G.R. No.

82220 July 14, 1995

PABLITO MENESES and LORENZO MENESES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO
QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING (Perla,
Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL
QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Luisa, Norberto, Jimmy, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed
Quisumbing), all represented by Atty. Galileo Brion, respondents.
G.R. No. 82251 July 14, 1995
CESAR ALMENDRAL, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, respondent.
G.R. No. 83059 July 14, 1995
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz,
all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING, (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios
and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr.,
Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Victoria,
Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing),petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLITO MENESES, LORENZO MENESES and BRAULIO C. DARUM,respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 07049 affirming the Decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna, in Civil
Case No. 474-83-C which declared as null and void the original certificates of title and free patents issued to Pablito
Meneses over lots found by the court to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by Ciriaca
Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.
I
On March 1, 1977, Braulio C. Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baos, Laguna, issued to Pablito Meneses Free
Patent No. (IV-5) P-12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268 covering Lot 1585 with an area of 417 square
meters, and Free Patent No (IV-5) 12808 and Original Certificate of Title No P-1269 for Lot 190 with an area of 515
square meters. Both lots are located in Los Baos, Laguna.
Pablito Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights executed
on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for and "some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito
Meneses (Rollo, p. 45). After the execution of said document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land, introduced
improvements thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn,
Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia (Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had been occupying the land
since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as September 6, 1919 when their
matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was issued Original Certificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot with an
area of 859 square meters located in Los Baos, Laguna with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same
parcel of land was registered on August 14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of Ciriaca's
heirs: Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed
Quisumbing.
In 1962, the Quisumbing instituted and accion publiciana in the then Court of First Instance of Bian, Laguna to recover
possession over a portion of the property from Dominga Villamor and Lorenzo Lanuzo docketed as Civil Case No. B-350.

On January 3, 1966, the case was decided in favor of the Quisumbings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the
Quisumbings' right over the property.
In LRC Case No. B-327, the Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an additional area of 2,387
square meters which had gradually accrued to their property by the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. In its
Decision of September 28, 1978, the Court of First Instance of Bian confirmed the Quisumbings' title thereto which, after
it was duly surveyed, was identified as Psu-208327. The additional area was divided into two lots in the survey plan
approved by the Director of Lands on November 16, 1964. In ordering the confirmation and registration of title on favor of
the Quisumbings, the land registration court said:
. . . There is no doubt that the applicants' right to the property was bolstered by the unappealed decision
of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 of this Court when the properties applied for were
classified as accretions made by the waters of the Laguna Lake. . . . (G.R. No. 82229, Rollo, p. 20).
On April 17, 1979, the Quisumbings filed Civil Case No. 07049 before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI,
Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio C. Darum and Cesar B. Almendral for nullification of the free
patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baos, using his
brother Pablito as a "tool and dummy," illegally occupied their "private accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and,
confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained free patents and original
certificates of title to the land.
On March 26, 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the Meneses brothers are
accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of the riparian land to which nature had gradually
deposited the disputed lots. In so holding, the trial court relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case
No. B-350, and quoted the following portions of the appellate court's decision:
Plaintiffs-appellees are titled owners of a (sic) 859 square meters of land under TCT No. 25978 of the
Laguna Land Registry, the northwest boundary of which is the Laguna de Bay.
It is ascertained that the northwest portion of Quisumbing's lot is bounded by the Laguna de Bay. The
nature of the Laguna de Bay has long been settled in the case of Government of the Philippines v.
Colegio de San Jose (55 Phil. 423) when it held that:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depression of the earth; it contains fresh
water coming from rivers and brooks and springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by
the Pasig River. According to the definition first quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.
Consequently, since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the authorities cited by the appellants referring to seashore
would not apply. The provision of the law on waters will govern in determining the natural bed or basin of
the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers
andlakes by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of
such lands.
Since the title indicate(s) that the northwest portion of the property is bounded by Laguna de Bay, which is
a lake, even if the area where Lanuza's house and Villamor's house for that matter is located is not
included within the title, it must necessarily be an accretion upon appellees' land by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof which should belong to the owner of the adjacent land. The authorities
cited by the appellants treat of the ownership of accretions by water of the sea under Title I. Lakewaters
being terrestrial waters, their ownership is governed by Title II of the Law of Waters. As held in the Colegio
de San Jose case, the provisions of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of sea water are
not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes which are governed by different provisions. As pointed
out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation as the law does not require the same (Ignacio Grande, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962 citing Roxas vs. Tuazon, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil.
567 and 3 Manresa, C.C. pp. 321-326, pp. 4-5) (Records, pp. 80-84).
The trial court also found that the free patents issued to Pablito Meneses had been procured through fraud, deceit and
bad faith, citing the following facts as bases for its conclusion: (1) The Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights allegedly
executed by Silverio Bautista in favor of Pablito Meneses was a simulated contract for lack of consideration; (2) The said
instrument was sworn to before Mayor Lorenzo Meneses who had no authority to notarize deeds of conveyances; (3)
Although the lots subject of the deed of conveyance were placed in his brother's name, Mayor Meneses actually exercised
rights of ownership thereto; (4) Land Inspector Cesar Almendral admitted having anomalously prepared the documents to

support the free patent applications of Pablito Meneses and, having personally filled up the blank forms, signed them in
the absence of the persons concerned; (5) Almendral kept the documents in his possession from 1979 to 1980 despite
orders from the Director of Lands to produce and surrender the same; (6) District Land Officer Braulio Darum approved
the free patent applications and issued the questioned titles without the required cadastral survey duly approved by the
Director of Lands and despite the pendency of LRC Case No. B-327 involving the contested lots; (7) Darum represented
the Bureau of Lands in LRC Case No. B-327 without authority from the Director of Lands and after he had withdrawn his
appearance in said case, persisted in filing a motion to set aside the order for the issuance of a decree in favor of the
Quisumbings; (8) Darum and Almendral in bad faith, refused to produce the missing original records of the free patent
applications and their supporting documents; and (9) When Darum was not yet an oppositor in LRC Case No. B-327, he
admitted in his letter to the Land Registration Commission that the contested lots are portions of the land being claimed by
the Quisumbings contrary to his later representation in the joint answer to the petition that the subject lots are not portions
of Lots 1 and 2, Psu-208327 owned by the Quisumbings. Accordingly, the trial court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the lands covered by Pablito Meneses' Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268/Free
Patent No. 12807 (Exh. "J"), covering Lot No. 1585, consisting of 417 square meters and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808 (Exh. "H"), covering Lot No. 190, consisting of 515
square meters, both located at Los Baos, Laguna, as accretion lands forming parts of a bigger accretion
land owned by plaintiffs as declared in a final judgment (Exh. "A"), rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Bian, Laguna, in LRC Case No. B-327, which bigger accretion land is directly adjacent to or at the
back of plaintiffs' riparian land, and consequently, declaring as null and void and cancelled Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free
Patent No. 12808;
2. Directing that the Register of Deeds of Laguna or his Deputy at Calamba, Laguna, to make the
corresponding entries of cancellation in his Registry of the above mentioned Original Certificate of
Titles/Free Patents;
3. Directing defendants Lorenzo Meneses and Pablito Meneses and all persons acting in their behalves to
vacate the subject lands and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiffs immediately; and
4. Directing the defendants to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sums of:
a) P20,000.00, plus P500.00 per month from January, 1977, until the subject property is
completely vacated, as actual and compensatory damages;
b) P350,000.00, as moral damages;
c) P70,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d) P40,000.00, as attorney's fees; and
e) the costs (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
Thereafter, the Quisumbings filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial court granted in its Order of
September 7, 1984 subject to the posting by the Quisumbings of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. The defendants
unsuccessfully moved for the reconsideration of said order.
The Quisumbings also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Pablito Meneses, Silverio Bautista, Pablo
Silva, Virgilio Cruz and Cesar Almendral for violation of paragraphs (e) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, for
conspiring in the approval and grant of the free patents over portions of Lots 1 & 2 of Psu-208327 owned by the heirs of
Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants
guilty as charged. The case was elevated to this Court but on August 27, 1987, the judgment of conviction was affirmed
(Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 [1987]).
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 07049 to the Court of Appeals. On
August 31, 1987, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit and affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
The defendants-appellants filed two motions for the reconsideration of the appellate court's decision but it was denied in
the Resolution of February 23, 1988 which in pertinent part stated:
However, for humanitarian considerations, and considering the appeal of the defendants-appellants for a
reduction of the moral and exemplary damages, We favor the reduction of the moral damages from

P350,000.00 to P50,000.00 and the exemplary damages from P70,000.00 to P5,000.00. In all other
respects, We find no justification for modifying the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court
(G.R. No. 82220, Rollo, p. 67).
Pablito and Lorenzo Meneses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 82220.
Cesar Almendral filed a motion in G.R. No. 82251 for a 45-day extension within which to file a petition for review
on certiorari. After this Court had granted them a 30-day extension, Almendral still failed to file any petition. The
Quisumbings also filed a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 83059, solely on the issue of the propriety
of the reduction of the amount of damages in the Court of Appeals' Resolution of February 23, 1988. Upon motion of
petitioners in G.R. No. 83059, the three petitions were consolidated in the Resolution of August 1, 1988.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 retell the same errors they had raised before the Court of Appeals, contending in the main:
(1) that the lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the public domain; (2) that no conspiracy to commit
fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and (3) that the Deed of
Waiver and Transfer of Rights was founded on a valid consideration.
As regards the issue of whether the lands in question are accretion lands, petitioners relied on the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in Republic of the Philippines v. Braga, CA-G.R. No. 55390-R, October 23, 1980, holding that the property
involved therein was part of the natural bed of the Laguna de Bay and therefore what had to be determined was whether
said property was covered by water when the lake was at its highest depth.
Petitioners' assigned errors in G.R. No. 82220 are evidently factual issues which have been thoroughly passed upon and
settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the
parties and not reviewable by this Court (Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 533 [1994])
and they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court (Binalay v.
Manalo, 195 SCRA 374 [1991]). The jurisdiction of this Court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous
as to constitute serious abuse of discretion (BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 566 [1941]). We find
no such showing in this case.
Petitioners' protestations notwithstanding the final decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 has a bearing
in the resolution of this case for while the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners
are claiming here, the two cases refer to the same accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the
Quisumbings.
In the same vein, the decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. B-327 ordering the confirmation and
registration of title in favor of the Quisumbings over 2,387 square meters of accretion land is binding on petitioners in G.R.
No. 82220. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, said decision, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds
the whole world, more so because it became final and executory upon the Bureau of Lands' failure to interpose an appeal.
Since petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 claim that "the foreshore land known as Lots 190 and 1585 are part of Laguna de
Bay" and therefore the Quisumbings "have no legal right to claim the same as accretion land," we quote the following
pertinent portions of the decision in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) which, although the case deals
with the registration of a reclaimed land along the Laguna de Bay, is nonetheless enlightening:
Laguna de Bay is a lake. While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that
cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the
case of lakes. Thus, the alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could
hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five months a year
during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in
question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a
shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry,
the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land
sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as
foreshore land. The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore
land, to wit:
. . . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux
and reflux of the tides.
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.

As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to
the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources." Since the inundation of
a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within
the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not
being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands,
it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant
proves that he has a registerable title (at pp. 538-539).
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of these requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters
of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
While the trial court mainly relied on the findings in Civil Case No. B-350 that the lands in controversy are accretion lands
and it has not determined on its own the presence of said requisites, it is too late now for petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 to
claim otherwise. Consequently, the lands held to be accretion lands could only benefit the Quisumbings, who own the
property adjacent to the lands in controversy (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 350 [1992]).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 also assert that the principle of indefeasibility of title should favor them as the one-year
period provided for by law to impugn their title had elapsed. They also urged that, having been granted by the state, their
title is superior to that of the Quisumbings. We hold, however, that in the light of the fraud attending the issuance of the
free patents and titles of Pablito Meneses, said assertions crumble. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v.
People, 153 SCRA 303 (1987) which held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.
Unlike the petition in G.R. No. 82220, the petition in G.R. No. 83059 (questioning the reduction of the damages awarded
to the Quisumbings by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution of February 23, 1988) is meritorious. The task of fixing the
amount of damages is primarily with the trial court (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]). While it is the
appellate court's duty to review the same, a reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of reasonableness. The
Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded as damages when they are palpably or scandalously
and reasonably excessive (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 423 [1993]; Prudenciano v. Alliance
Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]).
There is no justification for the radical reduction by the Court of Appeals of the damages awarded by the trial court. Its
action was premise merely on "humanitarian considerations" and the plea of the defendants-appellants. We may agree
with the Court of Appeals in reducing the award after scrutinizing its factual findings only if such findings are diametrically
opposed to that of the trial court (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra). But as it is, the Court of Appeals
affirmed point by point the factual findings if the lower court upon which the award of damages had been based.
We, therefore, see no reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court. Respondent Braulio C. Darum in
G.R. No. 83059 must also be solidarily liable for said damages in his capacity as a public officer. A public official is by law
not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions (Vidad v. RTC of Negros, Br. 42, 227 SCRA
271 [1993]).
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82220 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 83059 is GRANTED. The Decision
dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED while its Resolution of February 23, 1988 insofar as it
reduces the amount of damages awarded to the Quisumbing family is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners in G.R. No.
82220 and respondent Braulio Darum in G.R. No. 83059.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21783

November 29, 1969

PACIFIC FARMS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO G. ESGUERRA, ET AL., defendants,
CARRIED LUMBER COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Primicias, Del Castillo, Macaraeg and T. P. Regino for defendant-appellant.
Araneta and Araneta for plaintiff-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:

Before us for review, on appeal by the defendant Carried Lumber Company (hereinafter referred to as the Company), is
the decision, dated May 30, 1962, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in civil case D-1317, annulling the levy and
certificate of sale covering six buildings owned by the plaintiff Pacific Farms, Inc., executed by the defendant deputy
provincial sheriff Simplicio G. Esguerra in favor of the Company to satisfy a money judgment against the Insular Farms,
Inc., the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest over the said buildings.
The environmental setting is uncontroverted.
On several occasions from October 1, 1956 to March 2, 1957 the Company sold and delivered lumber and construction
materials to the Insular Farms, Inc. which the latter used in the construction of the aforementioned six buildings at its
compound in Bolinao, Pangasinan, of the total procurement price of P15,000, the sum of P4,710.18 has not been paid by
Insular Farms, Inc. Consequently, on October 17, 1958 the Company instituted civil case D-775 with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan to recover the said unpaid balance from the Insular Farms, Inc. On August 23, 1961 the trial court
rendered judgment sustaining the Company's claim. The judgment debtor did not appeal; so on December 19, 1961 the
corresponding writ of execution was issued. On January 16, 1962 the defendant sheriff levied upon the six buildings. On
January 30, 1962 the Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a third-party claim, subscribed by its corporate president, asserting
ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the Insular Farms, Inc. by virtue of a deed of absolute sale
executed on March 21, 1958, about seven months before the Company filed the above-mentioned action (civil case D775). Shielded by an indemnity bond of P7,120 put up by the Company and the Cosmopolitan Insurance Company, Inc.,
the sheriff proceeded with the announced public auction on February 12, 1962 and sold the levied buildings to the
Company for P6,110.78.
Asserting absolute and exclusive ownership of the buildings in question, the Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a complaint on May
14, 1962 against the Company and the sheriff with the court a quo, praying that judgment be rendered, (a) declaring null
and void the levy and judicial sale of the six buildings, and (b) adjudging the defendants jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiff in the sum of P2,000 by way of actual damages and for such amount as the court may deem proper and just to
impose by way of exemplary damages and for costs of the suit.
After due trial, the court a quo on May 30, 1963 rendered judgment annulling the levy of January 16, 1962 and the
certificate of sale of February 12, 1962. The court, however, denied the plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary damages
on the ground that it was not "prepared to find that there was gross negligence or bad faith on the part of any of the
defendants."
Hence this appeal, imputing errors which, according to the appellant's formulation, are the following:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the credit of the defendant-appellant, Carried Lumber Company, against
the Insular Farms, Inc., consisting of the value of lumber and construction materials used in the buildings which
were later acquired by the Pacific Farms, Inc., the appellee, was not a statutory lien on those buildings; .
2. The lower court, likewise, erred in holding that the doctrine laid down in De Barretto, et al. vs. Villanueva, et al.
(G.R. No. L-14938, December 29, 1962) is applicable to the facts of this case as found by said court; and .
3. The lower court erred, finally, in declaring that the sale at public auction conducted by the defendant deputy
provincial sheriff of Pangasinan, covering the six buildings described in the certificate of sale dated February 12,
1962, was null and void.
1. In ruling against the appellant below, the trial court relied mainly on the resolution (on the motion for reconsideration)
promulgated on December 29, 1962 by this Court in De Barretto, et al. vs. Villanueva, et al., L-14938 (6 SCRA 928). The
said case, however, is inapplicable because it concerned not one but two or more preferred creditors who, pursuant to
articles 2242 and 2249 of the Civil Code, must necessarily be convened and the nature and extent of their respective
claims ascertained. Thus, we held that before there can be a pro rata payment of credits entitled to preference as to the
same specific real property, there must first be some proceeding where the claims of all the preferred creditors may be
bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the settlement of a decedent's estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or
liquidation proceedings of similar import.
But the case before us does not involve a question of preference of credits, and is not one where two or more creditors
have separate and distinct claims against the same debtor who has insufficient property. Indeed, it is a matter of necessity
and logic that the question of preference should arise only where the debtor cannot pay his debts in full. For, if debtor A is
able in full to pay all his three creditors, B, C, and D, how can the need arise for determining which of the three creditors
shall be paid first or whether they shall be paid out of the proceeds of a specific property?
2. It is undenied and undeniable that the appellant furnished lumber and construction materials to the Insular Farms, Inc.
(the appellee's predecessor-in-interest) which the latter used in the construction of the six buildings. Likewise
unchallenged is the lower court's factual finding that out of the total procurement price of P15,000, the amount of

P4,710.18 remains outstanding and unpaid by the Insular Farms, Inc. The appellant is therefore an unpaid furnisher of
materials.
Whether there exists a materialman's lien over the six buildings in favor of the appellant, is a question we do not here
decide. To our mind the application by analogy of the rules of accession would suffice for a just adjudication.
Article 447 of the Civil Code1 provides:
The owner of the land who makes thereon personally or through another, plantings, constructions or works with
the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the
reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so
without injury to the work constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However,
if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event with a right to be
indemnified for damages.
The abovequoted legal provision contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being considered the principal, and
the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in good faith whether personally or
through another makes constructions or works thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the
owner of the said materials with the obligation however of praying for their value. 2The owner of the materials, on the other
hand, is entitled to remove them, provided no substantial injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right to
reimbursement for the value of his materials.
Although it does not appear from the records of this case that the land upon which the six buildings were built is owned by
the appellee, nevertheless, that the appellee claims that it owns the six buildings constructed out of the lumber and
construction materials furnished by the appellant, is indubitable. Therefore, applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce
consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their construction as the
accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the value of the said
materials; the appellant which apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so,
cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings has the corresponding right to recover the value of the
unpaid lumber and construction materials.
Well-established in jurisprudence is the rule that compensation should be borne by the person who has been benefited by
the accession.3 No doubt, the appellee benefited from the accession, i.e., from the lumber and materials that went into the
construction of the six buildings. It should therefore shoulder the compensation due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher of
materials.
Of course, the character of a buyer in good faith and for value, if really possessed by the appellee, could possibly
exonerate it from making compensation.
But the appellee's stance that it is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith is open to grave doubt because of
certain facts of substantial import (evident from the records) that cannot escape notice.
In the deed of absolute sale, exhibit 1, the Insular Farms, Inc. (vendor) was represented in the contract by its president, J.
Antonio Araneta. The latter was a director of the appellee (Pacific Farms, Inc.) and was the counsel who signed the
complaint filed by the appellee in the court below. J. Antonio Araneta was, therefore, not only the president of the Insular
Farms, Inc. but also a director and counsel of the appellee.
During the trial of civil case D-775 the Insular Farms, Inc. was represented by Attorney Amado Santiago, Jr. of the law firm
of J. Antonio Araneta. The latter was one of the counsels of the Pacific Farms, Inc. The appellee cannot claim ignorance of
the pendency of civil case D-775 because the Insular Farms, Inc. was defended by the same lawyer from the same law
firm that commenced the present action. J. Antonio Araneta, as counsel for the Pacific Farms, Inc., cannot close his eyes
to facts of which he as president of the Insular Farms, Inc. had actual knowledge. Significantly, exhibit 1 (supra) itself
shows that the Insular Farms, Inc. and the Pacific Farms, Inc. were housed in adjacent rooms (nos. 304 and 303,
respectively), of the same building, the Insular Life Building, as early as March 21, 1958.
It is reasonable therefore to conclude that the appellee, through its director and counsel, J. Antonio Araneta, knew about
the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the lumber and construction materials supplied or furnished by the appellant
to the Insular Farms, Inc.
Parenthetically, it is likewise worth our attention that despite the appellee's knowledge of the suit instituted by the
appellant against the Insular Farms, Inc. (the appellee's predecessor-in-interest) for the recovery of the unpaid balance of
the purchase price of the lumber and materials used in the construction of its six buildings, it merely folded its arms in
disinterest and waited, so to speak. Not until a decision was rendered therein in favor of the appellant, a writ of execution
issued, and the six buildings levied upon by the sheriff, did it file a third-party claim over the levied buildings. In the face of

the knowledge that its predecessor-in-interest had not fully paid for the lumber and construction materials used in the six
buildings it had purchased, its natural and expected reaction should have been to intervene in the suit filed by the
appellant against the Insular Farms, Inc. and hold the latter to account for breach of the warranties deemed included in
the deed of absolute sale conveying said building to it.
Curiously enough, although the six buildings in question were supposedly sold by the Insular Farms to the appellee on
March 21, 1958, as evidenced by the deed of absolute sale (exhibit 1), about seven months before the appellant filed civil
case D-775, the Insular Farms, Inc. never moved to implead the appellee therein as a necessary party-defendant, and
remained completely and strangely silent about the sale. It is not amiss to surmise that it is entirely possible that the
Insular Farms, Inc. and the appellee chose to remain silent in the hope that the appellant's claim against the Insular
Farms, Inc. in civil case D-775 would be dismissed or non-suited.
Moreover, the appellee was in a better position to protect its interest. It knew that the Insular Farms, Inc., its predecessorin-interest, was a mere lessee of the premises on which the buildings were located. This should have placed it on guard
and compelled it to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the construction of the said buildings on the premises.
On the other hand, the appellant was not as advantageously situated as the appellee. There being no separate registry of
property for buildings and no procedure provided by law for registering or annotating the claim of an unpaid furnisher of
materials, it was helpless to prevent the sale of the property built from lumber and construction materials it furnished. But
certainly, because it has a right, pursuant to article 447, supra, to reimbursement for the value of its unpaid materials, the
appellant could pursue any remedy available to it under the law in order to enforce the said right. Thus, the appellant
acted correctly in bringing an action (D-775) against the Insular Farms, Inc. and enforcing its right of reimbursement
through the execution of the final judgment it obtained in the said case against the six buildings in the possession of the
appellee who now stands to benefit therefrom. It follows, as a necessary corollary, that the sale at public auction
conducted by the defendant sheriff of the six buildings described in the certificate of sale dated February 12, 1962, exhibit
7, was valid and effective.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the complaint is hereby dismissed.
In view, however, of the equities clearly attendant in this case, it is the sense of this Court that the plaintiff-appellee Pacific
Farms, Inc. should be, as it is hereby, granted a period of thirty (30) days from the date this judgment becomes final,
within which it may exercise the option of redeeming the six buildings, by paying to the defendant-appellant Carried
Lumber Company the sum of P4,710.18, with legal interest from September 23, 1961 (the date the judgment in civil case
D-775 became final), until the said amount shall have been fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-43456

May 6, 1935

CATALINO BATACLAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE and VICENTE SANTO DOMINGO BERNARDO, respondents.
Nicolas Santiago for petitioner.
Pedro de Leon for respondent Santo Domingo Bernardo.
No appearance for the other respondent.
VICKERS, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite issued on April 24, 1934 for
the sale at public auction of the land which was the subject of civil case No. 2428 of said court between the respondent,
Vicente Santo Domingo Bernardo, as plaintiff, and the petitioner herein, Catalino Bataclan, as defendant.
The dispositive part of the decision in that case is as follows:
Por las consideraciones expuestas, se declara al demandante Vicente Santo Domingo Bernardo dueo y con
derecho a la posesion del terreno que se describe en la demanda, y al demandado Catalino Bataclan con
derecho a que el demandante le pague la suma de P1,642 por gastos utiles hechos de buena fe en el terreno, y
por el cerco y ponos de coco y abca existentes en el mismo, y con derecho, ademas, a retener la posesion del
terreno hasta que se le pague dicha cantidad. El demandante puede optar, en el plazo de treinta dias, a partir de
la fecha en que fuere notificado de la presente, por pagar esa suma la demandado, haciendo asi suyos el cerco y
todas las plantaciones existentes en el terreno, u obligar al demandado a pagarle el precio del terreno, a eazon
de trescientos pesos la hectarea. En el caso de que el demandante optara (por) que el demandado le pagara el

precio del terreno, el demandado efectuara el pago en el plazo convenido por las partes o que sera fijado por el
Juzgado. Sin costas.
On appeal to this court the value of the land containing 90 hectares was reduced from P300 to P200 a hectare, and the
value of the improvements made by the defendant thereon was increased from P1,642 to P2,212. The decision of the
lower court was affrimed in all other respects. (G.R. No. 37319.) 1
The plaintiff in that case, Vicente Santo Domingo Bernardo, elected to compel the defendant, Catalino Bataclan, to pay
him the value of the land, P18,000. Petitioner alleges that he filed a motion on January 12, 1934 praying that he be
granted a period of fifteen years in which to pay said sum of P18,000; that said motion was never granted or denied, but
on April 24, 1934 the court issued an order directing that the land be sold at public auction and that out of the proceeds of
the sale the sum of P18,000 be paid to the plaintiff in addition to the legal expenses of the sale, and that the remainder to
the amount of P2,212 be paid to the defendant.
It appears, however, from the order of Judge Leopoldo Rovira of January 24, 1934 that the plaintiff informed the court that
he elected to compel the defendant to pay him the value of the land, and that the defendant appeared in court and stated
that he did not have any money; that the court then granted the plaintiff thirty days in which to pay the defendant the sum
of P2,212, and ordered that if said payment was not made the land should be sold at public auction of the payment of said
sum to the defendant, the balance after deducting the expenses of the sale to be delivered to the plaintiff.
On March 16, 1934 Judge Rovira modified his order of January 24th, and ordered that from the proceeds of the sale the
plaintiff should be paid for the land at the rate of P200 a hectare, and that the balance, if any, should be delivered to the
defendant.
On April 24, 1934 Judge Sixto de la Costa issued an order for the sale of the land at public auction in order that the
plaintiff might be paid from the proceeds the sum of P18,000 and the legal expenses of the sale, and that from the
balance, if any, P2,212 should be paid to the defendant. This is the order complained of.
The decision of the lower court was based on article 361 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
Any owner of land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted, in good faith, shall be entitled to
appropriate the thing so built, sown, or planted, upon paying the compensation mentioned in articles 453 and 454,
or to compel the person who has built or planted to pay him the value of the land or, to require the person who
sowed thereon to pay the proper rent therefore.
The contention of the petitioner is that in issuing the order of April 24, 1934 the court exceeded its jurisdiction because it
constituted an amendment to a final judgment of said court, which had been affirmed by this court.
It is true that in the decision in question it was provided that in case the plaintiff elected to compel the defendant to pay
him the value of the land, the payment should be made within the period agreed upon by the parties or that it would be
fixed by the court; but, according to the petitioner, he asked for a period of fifteen years in which to pay the owner of the
land the value thereof; and when he appeared in court he informed the court that he had no money with which to pay for
the land. Under those circumstances, it would have been futile for the court to grant the defendant a reasonable period of
thirty or sixty days in which to pay the plaintiff the sum of P18,000, and if there was any irregularity in the court's ordering
the sale of the property at public auction under the conditions stated in the orders of March 16, 1934 and April 24, 1934, it
was not prejudicial but favorable to the petitioner, because his only right was to purchase the land for the sum of P18,000.
Furthermore the petitioner could have appealed from the order in question, and his right to appeal was an adequate
remedy.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied, with the costs against the petitioner.
Abad Santos, Hull, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-28721

October 5, 1928

MARTIN MENDOZA and NATALIO ENRIQUEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
MANUEL DE GUZMAN, defendant-appellant.
MAX B. SOLIS, intervenor-appellant.
Juan S. Rustia for appellants.
Godofredo Reyes for appellees.

MALCOLM, J.:
This case calls for the application of articles 361, 435, and 454 of the Civil Code to the proven facts.
On November 6, 1916, Leandra Solis and her husband Bernardo Solis brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas against Martin Mendoza for the recovery of a certain piece of land. Judgment was rendered in that case
absolving Mendoza from the complaint, and this judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. 1 When the
case was remanded to the court of origin, the trial judge issued an order requiring the provincial sheriff immediately to
dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction and to put Mendoza in the possession of the land. By virtue of this order,
Mendoza was in fact put in possession of the property.
In the cadastral proceedings of the municipality of Sariaya, Tayabas, the piece of land above-mentioned was identified as
lot No. 687. In the decision rendered in the cadastral case, this lot was adjudicated in favor of Martin Mendoza and Natalio
Enriquez in equal parts pro indiviso subject to the right of retention on the part of Manuel de Guzman until he shall have
been indemnified for the improvements existing on the land. By virtue of this judgment, De Guzman presented a motion
requesting the issuance of a writ of possession for lot No. 687 in his favor which was granted on June 25, 1924. From the
time Leandra Solis and Bernardo Solis, as well as Manuel de Guzman who was working on the land, were ejected
therefrom, Martin Mendoza possessed it until June 25, 1924, when de Guzman obtained the writ of possession abovementioned. Since then De Guzman has had dominion over the land.
Being unable to come to an agreement as to the amount which should be allowed for the improvements made on the
land, Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez began an action requesting the court to (a) fix the value of the necessary and
useful expenses incurred by Manuel de Guzman in introducing the improvements; (b) require the defendant to render an
accounting of the fruits received by him and order that the value of the fruits be applied to the payment of the necessary
and useful expenses; and (c) decree the restitution of the possession to the plaintiffs. To the complaint, the defendant filed
an answer in the form of a general denial with special defenses and appended a counter-claim and crosscomplaint, in
which a total of P6,000 was asked. During the pendency of the case, Bernardo Solis, or Max. B. Solis, one of the persons
who was ejected from the land, asked leave to intervene, alleging, among other things, that De Guzman, in consideration
of the sum of P5,000, had transferred all his rights in the improvements and in the lot to him with the exception of two
hundred coconut trees. This petition was granted by the trial court.
When the case was called for trial, the parties entered into the follwing stipulation:
1. That the plaintiffs are the owners and proprietors of the land described in the second paragraph of the
complaint.
2. That a decree of registration has been issued on said land in the terms set forth in paragraph 3 of the
complaint.
3. That the defendant Manuel de Guzman is the one who has been in possession and enjoyment of the land from
June 25, 1924, up to the present time by virtue of a writ of possession obtained by him from the Court of Land
Registration.
4. That the defendant has made improvements on said land be planting coconut trees thereon.
5. That the plaintiff Martin Mendoza is the one who has been in possession and enjoyment of said property and its
improvements since December 16, 1916, by virtue of a writ of possession in civil case No. 356 until said
pssession was transferred to the defendant Manuel de Guzman.
6. That from March 20, 1920, the plaintiff Natalio Enriquez has been in possession and enjoyment of a portion of
the land, the subject matter of the complaint herein, by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his favor by Attorney
Agustin Alvarez, who, in turn, acquired it from the other plaintiff Martin Mendoza, until June 25, 1924.
The parties desire to submit, as they do submit, under this stipulation of facts the following questions:
(a) The amount of the indemnity to be paid to the defendant for the improvements made by him on said
lot and the basis upon which said amount shall be fixed.
(b) Whether or not the defendant is obliged to render an account of the fruits received by him from June
25, 1924, until the improvements are delivered after same have been paid for. 1awph!l.net
(c) Whether the value of said fruits and products received by the defendant shall be applied to the
indemnity to which he is entitled, or whether said defendant is obliged to deliver to the plaintiffs the
remainder in case of excess.

(d) Whether or not the defendant has the right to be paid by the plaintiffs in whole or in part for the value
of the fruits received by Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez from the respective dates that they were in
possession and enjoyment of the land until June 25, 1924.
The parties at the same time that they submit to the court for decision the questions presented in the above
stipulation reserve to themselves, whatever said decision may be, the right to present later their evidence in
support of their respective views with respect to the amount of the indemnity.
After the preliminary questions have been decided, the parties request that commissioners be appointed to
receive said evidence with respect to the amount of the indemnity in accordance with the views of both parties.
The trial court resolved the questions presented by holding (1) that in accordance with the provisions of articles 435 and
454 in relation with article 361 of the Civil Code, the value of the "indemnization" to be paid to the defendant should be
fixed according to the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him in introducing "las plantaciones en cuestion"; (2)
that the plaintiffs as the owner of the property have the right to make their own "las plantaciones hechas por el
demandado" upon payment in the form indicated in No. 1, the defendant having the right to retain the land until the
expenditures have been refunded; (3) that the defendant is obliged to render a detail and just account of the fruits and
other profits received by him from the property for their due application; and (4) that the value of the fruits received by the
defendant should first be applied to the payment of the "indemnizacion," and in that it exceeds the value of the
"indemnizacion," the excess shall be returned to the plaintiffs. With respect to the last question as to whether or not the
plaintiffs are obliged to return to the defendant the value of the fruits received by them before the defendant took
possession of the land, the trial court abstained from making any pronouncement for the reason that the circumstances
under which the plaintiffs acquired possession and the defendant again acquired it were not before him, the parties
needing to submit their evidence with respect to this point.
At the trial which followed and at the instance of the parties, two commissioners were appinted with instructions to inspect
the land and to count the number of coconut trees planted thereon, determining the number of fruit-bearing trees and
those that are not fruit-bearing as well as the condition of the same. After trial, Judge of First Instance Gloria rendered
judgment declaring (a) that the defendant Manuel de Guzman and the intervenor Bernardo Solis have the right to collect
from the plaintiffs Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez the sum of P2,046 as compensation for the necessary and useful
expenditures in the proportion of 20 per cent for Manuel de Guzman and 80 per cent for Bernardo Solis; and (b) that
Manuel de Guzman and Bernardo Solis are obliged to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P666.93 per annum from June 25,
1924, one-fifth of this amount to be paid by Manuel de Guzman and the other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis. As on the date
when this judgment was rendered, that is on September 23, 1927, the amount that the plaintiffs were required to pay to
the defendant and intervenor exceeded the amount that the latter were to pay the former, the defendant and intervenor
were ordered to deliver the land and its improvement as soon as the plaintiffs have paid the difference, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
The appeal of the defendant and intervenor is based on fourteen assigned errors relating to both questions of fact and of
law. The question of fact mainly concerns the amount to be paid as "indemnizacion" in the form of necessary and useful
expenditures incurred by the defendant. The question of law mainly concerns the interpretation of articles 361, 453, and
454 of the Civil Code. Counsel for the appellants has presented a learned brief divided into three chapters. Counsel for
the appellees has countered with an equally helpful brief in which the fourteen assigned errors are reduced for purposes
of arguments to four fundamental questions. It would not be profitable and it is not necessary to follow opposing counsel
into all of their refinements of fact and law.
As to the facts, the findings of the trial judge should be given effect. An examination of the evidence shows that these
findings are fully substantiated. Our only doubt has been as to the just value for each coconut tree now found on the land.
However, everything considered, we have at last determined that we would not be justified in changing the value per tree
of P2 as fixed in the trial court. With respect to the fruits received by the defendant while the land was in his possession,
the finding in the trial court is correct.
With the facts as above indicated, little time need be taken to discuss the points of law. Article 361 of the Civil Code in the
original Spanish text uses the word "indemnizacion." However one may speculate as to the true meaning of the term
"indemnizacion" whether correctly translated as "compensation" or "indemnity," the amount of the "indemnizacion" is the
amount of the expenditures mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the present case is the amount
of the necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. Necessary expenses have been variously described
by the Spanish commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil,
p. 258); as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost (Scaevola's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p.408); as
those that augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p.
261; 8 Scaevola's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 416). Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for
cultivation, production, upkeep, etc. (4 Manresa'sComentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 257). Here the plaintiffs have chosen to
take the improvements introduced on the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and useful expenses
incurred by the defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not exactly a posessor in good faith with in the meaning of

the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenditures, it is only just that he should account to the
owners of the estate for any rents, fruits, or crops he has gathered from it.
In brief, therefore, and with special reference to the decision appealed from, the errors assigned on appeal, and the
argument of counsel as addressed to the decision in the lower court and the assignment of errors, we may say that we
are content to make the findings of fact and law of Judge Gloria in the lower court the findings of fact and law in the
appellate court.
Based on the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellants.
Avancena, C.J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-17985

September 29, 1962
GIL SAN DIEGO and RUFINA SAN DIEGO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, et al., respondents.
Isidro T. Almeda for petitioners.
Jose P. Osorio for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Presented before us in this petition for mandamus is the peculiar case of party-defendants insisting on, and prevailing
party-plaintiffs resisting, the execution of a final and executory decision.
To understand this peculiarity, we will state briefly facts leading to the controversy.
After trial in Civil Case No. 770 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on complaint of Jose, Maria and Urbano all
surnamed "de la Cruz", to recover a parcel of land and damages from Gil San Diego and Rufino San Diego, the Court
(Hon. Jesus Y. Perez, presiding) rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby rendered considers judgment as follows:
(a) Declaring the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, null and void;
(b) Ordering the defendants and third-party plaintiffs to vacate the land in question upon payment to them by the
plaintiffs and third-party defendants, within thirty (30) days after this decision has become final, of the sum of
THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,500.00);
(c) Dismissing the counterclaim of the third-party defendants; and
(d) No pronouncement as to costs.
The court found that the disputed portion of a parcel of land belonged to the plaintiffs through hereditary succession; that
the defendants built a house on the land in good faith, having acquired the land from Catalina Anastacio, mother of the
plaintiffs, by purchase for P1,000.00. During the proceedings, the defendants filed a third-party complaint against said
vendor. The vendor (mother of plaintiffs) subsequently died; hence, herein respondent who were the plaintiffs, became at
the same time third-party defendants in substitution of their deceased mother. The court voided the sale on the ground
that the vendor had no right to the land, but upheld the defense of defendants as builders in good faith.
On appeal by the plaintiffs and third-party defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the lower court's decision, and
the same, thereafter, became final and executory. Over two years later, the defendants and third party plaintiffs, who were
in possession of the parcel of land in litigation, moved to execute paragraph (b) of the aforequoted dispositive portion of
the decision in order to collect the sum of P3,500.00 and thereafter to vacate the premises. The motion was denied by the
court (Hon. Agustin P. Montesa presiding), and a motion for reconsideration was likewise of no avail Hence, the instant
petition for mandamus was filed to compel the respondent judge to issue the writ applied for.1awphl.nt
Petitioners' argument is that the pertinent part of the dispositive portion of the decision ordains, first, that they vacate the
land, and second, that the plaintiffs pay P3,500.00 within 30 days after this decision becomes final,
with the connecting preposition "upon" unmistakably denoting that the second (payment of indemnity) is a
condition precedent to the first (vacation of the premises). (Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 5)
They hold the view that the respondents should pay them first before they vacate, and not vice-versa; and that they are
entitled now to insist on the payment through a writ of execution.
Respondents, upon the other hand, contend:

(1) That petitioners have no right to the writ of execution, because as absolute owners of the land, the
respondents have the right, under Article 448, to exercise the option to either pay the value of improvements or
demand reasonable rent if respondents do not choose to appropriate the building;
(2) That in fact respondents have elected to demand payment of rentals on land actually occupied by petitioners'
building at TEN PESOS a month, and made a demand therefor immediately after the finality of the Court of
Appeals decision, because the amount of P3,500.00 is exorbitant, so that the land owners choose to allow
petitioners to remain on the land;
(3) That respondents have long suggested to petition that a commissioner be appointed to assess the present fair
market value of the building, taking depreciation into account; and
(4) That the denial of the motion for execution is justified because it is premature and has no legal basis.
We find the petition meritorious. The judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and now final, explicitly ordains the
payment by the respondents de la Cruz of the amount of P3,500.00 "within 30 days after this decision becomes final" to
petitioners San Diego. If it also orders petitioners to vacate only upon the payment, it did so in recognition of the right of
retention granted to possessor in good faith by Article 546 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This provision is expressly
made applicable to builders in good faith (Article 448). The right of retention thus granted is merely a security for the
enforcement of the possessor's right to indemnity for the improvement comments made by him. As a result, the possessor
in good faith, in retaining the land and its improvements pending reimbursement of his useful expenditures, is not bound
pay any rental during the period of retention; otherwise the value of his security would be impaired (cf. Tufexis vs.
Chunaco (C.A.), 36 O.G. 2455).
Normally, of course, the landowner has the option to either appropriate the improvement or to sell the land to the
possessor. This option is no longer open to the respondent landowners because the decision in the former suit limits them
to the first alternative by requiring t petitioner's to vacate the land (and surrender the improved comments) upon payment
of P3,500.00. Evidently, the Courts of First Instance and of Appeals opined that the respondents suit to recover the
property was an exercise their right to choose to appropriate the improvements and pay the indemnity fixed by law. The
respondents acquiesced in this view, since they did not ask for a modification of the judgment, and allowed it to become
final. Consequently, they can no longer insist on selecting another alternative; nor can they be heard now to urge that the
value of the indemnity, set at P3,500.00, is exorbitant for the same reason that the judgment fixing that amount is no
longer subject to alteration.
The judgment ordering payment to petitioners of P3,500.00, by way of indemnity, having become final, and the 30 days for
its payment having elapsed, the court of first instance has the ministerial duty to order its execution (Zulueta vs. Paredes,
62 Phil. 5; Buenaventura vs. Garcia, 78 Phil. 759; Amor vs. Jugo, 17 Phil. 703; Viquiera vs. Baraa 78 Phil. 456). That
duty is compellable by mandamus; and the execution is leviable on any property of respondents de la Cruz, including the
land now in question and its improvements.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is ordered to issue the writ of
execution in favor of petitioners. Costs against respondent de la Cruz.
G.R. No. L-12812

September 29, 1959

FILIPINAS COLLEGES, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL., defendants.
-----------------------------G.R. No. L-12813

September 29, 1959

MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL., plaintiffs.

MARIA GARICA TIMBANG, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, defendant-appellee.

De Guzman and Fernandez for appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc.

San Huan, Africa and Benedicto for appellant Maria Garcia Timbang.
Nicanor S. Sison for appellee Maria Gervacio Blas.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated May 10, 1957 (a) declaring the
Sheriff's certificate of sale covering a school building sold at public auction null and void unless within 15 days from notice
of said order the successful bidders, defendants-appellants spouses Maria Garcia Timbang and Marcelino Timbang, shall

pay to, appellee Maria Gervacio Blas directly or through the Sheriff of Manila the sum of P5,750.00 that the spouses
Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff's sale; (b) declaring the other appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. owner of
24,500/3,285,934 undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a covered by certificate of tile No 45970, on which the building sold in the
auction sale is situated; and (c) ordering the sale in public auction of the said undivided interest of the Filipinas Colleges,
Inc., in lot No. 2-a aforementioned to satisfy the unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of appellee Blas and against
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of P5,750.00 mentioned in (a) above.
The order appealed from is the result of three motions filed in the court a quo in the course of the execution of a final
judgment of the Court of Appeals rendered in 2 cases appealed to it in which the spouses Timbang, the Filipinas Colleges,
Inc., and Maria Gervacio Blas were the parties. IN that judgment of the Court of Appeals, the respective rights of the
litigants have been adjudicated as follows:1wphl.nt
(1) Filipinas Colleges, Inc. was declared to have acquired the rights of the spouses Timbang in and to lot No. 2-a
mentioned above and in consideration thereof, Filipinas Colleges, Inc., was ordered to pay the spouses Timbang
the amount of P15,807.90 plus such other amounts which said spouses might have paid or had to pay after
February, 1953, to Hoskins and Co. Inc., agent of the Urban Estates, Inc., original vendor of the lot. Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. original vendor of the total amount with the court within 90 days after the decision shall have
become final.
(2) Maria Gervacio Blas was declared to be a builder in good faith of the school building constructed on the lot in
question and entitled to be paid the amount of P19,000.00 for the same. Filipinas Colleges, Inc., purchaser of the
said building was ordered to deliver to Blas stock certificate (Exh. C) for 108 shares of Filipinas Colleges, Inc. with
a par value of P10,800.00 and to pay Blas the sum of P8,200.00 of the house.
(3) In case Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to deposit the value of the land, which after liquidation was fixed at
P32,859.34, within the 90-day period set by the court, Filipinas Colleges would lose all its rights to the land and
the spouses Timbang would then become the owners thereof. In that eventuality, the Timbangs would make
known to the court their option under Art. 448 of the Civil Code whether they would appropriate the building in
question, in which even they would have to pay Filipinas Colleges, Inc. the sum of P19,000.00, or would compel
the latter to acquire the land and pay the price thereof.
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. having failed to pay or deposit the sum of P32,859.34 within the time prescribed, the spouses
Timbang, in compliance with the judgment of the Court of Appeals, on September 28, 1956, made known to the court their
decision that they had chosen not of appropriate the building but to compel Filipinas Colleges, Inc., for the payment of the
sum of P32,859,34. The motion having been granted, a writ of execution was issued on January 8, 1957.
On January 16, 1957, appellee Blas in turn filed a motion for execution of her judgment of P8,200.00 representing the
unpaid portion of the price of the house sold to Filipinas Colleges, Inc. Over the object of the Timbangs, the court grated
the motion and the corresponding writ of execution was issued on January 30, 1957, date of the granting of the motion for
execution, Blas through counsel, sent a letter to the Sheriff of Manila advising him of her preferential claim or lien on the
house to satisfy the unpaid balance of the purchase price thereof under Article 2242 of the Civil Code, and to withhold
from the proceed of the auction sale the sum of P8,200.00. Levy having been made on the house in virtue of the writs of
execution, the Sheriff of Manila on March 5, 1957, sold the building in public auction in favor of the spouses Timbang, as
the highest bidders, in the amount of P5,750.00. Personal properties of Filipinas Colleges, Inc. were also auctioned for
P245.00 in favor of the spouses Timbang.
As a result of these actuation, three motion were subsequently filed before the lower court:
(1) By appellee Blas, praying that the Sheriff of Manila and/or the Timbang spouses be ordered to pay and deliver
to her the sum of P5,750.00 representing the proceeds of the auction sale of the building of Filipinas Colleges,
Inc. over which she has a lien of P8,200.00 for the unpaid balance of the purchase price thereof;.
(2) Also by the appellee Bals, praying that there being still two unsatisfied executions, one for the sum of
P32,859.34 in favor the land involved, Lot No. 2-a, be sold at public auction; and (3) By Filipinas Colleges, Inc.
praying that because its properties, the house and some personal properties, have been auctioned for P5,750.00
and P245.00 respectively in favor of the Timbang spouses who applied the proceeds to the partial payment of the
sum of P32,859.34 value of the land, Lot No. 2-a, it (Filipinas Colleges, Inc.) be declared part owner of said lot to
the extent of the total amount realized from the execution sale of its properties.1wphl.nt
The Timbang spouses presented their opposition to each and all of these motion. After due hearing the lower court
rendered its resolution in the manner indicated at the beginning of this decision, from which the Timbangs alone have
appealed.

In assailing the order of the court a quo directing the appellants to pay appellee Blas the amount of their bid (P5,750.00)
made at the public auction, appellants' counsel has presented a novel, albeit ingenious, argument. It is contended that
because the builder in good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after the owners thereof exercised their option
under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder lost his right of retention provided in Article 546 and by operation of Article
445, the appellants as owners of the land automatically became the owners ipso facto, the execution sale of the house in
their favor was superfluous. Consequently, they are not bound to make good their bid of P5,750.00 as that would be to
make goods to pay for their own property. By the same token, Blas claim for preference on account of the unpaid balance
of the purchase price of the house does not apply because preference applies only with respect to the property of the
debtor, and the Timbangs, owners of the house, are not the debtors of Blas.
This Court cannot accept this oversimplification of appellants' position. Article 448 and 546 of the Civil Code defining the
right of the parties in case a person in good faith builds, sows or plants on the land of another, respectively provides:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or plated in good faith shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnify provided for in article
546 and 548, or to obligate the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until he has reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention the person
who has defeated him in the possession having to option of refunding the amount of expenses or of paying the
case in value which thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Under the terms of these article, it is true that the owner of the land has the right to choose between appropriating the
building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. Even this
second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land is considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the
right of the builder to be paid the value of his improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the
property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these two article, 448 and
546, which would justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when
such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445.
The case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil., 590 cited by appellants is no authority for this conclusion. Although it is true it
was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this
alternative, the builder's right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said that as a
consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building. The question is; what is the recourse or
remedy left to the parties in such eventuality where the builder fails to pay the value of the land? While the Code is silent
on this Court in the cases of Miranda vs. Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil., 801; 51 Off. Gaz., [12] 6226; Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76
Phil., 605 and the cited case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, supra.
In the first case, this Court has said:
A builder in good faith not be required to pay rentals. he has right to retain the land on which he has built in good
faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. Possibly he might be made to pay rental only when the
owner of the land chooses not to appropriate the improvement and requires the builder in good faith to pay for the
land but that the builder is unwilling or unable to pay the land, and then they decide to leave things as they are
and assume the relation of lessor and lessee, and should they disagree as to the amount of rental then they can
go to the court to fix that amount. (Emphasis supplied)
Should the parties not agree to leave things as they are and to assume the relation of lessor and lessee, another remedy
is suggested in the case of Ignacio vs. Hilario, supra, wherein the court has ruled that the owner of the land in entitled to
have the improvement removed when after having chosen to sell his land to the other party, i.e., the builder in good faith
fails to pay for the same.
A further remedy is indicated in the case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, supra, where this Court approved the sale of the land
and the improvement in a public auction applying the proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of the land and the
excess, if any, to be delivered to the owner of the house in payment thereof.
The appellants herein, owners o the land, instead of electing any of the alternative above indicated chose to seek
recovery of the value of their land by asking for a writ of execution; levying on the house of the builder; and selling the
same in public auction. Sand because they are the highest bidder in their own auction sale, they now claim they acquired

title to the building without necessity of paying in cash on account of their bid. In other words, they in effect pretend to
retain their land and acquire the house without paying a cent therefor.
This contention is without merit. This Court has already held in Matias vs. The Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija (74 Phil.,
326) that while it is the inveriable practice, dictated by common sense, that where the successful bidder is the execution
creditor himself, he need not pay down the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgement,
nevertheless, when their is a claim by a third-party, to the proceeds of the sale superior to his judgment credit, the
execution creditor, as successful bidder, must pay in cash the amount of his bid as a condition precedent to the issuance
to him of the certificate of sale. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is
entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school building. Blas is actually a lien on the
school building are concerned. The order of the lower court directing the Timbang spouses, as successful bidders, to pay
in cash the amount of their bid in the sum of P5,750.00 is therefore correct.
With respect to the order of the court declaring appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. part owner of the land to the extent of the
value of its personal properties sold at public auction in favor of the Timbang, this Court Likewise finds the same as
justified, for such amount represents, in effect, a partial payment of the value of the land. If this resulted in the continuation
of the so-called involuntary partnership questioned by the difference between P8,200.00 the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of the building and the sum of P5,750.00 amount to be paid by the Timbangs, the order of the court
directing the sale of such undivided interest of the Filipinas Colleges, Inc. is likewise justified to satisfy the claim of the
appellee Blas.
Considering that the appellant spouses Marcelino Timbang and Maria Garcia Timbang may not voluntarily pay the sum of
P5,750.00 as ordered, thereby further delaying the final termination of this case, the first part of the dispositive portion of
the order appealed from is modified in the sense that upon failure of the Timbang spouses to pay to the Sheriff or to
Manila Gervacio Blas said sum of P5,750.00 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the final judgment, an order of
execution shall issue in favor of Maria Gervasio Blas to be levied upon all properties of the Timbang spouses not exempt
from execution for the satisfaction of the said amount.
In all other respects, the appealed order of the court a quo is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-12486

August 31, 1960

LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA TORRALBA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA BONGATO and JARDENIO SANCHEZ, respondents.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioners.

E.D. Mercado, J.V. Ong and J.T. Gonzales for respondents.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is a petition to review on certiorari a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Leonor Grana and Julieta Torralba, defendants below and herein petitioners, were on April 13, 1951 sued by Aurora
Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, respondents herein, before the Court of First Instance of Agusan, for the recovery of 87
square meters of residential land. After trial, the court rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs, herein respondents,
owners of the land in controversy and ordering petitioners to vacate and deliver it to said respondents and to pay a
monthly rental of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually vacate the same, plus attorney's fees and costs.
The decision, on appeal, having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the only modification of disallowing the award
for attorney's fees, petitioners brought the case to this Court through the present petition for review.
The record discloses that sometime in 1909 a cadastral survey of Butuan, Agusan, was made by the Bureau of Lands. In
that survey, the parcel of land here in question was included as part of the lot belonging to Gregorio Bongato and Clara
Botcon for which Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138) was issued in their favor on February 12, 1923. On
November 25, 1933, this lot was purchased by the spouses Marcos Bongato and Eusebia More, and upon their death, the

land was inherited by the respondents Aurora Bongato and Jardenio Sanchez, the former being the daughter of Marcos
Bongato by his first marriage while the latter is the son of Eusebia More also by her first marriage.
Petitioners claim that the lands in Butuan were subsequently resurveyed due to conflicts and overlapping of boundaries.
In that resurvey (TS-65 Butuan Cadastre), Gregorio Bongato's lot, according to petitioners, was identified as Lot No. 311
and that of Isidaria Trillo, their predecessor in interest, as Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that Original Certificate of Title No.
RO-72 (138) covers 295 square meters of land, while the sketch plan of the second cadastral survey of Butuan shows that
Lot No. 311 has only 230 square meters, petitioners maintain that it is the latter area properly belongs to respondents and
that the land in question is part of the adjoining land, Lot No. 310, which belonged to their predecessor in interest.
Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was presented to show that the first survey was erroneous or that it included part
of the contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in interest as part of the lot now covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. RO-72 (138). Note that the difference in area between the land covered by said title and Lot No. 311 of the resurvey
plan is 65 square meters while the area of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. And what is more, the alleged sketch
plan of the resurvey was not presented in evidence.
Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the land in question is part of the lot covered by the Torrens title issued way
back in 1923 in the name of respondents' predecessor in interest. Said title has not been contested up to the present, and,
therefore, has become inconvertible evidence of the ownership of the land covered by it. Well settled is the rule that a
Torrens certificate of title becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of the period within which it may be
impugned (Reyes, et al. vs. Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791; Yumul vs. Rivera, et al., 64 Phil., 13).
Petitioners' contention that the Court of Appeals erred in not granting their motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, likewise, cannot be sustained. The new evidence sought to be introduced was the sketch plan of the
second survey, which, with the employment of reasonable diligence would have easily been discovered and produced at
the trial. Anyway, even if presented at the result of the case. If a subsequent certificate of title cannot be permitted to
prevail over a previous Torrens title (Reyes, et al, vs. Borbon, et al.,supra) with more reason should a resurvey plan not to
be allowed to alter or modify such title so as to make the area of the land therein described agree with that given in the
plan. (See Government of the Philippines vs. Arias, 36 Phil., 195).
Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were found by the Court of
Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article
448 of the new), the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as
his own faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary and
useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the
price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore the choice of either appropriating the portion of
petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that
part of their land on which stands the improvement. It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents
to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event the
whole building might be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to
petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or
unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so. Of course, respondents cannot oblige
petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be
the case, then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the
lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the same. (Article 361, old Civil Code; Article 448 of the new).
In this connection, the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to pay monthly rentals of P10.00 from the date of filing
of the complaint until they actually vacate said land. A builder in good faith may not be required to pay rentals. He has a
right to retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him.
(Miranda vs. Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil., 801; 51 Off. Gaz., 6226, see also Martinez vs. Baganus, 28 Phil., 500; De
Guzman vs. De la Fuente, 55 Phil., 501; Kasilag vs. Rodriguez, Off. Gaz., Supp., August 16, 1941, p. 247).
Petitioners further contend that he complaint should have been dismissed for nonjoinder of an indispensable party, it being
alleged that their mother Maria Cupin, who owns the land in question as part of her Lot No. 310, has not been made a
party defendant in the case. This contention, which was not raised in the trial court, deserves scant consideration.
Petitioners clearly asserted ownership over the land in dispute as well as over Lot No. 310 in their answer to the
complaint. They are consequently estopped from alleging otherwise.
As to petitioners' assertion that they should have been awarded damages alleged to have been suffered by them in their
counterclaim, suffice it to say that petitioners failed to prove that they suffered any damage at all by reason of the filing of
the complaint. Indeed, in the light of the view we have taken of the case, they could not have substantiated their claim for
damages.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is modified in the sense that respondents are hereby directed to exercise
within 30 days from this decision their option to either buy the portion of the petitioners' house on their land or sell to said

petitioners the portion of their land and petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the same and
must pay reasonable rent of P10.00 monthly from the time respondents made their choice up to the time they actually
vacate the premises. But if the value of the eland is considerably more than the value of the improvement, then petitioners
may elect to rent the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms of a lease. Should they disagree, the court
of origin is hereby instructed to intervene and fix the terms thereof. Petitioners shall pay reasonable rent of P10.00
monthly up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the curt fixes such terms.
So ordered without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-18771

March 26, 1923

NICOLAS PANLILIO, EUTIQUIANO CUYUGAN, and SIXTO TIMBOL, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ATILANO MERCADO, CIRIACO PIMPING, MANUEL REYES, and TELESFORO MARTINEZ, defendants-appellants.
Aurelio Pineda and Gibbs, McDonough and Johnson for plaintiffs-appellants.
Perfecto J. Salas Rodriguez, Vicente S. de Villa, and Elias Canapy for defendants-appellants.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of injunction to restrain the defendants from entering upon certain lands situated in the
municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga, and from disturbing the plaintiffs in their peaceful possession of the same.
The plaintiffs also pray for damages for trespass on the land.
The defendants' answer denies generally the allegations of the petition. The defendant Reyes and Martinez alleged by
way of special defense that the former is the district engineer; that the latter is the Commander of the Constabulary of the
Province of Pampanga; that in their relations to the matter in controversy they have been acting in their official capacity;
and that they therefore have no interest in the litigation. The defendants Mercado and Pimping set up a counterclaim for
P40,000 alleging that the plaintiffs, by placing bamboo stakes in the River Abacan, caused it to change its course, thus
invading said defendants' lands and causing damages in the sum mentioned.
The court absolved the defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, without costs. From this
judgment all of the parties appeal.
It appears from the evidence that the plaintiffs are the owners of various parcels of land in the municipality of Mexico,
Province of Pampanga, more particularly described in plaintiffs' amended complaint. From 1911 until August, 1919, the
parcels of land belonging to the plaintiffs were divided by a small river known as the Estero Abacan. The defendants
Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping are the owners of various parcels of land which, previously to the months of August,
1919, were situated to the east of the land of the plaintiffs and were not touched by the Abacan River.
In the month mentioned, a very heavy flood occurred in the Abacan River and when the flood subsided, the river no longer
flowed in the channel through the lands of the plaintiffs but had opened a new course for itself through the lands of the
defendants where it still continues to flow. This new course was the course of the river previous to the year 1911. It may
be noted that in the years 1916 and 1917 a cadastral survey was made of the district where the lands of both the plaintiffs
and the defendants are situated and that upon the plans of that survey the then course of the river is excluded from the
cadaster and set apart as a public stream.
After the termination of the 1919 rainy season and early in the year 1920, a complaint was made to the provincial board of
the Province of Pampanga by various land owners including the defendant Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping, setting
forth that the new course of the river was destroying their land and rendering it useless and asking that the river be
returned to its former channel. The complaint was endorsed to the district engineer and on June 10, 1920, the defendants
Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping, accompanied by the defendant district engineer, Manuel Reyes, proceeded to the
point where the river had first begun to change its course, and, after locating this point upon the cadastral plan, proceeded
with laborers of the defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping to excavate the old bed of the river for the purpose
of causing the river to return to this bed. As a consequence, this action was instituted on June 25, 1920.
The facts stated are not disputed and the law of the case presents, in our opinion, no serious difficulty. Article 370 of the
Civil Code reads:
Los cauces be los ros, que quedan abandonados por variar naturalmente el curso de las aguas, pertenecen a los
dueos de los terrenos ribereos en toda la longitud respectiva a cada uno. Si el cauce abandonado separaba
heredades de distintos dueos, la nueva lnea divisoria correr equidistante de unas y otras.

Relying on the provisions of this article, the plaintiffs maintain that the old bed of the river Abacan became ipso
facto absolutely abandoned upon the river varying its course in 1919. Examining the provisions in question, it is apparent
that while the abandonment of the bed may be the consequence of the riving changing its course, it is not necessarily the
action of the river itself which is the only and final determining factor in such abandonment. In the case of a public stream,
the bed is of public ownership and the public cannot be considered absolutely divested of this ownership until there is
some indication of an intention on the part of the Government to acquiesce in the change in the course of the stream. That
the Government is not compelled to stand idly by and let nature take its course is clearly indicated by article 372 of the
Civil Code. (See also discussion in Manresa's Commentaries on the Civil Code, vol. 3, pp. 253, 254.)
In the present case the river is a public stream; its bed is of public ownership and was definitely located and determined in
the cadastral survey. As soon as practicable after the river changed its course, steps were taken under the direction of the
Government functionaries to bring it back into its old course and work was continued until interrupted by the present
action. This certainly does not indicated abandonment on the part of the Government.
As to the defendants' claim for damages, we agree with the trial court that while the evidence undoubtedly shows that the
plaintiffs placed bamboo stakes across the river and that the stakes may have caused an accumulation of sand or
sediment which in turn may have contributed to the change in the course of the river, such evidence falls short of showing
that this was the primary cause of the change and of the damage to the defendants' property.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs in this instance. So ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990
EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA
UBINA, respondents.
Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.
Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan.
According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east
of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land
east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).
As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank. The shifting of
the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by the
Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349,
7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351
(Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his possession in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted
to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead Application
No. W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug's possession was recognized in the
decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-Binayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad,
the predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for Lot
3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was
defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad), depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land
possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the process,
cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands
were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.
In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side
of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same
lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T) to
recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo
Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions.
On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:
In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and Octavio
Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre
together with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre
and for these defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the
only interested heirs of Macario Melad.
In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente
Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad,
Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and
Juan Langoay, or any of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879,
7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to restore
possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina. Without pronouncement as to damages
which were not properly proven and to costs.
SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)
Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case No. 344-T, only
defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay
appealed. But upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the execution pending appeal of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as
they had not presented evidence at the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).
On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial
court, with costs against the defendants-appellants.
In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents' estate as a result of
accretion;
2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to pertain to petitioners' estate
cannot preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof; and
3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not affected by the sudden
and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed
The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents who did not lose
the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course
of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).
All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:
. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within this
period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the original lands
of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not
discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases

that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against the denial of defendant
Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said
so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he
testified that when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao Cadastre
executed in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by
the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed by the denials of Vicente
Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.)
The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919
up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of
5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it
become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June,
1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the
Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial
deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this
principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of
the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that
such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion
(Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).itc-asl
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the
course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said
accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this
situation.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known
portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part
thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968
caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the current." The
private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side
of the river.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39677 July 22, 1975
INTER-REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO CABALLERO, respondents.
Raquiza, Esparraqo, Amante, Pacificador, Ozamis and Adaza for petitioner.
German M. Lopez for private respondent.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR 02794-SP. Upon consideration of
the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the respondent's
comment thereon, the Court resolved to treat this case as a special civil action. 1 The challenged decision declares null
and void an order dated January 16, 1974 of Judge Sancho Y. Inserto of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Branch 1)
which enjoined the defendant in its civil case 9562, entitled "Inter-Regional Development Corporation vs. Ricardo
Caballero," from cutting and milling the sugar cane crop which the therein plaintiff company (herein petitioner) asserts to
have planted in good faith.
On December 13, 1974 we issued a temporary restraining order which reads as follows:

You (respondent Court of Appeals) are hereby RESTRAINED from enforcing and/or implementing your
decision in CA-GR No. 02794-SP entitled "Ricardo Caballero versus Hon. Sancho Inserto, etc., et al." and
you (respondent Caballero), your agents, representatives, assigns, successors-in-interest and/or any
person or persons acting upon your orders or in your place or stead, are likewise RESTRAINED from
collecting and/or negotiating the quedans representing the milled sugar canes homestead from Lots No. I
and 6, Psu-118496 in Batad, Iloilo for the crop year 1973-74.
In civil case 8195 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, entitled "Inter-Regional Development Corporation vs. Isidro
Estrada, et al.," for annulment of sales and damages and involving land ownership, the court, thru Judge Castrence
Veloso of Branch III, rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and, among others, ordering the spouses Jose Baez
and Isabel Baez (president and treasurer, respectively, of the inter-Regional Development Corporation) or their privies
to immediately vacate and surrender the possession of Lots 1 and 6, Plan Psu-118496 to the third-party
plaintiff (Isidro A. Estrada) and not to molest, disturb or in any manner interfere with his possession
thereof ....
The corporation appealed; nonetheless, Judge Veloso issued, on May 7, 1973, a partial writ of execution pending appeal,
and possession of the two lots was delivered to Estrada, following which the latter, on May 25, 1973, leased the lots to
now respondent Ricardo Caballero for a term of ten years, starting with the crop year 1973-74.
On July 6, 1973 the corporation filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying that Judge
Veloso be enjoined from enforcing the partial writ of execution. Holding that the said Judge did not abuse his discretion in
ordering partial execution, the Court of Appeals, on October 16, 1973, dismissed the petition. This decision became final.
However, five days before entry of judgment, or on November 15, 1973, the corporation filed civil case 9562, for injunction
and damages, against the lessee Caballero to settle the question of ownership of the sugar crop for 1973-74 which the
corporation alleged to have planted in good faith on the lands litigated in civil case 8195. Judge Sancho Inserto, to whom
the case was assigned, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Caballero "from cutting, milling the growing sugar
cane ...."
Caballero moved for reconsideration, but before the court could act on his motion, he filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. On September 30, 1974 the appellate court promulgated its decision setting aside Judge Inserto's
preliminary injunction.1wph1.t
Hence, the present recourse by the corporation.
On the issue of whether the preliminary injunction issued in case 9562 by Judge Inserto enjoining Caballero from cutting
and milling the sugar cane constitutes an interference with the partial writ of execution pending appeal issued in case
8195 by Judge Veloso ordering the Baez spouses to vacate and surrender possession of the parcels of land and not to
molest or disturb Estrada's (Caballero's lessor) possession thereof, we find that neither order interferes with the other; as
a matter of fact the order of Judge Inserto complements that of Judge Veloso. The latter refers to the land itself, the
ownership of which was the only issue adjudged in the decision pending appeal, while the former refers to the sugar cane
crop standing thereon. True it is that under article 440 of the Civil Code the ownership of property includes the right of
accession to everything attached thereto either naturally or artificially, and that under article 415, trees, plants and growing
fruits, while they are attached to the land, are immovable property; it is equally true that when a person plants in good faith
on land belonging to another, the landowner does not ipso facto acquire ownership of what has been planted; he must first
indemnify the planter before he can appropriate the same. And so provides article 448:
The owner of the land in which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548 ....
The aforequoted article, not those relied upon by the respondent, applies in the present case, because the petitioner has
alleged good faith in planting the sugar cane, thus giving rise to a conflict of rights which poses the issue of the protection
of the alleged planter in good faith without causing injustice to the landowner. 2
Absent any incompatibility between the orders issued by Judges Inserto and Veloso, the doctrine that no court has the
power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction,
having equal power to grant the relief, 3 does not apply.
In holding that the gathering of the crops existing on the land is part of Estrada's right of ownership and possession, the
Court of Appeals in effect prematurely held that the petitioner is a planter in bad faith; this is error since the issues as to
who planted and whether the planter planted in good faith are the very issues posed in case 9562, which is yet pending.

The Court of Appeals, however, did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari even if a motion for reconsideration had
not yet been resolved by the Court of First Instance, in view of the urgency of securing a definitive ruling on the sugar
cane crop, which is perishable. 4
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 02794-SP is set aside, and the restraining order
heretofore issued is made permanent, without prejudice, however, to the final outcome in case 9562 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo. No costs.

G.R. No. L-46963 March 14, 1994

GLORIA A. FERRER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO BAUTISTA, MARIANO BALANAG, AND MAGDALENA DOMONDON, respondents.
Fortunato F.L. Viray, Jr. for petitioner.
Agaton D. Yaranon, Jr., for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the order, dated 11 December 1976, of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of La Union, Branch III, dismissing petitioner's complaint for Quieting of Title to
Real Property, as well as its order of 03 May 1977, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution, dated 19 August 1977 (p. 4, Rollo), petitioner was allowed to file the instant petition
under Republic Act No. 5440 considering that only questions of law had been raised.
On 03 August 1978, the Court dismissed the petition for lack of interest due to the failure of petitioner's counsel to submit
the requisite memorandum in support of the petition (p. 58, Rollo). In a Resolution, dated 28 September 1978 (p.
63, Rollo), however, the Court resolved to reconsider the dismissal and to reinstate the petition.
Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay, La Union. Petitioner claims its
ownership by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is immediately north
of the land in question. On the other hand, private respondents equally assert ownership over the property on account of
long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena Domondon, pursuant
to Free Patent No. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 (p. 29, Rollo).
On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of La
Union to "Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. The case
was denominated Civil Case No. A-514.
Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint
for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965, against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge,
who also handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground that the
court had no authority to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis of a mere
collateral attack (pp. 22-23, Rollo).
On 11 March 1976, private respondents also moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 514-A on the following grounds, to
wit:
1) Gloria A. Ferrer's lack of personality to file and prosecute Civil Case
No. 514-A;
2) Civil Case 514-A is barred by prior judgment;
3) Lack of sufficient averments to constitute a cause of action; and
4) Civil Case No. 514-A, is a collateral attack on the Free Patent Decree
No. 309504 and O.C. of Title No. F-168 (Annex "B," pp. 17-21). (p.
66, Rollo.)

On
07
December
1976,
Judge
Antonio
G.
Bautista
(pp. 23-24, Record on Appeal), dismissing petitioner's complaint, ratiocinating, thus

issued

an

order

This has reference to the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants, through counsel. The plaintiff filed an
Answer to the Motion to Dismiss also through counsel.
The subject of the present action for Quieting of Title to Real Property, is covered by Free Patent No.
309504 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the names of the defendants. However, the plaintiff
alleged in her Complaint that said Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title were secured through fraud,
etc., on January 24, 1966, for which reason, they are null and void. In view thereof, while the plaintiff filed
the present action ostensibly to Quiet Title of her alleged real property, it is in reality for the annulment or
revocation of the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title of the defendants. The observation of the
Court is clinched by prayer (a) of the plaintiff's complaint, i.e., "That Patent Title No. 168 be declared
revoked and cancelled as null and void from the Records of the Office of the Register of Deeds of San
Fernando, La Union, etc." Consequently, the present action is untenable because it constitute a collateral
or indirect attach on the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title of the defendants. That is so,
because it was held in the case of Samonte, et al. vs. Sambelon, et al., L-12964, February 29, 1960, that
like a decree, a Patent cannot be attacked collaterally.
Furthermore, the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants because the Patent title issued in
favor of the Firmalos (defendants here) by the Director of Lands is by now already indefeasible due to the
lapse of one year following the entry of the decree of registration in the records of the register of deeds
(Firmalos vs. Tutaan, No. L-35408, October 27, 1973).
WHEREFORE, the Court is constrained to order dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. There is no
pronouncement as to damages and costs. (p. 33, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the court in its order of 03 May 1977 (p. 38, Record on Appeal).
Hence this petition.
Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors on the part of respondent judge:
I. In not finding and declaring that Gloria A. Ferrer has legal personality to
prosecute Civil Case No. 514-A;
II. In not finding and declaring that Civil Case No. 514-A has stated
sufficient cause of action;
III. In not finding and declaring that petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer's title to the
land is beclouded by the contrary claim of the private respondents
thereto; and
IV. In outright dismissing Civil Case No. 514-A on the ground of collateral
attack on Free Patent Decree No. 309504 being an abuse of judicial
discretion and an excess of his jurisdiction. (p. 13, Rollo.)
The petition has merit.
Article 457 of the Civil Code, under which petitioner claims ownership over the dispute parcel of land, provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Undoubtedly, plaintiff is the lawful owner of the accretion, she being the registered owner of Lot 1980 which adjoins the
alluvial property. Parenthetically, the same finding has also been made by the trial court in Civil Case No. A-86 (p.
29, Rollo).
Alluvion gives to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion which is gradually received
from the effects of the current of waters (Art. 457, Civil Code; Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37; Cureg vs. IAC,
177 SCRA 313). The rationale for the rule is to provide some kind of compensation to owners of land continually exposed
to the destructive force of water and subjected to various easements (Agustin vs. IAC, 187 SCRA 218; Binalay vs.
Manalo, 195 SCRA 374).

The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which
has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void (Tuason vs. Court
of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37). The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those
that are privately owned (Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793).
Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at
the time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the public domain.
Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not
apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare the nullity of that void title does not prescribe (Agne vs.
Director of Lands, supra); in fact, it is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack (Estoesta, Sr. vs. Court of
Appeals, 179 SCRA 203).
Private respondents contend that an action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive period is
applicable to an action for reconveyance if, indeed, it is based on an implied or constructive trust. Article 1456 of the Civil
Code, upon which a constructive trust can be predicated, cannot be invoked, however, since the public grant and the title
correspondingly issued to private respondents that can create that juridical relationship is a patent nullity. Even assuming,
nonetheless, that a constructive trust did arise, the running of the prescriptive period is to be deemed interrupted when an
action is filed in court (Art. 1155, Civil Code) or, obviously, when one is already there pending.
Here, to recall, the Free Patent was issued on 24 January 1966 and OCT P-168 was transcribed in the Registration Book
of La Union on 08 February 1966 (pp. 38-39, Rollo). At that time, Civil Case No. A-86 forreivindicacion between the parties
was still pending in court. After Civil Case No. A-86 was dismissed, without prejudice, on 10 February 1976 (p. 32, Rollo),
petitioner, on 22 March 1976 (p. 1, Record on Appeal), promptly filed Civil Case No. A-514 (now on appeal in this
instance).
Neither can private respondents claim ownership of the disputed property by acquisitive prescription. Ownership and other
real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years if the adverse
possession is with a just title and the possession is in good faith. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, this time without need of title or of good faith.
(See Art. 1134, Civil Code.)
Given the settings in this case at bench, the applicable period of acquisitive prescription, if at all, would be thirty years.
Even assuming, then, that private respondents were in adverse possession of the property from 1966 when the free
patent was obtained, or even at the inception of their alleged adverse possession in 1954 ("Comment on Petition for
Review," p. 35, Rollo), that possession, for purposes of acquisitive prescription, was deemed interrupted upon their receipt
of summons (Art. 1123, Civil Code) in Civil Case No. A-86 pending since 1965, as well as Civil Case No. A-514 filed in
1976 following the dismissal the month previous of Civil Case No. A-86. The prescriptive period of prescription may not be
held to commence anew during the pendency of said cases.
The instant petition has merely prayed that respondent court be directed to continue hearing Civil Case No. 514-A. We
have repeatedly ruled, however, that where the determinative facts are before this Court, and it is in a position to finally
resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by the resolution of the case and thereby
obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case to the trial court (Heirs of Crisanta
Almoradie, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 91385, January 4, 1994; Lianga Bay Logging Co., et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, 157 SCRA 357; Escudero vs. Dulay, 158, SCRA 69). Clearly, the records support the finding that herein
petitioner is the true owner of the land subject of the free patent issued to private respondents. The court then, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction. may, instead of remanding the case to the trial court, direct the owner to reconvey the
disputed parcel to its lawful owner (Limaza vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 855; Agne vs. Director of Lands, supra). Considering,
moreover, the length of time that this case has been pending between the parties, not counting petitioner's original action
for reivindicacion in
Civil
Case
No.
A-86 filed on 25 November 1956, an order from this Court requiring such reconveyance can certainly be just and
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 514-A is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING petitioner to be the owner of the disputed parcel of land and
ORDERING private respondents to reconvey the same to said petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19570

April 27, 1967

JOSE V. HILARIO, JR., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee,
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS, CITY ENGINEER OF MANILA, FERNANDO BUSUEGO and EUGENIO
SESE,defendants-appellants,
MAXIMO CALALANG, intervenor;
DIRECTOR OF MINES, intervenor.
Maximo Calalang for plaintiff and appellant.
Gregorio Ejercito and Leandro L. Arguelles for defendant-appellee City of Manila.
Office of the Solicitor General for other defendants and appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49 hectares in area located at Barrio
Guinayang, in San Mateo, Rizal. 1 Upon his death, this property was inherited by his son, herein plaintiff-appellant Jose
Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title2 was issued.
During the lifetime of plaintiff's father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River. 3 To
prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side. This
was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose. However,
in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios and
municipalities. The river destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate,
segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular place of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip
which now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course. 4
In 1945 the U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises 5 and started scraping, excavating and
extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas the River. The operations eventually extended northward into this
strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was filed with the U.S. War Department by Luis Hilario, the then
administrator of Dr. Hilario's estate. The U.S. Army paid. 6 In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendantsappellants and appellee who took over its operations and continued the extractions and excavations of gravel and sand
from the strip of land along an area near the River.
On October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint 7 for injunction and damages against the defendants City Engineer of
Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of the plant. It
was prayed that the latter be restrained from excavating, bulldozing and extracting gravel, sand and soil from his property
and that they solidarily pay to him P5,000.00 as damages. Defendants' answer alleged, in affirmative defense, that the
extractions were made from the riverbed while counterclaiming with a prayer for injunction against plaintiffwho, it was
claimed, was preventing them from their operations.
Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to join the litigation as
intervenors. The former complained that the disputed area was within the bed of the river so that plaintiff should not only
be enjoined from making extractions therefrom but should also be ordered to pay the fees and penalties for the materials
taken by him. On the other hand, the latter claimed that he was authorized by plaintiff to extract materials from the
disputed area but this notwithstanding, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal collected from him a sand and gravel fee which
would be an illegal exaction if the disputed area turns out to be of private ownership. Answers to the two complaints in
intervention were duly filed by the affected parties.
On March 14, 1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same case,
alleging that the latter have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement 8 had between the latter and the
Director of Public Works wherein he defendants were allowed to continue their operations but subject to the final outcome
of the pending suit. It was prayed that plaintiff and intervenor Calalang be ordered to remove the fence and allow
defendants' men to continue their operations unhampered. Opposition to this petition was filed by the other side, with a
prayer for counter injunction. On March 23, 1954, the lower court issued an order maintaining the status quo and allowing
the defendants to continue their extractions from the disputed area provided a receipt 9 in plaintiff's favor be issued for all
the materials taken.
On May 13, 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint. Impleaded as additional defendants were the City of Manila, 10the
Provincial Treasurer of Rizal,11 and Engr. Eugenio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted
his claim to one purely for damages directed against the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the
amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until
defendants stop their operations.

Came the separate amended answers of the several defendants. Manila City denied ownership of the plant and claimed
that the City Engineer, acted merely as a deputy of the Public Works Director. The other defendants 12 put up, as special
defense, the agreement between plaintiff and the Public Works Director, and asserted a P1.2 million counterclaim for
damages against plaintiff. The rest13 renewed the same defense; that the disputed area was part of the public domain,
since it was situated on the riverbanks.
On November 3, 1954, the defendant City Engineer of Manila filed a petition to delimit the area of excavation and asked
the lower court to authorize his men to extend their operations west of the camachile tree in the disputed area. This met
vigorous opposition from plaintiff and intervenor Calalang. On May 27, 1955, the petition was denied.
Finally, on December 21, 1956, the lower court rendered its decision on the merits. The dispositive portion provided: 14
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public
Works, to pay solidarily the herein plaintiff the sum of P376,989.60, as the cost of gravel and sand extracted from
plaintiff's land, plus costs. Judgment is likewise hereby rendered against the defendant Provincial Treasurer of
Rizal, ordering him to reimburse to intervenor Maximo Calalang the amount of P236.80 representing gravel fees
illegally collected. Finally, defendants herein are perpetually enjoined from extracting any sand or gravel from
plaintiff's property which is two-fifths northern portion of the disputed area.
It is so ordered.
None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they all sought a reconsideration of the same. On
August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the motions to reconsider with an order, the dispositive portion of which
provided:15
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff and intervenor Calalang;
dismisses the complaint with respect to defendant City of Manila; holds that the northern two-fifths portion of the
area in controversy belongs to the plaintiff with right to the immediate possession thereof and hereby enjoins the
defendants and intervenor Bureau of Mines to vacate the same and to stop from extracting gravel thereon. The
Court however hereby dismisses the case against the defendant Bureau of Public Works and its agents and
employees insofar as the claim for money is concerned without prejudice to plaintiffs taking such action as he may
deem proper to enforce said claim against the proper party in accordance with law.
It is so ordered.
Still unsatisfied, plaintiff and intervenor Calalang filed a second motion for reconsideration. The lower court stood firm on
its ruling of August 30, 1957.16
Hence, this appeal.17 The defendants Director of Public Works, City Engineer of Manila, and Engrs. Busuego and Sese
have also appealed from the declaration made by the lower court that the northern two-fifths of the disputed area belongs
to plaintiff Hilario.
The parties herein have presented before this Court mixed questions of law and fact for resolution and adjudication.
Foremost among them is this legal query; when a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course and opens a new
one through private property, would the new riverbanks lining said course be of public ownership also? 18
The defendants answer in the affirmative. They claim that under the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, the riverbanks are,
by definition, considered part of the riverbed which is always of public ownership. On the other hand, plaintiff would have
the question resolved in the negative. He maintains that not all riverbanks are of public ownership because: (1) Art. 372 of
the old Civil Code, which governs this particular case, speaks only of the new bed; nothing is said about the new banks;
(2) Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river" cannot be applied in the case at bar in
conjunction with the other articles cited by defendants since that article applies only to banks of natural riverbeds and the
present, River is not in its natural bed; and (3) if all banks were of public ownership, then Art. 553 of the old Civil Code and
the second sentence, first paragraph of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters can never have any application.
Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, long before the present Civil Code took effect, 19the
question before Us should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code and those of the Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866.
We agree with defendants that under the cited laws, all riverbanks are of public ownership including those formed when
a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear.
Without any qualifications, it provides:
Property of public ownership is

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character; (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, as correctly contended by defendants, the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which
defines the phrase "banks of a river" provides:
By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by the
stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The use the of words "of its bed [de sus alveos]" clearly indicates the intent of the law to consider the banks for
all legal purposes as part of the riverbed. The lower court also ruled correctly that the banks of the River
are paint of its bed.20 Since undeniably all beds of rivers are of public ownership, 21 it follows that the banks, which
form part of them, are also of public ownership.
Plaintiff's contention that Arts. 70 and 73 of the Law of Waters cannot apply because Art. 312 of the old Civil Code
mentions only the new bed but omits the banks, and that said articles only apply to natural meaning original bed and
banks is untenable. Art. 70, which defines beds of rivers and creeks, provides:
The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest [ordinary]
floods.22 (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that
Whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from natural causes and opens a new bedthrough a
private estate, the new bed shall be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate shall recover it in the event
that the waters leave it dry again either naturally or as the result of any work legally authorized for this purpose.
(Emphasis supplied)
did not have to mention the banks because it was unnecessary. The nature of the banks always follows that of the
bed and the running waters of the river. A river is a compound concept consisting of three elements: (1) the
running waters, (2) the bed and (3) the banks. 23 All these constitute the river. American authorities are in accord
with this view:
'River' consists of water, a bed and banks.24
A "river" consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts constituting the river, the whole river. It is a
compound idea; it cannot exist without all its paints. Evaporate the water, and you have a dry hollow. If you could
sink the bed, instead of a river, you would have a fathomless gulf. Remove the banks, and you have a boundless
flood.25
Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either be totally public or
completely private. And since rivers are of public ownership, 26 it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the
same nature also. As Manresa commented:
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo Civil que los rios
son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de anquellos tres elementos que integran
el rio.27
However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three elements public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are
public under Arts. 339 and 407, respectively, of the Code, while the flowing waters are declared so under Art. 33, par. 2 of
the Law of Waters of 1866.
Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and their banks. Plaintiff now equates the term "natural"
with the word "original" so that a change in the course of a river would render those articles inapplicable. However, the
premise is incorrect. Diccionario De La Real Academia Espaola defines the word "natural" as follows:
NATURAL perteneciente a la naturaleza o conforme a la calidad o propriedad de las cosas; nativo, originario
de un pueblo o nacion; hecho con verdad, ni artificio, mezcla ni composicion alguna; ingenuo y sin doblez en su
modo de proceder; diceze tambien de las cosas que imitar a la naturaleza con propiedad; regular y que
comunmente sucede, y por eso, facilmente creible; que se produce por solas las fuerzas de la naturaleza, como
contrapuesto a sobre natural y milagroso, (Emphasis supplied)
"Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". On the contrary, even if a river should leave its original
bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the definition provided

above. Hence, the law must have used the word "natural" only because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and
concept of a river always to have a bed and banks.
Plaintiff's third point is not lightly to be taken. Indeed, it would seem possible to acquire private ownership of banks under
Art. 553 of the old Civil Code which provides:
Las riberas de los rios, aun cuando sean de dominio privado, estan sujetas en toda su extension y en sus
margenes, en una zona de tres metros, a la servidumbre de uso publico en interes general de la navegacion, la
flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento. (Emphasis supplied) .
And plaintiff is not without jurisprudential backing for in Commonwealth vs. Gungun,28 it was said that the private
ownership of the banks was not prohibited. His point is then neatly brought home with the proposition that it is
precisely when a river changes its course and opens a new bed through a private estate that there can be private
ownership of the banks.
A study of the history of Art. 553 will however reveal that it was never intended to authorize the private acquisition of
riverbanks. That could not have been legally possible in view of the legislative policy clearly enunciated in Art. 339 of the
Code that all riverbanks were of public ownership. The article merely recognized and preserved the vested rights of
riparian owners who, because of prior law or custom, were able to acquire ownership over the banks. This was possible
under the Siete Partidas which was promulgated in 1834 yet. 29 Under Law 6, Title 28, Partidas 3, the banks of rivers
belonged to the riparian owners, following the Roman Law rule.30 In other words, they were privately owned then. But
subsequent legislation radically changed this rule. By the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, riverbanks became of public
ownership, albeit impliedly only because considered part of the bed which was public by statutory definition. 31 But
this law, while expressly repealing all prior inconsistent laws, left undisturbed all vested rights then existing. 32 So privately
owned banks then continued to be so under the new law, but they were subjected by the latter to an easement for public
use. As Art. 73 provides:
Se entienden por riberas de un rio las fajas o zonis laterales de sus alveos que solamente sor baadas por las
aguas en las crecidas que no causan inundacion. El dominio privado de las riberas esta suieto a la survidumbre
de tres metros de zona para uso publico, en el interest general de la navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el
salvamento. ... (Emphasis supplied).1wph1.t
This was perhaps the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the banks, on the one hand, and the policy
of the law on the other hand, to devote all banks to public use. 33 The easement would preserve the private ownership of
the banks and still effectuate the policy of the law. So, the easement in Art. 73 only recognized and
preserved existing privately owned banks; it did not authorize future private appropriation of riverbanks.
The foregoing observation is confirmed by the still subsequent Law of Waters of June 13, 1879, which was principally
based on the Law of August 3, 1865.34 Art. 36 of the new law, which was a substantial reenactment of Art. 73 of the Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866, reads:
Las riberas, aun cuando sean de dominio privado en virtud de antigue ley o de costumbre, estan sujetas en toda
su extension las margenes en una zona de tres metros, a la servidumbre de uso publico en interes general de la
navegacion, la flotacion la pesca y el salvamento. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The new law also affirmed the public ownership of rivers and their beds, and the treatment of the banks as part of the
bed.35 But nowhere in the law was there any provision authorizing the private appropriation of the banks. What it merely
did was to recognize the fact that at that time there were privately owned banks pursuant to the SietePartidas, and to
encumber these with an easement for public use.
However, the public nature of riverbanks still obtained only by implication. But with the promulgation of the Civil Code of
1889, this fact was finally made explicit in Art. 339 thereof. Riverbanks were declared as public property since they were
destined for public use. And the first paragraph of Art. 36 of the Law of Waters of 1879 was substantially reenacted in Art.
553 of the Code.36 Hence, this article must also be understood not as authorizing the private acquisition of riverbanks but
only as recognizing the vested titles of riparian owners who already owned the banks.
The authority, then, for the private ownership of the banks is neither the old Civil Code nor the Law of Waters of 1866 but
the Siete Partidas. Unfortunately, plaintiff cannot invoke it. Law 6, Title 28, Partida 3, which provides for private ownership
of banks, ceased to be of force in this jurisdiction as of 1871 yet when the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, took
effect.37 Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, the new banks which were formed could not have
been subjected to the provisions of the Siete Partidas which had already been superseded by then.
Coming to the factual issues: both parties assail the conclusion made by the lower court that only the northern two-fifths of
the disputed area remained as plaintiff's private property. This conclusion was apparently based on the findings that the

portion where rice and corn were found 38 in the ocular inspection of June 15, 1951, was on the northern two-fifths of the
disputed area; that this cannot be a part of the bed because of the existence of vegetation which could not have grown
underwater, and that this portion is man-made. However, there is no evidentiary basis for these findings. The area
indicated by Nos. 1 and 2 in Exh. D-1 where no excavations had been made, appears to be more on the south-western
one-fourth of the disputed area. The American cases 39cited by the lower court cannot apply here. Our Law of Waters, in
defining "beds" and considers the latter is part of the former. Those cited cases did not involve a similar statutory
provision. That plants can and do grow on the banks which otherwise could not have grown in the bed which is constantly
subjected to the flow of the waters proves the distinction between "beds" and "banks" in the physical order. However, We
are dealing with the legal order where legal definitions prevail. And apart from these considerations, We also note the
considerable difficulty which would attend the execution of the ruling of the lower court. The latter failed to indicate fixed
markers from which an exact delimitation of the boundaries of the portion could be made. This flaw is conducive to future
litigations.
Plaintiff's theory is that the disputed area, although covered at times by flood waters, cannot be considered as within the
banks of the River because: (1) such floods are only accidental, and (2) even if they are regular, the flooding of the area is
due to the excavations and extractions made by defendants which have caused the widening of the channel. 40 Defendants
claim, however, that the area is always covered by the normal yearly floods and that the widening of the channel is due to
natural causes.
There is a gravel pit41 located along the west side of the River. This is about 500 meters long. 42 A greater part of this pit
occupies a portion of the strip of land that was sliced by the River from the rest of the Hilario estate. As shown in Exhs. D
and D-1, this strip of land is that western segment of the Hilario estate bounded on the west by the same lines connecting
stakes 23 through 27, which form part of the western boundary of the estate, and on the east, bounded by the western
waterline of the River.
Now, the disputed area, generally speaking, 43 is only that part of the gravel pit which is within the strip of land. Its northern
tip is that point where the so-called "secondary bank" line intersects the west River waterline up north; its southern
boundary is along the line connecting stakes 23 and 24. From these two ends, the disputed area measures approximately
250 meters long. The eastern boundary is the western River waterline at low tide and the western boundary is the
"secondary bank" line, a line passing near stake 24 and running almost parallel to the line connecting stakes 25 and 26.
Around the later part of 1949, the disputed area was about 150 to 160 meters wide. 44 This increased to about 175 to 180
meters by the later part of 1950. And by January, 1953, the distance from the "secondary bank" line to the west waterline
was about 230 meters.45
This increasing width of the disputed area could be attributed to the gradual movement of the River to the east. Since it
entered into the Hilario estate, the River has not stayed put. 46 Vicente Vicente, plaintiff's witness declared 47 that after the
River changed its course in 1937, the distance between the old and the new river sites was about 100 meters. Exh. D-2
shows that in 1943, the south end of the River was about 5 meters southeast of stake 24. 48 Honorato Sta. Maria, another
witness for plaintiff, indicated the flow of this course with a blue line in Exh. D-1. 49 This blue line is about 100 meters from
the line connecting stakes 25 and 26, which was also the east boundary of the old River. 50 Around 1945 to 1949, the River
was about 193 meters51 east of this line. This measurement is based on the testimonies of two defense witnesses 52 and
stated that during that period, the River passed along the Excavated Area and the New Accretion Area 53 sites, as shown in
Exh. 54. By the later part of 1949 up to November 1950, the west waterline was from 248 to 270 meters 54 east of the
aforesaid boundary line. And finally in January, 1953, based on the scale in Exh. 3-Calalang, the west waterline was from
300 to 305 meters away already. Hence, from 100 meters in 1937, the River had moved to 305 meters eastward in 1953.
There are two questions to be resolved here. First, where on the strip of land are the lateral borders of the western
riverbank? And second, where have defendants made their extractions?
Anent the first question, the key is supplied by Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the limits of banks of rivers
By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by the
stream only during such high floods as do not cause in inundations. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The farthest extremity of the bank on the west side would, therefore, be that lateral line or strip which is reached
by the waters during those high floods that do not cause inundations. In other words, the extent reached by the
waters when the River is at high tide.
However, there is a difference between the topography of the two sides immediately adjoining the River. The line indicated
as "primary bank"55 in Exh. 3-Calalang, which is on the east, is about 3 meters high and has a steep grade right at the
edge where it drops almost vertically to the watercourse level. The precipice here, which is near the east waterline, is very
easily detectible. But the opposite side has no such steep activity. In fact, it is almost flat with the bed of the River,
especially near the water edge, where it is about 30 to 50 cms. high only. But it gradually slopes up to a height of about 2
to 2- meters along the line indicated as "secondary bank", which is quite far from the waterline. This "bank" line is about

1- meters higher than the level of the gravel pit and there are erosions here. This is about 175 meters west from the
November 1950 waterline, and about 100 meters west from the camachile tree. 56
During the dry season, the waterlevel of the River is quite low about knee-deep only. However, during the rainy season,
the River generally becomes swollen, and the waterlevel rises, reaching up to the neck. 57 However, considering the
peculiar characteristics of the two sides banking the river, the rise in the waterlevel would not have the same effect on the
two sides. Thus, on the east, the water would rise vertically, until the top of the "primary bank" is reached, but on the west,
there would be a low-angled inclined rise, the water covering more ground until the "secondary bank" line is reached. In
other words, while the water expansion on the east is vertical, that on the west is more or less lateral, or horizontal.
The evidence also shows that there are two types of floods in the area during the rainy season. 58 One is the so-called
"ordinary" flood, when the river is swollen but the flowing water is kept within the confines, of the "primary" and
"secondary" banks. This occurs annually, about three to four times during the period. Then there is the "extraordinary"
flood, when the waters overflow beyond the said banks, and even inundate the surrounding areas. However, this flood
does not happen regularly. From 1947 to 1955, there were only three such floods. 59 Now, considering that the "ordinary"
flood easily cover the west side since any vertical rise of the waterlevel on the east would necessarily be accompanied
by a lateral water expansion on the west the "inundations" which the law mentions must be those caused by the
"extraordinary" floods which reach and overflow beyond both "primary" and "secondary" banks. And since the "primary"
bank is higher than the "secondary" bank, it is only when the former is reached and overflowed that there can be an
inundation of the banks the two banks. The question therefore, may be stated thus: up to what extent on the west side
do the highest flood waters reach when the "primary" bank is not overflowed?
Defendants have presented several witnesses who testified on the extent reached by the ordinary flood waters. David
Ross, a bulldozer operator at the plant since 1945, testified 60 that from 1945 to 1949, when the River was still passing
along the site where the camachile tree is located, the annual flood waters reached up to the "secondary bank" line.
These floods usually took from 3 to 5 days to recede, during which time their work was suspended. Corroboration is
supplied by Macario Suiza, a crane operator in the plant since 1945, and by Fidel Villafuerte, a plant employee since
1946. Suiza stated61 that from 1947 to 1949, the area enclosed within the blue lines and marked as Exh. 54-B which
includes the New Accretion Area was always covered by water when it rained hard and they had to stop work temporarily.
The western extremity of this area reaches up to the "secondary bank" line. Villafuerte stated 62 that in the ordinary floods
when the water was just 50 cm. below the top of the "primary bank", the waters would go beyond the camachile tree by as
much as 100 meters westward and just about reach the "secondary bank" line. Further corroboration is supplied by
plaintiff's own evidence. Exh. 1-Calalang states that from 1947 to 1949, based on the casual observations made by
geologist David Cruz, the area between the "primary" and "secondary" banks were always covered by the non-inundating
ordinary floods.
From 1950 to 1952, We have the testimony of Ross who stated 63 that there were still floods but they were not as big
anymore, except one flood in 1952, since the River had already moved to the east. Engr. Ricardo Pacheco, who made a
survey of the disputed area in November 1952, and who conducted actual observations of the extent of the water reach
when the river was swollen, testified 64 that the non-inundating flood regularly reached up to the blue zigzag line along the
disputed area, as shown in Exh. I-City Engineer Manila. This blue line, at the point where it intersects line BB, 65 is about
140 meters west of the waterline and about 20 meters west of the camachile tree. His testimony was based on three
floods66 which he and his men actually recorded. Corroboration is again supplied by Exh. 1-Calalang. According to Cruz'
report, the floods in 1950 and 1951 barely covered the disputed area. During the normal days of the rainy season, the
waters of the swollen river did not reach the higher portions of the gravel pit which used to be submerged. One cause for
this was the lesser amount of rainfall from 1949 to 1951. But two floods occurred from October 16 to 28, 1952, which
overflowed the whole area and inundated the banks. From 1953 to 1955, when the River was farther away to the east, the
flood waters still covered the west side. 67 Testifying on the extent reached by the water during the rainy season in 1954,
Ross stated68 that it reached up to the camachile tree only. The last and latest data comes from Engr. Magbayani Leao,
the Engineer-in-charge of the plant from August 1954. He testified 69 that as of December 1955, when the disputed area
was underwater, the water reach was about 20 meters or less to the east from the camachile tree.
From all the foregoing, it can be safely concluded: (1) that from 1945 to 1949, the west bank of the River extended
westward up to the "secondary bank" line; (2) that from 1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with the River, to the east its
lateral borders running along a line just 20 meters west of the camachile tree; and (3) that from 1953 to 1955, the
extremities of the west bank further receded eastward beyond the camachile tree, until they lay just about 20 meters east
of said tree.
To counteract the testimonies of the defense witnesses, plaintiff presented two rebuttal witnesses 70 who told a somewhat
different story. However, their testimonies are not convincing enough to offset the dovetailing testimonies of the defense
witnesses who were much better qualified and acquainted with the actual situs of the floods. And said defense witnesses
were corroborated by plaintiffs' own evidence which contradicts the aforesaid rebuttal witnesses.
However, plaintiff maintains that the floods which cover the area in question are merely accidental and hence, under Art.
77 of the Law of Waters,71 and following the ruling in Government vs. Colegio de San Jose,72 he is deemed not to have

lost the inundated area. This is untenable. Plaintiff's own evidence 73 shows that the river floods with annual regularity
during the rainy season. These floods can hardly be called "accidental." The Colegio de San Jose case is not exactly in
point. What was mainly considered there was Art. 74 of the Law of Waters relating to lakes, ponds and pools. In the case
at bar, none of these is involved.
Also untenable is plaintiff's contention that the regular flooding of the disputed area was due to the continuous extraction
of materials by defendants which had lowered the level of said area and caused the consequent widening of the channel
and the river itself. The excavations and extractions of materials, even from the American period, have been made only on
the strip of land west of the River.74 Under the "following-the-nature-of-things" argument advanced by plaintiff, the River
should have moved westward, where the level of the ground had been lowered. But the movement has been in the
opposite direction instead. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to defendants' operation. Moreover, plaintiff's own evidence
indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural causes. Thus, Exh. 1-Calalang shows that the movement
eastward of the channel by as much as 31 meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to two typhoons which caused the erosion
of the east bank and the depositing of materials on the west side which increased its level from as much as .93 to 2
meters.
Plaintiff's assertion that the defendants also caused the unnatural widening of the River is unfounded. Reliance is made
on the finding by the lower court that in 1943, the River was only 60 meters wide as shown in Exh. D-2, whereas in 1950,
it was already 140 meters wide as shown in Exh. D. However, Exh. D-2 only shows the width of the River near the
southwestern boundary of the Hilario estate. It does not indicate how wide it was in the other parts, especially up north.
And Eligio Lorenzo, plaintiff's own witness, admitted 75 on cross-examination that the width of the new river was not
uniform. This is confirmed by Exhs. D and D-1 which show that the new river was wider by as much as 50% up north than
it was down south. The 140-meter distance in Exh. D was at the widest part up north whereas down south, near the mouth
of the Bulobok River, it was only 70 meters wide. Lastly, the scale in Exh. 3-Calalang will show that in January 1953, the
River, near the same point also, was less than 50 meters wide.
The only remaining question now is to determine if the defendants have really confined their operations within the banks
of the River as alleged by them. To resolve this, We have to find out from what precise portion in the disputed area the
defendants have extracted gravel and sand since they did not extract indiscriminately from within the entire area. None of
the parties' briefs were very helpful but the evidence on record discloses that defendants made their extractions only
within specified areas during definite periods.
From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their operations only in the New Accretion Area along a
narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to the watercourse then. This zone, marked as Exh. 2-City Engineer Manila, is about
one (1) km. long and extends northward up to pt. 50.35 in Exh. 54. However, no extractions nor excavations were
undertaken west of this zone, i.e., above the "temporary bank" line. 76 These facts are corroborated by plaintiff's witnesses.
That the extractions were near the river then finds support in Vicente's testimony 77 while Leon Angeles and Mrs. Salud
Hilario confirm the fact that defendants have not gone westward beyond the "temporary bank" line. 78 This line is located
east of the "secondary bank" line, the lateral extremity of the west bank then.
In the later part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants from extracting along the New Accretion Area and constructed
a fence across the same. This forced the defendants to go below southeast of the "Excavated Area" and the New
Accretion Area sites in Exh. 54. 79 Engr. Busuego, testifying80 in 1952, indicated their are of extraction as that enclosed
within the red dotted line in Exh. D-1 which lies on the south end of the strip of land. Only a small portion of the
southeastern boundary of the disputed area is included. The ocular inspection conducted on June 15, 1951, confirms
this.81 Exh. 4-Calalang shows the total amount of materials taken from within the area from 1949 to 1951. 82 Thus, from
1950 up to 1953, although the defendants were able to continue their operations because of the agreement between the
plaintiff and the Director of Public Works, 83 they were confined only to the southeastern portion of the disputed area. On
the other hand, the lateral extremities of the west bank then ran along a line about 20 meters west of the camachile tree in
the New Accretion Area.
From 1954 to 1955, defendants' area of operation was still farther near of the New Accretion Area. They were working
within a confined area along the west waterline, the northern and western boundaries of which were 20 meters away east
from the camachile tree.84 Ross indicated85 this zone in Exh. 54 as that portion on the southern end of the disputed area
between the blue lines going through the words "Marikina River Bed" and the red zigzag line indicating the watercourse
then. Engr. Leao even stated, 86 that they got about 80% of the materials from the river itself and only 20% from the dry
bed. The sand and gravel covered by Exhs. LL to LL-55 were all taken from here. The foregoing facts are not only
corroborated by Mrs. Hilario87 but even admitted by the plaintiff in his opposition 88 to defendants' petition to extend their
area of operation west of the camachile tree. And because their petition was denied, defendants could not, and have
not,89 gone beyond the lateral line about 20 meters east from said tree, which has already been established as the lateral
extremity of the west bank during the period.
It appears sufficiently established, therefore, that defendants have not gone beyond the receding western extremities of
the west riverbank. They have confined their extraction of gravel and sand only from within the banks of the river which
constitute part of the public domain wherein they had the right to operate. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence

that defendants have gone beyond the limits of the west bank, as previously established, and have invaded his private
estate. He cannot, therefore, recover from them.
As a parting argument, plaintiff contends that to declare the entire disputed area as part of the riverbanks would be
tantamount to converting about half of his estate to public ownership without just compensation. He even adds that
defendants have already exhausted the supply in that area and have unjustly profited at his expense. These arguments,
however, do not detract from the above conclusions.
First of all, We are not declaring that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between the "secondary bank" line and the
"primary bank" line, has permanently become part of the riverbed. What We are only holding is that at the time the
defendants made their extractions, the excavations were within the confines of the riverbanks then. The "secondary bank"
line was the western limit of the west bank around 1945 to 1949 only. By 1955, this had greatly receded to the line just 20
meters east of the camachile tree in the New Accretion Area. All that space to the west of said receding line 90 would still be
part of plaintiff's property and also whatever portion adjoining the river is, at present, no longer reached by the noninundating ordinary floods.
Secondly, it is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his property without any compensation at all. Under Art.
370 of the old Civil Code, the abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part with the
other riparian owners. And had the change occurred under the Civil Code of the Philippines, plaintiff would even be
entitled to all of the old bed in proportion to the area he has lost. 91
And, lastly, defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiff's expense. They were not responsible for the
shifting of the River. It was due to natural causes for which no one can be blamed. And defendants were extracting from
public property then, under proper authorization. The government, through the defendants, may have been enriched by
chance, but not unjustly.
Considering the conclusions We have thus reached, the other questions involved in the remaining assignments of errors
particularly those apropos the doctrine of state immunity from suit and the liability of defendant City of Manila are
rendered moot.
Wherefore, the decision and orders appealed from are hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as
follows:
(1) Defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works and his agents and employees are hereby
absolved from liability to plaintiff since they did not extract materials from plaintiff's property but from the public
domain.
(2) All that portion within the strip of land in question, starting from the line running parallel to the western
waterline of the river and twenty meters east from the camachile tree in the New Accretion Area measured along
line AA in Exhs. 3-Calalang, 13 and 54, and going to the west up to the western boundaries of the Hilario estate, is
hereby declared as not part of the public domain and confirmed as part of plaintiff's private property. No costs. So
ordered.

G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995

PEDRO P. PECSON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID and ERLINDA NUGUID, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679
affirming in part the order 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-41470.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case as gathered from the record are as follows:
Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street, Quezon City, on which he built a
four-door two-storey apartment building. For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to twelve thousand pesos
(P12,000.00), the lot was sold at public auction by the city Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn

sold it on 12 October 1983 to the private respondents, the spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid, for one hundred
three thousand pesos (P103,000.00).
The petitioner challenged the validity of the auction sale in Civil Case No. Q-41470 before the RTC of Quezon City. In its
decision of 8 February 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint, but as to the private respondents' claim that the sale
included the apartment building, it held that the issue concerning it was "not a subject of the . . . litigation." In resolving the
private respondents' motion to reconsider this issue, the trial court held that there was no legal basis for the contention
that the apartment building was included in the sale. 3
Both parties then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 2931. In its
decision of 30 April 1992, 4 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the assailed decision. It also agreed with the trial court
that the apartment building was not included in the auction sale of the commercial lot. Thus:
Indeed, examining the record we are fully convinced that it was only the land without the apartment
building which was sold at the auction sale, for plaintiff's failure to pay the taxes due thereon . Thus, in
the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property To Purchaser (Exh. K, p. 352, Record) the property subject
of the auction sale at which Mamerto Nepomuceno was the purchaser is referred to as Lot No. 21-A,
Block No. K-34, at Kamias, Barangay Piahan, with an area of 256.3 sq. m., with no mention whatsoever,
of the building thereon. The same description of the subject property appears in the Final Notice To
Exercise The Right of Redemption (over subject property) dated September 14, 1981 (Exh. L, p. 353,
Record) and in the Final Bill of Sale over the same property dated April 19, 1982 (Exh. P, p. 357, Record).
Needless to say, as it was only the land without any building which Nepomuceno had acquired at the
auction sale, it was also only that land without any building which he could have legally sold to the
Nuguids. Verily, in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land executed by Mamerto Nepomuceno in
favor of the Nuguids on October 25, 1983 (Exh. U, p. 366, Record) it clearly appears that the property
subject of the sale for P103,000.00 was only the parcel of land, Lot 21-A, Blk. K-34 containing an area of
256.3 sq. meters, without any mention of any improvement, much less any building thereon. (emphases
supplied)
The petition to review the said decision was subsequently denied by this Court. 5 Entry of judgment was made on 23 June
1993. 6
On November 1993, the private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the
apartment building, citing article 546 of the Civil Code. 7 Acting thereon, the trial court issued on 15 November 1993 the
challenged order 8 which reads as follows:
Submitted for resolution before this Court is an uncontroverted [sic] for the Delivery of Possession filed by
defendants Erlinda Tan, Juan Nuguid, et al. considering that despite personal service of the Order for
plaintiff to file within five (5) days his opposition to said motion, he did not file any.
In support of defendant's motion, movant cites the law in point as Article 546 of the Civil Code . . .
Movant agrees to comply with the provisions of the law considering that plaintiff is a builder in good faith
and he has in fact, opted to pay the cost of the construction spent by plaintiff. From the complaint itself the
plaintiff stated that the construction cost of the apartment is much more than the lot, which apartment he
constructed at a cost of P53,000.00 in 1965 (par. 8 complaint). This amount of P53,000.00 is what the
movant is supposed to pay under the law before a writ of possession placing him in possession of both
the lot and apartment would be issued.
However, the complaint alleges in paragraph 9 that three doors of the apartment are being leased. This is
further confirmed by the affidavit of the movant presented in support of the motion that said three doors
are being leased at a rental of P7,000.00 a month each. The movant further alleges in his said affidavit
that the present commercial value of the lot is P10,000.00 per square meter or P2,500,000.00 and the
reasonable rental value of said lot is no less than P21,000.00 per month.
The decision having become final as per Entry of Judgment dated June 23, 1993 and from this date on,
being the uncontested owner of the property, the rents should be paid to him instead of the plaintiff
collecting them. From June 23, 1993, the rents collected by plaintiff amounting to more than P53,000.00
from tenants should be offset from the rents due to the lot which according to movant's affidavit is more
than P21,000.00 a month.
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Motion, the Court hereby grants the following prayer that:
1. The movant shall reimburse plaintiff the construction cost of P53,000.00.

2. The payment of P53,000.00 as reimbursement for the construction cost, movant Juan
Nuguid is hereby entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the Lot and
improvements thereon.
3. The movant having been declared as the uncontested owner of the Lot in question as
per Entry of Judgment of the Supreme Court dated June 23, 1993, the plaintiff should pay
rent to the movant of no less than P21,000.00 per month from said date as this is the
very same amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the lot.
4. The amount of P53,000.00 due from the movant is hereby offset against the amount of
rents collected by the plaintiff from June 23, 1993, to September 23, 1993.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order but it was not acted upon by the trial court. Instead, on 18
November 1993, it issued a writ of possession directing the deputy sheriff "to place said movant Juan Nuguid in
possession of subject property located at No. 79 Kamias Road, Quezon City, with all the improvements thereon and to
eject therefrom all occupants therein, their agents, assignees, heirs and representatives." 9
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the order of
15 November 1993, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32679. 10 In its decision of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in part the order of the trial court citing Article 448 of the Civil Code. In disposing of the issues, it stated:
As earlier pointed out, private respondent opted to appropriate the improvement introduced by petitioner
on the subject lot, giving rise to the right of petitioner to be reimbursed of the cost of constructing said
apartment building, in accordance with Article 546 of the . . . Civil Code, and of the right to retain the
improvements until he is reimbursed of the cost of the improvements, because, basically, the right to
retain the improvement while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in
fact of the land on which they are built . . . [2 TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1992) p.
112]. With the facts extant and the settled principle as guides, we agree with petitioner that respondent
judge erred in ordering that "the movant having been declared as the uncontested owner of the lot in
question as per Entry of Judgment of the Supreme Court dated June 23, 1993, the plaintiff should pay
rent to the movant of no less than P21,000 per month from said date as this is the very same amount paid
monthly by the tenants occupying the lot.
We, however, agree with the finding of respondent judge that the amount of P53,000.00 earlier admitted
as the cost of constructing the apartment building can be offset from the amount of rents collected by
petitioner from June 23, 1993 up to September 23, 1993 which was fixed at P7,000.00 per month for each
of the three doors. Our underlying reason is that during the period of retention, petitioner as such
possessor and receiving the fruits from the property, is obliged to account for such fruits, so that the
amount thereof may be deducted from the amount of indemnity to be paid to him by the owner of the land,
in line with Mendoza vs. De Guzman, 52 Phil. 164 . . . .
The Court of Appeals then ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, while it appears that private respondents have not yet indemnified petitioner with the cost
of the improvements, since Annex I shows that the Deputy Sheriff has enforced the Writ of Possession
and the premises have been turned over to the possession of private respondents, the quest of petitioner
that he be restored in possession of the premises is rendered moot and academic, although it is but fair
and just that private respondents pay petitioner the construction cost of P53,000.00; and that petitioner be
ordered to account for any and all fruits of the improvements received by him starting on June 23, 1993,
with the amount of P53,000.00 to be offset therefrom.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 11
Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in good faith of the apartment building on the theory that he constructed
it at the time when he was still the owner of the lot, and that the key issue in this case is the application of Articles 448 and
456 of the Civil Code.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the parties, concerned themselves with the application of Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code. These articles read as follows:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has
built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in
bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a
builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith. 12
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco vs. Regalado: 13
Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed the house on his
own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies only in cases where a person
constructs a building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply
to a case where a person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to
good or bad faith on the part of the builder.
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith
is entirely irrelevant.
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein
on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced coownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be determined. The respondent
court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and
not its current market value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made by the petitioner.
This position is, however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion,
Jr., 14 this Court pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin
made of strong material based on the market value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana, 15 despite the
finding that the useful improvement, a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of between eight thousand pesos
(P8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos(P10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in the amount of
forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at the time of the trial. In the same way, the landowner was
required to pay the "present value" of the house, a useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la
Fuente, 16 cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court
had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila 17 that the said provision was formulated in trying
to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of
them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this
precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A
contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued
income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed
to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its
finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.
The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the aggregate rentals paid by the
lessees of the apartment building. Since the private respondents have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the

petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity,
as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the
improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which
it is built, planted or sown. 18 The petitioner not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building
and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
It follows, too, that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial court's determination of the indemnity, but also
in ordering the petitioner to account for the rentals of the apartment building from 23 June 1993 to 23 September 1993.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 and the Order of 15 November 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 101, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-41470 are hereby SET ASIDE.
The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to determine the current market value of the apartment building on the
lot. For this purpose, the parties shall be allowed to adduce evidence on the current market value of the apartment
building. The value so determined shall be forthwith paid by the private respondents to the petitioner otherwise the
petitioner shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.
No costs.
G.R. No. 79688

February 1, 1996

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED JARDINICO,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the owner's agent, a builder in
good faith? This is the main issue resolved in this petition for review on certiorari to reverse the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. No. 11040, promulgated on August 20, 1987.
By resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case (along with several
others) to the Third Division. After due deliberation and consultation, the Court assigned the writing of this Decision to the
undersigned ponente.
The Facts
The facts, as found by respondent Court, are as follows:
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located at Taculing Road,
Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At
that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on December 19, 1978
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been
introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises,
Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess
the lot even before the completion of all installment payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of
P50.00 and another P50.00 on January 27, 1975, for the preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were paid prior to
Kee's taking actual possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI
through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kee's wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the
parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto
repair shop and other improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to reach an amicable
settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinico's lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9.
When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC),
a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.

The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. It further ruled that petitioner and
CTTEI could not successfully invoke as a defense the failure of Kee to give notice of his intention to begin construction
required under paragraph 22 of the Contract to Sell on Installment and his having built a sari-sari store without the prior
approval of petitioner required under paragraph 26 of said contract, saying that the purpose of these requirements was
merely to regulate the type of improvements to be constructed on the Lot. 3
However, the MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for the latter's failure to
pay the installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission. The rescission was effected in 1979, before the
complaint was instituted. The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract
between him and petitioner. Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he
cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced on said lot.
The MTCC thus disposed:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to vacate the premises of Lot 9, covered by TCT No. 106367 and to remove
all structures and improvements he introduced thereon;
2. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to pay to the plaintiff rentals at the rate of P15.00 a day computed from the
time this suit was filed on March 12, 1981 until he actually vacates the premises. This amount shall bear interests
(sic) at the rate of 12 per cent (sic) per annum.
3. Third-Party Defendant C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Subdivision are ordered to pay the plaintiff
jointly and severally the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees and P700.00 as cost and litigation expenses. 4
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or
were not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to
Kee5. It found Kee a builder in bad faith. It further ruled that even assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he
was, nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served
with notice to vacate said lot, and thus was liable for rental.
The RTC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with respect to the order against the defendant to vacate
the premises of Lot No. 9 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106367 of the land records of Bacolod
City; the removal of all structures and improvements introduced thereon at his expense and the payment to
plaintiff (sic) the sum of Fifteen (P15.00) Pesos a day as reasonable rental to be computed from January 30,
1981, the date of the demand, and not from the date of the filing of the complaint, until he had vacated ( sic) the
premises, with interest thereon at 12% per annum. This Court further renders judgment against the defendant to
pay the plaintiff the sum of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs of litigation.
The third-party complaint against Third-Party Defendants Pleasantville Development Corporation and C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. is dismissed. The order against Third-Party Defendants to pay attorney's fees to plaintiff and
costs of litigation is reversed.6
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on October 20, 1986, Kee appealed directly to the Supreme Court,
which referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the "mix-up" when he began
construction of the improvements on Lot 8. It further ruled that the erroneous delivery was due to the negligence of CTTEI,
and that such wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner herein. The appellate court also ruled that
the award of rentals was without basis.
Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and judgment is rendered as
follows:
1. Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he introduced on Lot 9, and is
entitled to the rights granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code.
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are solidarily
liable under the following circumstances:
A.
If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter, remove these
structures, the third-party defendants shall answer for all demolition expenses and the value of the
improvements thus destroyed or rendered useless;
b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer for the amount
representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico.

3. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are ordered to
pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorney's fees, as well as litigation expenses.
4. The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the determination of the actual value of the
improvements and the property (Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the New
Civil Code.7
Petitioner then filed the instant petition against Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI.
The Issues
The petition submitted the following grounds to justify a review of the respondent Court's Decision, as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law or the the ( sic) applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court on third-party complaints, by ordering third-party defendants to pay the demolition
expenses and/or price of the land;
2. The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted course of judicial proceedings, by granting to
private respondent-Kee the rights of a builder in good faith in excess of what the law provides, thus enriching
private respondent Kee at the expense of the petitioner;
3. In the light of the subsequent events or circumstances which changed the rights of the parties, it becomes
imperative to set aside or at least modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to harmonize with justice and the
facts;
4. Private respondent-Kee in accordance with the findings of facts of the lower court is clearly a builder in bad
faith, having violated several provisions of the contract to sell on installments;
5. The decision of the Court of Appeals, holding the principal, Pleasantville Development Corporation (liable) for
the acts made by the agent in excess of its authority is clearly in violation of the provision of the law;
6. The award of attorney's fees is clearly without basis and is equivalent to putting a premium in (sic) court
litigation.
From these grounds, the issues could be re-stated as follows:
(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.? and
(3) Is the award of attorney's fees proper?
The First Issue: Good Faith
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's ruling that Kee was a builder in bad faith.
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a
builder in good faith. We agree with the following observation of the Court of Appeals:
The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong
property to Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a lot would knowingly and willingly
build his residence on a lot owned by another, deliberately exposing himself and his family to the risk of being
ejected from the land and losing all improvements thereon, not to mention the social humiliation that would follow.
Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his
property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-69561, while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-106367. Hence, under the Torrens system of land registration, Kee is presumed to have
knowledge of the metes and bounds of the property with which he is dealing. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to find a way to ascertain
that what was described in TCT No. 69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the subdivision developer's agent and
applied and paid for the relocation of the lot, as well as for the production of a lot plan by CTTEI's geodetic
engineer. Upon Kee's receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI's employee,
Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and
confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the company's positive identification of the property, Kee
saw no reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery. The steps Kee had taken to protect his interests

were reasonable. There was no need for him to have acted ex-abundantia cautela, such as being present during
the geodetic engineer's relocation survey or hiring an independent geodetic engineer to countercheck for errors,
for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI.
Because of CTTEI's blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Kee's efforts all went to
naught.8
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw
in his title 9. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee 10.
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not
aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on
Installment.
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state
of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioner's cause of
action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach), but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee
was a builder in good faith.
Petitioner also points out that, as found by the trial court, the Contract of Sale on Installment covering Lot 8 between it and
Kee was rescinded long before the present action was instituted. This has no relevance on the liability of petitioner, as
such fact does not negate the negligence of its agent in pointing out the wrong lot. to Kee. Such circumstance is relevant
only as it gives Jardinico a cause of action for unlawful detainer against Kee.
Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot "claim that another lot was erroneously pointed out to him" because the latter
agreed to the following provision in the Contract of Sale on installment, to wit:
13. The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his contract he/she has personally examined or
inspected the property made subject-matter hereof, as to its location, contours, as well as the natural condition of
the lots and from the date hereof whatever consequential change therein made due to erosion, the said Vendee
shall bear the expenses of the necessary fillings, when the same is so desired by him/her. 11
The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the location, contour and condition of the lot due to
erosion. It merely provides that the vendee, having examined the property prior to the execution of the contract, agrees to
shoulder the expenses resulting from such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted away his right to recover damages resulting from
petitioner's negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to public policy and cannot be allowed. "Rights may be waived,
unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law." 12
The Second Issue: Petitioner's Liability
Kee filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI, which was dismissed by the RTC after ruling that there was
no evidence from which fault or negligence on the part of petitioner and CTTEI can be inferred. The Court of Appeals
disagreed and found CTTEI negligent for the erroneous delivery of the lot by Octaviano, its employee.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI was its agent. But it contends that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee
was an act which was clearly outside the scope of its authority, and consequently, CTTEI I alone should be liable. It
asserts that "while [CTTEI] was authorized to sell the lot belonging to the herein petitioner, it was never authorized to
deliver the wrong lot to Kee" 13.
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his authority, and should
bear the damage caused to third persons 14. On the other hand, the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable
for the damage 15
CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee.
In acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent. It is this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability,
as principal of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code.
Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Jardinico and Kee on July 24, 1987 entered into a deed of
sale, wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not inform the Court of Appeals of such deal.
The deed of sale contained the following provision:
1. That Civil Case No. 3815 entitled "Jardinico vs. Kee" which is now pending appeal with the Court of Appeals,
regardless of the outcome of the decision shall be mutually disregarded and shall not be pursued by the parties
herein and shall be considered dismissed and without effect whatso-ever; 16

Kee asserts though that the "terms and conditions in said deed of sale are strictly for the parties thereto" and that "(t)here
is no waiver made by either of the parties in said deed of whatever favorable judgment or award the honorable respondent
Court of Appeals may make in their favor against herein petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and/or private
respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises; Inc." 17
Obviously, the deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of petitioner. As we have earlier stated, petitioner's liability is
grounded on the negligence of its agent. On the other hand, what the deed of sale regulates are the reciprocal rights of
Kee and Jardinico; it stressed that they had reached an agreement independent of the outcome of the case.
Petitioner further assails the following holding of the Court of Appeals:
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development Corporation are solidarily
liable under the following circumstances:
a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter, remove these structures,
the third-party defendants shall answer for all demolition expenses and the value of the improvements
thus destroyed or rendered useless;
b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer for the amount
representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico. 18

Petitioner contends that if the above holding would be carried out, Kee would be unjustly enriched at its expense. In other
words, Kee would be able to own the lot, as buyer, without having to pay anything on it, because the aforequoted portion
of respondent Court's Decision would require petitioner and CTTEI jointly and solidarily to "answer" or reimburse Kee
therefor.
We agree with petitioner.
Petitioner' s liability lies in the negligence of its agent CTTEI. For such negligence, the petitioner should be held liable for
damages. Now, the extent and/or amount of damages to be awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after
evidence is adduced. However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually presented in the trial court; hence no
damages could flow be awarded.
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in good faith, respectively, are
regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight
modification" in the application of such law, on the ground of "equity". At any rate, as it stands now, Kee and Jardinico
have amicably settled through their deed of sale their rights and obligations with regards to Lot 9. Thus, we delete items 2
(a) and (b) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision [as reproduced above] holding petitioner and CTTEI
solidarily liable.
The Third Issue: Attorney's Fees
The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorney's fees and costs in the amount of P3,000.00 and P700.00, respectively, as prayed
for in his complaint. The RTC deleted the award, consistent with its ruling that petitioner was without fault or negligence.
The Court of Appeals, however, reinstated the award of attorney's fees after ruling that petitioner was liable for its agent's
negligence.

The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the circumstances of each case 19.
We shall not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals. Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of
his interests and for the recovery of damages sustained as a result of the negligence of petitioner's agent 20.
In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition of the Court of Appeals that Kee "is entitled to the rights
granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code" is deleted, in view of the deed of sale entered into by
Kee and Jardinico, which deed now governs the rights of Jardinico and Kee as to each other. There is also no further
need, as ruled by the appellate Court, to remand the case to the court of origin "for determination of the actual value of the
improvements and the property (Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the New Civil
Code."
WHEREFORE , the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith;
(2) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. are declared
solidarily liable for damages due to negligence; however, since the amount and/or extent of such damages was
not proven during the trial, the same cannot now be quantified and awarded;

(3) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. are ordered to
pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorney's fees, as well as litigation expenses; and
(4) The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-101177 March 28, 1994
GUILLERMO JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (15th DIVISION), DEMETRIO CARINGAL, SPOUSES DIONISIO CAAY AND NAZARIA
CARINGAL, respondents.
Valerio & De Guzman Law Offices for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for private respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:.
PETITIONER GUILLERMO JAVIER seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 13112
dated 26 March 1991 setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas dated 7 July 1986 which
declared petitioner the rightful owner of the disputed land.
On 2 April 1985, petitioner filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession with damages against
respondents Demetrio Caringal and spouses Dionisio Caay and Nazaria Caringal involving a parcel of land situated at
Barangay No. IV, Poblacion, Balayan, Batangas, with an area of 973 square meters. The evidence for the petitioner
shows that the property was the subject of a prior Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 14-2-305 filed by petitioner with the
Bureau of Lands on 2 April 1973. Petitioner claims that he has been in peaceful and adverse possession of the property
since 1971 and this possession was confirmed by the Bureau of Lands Investigator Felix O. Laude, Sr., when the latter
recommend that the miscellaneous sales application of petitioner be given due course.
On 14 August 1974, petitioner sold the land covered by his sales application to Santiago de Guzman by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale. During this time, respondents Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal constructed a house on the disputed lot
with permission and upon tolerance of Santiago de Guzman. Respondent Dionisio Caay was then the driver of Santiago
de Guzman.
On 31 August 1981, petitioner repurchased the property from Santiago de Guzman with knowledge that the house of
respondents Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal was existing on the property but did not immediately eject them as
respondent Caay was a good friend of petitioner. Petitioner later discovered that in 1982, respondent Demetrio Caringal,
father of respondent Cesaria Caringal, was awarded by the Bureau of Lands a free patent over the property in question
and was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-462 in his name.
On the other hand, evidence for private respondents shows that on 1 July 1981 respondent Demetrio Caringal filed a free
patent application covering the disputed property; that his possession started in 1981 when it was sold to him by Gavino
Tesorero who appeared to be the only surviving heir of Gregoria Pineda, the original applicant for free patent. Gregoria
Pineda had been in possession of the property since 1942 and had applied in 1951 for a revocable permit with the Bureau
of Lands in Tanduay, Manila. During the lifetime of Gregoria, respondent Caringal had introduced improvements on the
property including the house presently occupied by respondents Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal.
After Gregoria died in November 1976, her surviving heir, Gavino Tesorero, sold the disputed property to respondent
Caringal in 1981 for a consideration of P5,000.00 as evidenced by an affidavit executed by Tesorero. After proper
inspection and investigation by the Bureau of Lands, the free patent application of respondent Caringal was given due
course. In 1982, the land was awarded by the Bureau of Lands to respondent Demetrio Caringal under Free Patent
Application No. 18220 and registered under Original Certificate of Title No. P-462 in his name.
On 7 July 1986, the trial court rendered its decision declaring petitioner the legal owner of the disputed property. It also
ordered the Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel the name and personal circumstances of respondent Caringal as the
registered owner in OCT No. T-462 and to substitute, in lieu thereof, the name and personal circumstances of petitioner.
The court further directed the Register of Deeds to issue to petitioner an owner's duplicate certificate of OCT No. T-462
upon payment by the latter of the fees required by law. The court also ordered respondents Demetrio Caringal, spouses
Dionisio Caay and Cesaria Caringal to pay petitioner jointly and severally litigation expenses in the amount of P2,000.00
and attorney's fees in the amount of P3,000.00.

In granting the complaint, the trial court found circumstances showing that fraud attended the issuance of the free patent
thus making it null and void, to wit: (a) The existence of a prior miscellaneous sales application of petitioner should have
barred the acceptance and processing of the free patent application of respondent Demetrio Caringal; (b) The said free
patent
was
issued
on
21 August 1982 to Caringal without the technical description of the property having been first issued; and, (c) The survey
plan of Gregoria Pineda, original applicant for free patent and predecessor-in-interest of respondent Caringal, was
spurious as it was approved only after her death.
Respondent Demetrio Caringal appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 26 March 1991 overturned the decision of the
trial court and ordered the dismissal of the complaint of petitioner. In finding for respondent Caringal, the appellate court
cited the following reasons for its decision: (a) While petitioner had filed a prior sales application of the property in 1973,
no action on the application was taken by the Bureau of Lands even after respondent Caringal filed a free patent
application in 1981; the mere filing of the miscellaneous sales application does not mean that petitioner Guillermo Javier
had acquired any vested right or title over the disputed property, the application being evidence only of a claim over the
land; (b) Petitioner had not established continuous, adverse and open possession of the land because he sold his rights
over the same to Santiago de Guzman in 1974 and reacquired the same from the latter in 1981. There was also no
evidence that petitioner occupied and possessed the land under claim of ownership after he reacquired the same. On the
other hand, unrebutted evidence for private respondents shows their continuous possession and that of their predecessor
in-interest since 1951 until 1981 when respondent Demetrio Caringal filed an application for free patent; and, (c) No
survey plan was ever submitted by petitioner for the lot in question. Thus, it is doubtful whether the lot claimed by
petitioner, which contains 1,000 square meters, is the same property awarded to respondent Caringal by virtue of the free
patent which covers a 973-square meter lot.
Hence, this petition alleging that respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred (a) in ruling that an action for reconveyance of
title must be commenced within one (1) year from the issuance of the original certificate of title; (b) in misapprehending
the facts and disregarding the findings of fact of the trial court that fraud attended the issuance of Original Certificate of
Title No. P-462 in the name of respondent Caringal; and, (c) in declaring petitioner as not having established continuous,
adverse and open possession contrary to the testimonial and documentary evidence of petitioner on record.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of registration is no longer
open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean however that the
aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an
action for reconveyance is still available. 2 The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one
(1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in court for reconveyance, which is an action in
personam and is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages. In this case,
the disputed property is still registered in the name of respondent Demetrio Caringal, so that petitioner was correct in
availing himself of the procedural remedy of reconveyance.
However, despite the availability to petitioner of the remedy of reconveyance, this Court finds no merit in petitioner's claim
that he has legal title over the property in question that will justify its return to him. Petitioner failed to show sufficient proof
of ownership over the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-462. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of
that of his opponent. 3
In the case at bar, petitioner as plaintiff in the trial court tried to prove his ownership over the property registered in the
name of respondent Caringal by a miscellaneous sales application he filed with the Bureau of Lands and by his
continuous possession thereof since 1971 when he applied for a sales patent.
The records show that the property subject of petitioner's Miscellaneous Sales Application contained an area of 1,000
square meters and is particularly bounded as follows: on the North, by Gregoria Pineda; on the East, by a river; on the
South, by Balayan Bay; and, on the West, by Severino Labrador, situated in the Barrio of Boulevard, Balayan,
Batangas. 4 On the other hand, the land subject of the controversy which was awarded to respondent Demetrio Caringal
by virtue of free patent and registered in his name under Original Certificate of Title No. P-462 contained an area of 973
square meters and is bounded on the Northeast, by Paula Tesorero; on the Southeast, by Guillermo Javier; on the
Southwest, by Francisco Espineli; and, on the Northwest, by Gregoria Pineda. 5
However, in his complaint for reconveyance which he filed with the trial court, petitioner described the parcel of land he
sought to recover as
A parcel of land situated at Boulevard, Balayan, Batangas. Bounded on the North by the property of
Gregoria Pineda; on the East by River; on the South by Salvage Zone; and on the West by the property of
Reneirio Ramos, containing an area of ONE THOUSAND (1,000) SQUARE METERS, more or less. 6

The evidence for petitioner, which the court upheld, showed the petitioner had been in possession of the parcel of land
described in his complaint since 1970 and had introduced improvements thereon; that petitioner paid realty taxes as early
as 1974; that District Land Officer Constante Q. Asuncion testified that he conducted an ocular inspection of the land
subject of the miscellaneous sales application and found petitioner to be in possession thereof and had constructed four
(4) houses of light materials thereon. 7
On the other hand, the evidence for respondent Demetrio Caringal as found by the Court of Appeals showed that as early
as 1942 Gregoria Pineda had occupied the disputed lot covered by OCT No. P-462, and upon her death in 1976, her
brother and only heir, Gavino Tesorero, succeeded to her rights over the lot; then in 1981, respondent Caringal bought the
rights over the lot from Gavino Tesorero and later filed an application for free patent; on 7 August 1981, District Land
Officer Constante Q. Asuncion issued a certification to the Director of Lands that respondent Caringal and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession thereof and had introduced
improvements thereon consisting of fruit-bearing coconut trees and banana plants; respondent Caringal had paid realty
taxes thereon for the years 1983 to 1985; and, respondent Caringal has free patent over the property and was issued
OCT No. P-462.
Culled from the evidence on record, there is serious doubt on the precise identity of the parcel of land petitioner seeks to
recover. The description and boundaries of the land allegedly possessed by petitioner and which was the subject of his
application for sales patent differ from the parcel of land he described in his complaint for reconveyance. What petitioner
seeks to recover in his complaint is the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-462 which he claims to have been
fraudulently registered in the name of Caringal. But, interestingly, the description and boundaries of the lot covered by
OCT No. P-462 are totally different from the description in petitioner's complaint for recovery of ownership before the trial
court
against
respondent
Caringal
in
whose
name
OCT
No. P-462 is registered.
In order to maintain an action to recover ownership of real property, the person who claims that he has a better right to it
must prove not only his ownership of the same but he must also satisfactorily prove the identity
thereof. 8 In this case, failing to fix the identity of the property he claims, petitioner's action for reconveyance must fail. But,
assuming in gratia argumenti that the property which petitioner seeks to be reconveyed to him is the same as that covered
by OCT No. P-462 in the name of respondent Caringal, petitioner has not proved his ownership of the same. The filing of
the miscellaneous sales application did not vest title upon petitioner over the property as there was no showing that his
application was approved by the Bureau of Lands or that a sales patent over the property was granted to him prior to the
issuance of free patent and OCT No. P-462 in favor of respondent Caringal.
Under the Public Land Act, even the approval of a sales application merely authorizes the applicant to take possession of
the land so that he can comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent can be issued in his favor.
Meanwhile, the Government still remains the owner thereof, as in fact the application can still be cancelled and the land
awarded to another applicant, if it be shown that the legal requirements have not been complied with. Hence, when the
Bureau of Lands did not take action on the sales application of petitioner but instead issued the Free Patent and title to
another applicant, herein respondent Caringal, it was only then that the Government was divested of its ownership and
the land was segregated from the mass of public domain, converting it into private property. 9
Moreover, the record shows, which petitioner admits, that after the filing on 7 April 1973 of the miscellaneous sales
application with the Bureau of Lands, he sold the property in 1974 to Santiago de Guzman. The records fail to disclose
that the sale was approved by the Bureau of Lands. Subsequently, Santiago de Guzman resold the property to petitioner.
The sale of the property by petitioner to de Guzman pending the approval of the former's sales application without the
approval of the Bureau of Lands violated Sec. 29 of C.A. No. 141 provides:
After title has been granted, the purchaser may not, within a period of ten years from such cultivation or
grant, convey or encumber or dispose said lands or rights thereon to any person, corporation or
association, without prejudice to any right or interest of the government in the land: Provided, That any
sale or encumbrance made in violation of the provisions of this section, shall be null and void and shall
produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights thereto to the State,
and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited.
Clearly, this provision contemplates a sale and encumbrance that a purchaser may desire to make during the pendency of
his application and before his compliance with the requirements of the law. 10 Since the application is still pending
consideration and the rights of the applicant have not yet been determined, he cannot make any transfer that may affect
the land, without the approval of the government. Thus, the law allows an applicant "after the cultivation of the land has
begun" to convey or encumber his rights to any person "provided such conveyance or encumbrance does not affect any
right or interest of the Government on the land." And to safeguard such right or interest, previous approval of the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources is required. Such approval becomes unnecessary after the right of the
purchaser is already deemed vested, the issuance of the patent being a mere ceremony. 11

In this case, the sale of the property covered by a pending application for a sales patent without the required approval of
the government produced the effect of annulling the sales application as if none had been filed. Thus, the Bureau of Lands
could consider and approve subsequent applications for the acquisition of the property filed by other persons with the
necessary qualifications. In granting the free patent applied for by respondent Caringal which led to the issuance of OCT
No. P-462 in his favor, the Bureau of Lands acted regularly within its authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 March 1991 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108065 July 6, 1993
SPOUSES
FELIX
BAES
AND
RAFAELA
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BAES, petitioners,

Lorenzo F. Miravite for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in totothe ruling
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 0460-P, the dispositive portion of which read thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring null and void TCT Nos. 14405, 29592, 29593,
29594, 29595, and TCT No. 29593's derivative titles TCT Nos. 124725, 124726, 124727 and 124729, and
ordering the Register of Deeds for Pasay City to cancel them and issue new ones in their stead in the
name of the plaintiff after segregating from TCT No. 29593 452 sq. m., the actual area of Lot 2958-C
(covered by cancelled TCT No. 11043) belonging to defendant Felix Baes. The counterclaim is hereby
dismissed.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.
The controversy began in 1962, when the government dug a canal on a private parcel of land, identified as Lot 2958 and
covering an area of P33,902 sq.m., to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek.
This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes, who registered it in his name under TCT No. 10990 and then had it subdivided
into three lots, namely: (a) Lot 2958-A, with an area of 28,889 sq.m.; (b) Lot 2958-B, with an area of 3,588 sq.m.; and (c)
Lot 2958-C, with an area of 452 sq.m., covered by TCT Nos. 11041, 11042 and 11043, respectively.
In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which was totally occupied by the canal, the government gave Baes a lot with exactly the
same area as Lot 2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. 1 The property, which was
near but not contiguous to Lot 2956-C, was denominated as Lot 3271-A and later registered in the name of Felix Baes
under TCT No. 24300. The soil displaced by the canal was used to fill up the old bed of the creek.
Meanwhile, Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion of Lot 2958-A designated as Lot 1, Blk., 4, resurveyed and subdivided. On
January 12, 1968, he submitted a petition for the approval of his resurvey and subdivision plans, claiming that after the
said lots were plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found that there were errors in respect of their bearings and
distances.
The resurvey-subdivision plan was approved by the Court of First Instance of Pasay City in an order dated January 15,
1968. 2
As a result, the old TCTs covering the said lots were canceled and new ones were issued, to wit: (a) Lot 1-A, Blk. 4, with
672
sq.m.,
under
TCT
No.
T-14404; (b) Lot 1-B, with 826 sq.m., representing the increase in area after the resurvey, under TCT No. T-14405; (c) Lot
2958-C-1, with 452 sq.m., under TCT No. T-14406; and (d) Lot 2958-C-2, with 2,770 sq.m. representing the increase after
resurvey, under TCT No. T-14407.

Lots 2958-C-1 and 2958-C-2 were later consolidated and this time further subdivided into four (4) lots, namely, Lot 1, with
an area of 147 sq.m.; Lot 2, with an area of 950 sq.m.; Lot 3, with an area of 257 sq.m.; and Lot 4, with an area of 1,868
sq.m., which were respectively issued TCT Nos. 29592, 29593, 29594, and 29595.
In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot 1-B (with TCT No. 14405 and an area of 826 sq.m.), on which
the petitioners had erected an apartment building, covered Lot 3611 of the Pasay Cadastre, which is a filled-up portion of
the Tripa de Gallina creek. Moreover, Lot 2958-C (covered by TCT Nos. 29592 to 29595, with an increased area of 2,770
after resurvey and subdivision) had been unlawfully enlarged.
On November 17, 1982, it filed a petition for cancellation of TCT Nos. 14405 and 29592 to 29595. 3
Baes did not object in his answer to the cancellation of TCT Nos. 29592, 29594 and 29595 and was notable to prove
during the trial that the government utilized a portion of Lot 2 under, TCT No. 29593. The trial court therefore decreed
(correctly) that the original Lot 2958-C (with an area of 452 sq.m.) be reverted to its status before the resurvey-subdivision
of Lot 2958-C.
The only remaining dispute relates to Lot 1-B (TCT No. 14405), which the petitioners, relying on Article 461 of the Civil
Code, are claiming as their own. The government rejects this claim and avers that the petitioners had already been fully
compensated for it on June 20, 1970 when they agreed to exchange their Lot 2958-B with Lot 3271-A belonging to the
government.
Article 461 of the Civil Code states:
River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso factobelong
to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the land adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value
thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. (Emphasis supplied)
A portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek was diverted to a man-made canal which totally occupied Lot 2958-B (with an area
of 3,588 sq.m.) belonging to Felix Baes. Thus, the petitioners claim that they became the owners of the old bed (which
was eventually filled up by soil excavated from Lot 2958-B) by virtue of Article 461.
The petitioners rely heavily on Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino's interpretation of this Article, to wit:
This article (461) refers to a natural change in the course of a stream. If the change of the course is due
to works constructed by concessioners authorized by the government, the concession may grant the
abandoned river bed to the concessioners. If there is no such grant, then, by analogy, the abandoned
river bed will belong to the owners of the land covered by the waters, as provided in this article, without
prejudice to a superior right of third persons with sufficient title. (Citing 3 Manresa 251-252; 2 Navarro
Amandi, 100-101; 3 Sanchez Roman 148)
We agree.
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all
the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through artificial means. The
loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government
when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for
their loss.
We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in exchange
for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This was a fair
exchange because the two lots were of the same area and value and the agreement was freely entered into by the
parties. The petitioners cannot now claim additional compensation because, as correctly observed by the Solicitor
General,
. . . to allow petitioners to acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of the creek would be a clear case of
double compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of the state.
The exchange of lots between the petitioners and the Republic was the result of voluntary negotiations. If these had failed,
the government could still have taken Lot 2958-B under the power of eminent domain, upon payment of just
compensation, as the land was needed for a public purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Grio-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-43346

March 20, 1991

MARIO C. RONQUILLO, petitioner

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROSENDO DEL
ROSARIO, AMPARO DEL ROSARIO and FLORENCIA DEL ROSARIO, respondents.*
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the decision 1 rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on September 25, 1975 in CAG.R. No. 32479-R, entitled "Rosendo del Rosario, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus Mario Ronquillo, DefendantAppellant," affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, and its amendatory resolution 2 dated January 28, 1976 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of this Court dated September 25, 1975 is hereby amended in the
sense that the first part of the appealed decision is set aside, except the last portion "declaring the plaintiffs to be
the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub which is abutting plaintiffs' property," which we
affirm, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The following facts are culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals:
It appears that plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 34, Block 9,
Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila (Exhibit "A"). The other plaintiffs Florencia and Amparo del Rosario were daughters of
said Rosendo del Rosario. Adjoining said lot is a dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied by the
defendant since 1945 which is the subject matter of the present action.
Plaintiffs claim that long before the year 1930, when T.C.T. No. 34797 over Lot No. 34 was issued in the name of
Rosendo del Rosario, the latter had been in possession of said lot including the adjoining dried-up portion of the
old Estero Calubcub having bought the same from Arsenio Arzaga. Sometime in 1935, said titled lot was occupied
by Isabel Roldan with the tolerance and consent of the plaintiff on condition that the former will make
improvements on the adjoining dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub. In the early part of 1945 defendant
occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as well as the dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub which
abuts plaintiffs' titled lot. After a relocation survey of the land in question sometime in 1960, plaintiffs learned that
defendant was occupying a portion of their land and thus demanded defendant to vacate said land when the latter
refused to pay the reasonable rent for its occupancy. However, despite said demand defendant refused to vacate.
Defendant on the other hand claims that sometime before 1945 he was living with his sister who was then
residing or renting plaintiffs' titled lot. In 1945 he built his house on the disputed dried-up portion of the Estero
Calubcub with a small portion thereof on the titled lot of plaintiffs. Later in 1961, said house was destroyed by a
fire which prompted him to rebuild the same. However, this time it was built only on the called up portion of the old
Estero Calubcub without touching any part of plaintiffs titled land. He further claims that said dried-up portion is a
land of public domain.3
Private respondents Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia, all surnamed del Rosario (Del Rosarios), lodged a complaint with
the Court of First Instance of Manila praying, among others, that they be declared the rightful owners of the dried-up
portion of Estero Calubcub. Petitioner Mario Ronquillo (Ronquillo) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case since the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is public land and, thus,
subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands. The Del Rosarios opposed the motion arguing that since they are
claiming title to the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as riparian owners, the trial court has jurisdiction. The resolution of
the motion to dismiss was deferred until after trial on the merits.
Before trial, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
1. That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34797;

2. That said property of the plaintiffs abuts and is adjacent to the dried-up river bed of Estero Calubcub Sampaloc,
Manila;
3. That defendant Mario Ronquillo has no property around the premises in question and is only claiming the driedup portion of the old Estero Calubcub, whereon before October 23, 1961, the larger portion of his house was
constructed;
4. That before October 23, 1961, a portion of defendant's house stands (sic) on the above-mentioned lot
belonging to the plaintiffs;
5. That the plaintiffs and defendant have both filed with the Bureau of Lands miscellaneous sales application for
the purchase of the abandoned river bed known as Estero Calubcub and their sales applications, dated August 5,
1958 and October 13, 1959, respectively, are still pending action before the Bureau of Lands;
6. That the parties hereby reserve their right to prove such facts as are necessary to support their case but not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 4
On December 26, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment the decretal portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiffs the portion of the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of title No. 34797 which is occupied by him and to pay for the use and
occupation of said portion of land at the rate of P 5.00 a month from the date of the filing of the complaint until
such time as he surrenders the same to the plaintiffs and declaring plaintiffs to be the owners of the dried-up
portion of estero Calubcub which is abutting plaintiffs' property.
With costs to the defendant.
SO ORDERED. 5
On appeal, respondent court, in affirming the aforequoted decision of the trial court, declared that since Estero Calubcub
had already dried-up way back in 1930 due to the natural change in the course of the waters, under Article 370 of the old
Civil Code which it considers applicable to the present case, the abandoned river bed belongs to the Del Rosarios as
riparian owners. Consequently, respondent court opines, the dried-up river bed is private land and does not form part of
the land of the public domain. It stated further that "(e)ven assuming for the sake of argument that said estero did not
change its course but merely dried up or disappeared, said dried-up estero would still belong to the riparian
owner," citing its ruling in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama. 6
Upon motion of Ronquillo, respondent court modified its decision by setting aside the first portion of the trial court's
decision ordering Ronquillo to surrender to the Del Rosarios that portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 34797 occupied by the former, based on the former's representation that he had already vacated the same prior to the
commencement of this case. However, respondent court upheld its declaration that the Del Rosarios are the rightful
owners of the dried-up river bed. Hence, this petition.
On May 17, 1976, this Court issued a resolution 7 requiring the Solicitor General to comment on the petition in behalf of
the Director of Lands as an indispensable party in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, and who, not having
been impleaded, was subsequently considered impleaded as such in our resolution of September 10, 1976. 8 In his
Motion to Admit Comment, 9 the Solicitor General manifested that pursuant to a request made by this office with the
Bureau of Lands to conduct an investigation, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau sent a communication informing
him that the records of his office "do not show that Mario Ronquillo, Rosendo del Rosario, Amparo del Rosario or
Florencia del Rosario has filed any public land application covering parcels of land situated at Estero Calubcub Manila as
verified by our Records Division.
The position taken by the Director of Lands in his Comment 10 filed on September 3, 1978, which was reiterated in the
Reply dated May 4, 1989 and again in the Comment dated August 17, 1989, explicates:
5. We do not see our way clear to subscribe to the ruling of the Honorable Court of Appeals on this point for Article
370 of the Old Civil Code, insofar as ownership of abandoned river beds by the owners of riparian lands are
concerned, speaks only of a situation where such river beds were abandoned because of a natural change in the
course of the waters. Conversely, we submit that if the abandonment was for some cause other than the natural
change in the course of the waters, Article 370 is not applicable and the abandoned bed does not lose its
character as a property of public dominion not susceptible to private ownership in accordance with Article 502
(No. 1) of the New Civil Code. In the present case, the drying up of the bed, as contended by the petitioner, is
clearly caused by human activity and undeniably not because of the natural change of the course of the waters
(Emphasis in the original text).

In his Comment 11 dated August 17, 1989, the Director of Lands further adds:
8. Petitioner herein and the private respondents, the del Rosarios, claim to have pending sales application(s) over
the portion of the dried up Estero Calubcub, as stated in pages 4-5, of the Amended Petition.
9. However, as stated in the Reply dated May 4, 1989 of the Director of Lands, all sales application(s) have been
rejected by that office because of the objection interposed by the Manila City Engineer's Office that they need the
dried portion of the estero for drainage purposes.
10. Furthermore, petitioner and private respondents, the del Rosarios having filed said sales application(s) are
now estopped from claiming title to the Estero Calubcub (by possession for petitioner and by accretion for
respondents del Rosarios) because for (sic) they have acknowledged that they do not own the land and that the
same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands (Director of Lands vs. Santiago, 160 SCRA
186, 194).
In a letter dated June 29, 1979 12 Florencia del Rosario manifested to this Court that Rosendo, Amparo and Casiano del
Rosario have all died, and that she is the only one still alive among the private respondents in this case.
In a resolution dated January 20, 1988, 13 the Court required petitioner Ronquillo to implead one Benjamin Diaz pursuant
to the former's manifestation 14 that the land adjacent to the dried up river bed has already been sold to the latter, and the
Solicitor General was also required to inquire into the status of the investigation being conducted by the Bureau of Lands.
In compliance therewith, the Solicitor General presented a letter from the Director of Lands to the effect that neither of the
parties involved in the present case has filed any public land application. 15
On April 3, 1989, petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari, 16 this time impleading the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) which subsequently bought the property adjacent to the dried-up river bed from Benjamin Diaz. In its
resolution dated January 10, 1990, 17 the Court ordered that DBP be impleaded as a party respondent.
In a Comment 18 filed on May 9, 1990, DBP averred that "[c]onsidering the fact that the petitioner in this case
claims/asserts no right over the property sold to Diaz/DBP by the del Rosarios; and considering, on the contrary, that Diaz
and DBP claims/asserts (sic) no right (direct or indirect) over the property being claimed by Ronquillo (the dried-up portion
of Estero Calubcub), it follows, therefore, that the petitioner Ronquillo has no cause of action against Diaz or DBP.
A fortiori from the viewpoint of the classical definition of a cause of action, there is no legal justification to implead DBP as
one of the respondents in this petition." DBP thereafter prayed that it be dropped in the case as party respondent.
On September 13, 1990, respondent DBP filed a Manifestation/Compliance 19 stating that DBP's interest over Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 139215 issued in its name (formerly Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 of the Del Rosarios and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135170 of Benjamin Diaz) has been transferred to Spouses Victoriano and Pacita A.
Tolentino pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated September 11, 1990.
Petitioner Ronquillo avers that respondent Court of Appeals committed an error of law and gross abuse of discretion,
acted arbitrarily and denied petitioner due process of law (a) when it declared private respondents Del Rosarios the
rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub by unduly relying upon decisional law in the case of Pinzon vs.
Rama, ante, which case was decided entirely on a set of facts different from that obtaining in this case; and (b) when it
ignored the undisputed facts in the present case and declared the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as a private
property.
The main issue posed for resolution in this petition is whether the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub being claimed by
herein petitioner was caused by a natural change in the course of the waters; and, corollary thereto, is the issue of the
applicability of Article 370 of the old Civil Code.
Respondent court, in affirming the findings of the trial court that there was a natural change in the course of Estero
Calubcub declared that:
The defendant claims that Article 370 of the old Civil Code is not applicable to the instant case because said
Estero Calubcub did not actually change its course but simply dried up, hence, the land in dispute is a land of
public domain and subject to the disposition of the Director of Land(s). The contention of defendant is without
merit. As mentioned earlier, said estero as shown by the relocation plan (Exhibit "D") did not disappear but merely
changed its course by a more southeasternly (sic) direction. As such, "the abandoned river bed belongs to the
plaintiffs-appellees and said land is private and not public in nature. Hence, further, it is not subject to a
Homestead Application by the appellant." (Fabian vs. Paculan CA-G.R. Nos. 21062-63-64-R, Jan. 25 1962). Even
assuming for the sake of argument that said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or disappeared,
said dried-up estero would still belong to the riparian owner as held by this Court in the case of Pinzon vs.
Rama (CA-G.R. No. 8389, Jan. 8, 1943; 2 O.G. 307). 20

Elementary is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the review of errors of law, and that said appellate
court's finding of fact is conclusive upon this Court. However, there are certain exceptions, such as (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4)
when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; and (6) when
the Court of Appeals in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of
both
appellant
and
appellee. 21
A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the case at bar will reveal that the change in the course of
Estero Calubcub was caused, not by natural forces, but due to the dumping of garbage therein by the people of the
surrounding neighborhood. Under the circumstances, a review of the findings of fact of respondent court thus becomes
imperative.
Private respondent Florencia del Rosario, in her testimony, made a categorical statement which in effect admitted that
Estero Calubcub changed its course because of the garbage dumped therein, by the inhabitants of the locality, thus:
Q When more or less what (sic) the estero fully dried up?
A By 1960 it is (sic) already dried up except for a little rain that accumulates on the lot when it rains.
Q How or why did the Estero Calubcub dried (sic) up?
A It has been the dumping place of the whole neighborhood. There is no street, they dumped all the garbage
there. It is the dumping place of the whole community, sir. 22
In addition, the relocation plan (Exhibit "D") which also formed the basis of respondent court's ruling, merely reflects the
change in the course of Estero Calubcub but it is not clear therefrom as to what actually brought about such change.
There is nothing in the testimony of lone witness Florencia del Rosario nor in said relocation plan which would indicate
that the change in the course of the estero was due to the ebb and flow of the waters. On the contrary, the aforequoted
testimony of the witness belies such fact, while the relocation plan is absolutely silent on the matter. The inescapable
conclusion is that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was occasioned, not by a natural change in the course of the
waters, but through the active intervention of man.
The foregoing facts and circumstances remove the instant case from the applicability of Article 370 of the old Civil Code
which provides:
Art. 370. The beds of rivers, which are abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the waters,
belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout the respective length of each. If the abandoned bed divided
tenements belonging to different owners the new dividing line shall be equidistant from one and the other.
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation.1wphi1 Article 370 applies only if there is a
natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions 23 nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. 24 Considering our earlier finding that the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does
not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which
cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. That such is the case is made more evident in the letter, dated April
28, 1989, of the Chief, Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands 25 as reported in the Reply of respondent Director of Lands
stating that "the alleged application filed by Ronquillo no longer exists in its records as it must have already been disposed
of as a rejected application for the reason that other applications "covering Estero Calubcub Sampaloc, Manila for areas
other than that contested in the instant case, were all rejected by our office because of the objection interposed by the City
Engineer's office that they need the same land for drainage purposes". Consequently, since the land is to be used for
drainage purposes the same cannot be the subject of a miscellaneous sales application.
Lastly, the fact that petitioner and herein private respondents filed their sales applications with the Bureau of Lands
covering the subject dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub cannot but be deemed as outright admissions by them that the
same is public land. They are now estopped from claiming otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, the remaining effective portion of which declares private respondents Del
Rosarios as riparian owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95907 April 8, 1992

JOSE REYNANTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan, Branch VIII, and the HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS and DOLORES A. CARLOS, and HEIRS OF
GORGONIO CARLOS and CONCEPCION CARLOS, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal of: a) decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated February
28, 1990 in CA-G.R. No. 1917 entitled "JOSE REYNANTE versus HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, Judge, RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, and HEIRS OF LEONCIO AND DOLORES CARLOS, et al.", affirming the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 8, Third Judicial Region which reversed the decision 3 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch 1, Third Judicial Region in Civil Case No. 1526 entitled "HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS &
DOLORES A. CARLOS and HEIRS OF GORGONIO A. CARLOS & CONCEPCION CARLOS versus JOSE REYNANTE:
and b) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows:
More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos, owner and fatherin-law of herein private respondents, over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan with an area of
188.711 square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25618, Land Registry of Bulacan.
During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his family lived and took care of the
nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering an area of 5,096 square meters and 6,011 square meters
respectively. These lots are located between the fishpond covered by TCT No. 25618 and the Liputan (formerly
Meycauayan) River. Petitioner harvested and sold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition from anybody.
Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and
appropriate them as his own.
After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs (private respondents' predecessors-in-interest) entered into a written
agreement denominated as "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NG PAGSASAULI NG KARAPATAN" dated November 29, 1984
with petitioner Jose Reynante whereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum of P200,000.00 turned over the
fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or
"bantay-kasama at tagapamahala" (Rollo, p. 77).
Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered the fishpond and the two huts located therein to private
respondents. Private respondents thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Petitioner continued to live
in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted therein.
On February 17, 1988, private respondents formally demanded that the petitioner vacate said portion since according to
them petitioner had already been indemnified for the surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner
refused and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.
Hence, on April 22, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction
against petitioner alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over the physical, actual and material
possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or
disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto.
On January 10, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and finding that petitioner had been in
prior
possession
of
lots
1
and 2.
Private respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court and on August 8, 1989 it rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant and hereby
reverses the decision of the Court a quo. Accordingly, the defendant is ordered to restore possession of
that piece of land particularly described and defined as Lots 1 & 2 of the land survey conducted by

Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan on March 2, 1983, together with the sasa or nipa palms planted
thereon. No pronouncement as to attorney's fees. Each party shall bear their respective costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 55; Decision, p. 4).
From said decision, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review (Rollo, p. 30; Annex "A"). On February
28, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo, being consistent with law and jurisprudence, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. The instant petition seeking to issue a restraining order is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30; Decision, p. 3).
On November 5, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner ( Rollo, p. 35; Annex
"B").
Hence, this petition.
In its resolution dated May 6, 1991, the Second Division of this court gave due course to the petition and required both
parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 93).
The main issues to be resolved in this case are: a) who between the petitioner and private respondents has prior physical
possession of lots 1 and 2; and b) whether or not the disputed lots belong to private respondents as a result of accretion.
An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title to the property is never determined. A party who
can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character
of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana oraccion reivindicatoria (German
Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495, 498, 499). On
the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer
even if he should be the owner of the property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil. 469 [1942]).
Hence, the Court of Appeals could not legally restore private respondents' possession over lots 1 and 2 simply because
petitioner has clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2.
The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession of the questioned lots for more than 50 years. It is
undisputed that he was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and
that he constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms therein. This fact is bolstered by the
"SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY" executed by Epifanio Lucero (Records, p. 66), Apolonio D. Morte (Records, p. 101) and
Carling Dumalay (Records, p. 103), all of whom are disinterested parties with no motive to falsify that can be attributed to
them, except their desire to tell the truth.
Moreover, an ocular inspection was conducted by the trial court dated December 2, 1988 which was attended by the
parties and their respective counsels and the court observed the following:
The Court viewed the location and the distance of the constructed nipa hut and the subject "sasahan"
which appears exists (sic) long ago, planted and stands (sic) adjacent to the fishpond and the dikes which
serves (sic) as passage way of water river of lot 1 and lot 2. During the course of the hearing, both
counsel observed muniment of title embedded on the ground which is located at the inner side of the
"pilapil" separating the fishpond from the subject "sasa" plant with a height of 20 to 25 feet from water
level and during the ocular inspection it was judicially observed that the controversial premises is beyond
the titled property of the plaintiffs but situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it being a part of the
public domain. (Rollo, p. 51; Decision, p. 12).
On the other hand, private respondents based their claim of possession over lots 1 and 2 simply on the written agreement
signed by petitioner whereby the latter surrendered his rights over the fishpond.
Evidently, the trial court did not err when it ruled that:
An examination of the document signed by the defendant (Exhibit "B"), shows that what was surrendered
to the plaintiffs was the fishpond and not the "sasahan" or the land on which he constructed his hut where
he now lives. That is a completely different agreement in which a tenant would return a farm or a fishpond
to his landlord in return for the amount that the landlord would pay to him as a disturbance compensation.
There is nothing that indicates that the tenant was giving other matters not mentioned in a document like

Exhibit "B". Moreover, when the plaintiffs leased the fishpond to Mr. Carlos de La Cruz there was no
mention that the lease included the hut constructed by the defendant and the nipa palms planted by him
(Exhibit "1"), a circumstance that gives the impression that the nipa hut and the nipa palms were not
included in the lease to Mr. de la Cruz, which may not belong to the plaintiffs. (Rollo, p. 49; Decision, p.
9).
With regard to the second issue, it must be noted that the disputed lots involved in this case are not included in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 25618 as per verification made by the Forest Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. That tract of land situated at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan containing an area of 1.1107
hectares as described in the plan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan for Jose Reynante falls
within Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond development) under Project No. 15 per B.F.L.C. Map No. 3122 dated
May 8, 1987 (Rollo, p. 31; Decision, p. 2).
The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and hence the property of
private respondents pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (c) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61647, October 12, 1984, 132 SCRA
514, cited in Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218).
Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and while it is true that accretions which
the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owner of the banks,
such accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through
prescription.
This Court ruled in the case of Ignacio Grande, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962,
115 Phil. 521 that:
An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such
accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the
Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining
a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration
law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the land, but
merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under
the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have beenprovided.
Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by accretion, still their failure to
register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more than fifty (50) years and unless private
respondents can show a better title over the subject lots, petitioner's possession over the property must be respected.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated February 28, 1990 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-17652

June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and
dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession
of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of
3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in
whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934).
Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in
1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many
years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so
much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an
alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against
respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed
as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession
thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked
for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated
February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and
undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the
portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to
petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium
brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion
was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey
of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land
surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the
accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the
boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one
hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo
Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since
1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the
incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which,
it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")
when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257
(Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins
with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not
mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code
that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in
question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs
(Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by
the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on
the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9
Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner
is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3
Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in possession of
the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land
in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in
possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription
(Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered
property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496:
and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person.

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the decision
adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the early
thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior
title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of
natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This
contention poses the real issue in this case. The Courta quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two
grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance
the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496,
which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the
month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was
instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to registered
land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural
accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title
established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described
in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the
technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of
the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration
does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not
entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession:
and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This
Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time that the
defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first
time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years
went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in
1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to
Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro
Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question
adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful
possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one
hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the plaintiff
Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in
question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in
turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only
then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never
declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the
defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the
accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by
their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part
thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1wph1.t
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933 to 1958 is not
only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared
the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior
possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same.
The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their
property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any
serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the
certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the
land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since
1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when

they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the
defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through
prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the
lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is
whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens
title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso
facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that
ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil
Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land
must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The
fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after
petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they
instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became
registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered
property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a question which
requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after
analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934,
openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the
existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties,
is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since
the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the
effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired
alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration case by oppositors thereto, the
Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does ownership of land formed by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered property is
bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The
Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's registered
land on the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's registered property is
bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally accrues in favor of
the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land?

Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two subsequent resolutions 2 of the Intermediate Appellate
Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. N-84, 4 the application over which was filed by private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before the Court of First Instance 5 (now the
Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application
was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with
the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially,
such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the public domain.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1958, gave due course to his application but only to
the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond
purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the decision of the
Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The then
Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to register and confirm his
title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of
146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas,
Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay
River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as
the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property
resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto
stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same
being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry,
through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason as that advanced by the
Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the
sole oppositor.
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry.
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro
thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always
been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a
part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of
the President; and that be bad already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for
ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed
and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The
defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of
the premises sought to be registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the
parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case and was
jointly tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on November 1, 1961 and was
substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a
part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.

The decision's dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No.
2873;
(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land in question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2873 and as applicant
in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances." 6
The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assisted the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the action of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants [private respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.
3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the land in controversy in favor of applicantsappellants [private respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private respondents] are entitled to
eject the oppositor-appellee [petitioners]. 7
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the petition for registration of the
subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50) meters
from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:
The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their respective briefs is
whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land
was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If
formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed by the
action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land immediately adjoining the
land sought to be registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by
the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and
Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other words, between
the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers acting as the
boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject
land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto the land now
sought to be registered.
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is immediately
attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land
immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion
this case might have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding whether
or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the
subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would
be quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property of the State as
the lower court did in fact rule . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies between these two rivers and it is
precisely appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts as a barricade preventing these two rivers to
meet. Thus, since the flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt
are deposited at their mouths.

It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of the deposit thereat for in
the natural course of things, the waves of the sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge [ sic] inland. It
would not therefore add anything to the land but instead subtract from it due to the action of the waves
and the wind. It is then more logical to believe that the two rivers flowing towards the bay emptied their
cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing appellants' [private respondents'] land to
accumulate therein.
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to accept this theory and
stated that the subject land arose only when . . . . Pascual planted "palapat" and "bakawan" trees thereat
to serve as a boundary or strainer. But we do not see how this act of planting trees by Pascual would
explain how the land mass came into being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the sea.
Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the few trees that acted as strainers or blocks, then
the land that grew would have stopped at the place where the said trees were planted. But this is not so
because the land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants [private respondents] clearly show that the land that
accumulated beyond the so- called boundary, as well as the entire area being applied for is dry land,
above sea level, and bearing innumerable trees . . . The existence of vegetation on the land could only
confirm that the soil thereat came from inland rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring to the
shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other hand, the two rivers would be bringing
soil on their downward flow which they brought along from the eroded mountains, the lands along their
path, and dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private respondents'] land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While it is true that the subject
land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants' [private respondents'] land, said land is
not foreshore but an accretion from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly
what the Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in the following report of the Acting Provincial Officer,
Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:
"Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on June 11, 1960, it
was found out that the said land is . . . . sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers . . . . These
two rivers bring down considerable amount of soil and sediments during floods every
year thus raising the soil of the land adjoining the private property of the applicant [private
respondents]. About four-fifth [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land whereon are
planted palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is the natural action of these two rivers
that has caused the formation of said land . . . . subject of this registration case. It has
been formed, therefore, by accretion. And having been formed by accretion, the said land
may be considered the private property of the riparian owner who is the applicant herein
[private respondents] . . . .
In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should be withdrawn,
except for the portion recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May 2,
1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. . . ."
Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau of Lands withdrew his
opposition dated March 25, 1960, and limited "the same to the northern portion of the land applied for,
compromising a strip 50 meters wide along the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as part
of the foreshore" . . . . 8
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance of the corresponding
decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the reversion to private respondents of the
possession of the portion of the subject property included in Navarro's fishpond permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision. The Director of Forestry
also moved for the reconsideration of the same decision. Both motions were opposed by private respondents on January
27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed
by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its decision, to read, viz:
(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion included in their fishpond
permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand over possession of said portion to applicants-appellants, if
the said portion is not within the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the northern
portion of the land subject of the registration proceedings and which area is more particularly referred to

as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of
Plan Psu-175181. . . . 9
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director of Forestry, an extension of
time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent
appellate court and of the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for review entitled, "The Director of
Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." 10 We, however, denied the same in a minute resolution dated July 20, 1981, such
petition having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court of Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion
to set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that the decision dated November
29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil
Case No. 2873 of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978 was filed by
petitioners' new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners' request for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion for
reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the final order or judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably erred in appreciating the fact of the
case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.
We find no merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the accretion
formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn
trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the
eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters
of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. 11 Accretion is the
process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank 12; the
owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the
latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. 13The alluvium, by mandate of
Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be
seen 14 but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons 15.
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Petitioners' land,
therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners
insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court
that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted
palapat
and
bakawan
trees
thereon
in
1948,
the
land
began
to
rise. 16
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners' own tract of land; (c) the Manila
Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of
their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion
were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been

deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern
portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that
the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously
not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered
that we held that:
Appellant next contends that . . . . Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention
untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentatiom of the same:
"Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the
entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing
of the shore of the sea or of a lake. " 7 C.J. 1013-1014." 17
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of
Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457
of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the facts of the case. As the trial court
correctly observed:
A perusal of the survey plan . . . . of the land subject matter of these cases shows that on the eastern
side, the property is bounded by Talisay River, on the western side by Bulacan River, on the southern side
by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers meet a certain portion because the two rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay River is
straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering and there is no portion where the two rivers meet
before they end up at Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot
be considered an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual . . . . has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he has applied for
registration is the result of the settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to
be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no
applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action of the bay. 18
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the aforegoing observation is that the disputed land is part of the
foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public domain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived the
fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed land
must be an accretion formed by the action of the two rivers because petitioners' own land acted as a barricade preventing
the two rivers to meet and that the current of the two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila
Bay which accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the light of
the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was deposited, not on either the eastern or western portion of petitioners'
land where a river each runs, but on the northern portion of petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such
conclusions are further eroded of their practical logic and consonance with natural experience in the light of Sulpicio
Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the northern boundary of their own land. In
amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in his dissenting
opinion when he stated that:
As appellants' (titled) land . . . . acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to meet, and considering
the wide expanse of the boundary between said land and the Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters
. . . . it is believed rather farfetched for the land in question to have been formed through "sediments of
sand and salt [sic] . . . . deposited at their [rivers'] mouths." Moreover, if "since the flow of the two rivers is
downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths," why then
would the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the northern portion of appellants' titled land
facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two rivers? That being the case,
the accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled [land] was not caused by the current of the two
rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.
The conclusion . . . . is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on the contrary, shows that
the disputed land was formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the
heirs of the original applicant, testified on cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the shore
and it was only in 1948 that he noticed that the land was beginning to get higher after he had planted
trees
thereon
in
1948. . . . .

. . . . it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide could reach as far as the
dike of appellants' fishpond within their titled property, which dike now separates this titled property from
the land in question. Even in 1948 when appellants had already planted palapat andbakawan trees in the
land involved, inasmuch as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still reach the dike.
This must be so because in . . . . the survey plan of the titled property approved in 1918, said titled land
was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north. It was only after
the planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question began to rise or to get higher in
elevation.
The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water and at the same time a
kind of block to the strained sediments from being carried back to the sea by the very waves that brought
them to the former shore at the end of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline to recede and dry
up eventually raising the former shore leading to the formation of the land in question." 19
In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the withdrawal of
the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore, and the regular torrential
action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern boundary of petitioners'
own tract of land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the
disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.
While
we
held
in
the
case
of Ignacio
v. Director
of
Lands
and
Valeriano 20 that Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on accretion is to be applied in
multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are
concerned.
In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose 21, Republic v. Court of Appeals 22, Republic v. Alagad23,
and Meneses
v. Court
of
Appeals 24, we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a
sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part
of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the
Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof.
In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this
controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As
part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation
belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private
person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority." 25 Only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by
action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries
or for coast guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has already
declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of
petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-43105 August 31, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) AND SANTOS DEL RIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43190 August 31, 1984
AURORA BAUTISTA, OLIMPIO LARIOS, FELICIDAD DE LA CRUZ, ELPIDIO LARIOS, LUCITA BANDA, BENITO
SANTAYANA, FRUCTUOSA BANHAO LUCIO VELASCO, GREGORIO DATOY, FELIMON GUTIERREZ, ET
AL.,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SANTOS DEL RIO, respondents.
Bonifacio, Perez & Concepcion for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.
Eduardo Cagandahan for respondent Santos del Rio.
CUEVAS, J.:
These two 1 Petitions for Review of the same decision of the defunct Court of Appeals 2 have been consolidated in this
single decision, having arisen from one and the same Land Registration Cage (LRC Case No. N-283, Laguna), and
presenting as they do issues which may be resolved jointly by this Court.
The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered the registration of
the land in favor of applicant, now private respondent, Santos del Rio. Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105
claims that the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain and therefore not registerable. Petitioners private
oppositors in G.R. No. L-43190, on the other hand, allege that they reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells
thereon, and that they have been in possession of the same for more than twenty (20) years.
The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of 17,311 square meters, is situated near the shore of
Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20) meters therefrom (Exh. D), 3 in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was purchased by
Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. The Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the
Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918, and the realty
taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his
estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance.
Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for registration of said parcel on May 9, 1966.
The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on the land
in question. Although there was no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments to
private respondent. In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land
which prompted private respondent to file an ejectment suit against the former in 1966. 4Meanwhile, during the latter part
of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the Bureau of
Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna

dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of
Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.
The two consolidated petitions raise substantially the same issues, to wit :
1) whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2) whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. 5 Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under existing legislation are
not the subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. 6 The New Civil Code enumerates properties of
public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. Article 420 provides:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State without being for public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth.
Article 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds
themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a portion of the land sought to be registered is covered with
water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a foreshoreland, which
brings it within the enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and therefore it cannot be the subject of
registration.
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as follows:
The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at
their highest ordinary depth. (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been interpreted in the case of Government of P.I. vs.
Colegio de San Jose 7 to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being
the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year." The foregoing interpretation was
the focal point in the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed. We see no reason to disturb the same.
Laguna de Bay is a lake. 8 While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the
formation of tides 9 in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. 10 Thus,
the alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the water
level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which
bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the
submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the
is completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land
sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land.
The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the
tides... 11

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water mark and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. 12
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains "falling
directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources. 13 Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due
to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by
petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a
foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private
property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. This brings us to the second issue, which is
whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title
which applicant already possesses over the land. 14 Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means
of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces
the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale (Exh. G) in favor of his father from whom he inherited said land. In
addition to this muniment of title, he presents tax declarations (Exhs. F, G, H, I) covering the land since 1918 and also tax
receipts (Exhs. J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, K, K-1, K-2, K-3) dating back to 1948. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts
and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, 15 they become
strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. 16 The then Court of Appeals found applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open,
continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years,
counted from April 19, 1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by purchase. 17 The record does not show
any circumstance of note sufficient enough to overthrow said findings of facts which is binding upon us. Since applicant
has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in good faith, his possession need only last for
ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. 18 Applicant has more than satisfied this legal
requirement. And even if the land sought to be registered is public land as claimed by the petitioners still, applicant would
be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942). Sec. 48 of said Act enumerates as among the
persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, the following:
(a) ...
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under bona fide c of ownership, for at least tirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title ...
The claim of private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L43190, that they have reclaimed the land from the waters of
Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed the same for more than twenty (20) years does not improve their position.
In the first place, private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the public domain
without proper permission from government authorities. 19 And even if such reclamation had been authorized, the
reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of
the authority earlier granted.20 Private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation,
therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall. In the second place, their alleged possession can never ripen
into ownership. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by
prescription. 21 As correctly found by the appellate court, the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the
land with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio. The fact that some of them at one time or another did
not pay rent cannot be considered in their favor. Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were merely
tolerated by applicant and these could not have affected the character of the latter's possession 22 which has already
ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration.
The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his registerable title over the parcel of land described in
his application, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the registration in favor of
applicant private-respondent of the land described in his application is hereby ordered.
Costs against private petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92161

March 18, 1991

SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES, GREGORIO

ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG and
FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of twenty
(20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the
eastern portion which borders on the national road. Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under
the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however,
would re-appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of the year, that
is, from September to December during the rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959, respondent Guillermo
Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land sold was
described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1 as follows:
. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500 hectares, more or less;
bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National Road; on South by Julian Tumolva and on the
West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad,
and assessed at P 750.00. . . .
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the
same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45
hectares. The second piece of property was more particularly described as follows:
. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000 square meters, more
or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on
the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed at P 440.00, as tax Declaration No.
3152. . . . 2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2) parcels of land
belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot
307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b)
2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy
month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not included in
Lot 307.
The Sketch Plan 3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent Manalo shows that the
Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branchesthe western and the eastern
branchesand then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river
cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the
eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about eight
(8) months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river
water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to
cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very
much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969. 4
It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822 is
10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is
separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry
season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo
claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is
adjacent.
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821. They occupy the outer
edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural

products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer. 5 This situation compelled
respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the
Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo
again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints 6 before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for
quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he
bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered
ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that
judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was then set for trial for failure of
the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of facts. 7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court
rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the defendants and in
favor of the plaintiff and orders:
1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of
Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of
Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and
4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. They filed a motion
for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of the Cagayan River, the
Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be
considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the
most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up
bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that the depression on
the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that they carry even more
weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 9 This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial
court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled
that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. 10 But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of
facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court. 11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings that periodically at
the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court
held:
The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion (Accretion), for it appears
that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and
the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba
becomes a marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its widest in the
northern tip (Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by our Supreme Court that "the owner of
the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an express act of
possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest"
(Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408). 12
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:

As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the word since the eastern
portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up during summer.
Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy season especially from September to
November which increases the water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen due to heavy rains,
the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point would be inundated with water. This is
where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water level is high the whole strip of land
would be under water.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that
According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary," the highest depth of the waters
of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain during the extraordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs always or
most of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and measure,
and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of
Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their
highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at
their highest depth during the dry season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in
question.
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the waters of the Cagayan
River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the
natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in
existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still susceptible to cultivation and uneroded. 13
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San
Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court
applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine
the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or
basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in the
instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.
We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the case at bar:
Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest
floods. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during
the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the
rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially
dries up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the waters
( i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river waters.
The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record. 1wphi1 Firstly,
respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot
307. 15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to
as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as
the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern branch
of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from
the western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but also what this Court
characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as a
river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed
becomes visible. 16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit "W3" which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot
307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and
very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through the
eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to go
down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The
cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters. 17
The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface of the earth.
However, Exhibit "E" 18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property standing in the name of Faustina

Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The words "old bed"
enclosed in parenthesesperhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the submerged portion
is an implied admission of the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by respondent
Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either
side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time.
Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the bed of
the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and
Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion.
Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1) the running waters,
(2) the bed, and (3) the banks. 19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which
Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds:
La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario considerar en su
relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en todo rio es preciso distinguir 1. esta agua
corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de dominio
publico, como las aguas?
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo civil que los rios
son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran
el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num 1, donde
dice: son de dominion publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que concuerda con lo que dispone
el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los arroyos que
no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los riosen la extension que cubran
sus aguas en las mayores crecidas ordinarias. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it were alleged and
proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and
Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of
private ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his landholding
obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposed
to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the right
of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. 21 It so happened that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307,
the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers that there was no
evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a
mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river
(or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). 22 The
Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot
307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot
307 across the river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land to
respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual
findings to the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the aver in a slow
and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several floods that caused the land
to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial
process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil
deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.

Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of the strip of
land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from
slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45
hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively),
in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an
area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo's contention were accepted, it would mean that in a
span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of Appeals and the trial court
considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or
river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion
that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of either the
western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion coupled
with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and
Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad's)
tenants. When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property and had it
declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twice instituted the
appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo's allegation of prior
possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and
adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.
If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or the
eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was
also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini,
Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax
declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the
plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to
refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo
as owner(s) thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the
Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in
an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-43882 April 30, 1979

ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffs-petitioners,
vs.
HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, RICARDO LADRIDO
and ROSENDO TE, defendants-respondents.
G.R. No. L-45321 April 30, 197
ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
RICARDO LADRIDO and ROSENDO TE, defendants-appellees.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
Corazon Miraflores for respondent Ricardo Ladrido.
Tirol & Tirol for respondent Rosendo Te.

GUERRERO, J.:

Appeal from the summary judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, issued in Civil Case No. 9660
entitled "Angelica Viajar and Celso Viajar, plaintiffs, versus Ricardo Ladrido and Rosendo Te defendants."
On February 15, 1974, plaintiffs-petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of property premised on the
allegations that they were the registered owners pro-indiviso of a parcel of agricultural land at Guibuangan, Pototan, Iloilo
with an area of 2.0089 hectares, more or less, identified as Lot No. 7340, Pototan Cadastre and more particularly
described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan, with improvements thereon situated in
the Municipality of Pototan and bounded on the Northeast by Lot No. 7339; in the Southeast by Lot No.
7342-1 Southwest by lots Nos. 7341 & 7470 and on the West by the Suage River.
their ownership thereof being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-77367 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo (par.
2, Complaint); that the above-described parcel of land was acquired through purchase by the plaintiffs on September 6,
1973 following which they caused to be undertaken by a license Geodetic Engineer the relocation survey of the property
for the purpose of determining the exact metes and bounds thereof (par. 3, Complaint): that as a result of the said
relocation survey, plaintiffs came to know and discover that the northeastern half portion of Lot No. 7340 has been eaten
up and occupied by the new waterbed of the Suage River as a result of the natural change in its course, while the
remaining southwestern portion of the property is occupied and possessed by defendant Ricardo Ladrido (par. 4,
Complaint); that plaintiffs also later came to know that the defendant has occupied and possessed for more than (2) years
not only the aforesaid Parcel 2 but also the old abandoned riverbed of the Suage River which was the original boundary
on the West of the land in question, lot No. 7340 (par. 5, Complaint); that the northeastern portion of their property having
been occupied by the new riverbed of the Suage River, as aforestated, plaintiffs have become by law ipso facto the
owners of the aforesaid abandoned riverbed in proportion to the area they lost (par. 6, Complaint); that notwithstanding
demands made by the plaintiffs, defendant without any justifiable reason has refused and until now still refuses to vacate
the aforesaid area occupied by him or surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiffs to the latter as great damage and
prejudice in the amount of P6,000.00 per year, P5,000.00 for moral damages and P500.00 for expenses of litigation (pars.
7, 8 and 9, Complaint).
In his answer dated March 12, 1974, defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido denied the substantial allegations in the
complaint and averred as special and affirmative defenses that he is the owner of Lot No. 7511 situated at Barrio
Cawayan Pototan, Iloilo, which lot is bounded on the east by Suage River (par. 6, Answer); that since 1926 or 1927, the
Suage River gradually deposited soil accumulations on the eastern portion of Lot 7511 which the defendant promptly took
possession and worked the same as his own as soon as said Suage River gradually, slowly and consistently moved
farther to the East (par. 7, Answer); that Lot 7340 claimed by plaintiffs and allegedly titled in their names, is separated from
Lot 7511 of the defendant by the Suage River, and the gradual action of the Suage River, admitted by the plaintiffs in their
complaint, had eaten up said lot 7340 (par. 8, Answer); that the land in dispute which is indicated as parcel 2, Lot 7340, of
Annex "A" of the complaint, as wen as the old Suage River bed, is the soil accumulation or accretion attached to Lot 7511,
owned by the defendant (par. 9, Answer); that defendant possessed the portions formed by the accumulations of soil
deposits made by the Suage River gradually from 1926-27 up to 1940, at the latest, when the Suage River remained on a
more or less stationary course up to the present (par. 10, Answer); that defendant is owner of the soil accumulations and
the dried up riverbed now attached to his Lot 7511 (par. 11, Answer). Defendant-respondent filed as counterclaim the
amount of P1,500.00 for attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as moral damages.
In a reply filed on April 4, 1974, plaintiffs-petitioners averred that they never admitted that the change in the course of the
Suage River was through a gradual action resulting to an accumulation of soil deposits to the eastern part of Lot No. 7511
owned by the defendant. Plaintiffs had emphatically and continuously insisted that the Suage River changed its course
through natural action by passing through the northeastern portion of Lot No. 7340 owned by plaintiffs (par. 1, Reply); that
said lot in question indicated as Parcel 2 of Lot No. 7340 of Annex "B" is not the soil accumulation or accretions attached
to Lot No. 7511 owned by defendant inasmuch as parcel 2 retains its Identity, and in fact the old river bed of Suage River
formerly running between Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 is still existing (par. 2, Reply); that the defense of accretion
interposed by defendant in the instant case does not apply; instead it falls with the contemplation of Article 461 of the New
Civil Code on change of course of rivers (par. 4, Reply); and that by reason of the natural change of the course of the
Suage River, the abandoned river bed which is existing as admitted by defendant himself, exclusively belongs to the
plaintiffs for reasons above stated (par. 5, Reply).
On June 14, 1974, plaintiffs-petitioners amended their complaint by impleading Rosendo Te as defendant from whom they
purchased the land in question upon the latter's assurance that the title is clean and the landholding is not possess nor
subject to any lien, encumbrances or claims by third persons. Plaintiffs-petitioners prayed in the alternative that should
possession of defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido be sustained, an order be issued annulling the contract of sale and
direct the vendor Rosendo Te to return the purchase price thereof with interest from the date of execution of the sale.
Defendant-respondent Rosendo Te filed his own answer to the amended complaint acknowledging the deed of sale but
alleging that he only sold to plaintiffs-petitioners whatever rights he had over the property under the Torrens Title and Tax
Declaration over the land transferred to him by the original owner; that complainants are precluded from including

defendant Rosendo Te in the case because the former had never previously demanded from the said vendor the
cancellation of the sale, but on the contrary, plaintiffs-petitioners have always maintained that they were entitled as a
matter of right to the ownership of the remaining portion of Lot No. 7340 and the dry riverbed which are under the
possession of defendant Ladrido.
On August 8, 1975, defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the action of
plaintiffs and declaring defendant Ricardo Ladrido the owner of the land in question on the basis of the alleged admission
of the plaintiffs in their complaint as well as of the law and jurisprudence on the matter. Quoting par. 4 of the complaint
which reads:
That as a result of the said relocation survey, plaintiffs came to know and discover that the northeastern
half portion of Lot No. 7340 has been easten up and occupied by the new waterbed of the Suage River as
a result of the natural change in its course, while the remaining southwestern portion of the property is
occupied and possess by defendant Ricardo Ladrido,
movant Ricardo Ladrido argues that said allegation of plaintiffs is an admission on their part that the change of course of
the river was gradual and not sudden or abrupt; that it is therefore a case of alluvion in Article 457 of the Civil Code (366
of the Old Civil Code) and not abandoned river bed in Article 461 of the Civil Code (370 of the Old Civil Code) as in the
latter the change of course is sudden or abrupt; that being alluvion, the land in question is accreted land on Lot 7511
(Article 457 of the Civil Code; Article 366 of the Old Civil Code).
Defendant Rosendo Te filed his "Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment" on the ground that there is a clear
controversy between the parties as to how the Suage River had changed its course, whether abruptly as contended by
the plaintiffs and defendant Rosendo Te or gradually as contended by defendant Ricardo Ladrido. Moreover, oppositor
claims that the abandoned river bed which in reality does not form part of Lots Nos. 7511 and 7340 is likewise involved in
the case and the question as to whom such land should now belong is also a matter of controversy.
On August 19, 1975, respondent Judge issued the Summary Judgment, which is quoted fully hereunder:
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 of the amended complaint read, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
5. That as a result of the said relocation survey, plaintiffs came to know and discover that
the northeastern half portion of Lot No. 7340 has been eaten up and occupied by the new
waterbed of the Suage River as a result of the natural change in its course, while the
remaining southwestern portion of the property is occupied and possessed by defendant
Ricardo Ladrido. The portion now occupied by the Suage River is Identified as Parcel 1
and the portion occupied by the defendant Ricardo Ladrido is Identified as Parcel 2 in the
sketch marked as Annex "B " and is found attached to the original complaint;
6. That plaintiffs also later came to know that the defendant Ricardo Ladrido has
occupied and possessed for more than two (2) years not only the aforesaid Parcel 2 but
also the old abandoned riverbed of the Suage River which was the original boundary on
the West of the land in question, Lot No. 7340;
xxx xxx xxx
9. That plaintiffs upon knowing that a portion of the landholding in question is being
possessed by defendant Ricardo Ladrido, immediately informed and complained to the
defendant t Rosendo Te that the land sold to them is not free from any claim and
possession of third persons, as it is in fact possessed and claimed by defendant Ricardo
Ladrido, but instead defendant t Rosendo Te when he received the information merely
told the plaintiffs that it was their own lookout and for them to fight their own legal battle;
xxx xxx xxx
Then paragraphs 2 and 10 of defendant Rosendo Te's answer read:
xxx xxx xxx

2. It is admitted that on September 6, 1973 answering defendant executed a Deed of

Sale in favor of the plaintiffs herein selling to the latter for the sum of P5,000 all his rights,
title and interest over Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan of which he was
then the registered owner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50333; but all and each
of the other allegations in Par. 3 of the Amended Complaint, specially the assurances
supposedly given by answering defendant, are specifically denied, the truth of the matter
being as follows: that answering defendant was only selling to the plaintiffs an and
whatever rights he might have over the said parcel of land under and by virtue of the
aforesaid Torrens title and the tax declaration covering the land; that the plaintiffs
themselves were the ones who approached and proposed to the defendant the purchase
from the latter of his registered rights on the said land, stating that they would visit the
land before the purchase was going to be consummated; and that answering defendant
in turn acquired in good faith his rights over said land by purchase from its former
registered owners, the spouses Francisco M. Militants and Consuelo M. Cordova, by
virtue of a document of sale executed on January 2, 1966.
xxx xxx xxx
10. The plaintiffs are precluded by estoppel from including Rosendo Te as a defendant in
the present case because they had never previously demanded from the latter for the
cancellation of the sale in their favor; and, on the contrary, based on the facts of the case,
they have always maintained as they have so manifested to answering defendant that
they were entitled as a matter of right to the ownership of the remaining portion of Lot No.
7340, as well as to the dry abandoned bed of the Suage River.
xxx xxx xxx
Then paragraph I of the reply read as follows:
1. That plaintiffs never admitted that the change in the course of the Suage River was
through a gradual action resulting to an accumulation of soil deposits to the eastern part
of Lot No. 7511 owned by the defendant. Plaintiffs had emphatically and continuously
insisted that the Suage River changed its course through natural action by passing
through the northeastern portion of Lot No. 7340 owned by plaintiffs;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing judicial admission of plaintiffs supports the motion for summary judgment per comments of
Chief Justice Moran and Justice Martin cited by defendant Ladrido.
In the opposition of defendant Rosendo Te it is contended that no admission has been made as to the
ownership of defendant Ladrido but the foregoing paragraph 1 of the plaintiffs' reply clearly indicated and
admitted the ownership of defendant Ladrido on Lot 7511. Then defendant Te has filed no claim against
defendant Ladrido, so it is Te who is in estoppel to oppose Ladrido's motion for summary judgment.
The presence of the clause 'eaten up and occupied by the new waterbed of the Suage River' clearly
admitted a case of alluvion referred to in Article 457 of the New Civil Code, so that the doctrine laid down
in the case of 'Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, (53 Phil. 55) is applicable to the present
claim of defendant Ladrido.
Then plaintiff is a purchaser in bad faith as at the time of the purchase in 1973, defendant Ladrido was
already in possession of the land for more than 2 years before the filing of the complaint on February 15,
1974, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the original and amended complaint pursuant to the ruling in the case of
Comspecto vs. Fruto, 31 Phil 144, found on page 316 of the Philippine Torrens System by Ponce, to wit:
Precaution when property is in possession of another. One who purchases real property
which is in actual possession of others should, at least, make some inquiry concerning
the rights of those in possession. The actual possession by others other than the vendor
should, at least, put the purchaser upon inquiry. He can scarcely in the absence of such
inquiry, be regarded as a bona-fide purchaser as against such possessors. Comspecto
vs. Fruto, 31 Phil. 144, 149).
WHEREFORE, summary judgment is hereby rendered against the plaintiffs and in favor of the
defendants, hereby dismissing this case, without pronouncement as to costs

SO ORDERED.
From the above judgment, plaintiffs-petitioners filed the notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. This was followed by the
submission of their Record on Appeal on September 25, 1975. But before the petition for review could be filed, counsel for
petitioners moved for the certification of the case to the Supreme Court after realizing that the appeal involves pure
questions of law. The motion was granted by the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals in the resolution of September
2, 1976 which certified the case to Us for final determination pursuant to Section 31 in relation to Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act, as amended. In Our resolution of December 17, 1976, the certified case was docketed as G.R. No. L-45321
and consolidated with G.R. No. L-43882, a petition for review on certiorari of the same summary judgment filed by
plaintiffs-petitioners in the meantime on July 2, 1976 and given due course as a special civil action in Our resolution of
September 1, 1976.
Having considered the petition as an original action, the principal issue is whether or not the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in deciding the case by Summary Judgment dated August 19, 1975. Plaintiffs-petitioners contend that the lower
court erred in promulgating summary judgment in view of the questions of fact disputed in the pleadings. They maintain
that by invoking Article 461 of the Civil Code in relation to their allegation that there was a natural change in the course of
Suage River, they, in effect, alleged the abrupt or sudden change in the course of the waters. They point out that this
contention was contradicted by defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido in his answer when the latter claimed that the
change was instead gradual under the contemplation of Article 457 of the same Code. On the other hand, this defendantrespondent supports the propriety of the summary judgment on the ground that the complaint failed to aver categorically
the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the river, but on the contrary, the allegation therein that the land was eaten
up by the current amounts to an admission on the part of complainants that the change was in fact gradual.
From a careful reading of the complaint and answer, there are two conflicting theories respecting the occurrence of a
natural phenomenon, the effects and consequences of which are governed either by Article 461 1 or Article 457 2 of the
Civil Code. The obvious task laid before the trial court is to determine whether there actually occurred an abrupt and
sudden change of the water current, or that the river had gradually veered through the years leaving alluvial deposit of soil
now composing the portion claimed by the parties.
We cannot subscribe to the interpretation that the phrase "eaten up and occupied by the new waterbed" imports an
admission by plaintiffs- petitioners of a gradual action of the water current, thus stripping the complaint of its only
contestable issue, and hence, needs only to be disposed of in a summary judgment. We hold that the phrase "eaten up" is
a vague expression of what complainants wanted to convey, since the phrase can either mean gradual or sudden action
of the river. This ambiguity, though, cannot deprive the complaint of its merit because the pleader is required to state only
the ultimate facts constituting his cause of action. At least, by the reading of the entire complaint, it is clear enough that
the pleader did not take its own expression to mean the gradual shifting of the river current, so much so that defendantrespondent in his answer countered with a diametrically opposed explanation as demonstrated in his factual allegations.
Moreover, plaintiffs-petitioners in their reply alleged that they never admitted that the change in the course of the Suage
River was through a gradual action resulting to an accumulation of soil deposits to the eastern part of the lot owned by
defendant.
Besides, co-defendant Rosendo Te conceded in his answer to the amended complaint that the Suage
Riversuddenly changed its course by channeling its bed at the northeastern strip of Lot No. 7340 (Records, p. 28).
Considering that the interests of the parties clashed on the proprietary effect of the natural phenomenon, the issue all the
more became genuine and ripe for adjudication. Plaintiffs-petitioners claim ownership over the abandoned river bed in
proportion to the area they lost when the river opened a new channel within their property. On the other hand, defendantrespondent Ricardo Ladrido claims ownership to the disputed portion because its consists of accretion attached to his
land as a result of the gradual accumulation of solid brought by the action of the water current. With these conflicting
claims, a factual dispute certainly arises which can only be properly settled by means of a trial on the merits. Summary
judgment was therefore, unwarranted. 3
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and
certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an
issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. 4
An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny
of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary judgment by one party supported by affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion
supported also by affidavits, deposition ' or other documents (Section 3, Rule 34). In spite of its expediting character, relief
by summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a
summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a
party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of
fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and
any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant. 5

We find that in the case at bar, the aforementioned guidelines were not observed, The mere reliance on an "admission"
arrived at by construction and dubitable by its terms, rather than a clear and positive concession cannot be a basis for a
summary judgment. Respondent's motion is not supported by an affidavit of merit or any document attesting the state of
facts relied upon in the motion. Neither has the court afforded the parties a hearing on both the motion and opposition to
the same. Clearly, the trial court in cursorily issuing a summary judgment, committed a correctible error.
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment is set aside and the case is hereby remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125683 March 2, 1999

EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY LING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING YAO, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE and
JOSE N. QUEDDING, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No.
32472 entitled "Eden Ballatan., et. al., plaintiffs-appellees v. Gonzalo Go and Winston Go, appellants and third-party
plaintiffs-appellants v. Li Ching Yao, et. al., third-party defendants." 1
The instant case arose from a dispute over forty-two (42) square meters of residential land belonging to petitioners. The
parties herein are owners of adjacent lots located at Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta University Village, Malabon,
Metro Manila. Lot No. 24, 414 square meters in area, is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses
Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. 2 Lots Nos. 25 and 26, with an area of 415 and 313 square meters respectively, are
registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr. 3 On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr.,
constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27, 417 square meters in area, and is registered in the name of
respondent Li Ching Yao. 4
In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24. During the construction, she noticed that the concrete
fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern
side of her property. 5 Her building contractor formed her that the area of her lot was actually less than that described in
the title. Forthwith, Ballatan informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and his encroachment on her property.
Respondent Go, however, claimed that his house, including its fence and pathway, were built within the parameters of his
father's lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of
Agriculture (AIA), the owner-developer of the subdivision project.
Petitioner Ballatan called the attention of the IAI to the discrepancy of the land area in her title and the actual land area
received from them. The AIA authorized another survey of the land by Engineer Jose N. Quedding.
In a report dated February 28, 1985, Engineer Quedding found that the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by few
meters and that of respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away, increased by two (2) meters. Engineer Quedding
declared that he made a verification survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26 of respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly found the
boundaries to have been in their proper position. He, however, could not explain the reduction in Ballatan's area since he
was not present at the time respondents Go constructed their boundary walls. 6
On June 2, 1985, Engineer Quedding made a third relocation survey upon request of the parties. He found that Lot No. 24
lost approximately 25 square meters on its eastern boundary that Lot No. 25, although found to have encroached on Lot
No. 24, did not lose nor gain any area; that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square meters which, however, were gained by
Lot No. 27 on its western boundary. 7 In short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot
No. 24.
On the basis of this survey, on June 10, 1985, petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondents Go to remove
and dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24. Respondents Go refused. The parties including Li Ching Yao, however,
met several times to reach an agreement one matter.

Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue before the barangay. Respondents Go did not appear.
Thus, on April 1, 1986, petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go Civil Case No. 772-MN for recovery of
possession before the Regional Trial Court, Malabon, Branch 169. The Go' s filed their "Answer with Third-Party
Complaint" impleading as third-party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.
On August 23, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of petitioners. It ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion of Lot
No. 24, demolish their improvements and pay petitioner Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
It dismissed the third-party complaint against: (1) AIA after finding that the lots sold to the parties were in accordance with
the technical description a verification plan covered by their respective titles; (2) Jose N. Quedding, there being no privity
of relation between him and respondents Go and his erroneous survey having been made at the instance of AIA, not the
parties; and (3) Li Ching Yao for failure to prove that he committed any wrong in the subject encroachment. 8 The court
made the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering
the latter:
1. To demolish and remove all improvements existing and encroaching on plaintiff's lot;
2. To clear, vacate and deliver possession of the encroached area to the plaintiffs;
3. To pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the following:
a) P7,800.00 for the expenses paid to the surveyors;
b) P5,000.00 for plaintiffs' transportation;
4. To pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the current market value of
the subject matter in litigation at the time of execution; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
The third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiff Gonzalo Go and Winston Go against third-party
defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching Yao is hereby DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed
the dismissal of the third-party complaint against the AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose
Quedding. Instead of ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject land, the appellate court
ordered them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount for
that portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time of taking. It also ordered Jose Quedding to
pay respondents Go attorney's fees of P5,000.00 for his erroneous survey. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the
dismissal of the third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture is concerned but modified in
all other aspects as follows:
1) Defendants-appellants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellees the reasonable value of the fortytwo (42) square meters of their lot at the time of its taking;
2) Third-party defendant Li Ching Yao is hereby ordered to pay defendants-appellants the reasonable
value of the thirty-seven (37) square meters of the latter's lot at the time of its taking; and
3) Third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding is hereby ordered to pay to defendants-appellants the amount
of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
LET THE RECORD of the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for further
proceedings and reception of evidence for the determination of the reasonable value of Lots Nos. 24 and
26.
SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, this petition. Petitioners allege that:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN:
1. IT APPLIED EQUITY OR EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE INSTANT CASE IN UTTER DISREGARD
AND IN VIOLATION OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE VESTING
BASIC PROPERTY RIGHTS TO HEREIN PETITIONERS. RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER TO
APPLY/USE EQUITY IN THE PRESENCE OF EXISTING LAWS TO THE CONTRARY.
2. UNDER THE GUISE OF APPLYING EQUITY BUT IN EFFECT A VERY APPARENT PARTIALITY AND
FAVOR TO RESPONDENTS GO, IT ORDERED PAYMENT OF THE ENCROACHED AREA AT THE
VALUE AT THE TIME OF ITS TAKING AND NOT THE VALUE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT, THEREBY
ENRICHING THE GO'S BUT DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THE FRUITS OR INCREASE IN VALUE
OF THEIR PROPERTY TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED UNDER THE LAW AS THE REGISTERED
OWNERS WITH TORRENS TITLE IN THEIR NAMES.
3. WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ANY
FILING OR DOCKET FEE.
4. WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS THE RECOVERY OF THE NECESSARY EXPENSES IN
PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS IN THIS CASE. 10
Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of Appeals of the third-party complaint by respondents Go against
the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint should not have been
considered by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party plaintiffs' failure to pay the docket and filing
fees before the trial court.
The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint of petitioners against respondents Go. The
complaint filed was for accion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession of real property which is a real action. The rule in
this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied the payment of the requisite
docket and filing fees. 11 In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property and the amount
of damages claimed, if any 12 If the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court acquires
jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. 13Where
the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related damages are not, the court, although
having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompnying claim for
damages.14 Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for
amendment of the complaint so as to allege the precise amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal
fee. 15 If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the judgment award. 16 The same rule also applies to
third-party claims and other similar pleadings. 17
In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed by respondents Go was incorporated in their answer to the complaint.
The third-party complaint sought the same remedy as the principal complaint but added a prayer for attorney's fees and
costs without specifying their amounts, thus:
ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
1. That summons be issued against Third-Party Defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Jose N.
Quedding and Li Ching Yao;
2. That after hearing, they be sentenced to indemnify the Third-Party Plaintiffs for whatever is adjudged
against the latter in favor of the Plaintiffs;
3. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees as may be proved during trial;
4. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay the costs.
Other just and equitable reliefs are also prayed for. 18
The Answer with Third-Party Complaint was admitted by the trial court without the requisite payment of filing fees,
particularly on the Go's prayer for damages. 19 The trial court did not award the Go's any damages. It dismissed the thirdparty complaint. The Court of Appeals, however, granted the third-party complaint in part by ordering third-party defendant
Jose N. Quedding to pay the Go's the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeal did not err in awarding damages despite the Go's failure to specify the
amount prayed for and pay the corresponding additional filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers to
damages arising after the filing of the complaint against the Go's. The additional filing fee on this claim is deemed to
constitute a lien on the judgment award. 20
The Court of Appeals found that the subject portion is actually forty-two (42) square meters in area, not forty-five (45), as
initially found by the trial court; that this forty-two (42) square meter portion is on the entire eastern side of Lot No. 24
belonging to petitioners; that this said portion is found the concrete fence and pathway that extends from respondent
Winston Go's house on adjacent Lot No. 25; that inclusive of the subject portion, respondents Go did not gain nor lose any
portion of Lots Nos. 25 and 26; that instead, Lot No. 27, on which respondent Li Ching Yao built his house, encroached on
the land of respondents Go, gaining in the process thirty-seven (37) square meters of the latter's land. 21
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA.. The claim that the
discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was not proved. The appellate court, however, found that it was the
erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent
Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely
within the parameters of his father's land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached petitioners'
lot. They are deemed builders in good faith 22 until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on her
property. 23
Respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other parties did. 24 He constructed his house in
1982, respondents Go in 1983, and petitioners in 1985. 25 There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that respondent
Li Ching Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on respondents Go's
adjoining land. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the
burden of proof. 26
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance with
the appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, 27 or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the building, planting or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the
necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner of
the land may also oblige the builder, planter or sower to purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner
chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the owner may remove
the improvements thereon. The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value
considerably more than the building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent
to the owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the
terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the
improvement stands to the builder, planter or sower, is given to the owner of the land. 28
Art. 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements built by mistaken belief on land belonging to the
adjoining owner. 29 The facts of the instant case are similar to those in Cabral v. Ibanez, 30 to wit:
[P]laintiffs Geronima Zabala and her husband Justino Bernardo, constructed their house in the belief that
it was entirely within the area of their own land without knowing at that time that part of their house was
occupying a 14-square meter portion of the adjoining lot belonging to the defendants, and that the
defendants Bernardo M. Cabral and Mamerta M. Cabral were likewise unaware of the fact that a portion
of plaintiff's house was extending and occupying a portion of their lot with an area of 14 square meters.
The parties came to know of the fact that part of the plaintiff's house was occupying part of defendant's
land when the construction of plaintiff's house was about to be finished, after a relocation of the
monuments of the two properties had been made by the U.S. Army through the Bureau of Lands,
according to their "Stipulation of Facts," dated August 17, 1951.

On the basis of these facts, we held that:

The court, therefore, concludes that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith and the relative rights of the
defendant Mamerta Cabral as owner of the land and of the plaintiffs as owners of the building is governed
by Article 361 of the Civil Code (Co Tao v. Joaquin Chan Chico, 46 Off. Gaz.5514). Article 361 of the old
Civil Code has been reproduced with an additional provision in Article 448 of the new Civil Code,
approved June 18, 1949. 31
Similarly, in Grana and Torralba v. Court of Appeals, 32 we held that:
Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were found by
the Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. Under Article 361
of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the land on which anything has been built in
good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of
necessary or useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to
oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore the
choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment of the
proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of their land on which stands the
improvement. It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to
exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event the
whole building might be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents
to sell to petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If
petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they
do so. Of course, respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the case, then petitioners must pay
reasonable rent. The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the lease, and should
they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the same. 33
In light of these rulings, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by
respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it
may render the Go's house useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their
improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they
vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the value of the land is much more than the
Go's improvement, the respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then
they may go to court to fix the same.
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the
prevailing market value at the time of payment. The Court of Appeals erred in fixing the price at the time of taking, which is
the time the improvements were built on the land. The time of taking is determinative of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings. The instant case is not for expropriation. It is not a taking by the state of private property for a public purpose
upon payment of just compensation. This is a case of an owner who has been paying real estate taxes on his land but has
been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years. It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the time of
payment. 34
Art. 448 and the same conditions abovestated also apply to respondents Go as owners and possessors of their land and
respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of
respondents Go's land.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is modified as follows:
(1) Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision their option to either buy the
portion of respondents Go's improvement on their Lot No. 24, or sell to said respondents the portion of their land on which
the improvement stands. If petitioners elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must be at the
prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the improvement will render respondents Go's house useless,
then petitioners should sell the encroached portion of their land to respondents Go. If petitioners choose to sell the land
but respondents Go are unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent
from the time petitioners made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is
considerably more than the value of the improvement, then respondents Go may elect to lease the land, in which case the
parties shall agree upon the terms, the lease. Should they fail to agree on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix
the terms of the lease.
From the moment petitioners shall have exercised their option, respondents Go shall pay reasonable monthly rent up to
the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the court fixes such terms.

(2) Respondents Go are likewise directed to exercise their rights as owners of Lots Nos. 25 and 26, vis-a-visrespondent Li
Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty seven (37) square meters of respondents Go 's land in
accordance with paragraph one abovementioned.
(3) The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering Engineer Quedding, as third-party defendant, to pay attorney's fees of
P5,000.00 to respondents Go is affirmed. The additional filing fee on the damages constitutes a lien on this award.
(4) The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture is
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120303 July 24, 1996

FEDERICO GEMINIANO, MARIA GEMINIANO, ERNESTO GEMINIANO, ASUNCION GEMINIANO, LARRY
GEMINIANO and MARLYN GEMINIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINADOR NICOLAS, and MARY A. NICOLAS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR. J.:p
This petition for review on certiorari has its origins in Civil Case No. 9214 of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) in Dagupan City for unlawful detainer and damages. The petitioners ask the Court to set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, which, in turn, reversed the MTCC; ordered the petitioners to reimburse the private respondents
the value of the house in question and other improvements; and allowed the latter to retain the premises until
reimbursement was made.
It appears that Lot No. 3765-B-1 containing an area of 314 square meters was originally owned by the petitioners'
mother, Paulina Amado vda. de Geminiano. On a 12-square-meter portion of that lot stood the petitioners'
unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners sold in November 1978 to the private respondents for the sum of
P6,000.00, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot occupied by the house. Subsequently,
the petitioners' mother executed a contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of the lot, including that
portion on which the house stood, in favor of the private respondents for P40.00 per month for a period of seven
years commencing on 15 November 1978. 1 The private respondents then introduced additional improvements
and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the lease contract in November 1985, however,
the petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly rentals.
It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit, which resulted in its acquisition by one Maria Lee in
1972. In 1982, Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it in 1984 to the spouses Agustin and Ester
Dionisio.
On 14 February 1992, the Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the
petitioners. 2 As such, the lot was registered in the latter's name. 3
On 9 February 1993, the petitioners sent, via registered mail, a letters addressed to private respondent Mary
Nicolas demanding that she vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears within twenty days from notice. 4
Upon failure of the private respondents to heed the demand, the petitioners filed with the MTCC of Dagupan City
a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to confine the issues to: (1) whether there was an implied
renewal of the lease which expired in November 1985; (2) whether the lessees were builders in good faith and
entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements; and (3) the value of the house.
The parties then submitted their respective position papers and the case was heard under the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
On the first issue, the court held that since the petitioners' mother was no longer the owner of the lot in question at
the time the lease contract was executed in 1978, in view of its acquisition by Maria Lee as early as 1972, there
was no lease to speak of, much less, a renewal thereof. And even if the lease legally existed, its implied renewal
was not for the period stipulated in the original contract, but only on a month-to-month basis pursuant to Article

1687 of the Civil Code. The refusal of the petitioners' mother to accept the rentals starting January 1986 was then
a clear indication of her desire to terminate the monthly lease. As regard the petitioners' alleged failed promise to
sell to the private respondents the lot occupied by the house, the court held that such should be litigated in a
proper case before the proper forum, not an ejectment case where the only issue was physical possession of the
property.
The court resolved the second issue in the negative, holding that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, which
allow possessors in good faith to recover the value of improvements and retain the premises until reimbursed, did
not apply to lessees like the private respondents, because the latter knew that their occupation of the premises
would continue only during the life of the lease. Besides, the rights of the private respondents were specifically
governed by Article 1678, which allow reimbursement of up to one-half of the value of the useful improvements, or
removal of the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.
On the third issue, the court deemed as conclusive the private respondents' allegation that the value of the house
and improvements was P180,000.00, there being no controverting evidence presented.
The trial court thus ordered the private respondents to vacate the premises, pay the petitioners P40.00 a month
as reasonable compensation for their stay thereon from the filing of the complaint on 14 April 1993 until they
vacated, and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs. 5
On appeal by the private respondents, the RTC of Dagupan City reversed the trial court's decision and rendered a
new judgment: (1) ordering the petitioners to reimburse the private respondents for the value of the house and
improvements in the amount of P180,000.00 and to pay the latter P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and (2) allowing the private respondents to remain in possession of the premises until they
were fully reimbursed for the value of the house. 6 It ruled that since the private respondents were assured by the
petitioners that the lot they leased would eventually be sold to them, they could be considered builders in good
faith, and as such, were entitled to reimbursed of the value of the house and improvements with the right of
retention until reimbursement and had been made.
On appeal, this time by the petitioners, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC 7 and denied 8the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
The Court is confronted with the issue of which provision of law governs the case at bench: Article 448 or Article
1678 of the Civil Code? The said articles read as follows:
Art 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the
one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or plantercannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case if disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
Art 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which
the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remover the improvements, even
though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment
upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursed, but he may
remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does
not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
The crux of the said issue then is whether the private respondents are builder in good faith or mere lessees.
The private respondents claim they are builders in good faith, hence, Article 448 of the Civil Code should apply.
They rely on the lack of title of the petitioners' mother at the time of the execution of the contract of lease, as well
as the alleged assurance made by the petitioners that the lot on which the house stood would be sold to them.

It has been said that while the right to let property is an incident of title and possession, a person may be lessor
and occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of the premises let. 9After all,
ownership of the property is not being transferred, 10 only the temporary use and enjoyment thereof. 11
In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was originally owned by the petitioners' mother. The land
was allegedly acquired later by one Maria Lee by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortage. Lee, however,
never sought a writ of possession in order that she gain possession of the property in question. 12The petitioners'
mother therefore remained in possession of the lot.
It is undisputed that the private respondents came into possession of 126 square-meter portion of the said lot by
virtue of contract of lease executed by the petitioners' mother as lessor, and the private respondents as lessees,
is therefore well-established, and carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. 13 The private respondents, as
lessees who had undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are then estopped to deny their
landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in
possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord. 14 This estoppel applies
even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, 15 and may be
asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title. 16
Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only for
the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith. 17
In a plethora of cases, 18 this Court has held that Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same
Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement
is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
Anent the alleged promise of the petitioners to sell the lot occupied by the private respondents' house, the same
was not substantiated by convincing evidence. Neither the deed of sale over the house nor the contract of lease
contained an option in favor of the respondent spouses to purchase the said lot. And even if the petitioners indeed
promised to sell, it would not make the private respondents possessors or builders in good faith so as to covered
by the provision of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot raise the mere expectancy or ownership of the
aforementioned lot because the alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its existence even proven. The first
thing that the private respondents should have done was to reduce the alleged promise into writing, because
under Article 1403 of the Civil Code, an agreement for the sale of real property or an interest therein is
unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum thereof be produced. Not having taken any steps in order that
the alleged promise to sell may be enforced, the private respondents cannot bank on the promise and profess any
claim nor color of title over the lot in question.
There is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done in Pecson vs.Court
of Appeals, 19 because the situation sought to be avoided and which would justify the application of that provision,
is not present in this case. Suffice it to say, "a state of forced coownership" would not be created between the
petitioners and the private respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the right of the private
respondents as lessees are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement to the extent
of one-half of the value of the useful improvements.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises only if the
lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since the petitioners refused to exercise that option, 20 the private
respondents cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can
they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then is to remove the
improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. 21
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition, REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE
the decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 January 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34337; and REINSTATING the
decision of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Dagupan City in Civil Case No. 9214 entitled
"Federico Geminiano, et al. vs. Dominador Nicolas, et al."
Cost against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57288 April 30, 1984

LEONILA SARMINETO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ENRIQUE A. AGANA, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch
XXVIII, Pasay City, and SPOUSES ERNESTO VALENTINO and REBECCA LORENZO-VALENTINO,respondents.
Mercedes M. Respicio for petitioner.
Romulo R. Bobadilla for private respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
This Petition for certiorari questions a March 29, 1979 Decision rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Pasay City.
The Decision was one made on memoranda, pursuant to the provisions of RA 6031, and it modified, on October 17, 1977,
a judgment of the then Municipal Court of Paranaque, Rizal, in an Ejectment suit instituted by herein petitioner Leonila
SARMIENTO against private respondents, the spouses ERNESTO Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo. For the facts,
therefore, we have to look to the evidence presented by the parties at the original level.
It appears that while ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's mother had told him the couple could build a
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on a lot of 145 sq. ms., being Lot D of a subdivision in Paranaque (the LAND, for short). In 1967,
ERNESTO did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. It was probably
assumed that the wife's mother was the owner of the LAND and that, eventually, it would somehow be transferred to the
spouses.
It subsequently turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who, on September
7 , 1974, sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO. The following January 6, 1975, SARMIENTO asked ERNESTO and
wife to vacate and, on April 21, 1975, filed an Ejectment suit against them. In the evidentiary hearings before the
Municipal Court, SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in her favor, which showed the price to be
P15,000.00. On the other hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The figures were not questioned by SARMIENTO.
The Municipal Court found that private respondents had built the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE in good faith, and, disregarding
the testimony of ERNESTO, that it had a value of P20,000.00. It then ordered ERNESTO and wife to vacate the LAND
after SARMIENTO has paid them the mentioned sum of P20,000.00.
The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Pasay where, after the submission of memoranda, said
Court rendered a modifying Decision under Article 448 of the Civil Code. SARMIENTO was required, within 60 days, to
exercise the option to reimburse ERNESTO and wife the sum of 40,000.00 as the value of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, or
the option to allow them to purchase the LAND for P25,000.00. SARMIENTO did not exercise any of the two options
within the indicated period, and ERNESTO was then allowed to deposit the sum of P25,000.00 with the Court as the
purchase price for the LAND. This is the hub of the controversy. SARMIENTO then instituted the instant certiorari
proceedings.
We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in view of the peculiar circumstances under which they had
constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who,
having stated they could build on the property, could reasonably be expected to later on give them the LAND.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code provides:t.hqw
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than
that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (Paragraphing supplied)

The value of the LAND, purchased for P15,000.00 on September 7, 1974, could not have been very much more than that
amount during the following January when ERNESTO and wife were asked to vacate. However, ERNESTO and wife have
not questioned the P25,000.00 valuation determined by the Court of First Instance.
In regards to the valuation of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, the only evidence presented was the testimony of ERNESTO
that its worth at the time of the trial should be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The Municipal Court chose to assess its
value at P20,000.00, or below the minimum testified by ERNESTO, while the Court of First Instance chose the maximum
of P40,000.00. In the latter case, it cannot be said that the Court of First Instance had abused its discretion.
The challenged decision of respondent Court, based on valuations of P25,000.00 for the LAND and P40,000.00 for the
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, cannot be viewed as not supported by the evidence. The provision for the exercise by petitioner
SARMIENTO of either the option to indemnify private respondents in the amount of P40,000.00, or the option to allow
private respondents to purchase the LAND at P25,000.00, in our opinion, was a correct decision.t.hqw
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The
owner, of the land. upon, the other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay
for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here
did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove
it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell
his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. (Emphasis ours)
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their
buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for
such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be
executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the
Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608 [1946]).
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby ordered dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-47475 August 19, 1988

MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOSE H. TECSON, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and NILO
MADLANGAWA, respondents.
Ceferino V. Argueza for petitioner.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession and damages against the private respondent, the then
Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which provides inter alia:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In Civil Case No. 72872, declaring the defendant Nilo Madlangawa as a builder or possessor in good
faith; ordering the plaintiff to recognize the right of said defendant to remain in Lot No. 345, Block 1, of the
Clara Tambunting Subdivision until after he shall have been reimbursed by the plaintiff the sum of
P7,500.00, without pronouncement as to costs. (p. 24, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and upon affirmance by the
latter of the decision below, the petitioner elevated its case to this Court.

On July 13, 1977, we issued a resolution dated July 11, 1977 denying the petitioner's petition for lack of merit. Hence, on
August 5, 1977, the petitioner filed with the trial court, presided over by respondent Judge Jose H. Tecson, a motion for
the approval of petitioner's exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment, praying that the court issue an order: a)
approving the exercise of petitioner's option to appropriate the improvements introduced by the private respondent on the
property; b) thereafter, private respondent be ordered to deliver possession of the property in question to the petitioner.
On October 7, 1977, the respondent judge issued the disputed order, to wit:
Acting on the motion for approval of plaintiffs exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment filed by
the plaintiff, and the opposition thereto interposed by the defendant, both through counsels, and after a
judicious review of all the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, in the light of statutory
provisions (Art. 6, New Civil Code) and jurisprudential doctrines (Vide, Benares v. Capitol Subdivision,
Inc., L-7330 (Nov. 29, 1960), and considering further the definitive ruling of our Supreme Tribunal in the
case of Jose C. Cristobal v. Alejandro Melchor, G.R. No. L-43203 promulgated on July 29, 1977, wherein
the Court says:
"This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a rigid application of the law but rather
its action should conform to the conditions or exigencies of a given problem or situation in order to grant
relief that it will serve the ends of justice."
xxx xxx xxx
the Court is of the considered view that under the peculiar circumstances which supervened after the institution of this
case, like, for instance, the introduction of certain major repairs of and other substantial improvements on the controverted
property, the instant motion of the plaintiff is not well-taken and therefore not legally proper and tenable.
WHEREFORE, and for lack of merit, the instant motion for approval of the plaintiff's fai-rn of option and for
satisfaction of judgment should be, as hereby it is, denied. (pp. 45-46, Rollo)
After a denial of its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition for mandamus alleging that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to exercise option and for execution of
judgment on the grounds that under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, the exercise of option belongs to the owner of
the property, who is the petitioner herein, and that upon finality of judgment, the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of
right, to its execution which is only a ministerial act on the part of the respondent judge.
On April 15, 1978, the private respondent filed his comment on the petition alleging that the same has already become
moot and academic for two reasons: first, fire gutted not only the house of the private respondent but the majority of the
houses in Tambunting Estate; and second, as a result of the said fire, the then First Lady and Metro Manila Governor
Imelda R. Marcos has placed the disputed area under her Zonal Improvement Project, thereby allowing the victims of the
fire to put up new structures on the premises, so that the willingness and readiness of the petitioner to exercise the
alleged option can no longer be exercised since the subject-matter thereof has been extinguished by the fire.
Furthermore, the President of the Philippines has already issued a Presidential Decree for the expropriation of certain
estates in Metro Manila including the Tambunting Estate. Therefore, the beneficient and humanitarian purpose of the
Zonal Improvement Project and the expropriation proceeding would be defeated if petitioner is allowed to exercise an
option which would result in the ejectment of the private respondent.
On December 28, 1980, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1669 was issued providing for the expropriation of the Tambunting
Estate. However, this decree was challenged before this Court in G.R. No, 55166 entitled The "Elisa R. Manotok, et al. v.
National Housing Authority, et al." Hence, we decided to hold the decision on this petition pending the resolution of the
above entitled case.
On May 21, 1987, the Court rendered a decision in the Elisa Manotok case (Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150
SCRA 89) ruling that P.D. 1669 is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. Thus, since the present
petition has not been rendered moot and academic by the decision in said case, we will now decide on its merits.
As stated earlier, the petitioner argues that since the judgment of the trial court has already become final, it is entitled to
the execution of the same and that moreover, since the house of the private respondent was gutted by fire, the execution
of the decision would now involve the delivery of possession of the disputed area by the private respondent to the
petitioner.
We find merit in these arguments.

When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it became incumbent upon the respondent judge to issue
the necessary writ for the execution of the same. There is, therefore, no basis for the respondent judge to deny the
petitioner's motion to avail of its option to approriate the improvements made on its property.
In the case of Duenas v. Mandi (151 SCRA 530, 545), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
...Likewise settled is the rule that after a judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto,
and nothing can be done therewith except its execution, otherwise there would be no end to legal
processes. (Fabular v. Court of Appeals, 11 9 SCRA 329)
Neither can the respondent judge deny the issuance of a writ of execution because the private respondent was adjudged
a builder in good faith or on the ground of "peculiar circumstances which supervened after the institution of this case, like,
for instance, the introduction of certain major repairs of and other substantial improvements..." because the option given
by law either to retain the premises and pay for the improvements thereon or to sell the said premises to the builder in
good faith belongs to the owner of the property. As we have in Quemel v. Olaes (1 SCRA 1159,1163):
xxx xxx xxx
...The plaintiffs claim that their second cause of action is based on Article 448 in connection with Art. 546,
of the new Civil Code. A cursory reading of these provisions, however, will show that they are not
applicable to plaintiff's case. Under Article 448, the right to appropriate the works or improvements or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land' belongs to the owner of the land. The only
right given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the improvements; the builder,
cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the former. ...
Again, in the recent case of Paz Mercado, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., (G.R. No. L- 44001, June 10, 1988), we
said:
... To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the land on which he
builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner (Art. 525, Civil Code; Lopez, Inc. v. Phil. Eastern
Trading Co., Inc., 98 Phil. 348) and that he be unaware 'that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw which invalidates it.' (Art. 526, Civil Code; Granados v. Monton, 86 Phil. 42; Arriola v. Gomez de
la Serna, 14 Phil. 627; See also Manotok Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 134 SCRA 329, citing Caram v. Laureta, 103
SCRA 7) It is such a builder in good faith who is given the 1ight to retain the thing, even as against the
real owner, until he has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful
expenses. (Art. 546, Civil Code; Policarpio v. CA., 129 SCRA 51; Sarmiento v. Agana, 129 SCRA 1221; cf,
Queto v. C.A., 122 SCRA 206) ...
Furthermore, the private respondent's good faith ceased after the filing of the complaint below by the petitioner. In the
case of Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap (13 SCRA 190,196), we ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
...Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between themselves their
rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the transaction, this legal fiction of
Yap's good faith ceased when the complaint against him was filed, and consequently the court's
declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and proper . A possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon
service of judicial summons (Arts. 544 and 1123, Civil Code).
Thus, the repairs and improvements introduced by the said respondents after the complaint was filed cannot be
considered to have been built in good faith, much less, justify the denial of the petitioner's fai-rn of option.
Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent's right to retain the
premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse for the private
respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED and the respondent judge is hereby ordered to
immediately issue a writ of execution ordering the private respondent to vacate the disputed premises and deliver
possession of the same to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108894 February 10, 1997

TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL SEVENTEENTH DIVISION) and EDUARDO UY, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The parties in this case are owners of adjoining lots in Paraaque, Metro Manila. It was discovered in a survey, that a
portion of a building of petitioner, which was presumably constructed by its predecessor-in-interest, encroached on a
portion of the lot owned by private respondent. What are the rights and obligations of the parties? Is petitioner considered
a builder in bad faith because, as held by respondent Court, he is "presumed to know the metes and bounds of his
property as described in his certificate of title"? Does petitioner succeed into the good faith or bad faith of his predecessorin-interest which presumably constructed the building?
These are the questions raised in the petition for review of the Decision 1 dated August 28, 1992, in CA-G.R. CV No.
28293 of respondent Court 2 where the disposition reads: 3
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby reversed and set
aside and another one entered
1. Dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action;
2. Ordering Tecnogas to pay the sum of P2,000.00 per month as reasonable rental from October 4, 1979
until appellee vacates the land;
3. To remove the structures and surrounding walls on the encroached area;
4. Ordering appellee to pay the value of the land occupied by the two-storey building;
5. Ordering appellee to pay the sum of P20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees;
6. Costs against appellee.
Acting on the motions for reconsideration of both petitioner and private respondent, respondent Court ordered the deletion
of
paragraph
4
of
the dispositive portion in an Amended Decision dated February 9, 1993, as follows: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our decision of August 28, 1992 is hereby modified deleting
paragraph 4 of the dispositive portion of our decision which reads:
4. Ordering appellee to pay the value of the land occupied by the two-storey building.
The motion for reconsideration of appellee is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The foregoing Amended Decision is also challenged in the instant petition.
The Facts
The facts are not disputed. Respondent Court merely reproduced the factual findings of the trial court, as follows: 5
That plaintiff (herein petitioner) which is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of
Philippine laws is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Metro Manila known as Lot 4331-A (should be 4531-A) of Lot 4531 of the Cadastral Survey of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 409316 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province
of Rizal; that said land was purchased by plaintiff from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970, together with all the
buildings and improvements including the wall existing thereon; that the defendant (herein private
respondent) is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4531-B of Lot 4531 of the
Cadastral Survey of Paraaque, LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 19645 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
279838, of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal; that said land which adjoins plaintiff's land was
purchased by defendant from a certain Enrile Antonio also in 1970; that in 1971, defendant purchased
another lot also adjoining plaintiffs land from a certain Miguel Rodriguez and the same was registered in

defendant's name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31390, of the Registry of Deeds for the Province
of Rizal; that portions of the buildings and wall bought by plaintiff together with the land from Pariz
Industries are occupying a portion of defendant's adjoining land; that upon learning of the encroachment
or occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of defendant's land, plaintiff offered to buy from
defendant that particular portion of defendant's land occupied by portions of its buildings and wall with an
area of 770 square meters, more or less, but defendant, however, refused the offer. In 1973, the parties
entered into a private agreement before a certain Col. Rosales in Malacaang, wherein plaintiff agreed to
demolish the wall at the back portion of its land thus giving to defendant possession of a portion of his
land previously enclosed by plaintiff's wall; that defendant later filed a complaint before the office of
Municipal Engineer of Paraaque, Metro Manila as well as before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal against plaintiff in connection with the encroachment or occupation by plaintiff's buildings and walls
of a portion of its land but said complaint did not prosper; that defendant dug or caused to be dug a canal
along plaintiff's wall, a portion of which collapsed in June, 1980, and led to the filing by plaintiff of the
supplemental complaint in the above-entitled case and a separate criminal complaint for malicious
mischief against defendant and his wife which ultimately resulted into the conviction in court of
defendant's wife for the crime of malicious mischief; that while trial of the case was in progress, plaintiff
filed in Court a formal proposal for settlement of the case but said proposal, however, was ignored by
defendant.
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court 6 of Pasay City, Branch 117, in Civil Case No. PQ-7631-P, rendered a
decision dated December 4, 1989 in favor of petitioner who was the plaintiff therein. The dispositive portion
reads: 7
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant and ordering the
latter to sell to plaintiff that portion of land owned by him and occupied by portions of plaintiff's buildings
and wall at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter and to pay the former:
1. The sum of P44,000.00 to compensate for the losses in materials and properties
incurred by plaintiff through thievery as a result of the destruction of its wall;
2. The sum of P7,500.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
3. The costs of this suit.
Appeal was duly interposed with respondent Court, which as previously stated, reversed and set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and rendered the assailed Decision and Amended Decision. Hence, this recourse under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues: 8
(A)
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner a builder in bad faith
because it is "presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property."
(B)
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred when it used the amicable settlement between the
petitioner and the private respondent, where both parties agreed to the demolition of the rear portion of
the fence, as estoppel amounting to recognition by petitioner of respondent's right over his property
including the portions of the land where the other structures and the building stand, which were not
included in the settlement.
(C)
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in ordering the removal of the "structures and
surrounding walls on the encroached area" and in withdrawing its earlier ruling in its August 28, 1992
decision for the petitioner "to pay for the value of the land occupied" by the building, only because the
private respondent has "manifested its choice to demolish" it despite the absence of compulsory sale
where the builder fails to pay for the land, and which "choice" private respondent deliberately deleted from
its September 1, 1980 answer to the supplemental complaint in the Regional Trial Court.

In its Memorandum, petitioner poses the following issues:

A.
The time when to determine the good faith of the builder under Article 448 of the New Civil Code, is
reckoned during the period when it was actually being built; and in a case where no evidence was
presented nor introduced as to the good faith or bad faith of the builder at that time, as in this case, he
must be presumed to be a "builder in good faith," since "bad faith cannot be presumed." 9
B.
In a specific "boundary overlap situation" which involves a builder in good faith, as in this case, it is now
well settled that the lot owner, who builds on the adjacent lot is not charged with "constructive notice" of
the technical metes and bounds contained in their torrens titles to determine the exact and precise extent
of his boundary perimeter. 10
C.
The respondent court's citation of the twin cases of Tuason & Co. v. Lumanlan and Tuason &
Co. v.Macalindong is not the "judicial authority" for a boundary dispute situation between adjacent torrens
titled lot owners, as the facts of the present case do not fall within nor square with the involved principle of
a dissimilar case. 11
D.
Quite contrary to respondent Uy's reasoning, petitioner Tecnogas continues to be a builder in good faith,
even if it subsequently built/repaired the walls/other permanent structures thereon while the case a
quo was pending and even while respondent sent the petitioner many letters/filed cases thereon. 12
D.(E.)
The amicable settlement between the parties should be interpreted as a contract and enforced only in
accordance with its explicit terms, and not over and beyond that agreed upon; because the courts
donot have the power to create a contract nor expand its scope. 13
E.(F.)
As a general rule, although the landowner has the option to choose between: (1) "buying the building built
in good faith", or (2) "selling the portion of his land on which stands the building" under Article 448 of the
Civil Code; the first option is not absolute, because an exception thereto, once it would be impractical for
the landowner to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e. buy that portion of the house standing on his
land, for the whole building might be rendered useless. The workable solution is for him to select the
second alternative, namely, to sell to the builder that part of his land on which was constructed a portion
of the house. 14
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that the petition is "suffering from the following flaws:

15

1. It did not give the exact citations of cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court that allegedly
contradicts the ruling of the Hon. Court of Appeals based on the doctrine laid down in Tuason
vs.Lumanlan case citing also Tuason vs. Macalindong case (Supra).
2. Assuming that the doctrine in the alleged Co Tao vs. Chico case is contradictory to the doctrine
inTuason vs. Lumanlan and Tuason vs. Macalindong, the two cases being more current, the same should
prevail.
Further, private respondent contends that the following "unmistakably" point to the bad faith of petitioner: (1) private
respondent's purchase of the two lots, "was ahead of the purchase by petitioner of the building and lot from Pariz
Industries"; (2) the declaration of the General Manager of Tecnogas that the sale between petitioner and Pariz Industries
"was not registered" because of some problems with China Banking Corporation; and (3) the Deed of Sale in favor of
petitioner was registered in its name only in "the month of May 1973." 16
The Court's Ru1ing
The petition should be granted.

Good Faith or Bad Faith

Respondent Court, citing the cases of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Vda. de Lumanlan 17 and J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc.vs. Macalindong, 18 ruled that petitioner "cannot be considered in good faith" because as a land owner, it is
"presumed to know the metes and bounds of his own property, specially if the same are reflected in a properly issued
certificate of title. One who erroneously builds on the adjoining lot should be considered a builder in (b)ad (f)aith, there
being presumptive knowledge of the Torrens title, the area, and the extent of the boundaries." 19
We disagree with respondent Court. The two cases it relied upon do not support its main pronouncement that a registered
owner of land has presumptive knowledge of the metes and bounds of its own land, and is therefore in bad faith if he
mistakenly builds on an adjoining land. Aside from the fact that those cases had factual moorings radically different from
those obtaining here, there is nothing in those cases which would suggest, however remotely, that bad faith is imputable
to a registered owner of land when a part of his building encroaches upon a neighbor's land, simply because he is
supposedly presumed to know the boundaries of his land as described in his certificate of title. No such doctrinal
statement could have been made in those cases because such issue was not before the Supreme Court. Quite the
contrary, we have rejected such a theory in Co Tao vs. Chico, 20 where we held that unless one is versed in the science of
surveying, "no one can determine the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title."
There is no question that when petitioner purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other structures
were already in existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those structures, but it may well be assumed
that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and
since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondent's land
was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in
good faith. 21 It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until
the contrary is proved. 22 Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. 23 Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Pariz's successor, petitioner in
this case. Further, "(w)here one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former." 24And possession acquired in good faith does
not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that
he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. 25 The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made
known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. 26
Recall that the encroachment in the present case was caused by a very slight deviation of the erected wall (as fence)
which was supposed to run in a straight line from point 9 to point 1 of petitioner's lot. It was an error which, in the context
of the attendant facts, was consistent with good faith. Consequently, the builder, if sued by the aggrieved landowner for
recovery of possession, could have invoked the provisions of Art. 448 of the Civil Code, which reads:
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land, he
can compel the landowner to make a choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the
indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option
and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. 27
The question, however, is whether the same benefit can be invoked by petitioner who, as earlier stated, is not the builder
of the offending structures but possesses them as buyer.
We answer such question in the affirmative.
In the first place, there is no sufficient showing that petitioner was aware of the encroachment at the time it acquired the
property from Pariz Industries. We agree with the trial court that various factors in evidence adequately show petitioner's
lack of awareness thereof. In any case, contrary proof has not overthrown the presumption of good faith under Article 527
of the Civil Code, as already stated, taken together with the disputable presumptions of the law on evidence. These
presumptions state, under Section 3 (a) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that the person is innocent of a crime or wrong;
and under Section 3 (ff) of Rule 131, that the law has been obeyed. In fact, private respondent Eduardo Uy himself was
unaware of such intrusion into his property until after 1971 when he hired a surveyor, following his purchase of another
adjoining lot, to survey all his newly acquired lots. Upon being apprised of the encroachment, petitioner immediately
offered to buy the area occupied by its building a species of conduct consistent with good faith.

In the second place, upon delivery of the property by Pariz Industries, as seller, to the petitioner, as buyer, the latter
acquired ownership of the property. Consequently and as earlier discussed, petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the
shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the immovable sold, including the right to compel the private
respondent to exercise either of the two options provided under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Estoppel
Respondent Court ruled that the amicable settlement entered into between petitioner and private respondent estops the
former from questioning the private respondent's "right" over the disputed property. It held that by undertaking to demolish
the fence under said settlement, petitioner recognized private respondent's right over the property, and "cannot later on
compel" private respondent "to sell to it the land since" private respondent "is under no obligation to sell." 28
We do not agree. Petitioner cannot be held in estoppel for entering into the amicable settlement, the pertinent portions of
which read: 29
That the parties hereto have agreed that the rear portion of the fence that separates the property of the
complainant and respondent shall be demolished up to the back of the building housing the machineries
which demolision (sic) shall be undertaken by the complainant at anytime.
That the fence which serve(s) as a wall housing the electroplating machineries shall not be demolished in
the mean time which portion shall be subject to negotiation by herein parties.
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner agreed only to the demolition of a portion of the wall separating the adjoining
properties of the parties i.e. "up to the back of the building housing the machineries." But that portion of the fence which
served as the wall housing the electroplating machineries was not to be demolished. Rather, it was to "be subject to
negotiation by herein parties." The settlement may have recognized the ownership of private respondent but such
admission cannot be equated with bad faith. Petitioner was only trying to avoid a litigation, one reason for entering into an
amicable settlement.
As was ruled in Osmea vs. Commission on Audit, 30
A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that is expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by
the Civil Code and is therein dealt with in some detail. "A compromise," declares Article 2208 of said
Code, "is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an
end to one already commenced."
xxx xxx xxx
The Civil Code not only defines and authorizes compromises, it in fact encourages them in civil actions.
Art. 2029 states that "The Court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon
some fair compromise." . . .
In the context of the established facts, we hold that petitioner did not lose its rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code on
the basis merely of the fact that some years after acquiring the property in good faith, it learned about and aptly
recognized the right of private respondent to a portion of the land occupied by its building. The supervening awareness
of the encroachment by petitioner does not militate against its right to claim the status of a builder in good faith. In fact, a
judicious reading of said Article 448 will readily show that the landowner's exercise of his option can only take place after
the builder shall have come to know of the intrusion in short, when both parties shall have become aware of it. Only
then will the occasion for exercising the option arise, for it is only then that both parties will have been aware that a
problem exists in regard to their property rights.
Options of Private Respondent
What then is the applicable provision in this case which private respondent may invoke as his remedy: Article 448 or
Article 450 31 of the Civil Code?
In view of the good faith of both petitioner and private respondent, their rights and obligations are to be governed by Art.
448. The essential fairness of this codal provision has been pointed out by Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera,
citing Manresa and applicable precedents, in the case of Depra vs. Dumlao, 32 to wit:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners,
and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the
owner of the land. In view of the impracticality of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has
provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after

payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to
pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right
is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
(3 Manresa 213; Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G.R. No. 49167, April
30, 1949; Article applied; see Cabral, et al. vs. Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.]
52 Off. Gaz. 2050).
The private respondent's insistence on the removal of the encroaching structures as the proper remedy, which respondent
Court sustained in its assailed Decisions, is thus legally flawed. This is not one of the remedies bestowed upon him by
law. It would be available only if and when he chooses to compel the petitioner to buy the land at a reasonable price but
the latter fails to pay such price. 33 This has not taken place. Hence, his options are limited to: (1) appropriating the
encroaching portion of petitioner's building after payment of proper indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy the lot
occupied by the structure. He cannot exercise a remedy of his own liking.
Neither is petitioner's prayer that private respondent be ordered to sell the land 34 the proper remedy. While that was
dubbed as the "more workable solution" in Grana and Torralba vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 35 it was not the relief
granted in that case as the landowners were directed to exercise "within 30 days from this decision their option to either
buy the portion of the petitioners' house on their land or sell to said petitioners the portion of their land on which it
stands." 36Moreover, in Grana and Torralba, the area involved was only 87 square meters while this case involves 520
square meters37. In line with the case of Depra vs. Dumlao, 38 this case will have to be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings to fully implement the mandate of Art. 448. It is a rule of procedure for the Supreme Court to strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation. 39
Petitioner, however, must also pay the rent for the property occupied by its building as prescribed by respondent Court
from October 4, 1979, but only up to the date private respondent serves notice of its option upon petitioner and the trial
court; that is, if such option is for private respondent to appropriate the encroaching structure. In such event, petitioner
would have a right of retention which negates the obligation to pay rent. 40 The rent should however continue if the option
chosen is compulsory sale, but only up to the actual transfer of ownership.
The award of attorney's fees by respondent Court against petitioner is unwarranted since the action appears to have been
filed in good faith. Besides, there should be no penalty on the right to litigate. 41
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and the Amended
Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In accordance with the case of Depra vs. Dumlao, 42 this case is REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for further proceedings consistent with Articles 448 and 546 43 of the
Civil Code, as follows:
The trial court shall determine:
a) the present fair price of private respondent's 520 square-meter area of land;
b) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 520 square meters may have acquired by
reason of the existence of the portion of the building on the area;
c) the fair market value of the encroaching portion of the building; and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than the fair market value of the portion of
the building thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the regional trial court shall render judgment as
follows:
a) The private respondent shall be granted a period of fifteen (15) days within which to exercise his option
under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the portion of the building as his own by
paying to petitioner its fair market value, or to oblige petitioner to pay the price of said area. The amounts
to be respectively paid by petitioner and private respondent, in accordance with the option thus exercised
by written notice of the other party and to the court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days
from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the trial court in favor of the party entitled to
receive it;
b) If private respondent exercises the option to oblige petitioner to pay the price of the land but the latter
rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial court, the value of the land is considerably more than
that of the portion of the building, petitioner shall give written notice of such rejection to private respondent

and to the trial court within fifteen (15) days from notice of private respondent's option to sell the land. In
that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within
which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the trial court formal written notice of the agreement
and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15) days from and
after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease provided
that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) per
month, payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall
not be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of
time since 1970 that petitioner has occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by
ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease. Petitioner shall not make any further
constructions or improvements on the building. Upon expiration of the two-year period, or upon default by
petitioner in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, private respondent shall be entitled to
terminate the forced lease, to recover his land, and to have the portion of the building removed by
petitioner or at latter's expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by petitioner to the trial
court for payment to private respondent, and such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not
compliance was made within the period fixed by the said court.
c) In any event, petitioner shall pay private respondent an amount computed at two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of private respondent's land for
the period counted from October 4, 1979, up to the date private respondent serves notice of its option to
appropriate the encroaching structures, otherwise up to the actual transfer of ownership to petitioner or, in
case a forced lease has to be imposed, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in
the preceding paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its decision shall be non-extendible, and upon failure of the
party obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment
shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for
compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31934 July 29, 1977

RAMON LANZAR, petitioner
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and CITY OF ILOILO, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo and Solicitor Jose A. Janolo for
respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 34333-R entitled "Ramon
Lanzar, Applicant-Appellee, versus The Director of Lands and The City of Iloilo, Oppositors-Appellants", declaring the
property sought to be registered as the property of the public domain devoted to public use not susceptible of private
appropriation.
In May 1960, the petitioner, Ramon Lanzar, filed an application for registration of title to a parcel of land located in the
District of Molo, Iloilo City in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo alleging that he is the owner in fee simple of the land in
question and asking that the title thereto be registered in his name.
In August 1961, the Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo filed an opposition to the application on the ground that the land
in question a foreshore land which forms part of the public domain and is needed by the City of Iloilo as a road right of
way of the Molo Arevalo Boulevard, and that the applicant had not possessed the property in such a manner as to warrant
an implied grant entitled him to confirmation of his title thereto.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered a decision in March 1963 holding that the property in question,
having been possessed by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, publicly, continuously and adversely for more

than 30 years, the same was adjudicated to the petitioner, it appearing that no proof had been adduced that the said land
is necessary for public utility or establishment of special industries (Record on Appeal, pp. 30-37).
The Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo appealed to the Court of Appeals which on March 24, 1970 reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and held that the land in question, being an accretion formed by the action
of the sea, is property of the public domain and not susceptible of private appropriation.
Hence, the applicant-appellee, Ramon Lanzar, filed this petition for certiorari to review the aforesaid decision of the Court
of Appeals. The petitioner assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LANDS FORMED BY ACTION OF THE SEA AS
ACCRETION TO THE SHORES ARE PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION, ON THE AUTHORITY OF
ART. 4, LAW OF WATERS, KER & CO. VS GAUDEN AND GOVERNMENT VS. ALDECOA.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RELYING ON MONTEVERDE VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 93
PHIL. 134 HOLDING THAT ONLY THE EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATURE CAN DECLARE THE LAND AS
NO LONGER INTENDED FOR PUBLIC USE AND SO SHALL BELONG TO THE ADJACENT OWNER.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE ART. 422 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
PROVIDES THAT PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMAIN WHEN NO LONGER INTENDED FOR PUBLIC
USE, SUCH INTENTION CAN ONLY BE SPELLED OUT BY THE EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATURE, NOT
BY THE COURTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS ACQUIRED THE
PROPERTY THRU ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.
(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 1-2)
The pertinent facts are not disputed.
The petitioner has applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land which is admittedly an accretion of Lot No.
1899 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, it having been formed by the gradual action of the sea before 1,922. Ignacio Arroyo,
the registered owner of Lot 1899, leased in 19M the property to Maximo Tonogbanua who possessed the whole of Lot
1899 and its accretion. In 1927, Ignacio Arroyo donated Lot 1899 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, together with its
accretion, to Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de Molo, which in turn the property to the applicant, Ramon Lanzar. The
lessee planted coconuts and bananas on the land and a portion thereof was devoted to palay. A verification of Lot 1899 by
the Bureau of Lands disclosed that the portion of land applied for and described in the plan, Exhibit A, and in its technical
description, is outside of Lot 1899, the same being an accretion thereto formed by the action of the sea. Beaterio de
Santissimo Rosario de Molo and the applicant entered into an agreement, Exhibit 1, on August 13,1959, under which
Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de Molo assigned all its rights to the accretion, the title to which is sought to be registered
by the applicant. Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de Molo had possessed Lot 1899 and its accretion through its lessee,
openly, publicly, uninterruptedly and adversely to all claimants and under claim of ownership. The Beaterio had declared
Lot 1899 for taxation and when it assigned the rights to the applicant, he caused the tax declaration to be transferred to
his name in May 1960, Exhibit J.
During the Cadastral Survey of 1911-1912, the lot in question was non-existent (Exhibit 2, Director of Lands). Hence, said
land as an accretion to Lot 1899 must have gradually developed from 1912 to 1922 and thereafter. It is now separated by
the Arevalo-Molo Boulevard from the sea.
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the title to the land in question which was formed by action of the sea as
an accretion to Lot 1899 may be registered in the name of the applicant on the basis of adverse possession for over 30
years.
Article 4 of the Law of Waters provides:

ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvium deposits caused by the action of the sea,
form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and are not
necessary for the purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the
coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.
In Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil. 732, this Court said:
This case is directly covered by the first part of said article 4. There is therein an express declaration that
land formed in the way this land was formed is public property. Nothing could be more explicit and the
effect of this declaration is not in any way limited by the subsequent provisions of the same article. The
claim of the appellants that these subsequent provisions indicate that the ownership of such land is in the
private persons who own the adjoining property, and that the declaration which is spoken of is simply
proof of that ownership, can not be sustained. It is in direct conflict with the statement made in the first
part of the article. The true construction of the article is that when these lands which belong to the State
are not needed for the purposes mentioned therein, then the State shall grant them to the adjoining
owners. No attempt was made by the appellants to prove any such grant or concession in this case and,
in fact, it is apparent from the evidence that the conditions upon which the adjoining owners would be
entitled to such a grant have never existed because for a long time the property was by the Spanish navy
and it is now occupied by the present government as a naval station, and works costing more than
$500,000, money of the United States, have been erected thereon. (Idem. p. 736)
It is contended by the petitioner that:
As found by the Court of Appeals, the accretion began before 1922, but after 1912, as shown by the
undisputed evidence, hence, during the regime of the Spanish Civil Code, which became effective on
December 8, 1889, and consequently, its nature shall be determined by the said code. Now, the said code
provides:
ARTICLE 399. The following are property of public domain:
l. Those things intended for public use, as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads and others of a like
nature.
(Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 10-11)
However, in Insular Government vs. Aldecoa and Company, 19 Phil. 505, this Court held:
The Civil Code, which went into effect in these Islands on December 7, 1889, the twentieth day of its
publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the 17th of November of the same year, confirms the provisions of
the said Law of Waters, since, in its article 339, it prescribes that:
Property of public ownership is
l. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed
by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
Article 341 of the same code provides:
Property of public ownership, when no longer devoted to general uses or to the requirements of the
defense of the territory, shall become a part of the State property.
The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and
no grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a part of the public
domain and are for public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State, such
lands, thrown up by the action of the sea, and the shores adjacent thereto, are not susceptible of
prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among
men, in accordance with the provision of article 1936 of the Civil Code.
The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretions and alluvium
deposits occasioned by the sea, where the occupant or possessor is a private person and holds without
previous permission or authorization from the Government, granted in due form, although he may have
had the intention to hold it for the purpose of making it his own, is illegal possession on his part and

amounts to nothing more than a mere detainer of the land, which is out of the sphere of the commerce of
men, as belonging to the public domain and being alloted to public uses and for the use of all persons
who live at the place where it is situated. (Idem, pp. 514-515)
It is thus seen that the petitioner could not acquire the land in question by prescription.
The contention of the petitioner-appellant that by "thus expanding the meaning of shores to include inland property formed
by the action of the sea, Government vs. Aldecoa is guilty of judicial legislation ..." (Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, p. 15) has
no merit.
Articles 339 and 340 of the Spanish Civil Code are not repugnant to Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The
said provisions of the said Spanish Code did not provide that lands added to the shores by action of the sea form part of
the patrimonial property of the State.
As stated by this Court in Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, supra, p. 541, the Civil Code of Spain confirms the provisions
of Article 4 of the Law of Waters, citing Article 339 of said code. This Court has been consistent in ruling that lands formed
by the action of the sea belong to the public domain. Thus in Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil. 134, it was held:
Lots Nos. 1 and 2 were admittedly formed and added to the shores by the natural. action of the sea, and
the petitioners herein have claimed title thereto as accretion to their adjoining lots, in accordance with
article 4 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1966, which provides as follows:
'Lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by action of the
sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the water of the
sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be property
of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.'
(Idem. pp. 135-136)
In view of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the property sought to be registered as part of the
public domain devoted to public use not susceptible of private appropriation. The land in question is needed by the City of
Iloilo for the expansion of the Arevalo-Molo Boulevard.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed
is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31163

November 6, 1929

URBANO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE C. BERNABE, ET AL., defendants.
PABLO TIONGSON and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BULACAN, appellants.
Arcadio Ejercito and Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellants.
Eusebio Orense And Nicolas Belmonte for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal was taken by the defendants Pablo Tiongson and the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan from the judgment of the
Court of First of said province, wherein said defendant Pablo Tiongson was ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos the
value of 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay, at the rate of P3 per cavan, without special pronouncement as to costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors committed by the lower court in its judgment,
to wit:
1. The court erred in holding that it has been proved that in the cavans of palay attached by the herein defendant
Pablo Tiongson from the defendant Jose C. Bernabe were included those claimed by the plaintiff in this cause.

2. The court erred in ordering the defendant Pablo Tiongson to pay the plaintiff the value of 778 cavans and 38
kilos of palay, the refund of which is claimed by said plaintiff.
3. The court erred in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial.1awphil.net
The following facts were conclusively proved at the trial:
On March 20, 1928, there were deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse by the plaintiff Urbano Santos 778 cavans and
38 kilos of palay and by Pablo Tiongson 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of the same grain.
On said date, March 20, 1928, Pablo Tiongson filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan a complaint against Jose
C. Bernabe, to recover from the latter the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At
the same time, the application of Pablo Tiongson for a writ of attachment was granted, and the attachable property of Jose
C. Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached, sold at
public auction, and the proceeds thereof delivered to said defendant Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case.
The herein plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of the palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's filing the proper
bond, the sheriff proceeded with the attachment, giving rise to the present complaint.
It does not appear that the sacks of palay of Urbano Santos and those of Pablo Tiongson, deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's
warehouse, bore any marks or signs, nor were they separated one from the other.
The plaintiff-appellee Urbano Santos contends that Pablo Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans and 31 kilos of palay
attached by the defendant sheriff as part of those deposited by him in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse, because, in asking
for the attachment thereof, he impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged to Jose C. Bernabe and not to him.
In the complaint filed by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe, civil case No. 3665 of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, it is alleged that said plaintiff deposited in the defendant's warehouse 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay, the
return of which, or the value thereof, at the rate of P3 per cavan was claimed therein. Upon filing said complaint, the
plaintiff applied for a preliminary writ of attachment of the defendant's property, which was accordingly issued, and the
defendant's property, including the 924 cavans and 31 kilos of palay found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were
attached.
It will be seen that the action brought by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe is that provided in section 262 of the
Code of Civil Procedure for the delivery of personal property. Although it is true that the plaintiff and his attorney did not
follow strictly the procedure provided in said section for claiming the delivery of said personal property nevertheless, the
procedure followed by him may be construed as equivalent thereto, considering the provisions of section 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure of the effect that "the provisions of this Code, and the proceedings under it, shall be liberally construed, in
order to promote its object and assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice."
Liberally construing, therefore, the above cited provisions of section 262 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the writ of
attachment applied for by Pablo Tiongson against the property of Jose C. Bernabe may be construed as a claim for the
delivery of the sacks of palay deposited by the former with the latter.
The 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay belonging to the plaintiff Urbano Santos, having been mixed with the 1,026 cavans
and 9 kilos of palay belonging to the defendant Pablo Tiongson in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse; the sheriff having found
only 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay in said warehouse at the time of the attachment thereof; and there being no
means of separating form said 924 cavans and 31 1/2 of palay belonging to Urbano Santos and those belonging to Pablo
Tiongson, the following rule prescribed in article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this nature, is applicable:
Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture
occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a
right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or
commingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, we will take the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay
which were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof, and Pablo
Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and Pablo Tiongson is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
Urbano Santos the value of 398.49 cavans of palay at the rate of P3 a cavan, without special pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.