenants who already had won many decorations for their
underwater exploits; they were to gain many more before
the invasion troops could break out from the bridgehead.
They found that Hitler's Atlantic Wall extended not only
to the shores of Europe, but far beyond and into the sea.
Dangerous obstacles that had been erected at low tide,
could not be seen once high tide came in. Each obstacle
weighed 5000 pounds and was constructed like a railed
fence. They measured ten feet high and ten feet wide and
had to be destroyed so that no part of them would be left
projecting from their bases. In order to do this the frogmen
had to apply thirty-six small charges at various points of
each obstacle, and when these were detonated the massive
obstruction fell apart, leaving nothing more than eighteen
inches above the surface of the beach.
There were also other metal items in the form of pyramids

that stood about five feet high, and six-legged obstacles
known as hedgehogs. Every one of these obstructions was
booby-trapped with mines or explosives. The slightest contact of an invasion craft would touch them off. In many
instances these obstructions were such that they would
have ripped out the bottom of any craft that collided with
224
them. The
men who were
specialists in this obstacle-clear-
ance work had been trained in the postcard village of

Appledore on the North Devon coast. They were equipped
with thin rubber diving suits, helmets, a special breathing
apparatus, and wore great rubber fins attached to their feet.
They were expert in swimming under water for long periods of time, and in handling dangerous explosives in any
emergency. Four Royal Navy and four Royal Marines units
were in the water some time before H-hour working to clear
the beaches of all obstructions, and they remained in action in the face of heavy shellfire until the Allied forces had
clawed out a beachhead and were firmly established ashore.
Most of the frogmen were equipped with a special kapok
jacket that protected
them
against the concussion of under-
water shell explosions.
day would present the work of a unit

officer assigned to one special beach
with a particular task. Some were put overboard from small
landing craft and left to make their way to the shore by
swimming. In spite of previous advice most of them still
typical log of the
of eleven
men and one
expected to find the obstacles along the surfs edge, but

discovered instead that most of them were covered by four
or five feet of water. Some of the men found simple posts
with mines fastened to their tops. All these had to be disposed of, as well as the pyramids and hedgehogs, before
any assault craft could move in. By this time the shore de-
fenses
had spotted the invasion force and were hurling

fire, much of which
great shells or long bursts of automatic

fell in
the water in front of the beach. Sergeant K. Briggs,
who had
previously been awarded the Distinguished Serv-
Medal, cleared up more than one hundred charges

while continually under sniper fire. Still, the underwater
ice
work had to go on. At the same time the inclement weather

was not only making the landings difficult, but the work of
the frogmen most hazardous.
Once an initial gap was cleared,

widened until there was a safe beach
it
was widened, and
of about one
thousand
225
Within twenty-four hours these underwater heroes removed more then twenty-five hundred obstacles, most of
which were mined. It would be assuring to state that every
assault craft got through safely, but in all truth many were
wrecked, blown up, or simply sunk as the traffic was much
too much for the small force of frogmen to clear the way
in time. When a gap was opened, too many boats tried to
steer through it, and some were forced out into areas where
mined obstacles still remained. Some boats were blown up,
some had their bottoms torn out and the men had to scramble ashore with full marching order.
When the beachhead had been established, the underwater teams turned their hands to winching waterlogged vehicles from the surf. They helped unload stores, cleared
land mines, and did everything to assist the beachmaster.
I remember meeting a small group of these men shortly
after I had gone ashore at Utah Beach as a war correspondent. They were holed up in an old tarpaper shack just off
the road up from the beach, and I wondered what they were
doing in such a disreputable attire. Most of them seemed
to be wearing dirty old Navy caps, an odd assortment of
sweaters and rag-bag trousers. They obviously were tired
from their efforts and were lounging about trying to get
some well-earned rest. But they fascinated me and I gradually worked their story out of them. Because I had heard
nothing of these amazing operations, I felt that I had a remarkable tale to send back to the United States.
I first checked with an Admiralty official, however, and,
yards.
as I feared,
"Why
thing.
was not allowed
not?"
to write the story at the time.
men have done

know about them."
a wonderful
asked. "These
The public should
Admiralty censor replied, "but we cananything about what they have been doing because they have to do it all over again
somewhere
"I agree fully," the
not
tell
else."
"Somewhere
enough?"
else?
Isn't
all
this
Normandy
business
226
The Admiralty
official
just
shook his head negatively.
turned out, the underwater teams had next to go

into the invasion of southern France and then into Walcheren when the city of Antwerp was about to be attacked.
As
it
But
all
these valuable assists in the actual landings were
only part of the program, for once the offense was mounted,
be kept at high gear, and it usually had to be

maintained in motion by the capture of enemy ports. These
docks, wharves, and harbors were vital in the supply system
that continued the pressure, and though capturing a port
was important, the logistics staff had to be certain that, once
it
had
to
it was safe to operate.

The enemy never left anything
it, and in many instances these
taken,
he could help
were found
to be lethal as they were decked with booby traps and
various forms of delayed action mines. True, these were suspected and warned about by our intelligence agents, but
that was about all. The underwater teams had to clean out
these explosives before troop transports and supply ships
could be moved in for off-loading.
In such instances an underwater group, known as the "P"
party, was sent in first. These men were a band of human
minesweepers who went in on the wake of the assault force.
For hours on end they risked death in the mud and scum
of the harbor bottoms as they removed dangerous mines.
How many lost their lives in these ventures is hard to estimate, for it was almost impossible to keep any reliable
trace of them once they went below. There were so many
ways of dying while serving with a "P" party.
To
of value
if
installations
illustrate the pattern of the hazards;
British intelli-
gence learned in 1943 that the enemy had devised a new

type of harbor mine, and several of them were uncovered
had not been placed in position, so the

mine experts had an opportunity to study them at firsthand.
These devices were intended for deep-water operations,
in Bizerte, but they
but carried neither magnetic nor acoustic detonators. Magnetic detonators were fired by the magnetic field discharged
22.J
from metal hulls, and acoustic types were actuated by the

sound of propellers. These were armed instead with clockwork mechanisms that could be set to explode at any time
up to six days. Later versions were timed for forty or eighty
days.
up
demanded many new
whenever
blown
entering the anchorage. The alternative was
This discovery
a big port
was taken,
shortly after
tactics, for
large troop transports could be
keep them outside the harbor until the time detonators

had run out. Obviously, such delays could not be permitted
as no assault force could continue for a week without supplies or reinforcements. Intelligence seemed hobbled because there appeared to be no countermeasure against such
a weapon.
Commander C. E. Hammond of the Royal Navy was saddled with this problem, and it was he, a practical seaman
with a row of worthy decorations, who came up with the
idea of the "P" parties. He consulted Lieutenant Commander J. S. Mould who had just developed a new, selfcontained underwater breathing apparatus to be worn by
frogmen assigned to the recovery of enemy mines in deep
harbors. After a period of hauling mines ashore to remove
their detonators, Commander Mould decided that time
would be saved if they could be rendered safe where they
were under water.
Once this new breathing apparatus had proven itself,
Hammond and Mould concentrated on training men to use
it in their search for mines in the depths of the harbors.
These men were all volunteers and were trained to work
fast at various levels and to search out and recognize enemy
mines with amazing efficiency. Another problem was the
necessity of working in water where shell explosions or mine
blasts might take place at any time. It was recognized that
a diver could be killed or seriously injured by the explosion
of a depth charge a mile away. Working in confined areas
strung with booby traps, mines, bombs, and other demolito
tion charges
became more and more hazardous.
All these
228
factors
and the long periods
of
mental
strain tried the volun-
teers to their physical limits.
In order to counter some of
decided that
were trained to perform

the term.
The
to perfection
parties,
and the
Hammond and Mould
this,
the men should work
in teams,
and
as
such
their duties in the true sense of
each under an
final
officer,
were
drilled
phases of their instruction were
carried out within the confines of a security camp.
On
Cherbourg
to
The
"P" parties left England for Cherbourg on June

and arrived off Utah Beach five days later. Bad
weather and the lack of landing facilities kept their vessel
well offshore for some time and during this lull Lieutenant
first
22, 1944,
Commander
J.
L. Harries, a British-Canadian "P" party
went ashore. Commander Harries, who had won the

George Medal for his courage in rendering bombs safe during the Battle of Britain, was a typical hustler, and he made
his way from Utah Beach overland to Cherbourg during
leader,
the heat of the fighting. There he found the captured port

to be badly
damaged,
as intelligence
had warned. Some of

damaged by explo-
the wharves and basins were seriously

sives,
and
at the
water were
still
same time German
forts
out on the break-
lobbing shells into the port area. Harries
Commander F. L. De Spon,
who had rounded the Horn
reported to his working boss,

a former merchant seaman
many
times in square-rigged ships. Harries suggested that
the working parties be put ashore on the beach, as he
been, and hurry overland to the harbor
Around
ing
much
this
had
site.
time an amusing situation arose. After spend-
of that evening checking out intelligence reports
and every possible tip that might lead to tracking down any
mines and charges left by the enemy, Harries decided to
look about for a comfortable place to sleep. While searching
through the abandoned buildings, he came upon a German
officers' club where he found couches, food, liquors, cham-
22g
pagne, and several boxes of fine cigars. His

of
booby
traps, so the
first
thought was
young Canadian, who was too
astute
be taken in by such a layout, spent the night huddled

in a bleak alley, cold, hungry, and most uncomfortable.
While walking about the next morning to bring circulation to his limbs, he met a group of war correspondents
to
who were
brisk, bright,
and breezy. They had spent the
night devouring fine food, good drinks, and smoking wonderful cigars at "some
"War
abandoned
officers' club."
correspondents," Harries commented, "are brave
guys."
On
Commander De Spon arrived with two "P"

and the United States harbormaster provided a list
of the priority quays and basins to be cleared. The "P" parties had hardly begun when a new problem presented itself
in the form of an unfamiliar type of mine about which they
had been warned but had not previously encountered. It
was known as the "K" mine and consisted of a heavy explosive charge set in a concrete form that carried a steel-tubing
tripod on top. A long sea-green strip of canvas floated from
a magnetic trigger that was mounted on the tripod, the idea
being that any ship passing overhead would foul this snag
line with its propellers, pull it sharply, and explode the
July 2,
parties,
charge.
One of these mines was found on the bottom of a flooded

diy dock alongside the Quai Hornet. As much of the machinery had been damaged by the Germans before they decamped, the United States salvage authorities had not been
able to pump it dry, so Seaman M. H. Woods went down,
taking with him a line attached to a rubber float which
marked his position below. A service crew in a dinghy
stayed above and watched the progress of the diver as his
float moved back and forth over the water inside the dry
dock.
When
seemed to stand still for some time,

became concerned and gave a pull on the
to inquire if he was safe. No answer was
Woods's
the service crew

line as a signal
float
230
received so the officer in charge ordered the dinghy crew
men hauled hard

but could not pull him clear. Then suddenly
Woods appeared a short distance away and explained that
he had found a "K" mine and in order not to waste any
time finding it again had attached his float line to it. The
device weighed more than a ton, and this one was wired
to haul the diver to the surface. All three
on the
line
from ashore. Woods went back,

and the mine was brought to the surface
for electrical detonation
rendered
it
safe,
with a winch.
Woods's find spurred the
rest of the
"P" parties to
new
efforts, and Harries's crew found four plastic charges attached to the keel blocks of a dry dock. These devices were
been moved in for docking, the

on the keel blocks would have fired
the charges, holed the hull, and destroyed the dry dock.
Another hair-raising situation occurred when Harries and
De Spon took a motorboat out to look for snag lines that
had been reported by dock workers. While searching the
area the propeller of their little boat became entangled with
one of these lethal strips, but Harries fortunately caught it
in time. He ordered the boat to move astern, and then, still
in his shore suit, he went over the side and cleared the entanglement before the charge could be triggered.
Their work continued until the medical officer in charge
of the "P" parties decided that the men had been on enriched oxygen long enough, and ordered them all home for
a rest and re-equipment. Their places were taken immediso fitted that
had a
weight of
settling
ately
it
by two other
vessel
parties.
In the meantime Lieutenant Bailey and
six of his special
had gone ashore on Sword Beach, had landed their

equipment under heavy fire, and then had transported it
to the nearby port of Ouistreham at the end of the Caen
Canal. This commercial waterway connected the inland
port of Caen with the sea and was an important objective.
Although a comparatively small port, Caen was equipped
divers
23
to handle a fair amount of supplies, and the canal had to

be kept clear of mines and other demolition charges.
When they arrived at Ouistreham, Bailey's group began
a careful examination of the canal's lock gates, as their mechanism was important in controlling the water level of the
waterway. They found a number of heavy demolition
charges under water, all set to explode when the gates were
opened. Drifters moored to the seaward end of the lock
were also inspected and found to bear charges that would

have exploded and turned them into block ships. Working
at top speed, Lieutenant Bailey managed to remove all
these charges before the enemy opened up with a heavy
mortar-fire barrage and an attack by dive bombers. The
underwater party then had to come to the surface and
take to the Army's slit trenches until the enemy reception
was over.
When the barrage had ended the party returned to the
canal but found no more charges so they joined the Royal
Engineers who were replacing the parts of the lock equipment that had been damaged. Their next task was to make
a complete inspection of the commercial dock as far as the
end of the Ouistreham Quay, but nothing of importance was
found, after which, paradoxically, a
number
of British
mine-
sweepers sailed through in safety.
During the rest of their tour of duty Bailey's party

plugged and buoyed two lighters that had been sunk as
block ships; next, a canal dredger was restored to buoyancy
and moved away; a French lightship tender was found
aground against the West Quay, and an examination turned
up a charge fastened near the propellor shaft with a pulligniter attached to one of the blades of the propeller. If
the engines had ever been started and the propeller twirled,
the charge would have exploded. Bailey removed this and
was pumped out and refloated. Several other

were examined and more underwater charges found
the vessel
vessels
and removed.
As the attack progressed, "P"
parties
were rushed into
232
Boulogne, Calais, and Dieppe.
moved on
When
these harbors were
Le Havre and Ostend where

divers had to work in mud five-feet deep. At Rouen twentyone mines were found and rendered safe, to say nothing of
cleared, the group
to
dozens of small river mines found floating in the channel

or grounded along the banks. At Antwerp thirty-seven depth
charges were removed from the piles bearing the famed
E-boat pens. Three parties were employed at Antwerp,
chiefly to supply information to the salvage officer concern-
ing the masonry and other obstructions fouling important
wharves and basins. This port, the third largest in the world,
had twenty miles of wharves and many more miles of river
quays. By now, it was of great importance to the Allied
armies who were too far from French ports to enjoy a smooth
supply line. Because of approaching winter the conditions
here were the worst that any of the "P" parties had experienced. The men below worked in five feet of mud and the
servicing parties above suffered miserably. Added to this
was the enemy's frantic attack by buzz bombs and longrange rockets. It was under these conditions that their first
fatal casualty occurred outside of their routine duty. While
off duty a Seaman Brunskill went to a movie and was killed
when a German rocket demolished the building.
By the end of January 1945, these British frogmen had
cleared Zeebrugge, the South Beveland Canal, and the port
of Flushing where they found a new type of waterproof
Teller mine. The German port of Bremen was next on the
agenda.
One
of these groups,
under Lieutenant H. Hargreaves,
a twenty-one-year-old winner of the Distinguished Service

Cross, took part in both the southern France invasion
and
the Walcheren attack. At the latter place Hargreaves led a
four-man reconnaissance ashore with the idea of making
wave of troops, a venture that

The group crept about the
beach, studying the surface, making sure it was suitable for
tracked vehicles to land on. Then they checked out the num-
matters easier for the
proved to be quite
first
exciting.
233
ber of obstacles that had been set out and the types of
mines attached to them. Once Hargreaves was
satisfied that
the beach was suitable for assault, he called in his full unit
by means of a screened flash-signal light, and they went

to work clearing the beach. They had less than an hour
to complete their task, but in spite of the fact that they
worked in mud up to their knees, they cleared all obstacles

and mines with about seven minutes to spare.
However, when the defense force heard the demolition
explosions down on the beach they roused and opened a
terrific fire. The frogmen had to take cover wherever any
could be found, but some of the men became casualties.
Hargreaves made his way to an enemy pillbox just behind
the beach, hoping to have the pleasure of blasting out its
crew, but it was unoccupied.
Sub-Lieutenant I. A. P. Rumsey, another DSC winner,
was sent into a beach at Westkapelle where he too had an
exciting time. His party was spotted from a tower ashore
and came immediately under a heavy mortar fire. One of
his petty officers was killed and two men wounded. Fortunately, an RAF patrol came over and "took the tower apart,"
which eased the strain somewhat, but a hidden artillery battery continued to lob over shells that were most annoying.
One of these destroyed a pile of breathing apparatus, which
were not being used as the tide was out. Later on Rumsey
and Seaman A. Robertson continued with the work by holding their breath under water until they had removed at
least fifteen dangerous obstacles. But this was too exhausting and they had to stop and hole up in an RAF bomb
crater, from where an enemy 88-mm. gun eventually chased
them.
To offer a full account of the activities and accomplishments of these underwater teams would require more space
than is available in a book of this kind. Their achievements
and high courage were, of necessity, mothered by the requirements of military intelligence. That they
fulfilled
the
234
no one will deny. Not only did they display amazing

courage in their activities against the enemy, but they
showed unusual fortitude in helping to develop the many
pieces of equipment that had to be devised for this work.
role
CHAPTER
The
How
XI
Began
The
The Mission
The
of Keith McCarthy
Luck of a War
The Angels
The Fight
of Guadalcanal
The Ordeal
to the Finish
of Reg Evans.
Intelligence of Ferdinand
Enemy
Strikes
The
It
The Heroic Mr. Page

.
Intelligence of Ferdinand
Military intelligence takes
many
strange paths. Not
conducted in busy
offices
graphs, or microfilm
all
men and
where
are
their
equipment over
of their specialized duties are
stacks of information, photo-
studied and interpreted.
These
agents are not always risking their lives or freedom while
moving about in cosmopolitan cities, wearing smart clothes,

and bearing false documents. Very few important contacts
made
on the gilded
stairways of famous opera houses. More often the most valued intelligence work is done out on the fringe of the
battlefields or where the proximity of the enemy compounds
the element of danger. At the same time this hazard seems
are
in the lobbies of luxurious hotels or
to establish the degree of secrecy with
which these men
work, and, unfortunately, deprives them of public appreciation
when
their particular assignments
reach their close.
few of us know of, or can measure the

contribution made by a most redoubtable organization that
operated under the name of Ferdinand. This was the AusBecause of
this,
236
tralian
Commonwealth's coastwatcher system which was

and air approaches
early organized to cover all vital sea
throughout the Southwest Pacific.

This Australian venture started from scratch in September 1939 under the command of Captain R. B. M. Long
of the Royal Australian Navy who at the time was the direc-
Naval Intelligence. Commander Eric A. Feldt, who

served under Captain Long, is credited with establishing a
number of coastwatcher stations along the New Guinea
coast from Aitape to Samarai, along the southern coast of
Papua, and in the Torres Strait area. Information gleaned
tor of
here was relayed to a central headquarters at Townsville
on the northeast coast of Australia.

Coastwatchers were islanders, planters, prospectors, missionaries, and in many cases government administrators who
had lived for a long while in these islands. They were intimately acquainted with the areas and from their wide
experiences could determine which natives were friendly
and which would desert or act treacherously. When the war
started most Australians and Europeans withdrew to the
New Zealand mainland, but many decided to

remain in Japanese-held territory, sheltered and helped by
friendly natives. Those who had volunteered for coastwatcher work were taken in to their posts by submarine or
Australian or
and their chief task was to gather vital information

it back to military headquarters by radio; in this
role they could direct attacks on enemy planes and shipping, secretly evacuate Allied civilians from behind enemy
lines, or rescue and aid downed airmen. When the Japanese
had been driven out, these doughty coastwatchers organized and carried out guerrilla warfare, and rounded up the
seaplane,
and relay
stragglers.
The undercover men
of
the
Ferdinand
organization
played a crucial and decisive role in the fighting at Guadalcanal and Tulagi, and later on during the operations at New
Britain, particularly in the landing on and capture of the
Cape Gloucester territory.
237
name of Ferdinand was borrowed from Munro

famous character in his book of the same name; the
Their code
Leaf's
bull
who
did not care for fighting but preferred to
sit
and smell the flowers that is,

he was stung, and then look out! The name
to be a good cloak of secrecy.
The Ferdinand force was an undercover and most unorthodox intelligence unit created by imaginative members of
quietly under the cork trees
he did
proved
until
the Royal Australian Navy; a small force,
a few hundred
men and
it
numbered only
the field and at
officers in
its
bases
where the administrative work was handled. But the Ferdinand operators strung a network over more than half a
million square miles of island and ocean, and their organization was so secret that its existence was never admitted
during the war.
Hunted down by the Japanese, and

treacherous natives, these lonely
racking period. Like Ferdinand,
they fought
tent.
Most
often betrayed
by
men endured a nervewhen the occasion arose
with fleetness and deadly inwere almost invisible and most

work under these conditions was
like jungle vipers
of the time they
circumspect, and their

priceless.
When
the
enemy
sent his
first air
attack against American
were landing on Guadalcanal,

twenty-four torpedo bombers taking part
forces that
all
but one of the
were
kind.
any
before they could inflict damage of
This timely interception was made possible by the reports
of one lone coastwatcher sheltered three hundred miles
away, between the Japanese naval and air base at Rabaul
and the beachhead at Guadalcanal. Later on in many other
battles in the New Guinea-Solomons area, the warnings of
the Australian coastwatchers often gave the Allies a decisive
shot
in the strike
down
advantage.
Had the organization not existed, Japan would still have

been defeated, but the end would have come later and demanded a much higher cost in life and equipment. Without
Ferdinand, Australia might have been invaded, and its
238
value as a base for Pacific operations would have been

greatly
States
forces
their
reduced. Without the
coastwatchers
Navy would have had to

when it moved through
work
as intelligence groups
much
the
United
stronger
enemy
the Central Pacific.
When
face
ended
in
the Ferdinand organization did not pack
September 1944,
up and go home,
but instead began aggressive guerrilla operations against

the Japanese. In fact, an "M" Special Unit Native Infantry
Battalion was raised in 1945 to provide native troops for
these operations,
and
in addition
about two thousand
parti-
sans joined the various parties.
How
It
Began
The coastwatching organization
began
actually
as
peacetime expediency back in 1919 when, for the first time,

Australia faced the problem of protecting her long, undefended coastline. This massive continent had a population
and thus presented large areas where

an enemy might move in and set up operations without anyone in authority knowing of it. After some consideration,
the Australian Navy decided on a plan of appointing careof only seven millions,
fully selected civilians in the coastal areas as coastwatchers.

It
was the duty
ity,
of these
men
subversive behavior, or
to report
enemy
any suspicious
activ-
activity in case of war.
As far as the Australian mainland was concerned, the

watchers usually were postmasters, harbormasters, police or
railroad officials, teachers; in fact
anyone who had access
to the General Post Office telegraph operators.
The watchers
were supplied with routine printed instructions that explained what the Navy wanted to know, and suggestions
for reporting this information.
glance at a
map
will
show
that the north
sections of Australia presented the
most
and northwest
difficult
problems.
There were only a few dedicated missionaries and cattlestation managers available, and these people had no means
of immediate communication, but with the development of
a radio set that was powered with a bicycle-pedal gear, a
new
link to the outside
aries
and
239
world was forged, and the missionmanagers soon made use of this instrument.
None of these operators was paid because there was no
money for such a widespread system, but few of them refused to co-operate when the situation was brought to their
cattle
attention.
The scheme was eventually enlarged
to
take
in
the
New Guinea, and the Solomon

where government administrative officers, selected
planters, and missionaries were enrolled as watchers. When
World War II broke out in September 1939, Ferdinand
was made up of about eight hundred watchers, the majority
of them on the mainland of Australia. The network was
loose and spotty throughout the islands, but it proved to
be a valuable nucleus and as soon as funds were available
it was gradually built up into a workable organization. The
force was soon turned over to Captain (then Commander)
R. B. M. Long, who in turn selected Lieutenant (later Commander) Eric A. Feldt who was made Staff Officer (Intelcoastal stations in Papua,
Islands
ligence) at Port Moresby, territory of Papua,
New
Guinea,
where he received and interpreted the intelligence from

northeast New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. It was
duty to ensure the proper functioning of the organization in the islands and to expand it to cover all needs.
At the time no one knew that within two years all these
also his
would be in hostile territory and their posts surrounded by the Japanese.

But those two years gave Feldt time to visit every island post, instruct his watchers and make certain they knew
how to operate a portable radio set. He taught them to code
their messages, what was important to report, and to speed
up every bit of information that fitted a certain category.
Others, who were to act as runners, were given special training in military observation. Some of these islanders were
islands
responsible for areas that took several days to cover, routes
them through dangerous enemy territory.

became obvious that Japan would eventually
that often took
When
it
24O
enter the global conflict, funds were provided, and the Royal
Australian Air Force volunteered to distribute the necessary
was August 1940 before a reliable network

was completed; where no areas were covered, posts had to
be built and watchers moved in to take over.
The teleradios, as they were called, were remarkable devices that were developed to resist jungle mildew, heat, and
the crude handling of amateurs. They had a voice range
of four hundred miles, but by using the spark and key the
range could be stretched to about six hundred miles. The
set produced for the watchers consisted of a transmitter
radio
sets.
But
it
with four alternative frequencies that could be adjusted for

remarkable accuracy, a receiver, and a loud-speaker. All this
equipment was contained in three small metal boxes, and

power was supplied by an automobile-type battery that
could be charged in the field by a gasoline engine-powered
generator weighing around seventy pounds.
Although the original equipment was heavy and somewhat complex, it was continually checked and improved by
technicians of the Australian Air Force which delivered
most of the teleradios to the coastwatchers by parachute.
Eventually, a workable code had to be devised if information from the watchers was to be restricted to Australian
ears, and a simple cipher, known as Playfair, a schoolboy
code based on a list of agreed-upon words, rather than a
set of special documents, was first tried. It was not especially secure and could have quickly been broken by a
skilled cryptologist, so Commander Feldt drew up a variation that was known as the "Feldt Method/' It was more
complex and lasted until most of the watchers became more
skilled and could handle secure Navy codes. Only reports
of enemy aircraft were sent in plain words, for by the time
a watcher's signal was decoded, the aircraft information was
of
in
little
use.
The coastwatchers first came to grips with the opposition

December 1940, when two German sea raiders selected
24
the tiny island of Emirau, north of Kavieng,
New
Ireland,
from ships they had sunk. When a

small boat reached Kavieng with the news, the district
officer who held the job of watcher there, sent out an immediate report and gave the position of the abandoned pristo put ashore prisoners
oners.
The
nates,
and once they were cared
Australian authorities picked
gathered as
It
much
of attack,
up these unfortu-
intelligence officers
information as possible from the captives.
included details on the
mode
for,
enemy
ships, their
and the routes they had
armament,
their
sailed.
All this heartened the watchers for they
now
realized
what important parts they might play. When the Australian

Army, Navy, and Air Force pooled their authority and exercised command through a "Combined War Room/* all
coastwatcher reports were filtered through to this central
office.
By
the time Japan raided Pearl Harbor,
Commander
Feldt had sixty-four fully equipped coastwatcher stations in
but it had to be supported by Australia's small

Navy and her Air Force which had only a few obsolete
Hudson bombers, some PBY flying boats, and half a dozen
Australian-built Wirraway reconnaissance planes. The Army
his network,
had a
battalion in Port
Moresby and
still
smaller forces at
throughout the vast territory covered, and

was obvious that if the enemy moved in with anything
five other points

it
more
serious than a hit-and-run raid, the coastwatcher sta-
tions
might be overrun and important
links in the chain
broken.
This brings us back to the technicalities of the military
As most of the coastwatchers were civilians, they had

no legal right to transmit intelligence information, any
more than they could use a gun. Once their areas were
occupied militarily by the enemy, they could expect no legal protection if apprehended, but could be arrested and
tried as spies. And with this hazard in mind, the coastwatchers were ordered to halt their activities once their territory
was occupied by the enemy. International law left no other
spy.
242
choice because civilians could not be ordered to remain in
enemy territory. Unofficially, however, the Australian government hoped that in cases of invasion, the civilians
would elect to remain and continue their reporting. The
decision was in the hands of the coastwatcher. As a civilian
he could remain at his own risk in the hope that he might
get recognition and support, but there was no assurance
he would get either.
The Enemy
Strikes
stark truth of this was brought home within a month

Japan began her roaring rampage through the Southwest Pacific. Post after post was overrun, though in some
instances they remained intact, either ignored or completely overlooked. C. C. Jervis, a retired Navy signalman
who was a planter on Nissan Island, calmly watched and
reported a Japanese warship that moved into his lagoon.
He was never heard from again. The Assistant District Officer at Gasmata, New Britain, J. Daymond, found himself
The
after
warn Port Moresby of its first air raid, a retown time to take cover. For this aid,
he was unwittingly betrayed by his own people, as Australian radio stations explained that the enemy force had
been sighted over Gasmata. This tipped the enemy off, and
they in turn bombed and gunned Daymond's station, forcing him and his staff to flee with their teleradio. Two weeks
in position to
port that gave the
after the fall of Rabaul, the Australian returned to carry
on with
work, and a small force of Japanese landed to

make a search. This time it was a friendly native who, in
his
enemy to Daymond's hideout.

were never heard of again.
innocence, led the
all
and
his assistants
In comparison, L. G. Vial, another assistant district

cer,
He
offi-
had himself evacuated from Rabaul by the Australian
Air Force, accepted an Air Force commission, and was flown
with a complete station to Salamaua on the New Guinea

coast. There, for six months in a quiet, unhurried tone, he
concentrated on reporting enemy aircraft. So important was

his effort over those
243
months, he was eventually awarded
the United States Distinguished Service Cross.
young men served through those

making
hairbreadth escapes in order to survive and continue this
valuable work. Among these were W. L. Tupling, who was
holed up on Ningo, and J. H. McColl on Wuvulu, islands
in the Admiralty Group about 250 miles northwest of Rabaul. After the Japanese occupied Rabaul, these two watchSeveral other daring
early weeks, sending reports, changing their posts,
Moresby, but the distance

and topographical conditions were unfavorable, so they decided to hold on to their posts and become the guiding
light for a small detachment of Commandos which was operating nearby. By being advised continually of the movements of enemy shipping, the Commandos were able to
destroy everything that might be of value to the enemy.
Once this assignment was complete, the coastwatchers gave
vital aid in evacuating the troops, and finally when the
enemy were picking up their signals, McColl and Tupling
were instructed to leave and make their way to safety in
a plantation launch. Following these tasks, both men reers tried in vain to contact Port
quested
new
assignments.
The Heroic Mr. Page
One
nelius
New
of the classic tales about the watchers concerns Cor-
Lyons Page, who operated on Tabar Island, east of

Ireland. His story best illustrates the frustration, the
imagination, and best of
all
the unreasoning faith of these
undercover intelligence men.

Cornelius Page was raised in a Sydney suburb and taken
to the islands
by
his parents
while
still
a youth. Not too in-
terested in furthering his education, he took a job in a store

in Rabaul, the "metropolis" of Australia's Northeast Area,
but
this
sedentary post did not hold his interest for long.
he met many adventurous men;

miners, planters, traders, who seemed to lead glamorous
lives. The youthful Page settled on Mussau Island, north-
Working behind
his counter,
244
west of Kavieng where he acquired land, tried coconut

planting and traded with the natives. This had been part
of his boyhood dream. He listened to the whisper of white
beaches, watched the swaying palms in the moonlight and
caught the romance of the jungle, but most of all he wanted
personal freedom which he found time to enjoy at Mussau,
in no way goaded by unreasoning ambitions.
There were few Europeans in this area and Cornelius

Page soon picked up the native dialects and enjoyed profitable trading with the islanders. It was natural that such
a young man would fit in with the life and feel that the
rest of the world was remote and far removed. He could
have become the "white-native" of the South Seas' romances, but he was too big and virile to remain under this
island spell, and he finally sold his little plantation and
moved on to Tabar where rumor had it that gold was to
be found. He bought tools and tried prospecting, taking odd
jobs to pay his way, but never stayed long with any chore.
For companionship he took a native girl, Ansin Bulu, to
live with him, a free-and-easy union that developed into
a remarkable relationship.
At the outbreak of war with Germany, Page was caught
off balance. His background urged him to take up arms,
but the war in Europe seemed light-years away, and its
factors almost imcomprehensible. He decided to await
events before making any drastic decisions. However, the
war soon caught up with the planters and their chief crop
of copra was a glut on the market. One of them decided
to return to Australia and profit from the war boom. He
gave Page the job of managing his plantation while he
was away. This copra plant was on Simberi, one of the small
islands of the Tabar group, and this planter had earlier
undertaken coastwatching on the side, for which he had a
teleradio and all the necessary equipment to run a post.
Page was entranced with the general arrangement and
gladly took on the coastwatching duties. In this setup he
could have his native girl, his island dreams, plantation ac-
245
and also serve his country. The program was ideal.

There were other plantations in the area, one of which
was managed by Jack Talmage, a veteran of World War I,
who worked a place on the island of Tatau three miles south
of Simberi. A reliable man and a good worker, Talmage was
respected by both employees and neighbors. He was a high
cut above most of the men who drifted out to these islands
to take up various jobs, stay awhile, and then leave to seek
new goals. The natives in this area were little better, most
of them being idle, treacherous, and lacking any semblance
tivity,
of character.
Working on another plantation on Simberi was "Sailor"

Herterich, a German who had settled originally in New
Guinea when that island was a German colony. After the
1914-18 war Herterich managed to stay on and evade deportation by the simple expedient of marrying a native
woman. Unlike most of his former countrymen, "Sailor"
was a lazy, unreliable worker.
When
the Japanese broadened their scope of the war,
these islands were stirred into various degrees of the frantic
turmoil that swept through the Southwest Pacific. Japanese

pilots
and navigators used Tabar
while flying from Truk to

month preceding the actual
bomb
as
their
landfall point
Rabaul, and during the
fall of Rabaul, Page undertook

watch and plot these formations, and report enemy air
activity during all hours of the day and night. Had there
been a squadron of modern fighters nearby, the enemy
bombers could have been intercepted and downed like
ducks. Most certainly the enemy's long-range attack and
reconnaissance work would have been seriously handicapped. But Australia had no such defensive force at the
time. One has only to reflect to realize what might have
happened had Japan been so hindered in her bold move
to
southwestward.
While
this
was going
on, the
German, Herterich, had
consider his national status. If the Japanese came, he

that
it
would be wise
to revert to his original
to
knew
Germanic
246
and pose as an ally of Japan. If this could be

would be among friends. He began spreading the news that he was a German national, and stated
openly that if the Japanese came he would stay on as such
on his plantation.
Herterich's bold talk soon reached Page's ears, and in
counteraction he told the natives that the Japanese would
not dare come, but if they did they would soon be driven
off. "Let 'em come," he assured his workers. "They won't
bother me. I'll stay here in spite of them." These two attitudes bewildered the natives, and they quietly reserved
nationality
established, he
their decisions.
Page meant well, but with the fall of Rabaul and Kavieng,
he had to move out fast, for his radio reports did not long
escape the notice of the enemy. In a short time he became
a much-wanted man. As soon as his signals were pinpointed,
a warship was sent to bombard his plantation, but Page had
moved his equipment to a hut hidden in the jungle. When
the warship departed he resumed his work and reported
all that had happened.
The Australians in Townsville realized that Page's post

was untenable and they sent him a message complimenting him on his work, but suggesting that he now hide his
teleradio for the time being and join another party on New
Ireland. "At least take some measures for your own safety.
Good luck!" they signaled and signed off.
But Page had enjoyed this work and had no intention
of leaving. He was still master on Simberi and he had told
the natives he would stay. He was an Australian and was
expected to do his bit. Where else could he fight as he was
doing here? He had little respect for the Japanese and continued to send out reports that gave details of the extent
of the occupation of Kavieng, the names of Europeans in
the area
who had been
captured, the position of
guns and their caliber.

All this information was of value, but the
enemy
officials of
the
247
Ferdinand operation were deeply concerned for this man.

They now knew that he had no intention of leaving, and
something had to be done to protect him from himself. They
made contact again and ordered Page to keep off the air
until he had information of the greatest importance. They
pointed out that if he would stay silent for some time the
Japanese might conclude that he had decamped. "Your reports are most appreciated," they explained, "but it is more
important that you keep yourself free. Do not transmit, except in extreme emergency."
No
matter what the Australian authorities suggested or
ordered him to do, Page continued to report through to

Townsville, and his superiors realized that they were deal-
man who had no use for military

wartime procedures. Considering all
ing with a true islander, a

discipline or routine
this,
they reviewed the civilian status of
all
coastwatchers
and concluded that men in Page's position were too valuable to be ignored, and deserved some measure of protection.
finally set up whereby many

were given naval rank. Page
along with the others was commissioned a sub-lieutenant
in the Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve without
In
March
1942, a plan
was
of the civilian coastwatchers
by service authorities or medical officers,

even signing routine forms. In addition to providing
him with the pay and rank, it was hoped that it would set
up some legal protection against a possible brutal enemy.
ever being seen
or
Nevertheless, the natives on Tabar
who had watched
the
course of events in the Pacific gradually took sides with
Herterich and openly favored the Japanese cause. Jack Tal-
mage gave Page every measure
of support when this young

man, who had been so close to native life and believed
that he understood native thinking, saw his earlier influence
and control fast dissipating. Page was further shocked and
angered when renegade natives from Kavieng looted his
plantation and threatened to betray him to the Japanese.
248
The Australian was positive that Herterich had had a hand

in this, and was more certain when later a half-caste wastrel, Hans Pettersen, moved in with the German planter and
espoused the doctrine of accepting the Japanese. In fact,
it was Pettersen who turned the natives from their role of
indifferent sideliners to outright opposition.
Against this backdrop of hostility, the Ferdinand authorities
knew
abouts a secret
that
Page could not hope to keep his wherelonger, and he was sternly advised to
much
head for Buka, the northernmost island of the Solomons,

which up to then had remained clear of the enemy. Infuriated with the treachery of Herterich and Pettersen, Page
ignored the message and decided to stay in action as long
as possible, and continued to send all sorts of information.
In one message he explained that the Namatani airfield on
New Ireland had been mined, a valuable item he had
learned from runaway natives. All this time Page also talked
openly in Kavieng dialect with another watcher stationed
in Bougainville, a patois that both men spoke well, and as
such was as secure as any military code.
By the end of March, Page was completely bottled up
with every keypoint in the area taken by the enemy. Any
thought of escape was hopeless, unless he could be taken
out by air or submarine. He was short of supplies and had
no arms with which to defend himself. Page had to move
about through a series of caves with only Ansin Bulu bravely
supporting him in his cause. There were some attempts to
supply him by air, but such flights were risky, and parachutes suitable for airdrops were in short supply. It was
not until May that a successful supply drop was completed
in which were included a navy cap, badges of rank, food,
and a rifle. But by a weird stroke of misfortune, the pack
carrying the rifle jammed in the bomb-bay doors, and the
plane had to return to Port Moresby with it in that position.
Then a series of frustrating events almost drove Page frantic.
His radio set developed trouble in the voice transmis-
sion circuit.
He had no
regular key
and he
tried to
send
249
Morse by touching two wires together. The

some long-range deduction in Townsville, a spare lead-in was dropped to the
watcher, which proved to be the basis of the trouble and
voice transmission was restored.
This supply and support from the air made some impression on the natives for a time, but when the Japanese began
his signals in
transmission was so hopeless that after
recruiting a force of native police, the Australian authorities
sensed that Page's work was over, and plans were

to bring
By
him
made
out.
United States Navy submarines had arrived in Australia, and through the U. S. Naval
Liaison Officer, a rendezvous and rescue was arranged, and
Page agreed finally to listen to reason. For three nights, directing the agreed signals with a flashlight from a small
boat, the Australian waited hour after hour, watching every
movement from the sea, but no submarine came. For three
nights he risked being caught, and he must have suffered
this
time a small
fleet of
the tortures of panic and desertion. It was explained later
had developed a serious mechanical

breakdown and had to be brought back to port. A second
effort was made to have another submarine attempt the rescue, but by that time these underwater vessels were needed
for more important duties, and none could be spared.
When Page next reported he said that the Japanese were
planning a methodical search for him, and that a special
corps of soldiers and natives were to use dogs to track him
down. On receipt of this message, an Australian aircraft
went out in the hope of tracking down the ship that was
that the submarine
bombed an old
that Page still commanded
to bring in this search party, but
wreck chiefly
to
show the
natives
it
only
such support.
Ansin Bulu was captured first and

jail. A week later Page and his friend
Talmage were found, having been betrayed bv a hostile native. They were captured on June 16, 1942, and were taken
to the Kavieng jail where they were held for several weeks.
It
was
all in
vain.
placed in a Kavieng
25O
but Page and

island nearby and executed.
It must be admitted that Page had lived on borrowed
time for four months, and a less determined man would
have been caught weeks earlier. Taking the realistic viewpoint, he should have pulled out after his first month of
operations, but Cornelius Lyons Page was not an ordinary
The native girl was released

Talmage were taken to a small
eventually,
man.
Hans Pettersen was made leader
of the
Tabar Island
group and saddled with the duty of growing food for the
Japanese troops. In order to cany out this task, he flogged
the natives unmercifully and robbed them of every item of
value that they owned.
The Mission
of Keith
McCarthy
who
Keith McCarthy was another civilian watcher
up
ran
a remarkable record while working for the Ferdinand or-
ganization.
When
Rabaul
fell,
McCarthy was
filling
the post
as a
coastwatcher at Talasea toward the western end of
New
Britain.
Shortly after, the authorities at Townsville
wanted to know exactly what was taking place in and around

Rabaul and the extent of the Japanese penetration in particular. McCarthy was ordered to take his radio equipment
to Toma, near Rabaul, and send back a detailed outline on
the general situation.
In order to carry out this hazardous assignment, McCarthy
had
ged
first
to
New
make a
Britain
two hundred miles along the rugcoastline, then right turn and trek through
trip of
an unknown jungle to find a group of scattered people

whose position he did not know, and then hope he could
lead them out and transport them safely to New Guinea
by means that were not yet apparent.
The man
selected for this
work was a
free
and easy
Australian of Celtic descent. Never able to avoid trouble, he
was capable of getting out of it. He was a master

of improvisation, and his affections and warm emotions commanded his every move. Thus, when this order was received,
generally
<7
?:
~-
s
* X
$-i
o
o
1
UJ
X
a
<
<
UJ
UJ
ft
o X >
/
%
X
v>
CO
UJ
UJ
X
5
< <
UJ
3
K)
Q
UJ
<
'?/
252
McCarthy jumped at the chance to gather together a few

white traders and planters. He procured a small launch and
moved out on this amazing adventure. Aboard the little
vessel he had another Australian named Marsland, a few
native police and a seventeen-year-old native teleradio operator. After reporting the news of their departure, they
maintained radio silence over the next two weeks.
About this time the hastily formed Australian-New Guinea
Administrative Unit (Angau), organized for the military
administration of this territory, was collecting
New
all
small craft
and any other

refugees McCarthy might encounter and take under his
available to rescue the
Britain troops
wing.
A memorable
character, G. C. Harris,
was given command
man with many

weird contradictions and a truculent disposition, but a
speech impediment made him lisp. His bald head had a
fringe of fiery red hair, and according to the Australian custom, Harris was nicknamed "Blue." He was always most
courteous, with absolutely no sense of humor, but inherently
good-natured. Above all, his abounding courage was his
badge of office.
of this ragtag
flotilla.
Harris was a large
Harris was a patrol officer at Lae, New Guinea, and after

Rabaul fell, he planned to join the coastwatchers. His first
move was to gather up all the cash left in the abandoned
business offices to use where it would do the most good.
When he was appointed to head the Angau flotilla, "Blue"
Harris took a launch across the straits to Finschhafen, New

Guinea, where he joined a mission launch and three missionaries
who were
planning to join the watchers anywhere.
Rooke Island in
Guinea and New Britain. This ragvessel was capable of only eight knots,
Harris's full flotilla finally got together at
the
straits
between
time navy's fastest
but
it
took
off for
New
Talasea,
New
Britain, to rescue retreating
and give aid to McCarthy wherever he might be.

By this time McCarthy had reached the Pondo plantation
located fifty miles southwest of Rabaul where he found his
troops

first
253
refugees, troops of a military battalion
stationed at Rabaul but
who had been
had evaded capture. The young
charge of these soldiers used McCarthy's radio to

advise his superior officer that he had certain important information, and suggested that he should move out and deofficer in
liver
it
personally.
McCarthy, who had turned down the offer of a commission

from the young officer's superior, could see no reason why
the military man should leave his men to deliver some minor
intelligence,
and suggested instead that the
officer take
the
launch, load most of his troops aboard, and take charge of

the Talasea section of the coast. But the
young
officer raised
anchor, steamed past Talasea and continued on until he
New
Guinea mainland, escaping through Salamoved in. He not only had failed
provide
the protection McCarthy demanded, but had
to
deprived the party of a badly needed launch.
However, there was no time to worry over one mutinous
character, and McCarthy next rounded up two shipwrights
and put them to work repairing a launch that had been damaged by a Japanese landing party when it made a raid on
the Pondo plantation a few days before. Another Australian called Holland was sent to the south coast to collect
whatever troops he could round up while McCarthy made
a tour of nearby plantations to offer aid and advice to the
reached the
maua
before the Japanese
several planters in hiding.
Every move they made was risky for at any time they
might walk into a Japanese patrol. They also faced all the
terrors of the jungle, slime, marsh, attacks of animals, the
screech of outraged birds, and always the quaking mystery

of the impenetrable tropical tangle.
Here and there Mc-
Carthy came upon small bodies of dispirited, helpless soldiers who were usually suffering from jungle sores or malaria.
These trained military men had escaped the Japanese ambushes, but their ignorance of the jungle kept
them im-
mobile and helpless to aid themselves.
McCarthy had
to bully, cajole,
and threaten the
ill,
Ian-
254
guid men, practically forcing them to march back to Pondo,

meanwhile never giving up his search until he was assured
by natives that there were no more Australians between him

and the Japanese.
Holland who meanwhile had walked night and day to the
south coast found the remains of a large body of troops that
had been wiped out in cold blood after being intercepted
by the Japanese. He next came upon a group that was
blocked to the west by the Japanese occupation of Gasmata.
Holland also learned that a coastwatcher named Mackenzie
was somewhere in the rear with his party, so he sent out a
runner to warn this Ferdinand group in time for them to join
the column of refugees.
So from all directions, then, small groups of wounded, ill,
weary, and dispirited refugees made their way toward
McCarthy's gathering point. Tragically, some of them had
to be left behind in the care of loyal friends; some bravely
attempted the long marches, only to drop by the wayside, but
most got through to Pondo. Once there, McCarthy had to
use every volt of his personality to get this hapless force moving. He had to find and buy canoes so as to make full use
of the shoreline waterways. New parties of refugees had to
be picked up, and full directions given to the handful of men
who had the courage and ability to take command. Food was
scarce and most of it spoiled and unfit to eat. Malaria continued to take its toll. Talasea was one hundred and fifty
miles away to the westward end of New Britain, from there
dangerous straits had to be crossed, and after that they faced
another forced march of two hundred miles, while wearing
worn-out marching boots. With luck they might make it to
Port Moresby, there to be flown out if Port Moresby was
still
in Australian hands.
But McCarthy refused to give up. He kept the troops and

the other refugees moving, while maintaining constant communication with "Blue" Harris's Navy. All this demanded
considerable radio transmission and
that the Japanese
were translating
it
soon became evident
their simple codes,
and
255
they had to be changed frequently. Fortunately, McCarthy

had been taught the Playfair Feldt Method which permitted
the use of a longer key
word than would otherwise have
been possible.
When they arrived at the center of the north coast of

New Britain they had their first stroke of good luck. McCarthy was told that the Lakatoi, a motor ship of three hundred
tons,
was anchored
at the little island of
Witu, a good
dis-
tance off the New Britain shore. The captain, a jittery man,
had sought shelter there after taking on a cargo of copra.
McCarthy formed a raiding party aboard one of Harris's
launches, and backed by one man with a tommy gun, the
motor ship was seized. The captain was willing to surrender
if someone else took responsibility. While Harris ferried the
entire party of refugees over to Witu Island, McCarthy and
his
boarding party unloaded the bulky copra cargo into the

make room for the refugees. Just before they sailed
harbor to
Mrs. Gladys Baker,
who had managed
a plantation on Witu,
turned up and asked to be taken along. This resourceful
woman more
than paid for her passage by acting as ship's
nurse, dressing jungle sores
by
and comforting those exhausted
fever.
The voyage
of Lakatoi
was perhaps a minor incident
fered through
Harris
it
in
who
suf-
are not likely to forget the experience.
The
the history of the South Pacific carnage, but those
Navy immediately
left
for
Medang on
the
New
Guinea mainland, but Lakatoi waited for darkness before

out. With more than two hundred people aboard she
cleared the outer reefs and set a westward course at ten
knots. At dawn she crept into the harbor at Rooke Island
where small boats scurried ashore to bring back foliage from
moving
the jungle to cover the ship during the daylight.
At nightfall she moved out again, and

risk the unfriendly
waters of Vitiaz
Strait.
time had to
McCarthy kept
this
an armed guard on the bridge to make certain the captain

maintained the desired course, and his assistant Marsland
256
kept watch in the engine room. The badly
exhausted
men were
wounded and most
cared for in the available cabins, and
the others slept in the hold or on the deck, in fact anywhere
they could find space in which to stretch out. There were

only six men who could be considered fully fit.
moved toward the China Straits at the

where she was met with supplies of
Papua
eastern end
food and medicines, but none of these vessels could be
spared to take on any of the refugees, and they had to stay
Slowly the Lakatoi
of
aboard Lakatoi until she reached the harbor of Cairns in

northeast Queensland, nine weeks after the fall of Rabaul.
McCarthy was dumb with physical fatigue, and once ashore
sat unseeing, an unlighted cigarette between his lips and
an untouched glass of beer before him. He was in complete
mental and physical exhaustion, but he recovered to fight
again.
While
these,
and other refugee rescues were being made,
the regular coastwatcher teams did not desert their primary

duties. In many instances the teleradio operators remained
behind and continued the work, and other posts prepared
to broaden their important activities. But only a fortunate
few could provide much positive information, and in New

Britain, for instance, it would seem, on a cursory investigation, that little positive intelligence was available, but there
was a large amount of negative information that proved most
profitable.
Townsville
knew
that although the Japanese
Rabaul and occupied Gasmata, they had done
had taken
little
to spread
themselves over the rest of the island, information that was

valuable in all planning. The behavior pattern of the na-
was exactly what the Australian authorities had exThey were loyal and friendly just as long as they
risked no punishment from the enemy. Wherever government control was maintained, they were sympathetic to the
cause, and could be relied on to some extent, but once govtives
pected.
257
ernment influence was removed, they
fell
back on the laws
of self-preservation.
many
and
were influenced
and the preachings of self-appointed prophets who now found it convenient
to blame all disaster on the Australians and Europeans with
whom the natives had dealt. Thus, not only the Japanese invaders, but the natives had to be considered in the coastwatching plans.
Many of the European planters made no attempt to leave
In
by
instances,
areas, the natives
their religious beliefs, ancestor worship,
New
Britain,
stay.
Some knew only
having various reasons for their decisions to

a planter's life
and economy and
could not bring themselves to leave years of

the mainland
and
and begin
all
over again.
satisfied to take the risk of flight, a
effort,
return to
Some were too old

good many actually
harm would befall them if the Japanese did

come. They presumed they would be allowed to continue
their work, and sell their crops to the invaders at a reasonable price, just as the German planters had done throughbelieved that no
out
World War
lian occupation.
when the islands had come under AustraBut most of the British-Australians rose to
the occasion and served their flag in various ways.
Many took
coastwatcher jobs under the Ferdinand organization and
did outstanding work.
By
the time
McCarthy had brought
his shipload of refu-
gees into North Queensland, three watchers, Ball, Douglas,
and Olander, were operating posts in New Britain. They

were experienced islanders, well able to take care of themselves, and the authorities in Towns ville decided to leave
them there for the time being. New Britain was thus well
covered, but the long shillelagh-like area to the northeast,
New
Ireland, presented a very difficult problem. This al-
most-forgotten strip of rocks and sand, some two hundred

miles long,
lies
only forty miles
off
Rabaul. Namatanai, a
town nestling on the east coast of the island

where the club begins to bulge, was a settlement that accommodated the government subdistrict managers office.
trader-post
258
There were a few bungalows, Chinese shops, a police staand quarters for native laborers. In peacetime Namatanai was a pleasant backwater where the inhabitants led quiet lives, interested in little else but the
tion, a hospital,
business of turning coconuts into copra.
picture-postcard
bay provided anchorage for small craft, and nearby someone had started to level off an airstrip.
The Luck
of a
A. F. Kyle
War
was the
assistant district officer
and Greg M.
Benham was patrol officer, and when it appeared that there

would by trouble with Japan, their wives were evacuated to
the mainland. These two enjoyed a state of bachelorhood until they saw enemy convoy ships arrive off Rabaul.
Kyle, who had served in World War I, had grown plump
but was a good athlete. Benham was a typical Australian
with an easy gait, an islander's tact, and unswerving good
nature that made him a success in his official life.
Once the facts of the situation were apparent, Kyle and
Benham
set off
down
the east coast of
New
Ireland, collect-
number of planters and missionaries on the way.

Within a week they had reached a point a few miles off
Cape St. George on the southern tip of the island. From
here Kyle radioed Townsville explaining that he had a boat,
a party of ten, and asked for further instructions. In the
furor of the times, the message was forwarded to Port
Moresby instead of Townsville, and the New Guinea officials
ordered the boat and refugees to be sent on, but requested
Kyle and Benham to remain there. Believing that this message came from his close friend, Commander Feldt in
Townsville, Kyle sent the boat and the refugee party off to
make for some safe harbor. He assumed that he and Benham
were expected to stay and carry out their coastwatcher
duties, but by this time Benham was in ill health and of
little use in such demanding work. Kyle realized that there
ing a
was
little
sense in this order, considering
all
the risks in-
volved, but he decided to stay on until further instructions.
Commander
In the meantime,
259
Feldt discovered the grim
mistake and quickly got in touch with Kyle, and advised the
two men
to
move
inland and set up a hidden post, one
known
only to a few loyal natives, and to remain in hiding there

as long as possible.
By now Kyle was
ships in St. George's
the club end of
Commander
Channel which
New
Ireland.
enemy war-
reporting
splits
On
New
Britain
receiving
Feldt feared that Kyle would
this
now have
from
news,
trouble
finding any loyal natives, and knew that it was too late to do
much about it; the two watchers would have to work out
their own salvation.
They made a temporary camp on a ridge from where they
could keep watch on activities in the channel, but more complications arose
when
they were joined by a party of ten
who in trying to escape from New Britain by boat

had been driven ashore near Cape St. George. When this
news reached Commander Feldt he knew that these men
would soon devour the food available to Kyle and Benham,
and that supplies would somehow have to be dropped to
them. As this was the first attempt, before supplies had
been dropped to Page, it was not known just how to accomplish it. What efforts were made, proved almost useless.
Planes were not equipped for this work, and suitable parachutes were not available for the drops. In one instance a
Hudson bomber tried to fly in supplies in daylight but was
fired on by Japanese destroyers anchored offshore. A PBY
amphibian made an attempt that night and reported that
the destroyers had left, but Townsville received no word
for weeks as to what luck it had had.
Then, six weeks later, Kyle's voice was unexpectedly heard
soldiers
on the
air
once more.
He
reported that just before the day-
light-drop attempt a treacherous native

patrol
up
had
led a Japanese
to their ridge station. Fortunately,
Benham was
out in the jungle, but Kyle was trapped inside their hut.
Seeing the Japanese approaching, the district
officer
hurled
himself through the flimsy wall and went hell-for-leather
down
the mountainside.
The
raiders
rushed indoors but
260
could not
fire
an accurate shot
at the retreating coastwatcher
although the jungle resounded with their wild musketry.

Thus warned, Benham soon joined Kyle and they made their
the west coast, crossed over and re-entered
way up
Nama-
tanai.
On finding their homes burned and much
of their property
destroyed, they started off once more down the east coast.
While hiding in an abandoned plantation they were again
attacked by some eighty Japanese soldiers, but the two fugitives simply walked out the back door while the enemy
raiders were entering the front. Once more they made a safe
getaway.
In the meantime the ten soldiers
who had encamped
near
the coastwatcher station on the ridge were completely over-
looked by the Japanese patrol, and once the
moved
out, they
cluded a
new
enemy had
picked up the dropped supplies which
in-
radio and generator, and two bottles of whisky.
They hauled all this through the jungle until they caught
up with Kyle and Benham again. The whisky must have put
spirit into enterprise for a new post was set up with another
group of civilians, led by J. H. McDonald, a coastwatcher
from Kavieng. Once more Kyle made contact with Townsville and asked what should be done next. He was advised
to get the civilians and soldiers away on any available
boat. This was after an Amalgamated Wireless operator from
Kavieng had repaired the damage that Kyle's receiver had
sustained in
By now
its
parachute drop.
were moving into position for

May 5-7, 1942, and it was seen
Allied naval forces
the Battle of the Coral Sea,
that a watcher stationed at the eastern tip of
would be
New
Ireland
key position to keep track of the enemy. Kyle and Benham were encouraged to stay as long as
was reasonably possible although Kyle's transmitter was not
too reliable. However, it was hoped that Page, who was still
operating on Tabar, would be able to relay Kyle's signals on
to Townsville. There were several other hoped-for arrangein a vital or
ments
in this area, but
light of the Coral
At any
end
of
rate,
how
well they worked out, in the
Sea engagement,
Kyle and
26l
Benham
is
a question.
stayed in action until the
May when
planning to
set
they reported that the Japanese were

up a civil administration at Namatanai, a
warning that any Australian authority would soon dissipate,

and the natives would react accordingly. Officials in Townsville made plans to get Kyle and Benham out by submarine.
Again, several attempts were made, but something always
went wrong at a critical moment. An Australian Air Force
pilot, John Mason, who knew the islands well, volunteered
to go ashore and round up the coastwatchers and lead them
back to a rendezvous. It was a gallant effort, but ended
when Mason, along with a watcher named Woodwere captured and presumably executed. Kyle and
Benham were also captured only eighteen hours before they
were to be picked up by a submarine, and since the submarine was not attacked or intercepted, we have full proof that
neither man, in the face of threats and questionings, betrayed
their would-be rescuers.
tragically
roffe
was taking place in New Britain and

were contributing to the intelligence cause throughout the Solomons where they had
fronts seats to view the Japanese occupation moves. Once
Rabaul fell, the enemy was in a position to enact a wild program of bombing, and Tulagi appears to have been his first
objective. Here, the Resident Commissioner of the Solomons,
While
New
W.
S.
all
the above
Ireland, other watchers
Marchant, maintained his headquarters, as did Lieu-
tenant D.
S.
Tulagi, too,
Macfarlan, the naval intelligence
was an impressive-looking radio
officer.
target for bombers, but something of a fake, for despite
towers, aerials,
On
station, a prize
its
and neat buildings, the equipment was old
and almost obsolete.

The coastwatcher network
all
through the Solomons held
262
an amazing degree; from Buka at the north to

Guadalcanal to the south key men continually snooped on
intact to
the
Japanese.
Two men
Paul Mason, contributed
in
much
particular,
Jack
Buka Pasthe two north-
Read had assumed the coastwatcher chore

narrow
sage, the
ernmost
war.
He
when
Read and
to this intelligence network.

at
water that separates

one month before Japan entered the
spotted Japanese activity on January 21, 1942,
strip of
islands, only
first
small formations of
enemy
aircraft started circling over
the islands. Determined not to be caught this early,
moved
Read
equipment to a settlement known as Aravia,

a spot that could be reached only after a trek of twenty
miles along the Bougainville coast, and then a turn inland
his radio
for a two-hour climb to the top of a one-thousand-foot ridge.
known as Soraken, was taken over for

Once the news came through that RaRead and Lieutenant J. H. Mackie, who
large plantation,
the base of supplies.
baul had fallen,
commanded
a small force of Australian soldiers, put everyone to work hauling supplies and setting up caches upon
draw in emergencies.
Paul Mason was another planter who had also decided to
stay on and work as a coastwatcher. A small man, well over
forty, he spoke slowly and viewed the world through benign
eyes, but he was one of the toughest men in the Ferdinand
force. Radio had been his great hobby while he was a
planter. He had taught himself every feature of the science,
and his elaborate set had kept him in touch with Port
Moresby and Tulagi when no one else in the network had
been able to do so. It was Mason who warned Tulagi of the
first Japanese bombing raid.
By early March, Read and Mason had their little network
complete and were maintaining full communication with
Port Moresby and watchers all through the south Solomons.
On March 30, Read was almost captured while passing close
to the Buka Passage in his launch. He had been warned of
danger by a native policeboy, and he stopped his engine
and let the launch drift on silently. It was just as well, for
which
to
263
a party of Japanese had landed nearby to take control of the

Buka Passage. Read decided to hide the launch and take a
canoe to a Catholic mission a few miles south where he

found that a Japanese force had visited the mission the day
before. Finding that the priests and nuns had slipped away
to a hideout, the
enemy
looted the building of
much
of
was being related another Japanese

force appeared, but Read guided the missionaries to a safe
hiding place and tried to persuade them to follow him to
the east coast of the island. However, they refused, electing
its
contents.
As
this story
to remain.
The Angels
of Guadalcanal
Between August 1942 and February 1943 the United States

engagements in the Guadalcanal area
that were bitterer and bloodier than any in American history
since 1864. Four of these were naval night-gunfire actions
of a type that may never be recorded again. Two were
forces fought six major
carrier battles that followed a pattern set in the Coral Sea.
There were many actions involving destroyers and motor-torpedo boats that were never fully recorded, hundreds of air
battles between American and Japanese fliers, and an almost
continuous engagement involving United States Marines and
Army with
savage Japanese troops.
This Guadalcanal campaign was unique in

multiplicity of
weapons used, and
its
variety
and
for the co-ordination be-
No campaign in modern
marked with more savagery, misery, jungle horror,
self-sacrifice, and raw heroism. It was eventually won by
the Allies, but it could have been lost without the help and
intelligence provided by the Australian coastwatchers.
As pointed out by Samuel Eliot Morison in his majestic
tween
history
sea,
ground, and
air
power.
is
history of the struggle for Guadalcanal, this unpublicized
proved to be the nemesis of the Japanese invanetwork of radio stations that ranged through
the Solomons and Bismarcks consisted of only eight or nine
institution
sion. Its small
264
watchers after the evacuation of Tulagi, but they were of

inestimable value all through the campaign in the Solomons.
They relayed
to Allied headquarters the
emy
and ground
power was not too
ships,
American
aircraft,
air
aircraft flying
in advance,
forces.
it
of en-
At a time when
reliable, their reports of
southward, received as
made
movements
much
as fifty
minutes
possible for United States planes to
take off and gain valuable altitude in time to swoop down

on the enemy. Then, in another role, the coastwatchers succored one hundred and twenty airmen who had crashed
during these high-altitude battles.
The American landings at Guadalcanal, August 7, stirred

up a whirlwind of enemy reaction, and the first impact of
this was felt in the Battle of Savo Island. Recovering naval
initiative there, the
Japanese next turned their attention to

on Guadalcanal. Their revenge
Marines' beachhead
the
know as Operation "KA," was quickly put into action,

many of their preparations were caught by the coast-
plan,
but
watchers, and over the next few weeks the Ferdinand oper-
came into their own.

Four hours after the American attack began, Paul Mason,
who was operating from a jungle hideout on Malabite Hill
on the eastern end of Bougainville, first heard the roar of
enemy bombers, and immediately sent a warning message to
ators really
the Allied invasion forces explaining that twenty-four torpedo
bombers were heading for the Guadalcanal beachhead. A

short time later Pearl Harbor relayed the warning throughout the whole area.
Strengthened by this coastwatcher alert, the United States
Navy carriers had more than two hours to disperse in readiness, fuel-up, arm all guns, get into the air at high altitude,
and await the oncoming torpedo bombers. When the enemy
aircraft arrived, they were slaughtered, only one of the
twenty-four staggered back to Rabaul, and no damage of
any kind was inflicted on any of the Allied warships or
transports.
Early the next morning Jack Read
who was
at
Porapora at
266
the other end of Bougainville, caught the
first
rumble
dull
more enemy aircraft and identified forty-five dive bombers

that had taken off from Kavieng. He immediately uncovered
his radio set, and before the roar overhead had died away,
Guadalcanal and Pearl Harbor were fully advised. Read then
of
switched his receiver to the United States aircraft

wavelength, and soon heard a combat
they're shooting
them down
like flies!
carriers*
officer yelling,
"Boys,
One, two, three ...
can see eight tumbling into the sea at this minute!"

That afternoon it was Mason's turn again as he reported
more aircraft that were warmly welcomed, and the first
thrust of the Japanese attack was stopped cold. Fighter control cheerfully advised both watchers they were doing
splendidly, and both men felt that their long wait had been
well worth the time.
Over the next day every Japanese attack was reported, and
quickly batted down, and with these continued losses, the
enemy had
to hold off and await reinforcements flown in

from the Carolines. This gave the Allied force a few days'
breathing spell. All through this the Japanese had no idea
that they were being betrayed by the coastwatchers, as the
Americans and Australians kept any mention of them from
news reports.
Still, they could do little to aid the ground action, and
bitter fighting was experienced before Tulagi was taken. The
opposition gave a good account of itself before Gavutu could
be overrun. At Guadalcanal the initial resistance was negligible, but a reckoning, long to be remembered, was to
come.
The coastwatchers could be relied on to report daylight
activities,
but they could not see surface vessels far offshore

was with the Japanese at sea, and on the
at night, so luck
night of August 9 enemy surface forces attacked the Allied

screen of carriers that were covering the transports. The
Japanese, with superior gun power, sank one Australian and

three American warships. This assault forced the military
transports to hurry their off-loading to avoid air
and subma-

rine
attacks.
267
Their subsequent withdrawal also
left
the
Marines clinging to what small foothold they had gained.

Later on, of course, when the airfield on Guadalcanal was
taken and made available, Allied aircraft moved in to provide necessary air cover, and the transports and their naval
support returned. Some gains had been made, however,

and coastwatchers could explain to natives back on Bougainville that the Japanese had been pushed out of Tulagi and
parts of Guadalcanal. This was important as it made the
natives realize that the Australians and Europeans were
coming back.
F. A. Rhoades and E. Schroeder, two coastwatchers who
had been on Guadalcanal prior to the American invasion,
had a watcher post on the western end of the island where
they had a very difficult time for several days. The Japanese
troops who had been driven out of Lunga, marched toward
the watchers' hideout and on the way attacked a Catholic
mission and left the naked bodies of two priests and two
nuns strung up and bayoneted. Rhoades and Schroeder then
tried to move farther on but found their route blocked by
Japanese, so they holed up in a mountain cave where friendly
natives fed and shielded them.
The occupation of Tulagi and the attack on Guadalcanal

had a large part in retaining the loyalty of the natives and
several of the coastwatchers wisely capitalized
the time being, the shoe
this.
For
was on the other foot, and the

round up Japanese survivors from
natives
went
sunken
ships, aircraft, or military stragglers.
so far as to
on
In
many
in-
and killed their captives before they could be rescued by any Allied authority.
This situation had its reverse examples, of course. The
Japanese who were still holding out on Guadalcanal called
on the available natives to join them. One of these, a retired
stances they acted savagely
policeman with the name of Vouza, refused to give aid or

tell what he knew of the position of the Americans. So he
was tied to a tree and threatened with bayonets. He still
268
each refusal was pierced. Five times the

enemy soldiers cruelly jabbed him, until he lost consciousnessand was left for dead. When his tormentors had gone,
refused,
Vouza
and
finally
at
came
to,
and chewed
at the ropes that
him. Once free, he staggered to an American

at
Lunga, and gasped,
them."
He
would not tell

life and death
Vouza was awarded Great Brit-
"I did
not
tell
them.
then passed out and hung between
For this gallantry

George Medal.
for days.
ain
bound
field hospital

Shortly after the capture of Lunga, the U.
S.
Marines took
was named Henderson Field, in honor

of Major Lofton R. Henderson, the Marine Corps flier who
had died so heroically at Midway, and by August 20, the
over the
airfield that
squadron of Wildcat fighters flew in to afford air cover.

the Wildcat was a very rugged aircraft and superior
to the Japanese Zero in gun power, it lacked the speed
and maneuverability of the enemy fighter, and most important was no match in climbing ability. If by some means
the Grumman could overcome this disadvantage, it might
play an important part in the defense of Henderson Field.
first
Though
Once more the Australian coastwatchers were in a posimake a valuable contribution. The day after the first
Wildcat squadron had flown in to take over, August 21,
watchers Paul Mason and Jack Read advised Guadalcanal
that a number of Japanese raiders were approaching. This
gave the Wildcat pilots two hours to fuel-up, arm their
tion to
weapons, and get into the air. At a level of thirty thousand

feet they orbited and awaited the enemy. The results were
most satisfactory.
Day
whole month, the same routine was

Mason and Read carefully
checked them through. Day after day, warned in plenty of
time, the Wildcat pilots intercepted the raiders and shot
them down in large numbers. 7 hen what was left turned
back, the two coastwatchers reported their numbers, and in
after day, for a
followed by the enemy, and

this
way
269
Air Intelligence learned that the Japanese losses
were usually greater than they had supposed, for some had
gone down into the sea after leaving the main conflict over
the beleaguered island.
This
is
not to imply that American airmen had a sinecure
for they suffered
some
losses too,
and
their continued ag-
gressiveness that brought about the initial decline of the
Japanese Air Force, took a severe physical
The Fight
toll.
to the Finish
Week after week passed, but the fighting on Guadalcanal

seemed never to diminish and in no way improve. The Marines had managed to keep their perimeter secure, but by
October the Japanese had landed more forces notwithstanding the fact that Henderson Field had been strengthened
by squadrons of dive and torpedo bombers. The enemy continued to raid Lunga regularly and create havoc with the
ground troops. American bombers were running up high
scores against enemy shipping, but they could not completely blockade the Guadalcanal coast.
The naval balance

were able to dribble
of
power
so fluctuated that both sides
in reinforcements
and
supplies,
and
continued support only intensified the torment and

savagery that marked this bitter campaign. The loss of the
this
Wasp and Hornet gave
the enemy comand by mid-October many

types of Japanese warships were bombarding Lunga by
night, thus covering the movements of their transports that
could be seen on the horizon during the day.
In the face of all this the Allied forces ashore were shackled by the inadequacy of supplies. Now and then a few old
destroyers, doing tanker duty to bring in gasoline, were
able to break through the enemy sea cordon, but more often
the aircraft on Henderson Field were grounded by lack of
fuel, and there was a period when only one transport aircraft got through to bring in fuel and take out the wounded.
U.
S.
mand
Navy
carriers
of the sea in this vital area,
This obvious situation encouraged the Japanese to hurl them-
270
selves repeatedly at the
had
to
Lunga
perimeter, and the Marines
brace for attack after attack.
ground, the
enemy began
Against this back-
preparations for a final assault
designed to reconquer Guadalcanal, and once more Mason
and Read moved into the breach.

Paul had been busy gathering information, with the aid
of a number of native scouts, that showed the enemy was
already stocking tractors, trucks, guns, ammunition, and
assault equipment of all kinds at Buin in southern Bougainville. They were also hacking out an important airfield at
Kahili, and as a result the area between Buin and the Shortland Islands, just
off
the southeast point of Bougainville,
became the anchorages for many ships; so many in fact that

Mason could not identify them at all.
So the authorities in Towns ville took a copy of Janes
Fighting Ships, the navy man's bible, and photographed all
pages relating to the Japanese Imperial Navy. These pictures and other information were air-dropped to Mason, and
from that time on
were remarkable for

though reconnaissance
planes flew over these waters, their crews usually returned
with vague reports of "several naval vessels of undetermined
category." Paul, however, would come through with an
exact fist of each class of ship. He was stymied only once,
but from his lengthy description the Guadalcanal intelligence teams decided that he was trying to tell them about
a seaplane tender; the Japanese had five of these unusual
their
accuracy.
his identifications
In
comparison,
vessels at that time.
Paul Mason also recruited a number of natives and induced some of them to take jobs, working on the Japanese
airfield by day and reporting to him at night with all the
information they could pick up. Thus, it was routine for
him
to
send through reports such
Aerodrome
as:
is expected to be completed within a

week. There are 27 lorries (trucks), 6 motor cars,
10 horses, 6 motorcycles, 4 tractors, and other aerodrome working equipment at Kahili. Stores and
2J1
under tarpaulins spread along foreshore

Ugumo River and Moliko River. There
are 2 anti-aircraft guns near these dumps and another on northwestern boundary of aerodrome as
well as 8 new iron buildings. Some priests and nuns
fuel are
between
are interned in these buildings. Enemy troops numbering about 440 wear green uniforms with anchor
badge on sleeves and on their white hats. Coolies
too numerous to count.
On
another occasion Read reported:
ship
which may be a
cruiser,
and probably anfrom the
other, entered Kessa at 1 p.m., believed
north.
rick
Heavy
on stern
destroyer and light cruiser with derjust entered Buka Passage. Unusual
9 fighters landed on drome. Beabout 20 fighters and bombers here now.

First-mentioned ship now leaving Kessa, believe
may come this way.
air activity today;
lieve
With all this direct intelligence Allied forces bombed the

enemy bases and continued to attack the shipping around
Buin, in the Shortlands, and at the Buka Passage.
By
the end of October the Japanese
had completed
their
plans for a final all-out effort to drive the Americans off
Guadalcanal, and by
now were aware
that the Australian
coastwatchers were playing an important part in the war,
was made to wipe out every post.

were trained in tracking down
fugitives were brought in to Buin and housed in a special
kennel and runway, and a military patrol organized to handle these animals. But by a stroke of good fortune, a bomb
dropped in the area from a PBY Catalina flying boat fell
on the kennel and killed every dog in the pack. Needless
to state Paul Mason and his little band were most grateful.
For a few hours the report on this bombing was the last
signal he sent, for a one-hundred man patrol went out withso a concerted attempt
A number
of large dogs that
out the dogs to
make a thorough search
for
Masons
hideout.
272
But by that time Paul had taken his small party on a trek
through the rough mountain country, leaving a few loyal
scouts to keep a check on the Japanese patrol and inform
him
of
position.
its
The enemy searched
for thirty-six hours
and then gave up, assuming that the coastwatcher had escaped from the island. Before they were back in their camp,
Mason was on the air reporting his safety and the failure
of the Japanese patrol.
Up
at
Porapora Jack Read was also being harassed by

from Buka Passage, and he had to move
a patrol sent out
toward the high mountains, believing the

enemy would not penetrate that far. He made his way with
a small force along a steep slippery track that ended in a
native village that huddled on a high peak. They had
slogged through rain, drizzle, and hazy fog, but just as they
reached the highest ridge of the mountain, the drizzle
halted, and a warming sun came through the clear, rainwashed air, giving unusual visibility. Read stared about.
There out on the distant horizon steamed a convoy of twelve
large passenger-type vessels, all heading southeast.
Although he had been ordered to maintain radio silence
farther inland
while retiring to a
new
hideout,
Read knew
that this
was
important information. His teleradio was set up quickly and
was sent reporting the convoy. He had no idea,

were carrying a large Japanese army to a major assault on Guadalcanal.
Paul Mason, on Malabite Hill, picked up Read's signal,
made a new appraisal of the situation, and contributed the
a signal
of course, that these big ships
following:
At
least 61 ships in this area:
cruisers),
Aoba,
Mogami
2 Nati
(first-class
(cruiser),
Kiso
(large destroyer), 1 Tatuta (destroyer), 2 sloops,
33 destroyers, 17 cargo vessels, 2 tankers, and 1

passenger liner of 8000 tons.
Mason identified these vessels from the photo sheets that

had been dropped to him previously, and with this first-
273
hand information the
for
Allies
were warned to prepare
a major attack.
The Japanese naval craft staged

withdrew by daylight so
night, but
large
bombardments
as to
evade the venge-
at
ance of United States bombers. At the same time enemy

bombers pounded the American perimeter. In the middle
of all this, Admiral Daniel
Callaghan surprised the enemy
J.
fleet north of Savo, and with cruisers under his command
skillfully sank one Japanese battleship and seriously damaged another. In the resulting confusion an enemy cruiser
flotilla fired on their own battleships.
With the coming of daylight, Read's reported enemy convoy was intercepted and attacked by dive bombers from
Henderson Field, and when the American assault was over
only four transports had reached Guadalcanal. But these
were swarmed over by dive bombers, set on fire, and had
to be beached by the enemy crews.
Again the coastwatchers had more than paid for their
rations, and by October General Douglas MacArthur had
awarded the Distinguished Service Cross to Macfarlan, Mason, Read, and Rhoades. Another group, operating in the
southern Solomons, that included Marchant, was rewarded
with high British decorations, but none of these awards
was made public at the time.
Arthur Reginald Evans was an
every meaning of the phrase.
Australian
Army
in the
transferred to the
officer
and gentleman
He had
in
served with the
Middle East, but by July 1942 had

his commission as
Navy and was given
He played a
and when that
a sub-lieutenant in the coastwatcher service.
major role in the Guadalcanal campaign,
was over he moved into Kolombangara where he opened

an undercover station. This knob of an island is in the Blackett Strait west of New Georgia, and from a peak on the
south shore Evans could look down on the Japanese base
274
at Vila.
Holed up
in a
bamboo
hut,
armed with binoculars
and a telescope, he maintained constant communications

with Lunga on Guadalcanal and kept the whole Allied force
at the alert.
Reg, as Evans was
known
but brisk, determined
built,
narrow
man
was
a slightly
of fair complexion with a
He was cultured and had a ready

He had been educated in Australian
aristocratic face.
wit and social charm.

schools,
to his friends,
and by 1929 went
a coconut plantation.
to the
When
New
Hebrides to manage
the plantation was bought by
a French concern, Evans returned to Sydney and took a job

with a trading and shipping firm that sent him to the Solomons. He learned much about the islands and the natives,
and while there met and later married Gertrude Slaney of

who had been vacationing in Tulagi.
After his Guadalcanal stint, Evans was picked up by a
PBY flying boat at Florida Island and put down at night at
Segi Point on the southeastern tip of New Georgia, an area
still in enemy hands. The coastwatcher at Segi Point was a
swashbuckling character, Donald C. Kennedy, who was not
satisfied to live in the Ferdinand tradition, but bashed
Adelaide,
about with a ten-ton raider, sinking Japanese barges, whaleand attacking practically anything he came across
with salvos of hand grenades. He had recruited, trained,
boats,
and won the
band of natives who would have

had he so ordered. He had also
acquired a reputation for rescuing American pilots by the
gone
all
the
loyalty of a
way
to Tokyo,
simple expedient of offering his "Fuzzy
Wuzzy
Angels," a
bag of rice and a can of corned beef for every downed pilot
American or Japanese they brought alive to his headquarters.
Evans picked up some of this Kennedy manner when he

was left in charge at Segi Point while Don visited Guadal-
When
with a naMalanga, loaded a dugout canoe and set

out for his own station on Kolombangara. In order to do this
they had to travel by night and hide by day, and on one
canal.
his superior returned, Evans, along
tive helper called

occasion passed so close to the
Munda airstrip on New
gia they could hear Japanese road
who was
a coastwatcher on
275
traffic.
Rendova
Geor-
D. C. Horton,
Island, sent scouts
coming, and
had a spot prepared from where he could look, not only down on Vila,
but out across the Blackett Straight and Ferguson Passage
to Wana Wana and Gizo.
All this was routine in the coastwatcher service. As fast
as one area or point was mopped up, the watchers were
deployed to handle the intelligence work for the next opera-
ahead of Evans
when he
to advise the natives of his
arrived a group of friendly natives
tion.
The
first
months
six
something of a
lull
of 1943
were generally considered
or stagnant period in the Southwest Pa-
Over those months the Japanese were building up

their defenses in the central and northern Solomons, while
the Allied forces were concentrating on their next series
of attacks, and the Ferdinand organization became vitally
cific.
involved in both sides of this South Pacific planning.
By mid- 1943,
too, the
United States Navy had
finally ac-
cepted the torpedo motorboat, a small wooden vessel that
had been highly developed by the British and Italian navies.

Commander J. D. Bulkeley had had some remarkable exploits
with
pines,
and
this utility craft
during the defense of the Philip-
Solomons it proved
rescue work, reconnaissance
in the waters of the Central
be of exceptional value in
and particularly against Japanese powered barges
and other small targets.
Four of these PT squadrons, comprising some fifty boats,
to
patrols,
New Georgia campaign that began on June

They worked from two main bases; one in Rendova
harbor was assigned to everything in Blackett Strait, and
one at Lever harbor on The Slot side of New Georgia which
was within easy cruising distance of Kula Gulf. ( See map.
operated in the
21, 1943.
Captain E.
J.
Moran, former skipper
of the cruiser Boise,
276
now commanded
Pacific,
and had
all
his
torpedo boat squadrons in the South

headquarters in Rendova.
For a short time the PT captains enjoyed several rewarding fights with enemy transport barges, and on the night
of July 23-24 three PTs engaged three such vessels, sank
one, and drove the others away, a skirmish that delayed
a rendezvous with Japanese troop-carrying destroyers.
Tactical handling of these boats was not all it might have
been, particularly where co-operation was required between
PTs and Allied aircraft. On one occasion, PTs in Ferguson
Passage fired on a formation of B-25 light bombers by mistake. Two airmen were killed, one PT boat was sunk, and
eleven sailors were wounded. Much of this occurred because few of the small boats carried a reliable radar
set,
and those that did failed to have men available who could
operate one. It was learned, too, that torpedoes were useless for engagements against barges, and 37-mm. anti-tank
guns, or 40-mm. machine guns were adapted to the boats.
On the night of August 1-2, 1943, the Japanese Admiral
Tomoshige Samejima, whose headquarters were in Rabaul,
scheduled a destroyer run into Blackett
Strait,
but thought-
bombers ahead to raid the Rendova PT

base. This resulted in the destruction of two boats that were
under repair. That same night five enemy destroyers slipped
along the west coast of Kolombangara and evaded the effully sent eighteen
forts of fifteen
PT
boats in Blackett
Strait.
This small boat
under Lieutenant Henry J. Brantingham, closed in

what he believed were landing craft. The destroyers opened up with their guns, but the PTs had time
to fire six torpedoes, none of which scored a hit. The destroyers continued on through until they were spotted by
PT-171, commanded by Lieutenant Arthur H. Berndtson.
Here four more torpedoes were expended against heavy
fire, but no damage was done. Eventually, the Japanese destroyers swept through to Vila and discharged their cargoes.
force,
to strafe
By now PT-109, commanded by Lieutenant John F.

Kennedy, who later became the 35th President of the
United States, had teamed up with PT-169 and PT-162
277
which were southbound down the Blackett Strait. Since radio silence had to be maintained, none of them knew that
four Japanese destroyers were in the vicinity and were
actually steaming toward them. When they first noted the
outline of unreported ships, the lookouts presumed that they
were other PT boats.
In the general confusion, the enemy destroyer Amagiri
identified and rammed PT-109. Harold Marney, a newcomer to the crew, was crushed to death. The wheel was
torn from Lieutenant Kennedy's grasp and he was slammed
violently against the rear wall of the cockpit.
The
aft por-
was sliced away, and a fire broke out in

remained afloat, but this was quickly
quenched. The Amagiri continued on without firing a shot.
Of the thirteen members of Kennedy's crew, only two were
missing. The survivors were Lieutenant Kennedy, Ensigns
George Ross and Leonard J. Thorn; Patrick McMahon,
William Johnston, Gerard Zinser, Edgar E. Mauer, John
E. McGuire, Raymond Albert, Charles A. Harris, and Raytion of the boat
the
section
mond
that
Starkey.
Throughout the rest of the night, while hanging onto what

was left of their battered craft, Kennedy expected planes
or other
PT boats to come to their rescue, and when dawn

Wana Wana they could see Rendova Peak thirty-
rose over
eight miles to the south. They knew exactly where they were,
and optimistically believed that someone would come out
and get them when night fell.
The story of Lieutenant Kennedy and his crew of PT-109
has been told all too many times and has been viewed
world-wide on the movie screen, but perhaps all too few
realize
how much
the Australian coastwatchers contributed
to the epic event.
The Ordeal
of
morning Reg Evans from his

Kolombangara, spotted a floating obnear where he had observed a mysterious blaze the
In the
first
hideout in the
ject
Reg Evans
light of that
hills of
278
By nine-thirty he received a message relayed

on by a coastwatcher near Munda, that a PT boat, number
109, had been lost in Blackett Strait two miles west of Mereseu Cove. Any information on this affair was to be relayed
on to Rendova, the headquarters base of the PT boats.
As we all know now, Kennedy and his crew first made
their way to a small group of islands in the Ferguson Passage, and over the next few days shifted about, trying to
find a sanctuary where they could hide from the Japanese
but still be in a position to hail any rescue craft ordered
night before.
out to search for them.
As so often happens, everything went wrong. The PT

wrong area and aircraft assigned to the search missed them completely. Only Reg
Evans had any idea where the Kennedy group might be,
and it was through a very fortunate and quite accidental
contact made by two Gizo scouts of Evans's secret force,
that the PT boat crew was eventually rescued.
These two scouts, Biuku Gasa and Eroni Kumana, risked
boats sent out went into the
the Japanese naval surveillance in order to take messages
Reg Evans realized

crew was apparently safe on one of the islands, he was able to put the coastwatcher organization into
high gear and effect a complete and timely rescue. He even
managed to send a small boatload of food to them, while
setting up the rescue operation. This same boat also brought
Lieutenant Kennedy to Evans's hideout, where the two discussed the situation, and where Evans at first suggested
that Kennedy go on to Rendova by native canoe. The young
PT-boat commander, however, refused to leave his crew, so
Evans arranged that he be paddled out to the nearby island
of Patparan where he would await the arrival of the rescue
boats being sent out from Rendova to pick up his men. This
contact was carried out to perfection, although Kennedy
and Evans did not meet again until 1961 when the Australian was an honored guest at the White House.
to Rendova. All this took time, but once
that the PT-109
CONCLUSION
The
On
equal footing with
sumed
draw to a
and the Japanese war lords.
science of military intelligence did not
close with the defeat of Hitler
its full
all
other services
it
has always as-
share of any battle burden since the days of
Hannibal, Napoleon, and Lee. All through the Korean cam-
paign the lessons that had been learned in Europe, Asia,
and the Pacific were put to good use, but political expediency was to shackle every aspect of first-class planning and
prevented the full use of the weapons available.
The Korean War, hardly a small "brush-fire" uprising, introduced a
new
factor in psychological warfare,
known
as
brainwashing which since has become one of the most

important weapons in military intelligence. Psychological
warfare
is
the use of propaganda and other actions to in-
and behavior of
enemy, neutral, or friendly groups in order to establish national aims and objectives.
As soon as United Nations prisoners were released from
North Korean compounds, the full impact of Communist
brainwashing was realized. More than 6000 American soldiers and 5500 others, mostly ROK troops, had perished
after falling into Communist hands and fully half of these
were the victims of enemy atrocities while the others died
fluence the opinions, emotions, attitudes,
It was later proven that 1036

had been murdered after capture and
2370 more had died after being thrown into prison
during their imprisonment.
American
that
soldiers
camps.
It is generally agreed that most of these unfortunates
were not trained for or accustomed to the rigors of a North
CONCLUSION
280
Korean winter, or the inadequacies of North Korean

but
many
rations,
died because of the callous treatment suffered
because they had refused to collaborate.
Here was a new military weapon, which previously had

only been whispered or quietly feared. Never before had
collaboration been so openly organized
peacetime psychological warfare
the minds of people in order to prepare

tion in subversive activities
and applied. In
may be used
when
them
to influence
for participa-
hostilities begin. Intelli-
gence support of psychological warfare requires
full
ac-
counting of enemy vulnerability, capability, and the characteristics
of the
area applicable to psychological warfare
operations.
But in Korea collaboration took the form of contributing

Communist magazines and newspapers, and even military brochures. Some Americans were induced to play roles
to
Communist plays or take part in oratorical debates, in

which the American way of life was soundly denounced.
Some went on the radio to berate their military leaders
and many signed Communist peace appeals and in so many
ways aided the Communist progaganda agencies.
This brainwashing which resulted in collaboration was at
first introduced by denying United Nations prisoners all normal necessities, compelling them to wallow in filth and discomfort, by refusing to allow normal correspondence with
parents or other relatives and quite often by exploiting the
racial or economic discontent. The arts of psychological warfare were also applied in stirring up discontent between individuals, and in one instance an American sergeant was
later convicted of having killed two of his fellow prisoners
by throwing them out of their barracks to die in the snow.
In fact, some 4435 American prisoners were later accused
of collaborating with the enemy and thus established an
image that will take years to eradicate. How much all this
contributed to the widespread resentment against the campaign in general is hard to assay, but it added little to the
in
CONCLUSION
28l
determination to put an end to Communist aggression
initial
At the same time it is evident the intelligence on

and civilian personalities and methods, derived from prisoners of war, refugees and the enemy news
in Korea.
enemy
military
media, greatly
in organizing psychological warfare
assists
plans and policy. Intelligence along strategic lines also provides valuable background information of the history
and
ethnic composition of the enemy.
Collaboraton by American troops was not so widespread

as
first
reports indicated. In fact,
tivity actually
many
of the
men
in cap-
feigned co-operation by attending the
Com-
munist gatherings and appearing to absorb the Marxist
line;
but wisely making no comment, and thus were considered

in the "progressive" bracket, meaning they were men of
stronger will, but fine examples
come
who
in the
end would be-
intelligent reactionaries.
Recent
figures,
compiled after sound consideration and
reasoning, indicate that only 15 per cent of U. S. Army prisoners collaborated with the enemy and of these only 5 per
The vast middle ground could only

be accused of signing peace petitions for the right to let
their relatives know they were safe and alive.
This mental cruelty, the refusal to report the names of
all prisoners, was consistantly carried out by the Commucent actively resisted.
who had fought the principle of voluntary repatriaon the grounds of the Geneva Convention a document
they had never signed. Thus a prisoner could ease the lingering sorrow of his wife or parents only by signing a "peace
petition" or perhaps taking part in some cheerful radio
broadcast, innocent in its wording but deadly in intent.
This is psychological warfare at its military best. There
was no need for a modern rack or Death of a Thousand
nists,
tion,
Cuts. Actual physical torture "the application of pain so ex-
treme that
as
it is
The
it
it
causes a
defined in U.
man to faint or lose control of his will"

Army documents, was not necessary.
S.
torture was inflicted on their minds. At the same time

must be stated that not one American prisoner was able
CONCLUSION
282
Communist captivity, a record looked upon

with disdain by some critics, and the most degrading point
will be found in the report that 75 American soldiers had
agreed to spy for the Communists, or act as intelligence
agents after their repatriation to the United States and
to escape from
want to return at all!

Whether the varied weapons of psychological warfare
were applied to the enemy is difficult to state, but on the
that twenty-three did not
other side of the coin we find that of the North Koreans

and Chinese captured by troops of the United Nations,
22,000 preferred to stay in non-Communist countries, and
of these who were taken in October of 1953 to the Demilitarized Zone, 15,000 were Chinese, indicating that three out
of every four Chinese captured did not
wish to return to
Communism. This propaganda blow was a shocker and

North Korean and Chinese
"explainers"
had a very
sale defection
Most
officials
difficult
assigned to the roles of
time explaining
from the great advantages
of
this
whole-
Communism.
of the Chinese prisoners elected to go to
new
the
Formosa
under Chiang Kai-shek and the Koreans of

course remained in South Korea. Later on it was admitted
that the United Nations had waged war on the minds of
the prisoners, but "with a different method." There was no
brutality, no brainwashing, no denial of rights, but the Infor a
life
members
Commithad provided radio equipment over which the non-Communist story

was told. In effect, compassion, not cruelty was the chief
weapon of the United Nations' campaign of psychological
dian
of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
tee declared that the United Nations authorities
warfare.
had to cope with the new atomic

development of nuclear weapons has put new
Military intelligence has

age, for the
demands on our
ventions were
Air
Command
attacks"
national strategy.
new and
When
these fantastic in-
costly, the ability of the Strategic
to deliver so-called "destructive retaliatory
on key enemy
cities,
was the primary
factor in
CONCLUSION
283
Pentagon planning. Just so long as fissionable raw material

was scarce, or beyond the economic means of other countries, it was not necessary to give immediate attention to
other possible forms of the atomic weapon, but once nuclear
warheads were available to the tactical forces: in missiles or
conventional artillery shells, additional concepts
for
the
weapons had to be considered.

Today, technological advances have resulted in atomic
weapons that can be recognized by any alert reader of
newspapers or magazines. Their new shells can be fired on
employment
of atomic
enemy troops, against airfields, naunder way or at anchor and against key
the battlefield against

val concentrations
industrial cities
armed
of the
and
their arsenals. Thus, all three branches
services
have been saddled with a
vital
No
longer
is
warfare.
the atomic
ture Hiroshima or
may
and
modern
weapon designed and built for fuNagasaki targets. The next global war
related interest in this frightening form of
again witness the devastation of sprawling industrial
centers by atomic bombs, but we must not presume that

any future campaign will be fought and won by nuclear
bombing
kill,"
alone.
We
learned in
render.
of troops,
II that "overcities,
is
not
bring on immediate suraimed at the concentration

rather than the masonry of their defenses may be
economically sound, nor does
more
World War
the continued pounding of important
more detailed
it
attack,
profitable.
have to
have to
our new atomic weapons,
All this indicates that military intelligence will
accept these
new
conditions
and
specialists will
probe for the ultimate targets for

even though the actual responsibility for "pulling the lanyard" will be in the hands of the theatre commanders.
These target selections will rely much on the intelligence

available through the efforts of the G-2 staff agencies
and
once the bulk of the information has been presented, the

important problem of choosing the targets begins. To what
extent will naval and tactical aviation gunfire be included
in the attack pattern?
How
well can the available nuclear
CONCLUSION
284
warheads be employed to keep the expenditure down?

What point of the over-all target will offer the best reward
for the firepower expended and the shock that results?
In this new military situation then, the importance of
timely information concerning the
accurate,
enemy and
cannot be overrated. Immediate warning concerning the plans of the enemy will play a vital role in
atomic defense, locally as well as over the whole battlefield
his targets
complex. Troops sheltered in the new-type foxholes,

lery properly
dug
in
and concentrations
of tanks
artil-
cannot
always rely on the security of such shelters. The intelligence
must be in a position to flash out swift code warnings to

any threatened area, particularly if full advantage is to be
taken of the atomic defense cover. This may turn out to be
one of the most important roles in future military intelligence operations.
Atomic warfare will tax generalship and higher level planning, as never before, by putting a grim penalty on each
mistake or failure. By the same token it will offer great
rewards for outthinking the opposition.
Modern
electronics play an important role in this
theatre of war. For instance, the
enemy
new
will probably
be
using equipment capable of detecting infrared transmis-
from massed metal bodies, which in turn

movement of mechanical transport. To
simulators which produce the same electronic
tanks, trucks, and other military equipment are
sions radiating
could ferret out the
combat
this,
responses as
set up in strategic positions. The full value of all this can

be appreciated when we realize that today's inventory of
weapons includes nuclear artillery, the special storage sites
for their warheads and the elaborate, if mobile, launching
sites. Thus, any planning intended to deceive in this important field should be widespread and varied. The opposition
may
plies
erect real or false storage sites.
may be moved
activity,
and vice
fake equipment,
Some conventional
sup-
in to give false testimony of nuclear
versa.
Convoys
of conventional or
may be moved under what
even
appears to be
CONCLUSION
285
heavy guard,
in order to provide cover for the
of nuclear warheads, weapons, storage sites,
movement
and launching
equipment.
All this deception
and counterdeception brings
into fo-
From
cus the importance of high-speed signal equipment.
much
hands of today's troops

was designed for the slower pace of World War II, or even
Korea. The present-day mobility and speed, which requires
less and less manpower has proved to be something of a
problem for today's intelligence men and they are having
to revise their earlier concept of radio and wire communications. A tremendous amount of time is being wasted by
today's battlefield intercourse; the coding, decoding, and
verification problems which were important and tolerable
through 1939-45 can no longer be justified. To overcome all
this, new electronic security safeguards must be devised if
the intelligence is to keep pace with the battle action.
all
accounts,
Much
of that
still
of this deception
enemy commander and
is
in the
primarily directed against the
his staff, in the
hopes that
it
will
bewilder his regular intelligence organization and in turn
misguide the commander
who
is
responsible for
all
ultimate
decisions. Again, psychological warfare takes the stage
combat
when
intelligence carefully distributes false information
or supports the intended deception leaked to the
own intelligence channels. Any

depends much on one side's ability to
enemy
through his
success in this
field
predict his en-
emy's probable reaction. But here

self in
not
it is
necessary to put one-
the position of the enemy, to think as he does and
how
the friendly
commander would
react in the
same
contrived situation. Thus, a thorough understanding of the
enemy's culture, traditions, and his military system must be

known. By the same token, since one commander may be
impetuous or overanxious, it is essential to know how much
these factors of character will influence his battlefield deci-
The
must also be able to apply the

enemy's "capability" against his "intent,"
which means a full and reliable account of what he will do
sions.
figures
of
intelligence officer
the
CONCLUSION
286
At times then, it would appear

must be positively clairvoyant.
An excellent example of the necessary co-operation and
full understanding between top command and G-2 intelligence officials will be found in the situation faced by the
American staff just prior to the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944. In this it was erroneously believed that General
Eisenhower knew exactly what General von Rundstedt had
in
any particular
situation.
that the intelligence officer
available opposite the thinned-out line in the Ardennes. It
how the theatre commander, General Omar N.

became involved in a dangerous situation, and
how risks set up through the chain of command, were too
great for lower echelon commanders to handle. Although
Eisenhower and Bradley knew of the tactical situation and
had discussed it freely, consulting the intelligence information available, it was the top commander's responsibility to
assume the risks. The intelligence information clearly defined the risks, pointed out the concentrations of enemy
forces over a seventy-five-mile wide sector, where only three
American divisions were holding the line. But because he
also
shows
Bradley,
through the winter, doing nothing but mainwas a costly waste of time, the
Commander-in-Chief took the long risk. Intelligence had
brought up the warning, but had failed to provide the
enemy's full strength and its true location. Against this, both
Eisenhower and Bradley believed that they had sufficient
felt
that to
sit
taining a holding action,
forces available to harass the
enemy
flanks
if
he decided
to attack through the Ardennes.
The
Battle of the Bulge proved
much
of interest to to-
day's students of military intelligence. For one thing,
proved the unreliability of surface indications.

a startling picture of
how
of the risks involved.
From another
It also
it
gave
top commanders think in terms
lighted the divergence of thinking
and intelligence officers.

True teamwork was utterly
point of view
it
high-
between commanders
lacking. In too many instances

the intelligence officers expressed their personal opinions to
CONCLUSION
top
287
command and under
all this in
made
pressure
attempts to guess;
the face of the fact that they did not
know
the
exact location of the enemy's available strength prior to
move.
his initial
It is
also evident that General Bradley
appreciated the risk and planned to meet
not
know
not provided him with the essentials.
and the
it,
but he did
the the degree of risk, because intelligence
losses totted up,
intelligence estimate
it
When
was asserted
was the product
it
was
all
had
over
that the available
of an individual officer,
than the estimate of a team. By contrast, Von

Rundstedt had searched for a lightly held front and his intelligence had accurately pinpointed the Ardennes and provided accurate figures on American strength and disposi-
rather
His flanks were protected by the Roer River dams

and the casemated defenses of the Siegfried fine. American intelligence had failed to explain that the enemy had
amassed a total of thirty-six divisions in the four Armies
concentrated in that sector, four of which were crack Panzer divisions and three ordinary Panzer divisions. Thus, it
was understandable, and pathetic, that Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley were all trapped in the same net of
faulty information and later admitted that they had greatly
underestimated the German strength. How could they have
done otherwise?
Fortunately Von Rundstedt lacked the resources and retions.
serves necessary to score a vital stroke over the Allied forces,
and
instead, in the face of his
own
reliable intelligence,
wantonly squandered what forces were available to him,

and when he was forced to defend the Rhine, he found
himself too
weak
to fulfill his responsibility.
Germans retreated
forces were tightly con-
Interestingly enough, as soon as the
to their Siegfried line,
where
their
centrated, Allied intelligence found itself cut off from a
Now there
were few if any secretWhen the Germans were fighting on French

or Belgian territory, French patriots and underground operators continually reported every enemy movement and at
great pool of information.
agent reports.
CONCLUSION
288
the same time provided shelter, aid, and protection for

Allied agents.
their
own
Once the Germans were forced back into

among friendly
country, they were operating
people, and the only informers were unreliable traitors,
who were
soon attended to.

be seen from all this that throughout history weapons and their employment have changed but the basic
principles of warfare have not. The internal combustion engine mounted in various vehicles has improved intelligence operations and unshackled them from the limitations
imposed by the speed or stamina of the cavalry mount.
Bows and arrows have been replaced by muskets and automatic rifles, but they have had little influence on the basic
planning of war. Nuclear weapons may modify some of the
It will
accepted principles, but of
this
only time will
tell.
As Emanuel Swedenborg wrote in the eighteenth century:

is no proof of a man's understanding to be able to confirm whatever he pleases; but to be able to discern that
what is true is true, and that what is false is false, this is
the mark and character of intelligence."
"It
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Babington-Smith, Constance. Air Spy. Harper
&
Bros.,
New
York, 1957.
Bergier, Jacques. Secret Weapons, Secret Agents. Hurst
Brome, Vincent. The Spy.
W. W. Norton &
York, 1957.
Bryant, Arthur.
in the West.
Triumph
Co., Inc.,
Doubleday &
New
Co.,
New
Inc.,
.
&
London, 1956.
Blackett,
The
York, 1959.
Turn of the Tide. Doubleday
York, 1957.
Burgess, Alan. Seven
Inc.,
New
Men
Co., Inc.,
at Daybreak. E. P.
New
Dutton & Co.,
York, i960.
My Three Years
New York, 1946.
Butcher, Harry C.
and Schuster,
Churchill,
&
Winston.
Mifflin, Boston,
with Eisenhower. Simon
The Second World War. Houghton
1948-51.
Co.,
New
PT-iog. McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
New
Collier, Richard. 10,000 Eyes.
McGraw-Hill Book
York, 1958.
Donovan, Robert
J.
York, 1961.
Dornberger, Walter. V-2.
Downes, Donald. The
New
The Viking
Press,
New York,
Scarlet Thread. British
1954.
Book Centre,
York, 1953.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Doubleday
York, 1954.
Feldt, Com. Eric A.
Press,
&
New
York, 1948.
Farago, Ladislas. War of Wits.
Co., Inc.,
New
Funk & Wagnalls
Co.,
New
The Coast Watchers. Oxford University
York, 1946.
Fleming, Peter. Operation Sea Lion. Simon and Schuster,
New
York, 1957.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
290
Foote, Alexander.
Handbook
for Spies.
Brown, Watson
Ltd.,
London, i960.
Fuller, Jean Overton.
London, 1958.
Gramont, Sanche
New
de.
Double Web. Putnam &
The Secret War. G.
P.
Co., Ltd.,
Putnam's Sons,
York, 1962.
The German Generals Talk. William

Morrow & Co., New York, 1948.
The Tanks. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York,
Hart, B. H. Liddell.
1959-
Heymont, Irving. Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare.

The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., i960.
Hirsch, Phil. Fighting Generals. Pyramid Publications, Inc.,
New
York, i960.
Chas. F. The Great Events of the Great War. Na-
Home,
tional Alumni, Indianapolis, 1923.

Howarth, David. D-Day. McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Inc.,
New
York, 1959.
Ismay, Lord. Memoirs.
Jullian, Marcel.
The Viking Press, New York, i960.

H.M.S. Fidelity. W. W. Norton & Co., New
York, 1958.
Kennedy,
Sir John.
The Business
of
War. William Morrow &
New
York, 1958.
Landau, Capt. Henry. All's Fair. G. P. Putnam's Sons,
York, 1934.
Co.,
Leasor, James.
War
at the Top. Michael Joseph,
1959Ley, Willy. Rockets, Missiles

Press,
New
Travel.
London,
The Viking
York, 1951.
Martelli, George.
&
and Space
New
The Man
Who
Saved London. Doubleday
New
York, 1961.
Miller, Francis Trevelyan. Photographic History of the Civil
War. Review of Reviews Co., New York, 1906.
Co., Inc.,
Montgomery, Field Marshal, The Memoirs
of.
World Pub-
lishing Co., Cleveland, 1958.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Atlantic Little Brown, Boston,
1 959-6o.
Newman, Bernard. They Saved London. Werner Laurie,
Ltd.,
London, 1952.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
29
Pershing, John J.
erick A. Stokes,
My
Experiences in the World War. Fred-
New
York, 1931.
Reynolds, Quentin. Raid at Dieppe. Random House, Inc.,
New York, 1943.
Rintelen, Captain Von. The Dark Invader. Penguin Books,
London, 1933.
Captain S. W. White Ensign. U. S. Naval Institute,
Annapolis, Md., i960.
Ryan, Cornelius. The Longest Day. Simon and Schuster,
Roskill,
New York, 1959.

Saunders, Hilary St. George. Per Ardua. Oxford University
Press, New York, 1945.
Schellenberg, Walter. Schellenberg. The Harborough Publishing Co., London, 1958.
Shiber, Etta. Paris Underground. Charles Scribner's Sons,
New York, 1943.

Singer, Kurt. Spies
New
Who
Changed
History.
Ace Books,
Inc.,
York, i960.
Sweeney, Walter C. Military Intelligence. Frederick A.

Stokes,
New
York, 1924.
Townsend, Carter E. RISKS, The Key to Combat

gence.
The
Intelli-
Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg,
Pa., 1955.
Tully,
Andrew. The Inside
Story.
William Morrow
&
Co.,
New
York, 1962.
Waldron, T. J. & Gleeson, James.
London, 1959.
Whitehead, Don. The
New
The Frogmen. Evans
F.B.I. Story.
Random House,
Bros.,
Inc.,
York, 1956.
Zacharias, Ellis M. Secret Missions. G. P. Putnam's Sons,
New
York, 1946.
INDEX
Research
Aeronautical
Corp., 109, 111
Air intelligence, 96, 97
Albert,
Sales
Battle of
Raymond, 277
Alexander the Great, 17, 18, 20,

21
Allenby, General Edmund H. H.,
100
Anacostia, U. S. Naval Air Station, 117
Andre, Major John, 22, 24-28
Appleby, Flight Sergeant, 184
Arnold, Benedict, 21-24, 27
Aristagoras, Greek tyrant, 20
Ault. Commander William B.,
148
Babcock, John C., 32
Babington-Smith, Constance, 13,
169, 172, 177
Badoglio, Marshal Pietro, 207,
208
Bailey, Major,
36
88-95
Midway, 154-63
the Bulge, 286, 287
Battle of Jutland, 52,
Battle of
Baumgarten, General Artur von,

165
Beall, Captain John Y., 46
Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T., 42,
43
20
Seaman, 215
Benham, Greg M., 258-61
Berndtson, Lieutenant Arthur H.,
276
Bickley, Dr. George W. L., 45
Bissing, General Baron Moritz
Belisarius, General, 19,
Bell,
von, 59
Booth, John Wilkes, 38
Boyd, Belle, 41, 42

Bradley, General Omar N., 286,
287
Bragg, General Braxton, 35
Brainwashing, 279-81
Bailey, Lieutenant William, 213,
Brantingham,
230, 231
Baker, Mrs. Gladys, 255
276
Braun, Wernher von, 166
Briggs, Sergeant K., 224
Baffin, Albert,
83',
84
Banks, General Nathaniel
Lieutenant
Henry
J.,
P.,
Emperor, 19
Batchelder, Captain Samuel
118
Battle of Britain, 129
41
British Broadcasting Co.,
British
Basiliscus,
L.,
183
Museum, x
Brooke-Popham, Captain Sir H.

R. M., 98
Brown, Major F. Martin, 118
INDEX
293
Brown, Captain Harvey C, Jr.,

118
Browne, Squadron Leader, 123
Brunskill, Seaman, 232
Buchanan, President James, 44
Buckmaster, Captain
163
Elliott, 162,
Bulkeley, Commander J. D., 275

Bulu, Ansin, 244
Burnside, General Ambrose E.,
32
Butcher, Captain Harry
C,
191,
Caesar, Julius, 13-17

Callaghan, Admiral Daniel
Cotton,
W.
D.,
Frederick Sidney,
11, 115,
99
108-
116
Cox, Captain Charles, 117

Crabb, Lieutenant Lionel K.
P.,
213
Crace,
Rear Admiral
John
C,
Cradock, Sir Christopher, 79-81

Cripps, Sir Stafford, 171, 172
Cryptography, 76-79
Culliford, Flight Lieutenant,
J.,
273
Cameron, Lieutenant Donald, 219
Campbell, Lieutenant C. D. M.,
99
Camp
Douglas, 48
Canaris, Captain Wilhelm, 59,
139
Carmichael, Captain G. I., 102

Carrington, General Henry B.,
Cunningham,
Admiral
Browne, 205
Cushman, Miss Pauline, 35
184
Sir
Darlan, Admiral Jean, 202

Davis, President Jefferson, 31, 41,
44
Daymond,
De
Spon,
J.,
242
Commander
F. L., 228,
229
46
ix,
Dieppe, France, 199

Dixon, Commander Robert, 149
Doolittle, General Jas. H., 120,
Minister
141
Dornberger, General Walter R.,
Castellano, General G., 206, 207,
209
Central Intelligence Agency,
106
Chamberlain,
Neville, 122
Prime
Chamier-Glisczinski, General von,

173, 178
Cherbourg, France, 126
Churchill, Sarah, 120
Churchill, Sir Winston,
84,
Corse, Air Mechanic
146, 147
221
60,
Copperheads, 45, 46
Coral Sea, 140, 141
Corbett, Sergeant Boston, 38
112,
135,
195, 198
Clark, General
203, 204
Clay, Clement
168,
51, 83,
177, 188,
Mark W.,
C,
Jr.,
197,
44
Clinton, General Sir Henry, 22,
27
Cole, Captain Charles H.,
Combat intelligence, 52
Commius, 14
Cook, Lieutenant, 18
46
178
Dove, Sub-Lieutenant, 218
Drew, Major General James, 126
Dunkirk, France, 126
Eckener, Hugo, 112
Eisenhower, General D wight D.,
191, 197-200, 205, 207, 209,
220, 286
Evans, Arthur Reginald, 273-75,
277, 278
Admiral
Rear
Evan-Thomas,
Hugh, 92, 93
Enver Pasha, 85
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
ix,
106
INDEX
294
Feldt,
Commander
Eric A., 236,
239, 241, 258, 259

Ferdinand organization,
Ferrier, Signaler,
Harris, Charles A.,
277
Harris, C. G., 252, 254,
235-37
218
Ferte, Captain Joubert de
la, 98
Cyrus W., 25
Fitch, Rear Admiral Aubrey W.,
142, 144
Flame barrage, 138
Fletcher, Rear Admiral Frank J.,
142, 144-50, 159
Freel, Seaman, 218
Fremont, General John Charles,
4i
French, General Sir John, 97, 101
French Frigate Shoals, 158
General Werner von,
Fritsch,
108
Field,
255
Hart, Nancy, 35, 36

Harvey, Major F. J. W., 93
Haushofer, Dr. Karl, 23
Heath, Flight Lieutenant Walter,

110
Heath, General William, 24, 26
Henderson Major Lofton R., 161,
268
Hepburn Board Report, 155

Herterich, "Sailor," 245-47
Heston Airport, England, 109
Hewitt, Admiral Henry K., 121
Highland Division (51st), 127
Himmler, Heinrich, 3
Hines, Captain T. H., 48
Hipper, Admiral Franz von, 90
Hitler, Adolf, 125, 129, 167,
Galland, Adolf, 134

Garrod, Dorothy, 120
Genseric, Vandal king, 18, 19
Field Post Directory, 67
German
Ghormlev, Vice-Admiral Robert

Lee, 117
Girand, General Henri, 202, 203
Goebbels, Joseph Paul, 2, 3
Goering, Hermann, 129, 193
Goto, Rear Admiral Aritomo, 149
Graf Zeppelin, 112
Grandi, Dino, 208
Greeley, Horace, 44, 46
Greenhow, Rose O'Neal, 42, 43
Greenland, Lieutenant, 218
193
Holmes, Colonel, 203, 204
Home Guard, 137, 138
Honolulu, 2
Honolulu Police Department, 9
Hooker, General Joseph, 32
Horton, D. C, 275
Inouye,
Vice-Admiral,
141, 145
Invasion Warning
Shigeyo-
shi,
tee,
Sub-Commit-
136
Jackson, General
Thomas
J.,
35,
42
Jagow, Gottlieb von, 56
41,
Haig, General Sir Douglas, 101

Hale, Nathan, 25, 26
Halsey, Admiral William F., 159
Hamilton, Lieutenant Commander
Weldon
L.,
C.
E.,
227
Rear Admiral Tadaichi,
150
Hargreaves, Lieutenant H., 232,
233
Harries, Lieutenant Commander
Hara,
J.
L, 228
Admiral
John
R.,
85,
89-94
Jervis, C.
148
Hammond, Commander
James, Clifton, 191

Jellicoe,
Jeschonek,
C, 242
General
Hans,
173,
178
Jewell, Lieutenant N. L. A.,
204
General Joseph J. C, 99
Johnson, President Andrew, 38
Joffre,
Johnson's Island, 46
Jordan, Colonel Thomas, 42
Joshua, 11-13
INDEX
295
Kalama, Hawaii, 7
Kalle, Captain von, 59
Kegelman, Captain Chas. S., 197
Kelly, Captain Howard, 87
Kennedy, Donald C, 274
Kennedy, Lieutenant John F.,
276-78
King, Admiral Ernest
J.,
154
Kita, Nagao, 8, 9
Knights of the Golden Circle, 45
Koeltz, General Louis M., 203
Koenig, Colonel Egmont F., 118
Koller, General, 189
Kondo, Vice-Admiral Nobutake,
157
Korean War, 279
Kron, Major von, 59
Kuehn, Dr. Bernard J. O., 3-10
Kuehn, Frau Friedel, 5-10
Kuehn, Hans Joachim, 3, 6
Kuehn, Leopold, 2, 11
Kuehn, Ruth, 2-10
Kyle, A. F., 258-61
Landau, Captain Henry, 62-73

Lapeyrere, Admiral Boue de, 86
Laws, Sergeant F. C. V., 99
Leary, Admiral Herbert F., 147
Lee, General Robert E., 33, 41
Lemnitzer,
Colonel
Lyman
L.,
McGuire, John E., 277

Mackie, Lieutenant J. H., 262
McLeod, Captain Campbell, 54,
55
McMahon,
Patrick,
277
MacMillan, Harold, 207

McNarney, General Joseph T.,
*97> 198
McParlan, James, 31
McPherson, Flying Officer Andrew, 112
Majorian, Emperor, 18
Mapplebeck, Lieutenant G. W.,
98, 102
Marchant, W. S., 261
Marie (Belgian agent), 71, 72
Marney, Harold, 277
Marshall, General George C, 197
Marumo, Admiral Kuniori, 148
Mason, John, 261
Mason, Paul, 262, 264, 266, 268,
270, 272, 273
Mast, General Charles, 203
Mata Hari (Margarete Gertrud
ix,
13,
54-62
Medmenham, England,
116, 194
Ley, Willy, 165

Library of Congress, x
Lincoln, President Abraham, 31,
117, 119,
120, 168
Meurisse, M., 98
Milch, Air Marshal Erhard, 110
Military Intelligence Directorate,
38
Lindbergh,
Gooder-
Macfarlan, Lieutenant D. S., 261

MacFarlane, General Frank, 190
Zelle),
203
Lend Lease,
McColl, J. H., 243

McCormick,
Captain
ham, 117
McDonald, J. H., 260
Colonel Charles A.,
133
Lockheed 12-A, 109

Long, Captain R. B. M., 236, 239
Luftwaffe, 108, 133, 134
136
Military maps, 107
Milne, Admiral Sir C. B., 85, 86
Mitchell, Brigadier General William, 104
Lieutenant
Luxembourg, 73
Mitoya,
MacArthur,
Sesu, 161
Mitscher, Captain
General
Douglas,
273
McCarthy, Keith, 250-56
McClellan, General George
31. 32
197,
B.,
Commander
Marc A., 159

Montgomery, Field Marshal Viscount, 11, 209
Moore-Brabazon,
T.
C, 99
Lieutenant
J.
INDEX
29 6
Moran, Captain E. J., 275

Morison, Samuel Eliot, 263
Peenemiinde, 165-72
Petterson, Hans, 248, 250
Morrisac, Pierre de, 61

Morrison, Herbert, 187
Morton, General Oliver P., 46
Pigeons, courier, 74, 75

Pinkerton, Allan, 30-32, 42
Place, Lieutenant Basil C.
Mosby, John
S.,
Moses, 11
Lieutenant
G.,
219
39
Commander
Porterfield, John, 47
Port Moresby, New Guinea, 140,
Nagumo, Vice-Admiral Tadaichi,
144
Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley, 135
Pye, Vice-Admiral William S.,
159. 160
Mould,
S., 227, 228

J.
Murphy, Robert, 202
8, 157
France,
Neuve-Chapelle,
101,
102
Newall, Air Marshal Sir Cyril,
109
Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 155,
159, 160, 162
Niven, Robert, 109
Norstad, General Lauris, 118
Nowak, Captain Jan, 177
Nuneham Courtney, England,
119
Obrebski,
Stanislaw,
174,
176,
178, 179
Operation Husky, 204, 205

Operation Mincemeat, 191
Operation Overlord, 220
Operation Sea Lion, 119,
Radar
stations,
Com-
112
Rafal (Polish patriot), 176, 181-
85
Rahab, 12, 13
Read, Jack, 262, 263, 268, 270,
272, 273
Reeves, Lieutenant Colonel Quentin, 216
Rhoades, F. A., 267
Robertson, Seaman A., 233
Commander Joseph
Rochefort,
j- 156
Roosevelt, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott,
125,
128, 139
Operation Sledgehammer, 199
Operation Torch, 119, 190, 192,
193, 200
Oppenheim, Colonel, 66
Order of the American Knights,
45
Order of the Sons of Liberty, 45,
47
"P" Parties, 226
Page, Cornelius Lyons, 243-50
Pan American Airways, 155
Patron, General George S., 192
Paulding, John, 27
Payne, Louis, 37, 38
Pearl Harbor, 1-10
Quackenbush, Lieutenant
mander Robert S., 117
120
Roosevelt, President Franklin D.,
199
Rosecrans,
General
William
S.,
35
Ross, Ensign
J.,
277
Royal Air Force, 13

Royal Flying Corps, 97, 102
Royal Naval Air Service, 102
Rumsey, Sub-Lieutenant I. A.
P.,
233'
Salmond, Major W. G. H., 98
Samejima, Admiral Tomoshige,
276
Sanders, General Otto
Liman
85
Sandys. Duncan, 169
Sarnaki (village), 180
von,
INDEX
297
Saunders, Hilary
St.
George, 98
Savo Island, 144

Scheer, Admiral Reinhard,
89-
94
Schroeder, E., 267
Seward, William H., 33, 38
Shannon,
Lieutenant
Colonel
Harold D., 155
214; Qween Marc/, 93;

Repulse,
Southampton,
147;
95; Spitfire, 95; Thunderbolt,
211; Valiant, 214; Vulture, 23,
beth,
26
French:
Ships,
34
219; Breslau,
Dresden, 82; Elbing,
95; Frauenlob, 95; Gneisenau,
79-82; Goeben, 52, 85; Leipzig, 82; Magdeburg, 89; Nas-
cago, 146; Enterprise, 160; Farragut, 147; Gwin, 162; Hammann, 162; Honolulu, 160;
Hornet, 160, 161; Indianapolis,
Hawk,
Barenfels,
113;
52,
Shean, Lieutenant Max, 219

Sherman, Captain Frederick C,
152
Sherman, General William T., 47
Shields, General James, 41
Ships, American: Astoria, 144,
161; Augusta, 120, 121; Benham, 163; Chester, 144; Chi-
86;
-sfl,
EifeZ
79-82; Tirpitz, 219; Von

der Tann, 93; Wiesbaden, 94
Gondar,
212;
Italian:
Ships,
Irate, 212; Scire, 212; Vimina,
horst,
218
Afcagi, 161:
Japanese:
Amagiri, 177; Hin/u, 161; Kaga,
161; Kashima, 141; Kikuzuki,
143; Mlkuma, 161; Mogami,
161; SZioZio, 148, 149; Sho-
Ships,
Simard,
143, 145, 148, 150, 151, 153,
155
160-62
Ships, Australian: Australia, 146;
Hobart, 146; Lakatoi, 255, 256
Campania, 90-92;
Denbydale,
Durham, 213; Fiona
Ships, British:
Canopus,
213;
SneZZ, 213;
gow,
Good
79-81;
Galatea, 92; GlasGloucester, 87;
79-82;
Hope,
79-80;
Imber,
214; Indefatigable, 93; Inflexible, 81, 82; Invincible, 81, 82,

94; Kenf, 81, 82; Lion, 92, 93;
Monmouth, 79, 80; Otranto,
79; Prince of Wales, 147; Princess Royal, 93; Queen Eliza-
Niirnburg, 81, 82;

95; Posen, 95; Prinz
ScharnFriedrich, 82;
95;
Pommern,
156; Lexington, 142, 145, 148, 151-53;

Louisville, 160; Massachusetts,
121; Michigan, 46; Minneapolis, 143; Nashville, 160; Navajo,
162; Neosho, 142; Netc Orleans, 143; Phelps, 153; PniZo
Parsons, 46, 47; Ranger, 121;
Russell, 142; Sf. Louis, 160;
Vireo,
162; Yorktown,
142,
160; Kitty
120,
German: Admiral Scheer,
Ships,
Sharpe, Colonel George H., 32-
/eon Barf,
121
161;
Son7>
!54;
143; Zai-
149-51,
JcaJcn,
Tama Mara,
fcafcu, 149, 150, 154

Ships, Swedish: Gripsholm, 11
Siegfried line, 115,
287
Commander
Cyril
T.,
Smith, Lieutenant H. B., 37~39

Smith, Joshua Hett, 26
Smith, General Walter Bedell
190, 208, 221
Souchon, Admiral von, 86, 87
Spee. Admiral Maximilian von,
79-81
Speer, Albert, 187
Spender, Michael, 115, 116
Rear Admiral
159
Stalin, Joseph, 193
Stansbury, Joseph, 22
Spruance,
mond
Stanton,
Starkey,
A.,
Edmund
M., 34
Raymond, 277
Ray-
INDEX
298
Lieutenant Colonel, 36
Steeple Morden, England, 120
Stefan (Polish patriot), 174-79
Starr,
Steffen, Major, 73-75

Stephenton, Flight Lieutenant D.
W., 167
Strategic Air
Command, 282
Strategic intelligence, 52
neth
General Ken-
Brigadier
Strong,
W.
D.,
207
Strussler, Nicholas,
Sturdee,
Admiral
222
Sir
V-i bomb, 164-72

Vallandigham, Clement L., 45
Van Wart, Isaac, 27
Vial, L. G., 242
Volusenus, Caius, 13-16
Vouza, Police Officer, 267, 268
Doveton,
Wainwright,
81
Judge Jeremiah, 44
Swann, Captain Oliver, 91
Sylt, Island of, 122, 123
Szajer, Flying Officer, 184
Sullivan,
Tadeusz
(Polish
patriot),
174-
79
Takagi, Vice-Admiral Takeo, 144
Talaat Pasha, 85
Tallmadge, Major Benjamin, 26
Talmage, Jack, 245, 247, 249,

250
Tanabe, Commander Yahachi,
162
Tanaka, Rear Admiral Raizo, 157
Lieutenant Commander
Joseph, 143, 151
Tesi, Sub-Lieutenant T., 211
Theobald, Rear Admiral Robert
Taylor,
A.,
United States Naval Intelligence,

4, 10
United States Intelligence Service, 50
Jonathan
Wangenheim, Baron von, 85

Warrand, Lieutenant A. M., 102
Washington, General George, 22,
27
Washington Naval Conference,
104
Wavell, General Sir Archibald
P.,
136
Wells, Sumner, 195
Westmacott, Lieutenant
H.
P.,
219
Weygand, General Maxime, 127

Wilhelm, Crown Prince, 56
Wilhelmshaven, 111-13
Williams, Flying Officer, 184
Williams, David, 27
Wilson, President Woodrow, 116
Winterbotham, Frederick, 108,
109, 114
160
Thiel, Doctor,
General
M., 145
170
Thorn, Ensign Leonard J., 277

Thomas, Lieutenant Hugh Hamshaw, 100, 123
Thompson, Jacob, 44-46

Thomson, Sir Basil Home, 59
Togo, Shigenori, 9
Toschi, Sub-Lieutenant E., 211,
212
Train watching, 62-68
Wlodek (Polish patriot), 183-85

Women's Auxilary Air Force,
118
Woods, Seaman M. H., 229, 230

Worthy, Seaman, 218
Wright, Captain Jerauld, 203
Wright, Wilbur, 98
Yamamoto, Admiral
156-58
Yoshikawa, Takeo,
Isoroku.
7, 8,
8,
11
Tulagi, 143, 144
Tupling, W. L., 243

Turkey, 85
Tutde,
frey,
Wing Commander Geof116
Zacharias, Rear Admiral Ellis M.,
76
Zanessa, General, 209
Zeppelins, 90, 95
F38

Espionage and Counterespionage

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Espionage and Counterespionage

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE

Books by Arch Whitehouse.

Hell in the Heavens

Subs and Submariners

Squadrons of the Sea

Heroes and Legends of World War I

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 64-IQ221

served sans honor, decorations, or

Espionage at Pearl Harbor

Spies of the Revolution.

The Early Operatives

Confederate Secret Service.

The Legend of Mrs.

Spies in the Skies.

The Goeben-Breslau Fiasco

Fighting Blind at Jutland

Planning in the Dark

Operation Sea Lion

Admiral Crace's Dilemma

Stage Fright or Buck Fever

The Search for the Buzz Bomb

The Flying Bomb

The Whys and Wherefores

Enter the Frogmen

The Great Chariot Race

The Intelligence of Ferdinand

the story of military intelligence told from the point

men and women

trained to penetrate "the

not a record of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, or any peace-

time security organization, but the everyday operations of

contributed to their country's military cam-

all parts of the world. Some gained high awards

typical of this group.

phase of military activity

mystery, or burdened with contrived situations than the

seldom has been presented objectively;

yet the profession

The people involved

are not mental geniuses

or physical marvels, they are simply adults blessed with

Most are trained

a career of the work, though

temporarily in certain active assign-

all fit a standard pattern and have

ments. But one and

professional intelligence agent

adventurer; certainly never a spy in the general acceptance

interpret information that

undertake a secret mission, for their job

most important journeys are made to

tine channels. Their

Washington, or the British

card. Their personal stories

in London but most

are usually the lot of the zealous amateurs,

find themselves in critical or

intriguing adventures in military intelligence

moment. They are inexplicably drawn

any military service. If caught, spies are almost always

provides the drama, the action, and the re-

through most of these pages.