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1. PEOPLE VS. DELIMA, G.R. No.

L-18660, December 22,1922


ROMULADEZ, J.:
FACTS:
A policeman named Felipe Delima was looking for a fugitive named Lorenzo Napilon. The
policeman found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the
shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender but the latter answered with a stroke of his lance.
The policeman dodged it and the act of the criminal forced the former to impose his authority to
fire his revolver. The criminal was not hit and ran away, without parting with his weapon as the
peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time inflicting the mortal blow.
The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalties. He appealed to reverse the judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the killing is a justifying circumstance to release the accused from criminal
liability.
HELD:
Yes. The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
The injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance
of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an
extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.
Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code, which is now Art.11, par.5 of the Revised Penal Code is
being considered. Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby acquitted with the
costs de oficio.

2. PEOPLE VS. BARROGA, G.R. No. L-31563, January 16,1930


ROMULADEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Luciano Barroga admitted that he prepared the falsified documents with full knowledge of their
falsity in obedience to an order from the now deceased Baldomero Fernandez, but later on found
out, that such order was not supplied by the deceased, but by the pressmen head, Hermenegildo
Dela Cruz.
The accused was convicted of the crime of falsification of a private document and appealed from
the judgment sentencing him to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional with indemnification in the sum of P10,857.11 to the Compania General de Tabacos
de Filipinas as subsidiary imprisonment. The appellant argued that aside from the insufficiency
of evidence of the prosecution, there are also errors in considering such.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obedience to such order is a justifying circumstance that will release the
accused from criminal liability.
HELD:
No. One who prepared a falsified document with full knowledge of its falsity is not excused even
if he merely acted in obedience to the instruction of his superior, because the instruction was not
for a lawful purpose. According to Art. 11, par. 6 of the Revised Penal Code, to be justified and
not be held criminally liable, the obedience to an order issued should be for some lawful purpose.
When the order is not for a lawful purpose, the subordinate who obeyed it is criminally liable.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

3. PEOPLE VS. MARGEN, et.al., G.R. No. L-2681, March 30, 1950
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
The now deceased Diego Testor, in need of food for his children, traded the fish for camote and
he was sent for the Sergeant Margen to make him to the barracks a quantity of another kind of
fish, called kalapion. The accused was irritated by the conduct of the deceased as he threw the
fish into the latters face and had his hands tied behind his back and gave him blows. Following
their sergeant, three soldiers namely, Julian Tarravo, Domingo Ramos (now deceased), and
appellant Andres Midoranda, also maltreated Testor. Margen also forced Testor to eat two of the
kalapions. Despite medical attendance, Testor died the following day and autopsy revealed that
death was intestinal obstruction due to the fish bones
The defendants were prosecuted for murder. The herein appellant said that he did not join his
companions in maltreating the deceased but his own witness, Eleuterio Anabeso, admitted on
cross-examination that appellant took part of the act. Counsel for the defense argued that, in the
absence of proof of conspiracy, appellant should not be held liable for the said crime because he
merely obeyed the orders of his superior.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obedience to such order is a justifying circumstance that will release the
accused from criminal liability.
HELD:
No. Art. 11, par. 6, being considered, obedience to an order of a superior is justified only when
the order is for some lawful purpose. The order to torture the deceased was illegal, and the
accused was not bound to obey it. Having taken direct part in the unlawful acts which resulted in
the death of the deceased and nothing having been proved which would exempt him from
criminal liability, appellant must be held as coprincipal of the crime of murder changed in the
information. The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant.

4. VALCORZA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. L-28129, October 31, 1969


DIZON, J.:
FACTS:
The deceased Roberto Pimentel, a prisoner detained to answer a charge of stealing a chicken,
escaped which the appellant was the police guard on duty. To bring the fugitive back to jail, a
police patrol team composed of Sgt. Federico Daiton, patrolmen Melquuiades Canas, Pablo
Lubido, and the appellant himself went to Poultry Area in Cuya, Maramag, Bukidnon, where the
accused had been reported to be hiding. The next day, Daiton went to a nearby bridge and saw a
person approaching slowly and ordered him to halt but the latter jumped down into the creek. For
the possibility that the person jumped could be the fugitive, Daiton yelled for his companions
and they went to the creek to chase him. Pimentel emerged suddenly and hit appellant with a
stone at the right cheek and when the latter was on the ground, the former again struck him.
Fearing that the fugitive may not be arrested, appellant fired four times into the air while
pursuing the lawbreaker and inflicted a mortal blow because the offender was in the act of again
jumping down.
Elias Valcorza is declared guilty of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation and, accordingly, he is sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the
accessories of the law; to pay the heirs of the deceased, Roberto Pimentel, in the sum of six
thousand pesos (P6,000.00), together with the costs.
The petitioner claimed that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors:
a. Holding that petitioner although in the performance of his duty as peace officer was not
justified in shooting the deceased because there was no danger to his life or limb.
b. Liking petitioner to a trigger-happy policeman and in holding that the deceased has not
shown to be a dangerous person, a ruling which is contrary to its finding of facts;
c. Not acquitting the petitioner based on the facts in relation to article 11, paragraph 5 of the
revised penal code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the killing is a justifying circumstance to release that will release the accused
from criminal liability.
HELD:
Yes. Considering Art. 11, par. 5, the killing was done in the fulfillment of duty or exercise of
right or office. The acts of the deceased, in violation of law, such as escaping from detention,
running away when ordered to stop by a peace officer and assaulting of an officer would suffice
that the act of the accused was committed in the performance of his official duty. Supreme Court
said that to hold the accused guilty may have effect the of demoralizing police officers when they
encounter the same situation. Citing also People vs. Delima, Petitioner is acquitted.

5. PEOPLE VS. PAJENADO, et.al., G.R. No. L-26458 January 30, 1976
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
FACTS:
There was a celebration party at the house of Constancio Pajenado in Dapdap, Las Navas, Samar
and at the height of the festivities, Mayor Jolejole commented that the deceased Jorge Tapong
was already drunk and should be brought home. Teofilo Jorda then ordered two of his barrio
policemen to help in taking Tapong to the house of his cousin. While on their way, five armed
men suddenly emerged and beated Tapong. Jorda witnessed the crime and blew his whistle but
the accused did not heed him as they ran away after the deceased fell down. Tapong was dead on
arrival.
On the other hand, one accused name Antonio Toling admitted responsibility for the injuries
inflicted on the deceased and denied that his other co-accused took part in the crime. He claimed
that he acted in lawful performance of a duty or office being a barrio policeman. He stated that
Tapong was asking why he was taken from the party and came to know that his actions were
shameful to the mayor, that caused him to be angry and to get a bolo. Toling said that he was
only complying with the said order of the barrio captain to disarm the deceased. Toling ran away
from the scene of the crime and just reported to the police the following morning.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the killing is a justifying circumstance that will release the accused from criminal
liability.
HELD:
No. Under Art. 11, par. 5, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There is no legal basis to justify Tolings action.
His claim that he is a barrio policeman is not believable as the appointment of such position by a
Municipal Mayor is null and void since a mayor does not have the authority to do such act. Also,
running away from the scene of the crime is indicative of guilt and it is an unnatural action that
negates and renders improbable the claim that he was acting in the fulfillment of a duty. The
crime committed is murder qualified by treachery.

6. PEOPLE vs. OANIS, et.al., G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Police officers Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta, the appellants, and two others were called by
the Police Inspector Godofredo Monsod to arrest an escaped convict named Anselmo Balagtas
and to follow the telegram received from Major Guido which reads information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive
if the fugitive try to resist. The appellants went to the house of Irene and saw her in her room a
man sleeping with her. Upon seeing the man, the defendants successively fired at him but it
turned out that an innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson and not Balagtas was the one fatally
hit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the killing is a justifying circumstance that will release the accused from criminal
liability.
HELD:
No. To invoke Art.11, par.5 of the Revised Penal Code as a defense, there are two requisites to be
observed:
a. That the offender acted in the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or
office.
b. That the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the performance of
a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office.
Only the first requisite is present as they acted in the performance of their duty. But the second
requisite is wanting since the crime committed is not the necessary consequence of such
performance. Through impatience or over-anxiety, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such
duty by killing the person whom they believed to be the fugitive without any resistance from him
and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. The appellants are convicted with the
crime of murder.

7. PEOPLE VS. TENGYAO, G.R. No. L-14675, November 29, 1961


PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
Agustin Tengyao, a guard in the provincial jail of Bontoc, was assigned to watch the prisoners
Villamor Pagarigan and Pais Palaoay, who had been told to cut grass for feed of the carabaos
owned by the provincial government. Pagarigan asked the appellants permission to defecate,
which the latter granted. The former went to a place where the appellant could see him but
afterwards the latter noticed that the former had disappeared from sight. Appellant followed the
path of the footprints and saw the deceased running away. Upon seeing the fugitive, he ordered
him to stop and when the latter refused he fired a warning shot. During the pursuit, the accused
hit the deceased in the leg and when the latter attempted to jump, the former mortally wounded
him in the back.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the killing is a justifying circumstance that will release the accused from criminal
liability.
HELD:
No. His act of shooting and killing the victim is unjustified. He had already wounded the victim
on the thigh while at a distance and the wound the latter had sustained would have made it
difficult for him to run away because he would have limped. There was no absolute necessity to
fire again resulting in the death of the prisoner as he could then easily be captured. The crime
committed by the appellant is homicide.

8. PAERA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011


CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Santiago Paera, punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, limited the use of
communal water by his constituents. Despite petitioners scheme, Indalecio Darong continued
drawing water from the tank. Petitioner reminded Indalencio of the water distribution scheme
and cut Indalencios access. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly
disconnected and without any warning, he picked up his bolo and gave grave threats to the
family members of Indalencio. The petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act committed is a justifying circumstance that will release the accused from
criminal liability.
HELD:
No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the
5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of office. Arguably,
petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to ensure delivery of basic services when he
barred the Darongs access to the communal water tank. Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the
bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening
harm on their persons, for violating his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due
discharge of his office lay before petitioner and his resort to any of them would have spared him
from criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions outside of the ambit of criminally
immune official conduct.

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