RULE 7 TO 9

CHAVEZ V. ENRILE DOCTRINE

Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent
Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged
harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory
counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct
civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.
In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages
claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the petitioner
must be pleaded in the same action as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring,
however, to a case filed by the private respondent against the petitioners or parties in
the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not
against the party plaintiff itself.
To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who
is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the
case would lead to mischievous consequences.
A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics [1980] p. 147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293
[1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty. C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958];
Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm. Case No. 554, Jan.
3, 1969; People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals, 54
SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in
the same case, he is kept busy defending himself.
The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General.1wphi1 As counsel of
the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically charged
cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts
in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General
cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest
and obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a stance which to a
respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise unreasonable to require
Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same
cases they are prosecuting.
As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from
damage suits. However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on
a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party.
Any claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should be filed in an entirely
separate and distinct civil action.

CORTEZ V. CA DOCTRINE
The petition is meritorious. We hold that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to set
aside on August 18, 1970 its decision of November 17, 1969 which had become final

and was in the process of being executed in the lower court to which the record was
remanded after entry of judgment had been made in the Court of Appeals.
The 1969 decision became final and executory as to defendant-appellant Kuy Guam
Kay, Ltd. because its lawyer of record, Atty. Yuseco, was duly served with a copy of that
decision. It is true that Atty. Yuseco returned that copy to the Court with the note that he
was no longer appellants' counsel but that return did not nullify the effectiveness of the
service upon him since he did not retire from the case with his client's consent or with
the Court's authorization (Sec. 2, Rule 13 and Sec. 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court; Don
Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Alvendia, L-39124, November 15,
1974, 61 SCRA 87, 91; Magpayo vs. Court of Appeals and People, L-35966, November
19, 1974, 61 SCRA 115; Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, 112 Phil. 764; Guanzon vs.
Aragon, 107 Phil. 315, 320).
When a party is represented by an attorney, service of orders and notices must be
made upon the latter, and notice to the client and not to his lawyer of record is not a
notice in law (Chairman vs. Tancinco, 90 Phil. 862).
Thus, it was held that, unless the procedure prescribed in section 26 of Rule 138 is
complied with, the attorney of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served
with copies of the judgments, orders and pleadings and who should be held responsible
for the conduct of the case (Fojas vs. Navarro, L-26365, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 476,
485).
"In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a given case, there must
be (1) written application for substitution; (2) a written consent of the client, and
(3) a written consent of the attorney to be substituted. And in case the consent of
the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof that
notice of the motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed
by our rules." Where the procedure for substitution of attorney is not followed, the
attorney who appears to be on record before the filing of the application for substitution
should be regarded as the attorney entitled to be served with all notices and pleadings
and the client is answerable for the shortcomings of this counsel of record. (Ramos vs.
Potenciano, 118 Phil. 1435).
The counsel of record is obligated to protect his clients interest until he is released from
his professional relationship with his client. For its part, the court could recognize no
other representation
on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of
attorney is effected.

JUREIDEINI DOCTRINE:

WE answer these questions in the negative.

1. The matter of attorney's fees, if any, due Attys. Estanislao Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay,
Barin and Ortile from private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini cannot have a standing
higher than the rights of the clients or the parties themselves. Hence, lawyers' rights to fees
from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for
disapproving or otherwise. holding in abeyance

the approval of the compromise agreement, which is otherwise not contrary to law, morals-,
public order or public policy. The lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper
court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court, but said rights
may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement (Jesalva, et al. vs.
Hon. Bautista and Premier Productions, Inc., 105 Phil. 348, 352).
2. With respect to the petition for intervention, We deny the same, not only because the
claim of the intervenor can be properly ventilated before the proper court in a separate
proceeding, but also because it will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the parties litigants in the case at bar.
The compromise agreement hereinabove reproduced is not contrary to law, morals, public
order or public policy, and provides for the full satisfaction of respondent's claim against the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, THE AMICABLE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST 12,
1976 IS