Topic: Quieting of title

Case Title: Coronel v IAC

Date: October 29, 1987
Ponente: J. Gutierrez
Legal Doctrine:
Liquidation shall happen before a partner may claim his
share of profit from the partnership.
Facts:
Petitioner Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of
possession of a parcel of land registered in his name against
the private respondents. Coronel alleged that at the time he
purchased the subject parcel of land, the private respondents
were already occupying a portion thereof as tenants at will
and that despite demands to vacate the premises, the
defendants failed and refused to move out of the land.
In the defendants answer, they denied that Coronel was the
owner of the whole parcel of land and alleged that the lots
occupied by them form part of the 1/3 undivided share of the
respondents who are brothers which they inherited from
their dead father; that the Merlan brothers (respondents)
together with their siblings never sold their undivided 1/3
share of the lot to anybody, and that it was actually their
other co-heirs who sold their undivided portions and that the
plaintiffs (Coronel) claim of ownership of the whole parcel
of land is fraudulent, void, and without effect; and that the
Merlans have always been in open and peaceful possession
of their undivided share of the lot throughout the years from
the first sale by their co-heirs and that the other defendants
are legitimate tenants. They prayed that the plaintiff respect
their rights over 1/3 of the subject lot.
In their Third-Party Complaint, the defendants charged that
the third-party defendants, owners of the remaining portion
of the lot, defrauded them when they sold the entire parcel.
The third-part defendants denied they had something to do
with the fraudulent acts which deprived the defendants of
their share in the subject parcel of land, and that what they
sold was only their 2/3 undivided shares in said parcel. They
also filed a cross-claim against their co-defendant Mariano
Manalo whom they charged might have connived with
others including the plaintiff to deprive the defendants and
their co-heirs of their share in the subject parcel of land.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of the private respondents to
the land in question is barred by the statute of limitation or
by prescription.
Held: NO.
Ratio: The private respondents never sold their 1/3 share
over the subject lot; and that what their co-owners sold to
the petitioners predecessor-in-interest was really only just
the 2/3 share. However there was a mistake or oversight,
possibly in the Register of Deeds, because the title issued to
the petitioners predecessor in-interest was for the WHOLE
LOT (instead of just the 2/3).
Moreover, private respondents were in open, peaceful and
adverse possession of their 1/3 share over the lot even after
1950 when the first sale of the lot took place. The first time
they knew about petitioners claim over the whole lot was
when they were served a copy of his complaint in 1975.
Petitioner contends there was undue delay on the part of the
private respondents to claim their 1/3 portion of the Lot that
the action for annulment should have been brought within
four (4) years (Art. 1391, New Civil Code) counted from the
date of the registration of the instrument.
The counterclaim of the private respondents which was in
effect a reconveyance to them of their 1/3 undivided share
over the lot has not prescribed. As lawful possessors and

owners of the lot in question their cause of action falls

within the settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title
to property in one's possession is imprescriptible; their
undisturbed possession over a period of more than 25 years
gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and the effect of his own title. If at all, the private
respondents' right, to quiet title, to seek reconveyance and to
annul the TCT accrued only in 1975 when they were made
aware of a claim adverse to their own. It was only at that
time that, the statutory period of prescription may be said to
have commenced to run against them.
In the same manner, there is no bar based on laches to assert
their right over 1/3 of the disputed property. "Laches has
been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it." The facts of the case show that the private
respondents have always been in peaceful possession of the
1/3 portion of the subject lot, exercising ownership thereto
for more than 25 years disrupted only in 1975 when the
petitioner tried to remove them by virtue of his torrens title
covering the entire Lot.
Petitioner, though a purchaser in good faith, it is undeniable
that the 1/3 undivided portion of the private respondents
over the Lot was mistakenly included in the TCT of Mariano
Manalo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest).
Thus, for equitable considerations:
There is, however, a countervailing doctrine, certainly
not of lesser weight, that mitigates the harshness of the
iron-clad application of the principle attaching full faith
and credit to a Torrens certificate. It is inspired by the
highest concept of what is fair and what is equitable. It
would be a sad day for the law if it were to be oblivious
to the demands justice. The acceptance accorded the
Torrens system of registration would certainly be
impaired if it could be utilized to perpetrate fraud and
chicanery. If it were thus, then no stigma would attach to
a claim based solely on a narrow and literal reading of a
statutory prescription, devoid of any shadow of moral
right. That is not the juridical norm as recognized by
this Court. Deceit is not to be countenanced; duplicity is
not to be rewarded. Witness the favor with which
jurisprudence has looked on the action for reconveyance
as well as the recognition of the constructive trust. There
is thus the stress of rectitude.
Furthermore, The simple possession of a certificate of
title, under the Torrens System, does not necessarily
make the possessor a true owner of all the property
described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the
Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight
land which cannot be registered under the Torrens
systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included.
Thus, respondents ownership over the 1/3
portion of the Lot is recognized.

CARAGAY-LAYNO v.
CA
Dec. 26, 2014
Melencio-Herrera, J.

Krissy

SUMMARY: After discovering a discrepancy

between the Inventory of Properties of
deceased Mariano and his OCT in the area of
the estate, Salvador, the administrator,
proceeded to the disputed property and
discovered petitioner Juliana occupying the
same. Salvador demanded that she vacate but
she refused, asserting ownership and
possession of the same for a long period of
time. Salvador filed a suit to recover the
property. Juliana sought that the property be
reconveyed to her. She also claimed that there
was fraud in the inclusion of the property in the
OCT. The
RTC and CA awarded the property to Salvador.
SC reversed and ruled that there was no fraud.
Juliana was entitled to the property.
DOCTRINE: Mere possession of a certificate of
title under the Torrens System is not conclusive
as to the holders true ownership of all the
property described therein for he does not, by
virtue of said certificate alone, become the
owner of the land illegally included. A Land
Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree
a lot to persons who have put no claim in it and
who have never asserted any right of ownership
over it. The Land Registration Act as well as the
Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title
in good faith and does not permit its provisions
to be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the
expense of another.
FACTS: Salvador Estrada, nephew and
administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased Mariano De Vera, instituted a suit
against Juliana Caragay-Layno for the recovery
of a portion (3732 sq. m.) of sugar and coconut
land (total area indicated in OCT: 8752 sq. m.)
located at Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Juliana and decedent, Mariano, were first
cousins, both orphans, who lived together in the
care of a common aunt. As prior Administratrix,
Marianos widow filed in the Special Proceeding
an Inventory of all of Marianos properties,
including a parcel of land in Calasiao with an
area of 5417 sq. m. Because of a discrepancy in
area mentioned in the Inventory and that in the
OCT, Salvador repaired to the Disputed
Property. He found that it was occupied by
petitioners Juliana and Benito Layno. Salvador
demanded that they vacate the lot because it
was titled in the name of
Mariano. Petitioners refused, claiming that the
land belonged to them and, before them, to
Julianas father, Juan Caragay.
Juliana claims that the disputed portion had
been fraudulently or mistakenly included in the
OCT so that an implied or constructive trust
existed in her favor.
RTC: Salvador entitled to recover possession of
the disputed portion. Petitioners ordered to
vacate the same.
CA: Affirmed. Although Sec. 102 of Act 496
allows a Petition to compel a trustee to
reconvey a registered land to the cestui que

trust, this remedy is no longer available to

Juliana. Marianos land was registered on Sept.
11, 1947 and it was only on March 28, 1967
when Jualiana filed her answer that she sought
the reconveyance of the disputed land. Thus,
her claim for reconveyance prescribed after 10
years. Marianos OCT has become indefeasible.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the absence of fraud in the inclusion
of the property in the OCT destroys the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
2. Whether Juliana was entitled to
reconveyance.
RULING:
1. No
2. Yes. First, Juliana and her father had been in
actual, open, continuous and uninterrupted
possession in the concept of an owner of the
disputed portion for about 45 years. Second,
Mariano and his successors-in-interest are guilty
of laches. Third, Julianas property had not yet
passed into the hand of third parties.
RATIO:
1. Juliana: There was fraud in the inclusion of
the disputed portion in the OCT. During his
lifetime, Mariano borrowed from her the tax
declaration of her land purportedly to be used
as collateral for his loan and sugar quota
application.
Relying on her cousins assurances, she
acceded to his request and was made to sign
some documents of which she did not even
know because she was an unlettered woman.
She discovered the fraudulent inclusion only in
1966 when Salvador so informed her and
sought to eject them.
SC: Fraud was unsubstantiated. The disputed
portion was erroneously included in the OCT.
Deducting the area of the disputed portion from
the area of the entire lot, the difference is 5020
sq. m. which closely approximates 5147 sq.m.
indicated in the Inventory of Property of
Mariano. The widow by limiting the area in said
inventory in effect recognized and admitted
that the disputed portion did not form part of
the decedents estate.
Mere possession of a certificate of title under
the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the
holders true ownership of all the property
described therein for he does not, by virtue of
said certificate alone, become the owner of the
land illegally included. A Land Registration
Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to
persons who have put no claim in it and who
have never asserted any right of ownership
over it. The Land Registration Act as well as the
Cadastral
Act protects only the holders of a title in good
faith and does not permit its provisions to be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or
that one should enrich himself at the expense of
another.
2. The disputed portion was originally
possessed openly, continuously and
uninterruptedly in the concept of an owner by
Juan and had been declared in his name under a

tax declaration beginning with the year 1921.

Upon the demise of her father, in 1914(?),
Juliana adjudicated the property to herself as his
sole heir in 1958 and declared it in her name
under a tax declaration beginning with the year
1959. Realty taxes were religiously paid from
1938 to 1972. Juliana and her father had been
in actual, open, continuous and uninterrupted
possession in the concept of owner for about 45
years, until said possession was disturbed in
1966 when Salvador informed her that the
property was registered in Marianos name.
For 20 years from the date of registration of title
(1947) to when this suit was instituted (1967),
neither Mariano up to the time of his death in
1951, nor his successors-in-interest, had taken
steps to possess/lay adverse claim to the
disputed portion, hence they may be said to be
guilty of laches.
The remedy of the landowner whose property
has been wrongfully/erroneously registered in
anothers name is, after 1 year from the date of
the decree, not to set aside the decree, but,
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and
no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary
action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance, or, if the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for damages.
Prescription cannot be invoked against Juliana
because, as lawful possessor and owner of the
disputed portion, her cause of action for
reconveyance, which, in effect, seeks to quiet
title to property, falls within the settled rule that
an action to quiet property in ones possession
is imprescriptible. One who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be
owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right. Her undisturbed
possession for 52 years gave her a continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a
3rd party and the effect on her own title.
Besides, her right to quiet title, to seek
reconveyance and to annul the OCT accrued
only in 1966 when she was made aware of a
claim adverse to her own.
DISPOSITIVE: CA judgment reversed and set
aside.
Salvador ordered to cause segregation of the
disputed portion occupied by Juliana and to
reconvey the same to her.
Register of Deeds ordered to issue a new
certificate of title covering the area of the
disputed portion in favor of Juliana and the
remaining area in another certificate of title in
favor of the estate of Mariano.

Rumarante v. Hernandez
GR No. 168222, 18 April 2006, Ynares-Santiago,
J.
Law 102 Property

FACTS
Rumarates Version of the Facts

Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and

cultivated by Teodulos godfather, who was a
bachelor and used to live with the Rumarate
family.
Teodulos family, together with his godfather,
moved to avail of the land distribution in
Catimo, Quezon.
As a result, Santiago Guerrero (godfather)
occupied lot no. 379 (5 hectares) for 3 years
(1925-1928).
He
subsequently
orally
bequeathed his rights over the lot to Teodulo
(1929) and entrusted to him a copy of the CFI
decision recognizing Santiagos rights over lot
379.
o Since Teodulo was only 14 years old
then, his father helped him cultivate
the land. Their family thereafter
cleared the land, built a house and
planted coconut trees, corn, palay and
vegetables.
From 1929, Teodulo and later, his wife and 11
children possessed the land as owners and
declared the same for taxation, the earliest
being in 1961
1960 - Santiago executed an "Affidavit (quitclaim)" ratifying the transfer of his rights over
Lot No. 379 to Teodulo.
1960-1970, 3 fires razed the land reducing the
number of coconut trees growing to only 400,
but by the time Teodulo testified in 1992, the
remaining portions of the land was almost
entirely cultivated and planted with coconuts,
coffee, jackfruits, mangoes and vegetables.
1970 - Teodulo discovered that Sps.
Hernandez, were able to obtain a title over Lot
No. 379. He did not immediately file a case
against respondents because he was advised to
just remain on the land and pay the
corresponding taxes thereon.

Hernandezs Version of the Facts

Santiago Guerrero sold the lot in question to

their parents in 1964 for P9k, and that the CFI
of Tayabas issued a decision in 1925 declaring
the lot as public land and recognizing Santiago
as claimant thereof. However, a title wasnt
issued because of Santiagos failure to file an
answer.
Resps filed a motion to re-open the cadastral
proceeding as successors of Santiago, and that
the corresponding title over Lot No. 379 be
issued in their name. CFI issued an OCT to the
Hernandezes and they started cultivation the
land with the help of Fredo, a caretaker.
After the death of the Sps. Hernandez, their
heirs (respondents) executed a deed of
partition over the subject lot and were issued
TCT No. T- 237330 in lieu of OCT No. O11844 in 1984.

Sps.
Rumarate
filed
an
action
for
reconveyance of real property and/or quieting
of title with damages against the heirs of the
Sps. Hernandez.

RESP Joaquin Hernandez testimony: He

accompanied his father to inspect the lot in
1964, and visited again in 1977 and 1970.
From 1966 up to the time of his testimony, his
family declared the lot for taxation and paid
the taxes due thereon. He also explained that
after the death of his father in 1971, he no
longer visited the land and it was only when
the complaint was filed that he learned that the
Rumarates were in actual possession of the
property. Lastly, he manifested that there was
an intention to convert the lot into grazing land
for cattle, but this did not push through for fear
of NPA operations from 1965-1970.
TC: decision in favor of petitioners.
CA: reversed.

ISSUES & HOLDING

RATIO

To whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded petitioners who possessed and cultivated the
lot since 1929 up to the present, but do not
have a certificate of title over the property, or
to respondents who have a certificate of title
but are not in possession of the controverted
lot? To Sps. Rumarate.

In an action for quieting of title, the court is

tasked to determine the respective rights of the
parties so that the complainant and those
claiming under him may be forever free from
any danger of hostile claim.
o The remedy may be availed of only
when, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which appears valid but
is, in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is
thereby cast on the complainant's title
to real property or any interest therein.
(Art 476)
o The plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of
the suit. (Art 477)
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy.
Evangelista vs. Santos - title to real property
refers to that upon which ownership is based.
It is the evidence of the right of the owner or
the extent of his interest, by which means he
can maintain control and, as a rule, assert a
right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of
the property.
o Applied to the case: Teodulo's open,
continuous,
exclusive,
notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No.
379, in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years vested him and his
heirs title over the said lot.
Under Sec 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a government grant,
without necessity of a certificate of title being
issued, and the land ceases to be part of the
public domain. The confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality,
at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character
and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a
title already vested.

Applied to the case: TC gave credence

Teodulo and his witnesses that his
possession of the land was open,
continuous, adverse, exclusive, and in
the concept of an owner. Since 1929,
Teodulo cultivated the controverted
land, built his home, and raised his 11
children thereon. In 1957, he filed a
homestead application over Lot No.
379 but failed to pursue the same.
After his demise, all his 11 children
continued to till the land. For 31 years
Santiago never exercised any act of
ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in
1960, he confirmed that he is no
longer interested in asserting any right
over the land by executing in favor of
Teodulo a quitclaim.
The oral donation and quitclaim are void for
con-compliance with the formalities of
donation, but they nevertheless explain
Teodulos long years of occupation and
cultivation of the land, as well as the nature of
their possession thereof.
o There is no question that the donation
in question is invalid because it
involves an immovable property and
the donation was not made in a public
document, but it does not follow that
said donation may not serve as basis
of acquisitive prescription when on the
strength thereof the donee has taken
possession of the property adversely
and in the concept of owner.
Furthermore, the records do not support the
argument of respondents that Santiagos
alleged possession and cultivation of Lot No.
379 is in the nature contemplated by the Public
Land Act which requires more than
constructive possession and casual cultivation.
o Director of Lands v. IAC - The law
speaks
of
"possession
and
occupation." Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the
clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive
possession.
Taken
together with the words open,
o

continuous, exclusive and notorious,

the
word occupation serves
to
highlight the fact that for one to
qualify under paragraph (b) of the
aforesaid section, his possession of the
land must not be mere fiction.
o Ramirez v. Director of Lands The
mere fact of declaring uncultivated
land for taxation purposes and visiting
it every once in a while, as was done
by him, does not constitute acts of
possession.
o Santiagos short-lived possession and
cultivation of Lot No. 379 could not
vest him title. While he tilled the land
in 1925, he ceased to possess and
cultivate the same since 1928. He
abandoned the property and allowed
Teodulo to exercise all acts of
ownership. His brief possession of Lot
No. 379 could not thus vest him
title.Nemo potest plus juris ad alium
transferre quam ipse habet. No one
can transfer a greater right to another
than he himself has. Hence, Sps.
Hernandez did not acquire any right
over the questioned lot and the title
issued in their names are void, because
of the legal truism that the spring
cannot rise higher than the source.
Besides, they were not purchases in
good faith. While respondents cannot
be considered third persons in good
faith and for value because they
merely inherited the lot.
On the issue of prescription, the settled rule
is that an action for quieting of title is
imprescriptible, as in the instant case,
where the person seeking relief is in
possession of the disputed property.
Considering
that
petitioners
herein
continuously possessed Lot No. 379 since
1929 up to the present, their right to institute a
suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot be
barred by the statute of limitations.
Neither could petitioners action be barred
by laches because they continuously enjoyed
the possession of the land and harvested the
fruits thereof up to the present to the
exclusion of and without any interference
from respondents.

RESPS are actually guilty of laches.

This was not specifically pleaded but
averred in the petitioners allegations.
o
Petitioners continuous possession
and occupation of Lot No. 379 should
have prompted the respondents to file
an action against petitioners, but they
chose not to. Respondents cannot deny
knowledge of said possession by
petitioners as they even asserted in
their Answer that in 1970, Teodulo
ousted the tenant they (respondents)
instituted in the lot. From 1970 up to
the filing of petitioners complaint in
1992, or after 22 years, respondents
never bothered to assert any right over
Lot No. 379. Respondent Joaquin
Hernandez testified that he and his
siblings had a plan to convert the land
into a grazing land for cattle but
decided to put it off for fear of the
rampant operations of the New
Peoples Army between the years
1965-1970. (see other reasons in
original)
Respondents payment of taxes alone, without
possession could hardly be construed as an
exercise of ownership. Only a positive and
categorical assertion of their supposed rights
against petitioners would rule out the
application of laches. What stands out is their
overwhelming
passivity
by
allowing
petitioners to exercise acts of ownership and to
enjoy the fruits of the litigated lot for 22 years
without any interference.
o

DISPOSITIVE
Petition GRANTED.
GASPAR CALACALA, BALTAZAR CALACALA,
MELCHOR
CALACALA,
SOLOMON
CALACALA,
FELICIDAD
CALACALA,
PETRONILA
CALACALA
and
SALOME
CALACALA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Solicitor General, and SHERIFF JUAN C.
MARQUEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 154415. July 28, 2005

Topic: Quieting of Title; Definition, Nature

and Extent of Action
Digested by: James Uaminal
Facts:

1. The spouses Camilo Calacala and

Conchita Calacala, predecessorsin-interest
of
the
herein
petitioners, are the registered
owners of a parcel of land
situated
at
Barangay
Balincanaway,
Rosales,
Pangasinan and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T21204 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
2. The
spouses
offered
their
aforementioned parcel of land as
a property bond in in a criminal
case then pending before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Pangasinan. For failure of the
accused
to
appear
at
his
scheduled arraignment on 4
November 1981, the CFI ordered
the bond forfeited in favor of the
government, and, following the
bondmans failure to produce in
court the body of the accused,
rendered judgment against the
bond in the amount of P3,500.00.
3. A public auction of the subject
parcel of land was held on 24
September
1982,
at
which
respondent Republic submitted its
bid for P3,500, and won.
4. 5 October 1982: the Certificate of
Sale
was
registered
and
annotated on TCT No. T-21204 as
Entry No. 83793, giving the
spouses Calacala a period of one
(1) year therefrom within which to
redeem
their
property.
Unfortunately,
they
never
redeemed the property until their
deaths.

5. Claiming ownership of the same

land as legal heirs of the
deceased spouses, petitioners
filed with the Regional Trial Court
at
Rosales,
Pangasinan
a
complaint for Quieting of Title and
Cancellation of Encumbrance on
TCT
No.
T-21204
against
respondents Republic and Sheriff
Juan C. Marquez.
6. The trial court granted the
Republics motion to dismiss and
accordingly dismissed petitioners
complaint.
Issue: Whether the trial courts dismissal of
petitioners complaint for Quieting of Title
was proper.
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the
remedy may be availed of only when, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding, which appears
valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is
thereby casts on the complainants title to
real property or any interest therein. In
turn, Article 477 of the same Code
identifies the party who may bring an
action to quiet title, thus: Article 477. The
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to, or interest in the real property which is
the subject-matter of the action. He need
not be in possession of said property.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
(2) indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has
a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Petitioners base their claim of legal title not
on the strength of any independent writing
in their favor but simply and solely on

respondent Republics failure to secure the

Certificate of Final Sale, execute an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and
obtain a writ of possession over the
property in dispute within ten (10) years
from the registration of the Certificate of
Sale.
Petitioners
reliance
on
the
shortcomings or inactions of respondent
Republic cannot stand.
Petitioners predecessors-in-interest lost
whatever right they had over land in
question from the very moment they failed
to redeem it during the 1-year period of
redemption. Certainly, the Republics failure
to execute the acts referred to by the
petitioners within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale
cannot, in any way, operate to restore
whatever rights petitioners predecessorsin-interest had over the same or give rise to
a presumption that it has thereby waived or
abandoned its right of ownership or that it
has prescribed, for prescription does not lie
against the government, nor could it be
bound or estopped by the negligence or
mistakes of its officials and employees.
With the reality that petitioners are not
holders of any legal title over the property
subject of this case and are bereft of any
equitable claim thereon, the very first
requisite of an action to quiet title, i.e., that
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject matter of the action, is
miserably wanting in this case.
The second requisite of an action to quiet
title, namely, that the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast
cloud on a plaintiff's title is in fact invalid or
inoperative
despite
its
prima
facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy, is
likewise absent herein.

Pingol vs CA
FACTS:

In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No.

3223) in Caloocan City, executed a DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN
UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF
LAND in favor of Donasco (private
respondent), payable in 6 years.
In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to
pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment,
leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs of
Donasco remained in possession of such lot
and offered to settle the balance with
Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept
the offer and demanded a larger amount.
Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action
for specific performance (with Prayer for
Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol
were encroaching upon Donascos lot).
Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of
title was conditional upon the full payment
of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of
sale). With Donascos breach of the
contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the
sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs
continuous occupancy was only being
tolerated by Pingol.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to
transfer title to Donasco
(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to
quiet title
RULING:
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and
Donasco is a contract of sale and not a
contract to sell. The acts of the parties,
contemporaneous and subsequent to the
contract, clearly show that the parties
intended an absolute deed of sale; the
ownership of the lot was transferred to the
Donasco upon its actual (upon Donascos
possession and construction of the house)
and constructive delivery (upon execution
of the contract). The delivery of the lot
divested Pingol of his ownership and he
cannot recover the title unless the contract
is resolved or rescinded under Art. 1592 of
NCC. It states that the vendee may pay
even after the expiration of the period
stipulated as long as no demand for
rescission has been made upon him either
judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither
did so. Hence, Donasco has equitable title
over the property.
(2)
Petitioners fault the respondent Court for
holding that the action of the petitioners is
not barred by the statute of limitations.
They argue that the private respondents'
action, being based upon a written
contract, has prescribed since it was
brought only in 1988 or more than ten

years from the time when the latter could

have lawfully demanded performance.
Although the complaint filed by the
Donascos was an action for specific
performance, it was actually an action to
quiet title. In this regard, the following
excerpt from Bucton vs. Gabar 20 is
apropos:

The real and ultimate basis of petitioners'

action is their ownership of one- half of the
lot coupled with their possession thereof,
which entitles them to a conveyance of the
property. In Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana [103
Phil. 683, 686-87 (1958)], this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
explained that under the circumstances no
enforcement of the contract is needed,
since the delivery of possession of the land
sold had consummated the sale and
transferred title to the purchaser, and that,
actually, the action for conveyance is one
to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon
the appellee's ownership by the refusal of
the appellants to recognize the sale made
by their predecessors.
A cloud has been cast on the title, since
despite the fact that the title had been
transferred to them by the execution of the
deed of sale and the delivery of the object
of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to
accept the payment by Donascos and
insisted that they no longer had the
obligation to transfer the title.
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land
who had made part payment thereof,
entered upon the land and had made
valuable improvements thereon, is entitled
to bring suit to clear his title against the
vendor who had refused to transfer the title
to him. It is not necessary that the vendee
has an absolute title, an equitable title
being sufficient to clothe him with
personality to bring an action to quiet title.
Prescription thus cannot be invoked against
the private respondents for it is aphoristic
that an action to quiet title to property in
one's possession is imprescriptible.
HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA V. CA
GR No. 104813
October 21, 1993
GRIO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
Angelita Glor and her children filed for
reconveyanceof a parcel of land with the
RTC of Caluag, Quezon against the heirs of
Jose Olviga. The RTC ruled in favor of the
Glors which led to the Olvigas to appeal
with the CA arguing that the action for
reconveyance has already prescribed and
that they were purchasers in good faith.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Summary of Events:
1950 - Lot in question was still forestland
when Eutiquio Pureza and his father
cultivated it by introducing fruit bearing
trees such as coconuts, jackfruits,
mangoes, avocado and bananas.
1956 The Bureau of Lands surveyed the
land in the name of Pureza but Godofredo
Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga, protested and
claims that theyre entitled to of the lot.
1960 Pureza filed for homestead
application over the lot.
1961 Pureza transferred his rights to
Cornelio Glor, the husband of Angelita.
Neither the homestead application nor the
transfer was acted upon by the Director of
Lands for
unknown reasons.
1967 Jose Olviga obtained a registered
title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding,
in fraud of the rights of Pureza and his
transferee, Cornelio Glor and family. The lot
was split and transferred to the Olilas.
1988 Glors learned of the Olvigas title
April 10, 1989 The Glors filed an action for
reconveyance
ISSUE:
W/N the action for reconveyance has
already prescribed?
Held:
NO. The SC has ruled in a number of cases
that action for reconveyance of a parcel of
land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of
the deed of the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property.
However such rule applies only when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
If a person claiming to be the owner thereof
is in actual possession of the property, the
right to seek reconveyance, which in effect
seeks to quiet title to property doesnt

prescribe.
In the case at bar, the Glors were in actual
possession
since
1950
hence
their
undisturbed possession gave them the
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the claim
of the Olvigas who, upon their discovery in
1988 of the adverse title, disturbed their
Possession.
Added factual note:
What mustve happened was that the Glors
were not notified of the registration
proceedings with Angelita testifying that
theres been neither notice nor posting.
Jose Olvigas falsely ommitted the fact that
other persons were in possession of the
land he sought to be registered.
Topic: Quieting of title, rights and obligations of
plaintiff
Case Title: Titong, petitioner, vs. Court of
Appeals,
Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio,
respondents,
G.R. No. 111141
Date: 1998 March 06
Ponente: ROMERO, J.
Legal Doctrine: For one to file an action to
quiet
title to a parcel of land, the requisites in Art 476
of
the NCC must be complied with meaning there
should be an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance
setting forth the cloud or doubt over the title.
Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be
ejectment, forcible entry, unlawful detainer,
accion
reivindicatoria or accion publiciana.
Facts:
A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at
Barrio Titiong, Masbate is the subject property
being
disputed in this case. The property is being
claimed
by 2 contestants, however legal title over the
property
can only be given to one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting
of
title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The RTC of
Masbate decided in favor of private
respondents,
Vicente Laurio and Angeles Laurio as the true
and
lawful owners of the disputed land. The CA
affirmed
the decision of the RTC.

Titong asserts that he is the owner of an

unregistered
parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares
and
declared for taxation purposes. He claims that
on
three separate occasions, private resps, with
their
hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the
land
containing an approximate area of 2 hectares
and
began plowing the same under pretext of
ownership.
On the other hand, private resps denied the
claim and
said that the subject land formed part of the 5.5
hectare agricultural land which they had
purchased
from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo
Espinosa.
Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining
owner
asserting that no controversy had sprouted
between
them for 20 years until the latter sold lot 3749
to V.
Laurio. The boundary between the land sold to
Espinosa and what remained of Titongs
property was
the old Bugsayon river. When Titong employed
Lerit
as his tenant, he instructed the latter to change
the
course of the old river and direct the flow of
water to
the lowland at the southern portion of Titongs
property, thus converting the old river into a
Riceland.
Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim
of
Titongs, saying that the area and boundaries of
disputed land remained unaltered during the
series of
conveyances prior to its coming into his hands.
Accdg to him, Titong first declared land for
taxation
purposes which showed that the land had an
area of
5.5 hectares and was bounded on the north by
the B.
River; on the east by property under ownership
by
Zaragoza, and on the west by property owned
by De
la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold
property to
Verano. The latter reacquired the property
pursuant to
mutual agreement to repurchase the same.
However, the property remained in Titongs
hands
only for 4 days because he sold it to Espinosa. It
then
became a part of the estate of Espinosas wife,
late

Segundina Espinosa. Later on, her heirs

executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Simultaneous Sale whereby the 5.5 hectares
was
sold to Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In all these
conveyances, the area and boundaries of the
property
remained exactly the same as those appearing
in the
name of Titongs.
The court found out that 2 surveys were made
of the
property. First survey was made by Titong, while
the
second was the relocation survey ordered by
the
lower court. Because of which, certain
discrepancies
surfaced. Contrary to Titongs allegation, he was
actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total
areas of
lot nos 3918, 3918-A and 3606. The lot 3479
pertaining to Espinosas was left with only an
area of
4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold
by
Titong to him.
Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed
a
protest before Bureau of Lands against 1st
survey,
and filing a case for alteration of boundaries
before
the MTC, proceedings of which were suspended
because of instant case.
Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the
four
heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of
late
Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto
themselves the
3.6 hectares property of the deceased. The
property
was bounded by the north by Verano, on the
east by
Bernardo Titong, on the south by the Bugsayon
River
and on the west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his
rightful share in the extrajud settlement,
Titongs
share bloated to 2.4 hectares. It then appeared
to
Laurio that Titong encroached upon his property
and
declared it as part of his inheritance.
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it
was

bounded on the north by Verano, on the east by

B.
Titong, on the south by Espinosa and on the
west by
Adolfo Titong. Laurio also denied that Titong
diverted course of the B. river after he had
repurchased the land from Verano because land
was
immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter.
Issue(s): Whether or not Titong is the rightful
owner
of the subject property
Held: NO
Ratio:
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed
of
under the circumstances mentioned in Art 476
of the
NCC wherein it says that action to quiet title
may be
made as a remedial or preventive measure.
Under
476, a claimant must show that there is an
instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which
casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon
owners title to or interest in real property. The
ground for filing a complaint for quieting title
must
be instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding.
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that
there
was an instrument, claim etc be clouded over
his
property. Through his allegations, what Titong
imagined as clouds cast on his title were
Laurios
alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
purported
property. The grounds mentioned are for action
for
forcible entry and not quieting title.
In addition, the case was considered to be a
boundary
dispute. The RTC and CA correctly held that
when
Titong sold the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his
rights and possession ceased and were
transferred to
Laurio upon its sale to the latter.
Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a
contract transferring dominion and other real
rights in
the thing sold. Titong also cannot rely on the
claim of
prescription as ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith and with just
title
for the time fixed by law.