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G.R. No.

125835 July 30, 1998


NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a contract to sell a real property involved in restate proceedings valid and binding
without the approval of the probate court?
Statement of the Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review before us, assailing the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 41994 promulgated on February
6, 1996 and its Resolution 3 dated July 19, 1996. The challenged Decision disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court
dismissing the complaint is SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the CONTRACT TO SELL executed by appellee in favor of
appellants as valid and binding, subject to the result of the administration
proceedings of the testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the challenged Resolution.

The Facts
The antecedent facts, as succinctly narrated by Respondent Court of Appeals, are:
In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein
private respondents] Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that
[herein petitioner] Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a
"CONTRACT TO SELL" Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of
23,766 square meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per
square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but
defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under
the contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed that [petitioner] be
ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay
damages, attorney's fee and litigation expenses.
In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor
of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she
put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of
the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner's

father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna; that at the time the
contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the
probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the
probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had
offered to return the downpayment received from [private respondents],
but the latter refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further failed
to provide funds for the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of
his tenancy rights on the land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the
contract.
At the pre-trial conference the parties stipulated on [sic] the following facts:
1. That on February 3, 1989, [private respondents] and
[petitioner] entered into a contract to sell involving a parcel of
land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, otherwise known as Lot
No. 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate.
2. That the price or consideration of the said sell [sic] is
P150.00 per square meters;
3. That the amount of P300,000.00 had already been
received by [petitioner];
4. That the parties have knowledge that the property subject
of the contract to sell is subject of the probate proceedings;
5. That [as] of this time, the probate Court has not yet issued
an order either approving or denying the said sale. (p. 3,
appealed Order of September 15, 1992, pp. 109-112,
record).
[Private respondents] submitted their evidence in support of the material
allegations of the complaint. In addition to testimonies of witnesses,
[private respondents] presented the following documentary evidences: (1)
Contract to Sell (Exh A); (2) machine copy of the last will and testament of
Demetrio Carpena (defendant's father) to show that the property sold by
defendant was one of those devised to her in said will (Exh B); (3) receipts
signed by defendant for the downpayment in the total amount of
P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E); and (4) demand letters sent to defendant
(Exhs F & G).
It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence. In essence, defendant maintained that the contract
to sell was null and void for want of approval by the probate court. She
further argued that the contract was subject to a suspensive condition,
which was the probate of the will of defendant's father Demetrio Carpena.
An Opposition was filed by [private respondents]. It appears further that in
an Order dated December 15, 1992 the court a quo granted the demurrer
to evidence and dismissed the complaint. It justified its action in
dismissing the complaint in the following manner:

It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was consummated, no


petition was filed in the Court with notice to the heirs of the time and place
of hearing, to show that the sale is necessary and beneficial. A sale of
properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties must comply
with the requisites provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule 89, Rules of Court)
which are mandatory, and without them, the authority to sell, the sale
itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio. (Arcilla
vs. David, 77 Phil. 718, Gabriel, et al., vs. Encarnacion, et al., L-6736, May
4, 1954; Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 Phil. 755) Besides, it is axiomatic that where
the estate of a deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate Court. (Estate of Obave,
vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 767).
As held by the Supreme Court, a decedent's representative (administrator)
is not estopped from questioning the validity of his own void deed
purporting to convey land. (Bona vs. Soler, 2 Phil, 755). In the case at bar,
the [petitioner,] realizing the illegality of the transaction[,] has interposed
the nullity of the contract as her defense, there being no approval from the
probate Court, and, in good faith offers to return the money she received
from the [private respondents]. Certainly, the administratrix is not
estop[ped] from doing so and the action to declare the inexistence of
contracts do not prescribe. This is what precipitated the filing of
[petitioner's] demurrer to evidence. 6
The trial court's order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents who alleged:
1. The lower court erred in concluding that the contract to sell is null and
void, there being no approval of the probate court.
2. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] in good faith offers
to return the money to [private respondents].
3. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] is not under
estoppel to question the validity of the contract to sell.
4. The lower court erred in not ruling on the consideration of the contract
to sell which is tantamount to plain unjust enrichment of [petitioner] at the
expense of [private respondents]. 7
Public Respondent's Ruling
Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of the testate proceedings
on Demetrio Carpena's estate, the appellate court set aside the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint and correctly ruled as follows:
It is apparent from the appealed order that the lower court treated the
contract to sell executed by appellee as one made by the administratrix of
the Estate of Demetrio Carpena for the benefit of the estate. Hence, its
main reason for voiding the contract in question was the absence of the

probate court's approval. Presumably, what the lower court had in mind
was the sale of the estate or part thereof made by the administrator for the
benefit of the estate, as authorized under Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which requires the approval of the probate court upon application
therefor with notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees.
However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the contract to sell in
question is not covered by Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court since it
was made by appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property that was
devised to her under the will sought to be probated. Thus, while the
document inadvertently stated that appellee executed the contract in her
capacity as "executrix and administratrix" of the estate, a cursory reading
of the entire text of the contract would unerringly show that what she
undertook to sell to appellants was one of the "other properties given to
her by her late father," and more importantly, it was not made for the
benefit of the estate but for her own needs. To illustrate this point, it
is apropos to refer to the preambular or preliminary portion of the
document, which reads:
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the lawful owner of a certain
parcel of land, which is more particularly described as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the SELLER suffers difficulties in her living and
has forced to offer the sale of the above-described property,
"which property was only one among the other properties
given to her by her late father," to anyone who can wait for
complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament
of her father.
WHEREAS, the SELLER in order to meet her need of cash,
has offered for sale the said property at ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (150.00) Philippine Currency, per square
meter unto the BUYERS, and with this offer, the latter has
accepted to buy and/or purchase the same, less the area for
the road and other easements indicated at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2125 duly confirmed after the
survey to be conducted by the BUYER's Licensed Geodetic
Engineer, and whatever area [is] left. (Emphasis added).
To emphasize, it is evident from the foregoing clauses of the contract that
appellee sold Lot 2125 not in her capacity as executrix of the will or
administratrix of the estate of her father, but as an heir and more
importantly as owner of said lot which, along with other properties, was
devised to her under the will sought to be probated. That being so, the

requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court which refer


to a sale made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate do not
apply.
xxx xxx xxx
It is noteworthy that in a Manifestation filed with this court by appellants,
which is not controverted by appellee, it is mentioned that the last will and
testament of Demetrio Carpena was approved in a final judgment
rendered in Special Proceeding No. B-979 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24 Bian, Laguna. But of course such approval does not terminate
the proceeding[s] since the settlement of the estate will ensue. Such
proceedings will consist, among others, in the issuance by the court of a
notice to creditors (Rule 86), hearing of money claims and payment of
taxes and estate debts (Rule 88) and distribution of the residue to the
heirs or persons entitled thereto (Rule 90). In effect, the final execution of
the deed of sale itself upon appellants' payment of the balance of the
purchase price will have to wait for the settlement or termination of the
administration proceedings of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena. Under the
foregoing premises, what the trial court should have done with the
complaint was not to dismiss it but to simply put on hold further
proceedings until such time that the estate or its residue will be distributed
in accordance with the approved will.
The rule is that when a demurrer to the evidence is granted by the trial
court but reversed on appeal, defendant loses the right to adduce his
evidence. In such a case, the appellate court will decide the controversy
on the basis of plaintiff's evidence. In the case at bench, while we find the
contract to sell valid and binding between the parties, we cannot as yet
order appellee to perform her obligations under the contract because the
result of the administration proceedings of the testate Estate of Demetrio
Carpena has to be awaited. Hence, we shall confine our adjudication to
merely declaring the validity of the questioned Contract to Sell.
Hence, this appeal. 8
The Issue
Petitioner raises only one issue:
Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by
the [p]etitioner and [p]rivate [r]espondent[s] without the requisite probate
court approval is valid.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Contract to Sell Valid

In a nutshell, petitioner contends that "where the estate of the deceased person is
already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter
into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the Probate Court." 9 She
maintains that the Contract to Sell is void because it was not approved by the probate
court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the
deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage,
or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and
when it appears necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations:
xxx xxx xxx
Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case, petitioner argues that the
stipulations in the Contract to Sell require her to act in her capacity as an executrix or
administratrix. She avers that her obligation to eject tenants pertains to the
administratrix or executrix, the estate being the landlord of the said tenants. 10 Likewise
demonstrating that she entered into the contract in her capacity as executor is the
stipulation that she must effect the conversion of subject land from irrigated rice land to
residential land and secure the necessary clearances from government offices.
Petitioner alleges that these obligations can be undertaken only by an executor or
administrator of an estate, and not by an heir. 11
The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the
Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the
estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the
subject parcel of land. 12 She also explained the reason for the sale to be "difficulties in
her living" conditions and consequent "need of cash." 13 These representations clearly
evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered
into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioners has no
application to the instant case.
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of
the decedent's death. 14Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share
the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the
Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a
part of her share in the estate of her late father. 15 Thus, in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 16 the
Court resolved an identical issue under the old Civil Code and held:
Art. 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary
property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from
the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be
accepted." And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole
estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to
him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of
the estate while it remains undivided." . . . And according to article 399 of
the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the

common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be


limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the
dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the heirs, without the
concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father,
this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said
that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share
which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.
Administration of the Estate Not
Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell
Petitioner further contends that "[t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a
partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate
proceedings." 17 This becomes all the more significant in the light of the trial court's
finding, as stated in its Order dated August 20, 1997, that "the legitimate of one of the
heirs has been impaired." 18
Petitioner's contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's
offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will
Testament of her father." 19 Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected
between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel
of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price
and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no
basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature
partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale
made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in
no wise stands in the way of such administration." 20
Estoppel
Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid
Contract to Sell with private respondents, from whom she had already received
P300,000 as initial payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her
own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents who have
relied on them. 21 Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will
extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all
the required formalities and with full awareness of its consequences. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992
DONATO
S.
PAULMITAN,
JULIANA
P.
FANESA
and
RODOLFO
FANESA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIO PAULMITAN, ELENA PAULMITAN, ABELINO

PAULMITAN, ANITA PAULMITAN, BAKING PAULMITAN, ADELINA PAULMITAN and


ANITO PAULMITAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals, dated July 14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled "Alicio
Paulmitan, et al. v. Donato Sagario Paulmitan, et al." which affirmed the decision 2 of the
then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial District,
Branch IV, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 11770.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, 3 left the two following parcels
of land located in the Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an area of
1,946 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-8376; and
(2) Lot No. 1091 with an area of 69,080 square meters and covered by OCT No. RO11653. From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now deceased, Agatona
begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also died in
1953, 4 apparently shortly after his mother passed away, and Donato Paulmitan, who is
one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third
petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of
Agatona Sagario, is survived by the respondents, who are his children, name: Alicio,
Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all surnamed Paulmitan.
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to
the two lots mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on August
11, 1963, petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship,
extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he is the
only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The affidavit was filed with the Register of Deeds
of Negros Occidental on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No. RO-8376 in the name of
Agatona Sagario and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35979 in Donato's
name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the
same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. 5
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was
forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land was executed by the
Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental. 6
On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09. 7
On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan
filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.

Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as an
affirmative defense, contending that the Complaint was filed more than eleven years
after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan over the land as
consequence of the registration with the Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit
extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner
Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she acquired exclusive
ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor by her
father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the petitioners' affirmative defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757,
the trial court issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint as to the
said property upon finding merit in petitioners' affirmative defense. This order, which is
not the object of the present petition, has become final after respondents' failure to
appeal therefrom.
Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20, 1977, the trial
court decided in favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the trial court, the
respondents, as descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan were entitled to one-half
(1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan to his
daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not prejudice their rights. And the repurchase
by Juliana P. Fanesa of the land from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental
did not vest in Juliana exclusive ownership over the entire land but only gave her the
right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the property. The trial court
ordered the partition of the land and directed petitioners Donato Paulmitan and Juliana
P. Fanesa to pay private respondents certain amounts representing the latter's share in
the fruits of the land. On the other hand, respondents were directed to pay P1,479.55 to
Juliana P. Fanesa as their share in the redemption price paid by Fanesa to the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental. The dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause of
action pleaded in the complain as follows:
1. The deed of sale (Exh. "F") dated May 28, 1974 is valid insofar as the
one-half undivided portion of Lot 1091 is concerned as to vest ownership
over said half portion in favor of defendant Juliana Fanesa and her
husband Rodolfo Fanesa, while the remaining half shall belong to
plaintiffs, pro-indiviso;
2. Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province of Negros
Occidental, now covered by TCT No. RO-11653 (N.A.), is ordered
partitioned. The parties must proceed to an actual partition by property
instrument of partition, submitting the corresponding subdivision within
sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, and should they fail to agree,
commissioners of partition may be appointed by the Court;
3. Pending the physical partition, the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental is ordered to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. RO-11653
(N.A.) covering Lot 1091, Pontevedra Cadastre, and to issue in lieu

thereof a new certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs and defendants,


one-half portion each, pro-indiviso, as indicated in paragraph 1 above;
4. Plaintiffs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, defendant Juliana
Fanesa the amount of P1,479.55 with interest at the legal rate from May
28, 1974 until paid;
5 Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana Paulmitan Fanesa
are ordered to account to plaintiffs and to pay them, jointly and severally,
the value of the produce from Lot 1091 representing plaintiffs' share in the
amount of P5,000.00 per year from 1966 up to the time of actual partition
of the property, and to pay them the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees
as well as the costs of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition.
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the land in question, it is well to
review, initially, the relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario Paulmitan.
When Agatona died in 1953, she was survived by two (2) sons, Donato and Pascual. A
few months later in the same year, Pascual died, leaving seven children, the private
respondents. On the other had, Donato's sole offspring was petitioner Juliana P.
Fanesa.
At the time of the relevant transactions over the properties of decedent Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan, her son Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children. It is, thus,
tempting to apply the principles pertaining to the right of representation as regards
respondents. It must, however, be borne in mind that Pascual did no predecease his
mother, 8 thus precluding the operation of the provisions in the Civil Code on the right of
representation 9 with respect to his children, the respondents. When Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato and Pascual were still alive.
Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil Code that "[t]he rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent," 10 the right
of ownership, not only of Donato but also of Pascual, over their respective shares in the
inheritance was automatically and by operation of law vested in them in 1953 when their
mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of Donato and Pascual did not yet have
any right over the inheritance since "[i]n every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes
the
more
distant
11
ones." Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to inherit from
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing
away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the
Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of debts of the deceased." 12 Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore,
co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents,
succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right

of ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children, who,
from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the
disputed decedent estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two
transactions, namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan;
and (b) her redemption of the land from the Provincial of Negros Occidental after it was
forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P.
Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that
portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. 13 The sale
did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land
which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the
buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property 14 and
consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is partitioned. In BailonCasilao v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, outlined the
effects of a sale by one co-owner without the consent of all the co-owners, thus:
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in
Article 493 of the Civil Code, Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those
of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon
Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal
provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and
the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528
(1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and
Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate
shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to
private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a coowner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court
since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the
enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.

Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the
land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership
over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of
her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question with the respondents,
her first cousins.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of the
fact that when the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land after it
was forfeited for non-payment of taxes, she redeemed it.
The contention is without merit.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor
give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same issue
raised by petitioners, the Court, in Adille v. Court of Appeals, 16 resolved the same with
the following pronouncements:
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive
ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject of
dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its
redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions
of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present Code,
giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the entire
property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect to his
share alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612, CIVIL CODE (1889), art. (1514.).
While the records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its
entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the
owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of
co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of
property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners
to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in
common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from
this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall
be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of coownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may
not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by
one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it
entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title
thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not give to

the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide
for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the
redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of
the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on
behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject property
for the amount due her. 17
Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed, for them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the
partition of the estate which represents the share of private respondents in the fruits of
the land. According to petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only.
This assigned error, however raises a factual question. The settled rule is that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review. As a general rule, findings of fact
made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132964

February 18, 2000

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and
the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES seeks the nullification of the 5 March 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals 1which affirmed the dismissal by the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 77, Malolos, Bulacan, of the petition for escheat filed by the Government. 2
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon
Guzman,3 a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American
citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate
consisting of several parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered
by TCT Nos. T-146837 (M), T-146839 (M), T-146840 (M), T-146841 (M), T-146842 (M),
T-120254 (M) and T-120257 (M).
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property
belonging to the estate of Simeon. The document of extrajudicial settlement was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds on 8 December 1971. The taxes due
thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-fact, Attys. Juan L. Austria and Lolita G.
Abela, and the parcels of land were accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers
Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares.

On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and


conveying to her son David her undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of
land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon
Guzman. Since the document appeared not to have been registered, upon advice of
Atty. Lolita G. Abela, Helen executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, on 9
August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim as well as modifying the document
to encompass all her other property in the Philippines. 4
On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he
acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of
Quitclaim executed by Helen on 9 August 1989 and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to
sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1 February 1990 Atty. Lolita G. Abela, upon
instruction of Helen, paid donor's taxes to facilitate the registry of the parcels of land in
the name of David.
On 16 March 1994 a certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor
General and furnished it with documents showing that David's ownership of the one-half
(1/2) of the estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the
Government filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for
Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of David's interest in each of the subject parcels of
land be forfeited in its favor. On 9 August 1994 David Rey Guzman responded with a
prayer that the petition be dismissed.
On 11 July 1995 the trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two (2) deeds of
quitclaim executed by Helen Meyers Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the
ownership of the property subject thereof remained with her.5
The Government appealed6 the dismissal of the petition but the appellate court affirmed
the court a quo.
Petitioner anchors its argument on Art. XII of the Constitution which provides
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the Philippines. The
only instances when a foreigner can acquire private lands in the Philippines are by
hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship. Petitioner therefore contends that the acquisition of the parcels of
land by David does not fall under any of these exceptions. It asserts that David being an
American citizen could not validly acquire one-half (1/2) interest in each of the subject
parcels of land by way of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality
donations inter vivos. It also reasons out that the elements of donation are present in
the conveyance made by Helen in favor of David: first, Helen consented to the
execution of the documents; second, the dispositions were made in public
documents; third, David manifested his acceptance of the donation in the Special Power

of Attorney he executed in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela; fourth, the deeds were executed
with the intention of benefiting David; and lastly, there was a resultant decrease in the
assets or patrimony of Helen, being the donor. Petitioner further argues that the
payment of donor's taxes on the property proved that Helen intended the transfer to be
a gift or donation inter vivos.
David maintains, on the other hand, that he acquired the property by right of accretion
and not by way of donation, with the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helen's
intention to renounce her share in the property and not an intention to donate. He
further argues that, assuming there was indeed a donation, it never took effect since the
Special Power of Attorney he executed does not indicate acceptance of the alleged
donation.
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony
of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an
act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable
property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public document and
that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document.7 In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form,
to be noted in both instruments.8
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant
case. The transfer of the property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen
resulted in the reduction of her patrimony as donor and the consequent increase in the
patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen's intention to perform an act of liberality
in favor of David was not sufficiently established. A perusal of the two (2) deeds of
quitclaim reveals that Helen intended to convey to her son David certain parcels of land
located in the Philippines, and to re-affirm the quitclaim she executed in 1981 which
likewise declared a waiver and renunciation of her rights over the parcels of land. The
language of the deed of quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of
her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of David, and not a donation. That a
donation was far from Helen's mind is further supported by her deposition which
indicated that she was aware that a donation of the parcels of land was not possible
since Philippine law does not allow such an arrangement. 9 She reasoned that if she
really intended to donate something to David it would have been more convenient if she
sold the property and gave him the proceeds therefrom. 10 It appears that foremost in
Helen's mind was the preservation of the Bulacan realty within the bloodline of Simeon
from where they originated, over and above the benefit that would accrue to David by
reason of her renunciation.11 The element of animus donandi therefore was missing.
Likewise, the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen may have been in the nature
of a public document but they lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper
form required by law to make the donation valid. We find no merit in petitioner's
argument that the Special Power of Attorney executed by David in favor of Atty. Lolita G.
Abela manifests his implied acceptance of his mother's alleged donation as a scrutiny of
the document clearly evinces the absence thereof. The Special Power of Attorney
merely acknowledges that David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes
Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no intimation, expressly or impliedly,
that David's acquisition of the parcels of land is by virtue of Helen's possible donation to

him and we cannot look beyond the language of the document to make a contrary
construction as this would be inconsistent with the parol evidence rule. 12
Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a separate public writing the
notice of the acceptance must be noted not only in the document containing the
acceptance but also in the deed of donation. Commenting on Art. 633 of the Civil Code
from whence Art. 74913 came Manresa said: "If the acceptance does not appear in the
same document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is
sufficient if it shows the intention to accept . . . . it is necessary that formal notice thereof
be given to the donor, and the fact that due notice has been given must be noted in both
instruments. Then and only then is the donation perfected. 14
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of donation is recorded
in the registry of property the document that evidences the acceptance if this has not
been made in the deed of gift should also be recorded. And in one or both
documents, as the case may be, the notification of the acceptance as formally made to
the donor or donors should be duly set forth. 15 Where the deed of donation fails to show
the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate
instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in
the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. 16
These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied with, and no
proof of compliance appears in the record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the
conveyance of the parcels of land by Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by
David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special Power of Attorney. Further, the
records reveal no other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notice thereof
to the donor in an authentic manner. It is well-settled that if the notification and notation
are not complied with, the donation is void. Therefore, the provisions of the law not
having been complied with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land by
way of donation inter vivos.17
However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by Helen
in favor of David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already
accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970
dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of them all the property in Simeon's
estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in
her and her son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they
possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and
cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes that
vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon was
made through any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of the
existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen
cannot belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning
her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property from

Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which she executed eleven (11)
years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and effect.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the
parcels of land into res nullius18 to be escheated in favor of the Government. The
repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their
private owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is qualified by hereditary
succession to own the property subject of the litigation.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, dismissing the petition for
escheat is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO
BICOMONG,
et
al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendantappellant.
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.
Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the
only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter
which is purely a legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859
(Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely:
Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio
Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband
Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit
"E"). Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic
(Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in
1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff
Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19,

1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria


Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her
heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome
Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April
14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic,
the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter
Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or
on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the
defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father
Geronimo Almanza.
(Rollo,
pp. 23)
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land
which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38
fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the
N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by
Bernardino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax No.
12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No.
31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo
Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m.
Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and
German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by
Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the
name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of 11,739
sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and
Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino Alma; on the S. by Rosendo
Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by Anacleto
Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of
Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the
name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo,
with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro
Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro;
and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year

1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452, assessed at
P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria,
Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990 sq. m.
Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian
Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River.
Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
(Reco
rd on
Appea
l, pp.
4-6)
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic;
and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio
Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela
Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs
approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they
were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the
expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having
agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again
sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts,
accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the
properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of
the same to the defendants.
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who
are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on
the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and
the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in the
instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena, are hereby required
to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until
the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are
delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this decision
shall have become final.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.

(SGD)
JOSE
G.
BAUTI
STA
Judge
Recor
d on
Appea
l,
p.
47
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute
defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other
defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to
the parcels of land in his possession, that is, those described under Letters D and E in
the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the onehalf undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A,
B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his
possession. 2
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006
and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees
to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He
asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested
defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic,
died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to
Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was
not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the
parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic
died on May 9. 1945. 3
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the
trial court and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question
involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the
appellate court certified this case to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are
applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive
with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in
equal portions."

Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together
with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a
share double that of the latter.
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed
per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for
brothers and sisters of the full blood.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an
issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and
the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with
the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August
31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit
by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters
of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the
nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to
whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of
whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The
only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to
Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole
niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such
distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been
recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402,
June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610).
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa
Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood
citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous
factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here
before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura
Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
[G.R. No. 149751. March 11, 2005]
PURIFICACION
BALILO-MONTERO
and
JOVENCIO BALILO, petitioners,
vs. EUGENIA
SEPTIMO,
CONSUELO
ROBLES
and
PLACIDO
ROBLES, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Jose Balilo was the owner of a parcel of land, with an area of 7.7837 hectares,
located in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, covered by Homestead Patent No. 46784
issued on February 21, 1938. Based on the said patent, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 3014 was issued to and under his name by the Register of Deeds. [1]
On August 12, 1943, Jose Balilo died intestate. [2] Sometime in 1948, Niniana Balilo,
the sister of Jose Balilo, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga,
for the guardianship of the property and the person of Jovencio Balilo whom she alleged
to be the son of her brother, Jose Balilo; hence, her nephew. The case was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 262. Niniana filed a motion in the said case, for authority to
execute, for and in behalf of her ward, a deed of absolute sale over the property
covered by OCT No. 3014 in favor of Jose Septimo for P750.00. The CFI granted the
motion. Niniana executed the deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of Jose
Septimo who, thereafter, declared the property in his name for taxation purposes and
paid the realty taxes thereon.
However, Jose Septimo failed to register the deed in the Office of the Register of
Deeds and, consequently, to secure a torrens title over the property in his name. The
guardianship case was terminated on September 24, 1951 per the Order of the CFI of
even date.[3]
Thereafter, on October 12, 1963, Jovencio Balilo filed a complaint against Jose
Septimo in the CFI of Occidental Mindoro, to compel the latter to resell the property to
him. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-159. Jovencio alleged therein that he
was the only legitimate child of the spouses Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama, and that
the latter died on August 30, 1946. He prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in his favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that an order be issued requiring the Defendant to
resell the said Lot No. 1649, Pls-33, situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, to the herein
Plaintiff upon tender to the herein Defendant the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY (P750.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, or any such sum as this Honorable Court finds just and fair, and
requiring said Defendant to deliver possession of said homestead land to the herein Plaintiff.
Plaintiff further prays for other relief as may be deemed just and proper in the premises.[4]
Jovencio amended the complaint and impleaded Placido Robles as partydefendant, on his claim that the latter purchased a five-hectare portion of the property
before the complaint was filed. On November 8, 1966, the CFI rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint. The CFI ruled that Jovencio had no right to repurchase the
property, the five-year period under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 having
long expired. Jovencio failed to appeal the decision. [5]
On March 3, 1987, Purificacion Balilo-Montero filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, against the respondents,
Eugenia Septimo, the surviving spouse of Jose Septimo, and the spouses Placido
Robles and Consuelo Robles, for recovery of possession of the said property. However,

despite the allegation in his complaint in Civil Case No. R-159 that he was the only
legitimate child of Jose Balilo, she impleaded Jovencio Balilo as party-plaintiff.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the parties were the children and only legal
heirs of the late Jose Balilo who, before his death, was the owner of Lot No. 1649
covered by OCT No. 3014 located in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; only a year before
the complaint was filed, Purificacion learned that she was one of the co-owners of the
property; that the respondents claimed ownership over the property and installed
tenants thereon; and despite their demands, the respondents and their tenants refused
to do so.
Jovencio and Purificacion prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered
in their favor:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered for
the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
1. Restoring possession of the landholdings in question unto the plaintiffs;
2. Ordering defendants to reimburse plaintiffs the rentals on the landholdings to be determined
by this Honorable Court;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit; and
5. Extending unto the plaintiffs such other reliefs to which they may be entitled in law and
equity.[6]
The summons and complaint were served on respondents Eugenia Septimo and
Consuelo Robles. As per the return of the sheriff, Placido Robles was already dead.
In her answer to the complaint, respondent Eugenia Septimo alleged that her late
husband Jose Septimo had purchased the property from Jovencio Balilo, through his
guardian, and that the sale was approved by the CFI of Pampanga in Special
Proceeding No. 262. She specifically denied, for lack of information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof, the allegation of Purificacion Montero that she was one of
Jose Balilos children and one of his heirs. Consuelo Robles was declared in default for
her failure to file her answer to the complaint.[7]
On October 15, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Jovencio and
Purificacion. The fallo of the decision reads:
Premises thoroughly and fairly considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant Eugenia Septimo as successor-in-interest of decedent Jose Septimo to
recovery (sic) to plaintiff Purificacion Balilo-Montero one-half of the parcel of agricultural land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3014;
2. Denying claim for damages; and

3. Dismissing counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Only respondent Eugenia Septimo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA), where she alleged the following:
I. That the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff Purificacion Balilo-Montero did not lost
(sic) her right to recover the property from the defendants, because she was not a party to the sale
and for not having actual knowledge on the guardianship proceedings.
II. That the trial court erred in ruling that the sale of the land by the legal guardian of Jovencio
Balilo duly authorized and approved by the Court which (sic) the guardianship proceedings was
being held did not affect the share of plaintiff Purificacion Balilo-Montero because the sale was
not registered.
III. The trial court erred in ordering defendant Eugenia Septimo to reconvey 1/2 of the property
in question covered by TCT No. T-3014 to plaintiff Purificacion Balilo-Montero.[9]
In a Decision dated April 11, 2001, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court. The CA applied the Old Civil Code on testate succession, and ruled that
the property was registered in the name of Jose Balilo whose civil status was stated as
single. Considering that he was survived by Purificacion Montero, his wife Juana
Villarama and their son Jovencio Balilo when he died in 1943; and when Juana
Villarama died intestate, was, in turn, survived by her son Jovencio Balilo and
Purificacion Montero, Jovencio was entitled to two-thirds undivided portion of the
property, while Purificacion Montero was entitled to one-third undivided portion of the
property. Respondent Eugenia Septimo did not file any motion for the reconsideration of
the decision. However, Purificacion Montero filed a motion for the partial reconsideration
of the decision, alleging that, applying the provisions of the Old Civil Code on intestate
succession, she was entitled to an undivided one-half portion of the property. The CA,
however, denied the said motion.
Purificacion Montero, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review,
contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS
ENTITLED ONLY TO ONE-THIRD (1/3) SHARE OF THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE
RECOVERED HEREIN, SAID ADJUDICATION FINDING NO LEGAL SUPPORT UNDER
THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN WHICH WAS THE LAW THEN PREVAILING.[10]
The petitioner maintains that the CA should have applied the provisions of the Old
Civil Code on intestate succession because Jose Balilo died intestate in 1943 before the
New Civil Code took effect. She posits that she and Jovencio Balilo were entitled to
inherit the property from Jose Balilo in equal shares, because there is no competent
evidence on record to prove that Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama, the mother of
Jovencio, were married.
The petition is granted.

We agree with the contention of the petitioner that there is no evidence on record
that Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama were married, or that they cohabited with each
other as husband and wife. Even Jovencio Balilo opted not to testify. Neither was Jose
Balilo survived by any ascendants. However, we agree with the ruling of the CA that
Jose Balilo and Gertrudes Nicdao were not, likewise, married.
The contention of the petitioner that the CA erred in applying the law on testate
succession under the Old Civil Code is, likewise, correct. The appellate court should
have applied the provisions of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession considering
that Jose Balilo died intestate in 1943, before the effectivity of the New Civil Code.
Article 931 of the Old Civil Code provides that when a person dies intestate, his
legitimate children and their descendants succeed him, without distinction of sex, or
age, even though they spring from different marriages. Article 932 of the same Code
provides that the children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Moreover, under Article 939 of the Old
Civil Code, in the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the natural children
legally acknowledged and those legitimated by royal succession shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.
When Jose Balilo died intestate on August 12, 1943, he was survived by his
daughter, the petitioner herein, his son Jovencio Balilo, and Gertrudes Nicdao and
Juana Villarama. Conformably to Article 939 of the Old Civil Code, only the petitioner
and Jovencio Balilo inherited the property in equal shares, to the exclusion of Juana
Villarama and Gertrudes Nicdao. Neither of them was the lawful wife of Jose Balilo.
Besides, under Article 946 of the Old Civil Code, the surviving spouse shall inherit only
in default of the persons enumerated in the three sections next preceding.
Consequently, when Jovencio Balilo, through his guardian Niniana Balilo, executed
the deed of absolute sale over the entire property on May 26, 1948 in favor of Jose
Septimo, the latter did not acquire title over the entire property, but only to an undivided
one-half portion thereof which Jovencio Balilo had inherited from Jose Balilo. Jose
Septimo could not have purchased and acquired the other half of the property from
Jovencio Balilo because the latter was not the owner thereof. Hence, the CA erred in
holding that Jovencio Balilo inherited an undivided two-thirds portion of the property,
and that Jose Septimo acquired title over the said two-thirds undivided portion.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138774

March 8, 2001

REGINA
FRANCISCO
AND
vs.
AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.
PARDO, J.:

ZENAIDA

PASCUAL, petitioners,

May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father
by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 declaring void the deed of sale of two parcels of land conveyed to petitioners
who are illegitimate children of the deceased to the exclusion of respondent, his sole
legitimate daughter.
The facts2 are:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses
Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his
common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated
in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160.
When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that
the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, 3 Aida inquired about the certificates of title from
her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August
15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale
in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio
executed a "Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two
parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.4
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against
petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. 5 She alleged that the signature of her
late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15,
1983, was a forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation
of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law applicable
thereon, the Court hereby renders judgment:
"a) sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan" (Exh."G")
executed on 15 August 1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco in favor of the
defendants;
"b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-59.585 (Exh. "I")
issued to defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386 (Exh. "H") issued to
defendant Zenaida Pascual; and

"c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants' counterclaim for damages
and attorney's fees for lack of merit." 6
In time7, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals. 8
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
reversing that of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered as follows:
"1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983 (Exhibit "G") is
declared null and void from the beginning and TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59586 (M), both of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) in the
names of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual, respectively, are annulled and
cancelled;
"2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to cancel
the aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59.586 (M) and to reinstate
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-132740 and T-117160 both in the name of
Gregorio Francisco.
"3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual jointly and
solidarily are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso the amount of P5,000.00
as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
"4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of merit.
"Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees."

Hence, this petition.10


The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of
the appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to review of
pure errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all
over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 11
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, 12 unless the
case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule. 13
Petitioner has failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions. 14
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale.
Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and

Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the
property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991. 15
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in
operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and
selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not
withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to
pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank.
Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned
P50.00 a night at the club.16
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a
net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for
P15,000.00.17 She had no other source of income.
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00,
or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the
land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements
as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property
was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a
single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and
hence, null and void.18
Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil
Code19 provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime. The sale
was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family
Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate
daughters20 at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent
respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before
his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to
the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land
involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive

respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate
of her father as his only legitimate child.21
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or
intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be
deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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